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Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review

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J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-016-3038-5
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review
Benjamin R. Walker1 • Chris J. Jackson1
Received: 25 February 2015 / Accepted: 20 January 2016
Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract While psychopathy research has been growing
for decades, a relatively new area of research is corporate
psychopathy. Corporate psychopaths are simply psy-
chopaths working in organizational settings. They may be
attracted to the financial, power, and status gains available
in senior positions and can cause considerable damage
within these roles from a manipulative interpersonal style
to large-scale fraud. Based upon prior studies, we analyze
psychopathy research pertaining to 23 moral emotions
classified according to functional quality (positive vs.
negative signal) and target (self vs. other). Based upon our
review, we suggest that psychopaths are high in moral
emotions associated with other-directed negative signals,
low in self-directed negative signals, and low in other-
directed positive signals. We found no empirical articles
related to self-directed positive signals. This understanding
of the specific moral emotion deficits of corporate psy-
chopaths provides greater theoretical understanding and
practical implications of knowing which individuals not to
promote, though more research is needed on moral emo-
tions that are faked for manipulative reasons.
Keywords Moral emotions
Emotions
Psychopathy

Corporate psychopathy
Anger
Corporate psychopathy has emerged as a lens to understand
unethical behavior in organizations and has been impli-
cated in, but is different from, bullying (Boddy 2011c),
dysfunctional leadership (Mathieu et al. 2014), and
& Benjamin R. Walker
b.walker@unsw.edu.au
1
School of Management, UNSW Business School, University
of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
workplace deviance (Dunlop and Lee 2004). Psychopathy
is a personality disorder characterized by behavioral,
affective, and interpersonal deficits including shallow
emotions, reduced concern for social norms, and lack of
guilt, remorse, and empathy (Hare 1993). While psy-
chopaths are over-represented in the prison population
(Hare 1996), many psychopaths are non-violent members
of the community (Stout 2005). Corporate psychopaths are
subclinical psychopaths within an organizational setting
(Boddy 2014), and research has suggested that psychopa-
thy can even confer an advantage on individuals seeking
individual rewards within a corporate setting (Ray and Ray
1982), which indicates they can rise to the top of organi-
zations (Boddy 2011d; Chiaburu et al. 2013). While
researchers continue to be interested in corporate psy-
chopathy, a review has yet to be conducted on the influence
of moral emotions on corporate psychopathy and unethical
behavior. According to Haidt’s (2003, p. 276) definition,
moral emotions ‘‘are linked to the interests or welfare
either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than
the judge or agent.’’ We use the 23 moral emotions iden-
tified by Rudolph et al. (2013) to identify overlapping
scholarship related to psychopathy or corporate psy-
chopathy. Our aim is to help create an understanding of
how moral emotions play a role in shaping and under-
standing the unethical behavior of corporate psychopaths.
This review will provide greater theoretical understanding
as well as guidance for practitioners in how to manage
corporate psychopaths.
Psychopathy is present in approximately one percent of
the population (Coid et al. 2009) and is a disorder char-
acterized by disagreeableness, shallow affect, callousness,
a parasitic lifestyle, and lack of conscience (Hare 1993). In
The mask of sanity, Cleckley (1941) initially proposed
psychopathy as a classification for individuals who appear
123

normal but conceal a mental disorder. Cleckley examined
psychiatric patients, and the ‘‘mask’’ refers to the tendency
for psychopaths to initially present as confident, social, and
well-adjusted compared to other patients, but over time
their pathology is revealed. He proposed 16 diagnostic
criteria related to positive adjustment, behavioral deviance,
and emotional-interpersonal deficits.
Fully developed psychopaths, according to Cleckley’s
(1941) definition, are less likely to be successful in cor-
porate settings because they are too deviant and impulsive,
but more recent research suggests that psychopathy is a
spectrum rather than a typology (Vachon et al. 2013), and
research using community samples has found individuals
situated along a psychopathy continuum (Lilienfeld et al.
2014). Corporate psychopaths exhibit subclinical rather
than clinical symptoms with different variations on specific
dimensions of psychopathy (Dutton 2012). While fully
developed psychopaths may have more severe moral
emotion deficits and relatively little attachments to others,
subclinical corporate psychopaths may instead have some
moral emotion deficits and some attachments to others.
While research has traditionally examined psy-
chopaths in institutional settings (e.g., psychiatric facili-
ties and prisons), a growing body of research has
examined psychopaths in community settings including
businesses (Boddy 2011b; De Vries et al. 2012; Holt and
Marques 2012; Stevens et al. 2012; Marshall et al. 2013).
Psychopathy is not necessarily an impediment to corpo-
rate advancement because risk taking, low fear, and lack
of concern for consequences are all associated with
ambition and strong leadership styles (Babiak 1995;
Babiak and Hare 2006; Babiak et al. 2010), such that
corporate psychopaths and other individuals with dark
personalities appear to be able to rise to the top of
organizations (Boddy 2011b; Chiaburu et al. 2013;
Hogan et al. 1990; Singh 2008). Corporate psychopaths
in leadership positions therefore have the potential to
adversely influence the lives of many individuals (Hogan
et al. 1994; Hogan and Kaiser 2005). Moreover, corpo-
rate psychopaths may also engage in fraud and even
resort to violence to prevent fraud discovery, which again
can be very damaging to individuals and the organization
(Perri 2011a, b, 2013; Perri and Brody 2011). These
examples highlight the importance of learning about
psychopathy in the workplace.
