DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW and regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power not only to
POWER OF CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INVESTIGATION, AND REORGANIZATION
The President and other executive or administrative agencies or bodies are granted
powers and functions by the Constitution or statutes to enforce laws and to carry
out governmental functions, as well as policies and objectives provided in statutes
creating them. Among such powers are those of control, supervision,
reorganization, and investigation.
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The President is the Chief Administrative
Officer of the Government by reason of his being the Chief Executive and the head
of government. He wields all administrative powers that inhere in such position.
Administrative power is an adjunct, designed to complement the effective exercise
of executive power. Administrative agencies or bodies exercising administrative,
investigative, rule-making, and quasi-judicial powers, as conferred by law, are parts
of the executive branch.
The President's administrative powers can be implied from his executive power.
I. Power of Control
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that "the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed."
The President's power of control means his power to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute his judgment with that of the latter. His power of control over the
executive branch extends to all executive officers from cabinet secretary to the
lowliest clerk in the executive department.
The President, in the exercise of the powers of control, can do what any of his
cabinet secretaries can lawfully do as conferred by law.
For instance, it was held in Araneta v. Gatmaitan that since the DA Secretary was
empowered to regulate or ban fishing by trawl, the President, in the exercise of his
power of control, can take over from him such authority and issue the executive
order to exercise it. If a cabinet secretary or a bureau or agency head can issue rules
modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another set entirely
different from those issued by his subordinate.
This power includes the power to detail an executive officer in the OP, or to any
executive office, without any prior approval from any executive officer, so long as
there is no reduction in rank or salary and not considered as a disciplinary action.
For those discharging purely executive functions in the national government, he
gives orders to all and takes orders from none.
His act cannot be countermanded by a department secretary who is a mere
subordinate of the President nor can a subordinate of a department secretary
disregard his superior's altering his action in the performance of his function as the
department secretary acts as the President's alter ego and his action is presumed to
be that of the President.
By authority of the President
The Executive Secretary or his Deputy or Assistant Executive Secretary or any
cabinet secretary, who acts and signs "By Authority of the President" acts not for
himself but for the President.
The Executive Secretary or his Deputy or Assistant, if he acts "By authority of the
President," can modify, alter, or set aside acts or rulings of a department secretary
as he acts for and on behalf of the President.
Limitations on the President's control power
Generally speaking, the power of control does not include the following:
(1) abolition or creation of an executive office,
(2) suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees without due
process of law, and
(3) setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies,
including that of the Office of the President, on contested cases that have become
final pursuant to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law
All acts of an executive or administrative office or agency, other than final decisions
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory power in contested cases, are subject to
the President's power of control, such as rules and regulations, interpretations or
applications of the law. These may be reviewed, modified, or set aside at any time,
especially when they are later found to be erroneous, except that private rights
which have become vested thereunder may not be unsettled or disturbed thereby.
While an erroneous construction of a law by an administrative or executive officer
whose duty is to enforce it may not give rise to a vested right, nor estop the
government by such mistake, the rule admits of exceptions, as when in reliance
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thereon in good faith and a person complies with what the law requires as
construed by the administrative officer, his right which accrued therefrom may not
be disturbed. Justice and good faith dictate and operate to create such exceptions.
The President's power of control applies to acts of a subordinate official and not to
the official who performs the acts. He may not, by his control power, suspend or
remove the official without due process of law, except those officials who serve at
his pleasure.
II. Power of Supervision
The President may not have the power of control over agencies which are not
categorized as executive departments, bureaus and offices, unless the law creating
them provides that he shall have such power. In absence of such law, the President
may only have the power of supervision, which is only overseeing or the power to
see that the officials concerned perform their duties.
The power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any
express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his
alter ego, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or
comply with their duties.
Supervisory power over an inferior body does not include any restraining authority
over such body.
Control, supervision and review by other executive officials
The department secretary's supervision and control over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction is limited to the bureaus and officers under him, but does not
extend to agencies attached to department.
Attachment refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if
this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in
the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the department to
which it is attached than one which is under the departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision.
Cases
Ang-Angco v. Castillo
FACTS: The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrates
which were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counsels
approached Collector of Customs Ang -Angco to secure the immediate release of
the concentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from the
No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco
which stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates but
could not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco
telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release on
the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates.
When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrative
complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco.
For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office. Then,
Executive Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered his judgment
against the petitioner. Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take
direct action and dispose of the administrative casein subordinate officers of the
executive branch of the government
ISSUE: Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in
the classified civil service.
HELD: NO. The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees
in the classified civil service. It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil
Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid
down in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said
that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.
The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate,
suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees but not with regard to those officers
or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution
which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
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officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of departments" (Article
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution).
With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal
precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service
Act of 1959.Pending investigation of an administrative complaint against a
presidential appointee who is a career officer, the President or a cabinet secretary
acting on his behalf may, however, detail such officer to any other executive office.
Carpio v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: In 1990, RA 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Carpio, as a member of
the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said
law for he figured that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He
advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by
limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained
with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were
placed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and
NPC by virtue of RA 6975
HELD: NO. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is
the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to
delegate some of them to his Cabinet members
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under
the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and
the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the
national government.
Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. v. CA
FACTS: In 1977, a reclamation project was sought to be undertaken by the
City of Mandaue. It signed a contract with Malayan to actualize the project. The
Justice Secretary opined that only the national government can undertake
reclamation projects however the Public Estates Authority can delegate such
function to Mandaue. The SP of Mandaue then authorized its mayor to enter into a
MOA with the PEA to validate the contract with Malayan. The project however
remained hanging until after the EDSA Revolution. The contract was reindorsed to
Cory who referred the contract back to PEA. After this, the mayor of Mandaue
chose to open a new contract with another company (FF Cruz & Co.) since he
deemed that the Office of the President has some reservations against the contract
with Malayan. The mayor submitted the new contract before the PEA which
endorsed it to the Office of the President which approved the same and rescinded
the earlier contract between Mandaue and Malayan. Malayan appealed and sought
to have the contract between Mandaue and FF Cruz be annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract should be annulled.
HELD: NO. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the
reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the
disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN,
was signed by the Executive Secretary, “by authority of the President,” and not by
the President’s own hand, the Executive Secretary’s action is presumed to be valid
and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President and thus should be
accorded due respect.
As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of
the President. One of his myriad functions is “to exercise primary authority to sign
papers `By authority of the President,’ attest executive orders and other
presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials
by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special
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projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct”, his
personality is in reality “but the projection of that of the President,” his acts,
“performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”
The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in
favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN, is not
subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers
which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the government,
absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Lacson Magallanes Co. v Puno
Facts:
1. Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a pasture land in
Davao
2. Jose ceded his right to a portion of the land to plaintiff corporation
3. The portion ceded to the corp was released from the forest zone and was
declared agri land
4. Pano and other claimants applied for the purchase of the land released
5. Corp filed also its own sales application covering the released area which
was protested by Pano et al saying that they were the actual occupants of the part
6. Director of Lands dismissed the claims of Pano et al
7. Sec of Agri and Natural Resources dismissed the appeal of Pano et al
8. Case was elevated to the President of the PH and Exec Sec Pajo decided
(gave land to Pano et al) the case saying that it would be for the public interest that
Pano et al who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their
existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements
9. Corpo went to the CFI saying that Sec 4 of CA 141 which states that
decisions of the Director of Lands as to questions of facts shall conclusive when
approved by the Sec of Agri and Natural Resources. Corpo said that the law is
controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President
Issue: May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a
decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary
of Agriculture and
Natural Resources
Held: Yes, Exec Sec may reverse
• President’s control of all executive departments is of constitutional orgin
• Department heads are men of his confidence
• Power to appoint them is his power to dismiss them at his pleasure. He
controls their acts
• Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. Cannot be said that the Pres cannot
rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary
• Right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of
control over the exec dept and control simply means “the power of officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to sub the judgment of the former for the latter.
• Corp’s argument saying that the consti doesn’t allow the delegation of the
presidential power of control to the Exec Sec is incorrect
o The president is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions. Office of the Exec Sec is an auxiliary unit
which assists the Pres
o The exec Sec who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the Pres has an
undisputed juris to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Sec of Agri
and Natural Resources, and Director of Lands may issue
• Corpo also argues that one dept head cannot intrude into the zone of
action allocated to another dept sec
o SC: Exec Sec acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of the
President’s. Such decision if given full faith and credit by our courts. Only the
president may rightfully say that the Exec Sex is not authorized do so
Macailing vs Andrada
Facts:
1. Land dispute between plaintiffs who are settlers occupying 4 hectares each
and Andrada (sub by heirs) who is a sales applicant of a bigger parcel which includes
the lands occupied by the plaintiffs
2. District Land Officer decided in plaintiff’s favour
3. Director of Lands reversed and restored the land to the heirs of Andrada
4. Sec of Agri and NR, on appeal reversed the Director of Lands
5. The heirs sought recon but was denied and a year after, they once more
asked for reconsideration but the Sec rejected it by saying that the case had long
become final and executor
6. Heir appealed to the Office of the President and two years after appeal,
Exec Sec reversed the decision of the Sec and declared the land restored to the
heirs of Andrada
7. Plaintiffs went to court and raised the issue of finality of the decision of the
Sec
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8. Heirs said that the power to review on appeal is inherent in the Pres and
that the Consti fixes no period of such appeal and thus appeal can be entertained
by the President even outside the 30d period
Issue: WON 30 day appeal period as stated in Lands Administrative Order No. 6 Sec
12 is applicable when appealing cases to the Office of the President
Held: yes
LAW: 2. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.—The decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural Resources) or
the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise
specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of its
receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.—After a decision or order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the
Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for reconsideration of
such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the Secretary of
Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands, as
the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect: "Upon such terms as may be considered just, the
Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the
Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision,
order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made
within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision,
order or proceeding was taken."
• In admin law, administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law, is law.
Administratively speaking then, 30 days after receipt by the interested parties, the
decision of the Sec of Agri and NR become final, except in cases of mistakes,
inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect. In which case, the Sec may
relieve a party of a decision order or other proceeding taken against him upon
application made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding 1 year after
such decision, order or proceeding was taken.
• Dept Sec is the alter ego of the Pres. Must assume then that an admin rule
laid down by a Dept Sec is to all intents and purposes, that of the Pres, unless
countermanded by the latter It is illogical, unreasonable and unfair for the
executive branch of the government itself to set aside administrative rules — unless
previously changed beforehand — in a specific case for the convenience of one of
the parties thereof. Closed proceedings should remain closed; vested rights should
not be unsettled
• even administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy
demands that finality be written on judicial controversies
• public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was
already terminated should not be disturbed
• The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversy.
• t]he rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial
acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
• letter decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary "by authority of the
President" reversing the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in this case is null and void and of no force and effect.
Taule vs Santos
Facts:
1. Federation of Brgy Councils (FABC) composed of 11 members as Pres of
the Assoc of Brgy Councils convened w/ 6 members in attendance only to hold the
election of its officers
2. Governor sent a letter complaint so Sec of LG Santos protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification bec of irregularities
in the manner the election was conducted
3. Sec nullified the election of the officers
4. Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government
Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the
rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for
the initial implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least
disruption of on-going programs and projects 7 issued Department of Local
Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the
conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the
municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels
5. Petitioner: neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC, the
katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level and that hat under Article IX, C,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.
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Issue:WON the Sec has juris to entertain an election protest involving the election
of the officers of the FABC; extent of authority of the Secretary of Local
Government over
the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils
Held: NO juris
• jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials
of which are determined through the will of the electorate.
• Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain
any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
• no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
• Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local
government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance
thereof by said units."
• Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7,
Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code, to wit:
• (3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
• Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in
pursuance of his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force
and effect of law
• well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions
of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. 20
Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations
• Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to
the exercise of general supervision 22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." 23 The general supervision is exercised by the President through
the Secretary of Local Government
• In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the
Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long
as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25 Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
• Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will
give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give
him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a
purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as
the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest
autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be
conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by
the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by
the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
• state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared
that "the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government
units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress
• though the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.30 To
monitor means "to watch, observe or check. 31 This is compatible with the power
of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local
Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing
circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be
enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control
over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the
DLG Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere
with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government.
recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the
exclusive
Phil. Gamefowl Commission v. IAC
FACTS: Acusar was operating a cockpit in Bogo,Cebu. He was ordered to relocate
since he was operating at a prohibited area. Acusar failed to comply – thus his right
for renewal was considered waived.
Sevilla was granted a license to operate a cockpit; as granted by the Mayor and by
the Sanggunian;
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Acusar sued to have Sevilla’s license revoke; but it was dismissed by the CFI
Acusar went to PGC seeking to renew his license and have Sevilla’s cancelled. PGC
issued an interlocutory order allowing Acusar to operate his cockpit.
IAC declared the PGC resolution, null and void.
ISSUE: Conflict of jurisdiction between PGC and the municipal government
regarding the power to issue licenses for operation of cockpits.
HELD: According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the
power to "grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and
municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which
they have been granted,"[15] and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate
cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing
guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission.“
it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has
the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the
regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the
guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license
is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits.
Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review
and supervision.
the PGC cannot directly exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp
the authority directly conferred by law on the municipal authorities.
III. Power of Investigation
Investigatory powers have been granted by the Constitution or the legislature to
executive or administrative officials or agencies for the following purposes:
1) information gathering, as basis to recommend appropriate action by other
government agencies or to focus public opinion on matters of vital concern;
2) prosecution purposes;
3) in aid in the exercise of other powers granted them.
The enabling act defines the extent of such investigatory powers.
Notice and hearing in investigation
One of the cardinal requirements of due process is notice and hearing. If the law
upon which the investigation is authorized, provides that the person investigated be
given notice or accorded the opportunity to be heard, then such right cannot be
ignored nor he be denied notice and hearing without violating his right to due
process.
However, if the law is silent on the matter, the question as to whether or not a
person who may probably be affected or called to answer certain questions in the
exercise of investigative powers of officials or administrative agencies is entitled to
due process or to notice and hearing depends upon the stage during which the
investigation is conducted and the possible consequences to him of the outcome of
such investigation.
Executive power of investigation
The President has the power to order the conduct of investigation for all
administrative functions, rule-making, adjudication, and for purposes no more
specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if any thing should be
done.
As chief administrative officer, the President may make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a disciplinary,
administrative, prosecutor, legislative or judicial nature may be taken.
The President's investigatory power emanates from his power of supervision and
control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices; his power of
supervision over local government units; and his power of appointment of
presidential appointees, conferred upon him by the Constitution. It also comes from
powers delegated to him by the legislature. Sec. 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code empowers the President "to order, when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in
the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official,
committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted."
Investigatory powers, as incidents of main functions
Inquisitive power is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority. It allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or require disclosure
of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents or otherwise.
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It consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful tool in
an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions. It is indispensable to prosecution.
In investigations by an investigating body or committee, whose report may be the
basis of an administrative charge against a public officer or employee, the latter is
not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of said
investigating body or committee. He is only entitled to be informed of the charges
against him, to a hearing of said charges, to an opportunity to meet the evidence
against him, to present his own evidence and to be furnished with copy of the
administrative decision, so that he may, if he so desires, appeal therefrom to the
CSC within 15 days from notice.
Investigatory power as main function
An investigatory body with the sole power of investigation does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in
respect thereto.
The test whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions is:
adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties before it. If the only purpose of investigation is
to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on facts and circumstances
presented to it, and of the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
There are administrative agencies which are granted only investigatory powers.
The National Bureau of Investigation is another administrative agency, whose
power is basically investigatory and informational. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial
powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine
probable cause.
It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. In
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may
require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of
crimes.
Investigatory powers of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is the protector of the people against abuses of government
officials and employees. He has been granted vast powers, which may be classified
as follows:
1) investigatory power;
2) prosecutory power;
3) public assistance functions;
4) authority to inquire and obtain information;
5) function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures
The Ombudsman's authority to investigate any illegal act or omission of any public
official is broad enough to include the investigation of any crime committed by a
public official. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.
The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer upon the
Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by
an agency or office upon whom the judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus,
on the question of whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by
law in a government agency, which involves the exercise of discretion, the
Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and granting it to
another bidder.
Cases
Evangelista v. Jarencio
FACTS: The President of the RP created the Presidential Agency on Reformss and
Government Operations (PARGO) under EO 4.
One of its function is to "investigate all activities or affecting immoral practices,
graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion,
etc.
In line with its power, PARGO through it undersecretary, Evangelista, issued to
respondent Manalastas, the acting City Public Service of Manila a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him to be and appear as witness at the office of PARGO.
Manalastas din not obey the subpoena. He, however, filed with the CFI of Manila a
petition for prohibition.
CFI ruled in Manalastas favor.
ISSUE: Does PARGO, thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations?
HELD: Yes
Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making,
adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing,
for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no
more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be
done.
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings
of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling
for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions.
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not
necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of
violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the
subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to
make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.
The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent
upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that
it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
probable violation of the law
Carino v CHR
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, around 800 public school teachers performed mass
concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention.
Due to these acts. the Secretary of Education issued a return to work order to the
teachers.
Despite the order the demonstrations still continued.
Due to the failure to obey the order, some of the teachers were terminated and
suspended from their work.
The courts ruled against the teachers
However, the teachers sought relief from the CHR. The CHR disregarded the courts
order and said that it will be the one to judge the case.
ISSUE: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to try the case?
HELD: No
CHR have no such power. It was not meant by the Constitution to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or to duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
IV. Power of Reorganization
The legislature usually exercises the power to create or abolish by delegating it to
the President or to another executive officer or body. The means by which the
legislature makes the delegation is by authorizing reorganization.
Reorganization is the process of restructuring the bureaucracy's organizational and
functional setup, to make it more viable in terms of the economy, efficiency,
effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as
authorized by law. It is the means used by the legislature to reorganize or abolish
offices, which it may do so by law directly or indirectly by authorizing an executive
department or agency to reorganize its office. The legislative power to reorganize -
and to abolish offices - applies to all offices, including lower courts, except only
those created by the Constitution itself.
Cases
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted Larin (a Revenue Specific Tax Officer) of
crimes for the violation of NIRC; his conviction was reported to the President;
A committee was created to investigate the administrative charges against him;
Along with that, the President issued EO 132 which mandated the streamlining of
the BIR – abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred offices and some
positions.
The position of Larin was abolished
ISSUE: That pursuant to EO 132 Larin was unlawfully removed from office. The
President had no authority to dismiss him; and that he was removed due to the
reorganization.
HELD: While the President’s power to reorganize cannot be denied, this does not
mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with
law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is
pursued in good faith.
Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that: “As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio.
There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.”
Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898 (1961)
FACTS:5 labor disputes consolidated into one.
Complainants are claiming non-payment of separation pay, overtime pay, vacation
leave pay, and unpaid wages;
All are seeking relief from the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor,
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan 20-A;
It is being disputed that Reorganization Plan 20-A is null and void; thus cases of
money claims from labor disputes are well within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
ISSUE: Validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission -- insofar as it confers
jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan
to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
HELD: the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission
with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law,
had no compulsory power to settle cases for money claims, the only authority it had
being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing;
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting
money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new
conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it.
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
administrative, not judicial functions.
For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry
out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government which
plainly did not include the creation of courts.
And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law
Judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary.
It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or
bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of administrative functions.2 But in so doing, the
legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as
even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to
those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a
matter exclusively vested in the courts.3
"Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it confers judicial powers to the Regional
Offices over cases other than those falling under the Workmen's Compensation
Law, is invalid and of no effect.“
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when
clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such
conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
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Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute
She applied for a Career Executive Service Elegibility and a CESO rank
She was given a CES eligibility
Subsequently, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Exeutive Service Board
However, CSC passed Resolution No. 9304359, which reorganize the Commission.
The Career Executive Service Board was changed to the Office for Career Executive
of the CSC.
The resolution became an impediment to Eugenio's appointment as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV.
ISSUE: Does the CSC have the power to abolish the Career Executive Board (CESB)?
HELD: No.
The CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.
In this case, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993,
the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of the CESB.
CSC's power to abolish is limited to offices under its control as enumerated by the
CSC law.
CESB was intend to be an autonomous entity, although administratively attached to
respondent Commission.
OVERSIGHT POWER OF THE CONGRESS
J.PUNO’s opinion with facts
Romulo Macalintal filed taxpayer’s suit saying that the creation of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC,
R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a
constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative
departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules
and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law,
it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators
ISSUE: May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission
on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? role of Congress through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the independence of the
COMELEC, as a constitutional body
J. Puno’s Opinion:
• oversight power is indispensable for Congress to discharge its broad power
to legislate.
• (1) whether Congress has oversight functions over constitutional bodies
like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether Congress exceeded the
permissible exercise of its oversight functions.
• two principles basic to our constitutional democracy: separation of powers
and checks and balances.
o separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers to a single branch of government
o John Locke: defined legislative power as “that which has a right to direct
how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it; executive power as involving “the execution of
the municipal laws of the society within its self, [and] upon all that are parts of
it”[85] and federative power as concerned with “the management of the security
and interest of the public without” including “the power of war and peace, leagues
and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without
the commonwealth
• When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions
may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner
• if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and
oppression
• U.S. Constitution allows the “sharing” of the three great powers between
and among the three branches. The President, for instance, shares in the exercise of
legislative power through his veto power, and the courts through their power to
make rules of judicial procedure and especially through their right to interpret laws
and invalidate them as unconstitutional. Congress shares in the exercise of
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executive power through its confirmation of appointments and assent to treaties,
power to create inferior courts and regulate the number and pay of judges. Framers
established a government guided not by strict separation of powers but one of
checks and balances
• some legal luminaries were of the view that the concept of checks and
balances is diametrically opposed to the principle of separation of powers. Madison
defended the Constitution as having sufficient division of functions among the three
branches of government to avoid the consolidation of power in any one branch and
also stressed that a rigid segregation of the three branches would undermine the
purpose of the separation doctrine
• comprehensive system but the separate powers were not intended to
operate with absolute independence. no means contemplates total separation of
each of these essential branches of government and the framers viewed the
principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. “hermetic sealing
off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the
establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively
• TEST: an act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches,
the Court suggested that the proper inquiry should focus on the extent to which it
prevents the other branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions
Phil jurisprudence: actual division in our Constitution. Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government.
(1) blending” of some of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers in one
body; (2) does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring into the affairs
of the other branches to maintain the balance of power; (3) but ensures that there
is no encroachment on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the other
branches.
• Congress checks the other branches of government primarily through its
law making powers. Congress can create administrative agencies, define their
powers and duties, fix the terms of officers and their compensation.[124] It can also
create courts, define their jurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long as it does
not undermine the security of tenure of its members.[125] The power of Congress
does not end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant with its principal
power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are
faithfully executed
• The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government
• John Stuart Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is “to watch and
control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers objectionable;
and to censure them if found condemnable.
Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the
perceived “exponential accumulation of power” by the executive branch Congress,
thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies
perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.
oversight power has also been used to ensure the accountability of regulatory
commissions like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board, often referred to as representing a “headless fourth branch of
government.”[135] Unlike other ordinary administrative agencies, these bodies are
independent from the executive branch and are outside the executive department
in the discharge of their functions
Categories of congressional oversight functions
a. Scrutiny
o continuity of attention to administrative operations
o to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities
o request information and report from the other branches of government
o based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress; power of the
purse” belongs to Congress
o President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on
appropriations. administrative officials appear every year before the appropriation
committees of Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a program of
administration for the succeeding fiscal year. administrative officials defend their
budget proposals
o power to specify the project or activity to be funded
o budget hearing -- reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous
appropriation to ascertain whether they have been disbursed for purposes
authorized in an appropriation act
Congress can ask the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section
22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
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o This provision originated from the Administrative Code[144] and was later
elevated to the level of a constitutional provision
o provision was permissive: the department heads could appear but the
legislative was not obliged to entertain them; reciprocally, the legislature could
request their appearance but could not oblige them especially if the President
objected
o proposal was vigorously opposed on the ground of separation of powers
o Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation.
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the organization of a
Commission on Appointments
o Consent of the Commission on Appointments is needed for the nominees
of the President for the following positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b)
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose
appointments are vested with the President under the Constitution
o intended to lessen political considerations in the appointment of officials
in sensitive positions in the government
• b. Congressional investigation
o more intense digging of facts
o conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected
o essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function
o .”[161] It encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes
o virtually, plenary power to compel information needed to discharge its
legislative functions from executive agencies, private persons and organizations
o this is based on the theory that “a legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect change
o but this right is not unlimited - it must be related to, and in furtherance of,
a legitimate task of Congress
o Arnault v. Nazareno,[169] decided in 1950, when no provision yet existed
granting Congress the power to conduct investigation
refusal of Arnault to answer a question which he claimed to be “self-
incriminatory,”[170] the Senate passed a resolution citing Arnault in contempt. until
he shall have answered the question. Arnault filed a petition before this Court
contending that (a) the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt; (b) the
information sought to be obtained by the Senate is immaterial and will not serve
any intended or purported legislation; and (c) the answer required of him will
incriminate him.
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied; mere
requests for such information are often unavailing; volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed; investigation was also found to be “in aid of legislation.
inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination
witness can not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry.
that “the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation
fact that the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time
liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation; danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court
o 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed
by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it
must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c)
the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights
o power “to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness
• c. Legislative supervision
o Supervision” connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of
a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative
area
o ,congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority
o exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power;
granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations
with the force of law.
o present the proposed regulations to Congress; right” to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect; proposed regulation will become
law if Congress affirmatively approves it
o `After World War II, legislative veto provisions have been inserted in laws
delegating authority in new areas of governmental involvement including the space
program, international agreements on nuclear energy, tariff arrangements, and
adjustment of federal pay rates
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o Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive
branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular
exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing
law promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the
activities of unelected administrative agencies
o criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution.[203]They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible
evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in
the executive or judicial branches of government; further argue that legislative veto
“is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces
outside its chambers; legislative veto “is the most efficient means Congress has yet
devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as
declared by statute
• Congressional Oversight and COMELEC
o COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government
o independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people
o COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election contests
involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under its exclusive
original jurisdiction while all contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials are under its appellate jurisdiction
o President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the
President in the discharge of their functions.
o Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to
its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties; free from all
suspicions of partisan inclinations
o COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially during
budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC; it owes its origin from
the Constitution. Furthermore, the salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners
cannot be decreased during their tenure
o 1987 Constitution provides that its approved annual appropriations are to
be automatically and regularly released; has no power to call the commissioners of
the COMELEC to a question hour; question hour is limited to heads of departments
under the Executive branch,
• I respectfully submit that the legislative veto power or congressional
oversight power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in
order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional.—J. PUNO
• The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our
election laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively
by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress
in the exercise of its oversight powers.
• The power was vested by Congress to the COMELEC in the Omnibus
Election Code: c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of
this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer
o statutory power was elevated to a constitutional status with the insertion
of the word “regulations” in section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, viz
o present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power
to promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Article IX-C
• Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and
regulations has been directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by
Congress; power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence,
its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress
• From the law itself, it is clear that Congress has already set the necessary
standards to guide the COMELEC in identifying the countries where voting by mail
may be allowed
• Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their
enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be
subject to review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight
power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus
of partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must be
accorded considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by
COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not
be interfered with
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS
POLITICAL LAW
Branch of public law
Deals with the organization and operation of government organs
And defines relations of the state with its inhabitants
Its subdivisions:
Constitutional law
Administrative law
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Law on public officers Groupings of contiguous provinces

