SNAME Transactions, Vol. 98, 1990, pp.
663--{)94
The Reconstruction of
the Exxon Valdez
D. C. McNeill, Member, D. Malmquist,Visitor,
D. Walter, Member, D. Grothen, Visitor,
K. Londot, Visitor, NASSCO, San Diego,
California
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the unusual construction
approach taken to repair the extensive damage to the
hull of Exxon Valdez, the very large crude carrier that
received worldwide notoriety in March 1989 after
striking a reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound and
spilling her cargo of heavy oil. The work was performed
by National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, the ship's
builder, at their San Diego yard.
The paper is presented in two parts. Part One
covers the unique production approach, starting from
the receipt of the initial damage survey reports through
the actual reconstruction of the ship. Part Two ·
addresses the complicated engineering and
environmental aspects of this unique ship repair
contract.
BACKGROUND
When the Exxon Valdez sailed out of San Diego
Bay in December of 1986, she was the largest tanker
ever built in a West Coast shipyard, with a deadweight
of 211,469 tons, a length of 987 ft (301 m), and a beam
of 166 ft (51 m). The ship was built with
state-of-the-art systems including collision avoidance
radars, inert gas generation system and a segregated
ballast system. She was one of the safest ships in the
United States Merchant Marine Fleet, meeting the
latest U.S. Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping,
IMCO, and Solas requirements.
When she went aground on March 24th, 1989,
substantial damage was sustained by the ship.
663
PART ONE: THE PRODUCTION APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
A typical ship repair contract may include small,
localized areas of structural damage and are usually
repaired utilizing a "patchwork" methodology. Very
seldom does a repair contract include an amount of
structural damage sufficient to employ new constru ction
building techniques. The repair of the Exxon Valdez is
unique in this respect. It is also unique in that the
repair method embodied an untried steel rip-out and
reconstruction concept. Complex issues dealing with
engineering, environmental, and production concerns
had to be addressed and overcome for the successful
completion of this contract.
Part One of this pap e r focuses on the
production-related issues, in basically the chronological
order they were examined. When possible an attempt
will be made to show the thought process involved in
examining each issue and determining th e most cost
effective method/solution. Each step in the overall
program will be analyzed from pre-contract issues, to
contract award, to the eventual reconstructi on of the
ship. The principal points covered in this portion of the
paper are the complex production issues, the plans
developed to address these issues, and the production
methods implemented to ensure successful completion
of this unique sh·ip repair contract. The challenges and
restrictions can often become the stimuli for promoting
innovation.
CONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
Defining the Scope of Work
The normal evolu ti on of a bid proposal for a
repair job like the Exxon Valdez begins with a review of
 Fig. 4 Area of damage

total replacement of 15 starboard bottom shell center

blocks and ten starboard bilge shell blocks. (Fig. 4)

In addition there were numerous areas of

damage that would be addressed as change orders after
the ship was drydocked and inspection teams had
surveyed the tanks. The detailed damage survey reports
and specifications provided by Exxon Shipping
Company were instrumental in the eventual
development of the reconstruction strategy.

The Tunnel Method

Development of the construction strategy was

assigned to a small team. Brainstorming sessions were
held that produced questions requiring solutions. How
could the ship be drydocked with such severe bottom
damage? How would the steel be removed from under
the ship in the most efficient manner? How could we
minimize the duration the ship was out of service and
Fig. 2 Damage to hull of the Valdez provide our customer with a low cost solution to their
problem? Answers to these questions led to a bold and
innovative construction strategy.

The concept of the "Tunnel Method" began to

take form. If the damaged blocks could be removed in
basically the same configuration as they were originally
built, and new blocks inserted in their place, the cost to
repair the ship would be greatly reduced. In order to
accomplish this task a large area of the ship's structure
would have to be removed. Could the remaining
structure be supported in a manner that would prevent
collapse and minimize distortion. To minimize the
amount of structure removed, and to accommodate the
existing block configuration, a two-tunnel approach was
proposed. (See Figure 5)

301m(98T) ~
OUTLINE OF
GRAVING DOCK .----183m (600')
Fig. 3 Rock embedded in hull of the Valdez

p··•
.. ·- ..
the damage repo rts. The magnitude of the work was
replacing extensive steel damage as shown in Figures 1,
TUNNEL I
2, and 3. Tll'INEL 2 44 '
tt-:-===:::::~-:-:':!:::==:!:=:::-:-7~:::=~~==
51m (166') SHORE ~ 1:zi~ (400') ..
(TYP)
The first task was to define the scope of the work
to be performed. The exte nt of the damage required Fig. 5 Two tunnel approach to reconstruction

664 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez

 Due to limitations in the length of the drydock,
portions of the bow would have to be removed to allow
access to the damaged steel. Once the partial bow was
removed, rip-out of the damaged steel could commence.
Tunnel No. 1 would extend from the removed bow to
Frame 42, a distance of approximately 183 meters (600
feet). The width of this tunnel is about 13 meters (44
feet), extending from 1.3 meters (52 inches) off
centerline port to 12.1 meters (39' -9") off centerline
starboard. (See Figure 6)
- (PORT) (STBD) - - -
Fig. 6 Tunnel No. 1
The existing centerline block configuration is 1.3
meters (52 inches) off centerline starboard to 12.1
meters (39' -9") off centerline starboard. Because of the
amount of damage along centerline of the ship, a
modified centerline block configuration was proposed.
The original design drawings included a symmetrical
break at 1.3 meters (52 inches) off centerline port and
starboard. Utilizing this break allowed a simple flop of
the lofting, thus realizing a savings in engineering and
lofting manhours. Rip-out of the damaged steel would
start at the removed bow and proceed aft to Frame 42.
A total of 15 blocks, 12 meters (40 feet) by 13 meters
(44 feet), averaging 100 tons in weight, would be
removed. Upon completion of rip-out, the new blocks
would be inserted through the tunnel from Frame 42
working forward to the removed bow. After the new
blocks were installed, keel blocks would be placed
under them to add support to the ship's structure before
removing the damaged steel from Tunnel No. 2.
Tunnel No. 2 would extend from the removed
bow to Frame 29, a distance of approximately 122
meters (400 feet). The width of this tunnel would also
be about 13 meters (44 feet), extending from the
longitudinal bulkhead at 11.9 meters (39 feet) off
centerline starboard to the side shell. (See Figure 7).
The outboard block configuration did not
change. A total of ten blocks, 12 meters (40 feet) by 13
meters (44 feet), averaging 80 tons in weight, would be
removed. Upon completion of rip-out, the new blocks
would be inserted through the tunnel from Frame 29
working forward to the removed bow. After all the new
blocks were installed, the removed portions of the bow
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
- (PORT) (STBD) - - -
.... ·.
Fig. 7 Tunnel No. 2
would be re-installed, thus completing the major
portion of the steel reconstruction.
Having developed the reconstruction strategy,
the next step was to consult our Hull Technical
Department to determine the feasibility of the repair
concept. A series of preliminary calculations revealed
that the "Tunnel" method of removing and replacing
hull blocks was indeed feasible. Armed with this
knowledge, a senior management team departed for
Houston, Texas to present the bid package and
construction strategy to officials of the Exxon Shipping
Company. The result of this presentation was the award
of a contract on June 11, 1989 for the repair of the
Exxon Valdez.
PRE-CONTRACT ISSUES
Laydown Space
Before proceeding with the Bid Proposal, three
main issues were required to be resolved. The first
issue was block laydown space requirements. Laydown
space had become a serious problem at NASSCO. Like
most modem shipyards, NASSCO had embarked on an
extensive advanced pre-outfitting program. This
approach utilizes additional yard space which formerly
was used for steel construction. The timeframe for the
repair of the Exxon Valdez coincided with a peak in
laydown space requirements for two existing Navy
contracts currently in progress. An analysis of space
requirements determined the need for additional
laydown area. A decision was made hy Senior
Management that, if NASSCO were awarded the
contract for the repair of the Valdez, a new platen
assembly area would be built. This new platen {Table
11), would be 152 meters (500 feet) by 18.3 meters (60
feet) in area, and include all necessary services. This
was a progressive step for a shipyard that had just
become employee-owned. Upon award of the Exxon
contract, the order was placed to begin construction of
the new platen. This new assembly area was completed
just in time to support the schedule requirements for
new steel hull blocks.
665
Environmental Issues the Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB)
that the tanks of the Valdez were not discharging any
The third issue to be resolved was environmental oil. These two tasks were accomplished and the ship
consideration and this will be discussed in Part Two of entered the NASSCO facility approximately two weeks
the paper. later than originally scheduled.

DETAILED PLANNING The second reschedule was necessary because of

Contract award sparked a flurry of activity
setting the detailed planning wheels in motion. A
kick-off meeting was held assigning action items and
persons responsible for the various tasks. Some of the
major issues to be addressed for the reconstruction
included: schedules, material delivery, drydocking
procedure, keel blocking plan, shoring requirements
and internal back-up structure, and development of a
detailed construction method.
Schedules
Contract specifications required the submittal of
various schedules within 30 days of contract award.
This effort proceeded smoothly and all required
schedules were issued in the desired timeframe. From
this point on, however, a series of delays caused a total
of three rescheduling efforts. Figure 8 depicts the
original key event schedule submitted to Exxon.
EXXON PRODUCTION SCHEDULE
voocw
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JNSlL SHUP
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delays created by litigation procedures between Exxon
and the State of Alaska. Rip-out of damaged steel was
held up while teams of experts surveyed the damage.
Unlike the first reschedule, which only required a two
week shift to the right, this reschedule required
adjustments within the schedule. Since the docking date
did not change, yet rip-out of damaged steel was
delayed, a three week adjustment in the rip-out and
erection completion dates occurred.
The third and final reschedule was necessitated
by the condition of the tanks. Hot work could not
commence until a waxy residue was removed (by
scraping), in way of hot work areas. Due to the
relationship between rip-out of damaged steel and
erection of new blocks, another two week adjustment
was necessary. After this final reschedule, a firm
undocking date was agreed on between NASSCO and
Exxon.
The overall effect of those delays, which were
out of the shipowner's and shipbuilder's control, was to
TIME
re-allocate manpower, delay material processing, and
Cl>Pl....ET£ MEJ..DOl/TV
reorganize detail schedules.
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Material delivery was an important concern. Due
...., 01.2-116 (1 ll TONSI 6 ~
.d CCH'\..E"T[ to the tight lead time between contract award and start
,,./ . 01.2-tlO 197 TCWSI A \
; 0A2·1J6 1121 TONS) l:J. ..,. 6 ERECT of construction, a system was set up to monitor steel
~ 01.2-1 . . ,., TCHSI A ~
delivery to 'the "in-yard need date" for each new hull

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block to be constructed.
A2•2t0 t•l TCNSI .6 t'"
-232 197 TCJlrGI 4. ~
OA.2•2.&I 190 TONSI .4 The detailed construction method firmed up as
oaow •2-ne111• TQNSI A2-l96 ' " TONS~I Ob additional information became available. The
::= :n~: i: :g:: :;_~·:: ,',':, :;.·, : ~ ",. \ development of the docking plan confirmed the need to
Ai-''31 170 TONS! ' 0 ~ 1 remove portions of the bow for access and removal of
A2-606 l 100 f(ltS) SJ 0 A ~
A2·326 ('3 f'ONSJ S 0 6 q_ damaged steel. At this time, the location of the cuts for
A2-21• l 107 lDNSI E0 A ~
1.2-2'2 f~ TCMI er 0 A \e bow removal were determined.
&a-~ 161 TONSI 0 Ii •
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T""" ![ST

Outfit Planning
Fig. 8 Original key event schedule
The original damage survey reports included
The first reschedule was necessary to reflect the marked-up drawings of outfitting items detailing the
actual arrival date of the ship. During the voyage from extent of the work to be performed. The Outfitting
Alaska to San Diego the bottom shell plates peeled Planner developed an integrated work package
back from the longitudinals and web frames. These containing all the necessary information to organize,
plates were hanging down from the bottom of the ship install, monitor, and inspect the outfitting components
and they prevented entry of the ship into San Diego Bay attached to each new hull block. Typical outfitting
due to limited water depth. The plates would have to included ballast pipes, ladders and gratings, and sluice
be removed before the ship could be towed into valves. A pictorial representation of the work package
NASSCO. In addition, Exxon was required to prove to contents is shown in Figure 9.

666 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez

 were re-installed. Again, the reason for these shiploose
WORKPACKAGE pieces was to allow room for the new blocks to be
FOR maneuvered through the tunnel.
EXXON BLOCK
A2-036

WORKPACKAGE TITLE
SCHEDULE.
REFERENCES,
REQUIREMENTS

WORK DEFINITION

INSPECTION/
DISCREPANCY
SIGN-OFF SHEET

BUDGET CRITERIA
SHEET
Fig. 10 Strategy for removal and re-installation of five
MATERIAL LIST blocks in Tunnel No. 1

DRAWING The strategy developed for the removal and

re-installation of the forward ten starboard centerline
hull blocks was significantly different from that
Fig. 9 Work package contents developed for the after blocks. Since the outboard bilge
blocks would be removed and replaced, a portion of the
outboard web frame was removed with the starboard
Construction Details
centerline block during rip-out. (See Figure 11)
Development of the details for the rip-out of the
damaged steel and the installation of new hull blocks
was then analyzed. A careful examination of each step
of the repair process was undertaken to determine
methods to accomplish the work. The first area to be
addressed was the burning method for the rip-out of
damaged steel. The shell plate would be burned
utilizing track mounted semiautomatic burning
machines. The internal structure would be cut by
hand-held torches in a manual operation.