Psychopathy is a trait that has evolved in the gene pool,
rather than been selected out of the gene pool, which
suggests that it confers some survival and reproductive
advantages (Krupp et al. 2013). Humans are a social spe-
cies concerned with reputation, so reciprocal altruism is
beneficial for most of the population because cooperation
can increase survival in the long term even if it reduces
opportunities in the short term (Trivers 1971). While
123
B. R. Walker, C. J. Jackson
reciprocal altruism may be beneficial for most, a proportion
of the population may use a ‘‘cheater’’ strategy where they
choose not to reciprocate and therefore choose self-interest
over cooperation (Book and Quinsey 2004; Baughman
et al. 2014; Jonason et al. 2014). A cheater strategy is
frequency dependent. If too many individuals within the
population use a cheater strategy, then the strategy would
not be successful because it is based on others’ anticipation
that goodwill is the natural state of affairs, and they in turn
will receive goodwill. Since a cheater strategy involves
taking advantage of others, psychopaths can act as ‘‘con
artists’’ because of the anticipation of reciprocation (Hare
1996). Potentially beneficial features of psychopathy
include undue acquisition and maintenance of resources as
a result of superficial charm, deception, lack of other-
centered emotions, and a manipulative and parasitic life-
style. Game theory, as demonstrated in the prisoner’s
dilemma, has demonstrated that cheating can be an effec-
tive strategy if the associate does not cheat (Mealey 1995).
From an evolutionary perspective of gaining resources, ‘‘it
can be good to be bad, adaptively speaking’’ (Jonason et al.
2013, p. 574). The cheater strategy can be particularly
useful for psychopaths within a corporate setting for rising
in the corporate hierarchy because it can be associated with
unfairly gaining status and acquiring financial benefits.
Psychopaths have been described as homo economus
(Haidt 2003) because they are focused on gaining rewards
and unconcerned with social consequences including pos-
sible punishment. While others may use aggression as an
emotional reaction, psychopaths are more likely to use
aggression proactively and without emotion. Psychopaths
are higher on instrumental aggression and are less likely to
inhibit violence in response to distress cues (Blair 2001).
Aggression is simply a means to an end to ensure that
psychopaths get what they want (Glenn and Raine 2009).
Corporate psychopaths similarly prioritize self-interest,
which can include destructive consequences such as dis-
ruptions to group functioning (Baysinger et al. 2014).
Previous research and philosophy have emphasized that
morals arise through reasoning and reflection (Kohlberg
1969; Piaget 1965). More recently, emotion has been
identified as an increasingly important component. Since
the 1980s ‘‘affective revolution’’ (Tomkins 1981), some
researchers have suggested that emotion is the primary
component in determining morals (Haidt 2001; Wilson
1993). Moral judgments may be made intuitively, and
reasoning and reflection may be simply a means to justify
the intuitively made judgment. Corporate psychopaths will
generally lack these moral emotions because of their self-
interested concern. Intelligent psychopaths may be able to
articulate what they believe to be the socially appropriate
responses to moral issues, and may be able to fake such
responses but are less likely to feel these emotions.
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review
This review integrates research from corporate psy-
chopathy, moral emotions, and ethics in organizations.
Rudolph et al. (2013) identified 23 moral emotions using the
‘‘affective lexicon’’ (Clore et al. 1987) and research on moral
emotions by Haidt (2003) and Weiner (2006). Rudolph and
Tscharaktschiew (2014) created a 2 9 2 typology that
includes functional quality (positive vs. negative signal) and
target of the moral emotion (self vs. other). For clarity, we
use the terms self or self-directed instead of actor and other
or other-directed instead of observer. Signal refers to whe-
ther the moral emotions is experienced internally by the self
or directed toward another person. Research into moral
emotions continues, and Rudolph and colleagues note that
the list of 23 moral emotions is not intended to be definitive,
but rather a contemporary collection of moral emotions that
has been utilized by one or more researchers. While we
include positive and negative valences (regarding signals) in
this review, we note that this is a simplification and that
emotions are multifarious with different valences in differ-
ent situations (Solomon 2003). We also note that psy-
chopaths sometimes use a cheater strategy (Book and
Quinsey 2004) and moral emotions can potentially be faked
to gain advantage.
Literature Search
We conducted a series of literature reviews using the Web
of Science database to identify literature relevant to each of
the 23 moral emotions identified by Rudolph et al. (2013).
For each moral emotion, we conducted three topic sear-
ches: the relevant moral emotion and ‘‘psychopath,’’ the
relevant moral emotion and ‘‘psychopathy,’’ and the rele-
vant moral emotion and ‘‘psychopathic.’’ We similarly
included different endings to the moral emotion words,
such as ‘‘angry’’ and ‘‘anger.’’ We did not use the asterisk
wildcard search ‘‘psychopath*’’ where any article that
included a word starting with ‘‘psychopath’’ is displayed,
because this incorporates ‘‘psychopathology’’ and would
provide an extensive number of irrelevant results.
Table 1 Rudolph and
Functional quality
Tscharaktschiew’s (2014) 23
moral emotions clustered and Negative signal
classified by functional quality
(positive vs. negative) and Self Guilt, regret, remorse, shame
target of the moral emotion (self Embarrassment
vs. other)
Other Anger, rage, indignation
Contempt, disgust, resentment, scorn
Envy, jealousy
Schadenfreude
Table adapted from Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew (2014) with clustering of moral emotions
We found few articles directly related to corporate
psychopathy but a sufficient number of articles related to
moral emotions and psychopathy generally. Some of the
articles were part of Dark Triad research, which examines
psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism together
(Paulhus and Williams 2002; O’Boyle et al. 2012; Jonason
et al. 2012). This review attempts to extend the broader
literate on psychopathy to corporate psychopathy and so
focuses on psychopathy alone if in the context of Dark
Triad research.
