See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/21654325

Proneness to Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psychopathology

Article  in  Journal of Abnormal Psychology · September 1992

DOI: 10.1037/0021-843X.101.3.469 · Source: PubMed

CITATIONS READS

430 2,952

3 authors, including:

June P Tangney
George Mason University
114 PUBLICATIONS   10,902 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by June P Tangney on 23 May 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Journal of Abnormal Psychology Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
1992, Vol. 101, No. 3, 469-478 0021-843X/92/S3.00

Proneness to Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psychopathology

June Price Tangney, Patricia Wagner, and Richard Gramzow
George Mason University

The links between shame and guilt and psychopathology were examined. In 2 studies, 245 and 234
undergraduates completed the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory, the Symptom
Checklist 90, the Beck Depression Inventory, the State-Trait Anxiety Scale, and the Attributional
Style Questionnaire. Results failed to support Lewis's (1971) notion that shame and guilt are differ-
entially related to unique symptom clusters. Shame-proneness was strongly related to psychological
maladjustment in general. Guilt-proneness was only moderately related to psychopathology; corre-
lations were ascribable entirely to the shared variance between shame and guilt. Although clearly
related to a depressogenic attributional style, shame accounted for substantial variance in depres-
sion, above and beyond attributional style.

Psychologists have long speculated about the links between
shame and guilt and various forms of psychopathology. From
the early writings of Freud (1896/1953), psychoanalytic theo-
rists have emphasized the role of superego functions in the
formation of symptoms. Shame and guilt have also figured
prominently in more recent conceptualizations of a number of
disorders (Kohut, 1971; Lewis, 1971,1987b; Nathanson, 1987).
The clinical and empirical literature, however, is inconsistent
with regard to the specific links between psychological symp-
toms and these moral affective processes. Part of the confusion
is attributable to the fact that many psychologists either have
failed to make a clear distinction between the experiences of
shame and guilt or have adopted theoretical perspectives that
focus on one emotion to the exclusion of the other.
A growing theoretical and empirical literature underlines
important differences in the phenomenology of shame and
guilt (DeRivera, 1977; Erikson, 1950; Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-
Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1989b; Weiner, 1985; Wicker, Payne, &
Morgan, 1983). Both shame and guilt involve negative affect,
but the focus of the negative affect differs, leading to distinct
phenomenological experiences. In guilt, the object of concern
This research was supported by Grant IR15HD25506 from the Na-
tional Institute for Child Health and Human Development and by a
Faculty Research Grant from George Mason University.
The authors thank Carey Fletcher, Elly Bordeaux, Joe Constantin,
Laura Flicker, William Harman, Donna Marschall, James Maxfield,
Julie Morig, Yvette Nageotte, Gary Russell, Provie Rydstrom, Gordon
Shaw, and Chris Smart for their assistance with the larger studies from
which this report was drawn. Susanne Denham, James Maddux, John
Riskind, and two anonymous reviewers provided invaluable com-
ments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
Portions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the
American Psychological Society, Dallas, June 1990.
Correspondence concerning this article (including requests for cop-
ies of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory or the Test
of Self-Conscious Affect) should be addressed to June Price Tangney,
Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Vir-
ginia 22030.
469
is some specific action (or failure to act). There is remorse or
regret over the "bad thing that was done" and a sense of tension
that often serves as a motivation for reparative action. The ten-
sion, remorse, and regret engendered by guilt can be quite un-
comfortable, particularly when reparation is blocked for one
reason or another. Nonetheless, the experience of shame is far
more painful and devastating.
In shame, the object of concern is the entire self. The "bad
thing" is experienced as a reflection of a "bad self," and the
entire self is painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated.
With this painful scrutiny of the self is a corresponding sense of
shrinking, of being small, and of being worthless and power-
less. Shame also involves a sense of exposure. In introducing the
notion of an "internalized other," Lewis (1971) extended the
definition of shame beyond an affective reaction to public dis-
approval. But there is typically the imagery of an explicit or
implicit disapproving other. Even when alone, the disapproving
self imagines how the self (as disapproved object) might look to
another person. Thus it is not surprising that the ashamed per-
son often wants to hide from others or to sink into the floor and
disappear.
The most comprehensive discussion of shame and guilt in
psychopathology can be found in analytically oriented the-
ories. These theories, however, vary considerably in their em-
phasis on shame or guilt. Freud (1909/1955,1917/1957,1924/
1961), for example, devoted far more attention to the patho-
genic implications of guilt than to those of shame, particularly
in connection with obsessional neuroses, masochism, and de-
pression. He hypothesized that guilt, arising from unacceptable
impulses, unleashes a variety of self-punitive processes that re-
sult in manifest psychopathology. Shame played a much less
central role in early psychoanalytic thinking. Freud (1905/
1953) largely relegated shame to the status of a reaction forma-
tion against sexually exhibitionistic impulses. Some theorists
have suggested that Freud's relative neglect of shame may have
been attributable in part to his staunch adherence to a conflict-
defense model of psychological functioning and his attendant
failure to distinguish between the ego and the self (Lewis,
470 J. TANGNEY, P. WAGNER, AND R. GRAMZOW
1987a; Miller, 1985; A. P. Morrison, 1989). In any event, in
developing a theory that focused almost exclusively on guilt,
Freud may have misinterpreted his patients1 experiences with
shame. Lewis (1971) argued that much of Freud's case material
and associated formulations can be reconceptualized in terms
of shame.
With the emergence of self psychology, shame gained a more
prominent place in dynamic conceptualizations of psychopa-
thology. Psychoanalytically oriented clinicians and theorists
have identified shame as a key component of such disorders as
depression, bipolar illness, schizophrenia, and narcissism (Ko-
hut, 1971; A. P. Morrison, 1989; N. K. Morrison, 1987; Nathan-
son, 1987). Although these theories vary in the particular func-
tional role assigned to shame (in some, shame is viewed as a
cause of the disorder; in others, shame is viewed as a concomi-
tant of defects in the self system), these more recent formula-
tions share a common focus on shame and a corresponding