Law on public corporations For administration purposes; NOT for political representation

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT

Branch of public law Refers to any of the various units of the government:
Fixes the organization of government and determines the competence of Department
administrative authorities who execute the law Bureau
Indicates to individuals the remedies for the violations of their rights Office
Instrumentality
GOVERNMENT GOCC
Aggregate of authorities which rule a society Local government

ADMINISTRATION FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Aggregate of persons who reign the governments for the time being Authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or
privileges, and adjudicate cases;
CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT Licensing functions;
Self- constructive: it is not created by any organization Regulates private rights, privilege, occupation or business;
It has exclusive control over a population within a definite territory Exercise of disciplinary power over officials.
Self- regulated: bound only by rules of its own making
It has clear coercive capability INSTRUMENTALITY
Agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
It refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands; autonomy.
Including: the various arms through which political authority is made effective
Central Government CHARTERED INSTITUTION
Province Agency organized or operating under a special charter
Municipality Vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives
Other branches of local government Includes:
State universities
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT Colleges
Refers on the central government, consisting of: Monetary authority of the state
Executive; GOCC
Legislative, and Agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
Judicial relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature
Owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
LOCAL GOVERNMENT to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock
Political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs; Development of Administrative Law & Creation of Administrative Agencies
Political subdivision established by or in accordance with the Constitution
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS Development of Administrative Law
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Reason for the enactment of the 1987 Admin Code
The whereas clause of the Code:
WHEREAS, the Administrative Code currently in force was first forged in 1917 when
the relationship between the people and the government was defined by the
colonial order then prevailing;
WHEREAS, efforts to achieve an integrative and over-all recodification of its
provisions resulted in the Administrative Code of 1978 which, however, was never
published and later expressly repealed;
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new
Administrative Code which incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
WHEREAS, a new Administrative Code will be of optimum benefit to the people and
Government officers and employees as it embodies changes in administrative
structures and procedures designed to serve the people
Basically
The previous law was too old
There was an attempt to make a new one in 1978 but it did not materialize
To make the government more effective
For the benefit of both the State and its citizens
Creation of Administrative Agencies
Administrative Agencies, Boards, and Commissions are public offices.
Administrative Agencies are government bodies charged with administering and
implementing particular legislations.
How are public offices created?
Constitution
Office of the President (Chief Administrative Officer)
CONCOMS (COMELEC, CSC, COA, OMB, NEDA, CHR, NAPOLCOM
Law
Officer/ Tribunal to which the power to create has been delegated by the
legislature
What can we infer from the previous slide?
That except such offices created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is
primarily a legislative function.
Agpalo: When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define
duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created.
Reason for creation of Administrative Agencies
Administrative Agencies today are multiplying as problems of modern society keep
growing. Here are some reasons for its continuous growth according to Agpalo:
To unclog court dockets. Relieving courts of the burden of resolving all
controversies
To help in the regulations of ramified activities of a developing country.
To function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain
governmental functions (BOI, BIR, CSC)
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Administrative Agencies
 They are distinct department of government.
 They are granted by the legislature with administrative, executive,
investigatory, legislative, or judicial powers or a combination of these, as
exception to the general rule against delegation of power.
Two most important powers of administrative officers are:
 Quasi- legislative – which enables them to promulgate implementing rules
and regulations;
 Quasi-judicial – which enables them to interpret and apply such
regulations.
a. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED POWERS
 There must be a grant of authority, whether express or implied, to
justify any action taken by them.
 Otherwise or in its absence, what they do as public officials’ lacks
validity and, if challenged, must be set aside.
1. Express- a public official exercises power within the law which grants it
2. Implied- power need not to be expressed. It may be implied from the
wording of the law
CASES:
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS V. TORRES, 212 SCRA 298 (1992)
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Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) filed a petition to prohibit and
enjoin the Secretary of DOLE and the Administrator of the POEA from enforcing and
implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong
Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of
processing and deploying such workers.
They reasoned out that:
 that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess
of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
 that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution,
are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
 that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
Ruling:
 The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative
bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been
necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society
 Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
 Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant
violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and
documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private
employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to
Hongkong. [public interest)
 The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power
as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
JMM PROMOTION V. CA, 260 SCRA 319 (1996)
Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to
Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing
by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right
to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution,
petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid
exercise of the police power.
Ruling:
 The Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department
Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
 Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare
or the common good.
 As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows
that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or
was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
GTEB V. CA, 268 SCRA 258 (1997)
Issue: Whether the Board has jurisdiction to resolve who, between the contending
private entities, is entitled to certain garment quotas, and pursuant to the power
granted it by law to cancel or suspend quota allocations.
Held: The Board has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court equivocated as to whether the
grant was express or merely implied because the language of the law is not clear.
On the basis of the provisions of law cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun, that
the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity's entitlement to export
allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily
implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.
b. MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONATORY POWERS
 MINISTERIAL DUTY – is one which is as clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance.
 DISCRETIONARY DUTY – is that which by its nature requires the exercise of
judgment.
CASES:
MATEO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Issue: whether or not the approval of a notice of appeal by the trial judge is a
ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus.
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Ruling:
 A petition for mandamus lies “when any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for
the exercise of discretion in its performance.
 On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires
the exercise of judgment.
 A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done.
 But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
nor judgment. x x x
c. MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE DUTIES AND POWERS
CASES:
TANADA vs. CUENCO
 There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in
a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every
other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain
the legislative intent.
 The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding
circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the
statute.
 Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object,
and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or
the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other
related statutes.
 Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in
order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are
such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and
all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as
mandatory, such construction should be given;
 On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form,
may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried
out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a
mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as
directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact
make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. ..
d. ERRORS IN EXERCISE OF POWERS
 The government can do no wrong. It authorizes only legal acts by its
officers.
 Its officers and agents do wrong or commit unauthorized acts. And when
they do, they are not errors or acts of the government.
 The government is never estopped by such mistake or error. Neither does
it bar future action in accordance with law.
CASES:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose
rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen.
B. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Legislative Power, generally
Legislative power – the power to make, alter and repeal laws.
 the legislative power is plenary for all purposes of civil government,
subject only to such limitations as are found in the Constitution.
 the Constitution vests legislative power to the Senate and House of
Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
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Essential feature of Legislative Function – determination of the legislative 1. Executive Orders are “acts of the President providing for
policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule rules of a general or permanent character in implementation
of conduct. or execution of constitutional or statutory powers.”
 The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of 2. Administrative Orders are “acts of the President which relate
purely legislative power. Why? to particular aspects of governmental operations in
 U.S. v. Barrias gives the rationale: “Where the sovereign power of pursuance of his duties as administrative head.”
the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by 3. Proclamations are “acts of the President fixing a date or
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the declaring a statute or condition of public moment or interest,
constitution itself is changed… This doctrine is based on the upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only regulation is made to depend.”
a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the 4. Memorandum Orders are “acts of the President on matters
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of interest which only concern a particular officer or office of
another.” the Government.”
5. Memorandum Circulars are “acts of the President on matters
a. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT. relating to internal administration which the President
 The doctrine of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
delegation of legislative power. The Constitution itself delegates departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
legislative power to the President, the Supreme Court, and the Government, for information and compliance.”
local government units. 6. General or Specific Orders are “acts and commands o the
 Delegation of legislative power to the President is permitted in President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of the Constitution. The Administrative Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Code of 1987 also delegates to the President certain ordinance
powers, in the form of presidential issuances. Summary Table
 The doctrine of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit
delegation of legislative power. The Constitution itself delegates Presidential Subject Matter Origin of Examples
legislative power to the President, the Supreme Court, and the Issuance Authority
local government units. 1. Executive Implementation or Constitutional a. Modifying the rates
 Delegation of legislative power to the President is permitted in Orders execution of its or Statutory of duty on certain
powers imported articles as
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of the Constitution. The Administrative
provided for under the
Code of 1987 also delegates to the President certain ordinance Rules of a general Tariff and Customs
powers, in the form of presidential issuances. or permanent Code of the
 Presidential Issuances are those which the President issues in the character Philippines (TCCP), as
exercise of his ordinance power. They include the following: amended, in order to
implement the
Philippine Tariff

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Commitments on interest, upon

certain Products which the b. Declaring 5
included in the highly operation of a December of every
sensitive list under the specific law or year as “National
Association of regulation is made Competition Day”
Southeast Asean to depend
Nations (ASEAN) – 4. Memorandum Matters of Duties as a. Creating a technical
China Free Trade Area orders administrative administrative working group to
(ACFTA). detail or of head study and consolidate
subordinate or proposed
b. Modifying the temporary interest amendments to
nomenclature and the Republic Act no. 9165,
rates of import duty Only concerns a otherwise known as
on various products particular officer or the “Comprehensive
under Section 104 of office of the Dangerous Drugs Act”
the Tariff and Customs Government
Code of 1978 b. Directing the
(Presidential Decree Secretary of National
No. 1464), as Defense to lead the
amended 2011 observance of
2. Particular aspects Duties as a. Reorganizing and Araw ng Kagitingan
Administrative of governmental administrative renaming the and the Philippine
Orders operations head Philippine Council on Veterans Week
ASEAN and APEC 5. Memorandum Matters relating to Duties as a. Directing all
Cooperation into the circulars internal administrative concerned
Philippine Council for administration head government agencies
Regional Cooperation. to plan, prepare, and
Concerns all or conduct activities for
b. Creating an inter- some of the the inauguration of
agency task force on departments, the Puerto Princesa
the harmonization of agencies, bureaus Underground River
national government or offices of the (PPUR) as one of the
performance Government New Seven Wonders
monitoring, of Nature (N7WN),
information and Usually for pursuant to
reporting systems information and Proclamation No. 182
3. Proclamations Fixing a date or Constitutional a. Declaring the last compliance (s. 2011)
declaring a statute or Statutory week of May of every
or condition of year as “National b. Enjoining all officials
public moment or Interior Design Week” and employees in all

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departments, agencies Delegation as exception to restriction thereon.

and instrumentalities  The prohibition against delegation of legislative power does not
of the National embrace every power the legislature may properly exercise. What
Government, including
the doctrine of separation of power precludes is the delegation of
Government-Owned
and Controlled those powers which are strictly or inherently and exclusively
Corporations, as well legislative.
as Local Government  These exclusively legislative powers consist generally of what the
Units to actively law shall be, to whom it may be applied, or what acts are
participate in the necessary to effectuate the law.
observance of the
 The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law, to
26TH year anniversary
determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the
of the EDSA People
Power Revolution of law, and to fix the limits within which the law shall operate is a
1986 power which is vested in the legislative and may not be delegated.
6. General or Matters relating to Commander-in- a. Directing the Armed  The delegation to administrative agencies of some o the
specific orders security, peace and Chief of the Forces of the legislative power is necessary, particularly in modern regulatory
order Armed Forces of Philippines and the enactments in which the legislative is incapable of defining the
the Philippines Philippine National
multitudinous details.
Police to prevent and
suppress lawless
violence and acts of Trend in delegation of legislative power.
rebellion in the  Delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
Province of delegation the exception.
Maguindanao (except  The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many
for certain areas)
technical fields of governmental functions.
pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1959  Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
dated 4 December
2009 Power of Subordinate Legislation
 The Power of Subordinate Legislation – delegated authority to
b. Directing the Armed issue rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the
Forces of the
statute.
Philippines and the
Philippine National  With this power, administrative agencies may implement the
Police to prevent and broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details
suppress acts of (supplementary regulations)
terrorism and lawless
violence in Regions 11 Reasons for Delegation of legislative power.
and 12