We clustered some of the 23 moral emotions into groups
rather than discussed them independently to simplify the
review and because some moral emotions were utilized in
few psychopathy studies (see Table 1). Rudolph and
Tscharaktschiew (2014) note that some emotions are
qualitatively similar but gradations in intensity or expres-
sed in different contexts and so we clustered the moral
emotions based on general similarity. Guilt, regret,
remorse, and shame are similar moral emotions about
feeling bad about an action, whereas embarrassment con-
cerns feeling self-conscious about an action. Anger, rage,
and indignation are approach moral emotions about getting
back at someone, whereas contempt, disgust, resentment,
and scorn are disparaging moral emotions. Envy and jeal-
ousy concern feelings of inadequacy because of another
person’s perceived better situation. Admiration, awe, ele-
vation, and respect are positive feelings toward another
person because of noteworthy attributes, whereas pity and
sympathy are associated with another person’s misfortune.
Gratitude is a feeling of appreciation following a positive
action of another person. Schadenfreude is delighting in
the misfortune of another person, and pride is positive
enhancement of the self. While we cluster these emotions
for simplicity in the current study, we note the importance
of studying discrete emotions and that each emotion con-
tains particular appraisal process (Solomon 1993; Gooty
et al. 2009). We now discuss clusters of the 23 moral
emotions grouped within Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew’s
(2014) 2 9 2 typology of functional quality (positive vs.
negative signal) and target (self vs. other) and discuss their
Positive signal
Pride
Admiration, awe, elevation, respect
Pity, sympathy
Gratitude
123

relation to psychopathy and corporate psychopathy. See
Table 2 for a summary of the results.
Self-directed Negative Signals
Guilt, Regret, Remorse, and Shame
Guilt is a ‘‘self-conscious’’ moral emotion that is inter-
personal and experienced subsequent to a transgression
(Haidt 2003). One of Cleckley’s (1941) 16 diagnostic cri-
terions is ‘‘lack of remorse or shame’’ and a key part of the
affective component of Hare’s (1991) Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) is lack of remorse or guilt.
Reduced guilt is one of the features of psychopathy
because psychopaths are unconcerned with the conse-
quences of their actions (Thompson et al. 2014), so we
expect research to show reduced guilt in corporate
psychopaths.
Two review articles examined psychopathy and corpo-
rate crime and suggested reduced guilt is a key feature of
corporate crime (Pardue et al. 2013a, b). Many other
studies examined guilt in psychopaths. A study directly
examined guilt and psychopathy in offenders and found
psychopaths attributed less blame to themselves and had
reduced guilt (Johnsson et al. 2014). Another study found
psychopaths and non-psychopathic controls could make
effective attributions of happiness, sadness, and embar-
rassment, but that psychopaths had difficulty attributing
guilt. The authors infer that psychopaths experience hap-
piness, sadness, and embarrassment but less guilt (Blair
et al. 1995). One review also associates reduced guilt in
psychopathy with instrumental aggression and suggests
evolutionary reasons for psychopathy as an alternative life
strategy that benefits themselves (Glenn and Raine 2009),
while another suggests low guilt is a key feature of anti-
social behavior (Baumeister and Lobbestael 2011).
Regret pertains to intrapersonal faults as opposed to
guilt which relates to harm to others (Rudolph and
Tscharaktschiew 2014). Reduced regret also appears to be
a key feature of psychopathy. Using a simulated gambling
task, psychopathic incarcerated offenders displayed less
regret than control participants (Hughes et al. 2014).
Lack of remorse is a key feature of psychopathy (Hare
1994), so we would expect corporate psychopaths to be low
on the ‘‘self-conscious’’ moral emotion of remorse. One
review article notes the therapeutic challenge for rehabili-
tating individuals who lack remorse, because it reduces
desire to change (Thompson et al. 2014). A case study
example of a corporate psychopath with low remorse is a
director of an international non-profit organization who
hired a professor to secure a grant, but once the grant was
established fired the professor with no sense of remorse for
123
B. R. Walker, C. J. Jackson
using him (Cangemi and Pfohl 2009). An examination of
11 case studies of severely psychopathic offenders found
most lacked remorse but overall were a heterogeneous
group that experienced some psychological pain (Gull-
haugen and Nøttestad 2011). A study found psychopathic
alcoholics lacked remorse (Walsh 1999). A review sug-
gested less remorse in psychopaths is associated with
higher instrumental aggression (Glenn and Raine 2009).
Another author notes that while psychopaths have low
remorse, they still have moral responsibility (Glannon
2008).
Psychopaths appear to be low on shame because of their
low concern for social conventions. A study of adolescent
boys in juvenile facilities founder higher scores in an
adolescent measure of psychopathy predicted lower shame
(Holmqvist 2008). A study found differences in shame
when dividing psychopaths into primary and secondary
psychopaths (Blackburn 1975, 1996): Primary psychopaths
had higher social rank than secondary psychopaths and
were lower in shame and anger (Morrison and Gilbert
2001). Another study found both primary and secondary
psychopathy included externalizing shame coping and a
negative relationship with adaptive shame coping, but
primary psychopathy had a negative relationship with
internalizing shame coping, and secondary psychopathy
had a positive relationship with internalizing shame coping
(Campbell and Elison 2005). A study found higher psy-
chopathy-related personality traits related to higher
unconscious and externalized shame management strate-
gies (Nystrom and Mikkelsen 2013). A review article
agreed with the Millon and Davis (1998) suggestion that a
psychopath’s explosive anger could be triggered by feel-
ings of shame and humiliation, and argued for a re-exam-
ination of Hare’s (1993) link between psychopathic
insensitivity and humiliation. Another study of risky sexual
behavior and psychopathy traits in college women found
no association with shame (Fulton et al. 2014). Overall, we
expected to find psychopaths to be lower in shame, but
instead we found mixed results, with differences between
primary and secondary psychopathy, and one study finding
no relation. Primary psychopathy may be more related to
corporate psychopathy because primary psychopaths are
more in control of themselves (less impulsive) and more
social or at least more adept at disguising their antisocial
tendencies (Levenson 1992, 1993). We note that
researchers differ in their definitions of primary and sec-
ondary psychopathy and etiological evidence is still limited
(Waldman and Rhee 2006). Further research is necessary to
examine the role of shame and corporate psychopathy.