Next the strategy for removing the damaged

blocks and inserting the new hull blocks was developed.
Since the extent of the damage to the starboard
centerline blocks extended five full hull blocks aft
beyond the damaged bilge shell blocks, a separate
strategy was developed for removal and re-installation
of these five blocks in Tunnel No. 1. (See Figure 10)
First, the shell seams and butts were burned,
then the outboard web frames were air-arced loose
from the longitudinal bulkhead. The inboard web
frames and transverse bulkheads were double cut at ten
centimeters (four inches) off centerline to port and 1.3
meters (52 inches) off centerline to port. (See Figure
10). The 1.2-meter (4-foot) pieces were then removed
to allow the damaged blocks room to be maneuvered
out through Tunnel No. 1. Finally, the longitudinals
were cut and the blocks were lowered about 20 cm
(eight inches) onto low-boy trailers. Re-installation of
the five new hull blocks was facilitated by the removal
of the 1.2-meter (4-foot) pieces of web frames and
bulkheads as described in the rip-out of the damaged
. blocks. After the new blocks were positioned and locked
into place, these 1.2-meter (4-foot) shiploose pieces
Fig. 11 Strategy for removal and re-installation of ten
starboard centerline blocks
Outboard of the longitudinal bulkhead, the web
frames and the bulkheads were cut on a diagonal from
45 cm (18 inches) at the top to 61 cm (24 inches) at the
bottom. The intent of the diagonal cut was to allow
clearance for removing the block. As the block was
lowered the 20 cm (eight inches) down onto the low-boy
trailer, about 8 cm (three inches) of clearance would be
opened for removing the block. During the attempt to
remove the first block, this clearance was found to be
unsatisfactory. As the forklift backed up with the
trailers, they would wander from side to side in the
tunnel, causing the structure to bind up. After repeated
attempts, with similar results, the small piece of the
outboard web frame was cut off the longitudinal
bulkhead and removed to allow more clearance for
movement in the tunnel. After this minor adjustment,
the remainder of the forward starboard centerline
blocks were removed with no further delays.

The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez 667

Re-installation of these ten new hull blocks would not
require any cuts to the new structure or shiploose
pieces. The removed portion of the outboard web
frames and bulkheads would provide clearance to move
the new blocks through the tunnel.
Shear Bracket Installation
The next item to be planned was the installation
of the shear brackets. These large brackets, 4.2m X
I.Sm (14' X 6') were required to be installed prior to the
rip-out of the Centerline blocks in Tunnel No. 1. They
would be faired and welded to the lower tank strut, the
longitudinal bulkhead, and the outboard shell web
frames. (See Figure 12)
LOWER STRUT
SHEAR BRACKET
Fig. 12 Installation of shear brackets
The primary purpose of the shear brackets was
to provide a load path for the ship's weight to the
docking blocks. Due to the weight of these brackets
(approximately one ton), and the difficulty associated
with moving the brackets into place after the ship was
docked, the decision was made to advance this work.
The brackets were fabricated, assembled (with excess
material for trimming at installation), and placed in the
building dock at their respective locations prior to the
drydocking of the vessel. With the ship docked, the
brackets would be rigged into place. This operation was
made a little easier by the absence of bottom shell
plating in many of the areas of bracket installation.
Upon completion of the new hull blocks, the brackets
would be burned off just above the weld, and the
remaining stub would be left on and the sharp edges
ground smooth.
THE STEEL MOVEMENT SYSTEM
Defining the Design Requirements
Due to the location of the damaged steel work,
the gantry cranes were restricted in their usage and this
668 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
presented a major challenge. The design features,
operating constraints, and characteristics were
identified to develop a material handling system to
move the damaged steel units and replace them with
new blocks.
The main design features demanded that the
material handling system be simple to use, easy to
assemble, and reliable. At the onset of the project the
size and capacity were determined to be 13 meters (44
feet) wide by 12 meters (40 feet) long with the average
A-2 unit weighing approximately 100 tons. In addition,
all units were to be removed in a tunnel like manner.
The tunnel would start at the bow of the vessel and
move towards the stern of the ship. Hence, whatever
material handling system was developed, it had to be
capable of traveling in excess of 198 meters (650 feet).
Clearance around the units was restricted to 23 cm
(nine inches) on each side and a maximum of 20 cm
(eight inches) above the unit.
With knowledge of the design features and the
operating constraints of the material handling system,
the more important constraints were as follows:
a. height of the docking blocks
b. the location of the bow in the dock
c. the ship's fore and aft position in the dock
d. extent of the damage to each block
e. cost, availability, flexibility, and safety.
Initial Prouosals
Being aware of the design features and operating
constraints, several ideas for material handling systems
were proposed, one of which was an elaborate system of
hydraulic jacks, multi-ton rollers, and 427 meters (1,400
feet) of track. Also, consideration was given to a system
of air or water bearings to convey the steel units fore
and aft. Both these systems were short lived as
principal material handling systems. They were cost
prohibitive and deemed too labor intensive to properly
meet the requirements of the project. An alternative
movement system was proposed.
The Finalized System
The finalized system consisted of two "low-boy"
50-ton trailers propelled by forklifts. The trailer idea
showed exceptional potential as far as satisfying the
design features for the material handling system. The
idea moved rapidly from the conceptual phase to the
identification of major components.
The material handling system consisted of two
50-ton trailers structurally linked together, two 17-1/2
ton forklifts, inflatable air jacks, hydraulic 4-point lift
system, low profile tracks and lifting grid. With each
component of the system identified, the design and
modifications began.
 The trailers were positioned side by side and
structurally linked to form a flat bed measuring 9.7
meters (32 feet) long and 7.9 meters (26 feet) wide. The
structural connection afforded each trailer independent
vertical movement in the area of the king pin. Also,
with the trailers linked together, they performed as a
single unit when pulled or pushed by the two 17-1/2 ton
forklifts. The beds of the trailers were structurally
modified with 1.2-cm (1/2-inch) steel plates and steel
reinforcing bars. The structural enhancement provided
jacking flexibility so that loads were always redistributed
to the main steel beams. The fifth wheels were
modified to allow for the attachment of the forklifts to
the trailers. Once the modifications were completed
the trailers were independently load tested for
structural strengths, and rear axle and main beam
deformation. The rear axles were load tested to a
maximum of 62 tons and also operationally tested.
The 4-point lift system which is made up of four
100-ton jacks, a control console and track, and the
lifting grid made up the transfer system. The tracks
were redesigned to provide a low profile. The track
height of 7.6 cm (three inches) made it very easy for
forklift and trailers to cross with the aid of minimum
ramping.
The lifting grid which is supported on the head
of the jacks was designed to provide multiple lifting
points for supporting the transfer link between the
4-point lift system jacks and the crane.
During the design development of the material
handling system some constraints were modified.
Modification of the docking plan was necessary. The
block height for docking the ship was 106 cm ( 42
inches). Instead, the blocks were changed to 1.1 m (46
inches) to accommodate the trailer height of 91 cm (36
inches) plus S cm (two inches) of jacks and jacking
accessories. The 96.S-cm (38-inch) height of trailer and
accessories left a total of 20 cm (eight inches) for
vertical movement. This height was more than
adequate for the purpose of steel removal. The bow
location and the ship's fore and aft position in the dock
proved critical to the success of the material handling
system.
The overall length of the trailers, forklifts, and
proposed blocks combined was 21.9 meters (72 feet).
At this length of 21.9 meters (72 feet), the ship's final
position on the blocks and the bow location became
very critical. In an effort to provide enough clearance
for the transfer system and the trailer combination, the
sh ip's position was moved inland as far as practicable.
The bow of the ship was positioned toward the dock
gate. These two adjustments provided enough work
area for the material handling system to be effective.
Additional advantages were gained as a result of
optimizing the docking plan. The need for multiple
crane lifts of blocks was eliminated, and a larger work
area for staging of blocks was realized.
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
PRE-ARRIVAL WORK
Main Considerations
A series of four produ ction tasks would need to
be accomplished prior to the vessel's arrival to facilitate
the docking of the ship, viz.:
Task 1: Modifications to NASSCO's Building
Dock. A few minor modificati ons were required to the
building dock to accomm od ate the shoring pl a n.
Service platforms were cut off and removed from the
starboard dock wall. Also, a compressed air pipe
running horizontally on the starboard dock wall was cut
off and rerouted in way of the shore installation.
Task 2: Setting of the keel blocks. Soon after
the docking plan was issued, NASSCO's Dockmaster
began the process of arranging the keel blocks in
preparation for this unusual ship docking.
Task 3: Fabrication and assembly of the shores,
dock wall back-up structure, and shore supports.
Priority was given to this task, as the timeframe to
accomplish the work was very short.
Task 4: Installation of shores and dock wall
back-up structure. Utilizing refe rence points in the
building dock, the Shipwrights carefully performed the
layout for locating the shores and back-up structure.
Installation of these compo nen ts overlapped the
fabrication and assembly t a s k. As the steel
subassemblies were completed in the Fabrication Shop,
they would be palletized and moved by forklift to the
building dock, where they would be lifted by crane to
the correct location for installation.
It is interesting to note that the work outlined in
each of the four tasks would be accomplished in
conjunction with each other. Keel blocks were being set
as the modifications to the drydock and the installation
of the shores progressed. T he e nd result was that all
drydock work was completed we ll in advance of the
ship's arrival. (See Figure 13)
Fig. 13 Keel blocks set in dry dock
669
PIERSIDE WORK
Ship's Alignment Condition
After contract award, Exxon requested a plan
from NASSCO detailing the procedures the shipyard
would use for monitoring hull deflections and
maintaining alignment during the reconstruction efforts.
A plan was subsequently developed by the Shipwrights
that satisfied the requirements of Exxon. The basic
element of the plan was to establish a level plane at a
set height above the main deck. Utilizing the table of
offsets, this level plane was established on the house
front and forcastle deck bulkheads, and on permanent
stations at the ship's sides, spaced at approximately
30-meter (100-foot) intervals between these bulkheads.
Two readings per day were taken against this plane to
check for hog, sag, rack, and twist. It is interesting to
note that when the ship arrived and the first readings
were taken at pierside, the hull deflections indicated the
vessel had a 15-cm (6-inch) hog and a slight twist. After
drydocking, and during the reconstruction, the
deflections gradually reduced to an acceptable level as
the ship settled on the keel blocks. (See Figure 14)
FAIRED POSITION
DEFLECTED POSI TJON
Fig. 14 Alignment condition
The Exxon Valdez arrived at NASSCO's facility
the evening of July 31, 1989. Prior to the ship's arrival,
pallets containing the shore supports that were to be
installed on the vessel were arranged on the pier in the
general location of their installation. Before the
installation could commence, the tanks would have to
be gas-free and certified safe for hot work by a Marine
Chemist.
The following day, brows were attached to the
vessel for access, and some preliminary work began.
Both Exxon and NASSCO were extremely interested in
the alignment condition of the ship after its voyage, and
prior to drydocking. The first production task
accomplished was to establish the alignment procedure
and record the actual condition of the vessel.
After the tanks had been certified and ready for
hot work, the installation of the shore supports began.
Special care was given to the layout and installation of
670 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
the shore supports to ensure proper alignment at the
drydocking phase. Teams were established to
accomplish the shore support installation. This work
progressed smoothly, and all shore supports were
completed, checked, and verified in time to support the
drydocking schedule.
Shoring Requirements
The shoring requirements were determined by
NASSCO's Hull Technical Department working
together with James R. Libby and Associates, a
structural engineering consulting firm. These
requirements will be covered in detail in the
Engineering portion of this paper. From a production
standpoint, these shores were a critical path item in the
docking of the ship. The material for the shores and
shore supports had to be purchased quickly, fabricated
and assembled on a priority basis, and the shores had to
be installed on the drydock wall prior to the arrival of
the ship. Upon arrival of the ship, the upper shore
supports would be fit and welded to the hull at pierside
before the ship could be drydocked. The shore supports
were installed using reference points on the ship, while
the shores were installed using references in the dock.
If there were any inaccuracies in either installation, the
brackets and shores would not fit properly. Careful
planning paid off, and the two structures mated as
required during docking.
DRYDOCKING
Immediately after the arrival of the Exxon Valdez
at NASSCO's facility, discussions were underway to
select a drydocking date. The first available high tide
capable of supporting the drydocking requirements
would occur on August 15, 1989. This date was
mutually agreed upon since it allowed sufficient time to
accomplish the pre-drydocking tasks. The engineering
and environmental issues associated with this unusual
ship drydocking will be addressed in detail in Part Two
of this paper. The careful planning and preparation in
support of the drydocking operation contributed to the
successful completion of this very difficult task.
BOW REMOVAL
The bow of the Exxon Valdez was removed in
three sections utilizing the 4-point lift system previously
described. These bow sections were removed to provide
access for the rip-out of damaged blocks and the
re-installation of the new hull blocks. (See Figure 15)
After the bow sections were removed from the drydock
and moved to storage locations, the assembly of the
steel movement system began. The low-boy trailers
were lowered individually to the dock floor along with
the forklifts and assembly of the trailers commenced.
They were positioned side by side and the structural
tie-in was installed to secure the trailers together. Next,
the trailers were outfitted with 16 inflatable jacks which
were then covered with two sheets of 2.5-cm (1-inch)
steel plate. The inflatable jacks were tied together in
pairs and supplied from nitrogen bottles mounted on
the gooseneck of the trailers. The steel plates provided
a large surface for the jacks to operate. With the fifth
wheel assembly already on the trailer, the forklifts
positioned the entire rig under the first steel section to
be removed; the next task was putting together the
transfer system.
Fig. 15 Section of bow removed
The low profile tracks were positioned under the
bow at 90° to the fore and aft direction of the ship.
After leveling the tracks, the hydraulic jacks were
placed on the tracks. Finally the lifting grid was placed
on top of the jack heads. This assembly was moved into
position forming an archway to the forklifts and trailer
assembly.
THE TUNNEL RIP-OUT AND RECONSTRUCTION
Rip-out and Re-installation of Tunnel No. 1
With the bow removal complete and the steel
movement system assembled and positioned, the next
step was to begin the rip-out of damaged steel from
Tunnel No. 1. The track mounted semiautomatic
burning of the shell seams and butts was accomplished
during the assembly of the steel movement system.
After the material handling components were checked
and positioned under the damaged block to be
removed, the jacks were inflated. Load distribution on
the trailers was controlled to ensure that the total load
on each forklift did not exceed 17-1/2 tons and each
trailer was carrying approximately 50% of the block's
weight. Burning the block away from the ship
continued and the jacks were inflated to carry the
weight of the damaged block. Once burning was
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
completed, the jacks were deflated, lowering the
damaged steel onto the trailers away from the ship. The
forklifts began the removal by moving toward the open
bow with the damaged steel, continuing until the
mangled section was positioned under the lifting grid
for attachment. In this position, the hydraulic jacks
lowered the lifting grid just above the removed section.
Attachment of the section was completed and the
trailers were withdrawn. (See Figure 16)
Fig. 16 "Low-boy" trailer in dry dock
The lifting grid, now supporting the unit, was
elevated in excess of 8.2 meters (27 feet). This height
provides enough clearance between the bottom shell of
the unit and the highest part of the trailers. The trailers
were then lowered on the modified fifth wheels. In this
position, a small forklift pulled the trailers back into the
tunnel clear of the low profile tracks. Following the
withdrawal of the trailer, the hydraulic jacks were
lowered to bring the unit as close to the dock floor as
possible. Inter-connecting the hydraulic bases, the
transfer system was ready to travel. The system was
propelled to the port side of the dock where the 160-ton
portal crane had clear access to the damaged steel
block. Once at the dock wall in the blue sky area, the
block was lowered on 1.2-meter (4-foot) stands and
attachment to the crane began. The crane slings were
hooked up to the top of the lifting grid and the damaged
unit was removed from the drydock. The average time
to perform the removal process, which included set-up,
was one day. Removal proceeded from the bow aft
until all 15 centerline blocks were removed. This
completed the rip-out of Tunnel No. 1. (See Figure 17)
A-2 Unit Installation
Prior to installation of the new hull blocks in
Tunnel No. 1, the remaining structure accepting the
new blocks was beveled and prepared fo r welding.
Installation of the new hull blocks in Tunnel No. 1
would now commence. (See Figure 18) This process
required further enhancement to the material handling
system. Added to the trailers and forklifts was a driver
visibility system which included two cameras, two split
671
screen monitors, and a painted line . The cameras were
mounted on the trailers while the monitors were
positioned on the forklifts. The line was painted on the
floor on the dock along the center of the tunnel. The
driver visibility system provided the forklift drivers the
ability to trail forward tracking only to the painted line.
Once the new A-2 units were within centimeters of the
final erection location, they were loaded onto air
bearings.
Fig. 17 Completed rip -out of Tunnel No. 1
Fig. 18 "Low-boy" trailer in d ry dock
The air bearings provided the final horizontal
movement in both the fore / aft and athwartship
directions. Four air bearings rated at 40 tons each were
inverted on an equal number of 1-m (40-inch) keel
blocks. The units were lowered on the inverted air
bearings which were in turn inflated. The inflated
bearings provided air lubricated surfaces on which the
A-2 unit was moved. The force required to finally
position these units was approximately one lb. per 1,000
lbs. of load. Once in place, the units were scribed, cut,
and locked in position.
672 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
Maintenance and Repair Items/Change Orders
Included in the Bid Specifications were a
number of normal maintenance and repair items. Items
such as ranging the anchors and chains, taking tailshaft
readings, valve repairs, propeller inspection, and typical
open and inspect tasks were included. As survey teams
inspected the vessel, change orders were generated that
increased the scope of the work. In addition to the
replacement of 25 hull blocks, there were numerous
areas of localized structural damage identified that
would be repaired utilizing traditional crop and renew
techniques. The tonnage associated with this crop and
renew work totaled over 335 tons.
The maintenance and repair items, along with
the change order work, was integrated very smoothly
into the production schedule. A large portion of the
change order crop and renew steel work (32 tons) was
located adjacent to, and aft of, Tunnel No. 1. Upon
completion of the rip-out of damaged steel from Tunnel
No. 1, the tunnel opening was utilized to transport
material by forklift to the areas of localized steel
repairs. The conventional method of handling the steel
would be to load the steel into the drydock by crane and
then drag the steel under the ship to the repair location.
A savings in material handling costs was realized by
transporting the repair steel by forklift through the
tunnel. All maintenance and repair items, including the
change orders, are well contained within the steel
rip-out and reconstruction schedule.
Assembly of New Blocks
On September 18, 1989 the assembly of the new
hull blocks for the Exxon Valdez started on the recently
constructed Table 11. The 183-meter (600-foot) long
table is subdivided into ten building spaces 18.2 meters
(60 feet) by 18.2 meters (60 feet). Of the ten building
spaces, three spaces were set aside to build the large
web frame and bulkhead subassemblies. The remaining
seven spaces were used to build the new hull blocks.
Jigs were built to facilitate construction of the web
frames. These jigs were similar in design to those used
in the original construction of Valdez. The building
approach for constructing the new hull blocks was
similar to that used in the original construction, with
minor modifications. The modifications to the building
approach, mentioned above, consisted of changing the
method of assembly. The original block assembly
method utilized was to "egg-crate" the longitudinals to
the web frames and bulkheads at one process lane. The
completed "egg-crate" assembly would then he lifted out
of the jig with a crane and moved to the ne xt process
lane. At this process lane the "egg-crate" assembly
would be fitted and welded to the bottom sh e ll plate
panel assembly to form the completed hull block .
The modified assembly method eliminated the
"egg-crate" jig process lane. The web fr a me and
bulkhead subassemblies would now be positioned on
the bottom shell plate panel assembly, elevated
approximately one inch on wedges, and held
perpendicular to the bottom shell plate panel with
temporary braces. Next, the longitudinals would be
held with the crane, positioned at the cut-out slot in the
web frame or bulkhead, and pushed through the slots
with a forklift to the desired location. After the
longitudinals were tack welded to the bottom shell plate
panel, the elevated web frames were lowered until the
brackets were resting hard on the longitudinals. The
web frames, bulkheads, brackets, and collars were then
fitted, and the assembled block was welded out. The
requirement for modifying the assembly method was
necessary because the jig used to construct the
"egg-crate" assemblies was dismantled to improve
laydown space for other construction activities. For
clarity, differences between th.e original and the
modified assembly methods are depicted in Figure 19.
ORIGINAL METHOD MDO!FIEO METHOD
Fig. 19 Construction method
An optimum material flow was achieved in the
reconstruction of Tunnel No. 1. Block assembly would
be completed on Table 11, followed by a structural
inspection. Next, outfitting components such as ballast
piping, sluice valves, gratings, platforms, and ladders
would be installed. The hull block would then move
from Table 11 to the gritblast pit. After all applications
of hull coatings were complete, the new hull block
would be loaded into the drydock by crane for
installation. As each new hull block was installed, the
next adjoining hull block would be completed as
described above, and be in position and ready for its
scheduled erection date.
CONCLUSIONS
With any major project utilizing unique
techniques, the question always arises, "Was it
successful?" In terms of cost, schedule, quality, and
safety this method of reconstructing an extensively
damaged bottom shell, the answer is a resounding
"Yes!"
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
PART TWO
INTRODUCTION
In planning the drydocking of the Exxon Valdez,
many problems beyond the scope of a normal
drydocking had to be faced. One of the more significant
questions faced by NASSCO in the docking of the
Exxon Valdez was "How do you support a ship when
nearly 30% of its bottom is missing?" Several NASSCO
departments and two outside consultants worked
together on a solution, and the result was a smooth and
successful docking.
Normally, an intact ship is supported on an array
of docking blocks that transfers the loads to the dock
floor. Due to the severe damage suffered by the Valdez,
about 30% of the bottom was not expected to contact
any dock blocks, and some method had to be found to
support that portion of the ship. Fortunately, the
damage was confined to the bottom of the hull. The
side shell and internal structures were mainly intact.
FACILITIES CON SID ERATIO NS
NASSCO's Building Basin No. 1, where the ship
was originally constructed in 1986, is the only local dock
large enough to accommodate the ship. The sheet pile
and concrete dock was built in 1975 to be used primarily
for new construction work and has the following
characteristics:
Dock Characteristics
Length 304.8 meters (1,000 ft.)
Nominal width 54.8 meters (180 ft.)
Clear between fenders 52.4 meters (172 ft.)
Dock floor 4.9 meters (16 ft.) below
Mean Lower Low Water
(MLLW)
Tidal Range + 2.1 meters (7 ft.) to
-0.61 meters (2 ft.) MLLW
Slab Semi-relieved concrete slab
Walls Sheet pile with waivers and
tie-backs
The depth of the dock and the strength of the
slab in particular were designed specifically for new
construction of VLCCs.
In order to determine if docking of the damaged
ship was feasible, three questions had to be answered:
1. Could the ship be brought to a draft condition
that would allow it to fit into the dock?
2. How could adequate support be provided for the
ship where the bottom was severely damaged?
3. How could the dock floor be protected against
unusually high concentrated loads?
673
 While the condition of the ship was being
determined, a number of brainstorming sessions were
held to discuss possible approaches to these problems.
DOCKING CONSIDERATIONS
The extent, distribution, and severity of the
damage described in Part One significantly influenced
the approach used in docking the ship. The shipyard's
knowledge of the extent and severity of the damage was
based almost entirely on videotaped records taken
during an extensive bottom survey that was done in
Alaskan waters using a Remotely Operated Vehicle
(ROV) equipped with a TV camera. The video tapes
provided the means for obtaining a fairly accurate
definition of the distribution of damage but were largely
ineffective for determining severity of damage. The
severity of the damage shown on the TV screen was
unmistakable. However, NASSCO had very limited
means of translating this pictorial record into a
meaningful representation of damage, deformation, and
hence into accurate contours in way of the damaged
portion of the ship. Nevertheless, a lot of important
information was gleaned from the survey. First the
shipyard was able to determine with reasonable
confidence that the damage was limited to the starboard
side of the ship and that the Centerline Vertical Keel
(CVK) was intact and structurally effective. The
longitudinal extent of damage was also definable, and to
some extent within the damaged zone, it was possible to
at least categorize the condition of the bottom into
areas where support blocks would be totally ineffective
and areas where blocks might possibly be effective;
effectiveness being a measure of how much contact area
between docking blocks and ship structure could be
expected. Given this information it was possible to
decide where conventional docking blocks could be
used and where a specially devised method of support
was necessary. Reconciling this with the special needs
of the reconstruction process as described in Part One
of this paper, and the required loading parameters of
GRAVING DOC!<
--M>T---+-- a D-o----a~-;--D D a a a
aaaa
a a a a a
FR
!I
LE GENO
D STAl'OAllO 42 X 48 8LOCK
SIDE SUPPORT SHORING
c::::J BLOCK TABLE
Fig. 20 Stage I docking plan to accommodate damaged hull
67 4 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
the dock floor, (described elsewhere in this section) the
docking plan showed in Figure 20 was developed.
Methods of Support
Three distinctly different methods of supporting
the ship were utilized. In way of the virtually
undamaged port side conventional concrete blocks with
timber capping were used with the level plane set at
l.2m (46 inches) above the dock floor at center. The
ability to dock the ship at an attainable draft on a
reasonable tide height; under ship accessibility, and
being able to vary the timber capping to meet certain
other requirements were all considered in deciding
upon the appropriate block height. Conventional
blocks are shown as small squares on Figure 20 and it
can be seen that two rows of blocks are also provided on
the starboard side in way of the damaged area. Except
for those between Frames 34 and 40, these blocks were
almost totally ineffective during the actual docking.
However, as soon as the dock had been dewatered,
additional timber capping and in some cases lengths of
timber shoring, were wedged in place to help improve
the overall load distribution.
In areas where the bottom of the ship appeared
to be reasonably flat but substantial bearing contact in
way of precisely located blocks could not be assured
with any degree of confidence, a system which
permitted random contact was devised. The system,
identified as "Block Tables" in Figure 20 consisted of
conventional concrete docking blocks with an overlay of
steel plate ranging from 31.88 lbs. to 34.43 lbs. and
sheathing of 1.9-cm (3/4-inch) plywood. The system
effectively allowed for minor undulations in the hull
surface and also allowed for random areas of
undisturbed plating to find useful support.
The damage to starboard between Frames 13
and 34 was so severe that there was clearly no hope at
all of placing support points under the ship that would
i a D a
oa+aaaoa+aaoo
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be in any way effective. At the same time, whatever
form of support was provided had to be permanent for
the duration of the reconstruction and completely clear
of the damaged parts. The side support shoring shown
on Figure 13, between Frames 13 and 33, and 41, 42 and
43, as small solid squares was developed, and is
described in detail in Part Two of this paper.
The Docking Plan
The docking plan shown in Figure 20 represents
the arrangement of the different types of support that
were put in place and on which the damaged ship was
eventually landed. Aside from the special consideration
of ship strength and dock floor strength, the plan had to
accommodate the first stage of the reconstruction
process. That portion of the ship that would eventually
comprise the tunnel described in Part One of this paper
is clearly identifiable on the figure. The block table
between Frames 9 and 10 was utilized only for the
actual docking evolution and as soon as the dock had
been dewatered and compensating supports installed, it
was removed. As described in Part One of this paper,
the reconstruction was a multi-stage process with the
first stage being the rebuilding of the starboard side of
the center tanks and the second stage the rebuilding of
the damaged wing tanks. Figure 21 shows the pattern of
supports after completion of stage 1, in preparation for
stage 2 and Figure 22 shows the pattern of supports
after reconstruction is complete.
ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS
The docking plan developed was not only quite
unconventional, it also had to be suitable for long term
docking. There were, therefore, aspects of the
procedure that had to be validated by analysis before
proceeding. With the structurally weakened ship being
supported on a system that featured unusual methods of
support combined with very wide spacing of supports,
the stress and deflection levels had to be shown to be
within tolerable limits. Also, the pattern of point
loadings on the dock floor differed from the parameters
specified by the dock's builder and designer so special
analyses of the dock floor strength were needed. Since
the loads from the side shoring system were to be
diverted into the vertical sheet piling that comprised the
dock wall, it too required verification.