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 Inability of the legislative bodies to anticipate all or many possible
detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject,
that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agency
 Increasing complexity of the task of the government
 Legislature may not have the competence to provide the required
direct and efficacious specific solutions.
What cannot be delegated?
 Power to make the Law
 To determine what the law shall be
 To alter or repeal it.
 The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law, to
determine the purpose or policy to achieved by the law, or to fix
the limits within which the law shall operate
What may be delegated?
 Discretion as to how the law shall be enforced
 To issue rules to fill in details
 To ascertain facts in which the law will operate
 To exercise police power
 To fix rates
Two Test – determine whether there is a valid delegation of legislative
power.
1. The completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it.
 The subject, the manner, and the extent of its operation
are stated therein.
 The provisions is sufficiently definite and certain to
enable one to know his rights and obligations
 It describes what must be done, who must do it, and the
scope of authority
2. The sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
 The legislative must declare the policy or purpose of the
law and fix the legal principles which are to control in
given cases by setting up standards or guides to indicate
the extent, and prescribe the limits
 Standard may be express or implied. Standard may be
found:
a. Framework of the statute under which the act is to
be performed
b. Inhere in its subject matter or purpose
c. Other pertinent legislation, or an executive order, or
in the field of law governing the operation of the
agency
When Standard is Sufficient
 The court has upheld as adequate standards:
 simplicity and dignity - Balbuena v. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil 150 (1910)
 public interest - People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (1939)
 public welfare - Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940).
 interest of law and order - Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil 669 (1919).
 justice and equity - International Hardwood v. Pangil
Federation of Labor, 70 Phil 602 (1940).
 adequate and efficient instruction - Phil. Association of
Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97
Phil 806 (1955).
 public safety - Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1990)
 public policy - Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. vs. Municipality of
Tanawan Leyte, 69 SCRA 460 (1976).
 greater national interest - Maceda v. Macaraig, 197
SCRA 771 (1991).
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 protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates - Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703
(1993).
 promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
government - Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995).
Usual Issued on Validity of Delegation
 Against the delegating statute itself - whether or not the
requisites of valid delegation are present (2-test). If any one of
these requisites is absent, statute is unconstitutional.
 Against the exercise of the delegated power - whether or not
the rule or regulation conforms with what the statute provides
and whether the same is reasonable.
 May a delegated statute meet all requisites of valid delegation,
but the rule issued in the exercise of the delegated authority may
suffer infirmity? Yes.
Rules or Regulations
 Are the products of subordinate legislation
 If valid they have the force and effect of a law
 In order to be valid, the administrative rules and regulations
 must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
 must not contradict the law but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes
 must be reasonable
 must be related solely to carrying out the effect the general
provisions of the law
 cannot restrict nor enlarge the law
CASES:
PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)
Facts:
The President, by Executive Order, prohibited "the transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn
from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from
storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.” This action
was based on § 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
The Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and its co-
plaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, sued to restrain the
defendants, who were federal officials. Plaintiffs attacked the validity of § 9(c) as an
unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power and as
transcending the authority of the Congress under the commerce clause. The
Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its co-plaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas
and owning separate properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission of that
state, its members and other state officers, and the other defendants who were
federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal restrictions upon the
production and disposition of oil. As to the federal requirements, the bill not only
attacked § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the regulations of the
Secretary of the Interior thereunder, upon substantially the same grounds as those
set forth in the bill of the Panama Refining Company, but also challenged the
validity of provisions of the Petroleum Code.
Section 9(c) is assailed upon the ground that it is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
Issue: Whether Section 9 (c) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
Held:
The section purports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law. It is the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum
products which are produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted by state authority.
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Congress in § 9(c) declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess
production. It gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy
and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. Congress
permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the
President the functions of a Legislature, rather than those of an executive or
administrative officer executing a declared legislative policy.
The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. There is a distinction
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but
may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the
declared legislative policy; that is, to fill up the details" under the general provisions
made by the Legislature. From the beginning of the government, the Congress has
conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations -- "not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did
govern." Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of conduct, but they are
valid only as subordinate there are limits of delegation which there is no
constitutional authority to transcend
§ 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess
of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no
standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of
circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or
prohibited. If § 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that anything would
be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking
function.
Instead of performing its lawmaking function, the Congress could, at will and as to
such subjects as it chooses, transfer that function to the President or other officer
or to an administrative body. The executive order contains no finding, no statement
of the grounds of the President's action in enacting the prohibition.
The Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must
enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the
performance of its function. Such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules
enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith to give validity to its action.
When, therefore, such an administrative agency is required as a condition
precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must rest
upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is ineffective.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING
OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO
G.R. No. 76633; October 18, 1988; CRUZ
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
Petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by
the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the
State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The
award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was
made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of
the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority
had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
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Issue: Whether the POEA had the authority to promulgate such regulation and, if
so, whether it represents a valid delegation of legislative power?
Held:
The authority of the POEA to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section
4(a) of Executive Order No. 797
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered
by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted.
Delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found
it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The power of
the POEA in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable employment practices
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and
the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulation.
Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments
and cannot be considered violative of due process.
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY
G.R. No. 74457; March 20, 1987; CRUZ
Facts:
Petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery. The
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. He also alleges that it is a product of an undue
delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether the said statute is unconstitutional for constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power?
Held:
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6.
It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or
letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law.
As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the
executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment," a phrase that will
lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion.
We also mark the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when
they make their distribution. There is none.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that
is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. As such, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN
R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG
G.R. No. 102782; December 11, 1991; CRUZ
Facts:
In a letter, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped
for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. The Caloocan-Manila Drivers and
Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the
decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for
confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining
against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for
an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. This was followed by a letter-complaint
from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat.
R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. Still another complaint was received by the
Court , this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the
removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-
Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V.
Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/
abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila."
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and
motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Solicitor General to submit separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the
said decision.
Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it
was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. Solicitor General
expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is null and void for being an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power?
Held:
Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the
specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
Government Code
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all
its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute
reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall
be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with
a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of
the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an
acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority.
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power.
The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as
agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect
and conform to the will of their principal.
A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
Measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not
conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow
either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now
the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal.
In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The
measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so
doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
G.R. No. 127325; March 19, 1997; DAVIDE
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative.”
Petitioners herein filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such
law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner
Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments… (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has
no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative
to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass
the implementing law.”
Issue: Whether the delegation of power to the COMELEC is invalid?
Held:
The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
This is because the interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying
out Section 2 are left to the legislature. The interpellations which ensued on the
proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative
act which must implement the exercise of the right. The system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance
with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. First, contrary to the
assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Second, the Act does not provide for
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the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. It does not include, as
among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution, Third, while the Act provides
subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing
for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and
local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally,
to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering"
the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers
to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation
of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local
governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.
It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A.
No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, petitioner, vs. THE BOARD OF
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, respondent. [Cia. Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility., 34 Phil. 136(1916)]
Doctrine: VALIDITY OF ACT No. 2307; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO
BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES.—An Act of the Philippine Legislature giving to the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners power to require every public utility "to
furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and
containing such matters as the board may from time to time by order prescribe" is
invalid for the reason that it is a delegation of legislative power to the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners and is in violation of the Act of July 1, 1902.
Facts:
1. The petitioner alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the laws
of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common
carrier of passengers and merchandise by water;
 that on or about the 7th day of June, 1915, the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners issued and caused to be served on petitioner an order to
show cause why petitioner should not be required to present detailed
annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the
vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters
indicated by the model attached to the petition;
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
 that after a hearing the Board of Public Utility Commissioners dictated an
order in the following terms: "The respondent is therefore ordered to
present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report
of finances and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a
common carrier within the Philippine Islands…..
2. On its return to the order to show cause before the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners the petitioner denied the authority of the board to require the
report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by
said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring
such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the
Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board.
 The petitioner also answered that the requirements of the board with
respect to the proposed report were "cumbersome and unnecessarily
prolix and that the preparation of the same would entail an immense
amount of clerical work."
3. The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand,
reads as follows: Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon
notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e)
To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such
form and containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order
prescribe.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Public Utility Commissioners has the authority
to ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed
report of finances and operations of such vessels by the petitioner. NO
Held:
1. As is apparent at a glance the provision conferring authority on the board is
very general. It is also very comprehensive. It calls for a detailed report of the
finances and operations of the petitioning steamship company. That, it would
seem, covers substantially everything; for there is very little to a steamship
company but its finances and operations.
2. It is clear that a statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the
nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall
follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters
whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own
will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it
refers.
3. Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the
State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct
and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have
in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require
them to deal justly and equitably with the State.
4. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require what information the board wants.
5. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given
subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule
or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or
applied.
6. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the
general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does
it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically
everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act,
how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
7. We believe that the Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its
powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We believe that the
Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information
which the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information
which the board wants.
8. In the case of Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. (1 Ohio St.
77), the court, dealing with the question of whether a power is strictly
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law,
said:
 The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.
 Dowling vs. Lancashire Insurance Co. (92 Wis., 63). .. The result of all the
cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in
all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS ET AL., 70 PHIL., 726(1940)
Doctrine: .Constitutional Law; Constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 548;
Delegation op Legislative Power; Authority of Director of Public Works and
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to Promulgate Rules and
Reg-ulations.—The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Com-munications. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
de-signated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or
all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public con-venience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, there-fore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which
the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be di-rectly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occa-sion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.
Facts:
1. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commis-sion; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Ser-gio Bayan,
as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Com-munications; Eulogio
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting
Chief of Police of Manila.
2. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
a. recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30
p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for
a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic;
b. that the Chairman of the National Traffic Com-mission, on July 18, 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secre-tary of Public Works and
Communications, to promul-gate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads;
3. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which
the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
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Works and Com-munications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regu-lations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
Held:
This contention is untenable.
1. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early
Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of
cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or dis-cretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
2. The above provisions of law (Section 1 of CommonwealthAct No. 548) do
not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secre-tary of Public Works and Communications.
 The author-ity therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the Na-tional Assembly in said Act, to wit,
a. "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
As-sembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Phil-ippines" and
b. to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever
the condition of the road or the traf-fic makes such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
 The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what
the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstan-ces upon which the application of said law is to be
predi-cated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the re-quirements of public convenience and interest, is an
ad-ministrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly.
 It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law.
 But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
 As was said in Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less
than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to
rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed,
or to things future and impossible to fully know."
 The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legisla-ture cannot
delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be
to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination out-side of the halls of legislation."
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
Requisites for valid delegation of power.—Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) be
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
Facts:
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1. During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.
2. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
 Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
 Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action
is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of
the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded.
3. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC
has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed”
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected” and the
“recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which
the proposed barrio is situated.”
4. Pelaez argues, accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
5. Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created without creating
new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the
petitioners argument, which questions the President’s authority to create
municipalities. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of
legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binañgonan
Issue: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs
creatingmunicipalities.
Held:
The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor General permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said EOs or any disbursement by the created municipalities.
1. Althougha Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law:
a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and
b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
2. Without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority.
3. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make
the law, but worse, to adopt measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system
4. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not
overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68,
the President: ... may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
5. It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as
the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one
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just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be
transferred.
 This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68
was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, which provided that, "whenever in
the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he
may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in
said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires."
 The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not
included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the
time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of
said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the
government was to be transferred.
 At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true
that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68
Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest,"
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases —
as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the
specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect.
 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations topromote safe
transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the
Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under
Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the
sale ofspeculative securities. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
6. It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued
after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this
case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of
said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can
hardly be given.
7. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
 This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned.
 With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments.
 Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as
the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not
enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or
annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any
disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.
8. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in
effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including
therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would
thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel
local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over
them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
CHIONGBIAN V ORBOS (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY) 1995, J. MENDOZA
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Constitutional Law; Delegation of Legislative Power; Power conferred on the
President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which is
administrative in nature.—As this Court observed in Abbas, “while the power to
merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is
a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4
of the Constitution].” The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are “mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.” The power
conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries
which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as “administrative in
nature.”
Facts:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President
of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions
remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive
Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
1. Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734 the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
2. RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the following provinces:
Basilan,Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, SouthCotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Norte, and Zamboanga delSur; and the following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan,Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and
Zamboanga
3. Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region: Lanao del
Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi.
4. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of
the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
 That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall
be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in
the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
5. With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429,
“Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.”
6. Petitioners, members of the Congress, contending that there’s: There is no law
which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the
existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in
the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta,
Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions.
7. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point,
that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions."
 The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing governmental units or
reorganization.
 the authority to merge doesn’t include the authority to reorganize.
8. As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New
Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners
brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
9. On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a
resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners:
10. Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates
legislative powerto the President by authorizing him to merge existing region
and provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated; and
11. The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Respondent Solicitor General:
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12. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the President (Abbas v Comelec)
and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local
governments and control of executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Art X,
Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17 of Constitution)
13. There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of power to fill up or
provide the details of the legislation, bec Congress did not have the facility to
provide for them.
14. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is fairly embraced in the
title of the RA No. 6734, because it is germane to it. Power extends to all
regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous
region.4.PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the President shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government, guided
by the framework of more effective planning implementation, greater
decentralization, etc. The President may create abolish, consolidate units of the
National Government.
Issues:
(1) Whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in
character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as
respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
(2) Whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) Whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the
provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the
creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and
(4) Whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer
the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Held: Law Valid. No Undue Delegation Of Legislative Powers To The President.
(1) Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their creations:
 RA 5435 – “authorizing the President, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization to reorganize the different executive departments,
bureaus, etc.”
 Reorganization Commission submitted an Integrated Reorganization Plan
which divided the country into 11 regions (1969)
 PD No. 1 – the Reorganization Plan was approved and made part of the law
of the land (1972)
 PD No. 773 – divided Region IX into two grpups
 PD No. 1555 – transfer of regional center of Region IX from Jolo to
Zamboanga
 The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions
have been by the President pursuant to the authority granted to him by
the law. The choice of President is logical because the division intended to
facilitate the administration of executive departments and local
governments. It has been traditionally lodged in the President.
 By conferring the President the power to merge exising regions, Congress
merely followed a pattern set in previous legislation. There is no abdication
by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the
power to merge administrative regions
 The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings
of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor
General or as "administrative in nature."
 There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any
event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of
the law.
(2) First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It
may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of
the challenged legislation.
 With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the
standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the
President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive
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Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals
for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the
service in the transaction of the public business."
(3) The constitutional requirement that “every bill shall be passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”
has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title
is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to the
subject, such as the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions
(4) Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to
the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces
and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art.
XIX, §13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in
the existing administrative regions."
 The contention has no merit. ,,,,, this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination
merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting
provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the
creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped
with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of
administration may require.
 The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for
the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from
one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a
province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will
become part of Region IX.
 The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a
redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all
have political consequences on the right of people residing in those
political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized
that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes, not for political representation.
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,
vs.HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970
Valid Delegation of Legislative Power; Standard must be set to avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation.—What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. The test is the
completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
hands cf the legislature. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Facts:
(1) As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf
and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the
challenged Act (Reflector Law)
 as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due
process clause.
(2) This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as
an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold
said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation
be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
Held: We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the
Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
(1) The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or
disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is
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parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such
manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be
visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with
any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." It is
thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the
police power to promote public safety.
 Calalang v. Williams identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
(2) To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel.
 A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
 It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
 The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met.
 The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could
be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
 In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That
is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon
the roads."
 It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment,
leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is
the prime consideration in statutes of this character.
 There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as
Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations
to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2
can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise.
 What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them;
 the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
 To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted.
 The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. F
 or a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
 A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not
to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to
enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
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nothing mor£ than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does
not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be
done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-
Geheral, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
Facts:
(1) On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding
of Rice, Palay and Corn.
(2) The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products.
(3) Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was
published on 20 August 1919.
(4) The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold.
(5) On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and
illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos.
The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was
done on the 6th of August 1919.
(6) On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
Held: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act
authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and
regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the
legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue
the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define
“extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to
prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures by the Governor-General
(1) It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
(2) By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
(3) The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the
question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
(4) The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or
define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of
the Governor-General.
(5) The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council
of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and
effect, or when they shall take effect.
(6) That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of
the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or
what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of
the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General
issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold,
any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
(7) There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the
Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
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We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes
to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional
and void.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister
of Public Works, Transportation
G.R. No. L-49112; 1979 Feb 2; J. Fernando
Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of
Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter
of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued
Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. This petition alleges
that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful
and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection
of the law and undue delegation of police power. Agustin is the owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229
which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip
them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is
arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already
enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel
motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would
only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
Issue: Was there an unlawful delegation in this case?
Held: NO.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies
at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive
or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. This is to adhere to
the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too
long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-
delegation “has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
“subordinate legislation” not only in the United States and England but in practically
all modern governments.’ In the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is
public safety. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts.’ Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the
reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and
THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58184 October 30, 1981; J. Fernando
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
Facts:
The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding
strikes “affecting the national interest” is assailed in this petition which partakes of
the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union.
As amended, the Article now reads: “In labor disputes causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in
but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or
distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones,
the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. On
September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor (Ople)
for unfair labor practices and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct.
Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner
manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to
all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being
imposed be suspended – a position that failed to meet the approval of private
respondent. Subsequently, respondent, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the
private respondent’s establishment. Private respondent, following the lead of
petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of
Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh,
resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension – apparently the
principal cause of the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to the provisions on strikes of the Labor Code – this is to avoid
adverse effects to the national interest.
Issue: Was there an undue delegation in this case?
Held: None
FTWU failed to make out a case of undue delegation. The President “shall have
control of the ministries.” It may happen, therefore, that a single person may
occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that
what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an
official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects
of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: “The
President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines.” Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a
presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: “All powers vested in the
President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land
which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed
and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise.” However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence
cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should
afford protection to labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State
still is required to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.” At this
stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the
Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in
a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE
LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,respondents.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989; J. Regalado
Facts:
By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted
“a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications.” Under this franchise, it was
likewise granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal or terminals.” Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat
was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission.
However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed PhilComSat under
the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate
from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the
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necessary permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said
directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent NTC empowering it
to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by
any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat
subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
Issue: Should Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 be held unconstitutional on the
ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein
conferred? No.
Held:
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only
upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of
the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned,
respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-
confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power
becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness,
this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of
the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for
the lawful exercise thereof. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates
pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily
include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith.
And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which
provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that
the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the
communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable
rates.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. petitioners VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL, respondents
G.R. No. 180046 : April 2, 2009; J. Carpio
Facts:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The PRC later
admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results
came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-
taking of the successful examinees. President GMA ordered for a re-examination
and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED
Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006
(Implementing Rules and Regulations). Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to
"amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits
to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of
HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review
centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.- A
dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. The Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying
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to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the
meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to
revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to
public and private institutions of higher. In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri
responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review
centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the
said Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be
integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simplymeans, to be in partner with an
HEI. Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court
praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED
from implementing the RIRR.
Issue: Is there an invalid exercise of rule-making power by the Executive of
legislative power as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction? Yes.
Held:
The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III
of EO 297 requires legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the
President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."
There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the
CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the
functions of the CHED under RA 7722.The line that delineates Legislative and
Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution
has lodged it elsewhere. The President has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions
of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
its officials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to
fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of
his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of
legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative
power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making
power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722.
b. PERMISSIVE DELEGATION
i. Ascertainment of Facts
 Purpose: As a basis to determine when a law may take
into effect or whether a law may be suspended or come
to an end, in accordance with the purpose or policy of
the law and the standard for the exercise of the power
delegated
 Not a delegation of what the law shall be, but how the
law will be enforced
 Why is this permissible? There is nothing legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as a
basis of the taking into effect of the law. (People v. Vera,
65 Phil 56 [1937])
 Test of Validity of delegation: Law delegating the power
must determine some facts or state of things upon which
the law may take effect or its operation suspended must
provide the standard, fix the limits within which the
discretion may be exercise and define the conditions
therefore.
 What if there is an invalid delegation: Law delegating
power incurs undue delegation and the one given
delegation incurs exercise of rule-making power without
legal basis.
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Exception to the doctrine Potestas Delegata Non Delegari
Protest
 The power conferred upon an administrative agency to
which the administration of a statute is necessary or
proper in order to carry out the purposes and provisions
may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provision of the Act
or by implication it has been withheld.
CASES:
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. HON.
FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMIN YONZON, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-17821; November 29, 1963; J. JBL Reyes
Facts:
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had
blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking
that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated
11 August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the
expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal. The position of the
plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to
pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a
dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and
whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged
unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Issue: Was there an unlawful delegation of judicial power? None
Held:
R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was
anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property,
and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession. It is true that the
exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its
previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial,
are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable
streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear
that they are, validly conferrable upon executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act
No. 2056, section 2.The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what
his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to
non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into
operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other
subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis
for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws. It is noteworthy that Republic
Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances
or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees
clearly are in the latter class. In fine, it is held that Republic Act No. 2056 does not
constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act
No. 2056should be respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or
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imposition, so long as the said, findings are supported by substantial evidence
submitted to him.
ii. Filling The Details
 Boards and commissions now play an important part in
the administration of our laws. The great social and
industrial evolution of the past century, and the many
demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing
complexity of human activities, have made essential the
creation of these administrative bodies and the
delegation to them of certain powers.
 Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards
and commissions, the Legislature may delegate to them
administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a
statute and various governmental power for the more
efficient administration of the laws.
 The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix
the legal principles which are to control in given cases;
but an administrative officer or body may be invested
with the power to principles apply. If this could not be
done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and
in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
sufficiency both in provision and execution.
CASES:
JUAN B. ALEGRE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
respondents-appellant
G.R. No. L-30783; August 27, 1929; J. Johns
Facts:
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the
production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he
applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to
England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export
the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He
then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus,
alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection
and certification of fiber sand, in particular, sections 1772 and1244 of that Code,
are unconstitutional and void. Section 1244 states that A collector of customs shall
not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard
grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a
vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the
requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers. Section1772 states that
the Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the
various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be
produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its
proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the
several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general
order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same
shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal
presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request there for.
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be
given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least sixmonths before the
new standards shall goes into effect. Section 1788 on the other hand states that
fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in
quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being
graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. CFI held that sections
1722 and1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are unconstitutional and
void.
Issue: Was there a delegation by the law on FSB of legislative powers? None
Held:
The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which
are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested
with the power to principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite
confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
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sufficiency both in provision and execution. Boards and commissions now play an
important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and industrial
evolutions of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures
by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation
of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers.
Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the
purposes of a statute and various governmental power for the more efficient
administration of the laws. The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative
power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board
are for an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law.
The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber
Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In
legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the
Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board
or that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work.
That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of
administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the
law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale
the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a
board of commission.- The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which
provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its
enforcement.
1. "Agency" includes any department, bureau,
office, commission, authority or officer of the
National Government authorized by law or
executive order to make rules, issue licenses,
grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases;
research institutions with respect to licensing
functions; government corporations with
respect to functions regulating private right,
privileges, occupation or business; and officials
in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided
by law.
2. "Rule" means any agency statement of general
applicability that implements or interprets a
law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or
practice requirements of, an agency, including
its regulations. The term includes memoranda
or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not
affecting the rights of, or procedure available to,
the public.
3. "Rule making" means an agency process for the
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

4. "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a

iii. Administrative Rulemaking
 BOOK VII, SECTIONS 1-9 OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 297
 What are not affected by this Rule?
Section 1. All agencies except Congress, the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military
establishments in all matters relating exclusively to
Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and
Parole, and state universities and colleges.
 BOOK VII, SECTIONS 1-9 OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 297
 Basic Definitions: (Sec.2)
prohibition, limitation or other condition
affecting the liberty of any person; the
withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty
or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or
withholding of property; the assessment of
damages, reimbursement, restitution,
compensation, cost, charges or fees; the
revocation or suspension of license; or the
taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.