One issue that might confuse results reported in studies
is faking. In a case study, a corporate psychopath alternated
between bullying behavior and begging for forgiveness
(Babiak 1995); begging for forgiveness is normally elicited
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review

Table 2 Summary of results and literature relating to Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew’s (2014) 23 moral emotions
Moral emotion Key finding Literature

Self-directed negative signals

Guilt Psychopaths are low on guilt Pardue et al. (2013a, b), Johnsson et al. (2014), Blair et al.
(1995), Glenn and Raine (2009), Baumeister and
Lobbestael (2011)
Regret Psychopaths are low in regret Hughes et al. (2014)
Remorse Psychopaths are low on remorse Thompson et al. (2014), Cangemi and Pfohl (2009),
Gullhaugen and Nøttestad (2011), Walsh (1999), Glenn and
Raine (2009), Glannon (2008)
Shame Psychopaths are generally low on shame, but some mixed Holmqvist (2008), Morrison and Gilbert (2001), Campbell
results. Secondary psychopaths are higher in shame than and Elison (2005), Nystrom and Mikkelsen (2013), Millon
primary psychopaths. Another study found no relation with and Davis (1998), Fulton et al. (2014)
shame
Embarrassment Psychopaths are low on embarrassment Angrilli et al. (2013), Blair et al. (1995)
Self-directed positive signals
Pride No empirical literature on psychopathy and pride. A review Theoretical article: Walker and Bright (2009)
article suggested psychopaths and other may use aggression
to restore pride
Other-directed negative signals
Anger Psychopaths are high in anger Many studies including: Decuyper et al. (2009), Morrison
and Gilbert (2001), Blackburn and Leeevans (1985),
Bowen et al. (2014), Reidy et al. (2008, 2013a, b),
LeBreton et al. (2013), Angrilli et al. (2013)
Rage A case study found a corporate psychopath exhibited rage. Babiak (1995)
Theoretical articles suggest psychopaths may be low on Theoretical articles: Weinshenker and Siegel (2002),
rage and that their aggression is predatory rather than Declercq and Audenaert (2011), Dutton et al. (2013)
arising from affective rage
Indignation No literature on psychopaths and felt indignation. One study Book and Quinsey (2004)
found psychopaths use displays of indignation as a cheater
life strategy to gain resources
Disgust No literature on psychopathy and socio-moral disgust, but Many studies including: Bowen et al. (2014), Seidel et al.
many studies show psychopaths are low on general disgust (2013), Marsh and Cardinale (2012, 2014)
Resentment Psychopaths are high in resentment Blackburn and Fawcett (1999), Brody and Rosenfeld (2002)
Envy Psychopaths are high in schadenfreude which is correlated James et al. (2014), Porter et al. (2014)
with envy
Jealousy Two studies found non-significant results for psychopathy Costa and Babcock (2008), Meehan et al. (2001)
and jealousy
Rage No empirical literature on psychopathy and rage. Theoretical Theoretical articles: Weinshenker and Siegel (2002),
articles suggest psychopaths may be low on rage and that Declercq and Audenaert (2011), Dutton et al. (2013)
their aggression is predatory rather than arising from
affective rage
Schadenfreude Psychopaths are high in schadenfreude James et al. (2014), Porter et al. (2014)
Other-directed positive signals
Pity One study found organizational constraints increased as Boddy (2011a)
corporate psychopathy increased, which may be due to low
pity for employees in corporate psychopaths
Sympathy Large literature on psychopathy and empathy, but no studies Marsh and Ambady (2007)
directly examining psychopathy and sympathy. One study
found fear and sadness priming predicted greater sympathy
and interpreted the results as relevant because psychopaths
have low fear
Admiration No literature on psychopathy and admiration for others. Back et al. (2013), Foulkes et al. (2014), Kansi (2003)
Literature shows psychopaths enjoy admiration from others

123

by guilt, but in this case, the corporate psychopath may be
using this behavior to reduce potential consequences. In
another case study, a corporate psychopath lied and
manipulated others but then would apologize, which is an
action tendency of regret, because the apology would aid in
manipulating others (Cangemi and Pfohl 2009). In these
cases, we think psychopaths are likely to be faking moral
emotions with the aim of escaping detection or as a way of
engaging in further manipulation.
Embarrassment
Embarrassment is a ‘‘self-conscious emotion’’ and serves
an appeasement function after transgressing a social norm
(Keltner and Haidt 1999). We predict that corporate psy-
chopaths would be low on embarrassment because they
neither care about social norms nor appeasement. A non-
psychopath would be embarrassed to give a presentation to
senior people in their organization without preparation, but
a psychopath would feel no embarrassment about a poor-
quality presentation to senior managers. Since a psy-
chopath is concerned with social status and projection of
success, we also think a psychopath is likely to aim to
avoid presenting a poor-quality presentation to senior
managers.
A case study of a serial killer found low recognition of
embarrassment (Angrilli et al. 2013). Another study of
psychopathic and non-psychopathic incarcerated controls
did not find a difference in embarrassment attributions
using vignettes, but this study included a low sample size
of 25 participants in each condition (Blair et al. 1995). As
few studies have been conducted on psychopathy and
embarrassment and none on corporate psychopathy, we
think the link between low embarrassment and psychopa-
thy requires further research.