GRAVINO DOCK

a a l
a a a a a a a a a l II
all -} L. a_p ...!l L '-" ...!l .IL q_a _JI
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FR FR FR Fii FR FR
ll 13 3• •o 47 !II

LEGEND
a ST ANOARO 42 X 48 BLOCI<
510£ 51.PPOIH SHORll-G

Fig. 21 Stage 2 docking plan

D D + D D D
o a Ta a a a
D Q T D D

FR Fii FR FR FR
5 IJ 40 47 51

LEGEND
ST Al.()ARO 42 X 48 BLOCK

Fig. 22 Stage 3 docking plan

The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez 675

Verification of the Ship's Structure
A comprehensive program of analysis using finite
element methods was undertaken to determine the
stress level and deflection in the ship's structure. A
two-dimensional mathematical model (Figure 23)
representing the web frame was developed which was
systematically modified to represent the various stages
of the reconstruction process.
The series of analyses included studies of the
intact web frame, the damaged web frame, the web
frame as it would be during the first phase of the
reconstruction process, and the web frame as it would
be during Phase II of reconstruction. Each adaptation
of the model was subjected to the appropriate loadings
and controlled by boundary conditions that best
represented actual circumstances. Figures 24 through
29 show these various models and their boundary
conditions. Two local fine mesh analyses were
conducted; one in way of the side shore brackets which
confirmed the adequacy of the structure, and one in way
of the longitudinal bulkhead where the first structural
rip-out was to occur. The second analysis revealed the
possibility of high shear stresses in the traverse web
outboard of the longitudinal bulkhead, therefore the
brackets shown in Figure 28 were installed. These
additional brackets which were installed throughout the
cargo length as far aft as Frame 42 represented all of
the additional structure that was installed as a result of
the analyses. The data gathered during the regular
monitoring of hull girder deflection as described in Part
One of the paper confirm that considering the damage
to the ship and the wide spacing of supports, the
structure was stiff enough and had retained sufficient
strength to be essentially self-supporting.

