ANDRE L. D AIGLE, VS PP G.R. No.

174181 June 27, 2012 - one-way bearing CSK 20HC5

The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust,
is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[1]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Decision[2] dated March 31,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed
with modification the Decision[3] dated January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL
convicting petitioner Andre L. DAigle of the crime of Estafa. Likewise
assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration[5] thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the
following Information:
That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in
the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from
said Samfit, Phils. for management, care and custody the following
company properties:
a) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00
b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of
computer boxes worth P490,000.00
c) Machine spare parts consisting of
- set of rack and pinion
- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
- pair of meter gears 42 teeth
- set of gears 32 teeth
- gear bith bearing inserted
- 3 SL 20 bearings V plate
- one-way clutch
- 8 of LJ 34 bearings V type
- roller bearing 1 x 0
- 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value
of P12,765.35
d) [Equipment] and raw materials valued at P162,400.00
with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS &
35/100 (P681,665.35)
under the express obligation to use the same for a particular
purpose[,] that is, exclusively for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but
accused far from complying with his obligation with grave abuse of
confidence reposed upon him by his employer, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and
convert the aforesaid corporate properties to his own personal use
and benefit and despite several demands made upon him, accused
refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or account for
the same to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils., represented
by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in the aforesaid sum
of P681,665.35.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial
and trial on the merits.
During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho
(Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a
corporation primarily engaged in the manufacture of underwires for
brassieres. According to him, petitioner was the former managing director of
SPI tasked with the management of the company as well as the management,
care and custody of SPIs personal properties. At the time that he was holding
said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC
Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire
bending machine similar to that being used by SPI.[7]
Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and
responsibilities as SPIs managing director[8] due to alleged conflict of business
interest. Because of this, Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPIs
properties and reviewed its financial statements, vouchers, books of account
and other pertinent records. He also interviewed some of SPIs
employees.[9] These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire
materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine
spare parts, while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner,
went missing and were left unaccounted for.[10] Further investigation revealed
that some of SPIs wire bending machines, computer and electronic boxes were
inside the premises of TAC. This was confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former
employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that TAC copied the wire bending
machines of SPI.[11]
In a letter dated January 14, 1997,[12] SPIs counsel formally demanded upon
petitioner to turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody.
Ignoring the demand, petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI
also filed a replevin case against him for the recovery of the electronic and
computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of the Writ of Replevin,[13] an
electronic box found inside TACs premises was recovered from petitioner
while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated
spare parts for SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and
maintenance of SPIs machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding
with SPI that TAC would support SPIs operation until its business standing
improves. And since petitioner only had a 10% share in SPI, TAC would
fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each so that he
could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would
provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control
panels. However, petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending
machines as he was dismissed by SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case
against it before the Department of Labor and Employment.
Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the
repairs of its machines. While he admitted that SPIs electronic transformer,
computer boxes and motor drives were recovered while in his possession thru a
writ of replevin, he reasoned out that he did not return them to SPI after his
dismissal because he intended to exercise his right of lien over them since he
has properties which were still in the possession of SPI, collectibles amounting
to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary of P80,000.00. Finally, he
denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own benefit.[14]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of
petitioner for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315[15] of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of
petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI, upon demand, the properties
entrusted to his care, custody and management is sufficient evidence of actual
conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision[16] rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D
AIGLE to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusio[n]
temporal as maximum; to indemnify private complainant in the
amount of P191,665.35 and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.[17]

Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision[18] dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioners appeal and
affirmed with modification the trial courts Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna (Branch 93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal
Case No. 0434-SPL, is MODIFIED to the effect that appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is AFFIRMED
in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20] was likewise denied in a
Resolution[21] dated August 17, 2006.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
I Decision did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER-ACCUSED[S] MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF VALID
REASONS/JUSTIFICATION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, (RTC-BRANCH 93,
SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME TIME
MODIFYING THE EXTENT OF THE PENALTY [IMPOSED]
FOR THE CRIME ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.[22]
Our Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the
petitioner vis--vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent),
and in the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the
courts below, this Court finds the instant petition partly meritorious.
Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain
petitioners claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for
Reconsideration without valid reason or justification. The reason for the
appellate courts denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is clear and
simple, that is, after it made a thorough evaluation of the issues and arguments
proffered in the said motion, the CA found that same were already passed upon
and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is very plain from the
contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and justifiable cause.
Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial courts
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a
judgment is not rendered defective just because of the absence of a declaration
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive
portion. The ratio decidendiof the RTC Decision extensively discussed the
guilt of the petitioner and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained
by the courts below. Indeed, petitioners guilt was duly proven by evidence of
the prosecution. In any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states: 1) the legal qualification
of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; 2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or
accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived. We find
that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial courts Decision.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in
affirming the said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon
him since the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of estafa. He argues that Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC
requires that the person charged was given juridical possession of the thing
misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of the things
allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPIs properties was only by
virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on
whose behalf he has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said
properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand
counters that the prosecutions evidence has fully established all the elements of
the crime charged. Based on SPIs records, petitioner received from it various
equipment of SPI on several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing
underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct of an audit in December
1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.[23]
All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a
business transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and
spare parts for the latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the
necessary components to be used in the fabrication as well as the electronic
devices while work would be done at petitioners premises. Pursuant to this,
petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic transformer,
electronic box and a computer box.[24] When petitioner, however, was not able
to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded
for the return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand
and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.[25]
From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the
aforementioned elements is very clear. SPIs properties were received by the
petitioner in trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the
fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a
demand for their return after petitioners alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner
deliberately ignored the same.
The Court cannot agree with petitioners postulation that he did not
acquire juridical possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the same
was only by virtue of his official function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne
out by the records, the equipment subject matter of this case were received in
trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the fabrication of bending
machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them without
any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only physical
possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held
in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:[26]
When the money, goods or any other personal property is received
by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2)
on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both
material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up
even against the owner. x x x
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution
was able to prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or
conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence.[27] The failure to account upon demand, for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.[28]As
mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the properties of SPI
which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioners
own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the
purpose of preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because,
to reiterate, failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the
duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal
use. As correctly noted by the CA:
We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that
SPIs demand for the return of the properties subject of this case
was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no
longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated
from his position on November 19, 1996. This observation,
coupled with SPIs demand for the return of its equipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said
properties and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for
them raises the presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x
x x[29]
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued
at P191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter.
In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the
controversy between him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering
that he was a stockholder of the latter.Such being the case, he avers that his
conviction for estafa has no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the
Court consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate
controversy. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would
support appellants allegation that the acts complained of in this case
were corporate acts. His allegation without more that he had an
agreement with Mr. Bernie Kelly of SPI to the effect that his
(appellants) share in SPI would be increased to 40% in exchange
for two bending machines does not give his act of retaining the
properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no evidence
that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much
less of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellants
actuation should be considered as a corporate act, for which he
claims he could not be held personally liable. x x x[30]
Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said
witnesses to be credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and
credence. The CA for its part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the
same. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest months x x x.[34]
degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[31] Though
jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA
herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the correctly pegged the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years
Court accords deference to the trial courts appreciation of said of reclusion temporal but erred in imposing the minimum term of six (6) years
testimonies. Accordingly, the RTCs finding of petitioners guilt, as affirmed by and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is beyond the lawful range. Thus, the
the CA, is sustained. Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby
The proper imposable penalty sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the temporal as maximum.
RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and
exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same August 17, 2006, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment. correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount
involved which is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, SO ORDERED.
the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision
mayor.[32] [A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.[33] Hence,
sixteen (16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty
of prision mayor. And since same exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum
term should be pegged at twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Applying
now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its maximum to prision
mayor in its minimum is prision correccionalin its minimum to medium
periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be

SHEALA P. MATRIDO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179061 July 13, 2009
Sheala Matrido (petitioner) assails the May 31, 2007 Decision and
August 1, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed
the trial courts Decision of December 13, 2004 convicting her of
qualified theft.
As a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire East
Land Holdings, Inc., petitioner was tasked to collect payments from
buyers of real estate properties such as Laguna Bel-Air developed by
private complainant, issue receipts therefor, and remit the payments to
private complainant in Makati City.
On June 10, 1999, petitioner received amortization payment from one
Amante dela Torre in the amount of P22,470.66 as evidenced by the
owners copy[2] of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted
only P4,470.66 to private complainant as reflected in the treasury
departments copy[3] of Official Receipt No. 36547 submitted to private
complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of petitioner and
reflect a difference of P18,000
On private complainants investigation, petitioner was found to have
failed to remit payments received from its clients, prompting it to file
various complaints, one of which is a Complaint-Affidavit of September
21, 2000[4] for estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2000-I-32381 in the Makati
Prosecutors Office.
In the meantime or in October 2000, petitioner paid private complainant
the total amount of P162,000,[5] drawing private complainant to desist
from pursuing some related complaints. A few other cases including I.S.
No. 2000-I-32381 pushed through, however, since the amount did not
sufficiently cover petitioners admitted liability of P400,000.[6]
By Resolution of November 15, 2000,[7] the City Prosecution Office of
Makati dismissed the Complaint for estafa for insufficiency of evidence
but found probable cause to indict petitioner for qualified theft under an
Information which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of June 1999, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then a Credit and Collection Assistant
employed by complainant, EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS, INC.,
herein represented by Leilani N. Cabuloy, and as such had access to the
payments made by complainants clients, with grave abuse of confidence,
intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the said
complainant company, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P18,000.00 received
from Amante Dela Torre, a buyer of a house and lot being marketed by
complainant company, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the aforementioned amount of P18,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.[9] After trial,
Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, by Decision of
December 13, 2004 which was promulgated on April 28, 2005, convicted
petitioner of qualified theft, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused SHEALA P. MATRIDO is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years[,] five (5) months and ten (10) days.