Other-Directed Negative Signals
Anger, Rage, and Indignation
We predict that corporate psychopaths are likely to be high
in anger, indignation, and rage. Anger (and the related
moral emotions of indignation and rage) is unique because
the signal is negative, but it facilitates an approach rather
than avoidance action tendency (Marsh et al. 2005). Psy-
chopaths may also fake anger to serve a purpose. We note
that real versus fake anger is difficult to detect except that
there may be no emotional escalation or decline in a person
who is faking anger.
A case study example of anger is a corporate psychopath
who engaged in verbal tirades during staff meetings
(Babiak 1995), though these incidents may have been
123
B. R. Walker, C. J. Jackson
faked. A meta-analysis found psychopathy was positively
associated with scores on the angry–hostility dimension
(Decuyper et al. 2009). Classifying psychopaths into pri-
mary psychopaths, with better social competence, and
secondary psychopaths, who are moody and have lower
self-esteem (Blackburn 1975), a study found primary psy-
chopaths to be higher in social rank and lower in anger than
secondary psychopaths (Morrison and Gilbert 2001). A
study found psychopaths were higher in anger than controls
and more likely to interpret a provocation as an attack;
secondary psychopaths experienced higher anger arousal
than primary psychopaths (Blackburn and Leeevans 1985).
Offenders show reduced recognition of anger at low
levels, but increased recognition of anger in others at high
levels and offense severity predicted the differences
(Bowen et al. 2014). Another study found that interpersonal
and affective psychopathy had a negative relationship with
anger activation after interpersonal conflict; lifestyle and
antisocial psychopathy had a positive relationship with
anger activation related to interpersonal conflict (Reidy
et al. 2013b). Lifestyle and antisocial psychopathy had a
heightened experience to anger in a lexical decision task
(Reidy et al. 2008). A study found anger was associated
with psychopathy and this predicted hostile attitudes
toward women in single men (LeBreton et al. 2013). A case
study of a serial killer found low recognition of anger
(Angrilli et al. 2013).
We also examined rage, which is similar to anger, but
with higher intensity (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew 2014).
In a case study, a corporate psychopath exhibited rage
when his secretary displayed insufficient respect for him
and demanded to his superior that she be fired (Babiak
1995). A theoretical article suggests psychopaths would be
low on rage and that their aggression is more likely to be a
predatory attack than affective defense (Weinshenker and
Siegel 2002). A theoretical article on mass murderers
suggested they were cold-blooded predatory murders rather
than acting in rage (Declercq and Audenaert 2011). A
theoretical article on mass shooters suggested paranoid
delusions as a cause rather than rage (Dutton et al. 2013).
These articles provide an interesting perspective that the
aggression of psychopaths may be predatory as opposed to
influenced by rage.
No studies examined corporate psychopathy and felt
indignation. One study found support for psychopaths using
a cheater evolutionary strategy with displays of indignation,
which is faking indignation to provide a perception they have
been wronged (Book and Quinsey 2004). As indignation is
similar to rage and anger but with lower intensity, this study
may support the notion that psychopaths also fake rage and
anger to achieve their objectives.
This research provides evidence of a relationship
between psychopathy, anger, rage, and indignation. The
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review
relationships are not clear though, because psychopaths are
also adept at manipulation and use emotional strategies to
gain advantage over others. Further research is needed on
the specific relations between simulated and non-simulated
anger, rage, and indignation in corporate psychopaths.
Contempt, Disgust, Resentment, and Scorn
We have clustered contempt, disgust, resentment, and
scorn because they all relate to a disparaging, negative
signal toward another person. We predict that corporate
psychopaths would be higher than non-psychopaths on
these indicators. The relationship may be partly related to
psychopathy’s overlap with narcissism in the Dark Triad,
and narcissists’ sense of entitlement. No literature was
found regarding psychopathy, contempt, and scorn.
Psychopaths were found to be higher in resentment than
individuals with a mental illness or healthy controls in the
validation measure of the Antisocial Personality Ques-
tionnaire, which includes resentment as one of its factors
(Blackburn and Fawcett 1999). A study of criminal men on
probation found psychopathy related to resentment (Brody
and Rosenfeld 2002). This limited evidence suggests that
psychopaths are high in resentment.
No evidence in the literature was found concerning psy-
chopathy and disgust in a socio-moral sense, such as when
observing degrading behavior (e.g., fawning and betrayal) of
others (Rozin et al. 1999). However, several studies report
that psychopaths have low general disgust, which may be
indicative of a lack of concern for transgressions. In a sample
of young offenders, high scores on the Youth Psychopathy
Inventory (Andershed et al. 2001) were inversely correlated
with recognition of low intensity disgust faces in a facial
emotion recognition task (Bowen et al. 2014). A study of
violent offenders with psychopathy found reduced emotion
recognition for bodily disgust (Seidel et al. 2013). In con-
trast, one study found no relation between psychopathy and
bodily disgust (e.g., Marsh and Cardinale 2012, 2014).
Further research is necessary regarding corporate psy-
chopathy, contempt, and scorn. Although limited evidence
suggests that psychopaths are high in resentment and have
low levels of disgust, we again urge further research.
Envy and Jealousy
Envy can emerge because of the positive outcomes of another
person (Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew 2014). We thought
that corporate psychopaths may feel envy toward, for exam-
ple, a person with a high status job. Alternatively, psy-
chopaths may actively engage in behavior to gain the job, but
not necessarily spend time feeling envious regarding the job.
We found no articles that directly examine envy and
corporate psychopathy, but two articles indirectly examine
psychopathy and envy, because of its relation with
schadenfreude. Another person’s misfortune will elicit
either sympathy or schadenfreude depending on the person’s
empathy (Heider 1958), and the emotional response is more
likely to be schadenfreude because of psychopaths’ lack of
empathy. One article found envy was correlated with
schadenfreude, which in turn was associated with psy-
chopathy (James et al. 2014). Another article found a relation
between schadenfreude and psychopathy and mentioned
envy as a related construct (Porter et al. 2014). These two
articles suggest envy is experienced by psychopaths, and we
would expect these results to extend to the workplace.