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5. "Agency proceeding" means any agency process
with respect to rule-making, adjudication and
licensing.
6. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of
every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief
or its equivalent or denial thereof.
 Processes: (Chapter 2, Sec. 3-9)
Filing: Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
Effectivity: In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this
Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a
different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known
to persons who may be affected by them.
Publication and Recording. – This is carried out by the
University of the Philippines: (1) Publish a quarter
bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during
the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date
codification of all rules thus published and remaining in
effect, together with a complete index and appropriate
tables.
In Omitting some rules: if its publication would be
unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise
inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made
available on application to the agency which adopted it,
and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general
subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies
thereof may be obtained.
Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The
University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one
(1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of
the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the
President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National
Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made
available free of charge to such public officers or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other
persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and
mailing or distribution costs.
Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of
the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published
in the bulletin or the codified rules.
Public Participation
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption
of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order
shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least
two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
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(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested
cases shall be observed.
c. Rule-making power
• Rule- any administrative agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes procedures in, or
practice requirements of, an agency not affecting the rights of, or
procedure available to, the public.
• Agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
• Power to issue rules and regulations which resulted from delegated
legislation in the administrative level.
• Relaxation of the principle of separation of powers.
• An exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.
What cannot be delegated
• The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of that
which is purely legislative in nature.
Tests for valid delegation of legislative power
 Completeness test:
o The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
 Sufficient Standard test
o There must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot
CASES:
Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese
Facts:
• Plaintiff is a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the
Philippines.
• Aldanese is the Insular collector of customs.
• Plaintiff alleges that under the Tarrif Act, it had the legal right to export
from the Philippines into the USA cigars which it manufactured.
• Law No. 2613 was enacted to improve the methods of production and the
quality of tobacco in the Philippines and to develop the export trade
therein.
• Pursuant to the said law, CIR promulgated AO No. 35: Tobacco Inspection
Regulations.
• Under the said AO, only cigars manufactured in the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela and Nueva Ecija can be exported to ensure quality cigars.
• Plaintiff is alleging that it was deprived of its rights of exporting cigars to
USA.
• Plaintiff filed for mandamus to require the respondent to issue certificate
so that it can export its products.
Issue: Was the provision in the said AO, stating that only cigars manufactured in
said provinces can be exported, valid?
Held:
• No, the legislature has not defined what shall be the standard or the type
or leaf or manufactured tobacco may be exported to the USA or upon what
basis the CIR should fix or determine the standard. All powers were
delegated to the CIR.
• The legislative act did not limit the cigars to be exported to be those
manufactured in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueve Vizcaya.
• Neither the CIR nor the legislature itself has any power to discriminate in
favor of one province against another in the production or of any other
product of the country.
Sy Man vs. Jacinto
Facts:
• Textiles and a number of sewing machines were seized by the Collector of
Customs.
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• The Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila rendered a decision
ordering that the textiles be delivered to the imported and the sewing
machines be sold in a public auction.
• No appeal was made on the said decsion, thus petitioner wrote a letter to
the Collector of Customs asking that the said decision be executed since it
is final and excecutory.
• A reply was made stating that the letter was endorsed to the
Commissioner of Customs, to determine whether said seized articles can
be delivered.
• Sy Man filed a petition to declare null and void a portion of Memorandum
Order which provides that in protected cases, decisions of the Collector of
Customs in seizure cases, appealed or not, are subject to the review by the
Commissioner of Customs.
• TC granted the petition to execute the judgment.
• It is being contended by the respondents that the Commissioner as head of
the Bureau of customs and the chief executive administrative under
section 550 of RAC has supervision and control over the collector.
Issue: Can the Commissioner of Customs review the decision even if it is already
final?
Held:
• No, the rule that the decision will not be final against the government is
not only unjust but also oppressive.
• The said memorandum was not published in the official gazatte , thus it
does not have effect.
• There is no law that gives the Commissioner the power to review and
revise unappealed decisions of the Collector in seizure cases.
People vs. Maceren
Facts:
• Buenaventura, Reyes, Reyes, Aquino and Del Rosario were charged with
violation of Fisheries Administrative Code No. 84-1.
• They were accused to have resorted to electro fishing in the waters of San
Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz.
• According to them, the law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing in
fresh waters.
• AO No. 84-1 restricted the ban against electro fishing in fresh waters.
• The said AO imposed a lesser penalty as compared to the Fisheries law.
Issue: Can the fishermen be prosecuted under the said AO?
Held:
• No, nowhere in the law is electro fishing specifically punished.
• The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute an offense.
• It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law.
• Administrative agent is clothed with rule-making power because the
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing a law.
• Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effects its general
provisions.
Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission
Facts:
• Atty. Toledo was appointed by then COMELEC Chairman Felipe as Manager
of the Education and Information Department of the COMELEC.
• He was already more than 57 years old and was his first time to join
government service.
• His papers were endorsed to the CSC.
• However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Sec. 22,
Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies was
secured. The provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old
or above.
• COMELEC upon discovery of the lack of authority required under said
section issued Resolution No. 2066 stating that the appointment of Toledo
was made in violation of the law.
Issue: Was the provision prohibiting the appointment of a person more than 57
years old valid?
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Held:
 No, the prohibition was merely a creation of the Civil Service Commission.
 The statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting
appointment or reinstatement of any person who was already 57 years
old.
 The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an
act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the
rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect.
 The CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application
to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never
published, as is admitted on all sides. The argument that the CSRPAP need
not be published, because they were "a mere reiteration of existing law"
and had been "circularized," flies in the teeth of the explicit and categorical
requirement of PD 807 that rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty (30) days after
publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation. Moreover, the CSRPAP cannot properly be considered a mere
reiteration of existing law, for as already discussed, the implementing rule
governing 57-year old persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be
considered "existing law."
Commissioner of Internal revenue vs. CA
Facts:
 The President enacted EO No. 41 declaring a one-time tax amnesty on
unpaid income taxes.
 ROH then filed its Tax Amnesty Return and Supplemental Tax Amnesty
Return and paid the tax amnesty due.
 Prior to the availment, CIR assessed ROH of its deficiency in taxes in an
aggregate amount of 1,410,157.71.
 ROH asked that the assessment be cancelled because it availed the
amnesty program.
 According to CIR the said EO includes only assessment issued by the BIR
after its promulgation and not assessments theretofore made.
Issue: Was the construction the CIR of the EO correct?
Held
 No, nothing in the EO justifies the CIR’s ground for denying the taxpayer’s
benefits of the amnesty law.
 All administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent
and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.
 Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither
supplant nor modify, the law.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. CA
Facts:
 Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by
DAR and subjected to qualified beneficiaries under the CARL Law.
 Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR AO No. 6 Series 1990.
 According to them, such AO is invalid because it is in contravention of a
governing statute.
 Instead of depositing cash or bonds as payment for the land, DAR asked
Land Bank to deposit it in trust of the land owners.
 DAR said that such issuance was in consonance with the law.
Issue: Was the AO issued by DAR, that the money will be deposited in trust instead
of depositing cash or bond valid?
Held
 No, it is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP
bonds.
 If it were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of
deposit that should have been made express, to at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust
account is allowed.
 Actions of an administrative construction are not absolute. It may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error in law,
grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of a legislative enactment.
GMCR, Inc., et. al. vs. Bell Telecommunications Phil. Inc.
Facts
 BellTel filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity to Procure (CPNP) to install, operate and
maintain a Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to
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Charge Rates, and with further request for the issuance of Provisional
Authority (PA).
 Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting BellTel a congressional
franchise to carry on the business of providing telecommunications
services in and around the country.
 BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical,
financial and legal documents in support of its application.
 Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers
Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
 Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Dumlao and Perez adopted the same and expressly
signified their approval of the Memorandum of the CCAD
 The draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez but
was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar leading to its
disapproval.
Issue: Whether or not the NTC is a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546
meaning that a majority vote is required before granting the application of BellTel?
Held:
 NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members
of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
 Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to
legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
 Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC.
 The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
 NTC Circular No. 1-1-93, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, and the Order
of Kintanar declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are
contrary to law and thus null and void.
 The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in
the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can
never be a ratification of such an illegal practice.
 These illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of EO 546 and in
the context of and its predecessor laws.
Association of Phil. Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA
Facts:
 Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by PD 232 as an
independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil and to ensure
that coconut farmers become direct participants in such development
through a regulatory scheme set up by law.
 PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators.
 However, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require
those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a
condition for engaging in such business.
 The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by
protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes.
 But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in
congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-
based commodities.
 PCA then proceeded to issue “certificates of registration” to those wishing
to operate desiccated coconut processing plants.
 APCD appealed to the Office of the President not to approve the resolution
but despite follow-up letters, no reply was received.
 The APCD through its 7 coconut processing companies then filed a petition
for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.
Issue: Can PCA renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it?
Held: NO
 The PCA is charged with the duty of carrying out the State’s policy to
promote the rapid integrated development of the coco industry.
 By limiting the scope of registration to merely monitoring volumes of
production in effect abdicates its role provided by law.
 PCA limited its function to that of monitoring which is against its legislative
purpose. In effect, PCA would simply be compiling statistical data but if
violations are made, there would not be anything it could do.
 Leaving its role will in effect gives the market forces control on how the
coconut industry will develop.
 By repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme, PCA has put at risk other
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statutory provisions
o PD 1644
o Revised Coconut Code (PD 1468)
 “Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations”
 Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the
government.
 Beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
Ople vs. Torres
Facts:
 On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System".
 The late Senator Ople averred that the said AO is unconstitutional because
o it infringes upon the people’s privacy and
o that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislature’s power to
legislate laws.
 Ople opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of
the nature of a law hence it is beyond the president’s power to issue such.
 Ople filed a petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et. al from carrying out such
AO.
 Torres et al countered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office;
confers no right; affords no protection and imposes no duty.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of the president were an encroachment of the
functions of the Legislature?
Held:
 As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justifiability
of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has
no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our
sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit
raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.
 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public
funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The
ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
 per se
 and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to
be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social
Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the
GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national
identification system. All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light,
the dissenter’s insistence that weighten the rule on standing is not a
commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO Kilusang Mayo Uno vs The Director-General, NEDA
Facts:
 EO 420, was issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005
o Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing identification
(ID) systems.
 Petitioners in 1st case alleged that
o EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the government.
o that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
 Petitioners 2nd case allege that EO 420 is void based on the following
grounds:
o EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates
the decision in Ople v. Torres
o The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as
she has no power to issue EO 420.
o EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to
privacy
 it allows access to personal confidential data without the
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owner’s consent.
 EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or
penalties for any violation of its provisions.
Issues:
(1) Is EO 420 considered a usurpation of legislative power by the President?
NO
(2) Does EO 420 infringe on the citizen’s right to privacy? NO
Held:
 EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of
their functions under existing laws.
o These government entities have already been issuing ID cards
even prior to EO 420.
o Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government
entities.
 Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under
existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format
for their IDs.
 In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are
to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and
provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
 EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID
databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect
or record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
 Under their existing ID systems, some government entities collect and
record more data than what EO 420 allows.
 In the case of the Supreme Court, the IDs that the Court issues to all its
employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data,
 A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways.
o First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter
into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform
 This is purely an administrative matter, and does not
involve the exercise of legislative power.
o Second, the President may by executive or administrative order
direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.
 The President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their
functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public. Of course, the President’s power of control is
limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
 Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s
constitutional power of control over the Executive department.
 In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but
merely implemented and executed existing laws.
 What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID
card system.
o First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a
special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation
for such purpose.
o Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they
have a use for the ID card or not.
o Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually
required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy
is infringed.
 EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system.
o EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card.
o EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing
laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of
their governmental functions.
 Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative
power.
 Prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities
prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of
personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
o Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are
made.
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 On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even
narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown
compared to the existing ID systems of government entities.
 The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory
national ID systems
 Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government
entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and
identities.
 Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
o Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the
right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive
issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled
solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.
o Also in Ople v. Torres, it sought to establish a "National
Computerized Identification Reference System," a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because
it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system
where none existed before.
 In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-
friendly to the public.
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
Facts:
 Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed its quarterly income tax
returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and
paid the total income tax of P5, 016,954.00.
 PBCom then suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax
Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise
reported a net loss of P14, 129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable
for the year.
 But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased
properties.
 PBCOM requested the CIR for a tax credit of P5, 016,954.00 representing
the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.
 PBCOM filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their
lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for
P234,077.69.
 Pending the investigation of the CIR, PBCOM instituted a Petition for
Review before the CTA
 The CTA denied the request for a tax refund or credit in the sum amount of
P5,299,749.95,
o that it was filed beyond the 2 year reglementary period provided
for by law.
 PBCOM’s claim for refund in amounting to P234,077.69 was likewise
denied
o that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax
payment in the succeeding year.
 PBCOM now relies on Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 stating
that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the 2 year prescriptive
period under the NIRC and may claim refunds or tax credits within 10
years.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the
reglementary period from two (2) years to ten (10) years is valid? NO.
(2) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had already prescribed? YES
Held:
 Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation.
o The primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance
the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common weal. Due
process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial
proceedings in tax cases.
 Claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the time fixed by
law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect
taxes, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered
by incidental matters.
 Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec.
229, NIRC of 1997) provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court
proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
 The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment
of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced.
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o The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed
from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment
of the tax for the year
 RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive period imposed by law to 10-year
prescriptive period is invalid.
 Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of
the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over
them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power.
 “When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85,
o In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it
legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.”
 Fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the
respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation
which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to
the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be
given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.”
 By implication of the above, claim for refund had already prescribed.
 Since the petition had been filed beyond the prescriptive period, the same
has already prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return show an
excess tax credit does not automatically entitle taxpayer claim for refund
without any express intent to choose such refund over or claim an
automatic tax credit.
China Banking Corporation and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc.
vs. Members of the Board of Trustees, HDMF
Facts
 Petitioners applied for the renewal of waiver of Fund coverage for the year
1996.
 Their applications were disapproved by the HDMF Board on ground that
o their retirement plan is not superior to Pag-ibig Fund.
 Further, Section 1 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742,
and the HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and
Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742 provides that
o to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund coverage, a company
must have provident and housing plan which are both superior to
Pag-ibig Funds.
 Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC
to annul and declare void the Amendment and Guidelines claiming that
respondents exceeded its limit.
o That the law provides as a condition for exemption from
coverage, the existence of either a superior (retirement) plan,
and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both
plans.
 Respondents claimed that the use of the words “and/or” in Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752 can only be used interchangeably and not together, and the
option of making it either both or any one belongs to the Board of Trustees
of HDMF
Issue: Did the respondent, in the exercise of its rule making power, exceed its limits
by construing the enabling law, Sec. 19 of PD 1752, which included the words
“and/ or”, to be changed to only “and” in its amendments and revised
guidelines? YES
Held:
 It seems clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an
employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption
from coverage.
 If the law had intended that the employer should have both a superior
provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it
would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or.”
 Paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund
or continue to be so.
o The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan
is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption.
 To require the existence of both plans would impose a more stringent
condition for waiver, which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law.
 By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules, the
respondent Board has exceeded its authority. Consequently, the Supreme
Court declared null and void the assailed Amendment and Guidelines.
 Rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions having the effect of law, should
be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
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the administrative agency.
 Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred
by statute.
 While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of both
plans to qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home Development
Mutual Fund and make it more effective both as a savings generation and
a house building program, the basic law should prevail as the embodiment
of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to
implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.
ii. Publication and Effectivity
When rules take effect
 Section 2 of the Civil Code-
o Laws shall take effect after 15 days following their completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided
 Section 18 Book 1 of the 1987 Administrative Code modified this provision
saying
o Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
 OTHERWISE PROVIDED- means that a shorter of longer period may be fixed
by law from publication, when the law will take effect
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
 Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature or Letters of
instruction by administrative superiors (guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties
 Publication must be made as soon as possible to give effect of the law
pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code
 GR: the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the law does not
require that there be prior notice and hearing conducted by administrative
agency
o Exc: if the statute making the delegation requires such hearing
o If the statute is silent on that matter, a public hearing, if
practicable, may be conducted
 Rules and regulations are to be filed with the U.P. Law Center
Procedure on Publication
Filing
 Every agency shall file with the UP Law Center 3 certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. All rules since even those in force. If not filed within 3
months from the effectivity of this code, not effective
o A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Effectivity –Each rule shall become effective 15 days from the date of filing with
the UP Law Center unless:
 A different date is fixed by law,
 Or if specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule.
Publication and Recording – The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
 Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during
the preceding quarter; and
 Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in
effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Omission of Some Rules –
 May omit from the bulletin or the codification of any rule if its publication
would be unduly cumbersome, expensive
o Copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the
agency which adopted it
o Bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter
of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
 Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to
law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be
published in full text
Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. –
 Shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the
codified rules or supplements to the
o Office of the President
o Congress,
o All appellate courts
o National Library
 Available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress
may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication
and mailing or distribution costs.
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Judicial Notice – The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each
rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
CASE
People vs. Que Po Lay
Facts:
 Que was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US
checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell
the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
 Que claims that the said Circular was not published prior to the act
charged so therefore no force and effect.
 Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the
Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to
Que.
 Que contends that CA 638 and Act 2930 required said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette. Solgen disagrees with Que as to the need
to be published.
 Que appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1, 000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for
it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties? YES
Held:
 The two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette, for the guidance of the different branches
of the Government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing
 However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take
effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
 Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
 Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued
for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force
and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
 Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
 Que could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the
time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his
possession thereof.
 Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit Que, with
costs de oficio.
Philippine Blooming Mills v. SSS
Facts:
 The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic corporation since the
start of its operations in 1957, has been employing Japanese technicians
under a pre-arranged contract of employment, the minimum period of
which employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24 months.
 From April 28, 1957, to October 26, 1958, the corporation had in its
employ 6 Japanese technicians. In connection with the employment of
these aliens, it sent an inquiry to the Social Security System (SSS) whether
these employees are subject to compulsory coverage under the System,
which inquiry was answered by the First Deputy Administrator of the SSS,
under date of August 29, 1957, as follows:
 Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily
covered. But aliens who are employed temporarily shall, upon their
departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate
amount of their contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the
same proportionate rebate of their contributions in behalf of said aliens
employed by them. (Rule I, Sec. 3[d], Rules and Regulations.)
 On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General Manager of the corporation, on
its behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Japanese technicians, filed a claim
with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the System, on the
ground of termination of the members' employment.
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 As this claim was denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission for the return or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of
P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation and the 6 Japanese
employees, plus attorneys' fees.
 This claim was controverted by the SSS, alleging that Rule IX of the Rules
and Regulations of the System, as amended, requires membership in the
System for at least 2 years before a separated or resigned employee may
be allowed a return of his personal contributions. Under the same rule, the
employer is not also entitled to a refund of the premium contributions it
had paid.
 This amendment became effective on January 14, 1958, or before the
employment of the subject aliens terminated. The rights of covered
employees who are separated from employment, under the present Rules,
are covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the premiums only if they
have been members for at least 2 years.
Issue: When was the law implemented on January 14 1958, the date of effectivity
or on November 1958 the date it was published as to cover the separated
employees?
Held:
 The date of its effectivity on January 14, 1958 must be followed.
o the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material
for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the
statutes themselves do not so provide.
 In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS
specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by
the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the
President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in
the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is
January 14, 1958
Tanada v. Tuvera
Facts:
 Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of
a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication
of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.
 The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
 Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are
not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Issue: Is publication required and if it is required to be published in the Official
Gazette?
Held: YES
 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. "
 It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether.
 The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know
of its existence.
 Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres
Facts:
 PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and
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recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage
in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land based
workers, including domestic helpers.
 On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary
Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies
of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through
the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound
workers.
 Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum
Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES
on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic
helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment
agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
 On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to
prohibit their implementation.
Issue: Are the guidelines and memorandum circulars by POEA and DOLE valid?
Held:
 NO, Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for
lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5
of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
 Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code)
 Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
 Sec. 3 Filing — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987.)
 Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless
a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent
danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who
may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).
De Jesus v. COA
Facts:
 Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated
members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids
and Awards Committee.
 On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled "An Act
Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in
the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said
law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional
compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation.
 To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10),
discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all
allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.
 Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
o Payment of other allowances fringe benefits and all other forms
of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash
or in kind . . . shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989.
Payment made for such allowances fringe benefits after said date
shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. 2
 Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo
Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of
honoraria to the herein petitioners.
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Issue: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of
publication in the Official Gazette.
Held: NO
 In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No.
10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other
additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is
something more than that.
 And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their
allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and
soul together.
 At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees
concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject
circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to
voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance
on the matter.
 This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments
of fairness and transparency.
 In light of the foregoing disquisition on the ineffectiveness of DBM-CCC No.
10 due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country, as required by law.
NASECORE v. ERC
Facts:
 Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9136, known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) on June 8, 2001.
 On October 30, 2001, pursuant to the above provision, the ERC issued an
Order requiring all distribution utilities to file their application for
unbundled rates. In compliance therewith, respondent MERALCO filed
on December 26, 2001 its application with the ERC for the approval of its
unbundled rates and appraisal of its properties.
 Acting thereon, the ERC issued an Order and a Notice of Public Hearing
both dated February 1, 2002 setting the case for initial hearing on March
11 and 12, 2002.
 In the same order, MERALCO was directed to cause the publication of the
notice of public hearing at its own expense twice for two successive weeks
in two newspapers of nationwide circulation, the last date of publication to
be made not later than two weeks before the scheduled date of initial
hearing.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Commission on Audit and the
Committees on Energy of both Houses of Congress were furnished with
copies of the order and the notice of public hearing and were requested to
have their respective duly authorized representatives present at the said
hearing. Likewise, the Offices of the Municipal/City Mayors within
MERALCO’s franchise area were furnished with copies of the order and the
notice of public hearing for the appropriate posting thereof on their
respective bulletin boards.
 At the initial hearing, representatives of MERALCO were present. Also at
the said hearing were a representative from the OSG for the public and
oppositors to the application including Mr. Pete Ilagan, representing herein
petitioner NASECORE.
 After a series of hearings, the ERC rendered the Decision dated March 20,
2003, approving MERALCO’s unbundled schedule of rates effective on the
next billing cycle. However, in the same decision, the ERC directed
MERALCO,
 In other words, MERALCO was directed to recover the costs of power
purchased from the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) through a
new adjustment mechanism called the Generation Rate Adjustment
Mechanism (GRAM). Prior thereto, the said costs were recovered through
the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) mechanism.
 It appears that in another proceeding, ERC Case No. 2003-44, [10] the ERC
issued an Order dated January 29, 2003 setting for public consultation
on February 17, 2003 its proposed Implementing Rules for the Recovery of
Deferred Fuel and Independent Power Producers Costs (DÉCOR) and
Deferred Incremental Currency Exchange Recovery (DICER). The proposed
DÉCOR and DICER were formulated by the ERC to replace the PPA and the
Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment (CERA), the automatic adjustment
mechanisms then in effect, on its view that they (PPA and CERA) did not
meet the goal of balancing the need for timely recoveries of costs by the
utilities with the ERC’s need to review the reasonableness and prudence of
such costs.
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 A notice of the public consultation on the proposed implementing rules for
the recovery of DÉCOR and DICER was caused to be published by the ERC
in the Philippine Star on February 3, 2003. In the said notice and order, the
ERC directed the parties to submit their comments on the proposed
implementing rules on or before February 12, 2003.
 Several distribution utilities and consumer groups, including petitioner
NASECORE, filed their respective comments on the said proposed
implementing rules for the recovery of DÉCOR and DICER. Most of the
utilities manifested their strong objections to the adoption of the DÉCOR
and DICER contending that these mechanisms would defeat the purpose of
escalator clauses such as the PPA and CERA. For their part, the consumer
groups expressed that the ERC should have taken into consideration
consumer protection in the drafting of the proposed implementing rules.
 After taking into consideration the positions of the distribution utilities and
the consumer groups, the ERC promulgated the Order dated February 24,
2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44. In the said order, the ERC adopted the
Implementing Rules for the Recovery of Fuel and Independent Power
Producer Costs: Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM) and the
Implementing Rules for the Recovery of the Incremental Currency
Exchange Rate Adjustment (ICERA). These implementing rules were all
contained or incorporated in the aforesaid order.
 The respective effectivity clauses of the implementing rules of the GRAM
and the ICERA provided that they shall take effect immediately.[13]
 Thereafter, in consonance with the Decision dated March 20, 2003 in ERC
Cases Nos. 2001-646 and 2001-900 and the Order dated February 24, 2003
in ERC Case No. 2003-44, respondent MERALCO filed with the ERC an
amended application entitled “In the Matter of the Application for the
Recovery of the Independent Power Producer Costs under the Generation
Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM),” docketed as ERC Case No. 2004-
112.
 Earlier, acting on respondent MERALCO’s 1st application under the GRAM,
the ERC, in the Order dated January 21, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-20,
approved the generation charge of P3.1886 per kWh, inclusive of the
deferred PPA.
 In the assailed Order dated June 2, 2004, the ERC approved the increase of
respondent MERALCO’s generation charge albeit only from P3.1886
to P3.3213 per kWh, the same to take effect immediately.
Issue: Whether the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order
dated June 2, 2004in ERC Case No. 2004-112 which approved the increase of
respondent MERALCO’s generation charge from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kWh
effective immediately without publication of the latter’s amended application?
Held:
 YES, the petition is granted.
 The lack of publication of respondent MERALCO’s amended application for
the increase of its generation charge is fatal. By this omission, the
consumers were deprived of the right to file their comments.
 Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code,
provides that “laws shall take after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.”
 A careful review of the procedural steps undertaken by the ERC leading to
its issuance of the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case No. 2003-44,
which set forth the GRAM Implementing Rules, as well as the Order dated
June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112, which approved the increase of
respondent MERALCO’s generation charge purportedly in accordance with
the GRAM Implementing Rules, shows that there was no publication of the
same in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell
Facts:
 On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created
under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent
price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products.5
 Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing
the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs
of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in
foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of
petroleum products at reasonable prices.6
 Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the
Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset
prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing
prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting
the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as
necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the
OPSF.7
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 On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D.
No. 1956. It expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to
maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable
levels.8
 On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE,
informed the respondent that respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for
foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991
were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment
of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the
underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon
respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No.
1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94.
 On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent
advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the OPSF of the
foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period
April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount
of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.
 In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent
justified that its calculations for the transactions in question were based on
a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and
MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12
 On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of
its underpayment, totalingP24, 554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13
 In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the
latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of P18, 535,531.40 for
surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the
period December 1989 to October 1991.
 In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for
respondent to settle the surcharges due. Otherwise, the DOE
Issue: Must the MOF Circular No. 1-85 be published in order to be effective?
Held:
 YES
 As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera enunciated that
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force, to wit:
 All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
 Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
 Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of
Chapter 2, Book VII thereof specifically providing that:
 Filing — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or person.
 The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry
out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
 A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and
shall be open to public inspection.
iii. Penal Regulations
Penal Regulations
 The power to define and punish crime is exclusively legislative and may not
be delegated to the administrative authorities. While administrative
regulations may have the force and effect of law, their violation cannot
give rise to criminal prosecution unless the legislature makes such violation
punishable and imposes the corresponding sanctions.
Special requisites of a valid administrative regulation with a penal sanction:
 The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation
punishable;
 The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the
regulation;
 The regulation must be published
CASES:
People v. Que Po Lay (SUPRA)
Held:
 Rules, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should
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be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and Prior notice and hearing to the affected Prior notice and hearing are essential to
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal parties is NOT a requirement of due the validity of the rates, whether it is
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the process permanent, provisional or temporary
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties. Rules usually apply throughout the Usually apply to particular party, based
country to all enterprises of a given kind upon a finding of fact, on the basis of
Fixing of rates, wages and prices which the rates are applied
Book 7 of EO 292 (Administrative Code) Acts are prospective- these are rules of Acts are particular and immediate
Definition of Rates (Sec1): future action which will affect a group therefore the person whose rights or
- Any charge to the public for a service open to all property are affected is entitled to
- Imposed by law or regulation notice and hearing