Fig.23 Mathematical model used for the stress

analysis in drydocking condition

' J0101~p1a101~
1

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-.... .01
IDuCJCJCJl
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t-!>01LJIDtQD01d~
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Fig. 24 Initial drydocking condition

Fig. 25 Fine mesh model for the bracket area

676 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez

 L
Ch)
Fig. 26 First repair condition without reinforcing bracket

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77
I

~~
lib:Qbl)~
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71 '5 Si 47 ll

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Fig. 27 Fine mesh model for the critical area (the area enclosed by the dotted lines in Fig. 26)

L
Fig. 28 First repair condition with reinforcing bracket

In the first repair condition, the center block will

Figure 24 shows the boundary conditions and the
deformed shape for the initial drydocking condition,
where the critical area was in way of the side shell
bracket. A fine mesh analysis was performed for this
area applying the deformations obtained from the
original course mesh analysis as boundary conditions as
shown in Figure 20. This fine mesh analysis shows that
the structure near the side shell bracket is satisfactory
and that reinforcement is not necessary.
be cut away as shown in Figure 26. In this condition all
the supporting load (2.7 x lOS lbs) will be resisted by the
shear area which is the length between Nodes 15 and 21
(Figure 24), multiplied by the thickness. That is, the
area is not continuous structurally. Therefore
reinforcing shear brackets were introduced as shown in
Figure 28. Figure 27 shows the fine mesh model and
deformed shape of the critical area. The shear brackets
can also be seen in Figure 30.

The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez 677

 10101~p1w101~
101 'lai
101 IOI
IObc:JDCJI
1CJV
lc:JI
I
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I
I
!CJ~CJCJCJ
1C:::JV ~ I
II I~ IOI
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Fig. 29 Second repair condition

Fig. 30 Location of shear brackets

Table 2
For the first repair condition, both absolute and
relative deformations of Nodes 4, 15, 2, and 22 (refer to MODE ORIGllAl
DIR ID. ODCKll& COllD. Zld llEllll COID.
Figure 1) are important. The deformations of these 4 0.39573 mm 0.01558" 0.16459 mm 0.00648"
Nodes are listed in Table 1. 15 0 27711 mm 0.01091" 0.09677 mm -0.00381"
y 16 0.26187 mm 0 01031" 0.05689 mm -0.00224"
Table 1 19 0.09093 mm 0.00358" 0.65328 mm -0 02S9S"
20 0 14986 mm 0.00590" 0.65328 mm 0 02572"
IODI ORIGllUl 1SI R!JlllR COID. ISi RENIR COID.
4 2 7114 mm -0.10675" 0.22174 mm 0.0
ID. 011. OOCKll& COID. IWllllOUT IEllF.1 IWllll IEllF.I
4 0 39573 mm 0 01558" 0 7381 mm 0.0290ti" 0.62433 mm 0.02458" IS 2.71171 mm -0.10676" 0 44399 mm -0 01748"
~

15 0277II mm 001091" 0 39548 mm 0.01557" 0.47625 mm 0.01875" l 16 2 5542 mm -0.10056" 0.47269 mm -0 01861"
y
~

21 0.41042 mm 0 01251" 0.00558 mm 000022· 0.14097 mm 0.00558" 19 0 68351 mm -0 02691" 0 sms mm -0 02064"
22 0 30302 mm 0 Oil93" 0.01625 mm -0 00064" 000028 mm 0.00726" 20 0 18288 mm -0 00720" O00939 mm -0.00037"

~
4 2.71145 mm -0.10675" 0.22174 mm -0.0083" 0.15875 mm -0.00625"
15 2.71146 mm -010676" 0.83591 mm -0.03291" 0.72821 mm -0 02867"
l Verification of Dock Floor and Side Walls
~
21 2 6126 mm -0 10286" 1.64008 mm -006457" 1.50800 mm -0.05937"
22 2 71678 mm -0 10696" 0.99720 mm -0.03926" 084937 mm -0.03344"
A task that ran parallel to the ship's structural
analysis was an engineering study of the dock itself,
For the second repair condition (refer to Figure which involved finding a way to provide support to the
10), both absolute and relative deformations of Nodes ship where the bottom was severely damaged, without
4, 15, 16, 19, and 20 are important. The deformations of transferring excessively high concentrated loads to the
these Nodes are listed in Table 2. dock floor. The consulting engineering firm of James

678 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez

R. Libby and Associates was retained to help develop
acceptable solutions. NASSCO estimated the loads
involved at each damaged frame. Fortunately, since the
major damage was confined to the bottom structure of
the hull, the side shell and the internal struts were, for
the most part, in good condition. The finite element
analysis of the ship structure showed that the loads
could be safely supported by special brackets to be
installed on the hull at the level of the lower strut,
without overstressing the internal structure of the ship.
The ship itself would act as a bridge spanning between
the side shell brackets and the row of blocks just to the
port side of the keel line. (See Figure 30)
the jacks and the upper hinge was suspended beneath
the welded hull bracket, allowing space for shimming.
The half-pipe socket section on the shores was kept as
short as possible to limit strong-axis bending in the
shore in the event that the pin and socket did not make
uniform contact. The upper hinge pin, mounted on the
ship, was made long to allow for tolerance in the
fore-and-aft positioning of the ship.
SHIP SIDE SHELL---

The dock floor was incapable of supporting the

resulting loads, expecially so near the edge of the slab.
UPPER BRACKET HOUNTED
Libby Engineering proposed that brackets be installed ON SHIP SIDE SHELL
on the sheetpile wall of the dock. The concept was
readily accepted and the design efforts accomplished.

Side Shoring Design and Development

A design load of 250 tons was established for

each shore and bracket assembly. the design criteria
included provisions for monitoring and controlling the
load on each shore. The shores had to support enough
weight to prevent overloading the blocks on the dock
floor. However, too much load could overstress the
shoring system. Of particular concern was the
possibility of dimensional innaccuracies. The upper
brackets were installed using reference points on the
ship, while the lower brackets were installed using
references in the dock. Any innaccuracies would have LOWER HINGE ASSEMBLY
2" PLATE. 6" ROUND BAR
to accommodated.
250 TON JACK

The Freyssinet Company, recommended by

Libby as a supplier of heavy duty jacks, designed a
system of hydraulic pumps, gages, manifolds, and
250-ton capacity jacks that could provide control and
feedback for each of the 24 shores. The jacks had a
maximum piston travel of about three inches. It was
agreed that the shores would be designed a few inches
short, with the remaining space to be taken up by
pre-cut shims. This would allow several inches
adjustment either up or down during the docking
operation by adjusting the jacks and by installing or
removing shims.
The final design of the shoring system included
the sheetpile-mounted brackets, jacks, upper and lower
shims, the shores themselves, and the upper bracket
attached to the ship (See Figure 31 ). Sections of the
existing sheet pile were welded together at the seams to
make them act as a unit. A beam was installed to
distribute the horizontal component of the shore load to
the soil behind the sheet pile. The upper and lower
brackets had 15-cm (6-inch) diameter hinge pins that
mated to sockets on the ends of the shores, to prevent
the possibility of weak-axis bending in the shore. The
hinge pins top and bottom, were mounted on heavy
bearing plates. The lower hinge assembly sat on top of
WI 2x79 wl th
st l ff ener s
Fig. 31 General arrangement of shoring structures
PERFORMANCE DURING DOCKING
NASSCO Steel Department fabricated all the
required parts and assemblies. The brackets were
mounted on the dock wall and ship side shell
respectively. The jacks were positioned in the dock
brackets and the lower hinge pin assembly was mounted
on top of the jacks. Finally the shores were set in place
with the lower socket mating to the hinge pins and
secured against the side fenders with turnbuckles. The
24 jacks were connected in groups to six manifold and
pump assemblies to be operated from the top of the
dock. (See Figure 32)
With all equipment and systems in place, the
docking could commence. Six operators manned the
six pump stations to control the jacks and keep records