Few studies exist on psychopathy and jealousy, and the few
studies we identified did not find significant associations. One
study that incorporated psychopathy did not find differences in
jealousy related to their wives’ behavior between intimate
partner abusers, distressed/non-violent men, and satisfied/non-
violent men (Costa and Babcock 2008). Another marital
interaction study examined several constructs including psy-
chopathy and jealousy but found no association between
psychopathy and jealousy (Meehan et al. 2001). Another study
examined male batterers with and without psychopathy, but
did not find a difference and suggests the difference may be
due to other reasons such as jealousy, which was not examined
(Echeburua and Fernandez-Montalvo 2007).
We found limited literature on psychopathy, envy, and
jealousy with mixed results. A possible reason for the lack
of associations between psychopathy and matrimonial
jealousy may be their general indifference toward others
including their partner and their partner’s behavior. Further
research needs to be conducted to determine relations
between jealousy and corporate psychopathy. Potentially,
studies need to be conducted that include moderating
variables. One potential moderator is threat to existing
resources, and another potential moderator is threat to
future resources. We expect threat to activate jealousy in
psychopaths, whereas lack of threat would not be associ-
ated with jealousy.
Schadenfreude
Schadenfreude is an ‘‘other condemning’’ malicious plea-
sure regarding the misfortune of others, which includes the
downfall of people with undeserved status (Haidt 2003).
Schadenfreude is more likely to be shared when the target is
a CEO (high status) than an employee (low status) and when
the misconduct severity is low (Dasborough and Harvey
2016). We expect corporate psychopaths would experience
schadenfreude because it is a self-interested emotion.
Schadenfreude may be less likely to be faked because there
may be less advantage to faking than other emotions.
Two articles on the Dark Triad of psychopathy, Machi-
avellianism, and narcissism examined schadenfreude. A
123

survey of the Dark Triad in the general population found
participants who were higher in psychopathy self-reported
higher delight in the misfortune of others (James et al. 2014).
Another study used vignettes of an unfortunate event and
found participants in the general population who were higher
in psychopathy had higher self-reported schadenfreude and
higher smile intensity at the unfortunate event (Porter et al.
2014). These articles on psychopathy support the relation-
ship between psychopathy and schadenfreude, and we would
expect the relationship to extend to corporate psychopathy.
Self-directed Positive Signals
Pride
Pride provides positive self-evaluation with the self-di-
rected signal ‘‘I can go on like that’’ (Rudolph and
Tscharaktschiew 2014). We did not find any empirical
research related to psychopathy and pride. A review article
examining self-esteem and violence, which included an
examination of psychopathy, suggested violence may be a
‘‘macho’’ response to threat that restores pride (Walker and
Bright 2009). Corporate psychopaths may have this form of
pride that uses aggression against threats.
Other-Directed Positive Signals
Admiration, Awe, Elevation, and Respect
Admiration is an ‘‘other-praising’’ emotion, and we predict
corporate psychopaths are unlikely to admire others
because it is contrary to their self-interest. We found no
literature related to admiration as a moral emotion in
psychopathic individuals themselves. We also found no
literature related to awe, elevation, and respect. Three
articles found an association between psychopathy and the
social reward of admiration of self by others (Foulkes et al.
2014; Back et al. 2013; Kansi 2003), possibly because of
the relationship between psychopathy and narcissism
(Paulhus and Williams 2002). This literature suggests
corporate psychopaths may value admiration of self by
others to achieve favorable social comparisons. The desire
to achieve favorable social comparisons is associated with
performance goal orientation, which concerns the belief
that positive feedback from others drives performance
improvement (VandeWalle 2003) and may be associated
with social anxiety (Jackson 2009; White and Depue 1999).
Further research is needed regarding admiration and cor-
porate psychopathy to determine whether corporate psy-
chopaths lack admiration for others, but overall this
research appears to support the view that admiration of self
123
B. R. Walker, C. J. Jackson
by others is valued by psychopaths because of psychopa-
thy’s relation to narcissism.
Pity and Sympathy
Pity is an ‘‘other-suffering’’ moral emotion. We do not
expect that corporate psychopaths would experience pity or
any of the ‘‘other-suffering’’ emotions because it is related
to lack of empathy, which is a key feature of psychopathy
(Blair 2005). For example, we would not expect a corpo-
rate psychopath to have pity on a poor performer in a
workplace and provide them feedback for assistance rather
than terminating them. One study found that as corporate
psychopathy increases, organizational constraints increase
(Boddy 2011a); examples of organizational constraints
include lack of training, incorrect instructions, and poor
internal communications. While not tested, the corporate
psychopath’s reduced pity for employees may be impli-
cated in these organizational constraints.
Lack of empathy is a key feature of psychopathy, so we
would expect corporate psychopaths to be low in the ‘‘other-
suffering’’ moral emotion of sympathy. Cleckley (1941)
alluded to lack of empathy in his diagnostic criterions of
‘‘pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love’’ and
‘‘unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations’’. Hare
(1991) specifically referred to empathy in the PCL-R in the
affective component regarding ‘‘callousness/lack of empa-
thy‘‘. We found many studies include lack of empathy but
almost no studies examine sympathy. One study did not
examine psychopathy but related the results to psychopathy
because impaired ability to feel and recognize fear is related
to reduced sympathy and has behavioral consequences.
Study 1 found participants who viewed fear and sadness
expressions exhibited greater sympathy and willingness to
assist; Study 2 found participants who were fear primed
exhibited greater sympathy when reading a vignette of mild
distress (Marsh and Ambady 2007).