de-emphasis of the pathogenic aspects of guilt.
Helen Block Lewis is one of the few psychologists who has
presented an integrated theoretical account of the differential
roles of shame and guilt in psychopathology. In her seminal
work Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, Lewis (1971) noted that
there are individual differences in the degree to which people
experience shame or guilt across a range of situations. More-
over, Lewis (1971, 1987b) hypothesized that these individual
differences in affective style (shame-proneness vs. guilt-prone-
ness) are differentially related to the formation of psychological
symptoms. Specifically, Lewis postulated that shame-prone
persons are vulnerable primarily to affective disorders (particu-
larly depression), whereas guilt-prone persons are more vulnera-
ble to thought-related disorders (e.g., paranoia, obsessive-com-
pulsive syndromes).'
Lewis's formulation represents an interesting integration of
psychodynamic and cognitive principles. She believes that indi-
vidual differences in cognitive style (i.e., field dependence vs.
field independence) lead to contrasting modes of superego
functioning (i.e., shame-proneness and guilt-proneness), and to-
gether these cognitive and affective styles set the stage for differ-
ential symptom formation. The global, less differentiated self
of the field-dependent person is particularly vulnerable to the
global, less differentiated experience of shame and, ultimately,
to the global experience of depression. In contrast, the more
clearly differentiated self of the field-independent person is par-
ticularly vulnerable to the experience of guilt (which involves a
differentiation between self and behavior) and also to obsessive
and paranoid symptoms involving vigilance of the "field" sepa-
rate from the self.
There are some parallels between Lewis's (1971) conceptual-
ization and more recent attributional models of depression (e.g.,
Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 1983). Although
the attributional literature contains few explicit references to
the constructs of shame and guilt, these experiences involve
both affective and cognitive components, the latter of which
can be conceptualized in attributional terms (Hoblitzelle, 1987;
Lewis, 1987b). Shame, which focuses on the entire self, can be
viewed as an affective state stemming from internal, global,
and stable attributions; guilt, which focuses on specific behav-
iors, can be viewed as an affective state arising from internal,
specific, and presumably less stable attributions. Thus, with
regard to the cognitive components of these affective states, the
distinction between guilt and shame bears some resemblance
to Janoff-Bulman's (1979) distinction between behavioral and
characterological self-blame. To the extent that characterologi-
cal self-blame (the tendency to make internal, global, and stable
attributions for negative events) has been theoretically and em-
pirically linked to depression (for a review, see Robins, 1988),
the attributional literature is consistent with Lewis's notion that
there may be a special link between proneness to shame and
depression.
In spite of the rather rich theoretical literature pertaining to
shame and guilt and psychopathology, there is little direct em-
pirical evidence linking the two affective processes to various
aspects of psychological maladjustment. The paucity of empiri-
cal research is attributable in part to difficulties in the measure-
ment of shame and guilt. The earliest guilt scales (e.g., Buss &
Durkee, 1957; Mosher, 1966) were developed without regard to
the distinction between shame and guilt. As a consequence,
these measures tend to assess both shame and guilt experiences
and thus are of little use in distinguishing between the psycho-
pathological correlates of guilt and those of shame.
More recently, researchers have attempted to develop mea-
sures for assessing and differentiating these affective experi-
ences. Smith (1972) reported that severely depressed patients'
descriptions of their earliest memories contained more shame
themes than guilt themes. This finding, however, was not repli-
cated in a subsequent similar study by Crouppen (1977), and
Hoblitzelle (1987) raised concerns regarding the validity of the
Early Memories Test as an index of shame-proneness and guilt-
proneness. Using the Personal Feelings Questionnaire (a brief
self-report measure), Harder and Lewis (1987) found that both
shame- and guilt-proneness were associated with depression,
anxiety, hostility, and low self-esteem. Using a more extended
adjective checklist, Hoblitzelle (1987) found evidence of a link
between depression and shame-proneness in two independent
studies. The relation between depression and guilt-proneness,
however, was less consistent across the two studies, perhaps
owing to problems with Hoblitzelle's guilt scale. There is some
question, for example, about the use of the adjective checklist
approach for assessing guilt-proneness (Tangney, 1990). Al-
though adjectives may vary subtly in terms of shame and guilt,
adjective checklists essentially pose respondents with a shame-
related task. Respondents are asked to make global ratings
about the self (or, in the case of the Personal Feelings Question-
naire, global ratings of the self's general affective experience)
rather than ratings of affective responses to circumscribed be-
' It is interesting to note that Lewis's (1971) predictions are nearly in
direct opposition to those of Erikson (1950). In a brief discussion of
shame and guilt and psychopathology, Erikson suggested that shame-
related problems emerging from Stage II (autonomy vs. shame and
doubt) are likely to be associated with paranoid ideation, compulsive
behaviors, a defiant shamelessness, rage toward the self, or a combina-
tion of these characteristics. In contrast, he suggested that guilt-related
problems emerging from Stage III (initiative vs. guilt) are likely to be
associated with anxiety, denial, psychosomatic symptoms, jealousy,
grandiosity, and self-righteous anger toward others. Unfortunately, Er-
ikson did not fully develop his ideas on this topic in the 1950 volume,
nor did he elaborate in his later works.
 SHAME, GUILT, AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
haviors embedded in local contexts. Thus the structure of such
global adjective checklists seem more appropriate for the as-
sessment of shame.
In our two studies, we used the Self-Conscious Affect and
Attribution Inventory (SCAAI), a scenario-based measure of
affective style, to examine the degrees to which shame-prone-
ness and guilt-proneness differentially relate to a range of psy-
chological symptoms. In Study 2, we also used the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect (TOSCA), a revised version of the SCAAI
constructed from subject-generated scenarios and responses.
Because shame-proneness and guilt-proneness theoretically
have cognitive features in common with explanatory style, we
examined the relation of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness
to attributional style. We also evaluated the degree to which
these affective style variables contribute to the understanding
of depression above and beyond the variance accounted for by
purely attributional factors.
Method