WHAT HAPPENS: Legislature delegates its rate-fixing power to agencies

WHY: For the agencies to fix the rates public utilities may charge GENERAL RULE:
HOW:
1.) Issuing rules and regulations in the exercise of quasi-legislative power  The power of administrative agencies to fix rates cannot be delegated to
2.) Issuing orders affecting a specified person in the exercise of its quasi-judicial another (Principle of potestas delegata non delegari potest)
power EXCEPTION:

STATUTE ALLOWING THE CREATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS  Unless there is a law authorizing it
Completeness Test and Sufficient Standard Test

STATUTE DELEGATING RATE-FIXING POWER CASES:

Reasonable and Just
- Not confiscatory Vigan Electric Light Co. v. PSC
- Must be established in a manner prescribed by the legislature
Petitioner: Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc.
Required:
- Proposed rates be published in a newspaper of general circulation at least Respondent: The Public Service Commision
2 weeks before first hearing
- - Public hearing Law: Republic Act No. 316 Vigan a franchise to maintain an electric light, heat
and/or power plant for generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for
• Agency fixing the rate is limited by the following: sale within the limits of several municipalities in Ilocos Sur.
• Requirements of public safety
• Public interest Facts:
• Reasonable feasibility
• Reasonable rates  Vigan Electric received a letter petition from Congressman Crisologi and
Vigan residents, saying that they are importing electricity from Japan and
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may either be: are making money out of a privilege which belongs to the people;
Excessive charges and more than actual consumption
Legislative Adjudicative
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 Vigan Electric: Denied importation; meters have been inspected checked,
tested and sealed by PSC.
 An audit was conducted by General Auditing Office. Latter found out that
the company’s revenue can still be reduced by about 18%; That it violated
the 12% allowable return
 . PSC ordered for its reduction
 Vigan instituted an action for certiorari to annul the order
 Vigan:
o PSC did not furnish them a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of
Congressman Crisologo and others“
o Reduction issue resolved without hearing
o They offered to present evidence to show the reasonableness of
the price
o Order to reduce issued without notice and trial
 PSC:
o By way of special defense: The reduction order had been issued
under PSC’s delegated legislative authority
o No notice and hearing required to exercise such authority
Held:
 Court ruled for Vigan Electric:
o The reduction of rates apply only to Vigan Electric.
o Predicated upon the finding of fact — based upon a report
submitted by the General Auditing Office Therefore
o Quasi-Judicial
o Notice and hearing is required
 Such is absent in this case:
o More than 12% profit is denied by them, only right that they be
given the chance to cross-examine the one who did the report
and justify the rates
 Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that
the current rates were approved by PSC after proper notice and hearing.
 Modification of such rates cannot be made, over Vigan Electric’s
objection, without such notice and hearing,
 Preliminary injunction on the reduction of the rates made permanent.
PHILCOMSAT vs. Alcuaz
Petitioner: Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation- granted by RA5514 to
maintain and operate international satellite communications
Respondent: Jose Alcuaz- Commissioner of National Telecommunications
Commission
Subject: E.O. 546 – Granted NTC the power to fix rates
Facts:
 RA5514, Philcomsat was exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission, (now NTC)
 However, E0 196 issued in 987 placed it under the jurisdiction of NTC.
Because of this, they were required to apply for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity
 Pending the application for the certificate, they were given a provisional
authority to operate valid for 6 months and was extended for another 6
months but this time, they were directed a reduction of 15% on its
authorized rates.
 Philcomsat contends:
o The enabling act of NTC empowering it to fix rates for public
service communications does not provide the necessary
standards, hence an undue delegation of legislative power.
o Also violative of due process; issued without notice and hearing
Issue: Is the rate-fixing a valid delegation of legislative power? YES
Held:
 When is delegation valid? (absence will render it unconstitutional)
o some standards for exercise is provided
o the manner of its exercise is prescribed
 When is rate-fixing valid?
o reasonable
o just
 NTC in its exercise of rate-fixing power is limited to the requirements of:
o public safety
o public interest
o reasonable feasibility
o Reasonable rates
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 All of these satisfy ther requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power to fix rates
 Notice and hearing is essential in this case
 NTC is in the performance of its quasi-judicial function:
o Pertains exclusively to Philcomsat and to no other
o It is premised on the finding of fact (whether there is merit in the
reduction of the rates)
 NTC failed to rationalize its order to decrease rates, no opportunity was
given to Philcomsat to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report
on which NTC nased its order
 Public Service Act provides that the commission shall have the power
upon proper notice and hearing to fix and determine rates
 Order to increase rates is set aside
KMU vs. Garcia
Petitioner: Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center
Respondent: Jesus Garbia, Jr. LTFRB, Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines
Law: Memorandum Circular No. 90-39 issued by DOTC Sec. to LTFRB Chairman
allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates w/in 15% above and
15% below (later increased to 20% minus 25%) the LTFRB official rate for 1 year
Facts:
 Several memoranda, circulars and orders were issued by DOTC and LTFRB
authorizing provincial buses and jeepney operators to increase or
decrease the prescribed fares without application with LTFRB and without
hearing and approval .
 In 1994, PBOAB availed itseld of the Memorandum without having filed a
petition and without the benefit of a public hearing. It announced a fare
increase of 20%
 KMU filed a petition opposing the adjustment of fares:
o Aderogation of LTFRB’s duty to fix and determine just and
reasonable fares by delegating the function to bus operators
o Establishing presumption of public need in favor of applicants of
certificates and shifting the burden to oppositors is not just and
reasonable
Held:
 Court ruled for KMU
 Authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it
is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority
 It is LTFRB that is authorized under EO202 to determine such fares or rates,
not the holders of a certificate of public convenience
 Rates should not be confiscatory as would place the operator to continue
to operate at a loss. Thisshould be determined by the LTFRB alone.
Panay Autobus Co. v. Phil. Railway Co.
Petitioner: Panay Autobus- a holder of a certificate of public convenience to
operate an autobus service for the transportation of passengers and freight
between all the principal points in Cebu
Respondent: Philippine Railway- R. R. Hancock, vice-president and general
manager of the Philippine Railway Co.,
Subject: Petition for flexible rates
Facts:
 Hancock, the VP and GM of Phil. Railway filed with the Public Service
Commission a petition requesting the authority to alter the rates of PRC on
the Cebu and Panay Divisions whenever in their judgement they find it
necessary .
 Petition was set for hearing, and the operators were notified
 PPanay autobus opposed:
o it will promote undecessary competition between the operators
o the petition for flexible rates could not be granted as it is againts
the fundamental principles of public utility regulation because the
said law authorized Phil. Service Commission to fix the rates and
no other
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 PRC: the fixing o the rates to be left entirely to the discretion of the officals
of PRC. Cited and example: present max rate from Iloilo to Capiz=P15. If
allowed, they wish to reduce ot tp P5 or P6
Held:
 In fact Sec16 of the Public Service Commission prohibits any unjustly
discriminatory rate.
 PRC’s proposal to alter irates whenever it may be necessary and whenever
iit would be its advantage =Discriminatory
 If the unlawful cometition really exists i, it is up to PSC to correct them, not
by delegating such authority
MIAA v. Airspain Corp.
Petitioner: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) - a GOCC created by
Executive Order No. 778. Manages NAIA
Respondent: Airspan Corp., Aboitiz, LBC et al. are lessees of MIAA’s properties
Subject: Resolutions issued by MIAA on the increase of rentals and other fees
Facts:
 MIAA issued Resolution No. 97-51 announcing an increase in rentals of its
buildings, VIP lounge, business concessions.
 Thereafter it passed Resolution 98-30 adopting 20% increase in rentals
 Issued another resoliution; 99-11 which further increased “other airport
fees and charges”
 Hence, lessees filed with the RTC a petition for injunction and/TRO
o The resolution will cause damage to their properties as it will
impede their business
 RTC nullified MIAA’s resolutions for lack of notice and hearing.
o Enjoined to collect the increases
o Refund the amounts that they already paid
 MIAA contends:
o its charter authorizes it to increase its fees, charges, and rates
without need of public hearing
o It is not a public utility where fees, charges and rates are subject
to state regulation
o Fees involved are contractual in inature. If lessees are not
amenable, they are free to terminate the lease
o its charter authorizes it to increase its fees, charges, and rates
without need of public hearing
o The charter which created it is a special law. Therefore, the
requirement of notice and hearing (as stated in the Public Service
Act and the Administrative Code) is not applicable.
 Lessees contend:
o MIAA’s accountant erroneously based its recommendation on the
price levels of other countries
Issue: Can petitioner MIAA validly raise without prior notice and public hearing the
fees, charges, and rates subject of its Resolutions Nos. 98-30 and 99-11? NO.
Held:
 MIAA’s old charter (E)778) allowed it to adjust fees and rates. However,
EO903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power
 MIAA’s charter established it as an attached agency of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (now Dept. Of Transportaion and
Communications). Hence, it is the ministry head who has the power to
determine the revisions of fees and rates
 As an attached agency, MIAA is governed by the Administrative code which
specifically requires notice and public hearing
 -Even if the increases are contractual in nature, MIAA’s properties,
faciliites and services are imbued with paramount public interest, as it is
the country’s principal airport
 -EO903 requires that MIAA’s charges should reflect the costs and increases
in price levels
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION
a) Jurisdiction
b) Due Process in Proceedings
c) Power to Issue Subpoena
d) Power to Issue Warrants of arrest; administrative Searches
e) Cease and Desist Orders
f) Right to Counsel
g) Imposition of Fines and Penalties
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION
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Quasi-judicial functions describe powers which involve the decision or
determination by administrative agencies of the rights, duties, and obligations of
specific individuals, as contrasted with their rule-making powers which, while they
may involve decisions or determinations in the broadest sense, involve persons
generally rather than specifically, and usually operate only prospectively. [De Leon
(2010). Administrative Law: Text and Cases].
It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than the office, board or body
which performs it, that determines whether or not it is exercising a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. [Doran v. Luczon, Jr., 503 SCRA 106 (2006)].
Still administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the
judicial systems nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. [2 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 20]
Pertinent Provisions:
Chapter III, Book VII, Title II, E.O. 292 (1987)
§ 10.Compromise and Arbitration.
§ 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases.
§ 12. Rules of Evidence.
§ 13. Subpoena.
§ 14. Decision.
§ 15. Finality of Order.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is the power and authority given by law to hear and decide a case. It
consists of two elements – (a) over the subject matter, and (b) over the person. [De
Leon. Supra.]
Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative
agencies. Without it, their acts are void and open to collateral attack. [Ibid.]
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
of a court. [Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426 (1990)]
CASES:
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION V. NHA
Facts: A prospective-subdivision-lot-owner refused to pay monthly arrearages to
the subdivision developer during which period no development took place. The
developer responded by rescinding the contract to sell. Aggrieved by the rescission,
the prospective-owner brought his dispute with the developer before the NHA. The
developer contends that the NHA has no jurisdiction to act on the complaint.
Held: Pursuant to PD 1344, NHA has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases “involving specific performance of contractual obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots against the developer.”
AZARCON V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: A private-individual/businessman was designated as the custodian of
distrained property – belonging to a delinquent-taxpayer. Later on, the delinquent-
taxpayer surreptitiously withdrew his property from the businessman’s premises.
Because of this incident, the businessman was charged, tried, and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. On appeal, the businessman contends that he is not a public
officer.
Held: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the businessman. “To be a public
officer, one must derive his authority by: (a) direct provision of law, or (b) popular
election, or (c) appointment by competent authority.” The BIR’s power of
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include
the power to appoint him as a public officer.
BOISER V. CA
Facts: Without any prior notice, a long-distance-telephone-service-provider
terminated its Interconnecting Agreement with a local-telephone-system. To avert
serious consequences to the public and private sectors, the system was compelled
to seek judicial relief before the CFI for injunction and damages. The provider
counters that it is the NTC that has jurisdiction over their agreement.
Held: The CFI has jurisdiction over the system’s complaint for injunction and
damages. There is nothing in NTC’s powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach
of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA
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Facts: A local electric cooperative filed with the ERB, a petition praying that the
direct supply of power to industries within its franchise area be disconnected by
NAPOCOR. The members of a local industries’ association, who were among those
who were granted direct connection facility by NAPOCOR, moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that it is the DOE who has jurisdiction over it.
Held: The DOE has the jurisdiction over the petition. It is apparent from RA 7638
that the ERB is basically a price or rate-fixing agency.
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
TWO CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS
a) Substantive due process
b) Procedural due process
Substantive due process
a) Responsive to the supremacy of reason
b) Obedience to the dictates of justice
c) Arbitrariness ruled out and unfairness avoided
d) This requires that the law itself is fair, reasonable, and just
e) Procedural due process
f) Requires two thing:
 Notice and Hearing
 Guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
A law which hears before it condemns
Proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial
Pertains to the method or manner the law is enforced
Cardinal Primary Requirements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
 Right to a hearing – includes the right to present one’s case, submit evidence
 The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
 The tribunal’s decision must have something to support itself
 Evidence must be substantial – it is such evidence “as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
 Decision must be based on evidence presented or at least contained in the
records and disclosed to the parties
 Tribunal must act with independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy
 Should render its decision in such a way as to inform the parties of the
various issues involved and reason for the decision rendered
 A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted to afford
parties a reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality
 This was discussed in the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations to
be discussed later.
 All the enumerated cardinal rights from 1-7 was mentioned in the above
case, except for no. 8 which was pronounced in the case of Fabella vs. CA.
Minimum requisites of Due Process in A.P.
 Impartial tribunal constituted to determine the right involved
 Due notice and opportunity to be heard
 Procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of fair trial
 Conducted in such a way that the court is afforded an opportunity to
determine whether applicable rules of law and procedure were observed
 Decision or ruling of the court be supported by substantial evidence
 Principle of due process furnishes a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order to impress it with the strand of validity
 In quasi-judicial proceedings, where it appears that there are issues of fact
which cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits, a trial-type
of hearing ought to be held.
 Cold-neutrality of impartial judge
 Critical component of due process
 Every litigant is entitled to nothing less that the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge
 In case a reviewing officer before whom an appeal from a decision which he
previously rendered as subordinate officer has been filed cannot resolve the
appeal without deprive the appellant of due process
 No different view would be had – biased
 Human nature dictates that a person would not admit to have
committed a mistake in his first view of the case
 Impartial and Competent Tribunal
 Also an indispensable requirement of due process in administrative
proceedings
 Not only vested with competent jurisdiction, BUT ALSO constituted to
afford a person administratively charged a reasonable guarantee of
honesty and impartiality
Notice and Hearing
 Involves the right to a hearing and to present evidence in support of his case
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 This is the heart of procedural due process
 Violation of this, or any of the Cardinal Primary Requirements of Due Process,
renders any judgment or order issued NULL and VOID – can be attacked in any
appropriate proceeding
 Mabuhay Textile Mills Corp. vs. Ongpin to be discussed later
PRIOR Notice and Hearing required
 General Rule – prior notice and hearing is necessary only where the law so
requires
 Inquiry would go into the statute granting an administrative agency or officer
with certain duties and responsibilities the discharge of which someone may
adversely be affected
 Sec. 11, Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code – “In any contested case all parties
shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least 5
days before the date of hearing and shall state the date, time, and place of
hearing
 When prior notice NOT REQUIRED
 In the exercise of police power duly delegated, unless the applicable law
expressly so provides
 Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals to be discussed later
Abatement of a public nuisance per se
 Prior notice may be given not to be heard but to give him the opportunity
to remove or abate it himself
 Notice as minimum requirement in summary dismissal
 In such proceedings (summary dismissal), filling of charges made known to
the respondent allowing him reasonable opportunity to answer such
charges constitute the minimum requirements of due process
 What is dispensed with is the formal investigation – presentation of
witnesses by their direct examination – NOT notice of the charges made
and the chance to defend himself.
Notice and Hearing in Rate-Fixing
 Issuance of a fixing rate order issued in the exercise of quasi-judicial power
REQUIRES notice and hearing
 Whether notice and hearing is necessary depends chiefly in the statutory
and constitutional provisions applicable and the nature and object of such
proceedings
 General Rule – public utility must afforded an opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety and reasonableness of the rate fixed for its services by a
public service commission.
 Prior notice in issuance of ex parte or preliminary order
 General Rule – provisional reliefs may be granted without prior notice or
hearing
 Same in disciplinary proceedings preventive suspension may be ordered
against an officer or employee charged with a grave offense without prior
notice or hearing – preventive suspension not being a penalty
Opportunity to be heard
 Essence of due process in administrative proceedings
a. the opportunity to explain one’s side; or
b. chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of
 Motion for reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due process
 Provided that other requirements of due process have been met
 Informal proceedings are proscribed
 Not informing or furnishing the respondent of a complaint
 Requiring submission of documents which leaves an impression that
compliance was all that was expected of him
 After compliance, faulting him for the alleged non-receipt despite his re-
submission of such documents
 This is violative of his right to due process and is therefore null and void.
Right to counsel NOT a Due process requirement
 Right is afforded in a criminal proceeding NOT in an administrative
proceeding
 This right is NOT absolute
 Under existing laws, in administrative proceedings, a person may or may
not be assisted by counsel and no duty is imposed upon the body or
tribunal to furnish such person investigated with counsel
 The Constitution does not provide that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel in order for such
proceedings to be binding upon him.
CASES:
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
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In this motion for reconsideration of the decision of the majority of the SC –
respondents seeking to vacate judgment and have the case remanded to CIR for
new trial – the Court En Banc resolved to grant the same. In re-examining the entire
records of the case before the CIR, the court found no substantial evidence to
support the view that exclusion of 89 laborers were due to union affiliation. The
Court went on to explain that the function of the CIR is more of an administrative
agency rather than being part of the integrated judicial system of the nation As
such, it is not burdened by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, however
it must comply with the Cardinal Primary Rights which must be respected.
FABELLA VS. CA
The Court here ruled for the private respondents – public school teachers who were
subjected to administrative complaints by the DECS Secretary Carino (substituted
later by Fabella) due to massive walk-outs and strike. The Court found that the
committee formed handle the proceedings failed to comply with RA 4670 (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers) – which law covers administrative proceedings
involving such teachers. Committee should include “a representative of the local or,
in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization” as required
by Sec. 9 of the RA
Petitioner argues that members of the committees appointed by it were deemed
representatives of teacher’s organization as required by the law since they are also
members of such organizations – the Court does not agree. The Court ruled that
mere membership does not make them as authorized representative of such
organizations, it is not for the DECS Secretary to usurp such right to designate such
th
representatives. This is the case where the 8 Cardinal Primary Rights was
pronounced by the Court. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted to afford parties a reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality.
AIR MANILA VS. BALATBAT
Air Manila questions the Resolution No. 139 (68) issued by the CAB – “that (a) the
flight between Manila and San Fernando, La Union, F210/211 of the same
timetable, be operated daily instead of twice a week as proposed and (b) that all
schedules under DTS-35, for which no previous approval has been granted by the
Board, are to be referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its
economic justification”
The Court ruled that Air Manila was not deprived of due process. Its was Air Manila
who failed to adduce evidence in the proceedings conducted regarding the flight
schedules involved Mabuhay Textile Mills vs. Ongpin. This case involves a
revocation of export quota allocations of the petitioner by respondents based
merely on the findings of the BOC without conducting its own proceedings. Both
trial court and CA found that indeed petitioner was denied of due process, CA
however modified its decision – ordering the respondent board to give petitioner
due hearing and to receive evidence on whether its rules and regulations were
violated to warrant imposition of penalties, until such time, petitioners export
quota allocations should remain cancelled. This is later ruling is being contested by
petitioners – that a new hearing is no longer required.
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS VS. ONGPIN
The SC ruled that the Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon the
initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the questioned order but once
the basis for its action proved non-existent, it refused to lift its erroneous and
unfounded order. Since the Board has reason to believe that the petitioner might
have violated its rules and regulations in connection with the importation of
materials for the petitioner's garment industry then it has the discretion to conduct
a proper hearing to determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability. It does
not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge this function.
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS VS. ONGPIN
SC also ruled that CA was wrong to have allowed petitioner’s export quota
allocations to remain canceled despite ruling that it was denied due process. SC
ruled that despite the fact that issuance of quota allocations are mere privileges, in
view of the length of time such has been granted to petitioners and the huge
investments made by it by virtue of such quota allocations, with all the more reason
that such quota allocations cannot be arbitrarily revoked. SC finally ruled that, since
there are factual issues that remain unresolved, there really is a need for a new
hearing – trial-type.
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA
This involves a Resolution issued by the MB (Resolution No. 596) ordering the
closure of Triumph Savings Bank and placing it under receivership. Petitioner
questions the decision of both RTC and CA ordering it to restore to TSB the
management of its affairs. These rulings were hinged on the view that TSB was
denied due process when it was not given prior notice.
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SC ruled that due process does not require prior notice, but a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard subsequent to the closure to prove the arbitrariness of the
MB in ordering its closure. This is “close now and hear later” scheme is grounded on
practical and legal considerations – to prevent bank runs – and is considered as a
valid exercise of police powers.
POWER TO ISSUE SEARCH AND ARREST WARRANTS
Points to Remember
 The arrest of a foreigner to carry into effect the power of deportation is
valid only when, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the
order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not
indispensable that the alien be arrested.
EXCEPTION
 When the arrest or search is based on probable cause
Criminal Procedure
1.) Search is incidental to the arrest.
2.) Search in a moving vehicle.
3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view.
4.) Administrative Searches
 The issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration,
solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation
is issued, conflicts with Section 2 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our
Constitution.
 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Who may issue? Judges
The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the
one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while
ministerial duties maybe delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated.
CASES:
QUA CHEEGAN VS DEPORTATION BOARD
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the petitioners
before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum
of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong. Galang
also charged Qua CheeGan, Chua Lim Paoalias Jose Chua, and BasilioKing,with
having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments
(Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt.
A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S .Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said
unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars. Following the filing of said deportation
charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member
of the Deportation Board
Petitioners:
1.) Charges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this
country, and
2.) that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges.
Respondents:
1. the charges against petitioners constitute an act of profiteering, hoarding or
black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations —
an economic sabotage —Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
2. The Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the
charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest
Issue(s): The extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e.,
whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien
complained of and whether the same may be delegated to the respondent
Deportation Board.
Held:
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No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No.
613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority,
among others, to make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific
power to be exercised in connection with such investigation.
The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of
having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause
against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order
of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive
or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the
warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on
probable cause.
VIVO VS. HON. MONTESA AND CALACDAY
The private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all
surnamed "Calacday” arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18
November 1959, and the last three on 6December 1959. Upon their arrival they
sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special inquiry,
in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them to be the legitimate sons of
a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The
Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a
Filipino citizen, with the notation that their admission as such was by a decision of
the board of special inquiry, duly affirmed by the Board of Commissioners.
Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an
immigration official that theseven respondents were not his sons. On 9 May 1963,
Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the
herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under
Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines
"by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission."
LUCIO SANTOS VS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is
OngHiong King; that petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and
was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration; that deportation proceedings against petitioner were pending hearing
before the Board of Special Inquiry; that petitioner had confessed that he was an
illegal entrant to this country; that based on his own application for registration
with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkongfor documentation as a Filipino,
it is evident that petitioner is a Chinese because, even if he was born of a Filipino
mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too
late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship; that the lower
Court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action — the
deportation of petitioner — is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after
due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation; and
that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies
Held:
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to
carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated,
there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the
President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But,
certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested."
HARVEY ET AL. VS COMMISSIONER DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52and John
Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58 all residing at
PagsanjanLaguna. Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued
Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “OperationReport” read that
Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was
found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after
Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care
and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and
girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They
were apprehended 17 February1988after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID
in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One
released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with
NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings.
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest
were issued 7 March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in
accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to
sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section37 (a) provides that aliens shall be
arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence
of aground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are
administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive
measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be
conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.
The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of articles linked to the offense.The articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences(Rule 126, Section12 of
Rules on Criminal Procedure).
SALAZAR VS HON ACHACOSO
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
Achacosoissued Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that
there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that
petitioner has—(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;(2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code
in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
Presidential Decree No. 1920
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest
and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national
security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having
been licensed or authorized to do so.
Presidential Decree No. 2018
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-
holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute
a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of
job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and
seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in
illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by
media men and Mandaluyongpolicemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They
served the order to a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar, who let them in. The team
confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for
the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2
of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were
done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code
Held:
No. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The
Closure and SeizureOrder was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme
Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c),of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect... The power of the President to
order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power
to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.”
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BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (CID) V. DE LA ROSA
Facts:
William Gatchalian was in Hong Kong, seeking authority to enter into the
Philippines. On an application to the Bureau of Immigration he was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino Citizen, he was then issued an
Identification Certificate by the Immigration Authorities and was allowed entrance
thereof. Then subsequently the Secretary of Justice issued a Memorandum setting
aside all decisions purporting the decisions rendered by the Board. It tasked a Board
on Special Inquiry (BSI) to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that entrant was a Philippine Citizen, among those cases was that of Petitioner
William.
The BSI recommended reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners
(Bureau of Immigration, BOARD) and issue warrants of arrests (comment: arrest for
undesirable aliens, under PIL arrest for non-compliance of the Rules imposed by the
Bureau) against William and others. Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila, subsequently William filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Board.
RTC however dismissed the Motion and contends that it has jurisdiction over orders
of quasi-judicial bodies.
Issues:
Whether the BOC may issue warrant of arrest for purposes of investigation? NO
(Main Admin Issue)
WON, the RTC is vested with jurisdiction over petitions decided by a quasi-judicial
agency/body? YES
Ruling:
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the NLRC, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434,
provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as
the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with
the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to judicial
review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative
Code. Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg.
129 and which thus modifies the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like
the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court specified by the
statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the
proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the
Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129,
which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the
pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing
the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of
executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.
Cease and desist orders
CASES:
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, sec.7 [a], it has legal authority to
issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is
prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging wastewater, the
pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the
NPCC. That Solar Textile Corp. has violated such code.
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 DLSU LAW: Year III, Block 2, School Year 2012-2013
Solar on the other hand contends that an ex parte order under the Board’s rules
may only be issued if the wastewater discharged pose an immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life. Moreover, Solar claims
that the inspection reports before the Board made no such findings that the
wastewater discharged posed such threat.
Issue: Is it within the powers of the board to issue an ex parte cease and desist
order?
Ruling:
YES. That it is explicit under P.D. 984 that it may issue such ex parte order. That it is
not essential to that the Board prove that an immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare..” exists before it may issue such order. It is enough if the
Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed the allowable standards set by
the NPCC. It is clear that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board
that the wastewater from Solar’s plants exceeded the maximum allowable levels of
physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and there is adequate basis to
support the ex parte order.
On the Ex Parte cease and desist orders. This is permitted by law in situations like in
this case precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated wastewaters cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation on its
correctness has run its full course. It is a constitutional commonplace that ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interest in the exercise of police power.
Take note
The Court is not saying that the ex parte order may not be contested by Solar in a
hearing before the Board. But rather when the correctness of the prima facie
findings is contested the Board must hold a public hearing where the establishment
would have an opportunity to contest to controvert the basis of such order. That
such opportunity being available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution. The Board’s decision after public hearing may then be
tested judicially in the CA in accordance with P.D. No. 984 and sec. 42 of the IRR.
Right to counsel
CASES:
LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA
Facts:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by the Regional
Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Also complained was that the
cashier was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the
complaints were conducted, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to enable him to employ the
services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor
his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed
the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. FVR issued
AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
Ruling:
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was
not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by
the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or the law. “. . . There is nothing in the
Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable.
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In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by
the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration.
Imposition of Fines and Penalties
CASES:
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD V. PAL
Facts:
An appeal was made by PAL from the two resolutions of the CAB imposing a fine of
P2,500 upon PAL for making an unathorized flagstop, which flagstops must be
operated only with prior apporval by the Board.
Issue:
(1) Whether RA 776, creating CAB and CAA authorize CAB to issue the fine?
(2) Whether such grant of authority is invalid because to impose fines is a judicial
function exercised through the regular courts of justice?
Held:
(1) The CAB has the power to “review on appeal any administrative decision by the
CAA on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection
with the violation if any provision of this act or rules issued thereunder”. It also
has the power “either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal of CAA
decision, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate such fine and civil
penalties, as the case may be”. The power to impose fines is expressly given to
CAA.
(2) The fine imposed on PAL is an administrative fine and not a fine in the nature of
a criminal penalty in the RPC, because the fine was imposed for violating CAB
rules on flagstops. It is an administrative penalty which administrative officers
are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. Similar power has
been granted to Commision on Immigration for violating Immigration Laws, and
Commision of Customs for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The Court agrees to PAL’s contention that CAB has no power to impose fines in
the nature of criminal penalty and that courts of justice may only do so. But a
scrutiny of the provision of chapter 7 RA 776 on “Violation and penalties” that
in penalties for violations criminal in nature, the words ‘in the discretion of
the court’ always appear. But where the violation is punishable by fine or civil
penalty, the law does not include those words.
PEREZ V. LPG REFILLERS ASSOC. OF THE PHIL.
Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,
overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as
well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for
violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement
B.P. Blg. 33, which provides among others:
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS.
(REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2)
YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense – Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense – Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense – Recommend business closure to the proper local
government unit
It is alleged that the “assailed Circular” listed prohibited acts and punishable
offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33,
as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined the
prohibited/punishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in
the assailed Circular are not included in the law.
Issue: Is the circular valid? YES
Ruling:
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force
of penal law:
(1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and
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(2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes
illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum
products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving
petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said
criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing
scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no
trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no
embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering
LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and
omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb
the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law.
Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits
any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of
P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is
P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers,
marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty.
This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid
statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides
penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all
that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable
acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits
for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law,
albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and
dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
RULES OF PROCEDURE, GENERALLY
 Quasi-judicial agencies are empowered to issue their own rules of
procedure.
 Such rules of procedure must not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
 The rules of Court are suppletory to rules of procedure of quasi-judicial
agencies.
 All procedural rules are subject to alteration or modification by the SC.
 The technical rules of procedure and of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law and equity are not controlling.
 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally.
Book VII, Administrative Procedure
E.O. 292
Administrative Code of 1987
Section 1: This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next
succeeding section, except:
 Congress
 Judiciary
 Constitutional Commissions
 Military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces
personnel
 Board of Pardons and Parole
 State Universities and Colleges
Section 2
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority
or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order
to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate
cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions;
government corporations with respect to functions regulating private
right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of
disciplinary power as provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or
practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term
includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of,
or procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon
the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or
schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and
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other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be (13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance,
observed and followed by any person. license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking
amendment, or repeal of a rule. of any action upon the application or petition of any person.
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the (14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-
legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by making, adjudication and licensing.
the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association,  "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule,
public or private organization of any character other than an agency. order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any
agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an
agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited
purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an
interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in
form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and CASES:
granting of rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final Londoner v. City Bi-Mettalic v. State Corona vs. United Harbor
order. Board
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate,
passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory Denver City Charter State Board of PPA-AO 04-92 7
exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a Equalization (Colorado),
right or privilege. and Colorado Tax
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, Commission
revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment,
modification or conditioning of a license. Power to make local That the valuation of all “all existing regular
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other improvements and taxable property in
condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the assess the cost upon Denver be increased by appointments which have been
property specially forty percent previously issued either by the
imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or
benefited Bureau of Customs or the PPA
withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement,
shall remain valid up to 31
restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or
December 1992 only”; “all
suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive
appointments to harbor pilot
action.
positions in all pilotage districts
shall, be only for a term of 1yr