The literature on sympathy, empathy, pity, and compas-
sion is convoluted, with the words sometimes used as syn-
onyms and sometimes used with very different definitions
(Haidt 2003). If empathy is defined as a congruent emotional
response arising from another individual’s emotional state
(Eisenberg et al. 1991; Haidt 2003), then empathy does not
constitute a discrete emotion, but rather a response to feel
any emotion the other is feeling, including joy and boredom.
Nevertheless, psychopaths have a fundamental difficulty in
perspective taking, so corporate psychopaths are likely to be
low on this moral emotion using any definition.
Gratitude
A feature of psychopathy is a parasitic lifestyle in which
psychopaths take without reciprocity (Jones 2014).
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review
Gratitude is an ‘‘other-praising’’ moral emotion that has the
function of promoting prosocial action toward the bene-
factor as well as civic behavior (Haidt 2003). We expect
that corporate psychopaths are unlikely to experience
gratitude because their behavior suggests self-interested
rather than social behavior even when they are the bene-
ficiary of prosocial action. We suspect however that psy-
chopaths might fake gratitude as a result of a desire to
charm others. No literature was identified for psychopathy
and gratitude. Future research will need to determine if the
cheater behavior of corporate psychopaths is indicative of a
lack of gratitude.
Discussion
In this review article, we examined corporate psychopathy in
relation to the 23 moral emotions identified by Rudolph
et al. (2013). We utilized Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew’s
(2014) 2 9 2 typology and organized the moral emotions in
terms of functional quality (positive vs. negative signal) and
target (self vs. other). We clustered the moral emotions into
groups because limited literature on psychopathy was found
with some of these emotions. The purpose of our review was
to provide theoretical detail on the specific deficits of moral
emotions and to provide practitioners with details on the
likely moral emotion deficits in corporate psychopaths.
In general, we found very few corporate psychopathy
articles related to moral emotions, but we think articles on
general psychopathy are nevertheless relevant. Corporate
psychopaths are adept at gaining an advantage in organi-
zations (Ray and Ray 1982) and can manipulate their way
to the top of the organizational hierarchy (Chiaburu et al.
2013). This review therefore provides theoretical insight
into the specific moral emotion deficits of corporate psy-
chopaths that may be associated with this success. This
theoretical development can also be useful for practitioners
who struggle with corporate psychopaths. Corporate psy-
chopaths can be initially charming, so organizations may
be unclear they are hiring a corporate psychopath until
considerable damage has been inflicted (Babiak and Hare
2006) both at the individual level (e.g., poor personnel
management) and at the corporate level (e.g., directionless
leadership or misuse of resources; Boddy et al. 2015),
because even if they are able to attain leadership positions,
their leadership abilities are usually associated with poor
outcomes (Mathieu et al. 2015; Jackson and Walker 2015).
While we expect corporate psychopaths to be similar to
general psychopaths in how they are influenced by moral
emotions, research may identify differences given that
corporate psychopaths may be smarter, have more social
skills, and be less prone to aggression than general
psychopaths.
We found broad support for deficits in most of the moral
emotions. Psychopaths are intrinsically self-interested so
are unlikely to feel emotions in support of others. They
appear to be comfortable directing negative emotions
toward others but are less likely to direct positive emotions
toward others or experience negative emotions directed
toward themselves. Corporate psychopaths are subclinical
but likely have deficits in these same moral emotions.
Moral emotion deficits potentially confer advantages on
individuals to reap themselves business rewards such as
money and status. However, these same rewards are unli-
kely to confer an advantage on the organization or the
broader society, and of course many corporate psychopaths
are caught and punished for their behavior. Their short-
term self-interested focus sometimes, but not always, has
long term negative consequences.
We raise an interesting issue regarding corporate psy-
chopaths that is relatively unexplored in the literature. One
study found that psychopaths expressed indignation as a
mechanism to manipulate people (Book and Quinsey
2004). In other words, psychopaths use a cheater strategy
to maximize individual gain and this may include manip-
ulating others’ emotions. We suggest that the difference
between felt emotions and expressed emotions could be
researched more clearly in corporate psychopaths who may
use emotional displays for gain. In the 2 9 2 typology of
Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew (2014), some negative
emotions directed toward others (anger, rage, indignation,
contempt, disgust, resentment, and scorn) may have the
effect of changing a person’s behavior because these
expressed emotions signal to the other person that they
have behaved inappropriately. When a psychopath simu-
lates these emotions, the other person may believe they
have behaved inappropriately, even if their behavior was
suitable, and change their behavior in the direction suited
by the corporate psychopath. Delineating when these
emotions are expressed or felt, and when they are faked, is
necessary for future research.
Psychopaths appear unlikely to experience negative
emotions directed toward themselves (guilt, regret,
remorse, shame, and embarrassment). The limited research
in this area suggests that psychopaths do not feel these self-
directed negative emotions, because psychopaths are gen-
erally unconcerned what other people think of them, apart
from individuals who have access to desired resources and
capabilities. We note, though, that corporate psychopaths
may also express but not feel these emotions to gain
advantage. For example, when caught stealing company
funds, an expression of remorse may encourage the com-
pany to deal with the matter internally rather than seek
police intervention. We found no empirical evidence of
self-directed positive signals, although a theoretical article
suggested that psychopaths may have some pride and that a
123

violent response to threat may be an attempt to restore
pride.
As expected, our literature review found minimal evi-
dence that corporate psychopaths feel any other-directed
positive signals (admiration, awe, elevation, respect, pity,
sympathy, gratitude). Psychopaths are concerned with
themselves and unconcerned with the attributes of others.