Participants
In Study 1, 245 undergraduates attending a large east coast state
university received credit toward a course requirement in return for
their participation. The ages of students ranged from 18 to 55 (M =
21.1). Seventy-one percent were female. Seventy-seven percent were
White, 5% were Black, 13% were Asian, and 6% belonged to other
races. Thirty-nine percent reported their primary religious affiliation
in childhood as Catholic, 32% as Protestant, 4% as Jewish, and 13% as
other; 12% had no affiliation.
In Study 2, 234 undergraduates attending a large east coast state
university received credit toward a course requirement in return for
their participation. The ages of the students ranged from 17 to 35 (Af=
19.5). Seventy-two percent were female. Eighty-three percent were
White, 6% were Black, 7% were Asian, and 4% belonged to other races.
Thirty-seven percent reported their primary religious affiliation in
childhood as Catholic, 23% as Protestant, 4% as Jewish, and 21% as
other; 16% had no affiliation.
Measures and Procedures
The data reported here were collected as part of two larger investiga-
tions of the personality correlates of proneness to shame and guilt.
Students in Study 1 participated in two sessions, and students in Study
2 participated in four sessions. Sessions lasted from 30 to 60 min and
were conducted on separate days. At the beginning of the studies, in-
formed consent forms describing the general nature of the procedures
were distributed. Participants were informed that the investigation
was "a psychological study to learn more about emotions, perceptions,
and styles of thinking among normal, young adults." The voluntary,
confidential, and anonymous nature of the study was emphasized, and
students were asked not to write their names on any of the question-
naires.
Questionnaires were coded with unique identification numbers in
advance. At the end of each session, participants were asked to write on
a Post-It Note a unique and easily remembered pseudonym; these notes
were affixed to questionnaires for the subsequent session. Upon re-
turning, participants were asked to recall their pseudonyms, and the
note was removed, leaving questionnaires indexed only by identifica-
tion numbers. It was thus possible to link questionnaires across ses-
sions while preserving participants' anonymity. Only one participant,
from Study 2, was unable to recall his pseudonym and was excused
471
from subsequent sessions. The following were among the measures
completed by participants.
1. The SCAAI (Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme, & Domingos, 1988) is
designed to assess characteristic affective, cognitive, and behavioral
responses associated with shame, guilt, externalization of blame, de-
tachment/unconcern, and pride, as described in the theoretical and
phenomenological literature (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984;
Weiner, 1985; Wicker et al., 1983). The SCAAI is a paper-and-pencil
measure composed of 13 brief scenarios that college students are likely
to encounter in daily life. The 10 negative scenarios are followed, in
random order, by responses indicating shame, guilt, externalization,
and detachment/unconcern. The three positive scenarios are followed
by responses indicating shame, guilt, externalization, alpha pride
(pride in self), and beta pride (pride in behavior). The measure is not
forced choice in nature; subjects rate, on a 5-point scale, the likelihood
of responding in each of the manners indicated. Relevant items are
summed across scenarios to create indices of shame-proneness, guilt-
proneness, externalization, detachment/unconcern, alpha pride, and
beta pride. Thus a common set of scenarios is used to elicit shame and
guilt responses.
In previous reports, we have presented data supporting the reliabil-
ity and construct validity of the central scales of the SCAAI (Tangney,
1990, 1991; Tangney et al., 1988). Shame, guilt, externalization, and
detachment/unconcern subscales demonstrated satisfactory reliabil-
ity, as indicated by analyses of their internal consistency and test-retest
stability. With regard to validity, the interrelation among SCAAI sub-
scales and their relation to other measures of shame and guilt indicate
that the SCAAI yields related but functionally distinct indices of
shame and guilt in a way that other measures have not (Tangney, 1990).
Moreover, across several independent studies, shame has been consis-
tently linked to low self-esteem; a tendency to externalize blame; a
seething, bitter, resentful kind of anger; an impaired capacity for em-
pathy; and dysfunctional family relationships (Burggraf & Tangney,
1989; Hamme, 1991; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, &
Gramzow, 1992). Guilt, on the other hand, has been consistently posi-
tively related to interpersonal empathy and negatively related to exter-
nalization of blame, a detached/unconcerned attitude toward negative
interpersonal events, resentment toward others, and a hostile sense of
humor, particularly with regard to the unique variance in guilt
(Gessner & Tangney, 1990; Tangney, 1990,1991; Tangney et al., 1992).
In Study 1, the mean SCAAI shame score was 35.5 (SD = 7.98), and
the mean SCAAI guilt score was 47.2 (SD = 6.20). Estimates of inter-
nal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for the Study 1 SCAAI shame and
guilt subscales were .75 and .65, respectively. In Study 2, the mean
SCAAI shame score was 36.4 (SD = 7.78), and the mean SCAAI guilt
score was 47.0 (SD = 6.19). Estimates of internal consistency for the
Study 2 SCAAI shame and guilt subscales were .78 and .70, respec-
tively.
2. The TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) was modeled
after the SCAAI. The TOSCA also consists of a series of brief scenarios
(10 negative and 5 positive) and associated responses, yielding indices
of shame, guilt, externalization, detachment/unconcern, alpha pride,
and beta pride. This entirely new set of scenarios was drawn from
written accounts of personal shame, guilt, and pride experiences pro-
vided by a sample of several hundred college students and adults not in
college. The new responses were drawn from a much larger pool of
affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses provided by a second
sample of noncollege adults. The TOSCA has several advantages over
the original SCAAI. First, the items were subject generated rather than
experimenter generated, thereby enhancing the ecological validity of
the measure. Second, the items are appropriate for adults of all ages,
not just specifically college students. Third, in terms of reliability and
validity, our preliminary analyses indicate that the TOSCA is equiva-
lent to, and in some respects more psychometrically sound than, the
SCAAI.
472 J. TANGNEY, P. WAGNER, AND R. GRAMZOW
The TOSCA was administered to participants in Study 2 only. The
mean TOSCA shame score was 44.3 (SD = 8.43), and the mean
TOSCA guilt score was 58.3 (SD= 5.91). Estimates of internal consis-
tency (Cronbach's alpha) for the TOSCA shame and guilt subscales
were .76 and .66, respectively.2
3. The Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi,
1973) is a list of 90 symptoms, each rated on a 5-point scale to indicate
absence or intensity. The SCL-90 is a widely used clinical rating scale