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from date of effectivity subject and due process

to yearly renewal or protections attach.
cancellation by the Authority These due process
after conduct of a rigid protections do not
evaluation of performance.” require a full trial, but
the mere opportunity
Londoner provided Tax had been levied United Harbor Pilots to file a written
with notice of against Bi-Metallic’s Association and the Manila statement is
assessment (fixed a property without it Pilots Association, through insufficient. Due
deadline for the filing being afforded an Capt. Compas, questioned it process in this context
of complaints and opportunity to be heard before the DOTC; due process requires at least an
objection) only, then was not observed in the opportunity to be
challenged said adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 heard in person and
assessment of tax because no hearing was present evidence.
conducted whereby “relevant
government agencies” and the Subsequently, without In considering this case In the past, they enjoyed a
pilots themselves could further notice or in this Court we must measure of security knowing
ventilate their views. hearing, the city assume that the proper that after passing five
council enacted the state machinery has examinations and undergoing
In the context of Where an agency rule As a general rule, notice and ordinance of been used, and the years of on-the-job training,
taxation, a legislative will apply to a vast hearing, as the fundamental assessment whose question is whether, if they would have a license
body has the power to number of people, requirements of procedural validity is to be the state constitution which they could use until their
tax without affording the Constitution does due process, are essential only determined in this had declared that retirement, unless sooner
citizens due process not require that each be when an administrative body case. The facts out of Denver had been revoked by the PPA for mental
protections. However, given an opportunity to exercises its quasi-judicial which the question on undervalued as or physical unfitness. Under
when the decision to be heard directly for the function. In the performance this assignment arises compared with the rest the new issuance, they have to
tax particular purpose of arguing in of its executive or legislative may be compressed of the state, and had contend with an annual
individuals is made by favor of or against its functions, such as issuing rules into small compass. decreed that, for the cancellation of their license
a non-legislative body adoption. In cases such and regulations, an The first step in the current year, the which can be temporary or
based on the as this, it would be administrative body need not assessment valuation should be forty permanent depending on the
individual facts and impractical to allow all comply with the requirements proceedings was by percent higher, the outcome of their performance
circumstances of a individuals affected to of notice and hearing. the certificate of the objection now urged evaluation. Veteran pilots and
particular case, the offer a direct voice in board of public works could prevail. It appears neophytes alike are suddenly
decision becomes support of or in of the cost of the to us that to put the confronted with one-year
adjudicative in nature, opposition to an order. improvement and a question is to answer it. terms which ipso facto expire

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preliminary There must be a limit to at the end of that Unmanifested Cargo – Notice of VP for legal department
apportionment of it. individual argument in period. Renewal of their Television Set; Customs injury/sickness, and accused of abuse of conduct,
The last step was the such matters if license is now dependent on a sent written notice to claim for inefficiency, mismanagement;
enactment of the government is to go on. “rigid evaluation of the operator of the compensation filed Bank Director concluded
assessment ordinance. performance” which is vessel, AV Rocha with the Department charges as true
From beginning to end conducted only after the of Labor Region I at
of the proceedings the license has already been Dagupan City
landowners, although cancelled. Hence, the use of
allowed to formulate the term “renewal.” It is this Request for The hearing officer Memo issued for his
and file complaints pre-evaluation cancellation investigation not dismissed the voluntary resignation;
and objections, were which primarily makes PPA-AO heeded, and operator’s compensation claim: Requested for full hearing,
not afforded an No. 04-92 unreasonable and explanation that it was repeated non- but he was terminated from
opportunity to be constitutionally infirm. In a not cargo was found not appearance of the work
heard upon them. real sense, it is a deprivation of to be satisfactory, thus claimant and counsel
property without due process fined, with threat during the scheduled
of law. hearings of this case
despite due notice to
the and it appearing
that the evidence
Notice and Hearing adduced was not
enough to warrant an
 Right to a hearing includes: right to present one’s case and to submit evidence
immediate award in
in support of it
favor of the claimant
 There is no denial of due process when a party has been notified of the hearing
but failed to attend or refrained from participating in the agency proceedings
 Violation of this renders any judgment or order issued therein null and void and
can be attacked in any appropriate proceeding.

NDC vs. Collector of Bautista vs. Equitable Banking

Customs Workmen’s Corporation vs. NLRC
Compensation Comm.

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Exhaustion of The very rules of the While it is true that the thereof. Relative to the
administrative remedies Commission require essence of due process is August 20, 1975
is not required where the giving simply an opportunity to be scheduled hearing, the
the appeal to the of reasonable notice of heard or, as applied in counsel for claimant
administrative superior hearing to each party administrative proceedings, was not again notified
is not a plain, speedy or interested by service an opportunity to explain of the same.
adequate remedy in the upon him personally or one's side, meetings in the
ordinary course of law, by registered mail of a nature of consultation
as where it is copy thereof at his last andconferences such as the
undisputed that the known post office case here, however, may not
respondent officer has address or if he is be valid substitutes for
acted in utter disregard represented by a the proper observance of
of the principle of due counsel, through the notice and hearing.
process. latter, so as to ensure
observance and
Notice and Hearing: When not required
protection of an
interested party's right CASES:
to a hearing.
EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
Collector committed WCC record does not For having violated private HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
grave abuse of show that indeed respondent's right to due RIZAL, QUEZON CITY BRANCH V, AND THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, AS
discretion because counsel for claimant process private respondent SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
petitioner NDC was not received notice of shall, considering the G.R. NO. L-9430 JUNE 29, 1957
given an opportunity to hearing prior to the attendant circumstances PADILLA, J.:
prove that the aforesaid scheduled particularly his repeated, but
television set involved is date of hearing. With unheeded, request for a Facts:
not a cargo that needs respect to the August hearing, be entitled to an
In 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia, 16 years old, filed a complaint against
to be manifested. 6, 1975 scheduled amount of P5,000.00.
Emilio Suntay. At first, the Assistant City Attorney recommended that the complaint
hearing, the claim of
be dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, attorney for the complainant addressed a
claimant's counsel that
letter to the City Attorney of QC wherein he took exception to the recommendation
he was not notified
of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction
thereof is not disputed;
be filed against petitioner.
nor do the records
show that he was ever
In 1955, Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport. After which, he left for
furnished a notice
the US to study. Subsequently, a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction

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was filed in the CFI of Quezon City. On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed
a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies
as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back
to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The Court
granted the motion.
Because of said order, respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United
States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the
passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved.
Issue: WON the cancellation of Suntay’s passport is illegal
HELD: NO
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is
exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of
a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed
with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of
such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;
and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and
capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be
held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a
writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
petitioner contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the
cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing,"
because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning
and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty
without due process of law.
GEORGE DE BISSCHOP VS. EMILIO L. GALANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. NO. L-1836 MAY 31, 1963
Facts:
George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for
three years, as the prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which
he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the
Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959.
In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports that the Bissmag
Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of
local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of
having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration,
demanded from petitioner the paytion of 10 September 1959, and advised him that
his application for extension of stay has been denied, and that he should depart
within 5 days.
Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision said
Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11 September
1959, in this tenor:
In reply to yours of even date requesting that you furnished copy of the decision,
order or resolution of the Board of Commissioners denying the application for
extension of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be advised that, pursuant to
immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is
a vote for denial, for reason of practicability and expediency, no formal decision,
order resolution is promulgated by the Board. The denial of the petition for
extension was expressed by the majority members of the Board as follows:
For denial, Talabis, 8-24-59; O.K. for extension, De la Rosa, September 9; Denial,
Galang, 9-10.
1. No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration.
Instead, to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation
proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959.
2. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering
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herein respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-
appellee. During the hearing, only documentary evidence were presented.
Issue: WON Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal
hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens.
Held: NO
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility
of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely
discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act
No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to
the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the
argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative
practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency.
This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this
particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart
in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final,
because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the
"requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an
advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to
take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day
in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SOLAR TEXTILE
FINISHING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 93891 MARCH 11, 1991
The Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal
leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
A copy of the above Order and A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was
received by Solar
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of
execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board
issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to
enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's
wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation
within thirty (30) days.
Solar, however, went to the RTC of Quezon City on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against the Board.
The RTC dismissed Solar's petition upon 2 grounds:
That appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as
the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and That the Board's subsequent
Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
Solar went on appeal to the CA which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial
court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. It also declared
the writ of execution as null and void.
Issue: WON the writ of execution, which was issued ex parte, violated the
requirements of due process
Held: NO
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple
and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years.
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The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted
and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power.
The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled
Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any
case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on
an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to
reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by
imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and
comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their
implementing regulations.
IV. FORM AND PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT
CASES:
JUAN M. SERRANO vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, CHAMBER OF TAXICAB SERVICES, INC., ADMIRAL
TAXI CO., INC., LITA ENTERPRISES COMPANY, INC., SABINO GONZALES, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-24165 August 30, 1968
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts
Juan Serrano filed an application with the Public Service Commission requesting
authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of Manila and
from said city to any place in the Island of Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic and
vice versa, with the use of fifty (50) units." His application "was heard by Associate
Commissioner Gregorio C. Panganiban. The record of the case shows that the
petitioner completed the presentation of his evidence, but the oppositors did not
present any evidence to rebut the evidence of the petitioner as to his qualification
and financial capacity." The Public Service Commission denied completely, his
application ... It is not known from the decision appealed from whether the
application of the petitioner was dismissed for lack of interest or failure to
prosecute or denied for failure to qualify.
Issue: WON PSC committed error in denying Serrano’s application
Held: YES
An administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the Public Service
Commission, while it is "free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,"
does not mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process ... ." Seven
cardinal primary rights, which, this Court held, must be respected, are enumerated,
the last being "that quasi-judicial tribunals, should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it." It
does not admit of doubt that when in a decision under review respondent Public
Service Commission did not even bother to refer individually to petitioner and state
why his application is either dismissed or denied, there was a violation of the above
cardinal primary right.
The gravity of such a failing is underscored not only by deprivation of a right to
which petition is entitled, but also by the obstacle placed on the responsibility
entrusted to us of reviewing decisions and orders of the Public service Commission.
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG, REALTY
CORPORATION VS.
LUCINA S. SENDINO AND THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, MALACAÑANG, MANILA
G.R. NO. 109703 JULY 5, 1994
Facts:
Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange
Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,
Paranaque On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full
downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change
her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so.
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For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate
documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its Vice-
President for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on
the 31st of July 1989. Hence, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was
challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and
lot. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which
affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to
the Office of the President, herein public respondent. On January 7, 1993, the
public respondent rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal.
Issue: WON the OP erred in declaring that the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions,
and even if the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, public respondent stillerred in
declaring that the board of commissioners is allowed to sit in a decision to render
judgment and to delegate its quasi-judicial authority to a subordinate office.
Held: NO
The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners
with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their
obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement.
The HLURB is the successor agency of the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission's powers andfunctions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such
functions from the NHAto the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of
1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers
which included thepower to "hear and decide cases of unsound real estate
businesspractices . . . and cases of specific performance." Obviously, in the exercise
of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts,
determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages
whenever appropriate.
The Board is specifically mandated to "adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of
its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective
accomplishment of its above mentioned functions." Since nothing in the provisions
of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate
adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose
of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial
powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various
divisions.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and
IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005
Facts:
Respondents are former employees of the Department of Health–National Capital
Region. On May 15, 1996, some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint
before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda
U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and respondents,
arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of
Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules
worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory. The Resident
Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents
and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA
3019. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
hereafter AO 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative
case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it
issued a resolution finding Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting
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Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez,
Acting Supply Officer III, all of DOH-NCR guilty as charged and so recommends to his
Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the
government service be imposed thereon.
Thus, President Ramos issued AO 390:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby
found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal from the service.
The records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to
Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.’
Thereafter, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
respondents and Horacio Cabrera. The dispositive portion reads:
‘WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-
captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II,
Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I
and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health – NCR
are hereby DISMISSED from the service.
‘SO ORDERED.’
1. Respondents filed their appeal with the CSC, and it was denied.
2. Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied on
August 17, 1999.
3. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999.
While Cabrera’s motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000.
Respondents, however, received the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration on November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal
to the CA the CSC’s resolutions ahead of respondents. The petition of Cabrera
was granted by the CA.
Issue: WON the Health Secretary’s decision with regard to respondents is valid
Held: NO
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following
cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some
basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal
must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy
and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision
must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it
and the various issues involved.
In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing respondents
pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior
to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a
restudy of the doctor’s case. He even noted a violation that had not been
considered by the PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N.
Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commission’s
Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation
with regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
SOLID HOMES, INC., vs. EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by
PROCESO F. CRUZ
G.R. No. 166051 April 8, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes,
Inc. The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less. The
respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the
respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the
execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon
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the final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the
demands of the respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of
Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a Decision
denying respondents’ prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of
the TCT. He, however, directed the petitioner to execute and deliver the aforesaid
Deed of Sale and TCT the moment that the purchase price is fully settled by the
respondents. Further, he ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from charging
and/or collecting fees from the respondents other than those authorized by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957and similar statutes.
The petitioner appealed the said Decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
Which affirmed the Arbiter’s decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Office of the
President, which denied the petition. Petitioner, still unsatisfied, appealed to the
CA, who also dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON the Decision of the Office of the President, which merely adopted by
reference the Decision of the HLURB, without a recitation of the facts and law on
which it was based, is against Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution ("No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.“)
Held: NO
Reason:
The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based," does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
inferior tribunals.
In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of
"memorandum decisions," a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate
courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket
status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that "memorandum decisions"
comply with the constitutional mandate.
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not
apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said
section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII
is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with
respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or
even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are
oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
CASES:
PASCUAL V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA
106 PHIL 446 GUTIERREZ DAVID; OCTOBER 31, 1959
FACTS
October 6, 1956 > Acting Provincial Governor of Nueva Ecija filed with the Provincial
Board three administrative charges against Arturo B. Pascual, elected mayor of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and reelected in 1955, for [CHARGE NO. 3]
"Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions,"
committed by willfully, feloniously, criminally, without legal authority, and with
grave abuse of authority, assumed and usurped the judicial powers of the justice of
the peace by accepting the criminal complaint filed in the said court, conducting the
preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond of P6,000.00, and issuing the
corresponding warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case had
been arrested, while the justice of the peace was in his office in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, Pascual, in defiance of the express refusal by the justice of the peace to
reduce the bail bond of the accused, acted on the motion to reduce bail and did
reduce the bail
bond to P3,000.00,
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Pascual filed with the Provincial Board a motion to dismiss CHARGE NO. 3 above
referred to, on the ground that the wrongful acts alleged had been committed
during his previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining
him during his second term. Motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of the
Board. Pascual filed with SC a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of
CHARGE NO. 3, but the petition was denied by minute resolution "without prejudice
to action, if any, in the CFI." Accordingly, Pascual filed with CFI Nueva Ecija a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said
Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing of CHARGE NO. 3, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Provincial Board moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that it states no
cause of action because the Pascual had not complied with the cardinal principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the courts, and
because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over
CHARGE NO. 3. CFI issued an order dismissing the petition "for being premature,"
for the reason that the Pascual had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary.
From that order, the case was brought before us on appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON it was legally proper for Pascual to have come to court without first
bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review
2. WON disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act he committed
during his immediately preceding term of office is valid
HELD
1. YES. Doctrine Where the law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be
followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan Kai vs.
Import Control Commission etc).
Ratio The rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to availability of
the administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one,
and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where
although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts,
merely matters of from, and the administrative process, as a process of
judgment, is over; or where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but
merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not
proceed with optional administrative process before seeking juducial relief.
Reasoning
Mondano vs. Silvosa > granted a writ of prohibition against the provincial board
of Capiz, notwithstanding the fact that he did not appeal to the Executive
Secretary, the only question involved being WON the charged filed against the
municipal mayor of Calibo, Capiz, constituted any one of the grounds for
suspension or removal provided for in sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
2. NO
Ratio The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms,
and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
Reasoning
SC resorted to American authorities. The weight of authorities, however, seems
to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not
to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution
provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for
which the officer was elected or appointed.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.
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ALZATE V ALDANA
107 PHIL 298 BARRERA, J.; FEB 29, 1960
FACTS
RA No. 842 was enacted to adjust the salaries of Public school teachers and
personnel. Under the law salary adjustment of 4 grades was to be effected for every
five years of service plus another grade for
passing the examination for Superintendent of Private school given by the Civil
Service Commission.
Anacleto Alzate, Principal of a High School in La Union, has been in service for 24
years, the last one as secondary principal. His salary was adjusted based only on his
number of years of service as secondary principal ( 9 years, 8 months, 15 days) and
his having passed the test as earlier mentioned was not considered. He appealed
this but even before the ruling from the Bureau of Public School, he filed a
mandamus proceeding in the CFI of La Union fearing that the amount appropriated
for the payment of the salary adjustment of public schools teachers and officials, if
not disbursed or committed before the expiration of the fiscal year on June 30,
1958, would be reverted to the general funds of the Government.
Thereafter, respondents filed their motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
petition stated no cause of action against respondents; that petitioner had not
exhausted all administrative remedies before coming to court, and that the lower
court had acquired no jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the petition was
dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to file an appropriate
action at the opportune time. Hence this appeal to the SC
ISSUE/S
WON the CFI as correct in dismissing the case for non exhaustion of administrative
remedies
HELD
No. There is merit in petitioner's contention. The fact that the partie shad to agree
and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director of Public Schools
shall recommend to the proper officials not
later than June 30, 1958 and before the closing of office hours on that date the
commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by petitioner, to accounts payable in
order to prevent its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well as the court of
the validity and urgency of the action taken by the petitioner-appellant.
It would seem, therefore, that in the particular circumstances of the present case,
petitioner had sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of his petition on
June 11, 1958, and a resort to the court without awaiting for the final decision of
the administrative officers is not, in view of the special situation, premature.
It appears from the petition that the reason for its filing without awaiting the final
action on the part of the respondent Director of Public Schools was the urgency of
preventing the automatic reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of the
then current fiscal year, of the sum appropriated in Republic Act No. 2042 for the
adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers pursuant to
Republic Act No. 842.
Petitioner contends that if he waited for the final decision on his petition for
reconsideration which was not forthcoming, and in fact did not come, before June
30, 1958, whatever action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable
to petitioner, would be of no avail after the reversion of the funds appropriated for
the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims, that to require him to exhaust
the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in effect
amount to a nullification of his claim.
CIPRIANO V. MARCELINO
43 SCRA 291 CASTRO, FEBRUARY 28, 1972
FACTS
Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of municipal treasurer Gregorio P.
Marcelino of Calabanga, Camarines Sur. On the latter date she resigned. Because
the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from the service, refused
to pay her salary for a certain period, as well as the commutation equivalent of her
accumulated vacation and sick leaves. Cipriano filed an action for mandamus to
compel the said municipal treasurer to pay her the total amount of P949. She also
asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not "exhausted all
administrative remedies before filing the present action," arguing that exhaustion
of all administrative remedies is a condition precedent before an aggrieved party
may have judicial recourse. Granting the motion, the court a
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quo ordered the dismissal of the case. Cipriano's motion for reconsideration was
denied
ISSUE
WON Cipriano did not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing the present
action.
HELD
NO. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without
exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may
and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage.
It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way
to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the
small total of nine hundred forty-nine (P949) pesos, would not only be oppressive
but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been
decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total
sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.
The theory that a party must first exhaust his remedies in the administrative branch
before seeking the aid of the strong arm of equity must give way to the reality that
a government employee must depend for the support of himself and his family
upon his salary, and were he to be deprived of that even alone for a few months,
possibly even lees, that must mean starvation because more often than not, a
government employee lives hand-to-mouth existence and he awaits with eager
hands the arrival of the forthnightly envelope because upon it must hinge the
supply of rice and fish and clothing of his spouse and children and himself and with
it only can be maintained, and therefore were the dogmatic rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies be made to mean that he should wait for the most final
administrative decision in his case, the only logical result must be vital disaster to
his dependents and to himself, so that this is the reason why the rule of exhaustion
of administrative remedies has always been understood to mean that the same
have furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
All the documents required to support payment of Cipriano's salary and the cash
commutation of her unused vacation and sick leaves have been accomplished.
Cipriano having thus earned the right to the said payment, it has become the
corresponding duty of the respondent treasurer to recognize such right and effect
payment.
PAREDES VS. CA (NAVARRO)
253 SCRA 126 KAPUNAN; FEB 11, 1996
FACTS
Public respondents promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992,
revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take effect on 15
March 1993. Among the provisions of said administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O.
No. 1 and Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for
registration of patents and trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2 which prohibited
the filing of multi-class applications, that is, one application covering several classes
of goods.
Petitioners, who are registered patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to stop public respondents from enforcing the aforementioned