The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez 679

of the jack pressures. Engineers from NASSCO and
Libby were in radio contact with the operators. The
ship was hauled into the dock, the caisson was replaced,
and dewatering started.
PUMP
SIX PORT MANIFOLD
GAGE. TYPICAL
EACH LIN!
fI
r r r r r So' OR 75" LIN!
TO EACH JACI(
15m (50') OR 23m (75') LINE TO EACH JACK
Fig. 32 Typical six-jack hydraulic station
The ship had a hog of about 15 to 23 cm (six to
nine inches) at midship. Consequently, the end shores
made contact with the top hinge pins well before those
closer to midship. The jacks had been extended so that
contact would take place as early as possible. As the
ship settled, the pressure was allowed to rise to near the
maximum predicted. During the docking the pressure
was periodically relieved and allowed to rise again. As
the intact bottom portion of the hull firmly contacted
blocks fore and aft, the deflection of the ship decreased
and the center shores made contact with the top hinge
pins. Gradually the loads equalized, indicating that the
ship deflections had been primarily due to elastic strains
in the ship structure.
Once the ship was firmly settled on the blocks
and shores, final jack load settings were established.
During the next several days, as the ship made its final
settlements, heating and cooling in the sun, the pressure
changes were recorded and periodic adjustments were
made. A setting was found that kept the loads within
the desired range, and shims were installed beside the
jacks below the lower hinge pin. The jacks were
depressurized and removed.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND
CONSIDERATIONS
Pre-docking
The damage to the Valdez was such that the
NASSCO shipyard would be the first harbor that the
vessel would enter after departure from Alaskan waters.
The Valdez had been under close observation
and scrutiny by all the various environmental and local
Government agencies. The Regional Water Quality
680 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
Control Board (RWQCB) for the San Diego area was
immediately contacted by NASSCO to discuss the
arrival and handling of the Valdez at the shipyard piers
and drydock. The initial plans were discussed far in
advan~e of the arrival and the environmental guidelines
and nsk areas were identified for assessment and
solutions. The RWQCB mandated that the terms of the
NASSCO National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit would be strictly enforced.
There would be zero discharge of oil into San Diego
Bay.
Prior to departure from Alaska, the Exxon Valdez
was cleaned by a high pressure water wash in all tanks
that had cargo oil and also those ballast tanks
contaminated as a result of the grounding. The exterior
of the vessel was also completely cleaned of all oil
residue by high pressure water blast machines.
The areas below the water level in the tanks
could not be washed, but these areas had been
somewhat scoured by the rise and fall of the tide while
grounded and with the changing draft of the vessel.
The vessel would arrive at the yard drawing
approximately 7.6 meters (25 feet) of water at an even
trim. This draft would ensure that the vessel did not
ground at the pier during the cycles of the tide and have
sufficient draft to support ship handling by the tugs and
pilot. Several cable pendants were installed on the
vessel at the San Clemente Island anchorage prior to
entering San Diego Bay to provide hookups to the
tugboats that would allow responsive ship handling.
The maximum draft of the vessel entering the
graving dock was limited to 5.5 meters (18 feet). The
vessel required pumping up to lower the vessel draft. A
91.4-cm (36-inch) and 1-m (42-inch) floating oil booms
were placed completely around the vessel and pier. The
booms were anchored away from the vessel and pier to
ensure a safe distance to allow any escaping oil to rise
to the surface inside the booms. Oil skimmers and
cleaning equipment were located within the boomed
area. The Exxon Valdez was stabilized at the NASSCO
pier for two days to facilitate separation of any residual
oil which might be in the tanks.
To ensure vessel stability during the voyage from
Alaska, certain undamaged tanks were ballasted with
slightly contaminated water, which under the
agreement, had to be removed from the vessel prior to
lowering the vessel draft. The water could not be
pumped into the bay or taken away from the yard by
conventional tanker trucks, due to the extremely large
quantity.
Exxon Shipping Company arranged vessel
schedules that would allow the tanker Exxon Washington
to be brought to the yard in a light draft condition and
berthed at the same NASSCO pier as the Exxon Valdez.
The Exxon Washington was moved inside the booms and
made secure port side to the pier. The two vessels were
connected to 20-cm (8-inch) and 15-cm (6-inch) cargo
hoses at the midship cargo manifolds with the hoses
secured to each vessel and laid on the pier. The area
where the hoses crossed the pier was made water tight
and both vessels provided a constant watch during
pumping operations. Each hose was tested to 150 psi
and proved tight.
The Exxon Washington took off all 13,000 tons of
water.
After all contaminated water and oil was
removed from intact tanks, the Valdez crew and salvage
team commenced pumping air into the tanks to raise
the vessel to the drydocking drafts. The pumping
evolution was restricted to daylight hours by the
RWQCB to ensure that no contaminates were forced
out of the tanks into San Diego Bay. Throughout this
evolution, the R WQCB Inspectors monitored progress
and found no discharge. The vessel was raised from 9.7
meters (32 feet) of draft to 5.2 meters (17 feet) of even
draft removing 55,717 tons of water without a trace of
discharge.
The grounding of the vessel and subsequent
ripping of loose plates during the voyage to San Diego
from Alaska had left plates and frames below the flat
bottom plane. With the vessel at an even draft of 5.5
meters (18 feet) at the maximum high tide of 2.2 meters
(7'-2") there was only minimum clearance over the
blocks which had been set at 1.2 m (46 inches).
In discussion with the salvage divers and salvage
master aboard the vessel en route from Alaska it was
determined that there could be significant steel hanging
below the bottom plane and that the divers could not
ensure that they could trim the plates within an
acceptable tolerance. The effort of the divers was
hampered while cutting at sea by the rise and fall of the
vessel and the lack of reference points. A straight edge
that could be ballasted down to 5.5 meters (18 feet) and
drawn along the bottom by divers and air tuggers was
designed by the salvage master. The straight edge was
fabricated from 45.7-cm (18-inch) schedule 40 pipe into
a U-shape 6.4 X 54.5 meters (21' x 179') with roller pins
at the horizontal ends to allow rolling the unit along the
vessel's bottom.
The salvage divers using "go/no go" jigs
measured and cut off any steel that was below the
bottom plane. Each piece was marked and a retrieval
line attached to ensure that each piece was saved and
that no steel was allowed to remain on the bay floor
after the vessel departed the pier. The damage to the
bottom at Frame 25, extended up the vertical side to a
level just below 4.9 meters (16 feet). The ever changing
air temperature in the tanks by the sun beating on the
deck and hull constantly changed the drafts and shape
of the ship. Extreme care was taken by the crew to
release air during daylight hours and compensate at
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
night by increasing air pressure to keep the ship at the
5.5-meter (18-foot) draft.
Pre-drydocking
The drydock is a graving dock that can be
completely isolated from the bay after installation of the
gate. The bay outside the gate could be isolated by a
90-cm (36-inch) oil boom to eliminate any accidental
discharge outside the NASSCO facility. The firm of
PDS Engineering was hired to develop plans and
systems to make the drydock totally separate from any
outside or underground water source. The original
design of the graving dock allowed for a cross flow of
ground water from under the dock into a sump area that
is continuously pumped to maintain no more than 5.2
meters (17 feet) of water pressure against the drydock
floor. The floor of the dock is fitted with relief
chambers that allow ground water to vent to the
drydock floor if the water pressure exceeds the
5.2-meter (17-foot) level. The drydock floor was cross
connected to the sump area where excess water could
be pumped away. The drydock had to be modified to
separate the ground water from the interior of the
drydock and still allow a safety vent system. The cross
flooding trunks were sealed by installing a 25-cm
(10-inch) gate valve in the drydock sump and all floor
vents were sealed. The ground water pressure would be
relieved by external pumps on automatic service and
monitored throughout the drydock evolution. The
drydock was inspected thoroughly by R WQCB
Inspectors prior to docking the vessel. For approval
purposes it had to be assumed that water remaining in
the tanks after initial dewatering would contain
significant quantities of oil and wax residue. When the
Exxon Valdez is situated in the drydock only 90 cm (36
inches) of clear area is left on either side between the
sheetpile bulkhead and the vessel sides which
significantly reduces the water area that would have to
be moved.
PDS Engineering installed a 10-cm (4-inch) air
pipe line with air holes along the entire length. The
pipe was installed along the drydock floor adjacent to
the dock gate. Compressed air at 100 psi was connected
to provide continuous yard air. Throughout the docking
evolution when water was present in the drydock, air
was circulated through the pipe causing a constant
agitation of the water at the lowest point allowing
contaminants to rise to the surface. Water hoses from
the pumping systems were secured and fastened so that
their flow was directed toward the gate. This force of
water kept the surface water and any potential floating
material moving forward in the dock. The prevailing
wind direction in the drydock moves from the gate to
the forward end of the dock. The constant wind and
water pressure would move everything away from the
dewatering pump intakes on the floating barge. At the
forward end of the dock an oil skimmer with an endless
loop mop was installed across the full width of the
drydock. As needed, this continuous mopping
681
operation could remove any significant amount of the
oil and wax and allow the remainder to be put into
tanks. The drydock at high tide with the gate open has
a water depth of 7 meters (23 feet). The gate
reinstalled at high tide and at the start of the ebb tide
will stay seated only if the water level inside the drydock
is maintained at least six inches lower inside than the
level outside. The water in the dock was drained
through the open sluice valves as the tide went down.
The Exxon Valdez tank air pressures were held constant,
the drydock gate sluice valves were closed just prior to
low tide, and the dewatering pump continued pumping
at 84,0001/min. (18,000 GPM) when the ship was
centered. Any water in the vessel remained in the
vessel as the tide went down and landed the vessel at 5.2
meters (17 feet). As the weight was transferred from
hull flotation to the blocks, the air pressure in the tanks
was gradually released to atmosphere. The pumping
continued until the water level was at 4.3 meters (14
feet) inside the dock and 4.9 meters (16 feet) outside.
The vessel was held in this condition and no evidence of
contaminated water outside the vessel was noted. The
second major phase had been completed with zero
discharge of oil or contaminants.
Under the agreement with the WQCB, the
remaining water in the drydock, approximately 70,000
tons, was to be considered contaminated regardless of
actual test results, and removed from the vessel and
drydock for disposal. Exxon Shipping Company again
made tankers available to use for hauling water from
San Diego, back to Valdez, Alaska for treatment.
The pier and drydock configuration of NASSCO
did not allow for the direct connection of hoses to
transfer water from the tankers Exxon Washington and
Exxon New Orleans to the drydock or the Exxon Valdez.
The large 84,0001/min. (18,000 GPM) dewatering
pumps could not be used as they could not pump water
under pressure. The dewatering of the drydock was
done by placing four large diesel pumps on a floating
barge inside the gate with suction lines into the drydock.
The dewatering sump at the gate end was bordered with
a 60-cm (24-inch) steel fence to eliminate the possibility
of any oil or wax not floating on the surface of entering
the pump intakes. The pumps were connected to a
manifold using 15-cm (6-inch), 1N/m 2 (150 psi) cargo
hoses connected directly to the port cargo manifold of
Crowley Barge 274, with a 50,000 barrel capacity. The
second barge, Exxon Barge 502, with a 80,000 barrel
capacity was moored alongside the Crowley Barge and
connected to the starboard cargo manifold. Water was
then pumped from the drydock to the Crowley Barge
and then to Exxon Barge 502 using the Crowley 274
pump system. When Exxon Barge 502 was full, the
barge was shifted to Exxon New Orleans at Pier 5. The
water was discharged from Exxon Barge 502 to Exxon
New Orleans.
While Exxon Barge 502 was discharging, the
pumps continued to fill Crowley Barge 274 and the
682 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
positions were reversed as each was emptied and filled.
The Exxon New Orleans and Exxon Washington took on
50,000 tons of water until only 1.2 m (46 inches) of
water remained in the drydock. The Exxon tankers
departed with their cargo. There had again been zero
discharge of water or oil into the bay and all activities
were observed by the R WQCB Inspectors.
The cargo tanks and those tanks breached by the
grounding still contained residue below the water level
maintained during the voyage south from Alaska.
These tank structural members had to be cleaned prior
to any work being done and it was not practical to clean
them after all the water had been removed from the
dock. The most effective method of cleaning the tanks
was to use the Exxon Valdez tank washing system.
Because all water generated by the ship and shipyard
would be considered contaminated, bay water or fresh
water could not be used to wash the tanks.
The remaining 1.2 m (46 inches) of water (16,807
tons) in the drydock was used as the reservoir to supply
the tank washing system. The water level in the drydock
was too low to provide suction for the ship's pumps and
an outside pump source was required. The 46-cm
(18-inch) pipe previously used as the floating straight
edge was disassembled and reinstalled on the pier
alongside the bow. The 46-cm (18-inch) pipe was
connected with 25-cm (10-inch) and 20-cm (8-inch)
1N/m2 (150 psi) flexible cargo hose from the pier to the
vessel. The hose was connected into the main cargo
handling pipe on the main deck at Frame 5 and then to
the tank washing units.
Crowley Barge 274 was connected to the 46-cm
(18-inch) pipe at the gate and completed the circuit. As
the water was pumped to the vessel it was draining back
into the drydock out of the holed tanks. The water
draining into the drydock contained the oil and wax
residue water blasted from the tank structure.
The bubbler at the gate end and prevailing wind
continuously moved any material from the gate to the
floating skimmer where it was picked up and pumped
into tanks for disposal.
Each tank took four to six hours to clean using
this method and the tanks required very little cleaning
after being pumped dry and wiped down.
The 46-cm (18-inch) pipe and hoses to the vessel
were disconnected. Pumping to Crowley Barge 274 was
commenced to lower the water level to 46 centimeters
(18 inches). Men and equipment were allowed to work
on the drydock floor and herd the oil residue and wax
out from under the vessel and around the blocks. Short
oil booms and rakes were used and the oil was moved to
the skimmer for extraction. The final 46 cm ( 18 inches)
of water was pumped to Crowley Barge 274 and
removed from the shipyard for disposal.
 The drydock interior, the drydock blocks, and
the exterior of the vessel were contaminated with some
oil and wax as a result of tank washing. Six 69N/m 2
(10,000 psi) water blast machines were placed along the
drydock walls and the entire drydock was washed with
cleaning solutions and blasted with high pressure water.
The residual water was washed to the drydock sumps
and pumped into Crowley Barge 274. The final
Discussion
Phil Rynn, Member
Overall the paper is an excellent description of the re-
construction of the Exxon Valdez and the authors are to
be commended for their concise presentation. The infor-
mation presented will undoubtedly be of value to builders
faced with large reconstruction tasks in environmentally
sensitive locations.
As is apparent in the paper, accurate assessment and
documentation of the extent of the damage was crucial in
a repair of the magnitude of the Exxon Valdez. Knowledge
of the damage was necessary to develop a successful dry-
docking strategy that would maintain the structural ade-
quacy of both the hull and the drydock and still accommo-
date removal and replacement of structures while
preventing undue hull deflections and torsions. Along with
accurate damage assessment, the fact that the repair took
place in the shipyard where the ship was constructed and
information on the undamaged hull was readily available
most likely contributed to the success of the repair.
In the case of the Valdez the construction planning was
designed to replace specific damaged block sections using
a tunnel approach. Damaged blocks were cut away and
replaced efficiently and quickly. With the advent of the
Oil Pollution act of 1990, it would be interesting to know
if the authors could advise the relative cost of fitting a
completely new bottom as opposed to replacing only one
side as in the case of the Valdez. The replacement tech-
niques utilized on the Valdez repair may enable vessels
currently in service to comply with the new laws. Also of
value would be the authors' opinion as to what technical
problems could arise in a different shipyard environment
than that of NASSCO.
The authors have provided a very descriptive paper
presenting all of the steps needed to reconstruct the bot-
tom hull, taking into account the environmental and
strength considerations and pointing out necessary techno-
logical decisions that needed to be made. The success and
rapid completion of the repair procedure is indicative of
the use of proper planning as outlined in the paper. It is
an apparent conclusion that with proper planning any task
can be completed successfully. The useful content and ben-
eficial applications associated with the paper will no doubt