that is appropriate for psychiatric outpatients as well as for screening
nonclinical populations. The checklist yields nine clinical subscales:
Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity (as-
sessing feelings of personal inadequacy or inferiority), Depression,
Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychotic-
ism. An extensive body of research supports the reliability and validity
of these scales (e.g., Derogatis, 1989; Derogatis & Cleary, 1977; Deroga-
tis, Rickels, & Rock, 1976). In our studies, internal consistency (Cron-
bach's alpha) of the SCL-90 scales ranged from .66 to .89 (M= .82).
4. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1972) is a widely
used, well-validated measure of depression appropriate for both clini-
cal and nonclinical populations. The measure is a list of 21 symptoms,
each of which are rated on a 4-point scale to indicate intensity. Esti-
mates of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) were .86 and .88 in
Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
5. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch,
& Lushene, 1970) is a widely used, well-validated measure of anxiety. It
is composed of 30 items (15 state items and 15 trait items), each rated on
a 4-point scale. Spielberger et al. (1970) presented considerable data
supporting the reliability and validity of the measure. In our Study 1,
estimates of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for the State Anxi-
ety and Trait Anxiety scales were .94 and .90, respectively. In Study 2,
estimates of internal consistency for the State Anxiety and Trait Anxi-
ety scales were .94 and .92, respectively.
6. The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Seligman, Abram-
son, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) consists of 12 hypothetical situa-
tions (6 positive and 6 negative). Respondents provide a likely cause for
each event and then rate, on a 7-point scale, each cause on three dimen-
sions: internal-external, stable-unstable, and global-specific. The rat-
ings are summed across negative and positive situations separately to
yield six scales of attributional style: Internality, Stability, and Global-
ity for positive and negative events each. Although the individual scales
of the ASQ have generally modest reliabilities (e.g., Peterson et al.,
1982), a number of studies have supported the validity and empirical
utility of the ASQ (see reviews by Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Robins,
1988). In our studies, internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of the
ASQ scales ranged from .25 to .67 (M= .52). Internal attributions for
negative events had, by far, the lowest reliabilities; reliabilities for the
other five attributional scales were more substantial.
Study 1 participants completed the SCA Al, the BDI, and the SCL-90
in Session 1 and the ASQ and the STAI in Session 2. Study 2 partici-
pants completed the TOSCA in Session 1; the SCAAI, the ASQ, the
BDI, and the SCL-90 in Session 2; and the STAI in Session 3.
Results
Shame-Proneness, Guih-Proneness, and Psychopathology
Table 1 contains the correlations of proneness to shame and
proneness to guilt with indices of psychopathology from Study
1 and Study 2. Correlations for both the SCAAI and the TOSCA
in Study 2 are presented. In both studies, the tendency to experi-
ence shame across a range of situations was strongly related to
psychological maladjustment in general. All 12 indices of psy-
chopathology were positively and significantly correlated with
shame-proneness, as measured by both the SCAAI and the
TOSCA.
Guilt-proneness, on the other hand, was only moderately re-
lated to psychopathology, and part-correlational analyses re-
vealed that these moderate correlations resulted entirely from
the shared variance between shame and guilt. Across numerous
studies, we have found a substantial positive correlation be-
tween shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, as assessed by the
SCAAI (Tangney, 1990). This covariation between measures of
shame and guilt no doubt reflects the fact that shame and guilt
have a number of features in common (e.g., both are dysphoric
affective processes that involve internal attributions) and that
these affective processes can be experienced in tandem (Lewis,
1971). In our Studies 1 and 2, SCAAI shame and guilt subscales
were correlated at .46 and .63, respectively,3 and TOSCA shame
and guilt subscales were correlated at .45. To further refine our
analyses, we conducted part correlations, factoring out shame
from guilt and vice versa. The part correlations showed an even
clearer pattern of results. All indices of psychopathology, with
the exception of Somatization in Study 1, were positively and
significantly related to shame residuals. In contrast, the mea-
sures of psychological maladjustment were negligibly, and in
some cases negatively, related to guilt residuals.4
One question that arises in the interpretation of null results
involving part correlational analyses is whether there remains
in the residual variable any meaningful variance beyond mea-
surement error—that is, whether in partialing out the variance
shared with shame we have effectively partialed out all the reli-
able and valid variance of guilt. This consideration is impor-
tant, particularly because our measure of guilt-proneness ap-
pears somewhat (although not substantially) less reliable than
our measure of shame-proneness (Tangney, 1990). Results in-
2
The Study 2 sample was initially randomly split, and item analyses
were conducted on one half so that we could select the final 15 TOSCA
scenarios from a larger pool of scenarios. Thus the reliability estimates
reported here were based on analyses involving only the other half of
the sample. (Item analyses involved only the TOSCA items; none of the
other measures used in the study were considered in the preliminary
analyses of the TOSCA.)
3
The correlation between the SCAAI shame and guilt measures in
Study 2 was substantially higher than expected. In five previous stud-
ies in which the SCAAI was used, shame-guilt correlations have
ranged from .43 to .48. An inspection of the joint distribution for Study
2 revealed 5 outliers. These 5 participants had responded rather idio-
syncratically to the SCAAI, primarily making use of the extreme ends
of the 5-point rating scale. Apart from these 5 outliers, the Study 2
sample offers substantial nonshared shame and guilt variance, as ob-
served in previous samples.
4
Results of; tests for dependent correlations indicated that in 28 of
the 36 pairs of bivariate correlations, the magnitude of association
involving shame was significantly different from that involving guilt.
In 35 of the 36 pairs, the shame correlation was higher than the guilt
correlation—a pattern highly unlikely to be observed by chance, as
indicated by a sign test (z = 5.50, p < .001). Similarly, / tests for indepen-
dent correlations indicated that in 29 of the 36 pairs of part correla-
tions, the correlates of the shame residuals were significantly different
from those of the guilt residuals. Again, in 35 of the 36 pairs, the part
correlation involving shame was higher than the part correlation in-
volving guilt.
 SHAME, GUILT, AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 473

