Political Law

POLITICAL LAW CASE DIGESTS
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2018 – 2019
CHAIRPERSON Catriona Janelle Gayatin

VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR ACADEMICS Jerekko Cadorna
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR ACADEMIC OPERATIONS Rodel Cadorniga Jr.
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR HOTEL OPERATIONS Emmanuel Josef Jovellanos
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR HOTEL OPERATIONS Christian Boy Benedict Tiangco
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR FINANCE Katreena Frances Monje
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR SECRETARIAT Odette Marie Jumao-as
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR COMMUNICATIONS Maryll Ann Ragpala
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR RECRUITMENT AND MEMBERSHIP Giulia Ingrid Calub
VICE CHAIRPERSON FOR ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING John Eli Zuriel Bitong
San Beda College Alabang School of Law Administration
Dr. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III
Dean and Adviser
ATTY. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad
Vice Dean
ATTY. Carlo D. Busmente
Prefect of Student Affairs
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
2018 Centralized Bar Operations
POLITICAL LAW TEAM

Subject Head Robert Paul Arpa
Members Frederick M. Abella Jr.
Ma. Veronica Malabanan
Jerome Napoleon Gonzales
John Kristian Lalas
John Nikko Roxas
Clarisse Ann Miranda
Fatima Dennise Briones
Melissa Manansala
Mark Ellison Alarilla
Paolo Thomas Damagiba
Pamela Riel Carmelle Herbosa
Maria Kriselda Jimenez
Denis Grajo
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DOCTRINES
HADJI HASHIM ABDUL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an
adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging.
DOROMAL V. BIRON
An act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
DANGAN-CORRAL V. COMELEC
The court must clearly and distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots has been written by
only one person. The specific figures or letters indicating that the ballots have been written by
one person must be specified.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.MARGARITA M. GALON vs.

PHIL PHARMA WEALTH, INC.
The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be sued for acts
done in the perfom1ance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority.
TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., ET AL.
The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name of his Filipino spouse,
violates the Constitution and is thus, void.
ROM vs. ROXAS & CO.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process
impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
LUZ S. ALMEDA vs. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
The right of speedy disposition of cases is akin to speedy trial as to its salutary objective, that is, to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation. The
concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible, a mere mathematical reckoning of
time involved is not sufficient, but particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstance
peculiar to each case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH v. SPOUSES SALVADOR
In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of
the property by considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual
or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from impairment
or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded by the trial court, provided that
the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation do not exceed said
damages suffered by the owner of the property.
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Eminent domain refers to the inherent power of the State to take private property for public use.
This power has two basic limitations: (1) the taking must be for public use; and (2) just
compensation must be given to the owner of the property taken. Notably, in agrarian reform
cases, the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one
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for public use. Anent just compensation, the same is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property expropriated.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON
Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS GALLE
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and in the computation of just
compensation, both Section 17 of RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) and the
formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform
should be considered.
CITY OF ILO-ILO VS. CONTRERAS-BERSANA

When taking of property to be expropriated occurs before expropriation proceedings have
been commenced, the fair market value of the land on the date of filing of the complaint shall
be appreciated in determining just compensation.
TANENGGEE V. PEOPLE
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt

obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA

A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers.
In this regard, police authorities are given a wide latitude in employing their own ways of
trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed method on
how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v. Garcia, the absence of a prior
surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no text
book method of conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug
dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. Thus, in People v.
Salazar,we ruled that "if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-
bust operation deserves judicial sanction."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SOBREPEÑA SR., et al.
In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong, which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The
judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties.
SPOUSES HING V. CHOACHUY
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands
respect.||
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUANG TE FU
This case reiterates the rule in naturalization cases that when full and complete compliance with
the requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law, or Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473), is
not shown, a petition for naturalization must be perfunctorily denied.
REPUBLIC V. BATUIGAS
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It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of
one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance
among the members of the family.
REPUBLIC V. ONG
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.
ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
SAÑO VS. COMELEC

Invoking grounds for pre-proclamation controversies without sufficient evidence will not justify
exclusion of election returns which appear regular and authentic on their face.
REPUBLIC VS NAMBOKU PEAK, INC.
The court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions is bereft of any right or personality to
question the decision of an appellate court reversing its decision.
BalasbasvsMonayao
An administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions as long as
it constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Araullovs Office of the Ombudsman
A public officer who acts pursuant to the dictates of law and within the limits of allowable
discretion can hardly be considered guilty of misconduct.
SPOUSES HIPOLITO, JR. VS. CINCO
Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
DAZON VS. YAP