be of great benefit to the industry.
Robert R. Fargo, 1 Visitor
The reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez by NASSCO
provides some interesting and innovative solutions to the
unusual problems encountered in this repair situation. Of
particular interest were the creative approaches taken in
addressing three primary concerns:
1
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., Pascagoula, Mississippi.
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
cleaning was done using water hose and yard water
pressures. The water was pumped from the drydock
sumps into truck trailers for disposal.
Following these procedures, throughout the
cleaning of the vessel in the drydock and in the drydock
cleaning process itself, there had been zero discharge of
contaminated water into San Diego Bay.
1. Drydocking support requirements for a ship with
30% of its bottom damaged.
2. Access and method of transfer in the graving dock of
removed sections and erection of new hull bottom units.
3. Environmental protection.
For a ship with extensive bottom damage, it can be diffi-
cult to determine how much contact will occur with the
dock's blocking arrangement. The inability to clearly de-
fine the extent of damage (other than general location)
compounds this problem. Support requirements for the
ship must prevent overstressing of the dock floor, as well
as maintain alignment as bottom units are removed and
replaced. NASSCO's combined use of traditional blocking
with side shoring and blocking tables was shown to effec-
tively provide these support requirements.
NASSCO's use of the "tunnel method" for removal of
damaged structure and the erection of new hull units was
an innovative solution to the restriction imposed by the
size of the graving dock. The cost effectiveness of this
method, however, depends somewhat on how much un-
damaged ship must be removed to provide access to the
damaged portions. In this case, since damage to the star-
board and starboard/center bottom sections was so exten-
sive, only minimal undamaged structure was required to
be removed.
The measures taken to protect the environment during
docking and repair are noteworthy. Unconventional steps
such as the use of a compressed air and hose system to
agitate the water and establish flow into the drydock dur-
ing docking operations, modification of venting systems to
provide isolation of the drydock, and pumping of all dock
water to other ships for disposal were very effective in
preventing an incident. NASSCO demonstrated that strict
environmental regulations can be complied with in a ship
repair situation even with damage as severe as that which
existed on the Exxon Valdez.
There have been other noteworthy occasions when ships
with extensive structural damage have been repaired uti-
lizing new construction modular techniques. In 1987 in
the Persian Gulf, the USS Stark (FFG 31) was struck on the
port side forward by two Exocet missiles. Upon her return
to the United States, Stark was repaired during the period
November 1987 to August 1988 by Ingalls Shipbuilding
division of Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Al-
though the damage was extensive, unlike Valdez, it was
topside, primarily to the main deck and forward super-
structure from frames 93 to 153. Thus it was relatively
easy to scope the extent of repairs for planning purposes.
Docking of the ship could be done in a normal manner and
there were no unusual environmental hazards.
Stark was not repaired in a graving dock. Instead, the
ship was raised on the yard's launch platform, a floating
drydock, and then translated onto land using a motorized
pallet car system. On land, the damaged structure was cut
683
and removed in one section of about 150 tons and new
structural units were erected. Unlike Valdez, the repair of
Stark required significant replacement of outfitting sys-
tems. Much of this work was accomplished by preoutfitting
of the structural units prior to erection.
On land, much better access was provided to the dam-
aged areas than would have been afforded in a dry dock.
The damaged section was lifted from the ship using 200
and 300 ton gantry cranes. New structural units were simi-
larly set. If bottom units had required replacement, the
increased accessibility would allow relatively simple trans-
lation or trucking of units into position. If it is possible in a
particular situation where extensive bottom damage exists
and a graving dock with adequate dimensions is not avail-
able, translating the ship onto land would eliminate the
need for a "tunnel method" of repair and the possible need
for removal of undamaged structure in order to provide
accessibility. However, handling environmental concerns
such as existed in the Valdez situation during docking and
tank cleaning would be more difficult since it would not be
possible to contain the contaminated water in the floating
drydock or shiplift platform.
M. L. Ingwersen, Member
What a great ship repair accomplishment. The amount
of hull damage involved with its jaggedness and torn areas
hanging below the baseline; the added publicity and public
awareness of the environmental aspects of this very large
crude carrier of worldwide notoriety made this a challeng-
ing job.
The company, realizing that this was not the usual bot-
tom damage repair job, had the presence of mind to assign
a small knowledgeable team to review the detailed damage
reports and specifications.
The team's arrival at the Tunnel Method concept was in
my estimation a "brainstorming" that must have taken
many hours of innovative thinking to deviate to this degree
from the standard bottom damage repair.
The damage being in a reasonable straight line fore and
aft and conforming somewhat to the original centerline
and outboard block configurations supported the two-
tunnel approach that was arrived at by the team.
The team having arrived at the tunnel method of repair
and then challenging the hull technical department and
the outside consultant to determine a feasible way to sup-
port the ship and its structure must have caused some
sleepless nights.
The detailed planning for the job was well thought out
and reasonably executed. Experience dictates that in any
job of this magnitude you're going to find that on the job
alterations or changes to the detail planning had to be
made. This job was no exception, changes had to be made;
they were made in a timely fashion and the job proceeded.
In addition to the repair and the supporting of the ship
the steel movement system required considerable innova-
tive brainstorming and a unique method to accomplish the
moving in and out of large hull blocks in a constricted area
where cranes were of little value.
The total handling method was innovative and accom-
plished the job; however, from the paper it is hard to visual-
ize and comprehend the operation of the various compo-
nents of the system. I would have appreciated seeing better
pictures of this operation and a clearer description.
The three different methods of supporting the ship
couldn't have been better conceived and engineered by
hull technical and the outside consultant or executed by
684 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
the docking personnel. A very commendable job by all
concerned.
The clincher to this outstanding repair job was how the
environmental issues were organized, planned, and exe-
cuted. It's almost unbelievable that the environmental pro-
cedures could be carried out from the arrival of the vessel
through the drydocking procedure and the cleaning pro-
cess of the drydock itself with zero discharge of contami-
nated water into San Diego Bay-my hat's off to the Na-
tional Steel employees and the authors.
M. E. Young,2 Visitor
One cannot help being impressed with the team effort
between Exxon and NASSCO in developing the plan for
this extensive reconstruction project. This effort should
receive the Nobel Price of planning.
The amount of damage sustained to the hull created
a difficult drydocking that was readily addressed by the
NASSCO team, assuring structural integrity both in the
drydocking and subsequent tunneling operations.
The eventual tunnel method certainly was the best ap-
proach that could have been used both from the sense of
limiting costs, and production efficiencies. To attempt this
project on other than a graving dock would have been
costly and would have required more extensive engi-
neering.
This project was probably one of the most complex engi-
neering projects in recent history. The decisions reflected
a great deal of work that was flawlessly executed. The
environmental considerations were similarly well man-
aged, and establishes some benchmarks for the rest of the
industry to target towards.
The steel director, Mr. Duncan McNeill, should be com-
mended for his extensive planning, contingency planning,
and coordination of the project. His extensive training,
experience, and background probably makes him one of
the best qualified persons in the world to take on a project
such as this. The successful conclusion certainly vouches
for his capabilities.
Authors' Closure
Mr. Rynn correctly points out that maintaining the struc-
tural adequacy of the dock and the ship were major issues.
We assure him that these issues were treated as such and
given very serious consideration.
Regarding Mr. Rynn's first question, we are of the opin-
ion that the relative costs of fitting a completely new dou-
ble bottom using the tunnel approach would be roughly
proportional to the tons of steel involved. Schedule, on the
other hand, would not necessarily suffer since if the entire
bottom of the ship is being retrofitted it could be arranged
such that two tunnels are being worked simultaneously.
Another possible source of savings is likely to be realized
due to the easier workability of an undamaged ship.
Mr. Rynn's second question relates to the technical prob-
lems that might be encountered by other shipyards when
attempting to use similar techniques to those used by NAS-
SCO. We feel that any such problems would be related to
and a consequence of differences in facilities. The ability
to do this type of repair work is very much facility depen-
dent and requires that individual shipyards adapt the pro-
cess to match their particular facilities. We feel, however,
that NASSCO's approach to this repair problem is trans-
ferrable to other facilities, subject to appropriate adapta-
2 Portland Ship Repair Yard, Portland, Oregon.
tion, and applicable to other situations such as retrofitting
double bottoms.
Mr. Fargo-The authors wish to express their apprecia-
tion to Mr. Fargo for his comments. He zeroed in on some
of the unusual problems we encountered in this recon-
struction project. The drydocking support requirements
and the measures taken to protect the environment were
two of several problems requiring innovative solutions.
It is interesting to note that new construction building
techniques were utilized in the repair of the USS Stark
(FFG 31). The authors are not sure if we see any merit in
Mr. Fargo's comparison between the Exxon Valdez and
the Stark repair problems. The principal difficulties with
the Valdez problems involved simultaneously supporting,
removing, and renewing a large percentage of the bottom
of the ship. This situation did not exist with the Stark
project.
Noteworthy was the reference to the yard's launch plat-
form, a floating drydock, and the subsequent translation
onto land of the ship using a motorized pallet car system.
In a case of damage where strict environmental considera-
tions are not required, this system could possibly be used
as an alternative to a drydock.
Mr. Ingwersen-The authors wish to express their thanks
to Mr. Ingwersen for his in-depth analysis of the paper. His
remarks fully captured the atmosphere of this project. As
he correctly points out, the review of the damage survey
reports and the eventual arrival at the Tunnel Method of
reconstruction was indeed a major deviation from tradi-
Panel Discussion
Society President Arthur J. Haskell presiding
[EDITOR'S NOTE: After formal discussions on the paper and the authors' closure, a
panel discussion was convened on the broader topic of oil spill prevention and tanker
construction. Following are the major contributions to the panel debate.]
Thomas R. Hagner, Jr., Member
MID-DECK TANKERS
I am very pleased to address SNAME on the subject of
mid-deck tankers.
I've been watching the recent budget debate in Con-
gress. I think probably the most important question for
naval architects and shipbuilders is: Do we really want
these people designing our oil tankers for us?
I would like to thank NASSCO for their excellent paper
on the Exxon Valdez repair. I particularly liked a sentence
on the first page which has meaning for more than ship
repair. It says "The challenges and restrictions can often
become the stimuli for promoting innovation." With the
new oil spill law, we certainly have the challenges and
restrictions-so let's get on with the innovation.
Figure 33 shows a mid-deck tanker. As you can see it's
essentially a double-sided ship with an additional deck
somewhat below mid-depth. Ballast is all in the wing tanks
and fairly conventional structure is used in the cargo tanks.
At the current stage of design, no unusual structural prob-
lems have been noted.
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
tional bottom damage repairs and was the product of con-
siderable brainstorming sessions. The Engineering Depart-
ment confirmed the production tunnel method approach
was technically sound in terms of dock loading, support of
the damaged vessel, and the ability to maintain the ship's
structural integrity. The extent of pre-planning and careful
preparation by all concerned was crucial to the successful
completion of the reconstruction.
The authors regret that the pictures and description of
the Steel Movement System made it hard to visualize and
comprehend the operation of the various components of
the system. We hope that during the actual presentation
of the paper, the additional slides shown helped to clarify
the system.
This was certainly a team effort integrating planning,
engineering, production, and materials altogether as one
unit which contributed to the successful completion of the
vessel.
Mr. Young-Our thanks to Mr. Young for his complimen-
tary remarks. He quickly assesses the team effort between
Exxon and NASSCO in the evolution of the reconstruction
project. His conclusion that the tunnel method was the best
approach from the sense of limiting costs and maximizing
production efficiencies is considered high praise. Also, the
comment that the environmental considerations were well
managed, and establish some benchmarks for the rest of
the industry to target towards, is very much appreciated.
The success of this reconstruction project is a direct result
of the teamwork and dedication of the employees of
NASSCO.
J
l
l
Fig. 33 Typical transverse section
The basic concept (Figs. 34, 35) is very simple. The cargo
oil level in the lower tank is well below the waterline.
Thus the seawater exerts an upward pressure on the ship's
bottom in loaded condition. When the bottom is pene-
trated, seawater enters the cargo tank until hydrostatic
685
 balance is reached. Folks, this ain't rocket science. There
will be no oil pollution in the example shown. If the ship
is stranded and the tide falls, it is very easy to design a
system to transfer the cargo to an adjacent ballast tank.
There would be plenty of time, so risky automatic devices
would be unnecessary.
Designed in this fashion, the Exxon Valdez would have
lost no oil. After looking at NASSCO's pictures today, I
don't think we can reasonably say the same for any practi-
cal double hull design. My first exposure to the mid-deck
concept was in June of 1990. I was a member of the API
Tank Vessel Committee which sponsored the Forum on
Alternative Tank Vessel Design. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
tries presented model test results and outline details for
mid-deck tankers. In my personal opinion, it was the best
concept for new construction presented that day. Mitsubi-
shi subsequently presented mid-deck tankers to the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, and will talk this month to
IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee. I un-
P SW > poi I derstand MHI's presentation will be on behalf of the Japa-
nese government.
Fig. 34 Basic concept The mid-deck concept is under serious consideration by
Amoco Transport Company for use in its new construction.
However, Amoco is not presently advocating mid-deck
tankers pending completion of our study. The advantage of
this concept clearly is pollution prevention. Disadvantages
are mostly operational in nature.
The upper and lower tanks are interconnected and
drained by the same cargo manifold. There is nothing re-
ally unusual about the piping and valving. On the other
hand, major maintenance areas of concern have always
been the cargo tank tops and bottoms. In this ship, we have
essentially added an extra top and extra tank bottom with
no operational advantage nor any increase in oil carrying
capacity. (See Figs. 36, 37).
One of my major concerns with this design is tank clean-
ing. There is a lot of extra structure in the cargo tanks. Gas
freeing, on the other hand, should be no problem. Tank
inspection should be no more hazardous than for a single
hull.
Why should Amoco be interested in this? The answer is
technical uncertainty of double hulls. No VLCC's have
ever been built with double hulls. No construction has com-
menced for any double hull oil tanker larger than a Suez-
max. There are scale problems in applying 40 000 DWT
ton product carrier structural details at the VLCC size. In
Amoco's ongoing parallel study on VLCC double hulls, we
are finding very heavy plate in the web frames in the
double bottom area. This raises serious questions about
fabrication even before we tackle the issues of dynamic
response and fatigue for the double hull structure.
Designing a vast horizontal inner bottom that will always
either be holding up the entire weight of the cargo or
resisting the reverse hydrostatic head of the draft in bal-
last-this causes concern.
Everyone knows that under the new oil spill law; if an
owner acts reasonably quickly, he could still build and op-
erate a single hull VLCC in offshore U.S. waters for her
entire economic life. Technical uncertainty could more
than justify such a decision.
Safe and efficient maintenance of ballast tank coating
also is a serious concern, and double hull VLCC's have
over 2'l2 times the ballast coating surface area compared to
S e a W a L e r
single hulls. The mid-deck tanker has less than l 'l2 times
the surface area. A mid-deck tanker also offers significantly
Fig. 35 Mid-deck tanker improved collision protection.
686 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
 • 1 sum 01 IRArol /