Table 1
Relation of Shame-Proneness and Guilt-Proneness to Indices of Psychopathology
Bivariate correlations Part correlations: Residuals

Index Shame Guilt Shame Guilt

Symptom Checklist 90
Somatization
Study 1 (SCAAI) .14* .16* .07 .11
Sutdy 2 (SCAAI) .26*** .18** .18** .03
Study 2 (TOSCA) _27**« .11 .25***" -.02
Obsessive-Compulsive
Study 1 (SCAAI) .31*** .19** .25***" .05
Study 2 (SCAAI) .38***" .21*** .32***" -.03
Study 2 (TOSCA) .38***" .22*** .31***" .05
Psychoticism b
Study 1 (SCAAI) .25***' .11 22*** -.01
Study 2 (SCAAI) .39***" .23*** ;32***b -.03
Study 2 (TOSCA) .34***" .15* 31***b -.01
Paranoid Ideation
Study 1 (SCAAI) .23*** .14* .19** .04
Study 2 (SCAAI) .40***" .17* .38***b -.11
Study 2 (TOSCA) .35***' .08 .35***" -.09
Hostility-Anger
Study 1 (SCAAI) .13* .03 .13* -.03
Study 2 (SCAAI) .19*** .01 .23***" -.14*
Study 2 (TOSCA) .20**" -.05 24***b -.15**
Interpersonal Sensitivity
Study 1 (SCAAI) .42***" .22*** .36***" .03
Study 2 (SCAAI) .56***' .29*** 49***b -.08
Study 2 (TOSCA) .46***" .21*** 42***b -.00
Anxiety
Study 1 (SCAAI) .24*** .18** .18** .08
Study 2 (SCAAI) .36***' .25*** .26***" .03
Study 2 (TOSCA) .34***' .19** 2g***b .04
Phobic Anxiety
Study 1 (SCAAI) .27*** .16** .21*** .05
Study 2 (SCAAI) .32***a .18** .26***" -.03
Study 2 (TOSCA) .25***' .01 27**#b -.11*
Depression
Study 1 (SCAAI) .32*** .24*** .23*** .10
Study 2 (SCAAI) .41***' .22*** .36***b -.05
Study 2 (TOSCA) .43***" .15* .41***" -.06

Other measures
Beck Depression
Study 1 (SCAAI) .34***' .15* .31***" -.01
Study 2 (SCAAI) .47***' .24*** .41***" -.07
Study 2 (TOSCA) .51***" .19** 47***b -.05
Trait Anxiety
Study 1 (SCAAI) .45***' .21*** .40***" .00
Study 2 (SCAAI) .52***' .22** .50***b -.15*
Study 2 (TOSCA) .53***" .17* .51***" -.09
State Anxiety
Study 1 (SCAAI) .38***' .21** 32***b .03
b
Study 2 (SCAAI) .36***' .09 39*** -.17*
Study 2 (TOSCA) .41***' .10 ;41***b -.10

Note. SCAAI = Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory; TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious
Affect. Study 1 ns ranged from 228 to 243; Study 2 ns ranged from 206 to 225 and from 211 to 230 for
analyses involving the SCAAI and TOSCA, respectively.
a
t tests for dependent correlations indicate that the shame correlation is significantly higher than the guilt
correlation at at least p < .05. b / tests for independent correlations indicate that the shame part correla-
tion is significantly higher than the guilt part correlation at at least p < .05.
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p< .001
474 J. TANGNEY, P. WAGNER, AND R. GRAMZOW

volving measures of other constructs, however, indicate that Table 2

this is not the case. In previous studies with the SCAAI, the Relation of Attributional Style to Shame-
TOSCA, or both, guilt residuals (the unique variance in guilt) Proneness and Guilt-Proneness
have shown consistent positive correlations with interpersonal
empathy and with a variety of constructive responses to anger Bivariate Part correlations:
correlations Residuals
(Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al, 1991) and consistent negative
correlations with externalization of blame, resentment toward Attributional style Shame Guilt Shame Guilt
others, a hostile/aggressive sense of humor, and a detached/un-
concerned attitude in response to negative events (Gessner & Positive events
Tangney, 1990; Tangney, 1990; Tangney et al, 1992). Thus the Internality
negligible correlations between indices of psychopathology and Study 1 (SCAAI) -.14* -.08 -.12 -.01
guilt residuals are not simply artifacts of a restriction of valid Study 2 (SCAAI) -.30*** — 22** -.21** -.04
Study 2 (TOSCA) -.21*** -.11 -.18** -.02
variance in the residual guilt variables. Stability
In summary, our findings failed to support Lewis's (1971) Study 1 (SCAAI) -.17* -.16* -.11 -.08
notion that shame and guilt are differentially related to unique Study 2 (SCAAI) -.26*** -.01 -.32*** .19*'
symptom clusters. Rather, shame-proneness was associated Study 2 (TOSCA) -.19** .08 -.25*** .19*'
with a wide variety of pathological features; guilt-proneness, Globality
Study 1 (SCAAI) .00 .08 -.04 .09
independent of shame, appears to have few implications for Study 2 (SCAAI) -.16* .02 -.23*** .16*
psychological maladjustment. Study 2 (TOSCA) -.10 .08 -.15* .15*
Negative events
Shame-Proneness, Guilt-Proneness, and Attributional
Style Internality
Study 1 (SCAAI) .16* .11 .13 .04
In recent years, cognitive theories have dominated the clini- Study 2 (SCAAI) .29*** .21** .21** .04
Study 2 (TOSCA) .29*** .16* .24*** .03
cal literature pertaining to depression and anxiety (e.g., Abram- Stability
son et al., 1978; Beck, 1983). One question that inevitably arises Study 1 (SCAAI) .15* .01 .16* -.07
when shame and guilt are considered is the degree to which Study 2 (SCAAI) .21** .08 .20** -.07
these constructs (or measures of these constructs) simply reflect Study 2 (TOSCA) .17** .05 .17** -.03
individual differences in explanatory style. As noted earlier, the Globality
Study 1 (SCAAI) .24*** .19** .18** .08
cognitive components of shame and guilt can be conceptual- Study 2 (SCAAI) .40*** .23*** .33*** -.03
ized in attributional terms. Shame, which focuses on the entire Study 2 (TOSCA) .35*** .17** .31*** .01
self, involves internal, global, and stable attributions, whereas
guilt, which focuses on specific behaviors, involves internal, Note. SCAAI = Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory;
TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect. Study 1 «s ranged from 227 to
specific, and presumably unstable attributions. In view of the 228; Study 2 ns ranged from 218 to 224 and from 223 to 229 for analy-
observed links between shame and psychopathology, particu- ses involving the SCAAI and TOSCA, respectively.
larly depression and anxiety, it is important to examine whether */7<.05. **/7<.01. ***/7<.001.