A corporate psychopath may use these emotional tools for
flattery, which is one-way corporate psychopaths may rise
the corporate ladder. While no evidence discerns that
psychopaths feel admiration, we found that psychopaths
value admiration from others, which is possibly related to
the association between psychopathy and narcissism. In
terms of other-directed negative signals, we found an
association between psychopathy and schadenfreude,
which is similar to the understanding of psychopaths as
bullies and delighting in the misfortune of others, whether
caused by them or not. We found mixed results for jealousy
and envy. Psychopaths may care about blocked resources,
but in terms of a partner, they may be unconcerned about
the behavior of their partner. Faked schadenfreude, jeal-
ousy, and envy may be less useful to psychopaths.
Our key findings of the specific moral emotion deficits
provide further understanding of the functioning of cor-
porate psychopaths. Psychopaths differ from individuals
with Anti-Social Personality Disorder, although the litera-
ture often conflates the two, because individuals with Anti-
Social Personality Disorder have some moral emotions and
make some basic moral decisions. In contrast, psychopaths’
lack of moral emotions indicates they are incapable of
moral decision-making. They engage in heinous crimes
simply because no behavior is inherently right or wrong.
Psychopaths may be aware of social norms of right and
wrong, but they do not care (Cima et al. 2010), because the
understanding does not stem from moral emotions. Any
behavior is simply a means to gaining their desires. For
example, they are unconcerned if their corporate fraud
steals many client’s life savings and renders them destitute.
They are unconcerned if their hostile interpersonal behav-
ior renders people unable to continue work in that
environment.
Our findings also show how psychopaths differ from
people with other mental disorders. In contrast to people
who are psychotic, psychopaths have rational decision-
making processes. Psychotic individuals hear voices, have
hallucinations, and perceive an altered sense of reality,
whereas psychopaths understand reality but have deficits in
moral emotions that in turn effect their decision-making
and behavior. Regarding the individuals themselves, it is
difficult to know how to treat psychopaths because most
therapeutic interventions have failed (Reidy et al. 2013a).
From an organizational perspective, prevention is better
than cure. In other words, organizations need to minimize
123
B. R. Walker, C. J. Jackson
the number of psychopaths who enter the organization and
who are promoted within the organization.
Practical Implications
One of the key findings of our review is that psychopaths
tend to be high in other-directed negative emotions and low
in self-directed negative emotions. In other words, they
may be frequently giving signals to others to change their
behavior but rarely be changing their own behavior. If a
consistent pattern of this behavior is observed in an orga-
nization, then organizations should be wary of promoting
this person to upper levels of management. The problem of
promoting this person to senior management is that cor-
porate psychopaths potentially create an extreme work-
place environment (Boddy et al. 2015). This can include
not only the individual-level problems such as abusive
supervision but also the corporate-level problems such as
large-scale fraud that leads to corporate collapse. Unfor-
tunately, moral emotion deficits may be difficult to detect
in initial employment interviews, though measures have
been devised to assess corporate psychopathy (Mathieu
et al. 2013) and toxic leadership behavior (Hogan and
Kaiser 2005). Staff surveys that include feedback from
colleagues and subordinates can assist in determining who
to promote. Organizations should investigate before pro-
moting someone for whom there is a large disparity
between a person’s self-ratings and colleague and subor-
dinate ratings of that person (Furnham 2015).
Methodological Comment
These studies include the strength of using several
methodologies. These include self-report questionnaires,
vignette studies, an examination of facial expressions, and
attributions of these emotions in others. Nevertheless, these
studies also contain some methodological limitations.
Many of the studies contain small samples sizes when
comparing psychopaths and non-psychopaths. Other stud-
ies are case studies that provide detailed analysis, but
future studies need larger sample sizes to determine the
generalizability of the findings. Almost no studies use
longitudinal studies or a causal chain of experiments.
Future studies could use several methodologies. To deter-
mine causality between corporate psychopathy and moral
emotions, studies need either longitudinal experimental
studies (Maxwell and Cole 2007) or a sequence of related
experiments (Spencer et al. 2005). A possible methodology
to include in corporate psychopathy studies is 360° feed-
back, which is multi-source feedback from supervisors,
colleagues, and subordinates. As mentioned already, we
think a major issue in the study of psychopathy and moral
emotions concerns faking, and we urge the design of new
Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review
methodologies to investigate when and how corporate
psychopaths fake moral emotions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our review found few studies specifically on
moral emotions and corporate psychopathy. Using Rudolph
and Tscharaktschiew’s (2014) 2 9 2 typology, we found
psychopaths to be high in moral emotions associated with
other-directed negative signals, low in moral emotions
associated with self-directed negative signals, and low in
moral emotions associated with other-directed positive
signals. We found no empirical articles related to psy-
chopathy and self-directed positive signals. This article
contributes theoretically to the literature by providing
greater depth in terms of the knowledge of corporate psy-
chopaths and moral emotions, and the review may assist
practitioners. Psychopaths differ from individuals with
Anti-Social Personality Disorder and psychotic individuals
because their rational processes are intact but they lack an
emotional sense of right and wrong. The evidence suggests
that psychopathy is difficult to treat, so our best advice to
organizations is to minimize entry into the firm by psy-
chopaths and screen, such as through 360° appraisal, to
ensure they are not promoting psychopathic individuals.
We also note moral emotions can be faked to gain
advantage and we suggest that future studies should
incorporate designs that investigate possible faking by
corporate psychopaths. Most of the research used psy-
chopathy samples rather than corporate psychopathy sam-
ples, so further research with corporate psychopathy
samples is necessary. Some businesses pursue profit above
all else, and so the moral emotion deficits of psychopaths
may be perceived as a benefit, but psychopaths are just as
likely to engage in individual-level and corporate-level
misbehavior within the firm as they are with clients. While
corporate psychopaths may not be serial killers, they still
may pursue their desires with the ruthlessness of Ted
Bundy who said ‘‘I don’t feel guilty for anything, I feel
sorry for people who feel guilt’’ (Brogaard 2012).
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