Fig. 36 Transverse section schematic (looking aft)

T.lEYl:l W'1:
ilii.-l£VU Al.All:Kl C.O T. HATCll
(C.11.l.T.l , ;Tc.O:cn I ' KATCL.
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Fig. 37 Longitudinal section schematic (profile)

The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez 687


Energy E [kJ]
5
8. 10
Absorbed Energy E and Critical Impact Speed ver
for Various Wing Tank Breadths b
5
6. 10
ver
5
5. 10
4. 10
5
3. 10
5
1 . 10
5 Ratio Wing Tank Breadth b
Ship's Breadth
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
0 2 3 4
Wing Tank Breadth b [m]
Fig. 38 Critical impact speed (source: Germanischer Lloyd)
A mid-deck VLCC will have 6-m-wide wing tanks where
as a double hull VLCC would only have three. As can be
seen in this study by Germanischer Lloyd, increasing the
wing tanks from three to six meters increases the collision
energy that can be absorbed without an oil spill fourfold.
The critical relative velocity of a ship in a perpendicular
collision with her sister goes from 4 to 7 knots which moves
it well within the normal range of channel maneuvering.
(See Fig. 38.)
By the way, this doesn't mean that we have done any
good, if we make ships unnecessarily larger with needless
empty space, or if we restrict carrying capacity so much
that many additional ships would be needed.
Many of you are probably wondering what happens on
that dark day when someone pumps the lower tanks out
with the upper tanks still full? Will she roll over? My ver-
sion of Herbert Engineering's Cargomax Loading Program
has the ability to simulate voids anywhere in the ship.
So it was fairly easy to computer fit a middle deck on
Amoco's double sided Aframax ship, the Ocean Leader.
This is the stability for the Ocean Leader as-built with 46
percent full tanks. This would be the same as a mid-deck
tanker with only the lower tanks full. (See Fig. 39.)
Figure 40 shows data for the mid-deck tanker with the
46 percent cargo shifted to the upper tanks. Stability is still
no problem. All IMO minimums are exceeded by a large
margin. It is interesting to note that you might very well
want to operate this way. The bottom of the upper tank is
smooth and is fitted with a sump while the bottom of the
lower tank has a conventional bottom. You could reduce
overall pumping time if you stripped the lower tank while
pumping out the upper.
The mid-deck tanker also has plenty of intact stability in
normal loaded condition even when all upper and lower
688
tanks are slack. Damage stability needs to be further stud-
ied. A trim and stability booklet almost certainly will be
Critical Speed
v., [kn] required. Direct calculation of the free surface effect
8 rather than simple formulas will be necessary for this type
of structure.
The steel weight of mid-deck tankers will be a few per-
7 cent higher than an equivalent double hull. However,
overall construction cost will be somewhat lower.
Well, it might be nice to say this is a brand-new innova-
6 tion, and that one could get rich on the patent. However,
this concept dates back to the infancy of bulk oil transporta-
tion. Here is an 1886 mid-deck tanker (Fig. 41). A British
5 technical journal of the day had the following to say (by the
way, I would have trouble saying it better today). Quote:
4 In the oil tanker Gluckauf, it would be possible to
imagine the ship's bottom entirely knocked out,
and yet, she would float and come to her port
3 of destination without any serious casualty. The
lightness of the oil itself is such that it will remain
in the upper part of the damaged tank. Only a
2 few months ago, I was speaking with a Russian
gentleman who owns a vessel in which that very
thing occurred. The vessel struck an anchor ...
and had her bottom completely torn along; but
B not withstanding this serious damage, the loss of
0.12 0.14 0.16 oil was extremely small.
5 6 In closing, I would like to thank Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
tries for their technical support in my presentation today.
I don't know what is going to happen to the mid-deck
tanker concept, but its apparent attractiveness should
serve as a challenge for all of us to look for something even
better.
I consider myself an optimist despite the fact that every-
thing is going to hell in a handbasket.
And, if we look at it optimistically, Congress is saying
that we have to spend 20 percent more on our tankers to
reduce oil spills. That's a lot of money. So let's take back
our authority as naval architects and shipbuilders and find
ways to spend that money wisely. Thank you.
Charles Corbett,3 Visitor
OIL POLLUTION ACT
The thrust of my remarks will be a little bit of a history
on how we got this act, how it evolved before the Exxon
Valdez, and a principal provision of the act which is largely
illusory, and that is the matter of limits of liability, where
perhaps the word "limit" shouldn't really be used.
Some of you may know that the legislation was being
worked on in the Congress for nearly 15 years before the
Exxon Valdez. In fact, I heard one staffer earlier this year
when the Hubble telescope went up remark that this won-
derful instrument, the Hubble telescope, is going to let us
see so far back into the past that we might even get a
glimpse of the first oil spill legislation that was tried in the
Congress.
The Reagan Administration at one stage set back the
process when in about 1982, I think it was, they sent me
to the Hill to testify that we didn't need oil spill legislation,
contrary to what the previous two Presidents from both
parties had said. However, Elizabeth Dole came into the
Department of Transportation following that, or about that
time, and became very interested in oil spill legislation.
She was quite interested in the international regime, often
3
Captain, USCG (Ret.); Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc.
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
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Fig. 39 As-built 85 000-ton vessel Fig. 40 Mid-deck tanker, 85 000 tons