these findings are simply a reflection of participants' attribu-

tional style. If so, a consideration of shame and guilt may be
largely superfluous to the understanding of psychological mal-
adjustment. Individual differences in cognitive style may pro-
vide a more parsimonious (and mainstream) framework for in-
terpreting these results.
To answer this question, we first directly examined the rela-
tion of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness to attributional
style as measured by the ASQ (see Table 2). The results across
studies clearly indicate that shame-proneness is linked to a de-
pressogenic attributional style. Proneness to shame (and the
unique variance in shame) was positively correlated with the
tendency to make internal, stable, and global attributions for
negative events and negatively correlated with internal, stable,
and (to a lesser extent) global attributions for positive events.
The attributional style correlates of guilt-proneness were less
consistent and did not reflect the expected pattern of results—
that is, correlations with internal but unstable and specific at-
tributions for negative events. With regard to the bivariate
correlations, guilt was positively associated with global attribu-
tions for negative events in both studies, as well as with internal
attributions for negative events in Study 2. Part correlational
analyses revealed that these associations resulted entirely from
the shared variance with shame. Guilt residuals were unrelated
to dimensions of attributional style for negative events. There
were, however, indications in Study 2 (involving both the
SCAAI and the TOSCA) that the unique variance in guilt may
be associated with stable and global attributions for positive
events. (The pattern of results was relatively independent of the
differential reliabilities of the ASQ subscales. For example, in-
ternal, not stable, attributions for negative events showed the
lowest reliabilities.)
Attributional Style and Affective Style as Predictors of
Depression
Across both studies, shame-proneness was clearly related to a
depressogenic attributional style. Does a consideration of self-
conscious affective style contribute to the understanding of de-
pression, above and beyond the variance accounted for by attri-
butional style? To answer this question, we conducted a series
of multiple regression analyses to predict BDI and SCL-90 de-
pression scores from attributional style and affective style vari-
ables. In doing so, we used hierarchical regression procedures,
 SHAME, GUILT, AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 475

forcing in attributional style dimensions first, to provide the
most conservative test of the predictive utility of shame-prone-
ness and guilt-proneness.
Tables 3 and 4 show that in both Studies 1 and 2, attributional
style accounted for a significant portion of the variance in de-
pression (for the BDI, 9% and 13%, respectively; for SCL-90
depression, 7% and 14%, respectively). Of the six attributional
dimensions, internal attributions for negative events was a sig-
nificant predictor of both BDI and SCL-90 depression scores in
Study 1, and unstable attributions for positive events was also
significantly predictive of Study 1 BDI scores. In Study 2, global
attributions for negative events was a significant predictor of
both BDI and SCL-90 scores, and internal attributions for nega-
tive events was also significantly predictive of Study 2 BDI
scores.
Shame-proneness and guilt-proneness were forced into the
regression equations after attributional style variables. In each
case, the change in R2 associated with these affective variables
was substantial. In the prediction of BDI scores, SCAAI shame
and guilt subscales accounted for an additional 8% and 12% of
the variance in depression in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. In
Study 2, TOSCA shame and guilt subscales accounted for an
additional 15% of the variance in BDI scores. In the prediction
of SCL-90 depression scores, SCAAI shame and guilt subscales
accounted for an additional 9% of the variance in depression in
both Studies 1 and 2. In Study 2, TOSCA shame and guilt sub-
scales accounted for an additional 10% of the variance in SCL-
90 depression scores. In all cases, the change in R2 resulted
almost entirely from individual differences in shame-prone-
ness. Guilt-proneness emerged as a significant predictor of de-
pression only in the Study 1 analysis involving the SCL-90.
These findings clearly indicate that the link between shame
and depression is not solely due to attributional style. In fact,
inclusion of the affective component of shame (e.g., once attri-
butional factors were controlled for) essentially doubled the
proportion of variance predicted in depression.
Discussion
In a series of previous studies (Tangney, 1989a, 1991; Tang-
ney et al., 1992), we presented evidence suggesting that shame-
prone persons have rather pervasive difficulties in interper-
sonal relationships. Shame-proneness was associated with im-
paired empathic abilities, a tendency to externalize blame, and
frequent bouts of anger and hostility. The results of our current
studies extend our earlier findings regarding the maladaptive
nature of shame from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal
realm.
Shame-prone persons appear vulnerable to a host of psycho-
logical symptoms. Across two independent studies, the second
of which involved two measures of shame, proneness to shame
was consistently related to a range of symptom clusters. Further-
more, although shame-proneness was clearly related to a de-
pressogenic attributional style, our findings indicate that the
link between shame and depression is not solely due to attribu-
tional factors. Shame-proneness accounted for a substantial
portion of variance in depression, above and beyond the vari-
ance accounted for by attributional style.
Our studies were correlational in nature and thus cannot
directly address the causal links between shame-proneness and
psychological maladjustment. It seems likely, however, that the
relation between affective style and psychopathology is com-
plex. First, shame is a painfully devastating experience that, at
least temporarily, leads to a crippling of adaptive self-functions.
Thus the tendency to experience shame across a range of situa-
tions may render people more vulnerable to a variety of psycho-

Table 3
Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Depression (BDI) From Attributional
Style Variables, Shame-Proneness, and Guilt-Proneness
BDI scores
Study 1: SCAAI Study 2: SCAAI Study 2: TOSCA
2 2
Variable 0 R change /3 R change 0 R2 change
Step 1 .09** .13*** .13***
Positive events
Internality .04 -.07 -.08
Stability -.23* -.09 -.09
Globality .07 .05 .04
Negative events
Internality .20** .16* .16*
Stability .05 .02 .01
Globality .02 .21** .21**
Step 2 .08*** .12*** .15***
Guilt-proneness .01 -.11 -.05
Shame-proneness .29*** .45*** .45***
Total .17*** .25*** .29***
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; SCAAI = Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory;
TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect. Study 1 /i = 227; Study 2 ns = 216 and 221 for analyses involving
the SCAAI and TOSCA, respectively. The regression coefficients are standardized betas.
*p<.05. **/)<.01 ***;?<.001.
476 J. TANGNEY, P. WAGNER, AND R. GRAMZOW

Table 4
Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Depression (SCL-90) From Attributional
Style Variables, Shame-Proneness, and Guilt-Proneness
SCL-90 Depression scores