Accused is further ordered to pay complainant EMPIRE EAST LAND
HOLDINGS, INC., the amount of P18,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]
By the challenged Decision of May 31, 2007,[11] the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision, hence, the present petition which raises
the sole issue of whether the appellate court gravely erred in affirming
the decision of the trial [court] convicting the petitioner of the crime of
qualified theft despite the fact that the prosecution tried to prove during
the trial the crime of estafa thus denying the petitioner the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against her[12]
Petitioner posits that despite her indictment for qualified theft, the
prosecution was trying to prove estafa during trial, thus violating her
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
The petition fails.
In Andaya v. People,[13] the Court expounded on the constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the
accused
x x x As early as the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen, the rationale of this
fundamental right of the accused was already explained in this wise:
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should
be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation
of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be
alleged in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The
allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial
matters and an accuseds right to question his conviction based on facts
not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused
cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information
on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of
a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that
a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced
during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
rights.[14] (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied)
It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the
nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the public
prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is
the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way
aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth.[15]
Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this
case, the Court finds no violation of petitioners rights. The recital of facts
and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of
qualified theft.
As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain
therefrom and without the use of force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons, a personal property consisting of money in the
amount P18,000 belonging to private complainant, without its knowledge
and consent, thereby gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as
credit and collection assistant who had access to payments from private
complainants clients, specifically from one Amante Dela Torre.
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but
without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take the personal property of another without the latters
consent.[16] If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of
theft becomes qualified.[17]
In prcis, the elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as
follows:
1. There was a taking of personal property.
2. The said property belongs to another.
3. The taking was done without the consent of the owner.
4. The taking was done with intent to gain.
5. The taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against person, or force upon things.
6. The taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.[18]
In the present case, both the trial court and the appellate court noted
petitioners testimonial admission of unlawfully taking the fund belonging
to private complainant and of paying a certain sum to exculpate herself
from liability. That the money, taken by petitioner without authority and
consent, belongs to private complainant, and that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor force upon things, there is no issue.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from
the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain.[19]
The taking was also clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. As a
credit and collection assistant of private complainant, petitioner made use
of her position to obtain the amount due to private complainant. As
gathered from the nature of her functions, her position entailed a high
degree of confidence reposed by private complainant as she had been
granted access to funds collectible from clients. Such relation of trust and
confidence was amply established to have been gravely abused when she
failed to remit the entrusted amount of collection to private complainant.
The Court finds no rhyme or reason in petitioners contention that what
the prosecution tried to prove during trial was estafa through
misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC
x x x The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the
thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with
the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
The appellate court correctly explained that conversion of personal
property in the case of an employee having material possession of the
said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom
both material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.[21] Notably,
petitioners belated argument that she was not an employee but an agent
of private complainant[22] grants her no respite in view of her
stipulation[23] during pre-trial and her admission[24] at the witness stand
of the fact of employment. Petitioners reliance on estafa cases involving
factual antecedents of agency transactions is thus misplaced.
That petitioner did not have juridical possession over the amount or, in
other words, she did not have a right over the thing which she may set up
even against private complainant is clear.[25] In fact, petitioner never
asserted any such right, hence, juridical possession was lodged with
private complainant and, therefore, estafa was not committed.
Petitioners view that there could be no element of taking since private
complainant had no actual possession of the money fails. The argument
proceeds from the flawed premise that there could be no theft if the
accused has possession of the property. The taking away of the thing
physically from the offended party is not elemental,[26] as qualified theft
may be committed when the personal property is in the lawful possession
of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony.[27]
A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.[28] The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer.
So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass
to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft,
qualified or otherwise.[29]
x x x When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received
by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission
or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this
case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for
the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is
akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees.[30] (Italics
in the original omitted; underscoring and emphasis supplied)
That the transaction occurred outside the company premises of private
complainant is of no moment, given that not all business deals are
transacted by employees within the confines of an office, and that field
operations do not define an agency. What is of consequence is the nature
of possession by petitioner over the property subject of the unlawful
taking.
On the penalty imposed by the trial court, which was affirmed by the
appellate court ─ indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years,
5 months and 10 days:
The penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than the applicable
penalty for simple theft. The amount stolen in this case was P18,000.00.
In cases of theft, if the value of the personal property stolen is more than
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Two degrees higher than this
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision

mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months.[31] The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender being
present, the maximum penalty shall be the minimum period of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or within the range of 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 20 days.

The Court thus affirms the minimum penalty, but modifies the maximum
penalty imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 31, 2007 and Resolution of August

1, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29593 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the imposed penalty, such that
petitioner, Sheala P. Matrido, is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.