Earty Slngle Skin Tanker
@~~B!~>
Ef11Jdsatpi§~
GJucksuf
Steam Tanker, Built 1888
Double Bottom Under Aft Macntnery Space,
Single Skin Cargo spaces
C!N rRe BUUU1Lio0
Fig. 41 Mid-deck tanker, 1886
referred to as "the protocols." Perhaps Admiral Kime men-
tioned in his address. And she really wanted to see oil spill
legislation enacted, and she worked real hard on it. In fact,
I had the pleasure of being her special assistant on oil spill
legislation for the last two years of my regular Coast Guard
service.
So in 1984 we had really a whole new era of oil spill
legislation initiatives. It looked like things might go some
place. But as it turns out, the Congress couldn't agree on
one principal issue, that's the matter of state preemption.
The House had always favored state preemption. Senator
George Mitchell and the very powerful Senate Environ-
ment and Public Works Committee opposed preemption
of any kind, and the Administration was somewhere in the
middle.
Now comes Exxon Valdez. Most insiders predicted that
we would have oil spill legislation following the Exxon Val-
dez. In fact, at that state, then Commandant, Admiral Paul
Yost, asked to return from the private section into uniform
and be Sam Skinner's advisor on the legislation. And we
took legislation to the Hill on the 11th of May, which was
largely a liability and compensation regime. Few predicted
that it would take Congress almost a year and a half to see
oil spill legislation enacted, and I certainly don't know of
anyone who predicted the shape that the legislation would
eventually take. But soon we were stuck in the same quag-
mire over state preemption.
During these months that followed, everyone wanted
into the act, and most of the people got into the act. Again,
as you may have heard last night, in addition to liability and
compensation, the act covers oil spill prevention, removal,
690 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
plate gauging, overfill devices, tank level monitoring de-
vices, double hulls, research and development, contin-
gency planning for tankers-and I'm just naming a few of
these now. It has an entire title on Prince William Sound
which establishes the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Insti-
tute. I'll leave it for yourselves to read the act and see what
the Oil Spill Institute is supposed to be doing.
It calls for the establishment of a light on Blyth Reef,
and it would improve the vessel traffic system in Prince
William Sound. The bill also contains something that was
added at the very last minute by Chairman Jones, a real
smell of pork to this. It's a moratorium on offshore drilling
on the Outer Banks. It was a big surprise, the last day of
the conference committee. It caused a big brouhaha. But
it carried and it carries with it this provision. It's a very
short part of the bill, but it's a moratorium on drilling in
that area.
It revamped the national response mechanisms very
much. It gives the President much more authority with
respect to oil spills and directs the President to direct the
response to oil spills when the public health and welfare is
significantly affected or threatened.
Now to liability and compensation, just for a minute.
When we talk about liability, I'm talking about what the
owner or operator or the responsible party is liable for, and
compensation refers to the one billion dollar fund that was
established through a 5-cent-per-barrel levy on oil. The
liability for tanker owners was eventually set at $1200 per
gross ton. And you might be interested in how the Congress
got there.
Prior to the day that the Senate passed their bill, S-686,
all of the bills, including 686 on that date, the President's
bill, the House bill, and the 686, all called for liability limits
of $500 per gross ton. That fit in nicely with the interna-
tional scenario. Everything was consistent. It was fairly
rational. Insurance would be available. And nobody was
saying anything else. Howard Metzenbaum took the floor
in the 11th hour of the discussions, pounded the table with
his fist, and much to the surprise to me and to George
Mitchell and to practically everyone else in the room said
that if $500 a ton is good, then $1000 per gross ton has got
to be doubly good. And it passed in the blink of an eye.
Then the Senate went to the press that evening and the
following day throughout the country you read how well
the United States Senate had stuck it to the oil companies.
And I can guarantee you that I don't think Senator Howard
Metzenbaum and perhaps the majority of the Senate had
even a clue that oil is carried by others than oil companies.
Then you heard recently with the budget business that
the House and the Senate often vie for attention. Perhaps
some of you know that the boys over in the House often
refer to the Senate as the House of Lords. So it got over to
the House now and they said, "Well, we can't let the Senate
outdo us here. We've got to do better. So we're going to
make it $1200 a gross ton and we're going to slice that in
the middle and we're going to assign part of that to cargo
interests." How they figured they were going to enforce
that, I haven't a clue. But the final readout is it's $1200 per
gross ton for tanker owners.
Now, as I said a minute ago--and there would be no
preemption of state governments-seventeen states have
unlimited liability. But the important part of this whole
thing-perhaps for you, perhaps not, perhaps for some of
you anyway-are the standards for breaking liability. And
I want to read you those right out of the act.
First of all, there's a couple of fairly rational standards of
gross negligence or willful misconduct or a failure to report
an oil spill. Well and good. Also, you lose your limits of
liability if you fail to comply with an order of the President
or if you do not provide all reasonable cooperation and
assistance required by responsible officials. Unfortunately,
the act doesn't say who a responsible official is, whether
it's the Federal on-scene coordinator, a state flunky, or a
local fire chief.
However, this is the section that I think might interest
you. It says Subsection 8, which is the limits. It does not
apply if the incident was approximately caused by "the
violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or
operating regulation." So far so good. I'll read that again.
"The violation of an applicable federal safety, construction,
or operating regulation by the responsible party, an agent
or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting
pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible
party." Now I'll leave it for you to decide if any of those
persons are you, for instance.
Well, what are the implications of this act? First of all,
the availability of insurance certificates is really in ques-
tion. The act provides for direct access to insurance compa-
nies. What with the standards for breaking liability what
they are, the insurance companies, the clubs in London,
are saying, "We're not going to play this game. We're not
going to issue certificates." Whether they'll back down or
not on that remains to be seen.
How will the independents obtain evidence of financial
responsibility? A major question.
Will some states have trouble receiving oil? There are
two carriers of oil in this country that recently stopped
serving, at least black oil movements, in Maine and Rhode
Island. Whether or not they will maintain that posture or
not remains to be seen.
Will responsible operators leave the market to bucket
shop operators, particularly the companies that are owned
by individual families? The Greeks, for example, are talk-
ing that "we don't really want anything to do with this.
We're very wealthy as it is, and we just simply can't take
the chance on losing everything that we've got." Will at-
tempts be made to shield liability through one ship compa-
nies, and will it work?
Will there be a cost at the gas pump? I suspect that
there will be a cost, although things being what they are
internationally it doesn't seem likely that we'll be able to
identify them.
And then perhaps the most important question of all is,
Will there be a reduction in oil spills? I think the answer
to the last question is somewhere between maybe and
probably.
John Kimble, Member
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The discusser frequently refers to figures, or
slides, that were part of his presentation at the meeting. Although
copies of these graphics were not received by us to include here
in the printed TRANSACTIONS, we decided to leave standing Mr.
Kimble's references to them instead of risking eviscerating his
important discussion.]
DOUBLE HULLS
We all know the law is passed, but the law simply states
that new vessels trading in the U.S. must have double hulls.
It's significant that it doesn't define what a double hull
must be.
Now, Chevron has operated five 40 000-ton double-hull
tankers for 15 years. And we just recently completed the
contracts for two 130 000-ton double-hull tankers. Those
experiences have convinced us that there are serious issues
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
in the design and operation of double-hull vessels that must
be addressed.
We don't know all the answers concerning double hulls,
but I think we know a lot of the questions. The public, we
believe, perceives that the double-hull vessel will end oil
pollution from tank vessels. We believe that if we don't
come up with the right answers to serious issues regarding
double-hull design that the double-hull tanker may be-
come part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
In this brief presentation, I'll present some of the issues
involved and give you one owner's perspective.
The first issue that we have to struggle with is what
should a double hull look like. Should it be like the one on
the right or perhaps more like the one on the left? The
important point I'd like to make is that both designs have
problems.
What we'd obviously like to have happen in any double
hull is something more like on the right there where you
have crumple rather than the double hull really acting
more like a thick single hull. Now the industry hasn't done
much work on this issue, and I think it's one of the issues
that cries out for work to be done to define how to better
or best build double-hull tankers whereby you will have
crumple and the inner hull will remain intact in any kind
of a collision or grounding.
Access, we think, is one of the very important issues in
double hull design. Absent the work required to better
define what sort of dimensions would allow crumple rather
than breakage of double hulls, we believe that B/15 is
a reasonable dimension and it does certainly satisfy one
requirement where it does allow you reasonable access
into your double-hull tanks.
Now here's a midship section of the Chevron 130 000-ton
vessel. Obviously being able to design in incline ladders,
no problem. You get down into the double bottom area, we
have 2 m clearance between the longitudinals, so walking
across or stepping across longitudinals is not a problem.
There's reasonable access, as reasonable perhaps as you can
get in a double-hull tanker.
Now this is a tank section aft, and you have similar sec-
tions forward. Now the going gets a little tougher. The
shape of the hull starts to play a part and access down about
half way is really easy-getting down to the lower sections
becomes a little more difficult, but with B/ 15 type dimen-
sions it's still not really a problem.
This is a cartoon. We just moved the bulkhead out to
show what it might look like if you only had 2 m. Obviously
access becomes nearly impossible or certainly very diffi-
cult. In our small double-hull tankers we have problems of
access, but I don't think they're anything like you would
find in this kind of an arrangement.
This is a midship section of a vessel currently being built
in the Far East. Now here they've solved some of the prob-
lem of having a very shallow double bottom and having
encroachment of the longitudinals into it to make access
very difficult. They've made the longitudinals shallower,
but then you get into very frequent frame spacing, about
half what we have, and you have the series of longitudinal
girders. So basically what you've done is built yourself a
bunch of boxes. On a Suez max-type vessel, you may have
as many as 500 boxes. And if you don't specify something
differently, the access from box to box is probably going to
be a hole about 600 mm by 400 mm. Access is going to be
certainly difficult.
Here's a photo of a fellow doing a little inspection work
in one of our double-hull vessels, the 40 000-tonners. It's a
little tight. Here's another one. Now these photos show
691
some of the tight access perhaps. What they don't show is
the heat, the lack of ventilation, the smell, and the down-
right slimy conditions that are found in these tanks.
The whole point here is that unless we design double-hull
vessels with consideration for good access, inspections
won't be made or they won't be made properly. And if
they're not made properly, we're going to have lots of
problems. If I were a class surveyor and ships were going
to be built without consideration of access, I'd be working
on my resume right about now.
Getting air into these spaces, not only in the event you
have to purge out hydrocarbon vapors in the event of a
leak, but simply for normal inspections. Anywhere you
have the configuration where you have a tank dead end at
the centerline of the vessel, you have that long dead leg
that is going to be very difficult to get ventilation into it.
In our case we decided that the only way we felt we could
reasonably get ventilation in there is to put a purge pipe
in. The idea here would be to put a ventilator on that purge
pipe, suck air out, put another ventilator on a Butterworth
opening in the tank and blow air in. Even at that, it's going
to be difficult. And this is a design without all the boxes. If
you have a design with the boxes, I don't know how in the
world you're ever going to get adequate ventilation in that
space for inspection.
Tom mentioned the coating areas, and that's a problem.
Here showing our 150 000-ton single-hull vessel and the
130 double hull, obviously the coating areas are tremen-
dously different. Now the industry hasn't had a very good
track record in being able to maintain ballast tanks, coated
or not. As a matter of fact, it's been so pitiful in some cases,
whole sections of the side of the vessel have fallen off. It's
a little embarrassing to have the side of your vessel fall off.
It's a little worse if half the bottom falls off.
This issue was the big issue that was being talked about
wildly at the time when the debate still raged-Should we
have double hulls or not? This was the case of we poke a
hole in the ship somewhere and, oh my God, we're going
to flood all this water into the double bottom, the vessel's
going to sink, it's going to be harder to salvage, and it's
going to eventually break up and we're going to lose the
whole shooting match.
We agonized over a subdivision in the double bottom,
came up with the arrangement shown on the top of this
slide. As you can see, the worst case, the worst single place
we could hit the ship was right there between 6 and 7.
Those tanks would flood the way across. We would flood
approximately 15 000 tons. Imagine a VLCC with rather
minimum subdivision. Hit is in the wrong place, you could
perhaps flood as much as 50 000 tons. Obviously, you would
need to light her 50 000 tons and more to ever refloat the
vessel. I think consideration should be given to what kind
of subdivision you provide in those ballast spaces for the
case where you may put a single hole in the vessel and take
on quite a bit of water.
Now damage stability and capsize: In a single-hull vessel
it just wasn't an issue. We didn't have to worry about it. It
was almost impossible to capsize a single-hull vessel. But
in a double-hull vessel you've got a combination of things
that are going to affect what happens. You've got a higher
center of gravity of the cargo. You've got a large free sur-
face area in those center cargo tanks if you don't subdivide
them. And if you do subdivide the bottom ballast tank and
then damage it port or starboard, you're going to have
axisymmetric flooding and potential for capsize.
Now when we got into the design of our 130s we thought
that what we probably should be trying to do is to build a
692 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
vessel that would have at least the capability in a damaged
condition to survive that a single-hull vessel would. Now,
we're talking about a case here where the vessel is fully
loaded to 98 percent, it grounds on an object, it clears the
object and floats free.
We took a look at a single-hull vessel and found that
basically we could damage it to full cargo length. We ended
up with about 33~-deg heel, and we have taken on an
awful lot of water because we flooded both those large
ballast tanks here on the starboard side, but the vessel
survives. Then we looked at the 130 000 ton double-hull
vessel with L-type tank configuration subdivided in the
middle and no cargo tank subdivision longitudinally, and
we found it doesn't fare quite as well. Here we can damage
back through number 6. We end up with about a 20-deg
heel. We have a displacement in this case of about 180 000
tons. It survives. If you hit number 7, it's over. You capsize.
Then we look at what happens if perhaps you don't load
your tanks quite full and you're carrying a little bit heavy
cargo, you leave them a little slack. In this case we've got
98 percent full tanks, so we've got some free surface. Now
we damage. By the time we hit number 2 cargo tank, it's
all done. We've capsized. As you can see by the righting
arm curve there, no righting energy left. Don't know that
it will float neatly upside down like that but ... [Laughter]
. .. it's not going to float right side up either.
Now we took the case, we widened out the double-hull
sections as per the Chevron design. We have now 3.75-m-
wide wing tanks and 3.295 m height of double bottoms.
It's still the same configuration though subdivided in the
double-hull structure on the centerline and no centerline
subdivision in the cargo tanks. The damage it can withstand
is about the same. However, you'll note that the displace-
ment in the damaged condition is worse. Now rather than
180, it's about 186. And the heel is greater, rather than
being about 20 deg heel, you've got a 26-deg heel. And this
is the detrimental case for wider and wider double sides or
deeper and deeper double bottoms. When you do damage
them, your situation in a damaged condition is obviously
worse than if they are narrower.
Now this slide just gives you a little terminology here so
you'll understand what we're talking about when I get to
the slide on the Chevron vessel. First, it indicates there the
U-tank, it's simply a tank that has no internal subdivision
port to starboard. The L-tank is the standard configuration
we see an awful lot of. It's a U-tank with a centerline subdi-
vision. The one that is a little unusual is this S and J tank
arrangement which is really an L-tank, taking a portion of
that and subdividing it, and we called it a side or an S-tank.
Now, this is the Chevron 130 000-ton arrangement of
double-hull tanks. As you can see, a lot ofU-tanks. We don't
have any L-tanks. We decided against the L-tanks because
of the difficulty in ventilating those tanks and the axisym-
metrical flooding they present if flooded, one side or the
other.
Now the U-tanks present some problems as well. If you
do damage a U-tank, of course, you now flood symmetri-
cally, sink evenly, but, of course, you take on more water
and there is no now reserved buoyancy left. That's why we
went to these S-tanks, two pairs ofS-tanks in number 2s and
number 4s, to provide buoyancy in the event of damage to
those U-tanks.
The U-tanks also present a bit of a problem during load-
ing and discharge. You can't flood too many of those tanks
or you create a lot of free surface and you could end up
becoming unstable alongside the pier and heeling over,
perhaps breaking a hard arm or whatever. So that's another
reason for having the S and J tanks. It helps heel control;
and also to prevent this heeling, we subdivided three of
the center tanks to reduce the free surface in those center
cargo tanks.
This is the damage that the Chevron vessel can with-
stand. We can damage the vessel from bow clean through
the engine room. We heel a bit, we obviously sink quite a
bit, but we have a lot of stability and the vessel survives
quite nicely. This is a case where you have 98 percent full
cargo tanks. We also looked at the case where you have 96
percent, and it does bring that righting arm curve down
quite a bit, but it still survives quite nicely.
So Chevron's design may not be the full answer. We
acknowledge that, and it is not presented as such. We pres-
ent it to spark interest and commitment-interest in the
problems of double hull vessels, and commitment to get
the necessary work done to resolve the outstanding issues.
The other thing we'd like to do is maybe create some
worry, some worry that if we don't design and build prop-
erly configured double-hull vessels, we're going to have
problems and they're going to be with us a long time.
So we hope that we can resolve the problems. We hope
we get on with the work necessary to ensure that double
hull vessels are built to criteria that will serve the industry,
the environment, and their crew as well.
Ted Thompson, 4 Visitor
[The views expressed herein are the opinions of the discusser and
not necessarily those of the Department of Transportation or the
U.S. Coast Guard.]
PROPOSED TANKER REGULATIONS
Actually I was told that I would be speaking toward the
Oil Pollution Act, so that's a little bit about what I'm going
to talk about. It will come as no surprise to you that with the
recent casualties Congressional action and internal studies
have occupied much of our time on this subject and
changes are necessary.
Change is a part of our lives. When I was young, Chuck
Yeager was just probing the sound barrier. When I was in
high school, Alan Shepard and Colonel John Glenn made
our first manned suborbital and orbital space flights.
Shortly after I entered the field of ship operations as an
ensign in the Coast Guard, we placed a man on the moon.
Our generation has seen the introduction of television as a
medium of instant communication that has shrunk the
world. We now have contact lenses, Xerox, laser beams,
boom boxes, and plastic credit cards. Some of you swung
with the big bands. I remember Elvis.
We've all handled these changes in our lifestyles over
the years, not without some confusion and uncertainty, but
surely we have seen many benefits to our well-being and
prosperity. Change is not new to the marine industry and
the maritime field, and change continues today, part of it
driven by the Oil Pollution Act.
As fresh water, gunpowder, and certain staples of life
were carried in casks aboard the earliest ships, so, too, was
oil, the oil that lit the lamps then and whale oil as cargo.
Oil was eventually carried in independent tanks and then
directly in the hull of steel ships, all with the view presum-
ably to protecting the cargo from the environment. It was
1924 that the first Federal Government regulations were
issued for the safe carriage of flammable and combustible
materials in bulk. These rules were little more than the
4 Captain, USCG; Marine Technical and Hazardous Materials
Branch.
The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
adoption of early industry standards and guidelines devel-
oped by a company now known as Exxon.
We have come along way in improving our standards,
not only for the safe carriage of oils and hazardous materials
but also for preventing pollution with an eye now toward
protecting the environment from the cargo. Change.
There are some 13 to 15 international treaties developed
over the years which either directly or indirectly go to-
gether to establish a systematic approach to safety and
pollution prevention. These include the SOLAS Conven-
tions, Intervention on the High Seas, MARPOL, and
STCW. Now our latest effort this November will be di-
rected at MAPC at oil pollution prevention and response.
The United States has been a leader in negotiating a rise
in worldwide standards to a point that we profess to be
happy with, and yet somehow we seem to lose focus and
go off in a different direction without reaping the benefit
of our gains in international negotiations. There are several
of these treaties, hard fought, hard negotiated, which we
have never ratified. Now the American public is calling for
even more at a time when we have become for the most
part a port state and not a flag state. Ninety-five percent
of the arriving cargo comes to this country in foreign ves-
sels; 75 percent of our crude oil comes in foreign tankers.
We must continue to seek and rely on international stan-
dards for the problems that are global in nature. And until
recently, our national legislation has been compatible with
the international treaties. With OP A-90 that has changed
mainly in three areas.
The first area that was discussed by CAPT Corbett is
liability and compensation for damages resulting from
tanker accidents. We have opted for an alternative as old as
our Constitution, and that is the right of states to prescribe
remedies, and we certainly can't argue with that. But it's
interesting to note that this is a time when the European
powers are combining for their mutual good and we are
promoting separatism and may be endorsing as many as
26 different state arrangements to solve a single problem.
Or maybe not just one problem, considering that some of
the states are also looking into equipment standards, crew
qualifications, and onboard inspections. And where does
that leave the Federal Government? Where does that
leave the Coast Guard? Where does that leave the owners
and operators? And where does that leave many who may
truly deserve to be compensated fairly for damages when
possibly that is a one-ship company, as we heard discussed
earlier?
The second area is double hulls. Again, a call for unilat-
eral action by the United States, double hulls for all ships
serving the United States. I believe double hulls will pro-
vide an extra level of protection from oil spills, and this has
been a recognized alternative in the segregated ballast and
protectively located schemes of MARPOL '73-78, albeit
it's an expensive alternative, 10 to 25 percent more expen-
sive depending on who you talk to.
Double hulls also raise other safety issues that we have
recently heard about here, all of which I believe are solv-
able. They include gas pockets in between hull spaces,
potential salvage difficulties, stability, corrosion preven-
tion, coatings and repair techniques. There is a lot of work
to be done, and double hulls are certainly not seen as a
panacea. Double hulls will not guarantee that we do not
have accidents, nor will they guarantee that in an accident
that no discharge at all will occur.
The third area that we see as different is people. People
are the key. People cause accidents, not ships. Ship design
is critical to the safety in withstanding or surviving of acci-
693
dents, but crew training and crew qualification are among
our top priorities. It has been shown time and time again
that crews that are poorly trained or fatigued for whatever
cause are more prone to have accidents. Eighty to 85 per-
cent of the casualties that we see involve crew response of
some sort, either improper actions, lack of training, or just
a plain casualty caused by fatigue or something like that.
The OPA addresses this matter principally for U.S. crews,
but we have got to ratify the STCW, the international
convention establishing training, crewing, and watchkeep-
ing of seafarers. Only then will we have a strong position
to enforce standards on foreign vessels entering U.S. ports.
But this is a gathering of professionals in the marine
industry here, and I am sure that you have recognized
these issues yourselves. Some of the real questions are how
do we meet the expectations of the public and the people
and not destroy our national and international mechanisms
for dealing with safety and pollution prevention. Likewise,
how do we, given past history, sustain the public interest
and national commitment in preparing for events that ac-
tually occur relatively infrequently, and how much are we
willing to pay to be constantly prepared?
A central theme of our future work will highlight the role
of management in maintenance, quality control, human
factors engineering, and personnel training and qualifica-
tion. We will begin to rely more on performance oriented
standards and the evaluation of the ship itself as a system
through increased use of ship riders.
Much progress can be made in responding to the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, hopefully before we are faced with
another catastrophic occurrence and another round ofleg-
islation aimed at solving the problem.
The Coast Guard initially intended to issue standards for
double hulls. We were not able to do so, so at this point we
have prepared a notice of proposed rule making we expect
to have published sometime by the end of this month.
These standards, which essentially are those that we have
proposed within our NA VAC-292, address the size of dou-
ble hulls, and they're a starting point for discussions not
only within our own system, looking for your comment and
your suggestions, but also in the international arena.
The timetable that we are looking for is for phasing out
ships as a function of vessel size, age, and construction-
the size is in gross tons, not deadweight tons-and the age
considered is after completion of construction or major
conversion. The law also requires that we look at opera-
tional and other mechanical techniques to improve the
safety of hulls during the phaseout time. And we will be
looking for input from professional societies such as
SNAME as well as industry as to what some of those tech-
niques may be.
I think there are some areas for input by SNAME. What
are the structural implications of double-hull construction?
How do you prevent corrosion of ballast tanks? How to
coat tanks in accordance with vapor emission standards
that many of the states are now adopting? The stability
implications of double-hull construction need to be investi-
gated further. Dimensions for protective spaces with re-
spect to protection and to minimum clearance for inspec-
tion, ventilation, and maintenance need to be further
investigated. And requirements for sounding and ventilat-
ing protective spaces, especially in barges, need to be ad-
dressed.
Thank you.
694 The Reconstruction of the Exxon Valdez
Discussions from the floor
Mr. Arthur Haskell (presiding): What I'd like to do now
is open up for some discussion from the floor, questions or
comments. They may be directed to any of the members
of the panel, that is, either on the reconstruction of the
Exxon Valdez or on the other topics that were raised.
Paul Menz (MARAD): Title VII of the act authorizes up to
$27 million for research and development for protection,
mitigation, recovery, and fix. Does the industry support
any appropriation of public funding for this? And if it does,
how much and do you have any plans for the wise use of
such resources?
Mr. Kimble: Basically we haven't considered that at
Chevron. We have considered the need to do something.
We were thinking along the lines more of industry funding,
perhaps through API or one of the industry groups. But if
that money is available and it would be spent in the best
interests of the public in doing the necessary studies that
are just crying to be done, I think that would be a wise
investment of that money.
A panelist: I'm primarily up here on the technical part,
but I have taken part in some of the API deliberations. As
you well know, we had the PIRO concept and then they
ran into some trouble concerning liability for actions of
insurance. I'm not really sure where that is. That's handled
by different people. But it is a very high level of concern.
I'm not sure, Paul, whether your focus is on public funds,
but I believe that the numbers that are being run around
for building oil spill response centers are in the couple of
hundred million dollars on the industry by the time the
cost is all added up.
Mohr Hussain: My question is directed to Mr. Walter.
Have you done any analysis, do you know of any analysis
done to determine that if Exxon Valdez had been fitted
with a double hull with exactly the same rupture, how
much of a reduction of spillage we could have expected?
And the second question is, would there have been a stabil-
ity problem?
Mr. Walter: The questions don't relate to the topic of my
paper this afternoon. Therefore, I don't have an answer to
the question. Thank you.
Maxwell Chung (MCA Engineers): I have a question to
ask Mr. Walter. I noticed that you have extensive shears
onboard on the starboard side. As you make a tunnel re-
moving the material, would the hull start to open up a little
bit? And when you put back the material inside of it, would
you able to close up and line up exactly the hull, or put
back in the original strength, or do they have a lot of resid-
ual stress built up after you complete the repair?
Mr. Walter: The way we addressed the issue of the defor-
mation of the hull according to the configuration of the
models that we built was to assess the deflections. The
deflection levels in the results of the analysis were such
that the chance of that type of spreading taking place was
virtually nonexistent. But by the same token, very quickly
after the ship was in drydock and the dock was dewatered,
the supports under the wing tanks in way of the damage
were put in place anyway. So it was a non-issue in effect.
Mr. Haskell: I would like to thank the authors, the dis-
cussers, and the other people that participated in this for
a very, very interesting and noteworthy discussion. Of
course, all of this will be recorded in the TRANSACTIONS of
the Society.