Study 1 : SCAAI Study 2: SCAAI Study 2: TOSCA

Variable 0 R2 change /3 R2 change & R2 change

Step 1 .07* .14*** .14***

Positive events
Internality .07 -.03 -.03
Stability -.13 -.07 -.07
Globality .02 -.02 -.02
Negative events
Internality 22** .13 .13
Stability -.00 -.02 -.02
Globality .09 29*** .28***
Step 2 .09*** .09*** .10***
Guilt-proneness .14* -.09* -.08
Shame-proneness .24** .39*** .38***
Total .16*** .23*** .24***

Note. SCL-90 = Symptom Checklist-90; SCAAI = Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory;
TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect. Study t n = 226; Study 2 ns = 213 and 218 for analyses involving
the SCAAI and TOSCA, respectively. The regression coefficients are standardized betas.
*p<.Q5. **p<.0\. ***p<.001.

logical disorders because of repeated disruptions in self-func-
tioning. Second, shame-prone persons may also be prone to
feelings of hopelessness, which have been cited as a proximal
cause of hopelessness depression and possibly other types of
disorders (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Abramson et al.
(1989) noted that internal, stable, and global attributions for
negative events and associated inferred negative characteristics
about the self (each components of the shame experience) are
key contributory causes of hopelessness and hopelessness de-
pression. Third, the recognition and experience of psychologi-
cal symptoms may place people at higher risk for further bouts
of shame. People may feel ashamed of the psychological symp-
toms themselves. Finally, both shame-proneness and various
forms of psychopathology likely share common etiological
roots. An examination of family processes in relation to affec-
tive style and psychological adjustment, particularly within a
longitudinal framework, is an important direction for future
research.
The negligible relation between guilt and psychopathology
may, at first glance, appear surprising. Freud (1909/1955), for
example, emphasized the self-punitive aspects of guilt, which
can lead to rather pervasive psychological symptoms. The guilt
portrayed in much of the clinical case literature, however, is an
unusual form of guilt, quite distinct from that experienced in
the normal range. It is typically an insoluble guilt (i.e., the pa-
tient for whatever reason sees no means for making reparation,
apart from rather extreme forms of intrapsychic self-punish-
ment), and it is typically guilt fused with shame. As noted ear-
lier, shame itself presents an insoluble dilemma because at issue
is a malignant self, not a malignant behavior. Thus the opportu-
nities for change are generally quite limited. The shame-free
guilt assessed in our studies, on the other hand, is more likely to
afford a range of adaptive resolutions. One can confess, apolo-
gize, or in some way make amends for the bad thing that was
done—and then move on to the business of everyday life.
The results address not only the links between shame and
guilt and psychopathology but also the links between shame
and guilt and attributional style. Lewis (1987b) and Hoblitzelle
(1987) noted conceptual parallels between attributional dimen-
sions and the cognitive components of shame and guilt. Our
findings underscore the fact that shame and guilt are not
merely new affective labels for old cognitive styles. Rather, the
constructs of shame and guilt are related to but distinct from
attributional style factors. As predicted, shame-proneness was
associated with a depressogenic attributional style, but shame
makes a substantial and unique contribution to the under-
standing of depression, beyond the contribution of attribu-
tional factors.
Guilt, on the other hand, was less clearly linked to the pre-
dicted pattern of internal, unstable, and specific attributions.
Why was the expected pattern of attributional correlates evi-
dent for shame but not for guilt? One possibility is that internal,
unstable, and specific attributions for negative events can result
in a broader range of reactions, guilt being only one such re-
sponse. In acknowledging one's role in a negative event, but
conceptualizing it as fairly transient and specific to the particu-
lar situation, a person may experience guilt (e.g., the person may
earnestly accept responsibility and experience the tension, re-
gret, and remorse over the "bad thing that was done"). But
because of the specific and unstable nature of the cause, a per-
son might instead downplay the importance of his or her role
(e.g., "Well, I did it, but it was only one time, and it didn't affect
much anyway"). As a result, the person may experience little
negative affect of any kind. In contrast, internal, stable, and
global attributions for negative events may afford fewer affec-
tive reactions. The cognition that"/ did it, I always do it, and it
 SHAME, GUILT, AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
affects a great dear may more consistently lead to a shamelike
affective reaction, as well as to feelings of hopelessness, depres-
sion, and so forth.
We conducted our studies with nonclinical samples of univer-
sity undergraduates, and although considerable variance was
observed in the indices of psychopathology, there remains the
question of whether a different pattern of results would emerge
in a study of the links between affective style and psychopathol-
ogy in a clinical population. This possibility warrants investiga-
tion for at least two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the nature of
guilt itself may be qualitatively different in the clinical range,
perhaps resulting in a different pattern of relations between
guilt and psychopathology. Second, in nonclinical samples, psy-
chological symptoms may not be clustered into well-defined
syndromes; rather, reported symptoms may simply reflect a
kind of general negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984).
Thus although we found no evidence to support Lewis's (1971)
hypothesis that shame and guilt are differentially related to
unique symptom clusters, the possibility that such a pattern
may emerge in clinical studies remains.
In spite of these limitations, our results linking shame to
psychological maladjustment in general suggest that a consider-
ation of shame-related issues may be useful in the treatment of a
number of psychological problems.
References
Abramson, L. Y, Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. (1989). Hopelessness
depression: A theory-based subtype of depression. Psychological Re-
view, 96, 358-372.
Abramson, L. Y, Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. (1978). Learned
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Ab-
normal Psychology, 87, 49-74.
Beck, A. T. (1972). Measuring depression: The depression inventory. In
T. A. Williams, M. M. Katz, & J. A. Shields (Eds.), Recent advances in
the psychobiology of the depressive illnesses (pp. 299-302). Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Beck, A. T. (1983). Cognitive therapy of depression: New perspectives.
In P. Clayton & J. Barrett (Eds.), Treatment of depression: Old contro-
versies and new approaches (pp. 265-290). New York: Raven Press.
Burggraf, S. A., & Tangney, J. P. (1989, June). Proneness to shame, pron-
eness to guilt, and self-concept. Poster presented at the annual meet-
ing of the American Psychological Society, Alexandria, VA.
Buss, A. H., & Durkee, A. (1957). An inventory for assessing different
kinds of hostility in clinical situations. Journal of Consulting Psychol-
ogy, 21, 343-348.
Crouppen, G. A. (1977). Field dependence-independence in depres-
sive and "normal" males as an indicator of relative proneness to
shame or guilt and ego-functioning. Dissertation Abstracts Interna-
tional, 37, 4669B-4670B. (University Microfilms No. 77-6292)
DeRivera, J. (1977). A structural theory of emotion. New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press.