administrative orders 2 and to declare Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of
A.O. No. 2, series of 1992 of the BPTTT null and void. CA dismissed the petition for
prohibition and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. Thus,
this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
2. WON the CA erred in not holding that the questioned administrative orders are
null and void for failure to comply with the publication requirements of both
the Administrative Code and BP 325
3. WON the CA erred in not declaring null and void Rule 59 of Administrative
Order No. 1 on the ground that the public respondents do not have the power
to amend the Trademark Law
HELD
1. NO.
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Ratio Prohibition is not the proper remedy. Where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative
appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
will not entertain a case unless the available administrative' remedies have been
resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is
sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy
at law either by appeal or otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for dismissing
the writ.
Reasoning The proposed rates and charges still have to obtain the imprimatur of
the Cabinet, and prior to which, they have to undergo Cabinet scrutiny. Thus, there
is the contingency that the same may not obtain the approval of the Cabinet.
2. NO.
Ratio B.P. Blg. 325 requires Cabinet review and approval of the impugned
administrative orders before their publication. However, since the Cabinet has yet
to review and approve the proposed revised rates of fees and charges, there can be
no proper publication.
3. NO.
Since the challenged administrative orders have not yet been submitted to the
Cabinet for its consideration and approval, this Court finds it untimely to discuss
and resolve the merits of the questions of whether or not the rate increases and
charges are just and reasonable sufficient to cover administrative costs, and/or that
the same are practicable and uniform for similar or comparable services and
functions, and/or that those rates conform with the rules and regulations of the
Ministry of Finance. Courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative
action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absence of a final
order or decision, the power of the administrative agency concerned has not been
fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm.
Reasoning
a. To prevent the courts from being swamped by a resort to them in the first
instance
b. Rule on comity and convenience
QUASHA V SEC & MANILA POLO CLUB
320 SCRA 478 TEEHANKEE; MAY 31, 1978
FACTS
Petitioner filed complaints with the SEC against the filing of Manila Polo Club’s
(MPC) Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws converting it into a
proprietary club, alleging that such amendments would enable the members to
appropriate the club’s property and use it as their contribution to the ‘new’ club,
essentially negating the accrued contributions of past and present member’s
(including his) money, time, effort and foresight for a paltry proprietary
membership fee (plus they allegedly had not been adopted by the required two
thirds vote). SEC denied such injunctive relief for lack of merit hence this petition
with prayer for a restraining order enjoining MPC from selling proprietary shares
(the latter later issued by the Court).
ISSUE/S
1. Did petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing
with the court?
2. Did the resolution of the issues w/o a full blown hearing on the merits
deprived petitioner of due process?
HELD
1. NO.
In view of the limited time, and considering the issuance of the order denying
injunctive relief only at the height of the Christmas holidays, petitioner properly
filed directly with the Court without going through the prescribed procedure of
filing before the SEC en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such
recourse would not be a plain, speed and adequate remedy.
2. YES.
The issues set forth, such as the necessary two-thirds vote and the legality of the
value of the proprietary shares warrants the full-blown trial sought hence the case
should be remanded to the SEC for such trial and determination on merits. As for
the TRO, it shall be lifted subject to the condition advanced by the SEC that should
the amendments be later annulled, all payments made pursuant to it would be
refunded to the members
PAAT V CA (DE GUZMAN)
266 SCRA 167 TORRES, JANUARY 10, 1997
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FACTS
The truck of private respondent de Guzman was seized by DENR personnel because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Layugan (Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer) issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave de Guzman
15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. De Guzman failed to submit the required explanation. Regional Executive
Director of DENR sustained Petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck. De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration of the
Regional Executive Director’s order – denied.
De Guzman filed a letter to DENR Sec, wherein it was stated that in case the letter
for reconsideration would be denied, the letter should be considered an appeal to
the Secretary. However, pending the decision of the DENR Sec, De Guzman filed a
suit for replevin with RTC. Petitioners filed MD (De Guzman had no cause of action
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). RTC: MD denied – MFR – denied –
filed petition for certiorari with CA CA: affirmed RTC decision
Petitioner:. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondent:. Doctrine does not apply because (1) due process was violated (not
given a chance to be heard); (2) seizure and forfeiture was unlawful because (a)
DENR Sec and his representatives had no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, (b) trucks were not used
in the commission of the crime
ISSUES
1. Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, can an
action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
HELD
1. NO
Ratio. (GENERAL RULE) Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. If a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for
reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. EXCEPTION It is disregarded when there is a violation of due
process, when the issue involved is purely a legal question, when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, when there is
irreparable injury, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention
Reasoning. The controversy was pending before the DENR Secretary when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the MFR. By appealing
to him, the respondents acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCGG) V SANDIGANBAYAN
255 SCRA 438 FRANCISCO; MARCH 29, 1996
FACTS
Petitioner PCGG issued separate sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, allegedly part of Lucio Tan’s ill-gotten
wealth. 2 separate petitions were filed by Sipalay and Allied before the SC assailing
the sequestration orders. The SC referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition.
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The petitions were jointly heard. The Sandiganbayan ordered the submission by
PCGG of its formal evidence in writing, but the latter instead filed a Motion to
Dismiss. This motion to dismiss came nearly 7 years after Sipalay and Allied
originally filed their petitions before the SC. The ground was Sialay’s and Allied’s
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that Sipalay
and Allied should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the
President before challenging them in court, invoking the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion and voided the orders issued
against Sipalay and Allied.
ISSUES
Is the Sandiganbayan’s denial of PCGG’s motion to dismiss is proper?
HELD
YES
Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a
motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The Court approves of the
filing of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any
stage of the proceedings. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have
repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of noncompliance
with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is
deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it.
The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion
to dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as “proper time.” Such
tarried maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches. Another equally
forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss is that this
case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and the Sandiganbayan’s brief but lucid disquisition on
one exception merits this Court’s approval.
“The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to
petitioners’ case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit:
(i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine;
(ii) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(iii) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and
(iv) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice. x x x
there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG’s resolution to the
Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited indifference
towards petitioners’ pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search and seizure
orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of
the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for seeking relief
directly from the courts.”
The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., “where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine,” consisting in the PCGG’s being guilty of
estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer
therefore to the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the
PCGG’s motion to dismiss was in order.
FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
 What is a decision?
o In administrative law, it is the whole or any part of the final
disposition, not of an interlocutory order, of a quasi-judicial
agency in any matter (e.g., licensing, rate fixing, grant of rights
and privileges)
o According to Sec.14 of Book VI (AC), it shall be rendered by any
agency “within thirty (30) days following its submission.”
o When is it “deemed submitted?”
 After both parties shall have concluded presentation of
their evidence or upon the filing of their respective
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memoranda, if required or if they so ask and the same is
granted.
o Is the 30-day period to render a decision mandatory?
 No, according to Marcelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, while
the law employs the word “shall,” which imports a
command or implies that it shall be mandatory, a time
provision for decision is construed as directory, so that
the failure of the agency to decide does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction to resolve it thereafter, nor render such
decision invalid.
 RELIEF—Includes the whole or part of any:
1. Grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption,
exception, or remedy;
2. Recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption,
exception; or
3. Taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person.
 SANCTION—Includes the whole or part of a:
1. Prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any
person; the withholding of a relief;
2. Imposition of a penalty or fine;
3. Destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of a property;
4. Assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation,
cost, charges or fees;
5. Revocation or suspension of license; or
6. Taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.
 The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the part adversely affected
unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if
proper, has been perfected.
 Where the rules of administrative agency prohibit the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration, the agency is precluded from entertaining such
decision, which thus becomes final. For while the administrative agency
may alter, modify or reverse its decision, with or without a motion for
reconsideration, the same can only be done before it becomes final and
executory.
 Notice of a decision: The parties shall be notified of the decision personally
or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to
them.
 If a decision becomes final and executory, this even binds the Office of the
President even if such agency is under the administrative supervision and
control of latter.
Reason: Administrative decisions must end sometimes, as fully as public
demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest
requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at
every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that one that has
already been terminated should not be disturbed.
 APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES
o The rule of procedure of some quasi-judicial agencies prescribe
the requirements for appeal to higher administrative agencies.
o An appellant should comply with all the requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed.
o Reason: Appeal is a statutory right which may be exercised in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law.
 APPEAL
o Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or
executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may
be taken to the Department head.
o Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. -
Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision
complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the
agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving
copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate
agency, and paying the required fees.
If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have
the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period
for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If
the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party
shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of
reversal within which to perfect his appeal.
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The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the
records of the case to the appellate agency.
o Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision
appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate
agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case.
o Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review
the records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or
upon motion, receive additional evidence.
o Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any
contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the
parties of a copy thereof.
CASES:
SWITCHMEN’S UNION OF NORTH AMERICA V. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 320
U.S. 279 (1943)
Congress has long delegated to executive officers or agencies the determination
of complicated questions of fact and of law. And where no judicial review was
provided by Congress, the Court has often refused to furnish one even where
questions of law might be involved. That the Board's certification of representatives
of employees for collective bargaining is conclusive does not, of itself, make such
certification judicially reviewable.
FORTICH VS CORONA (1998)
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including
the OP, may be taken to the CA by filing a verified petition for review within 15days
from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in this particular
case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal"
and was issued with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his Corona's
jurisdiction" when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision
which had long become final and executory. Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening
the case and substantially modifying its March Decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
VICENTE SOTTO vs. JUAN RUIZ (1921)
The rule is that courts will not interfere with the decision of
the Director of Posts unless they are clearly of opinion that it was wrong
UY v PALOMAR (1969)
In other words, the courts will interfere with the decision of the PostmasterGeneral
if it clearly appears that the decision is wrong. This Court, by said rulings, recognizes
the availability of judicial review over the action of the Postmaster General,
notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision for judicial review of his action .
It may not be amiss to state that said rulings are in consonance with
American jurisprudence to the effect that the absence of statutory
provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is
barred.
ANTIQUE SAWMILL INC VS ZAYCO (1966)
That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law can no longer be
questioned. Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as fully as public
policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. In other words,
public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered
at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already
terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery).
MANUEL v VILLENA, THE DIRECTOROF FORESTRY (1971)
The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is basically executive or
administrative in nature. And courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings
undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically
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to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government
policy on the matter, are usually involved in the decisions. There
are, of course, limits to the exercise of administrative discretion. Administrative
proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon
a showing that "the board or official has gone
beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion" or that
the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.
SAN MIGUEL CORP V. SECRETARY OF LABOR (1975)
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts
of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review
is given by statute
FLORES v. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA (2005)
It is a well-settled rule that where petitioner has available remedies within the
administrative machinery against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, the intervention of the courts can be resorted to by him only after having
exhausted all such remedies
CSC v. DBM (2005)
A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition Rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent
applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative
step as a condition precedent to taking action in court.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
 Judicial review of an act, rule or decision of an executive or administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body is the re-examination or determination by
the courts in the exercise of their judicial power as to whether the
questioned act, rule, or decision has been validly or invalidly issued or
whether the same should be nullified, affirmed or modified.
 Through the power of judicial review, courts may determine the legality or
propriety of the exercise of discretion by the political departments of the
government.
 Purpose: To keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect the substantive rights of parties affected by its acts, rule or
decision, as part of the checks and balances.
 Any agency action is subject to judicial review in an appropriate case.
 LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
o General rule: Purely administrative and discretionary functions
may not be interfered with by the courts because the latter have
no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government.
o Exceptions:
1. When there is grave abuse of discretion which is equivalent
to a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.
2. Where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
o Examples:
 Denial of due process
 Fraud, mistake of facts, or collusion
 Arbitrary action in the administrative proceedings
 Absolutely no evidence in support of the findings
 Evidence is clearly, manifestly and apparently
insubstantial
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 Disregard of rebuttal evidence which otherwise would
have the effect of reversing the finding
 Prejudice caused to a party because the findings and
decisions are in violation of constitutional provisions
 REVIEW OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
o The court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule
o However, a court is free to make inquiries:
 Is the rule within the delegated authority of the agency?
 Is it reasonable?
 Was it issued pursuant to proper procedure?
 REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
o Rule: A court has no supervisory power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government.
o Reasons:
1. In the exercise of their powers in their respective specialized
fields, these quasi-judicial agencies have acquired
knowledgeability, experience, and expertise which are
essential in the resolution of questions of complex or
specialized nature
2. Presumption of regularity
 FINAL DECISION BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW
o The right to appeal is merely a statutory right and may be
exercised only in the manner in accordance with the law. Failure
to do so will cause the loss of this right and render the decision
final.
o The decisions and orders of administrative agencies, in their
quasi-judicial function, have upon their finality, the force and
biding effect of a final judgment that is res judicata.
 MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Petition for review
2. Appeal by certiorari
3. Petition for certiorari
4. Prohibition
5. Mandamus
 Petition for review
o This is a mode of appeal from decision or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies filed with the Court of Appeal (Rule 43 of ROC
and BP 129, Sec.9)
o The enumeration in Rule 43 is not exhaustive since there are
other quasi-judicial agencies and the legislature is still free to
enact laws creating such.
o The petition for review to the CA may be questions of fact or law,
or a mixture of both.
 Appeal by certiorari
o appeal to the Supreme Court from judgment or final order of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court
under Rule 45 (ROC)
o it is not a matter of right but of sound discretion
o must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth
 Petition for Certiorari
o a special civil action directed against any tribunal or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions which is alleged to
have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy.
o designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.
o Purposes:
1. To annul or modify the questioned act or ruling.
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2. To prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority
3. Provide for a fair and orderly justice.
o Petition on certiorari v. Appeal by certiorari
1. The latter corrects error of judgment
2. The latter is an ordinary appeal
3. The latter may raise questions of law or facts
o Prohibition
o This is a preventive remedy since its function is to restrain the
doing of some act about to be done.
o It does not intend to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished (fait accompli)
o Ground: The administrative agency is threatening to usurp or
exercise a jurisdiction or power not vested unto them by law.
o Mandamus
 Remedy when there is a neglect on the part of an agency or
officer in the performance of an act, specifically enjoined by law
as a duty
 Requisites:
1. The applicant must have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded.
2. The corresponding duty to perform the required act must
also be clear and specific.
CASES:
o Distinction between law & fact
VDA. DE SANTIAGO V. REYES (1960)
There being a presumption under the provisions of Section 43 of the Workmens’
Compensation Act that the deceased died while in the course of his employment,
his death must be presumed to have arisen out of said employment.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. V. PEPITO (1966)
Noncontroversion of a claim for workmen’s compensation simply means, as in the
case of pleadings in ordinary cases, an admission of facts not of legal conclusions.
o Question of law
ORTUA V. ENCARNACION, 59 PHIL. 440 (1934)
The decision of the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce on the question of law, is in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is
subject to review. Any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon
misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts.
YSMAEL V. CIR 108 PHIL. 407 (1960)
The findings with regard to questions of law may not be disturbed in this
proceeding for review by certiorari.
o Question of fact
GONZALES V. VICTORY LABOR UNION 30 SCRA 47 (1969)
While under the substantial evidence rule, the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are not disturbed on appeal as long as they are supported by
such relevant evidence. There is one circumstance where findings of fact is not
accepted as conclusive—that the said decision was rendered by an almost divided
court and that the decision was precisely on the facts as borne out by the evidence.
SC is called upon to go over the record and, in order to determine the substantiality
of the evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative but also in its qualitative
aspects. For to be substantial, evidence must first of all be credible.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK V. MONETARY BOARD 204
SCRA 767 (1991)
Courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect
to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. But
when there is a grave abuse of discretion which is equivalent to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner, then there is a justification for the courts to set aside the
administrative determination reached.
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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. CONFESSOR (1994)
While it is true that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor are entitled to
respect by the Supreme Court, the Court is inclined to review her findings since the
fundamental issue involved is the survival of the company.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. SANTOS, 486 SCRA 463 (2006)
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A
finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it
is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated
in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion
o Question of Discretion
MANILA TRADING V. ZULUETA, 69 PHIL. 485 (1940)
Although the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is
subject to regulation by the State basically as we should expend beyond economic
orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with
the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the
latter is patently inimical to his interest.
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer.
FFW V. NORIEL, 86 SCRA 132 (1978)
DECISION: Noriel is directed to set the date for the holding of the certification
election.
The signatories totalled 1,399 or more than 30% of the 4,055 employees. Even if
there were among the signatories submitted 105 falsified or double entries and 7
came from those not qualified to vote or a total of 112, that would still leave 1,287
signatories or more than thirty percent of the 4,055 employees. The matter is thus
essentially factual in character, the determination by respondent Noriel being
entitled to respect. Petitioner missed the point that such a requirement of 30% of
all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it
becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election.
Petitioner ignored that respondent Noriel is likewise possessed of
discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held.
PLDT V. NTC, 241 SCRA 486 (1995)
It is important to recall that NTC, as the governmental agency charged with passing
upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCNs) in
the field of telecommunications, is authorized to determine what the specific
operating and technical requirements of "public convenience and necessity" are in
the field of telecommunications, subject of course to relevant limitations
established by legislative enactments, if any.
The NTC is also authorized to examine and assess the legal, technical and financial
qualifications of an applicant for a CPCN and in doing so exercises the special
capabilities and skills and institutional experience it has accumulated. Courts should
not intervene in that administrative process, save upon a very clear showing of
serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or wanton oppression. Courts
have none of the technical and economic or financial competence which specialized
administrative agencies have at their disposal, and in particular must be wary of
intervening in matters which are at their core technical and economic in nature but
disguised, more or less artfully, in the habiliments of a "question of legal
interpretation."
Thus, the NTC did not only address the legal capability of, or franchise authority
11
vested in Eastern; it also explicitly considered the technical requirements of the
IGF and acknowledged the technical and financial ability of Eastern to install,
maintain and operate the facility
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