Derogatis, L. R. (1989). Description and bibliography for the SCL-90-R
and other instruments of the psychopathology rating scale series. Rid-
erwood, MD: Clinical Psychometric Research, Inc.
Derogatis, L. R., & Cleary, P (1977). Confirmation of the dimensional
structure of the SCL-90: A study in construct validation. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 33, 981-989.
Derogatis, L. R., Lipman, R. S., & Covi, L. (1973). SCL-90: An outpa-
tient psychiatric rating scale—Preliminary report. Psychopharma-
cology Bulletin, 9, 13-28.
Derogatis, L. R., Rickels, K., & Rock, A. (1976). The SCL-90 and the
477
MMPI: A step in the validation of a new self-report scale. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 128, 280-289.
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: W W Norton.
Freud, S. (1953). Further remarks on the defence neuro-psychosis. In J.
Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of 'the complete psycho-
logical works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 3, pp. 157-185). London: Ho-
garth. (Original work published 1896)
Freud, S. (1953). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. In J. Strachey
(Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological
works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 7, pp. 153-243). London: Hogarth.
(Original work published 1905)
Freud, S. (1955). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. In J. Stra-
chey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychologi-
cal works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 10, pp. 155-318). London: Ho-
garth. (Original work published 1909)
Freud, S. (1957). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (Ed. &
Trans), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of
Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 243-258). London: Hogarth. (Original
work published 1917)
Freud, S. (1961). The economic problem of masochism. In J. Strachey
(Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological
works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19, pp. 159-170). London: Hogarth.
(Original work published 1924)
Gessner, T. L., & Tangney, J. P. (1990, March). Personality and adjust-
ment correlates of wit and witticism. Poster presented at the annual
meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia.
Hamme, H. (1991). Family correlates of proneness to shame and prone-
ness to guilt. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr Col-
lege.
Harder, D. W, & Lewis, S. J. (1987). The assessment of shame and guilt.
In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger (Eds), Advances in personality
assessment (Vol. 6, pp. 89-114). Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum.
Hoblitzelle, W (1987). Attempts to measure and differentiate shame
and guilt: The relation between shame and depression. In H. B.
Lewis (Ed), The role of shame in symptom formation (pp. 207-235).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1979). Characterological versus behavioral self-
blame: Inquiries into depression and rape. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 37, 1798-1809.
Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self New York: International
Universities Press.
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: Interna-
tional Universities Press.
Lewis, H. B. (1987a). Introduction: Shame—the "sleeper" in psychopa-
thology. In H. B. Lewis (Ed), The role of shame in symptom forma-
tion (pp. 1-28). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Lewis, H. B. (1987b). The role of shame in depression over the life span.
In H. B. Lewis (Ed), The role of shame in symptom formation (pp.
29-50). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Lindsay-Hartz, J. (1984). Contrasting experiences of shame and guilt.
American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 689-704.
Miller, S. (1985). The shame experience. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Morrison, A. P. (1989). Shame: The underside of narcissism. Hillsdale,
NJ: Analytic Press.
Morrison, N. K. (1987). The role of shame in schizophrenia. In H. B.
Lewis (Ed), The role of shame in symptom formation (pp. 51-87).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mosher, D. L. (1966). The development and multitrait-multimethod
matrix analysis of three measures of three aspects of guilt. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 30, 25-29.
Nathanson, D. L. (1987). A timetable for shame. In D. L. Nathanson
(Ed), The many faces of shame (pp. 1-63). New York: Guilford.
Peterson, C, & Seligman, M. E. P. (1984). Causal explanations as a risk
factor for depression: Theory and evidence. Psychological Review,
478 J. TANGNEY, P. WAGNER, AND R. GRAMZOW
Peterson, C, Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C, Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky,
G. I., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1982). The Attributional Style Question-
naire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6, 287-299.
Robins, C. J. (1988). Attributions and depression: Why is the literature
so inconsistent? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,
880-889.
Seligman, M. E. P., Abramson, L. Y, Semmel, A., & von Baeyer, C.
(1979). Depressive attributional style. Journal of Abnormal Psychol-
ogy, 88, 242-247.
Smith, R. L. (1972). The relative proneness to shame or guilt as an
indicator of defensive style. Dissertation Abstracts International, 33,
2823B. (University Microfilms No. 72-3258)
Spielberger, C. D, Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manual for
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychol-
ogists Press.
Tangney, J. P. (1989a, April). Shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and
interpersonal processes. In J. P. Tangney (Chair), Self-conscious
emotions and social behavior. Symposium conducted at the annual
meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Kansas
City.
Tangney, J. P. (1989b, August). A quantitative assessment of phenomena-
logical differences between shame and guilt. Poster presented at the
annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New
Orleans.
Tangney, J. P. (1990). Assessing individual differences in proneness to
shame and guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and At-
tribution Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59,
102-111.
View publication stats
Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 598-607.
Tangney, J. P., Burggraf, S. A., Hamme, H., & Domingos, B. (1988,
March). Assessing individual differences in proneness to shame and
guilt: The Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory. Poster pre-
sented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Associa-
tion, Buffalo, NY
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., & Gramzow, R. (1989). The Test of Self-
Conscious Affect. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Shamed
into anger? The relation of shame and guilt to anger and self-re-
ported aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62,
669-675.
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., Gavlas, J., Hansbarger, A., Marschall, D., &
Gramzow, R. (1991). Constructive vs. destructive responses to anger:
The moderating role of shame and guilt across the lifespan. Manu-
script in preparation.
Watson, D, & Clark, L. A. (1984) Negative affectivity: The disposition
to experience aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96,
465-490.
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation
and emotion. Psychological Review, 92, 548-573.
Wicker, F. W, Payne, G. C., & Morgan, R. D. (1983). Participant de-
scriptions of guilt and shame. Motivation and Emotion, 7, 25-39.
Received August 20,1990
Revision received November 21,1991
Accepted November 21,1991 •