HLURB does not exercise criminal jurisdiction over violations of PD 957.
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ET.AL. vs. SONIA R. LORENZO, ET.AL.
Judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. This principle
goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which precludes courts from
resolving, in the first instance, controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. Hence, a premature invocation of the court's judicial power is often struck down,
unless it can be shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner, vs. JEROME JAPSON
The Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered employees of the
National Government, and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service laws and
regulations. Petitioner cannot evade liability under the pretense that another agency has
primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.
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LEAH M. NAZARENO, ET. AL. vs. CITY OF DUMAGUETE
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to
promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service including the power to ISSUE rules and
regulations and to review appointments. There is no reason not to apply the constitutional
prohibition against midnight appointments to those mass appointments made by chief
executives of local government units since they are precisely designed to ensure that
appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the basis of qualifications,
instead of political loyalties or patronage.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MANALO
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence ‘refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a flagrant and culpable
refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross
negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
RONNIE H. LUMAYNA, ET. AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties.
Absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable and
the latter is not personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties
absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.
FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS vs. DR. AMELIA C. ALMIRANTE

Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, or in case of conviction, where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman's decision shall be final, executory, and
unappealable. The CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the order or
decision of the Ombudsman
FAJARDO V. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V. HEIRS OF PUYAT
Land acquisition processes which commenced under Presidential Decree No. 27 but remained
incomplete upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 become the subject of the newer law.
RODRIGUEZ vs. SALVADOR
Agriculturaltenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it. Agricultural tenancy
exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.
BUADA VS. CEMENT CENTER, INC.

Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law
which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
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CASES
HadjiHashim Abdul v. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Moot and Academic; Justiciable Controversy
DOCTRINE:Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
FACTS: Petitioner was re-elected as municipal mayor for a second term in the May 2001 election.
While serving his second term as municipal mayor, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
filed an Information charging petitioner, along with Abdul and Domado, with falsification of
public documents. Before the trial, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the
suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused as mandated under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent granted the
OSP's motion and accordingly ordered the suspension pendente lite. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied Thus, he filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for TRO. The Court dismissed the Petition, which dismissal attained finality. The
suspension order, however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the
expiration of petitioner's second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election
during the May 2004 election.During the May 2007 election, petitioner emerged as the winner in
the mayoralty race and again sat as Mayor. The OSP once again moved for his and his co-
accused's suspension pendente lite to implement respondent's final and executory suspension
order. In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner called attention to respondent's
pronouncement in its Resolution that his defeat in the May 2004 election has effectively
rendered his suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless, respondent ordered anew the
suspension of petitioner from his present position for a period of 90 days. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Undeterred, petitioner filed on October 2, 2008 the
present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO submitting again the sole issue of whether
the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the implementation of the suspension Order. Subsequently, while the present Petition
was pending before the Court, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision acquitting
petitioner and his co-accused of the offense charged
ISSUE: Whether or not the present petition should be dismissed
HELD: Yes. The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic. For a court to
exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, in Mattel,
Inc. v. Francisco we have ruled that "[w]here the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value
as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however
intellectually challenging." In the present case, the acquittal of herein petitioner operates as a
supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of
the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public
officer, for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged. The issue on the validity or
invalidity of petitioner's suspension had been mooted considering his acquittal by
the Sandiganbayan in its Decision. As such, there is no justiciable controversy for this Court to
adjudicate.
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DOROMAL V. BIRON
TOPIC: Political Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion
DOCTRINE: An act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
FACTS:Petitioner Rose Marie D. Doromal and private respondent HernanBiron were the vice mayoralty
candidates for the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo in the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvassing
of votes, Biron orally objected to the inclusion of 25 election returns. Biron anchored his objections to the
inclusion of the 21 returns on the alleged missing taras in Copy 4 of the contested returns, which he
obtained as the standard bearer of LAKAS-CMD, the recognized dominant majority party in said
elections. As regards the remaining four contested returns, Biron opposed their inclusion allegedly
because there was a discrepancy between the number of votes stated in the said returns and those
stated in the certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). In view thereof, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) deferred the canvassing of the said returns. Thereafter, Biron filed
his written objections and supporting evidence.MBC denied the petitions for exclusion. It found that there
was no tampering on the number of taras for Doromal in the copy of the election return for the MBC. It
also held that the copy of the election return of the MBC was complete with no material defect and duly
signed and thumbmarked by the BEIs.Aggrieved, Biron appealed to the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it used the certificate of
votes to exclude the three contested election returns considering that it cannot go beyond the
face of the returns in establishing that there was tampering or falsification and considering
further that said certificates did not comply with Section 17 of RA 6646.
HELD: Yes.In the instant case, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the exclusion of the subject returns. The ruling contravenes clear legal
provisions as well as long standing jurisprudence on the admissibility of the certificate of votes and the
appreciation of election returns. Lamentably, the refusal of the COMELEC to heed this Courts repeated
pronouncements has again led to the disenfranchisement of voters in this case. The writ, therefore, lies to
correct this grossly abusive exercise of discretion. In excluding three of the 11 subject returns, specifically,
those coming from Precinct Nos. 90A/90B, 7A/7B and 208A, the COMELEC relied on the alleged glaring
dissimilarity between the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificates of
votes. Hence, it concluded that the subject returns were falsified and thereafter ordered their exclusion.
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DANGAN-CORRAL V. COMELEC
TOPIC: Political Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion
DOCTRINE: The court must clearly and distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots has
been written by only one person. The specific figures or letters indicating that the ballots have
been written by one person must be specified.
FACTS: Petitioner Leonor Dangan-Corral (Corral) and private respondent Ernesto Enero
Fernandez (Fernandez) were candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of El Nido,
Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was eventually proclaimed the winner with
5,113 votes as against Fernandez's 3,807. The latter, thereafter, filed an election protest
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 1870 which was raffled to Branch 95 of the RTC of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec committed not only a reversible error but gravely abused its
discretion when it ignored the mandatory requirements of the SUPREME COURT duly
promulgated Rule on the matter of Form of Decision of trial court in protest cases.
HELD: Yes. In the present case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee
were not clearly established in the Decision because of the RTCs failure to conform to the
prescribed form of the Decision. Because of said infirmity, there is no certainty, it not being
mentioned in the Decision, on whether the ballots of those who voted through assistors were also
invalidated or not, in conjunction with the lack of a specific number of ballots invalidated for
being written by one person. The ballots of those who voted through assistors, if any, could
validly be written by one person. It being unclear from the Decision whether these ballots, if any,
were invalidated, it follows that the victory of the protestant and defeat of the protestee are
unclear and not manifest therein. Consequently, to allow the execution of such a grossly infirm
RTC Decision in disregard of established jurisprudence and clear and straightforward rules is
arbitrary and whimsical and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Considering that the execution pending appeal cannot be validly allowed without
the above discussed requisite, and having already found the presence of grave abuse of
discretion, we find no necessity of addressing the other matters raised by the petitioner and of
still determining the presence or absence of the other requisites for execution pending appeal.
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.MARGARITA M. GALON vs.

PHIL PHARMA WEALTH, INC.
TOPIC: State Immunity
DOCTRINE: The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be
sued for acts done in the perfom1ance of their official functions or within the scope of their
authority.
FACTS: On December 22, 1998, AO 27 was issued by DOH Secretary Romualdez which set the
guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers of pharmaceutical
products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but
subject to annual review. Several amendments was made and later issued Memorandum No.
171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 inviting
representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including respondent PPI to a meeting.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled "Report
on Violative Products" issued by BFAD, which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to
these accredited drug companies’ products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products
which were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption. PPI belatedly sent a
letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on
Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply. However,
PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10-day
period, which had previously expired, much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely
submit its reply. In a letter-reply, Galon informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation
has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. In
December 14, 2000 letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon, PPI through counsel questioned
the suspension of its accreditation. It thus demanded that the DOH desist from implementing the
suspension of its accreditation, under pain of legal redress. PPI filed before the RTC of Pasig City
a Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer
for damages and injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and DOH
Undersecretary Galon. In their Amended Answer, the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then
Secretary Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon sought the dismissal of the Complaint, stressing that
PPI’s accreditation was suspended because most of the drugs it was importing and
distributing/selling to the public were found by the BFAD to be substandard for human
consumption. Petitioners moved for the dismissal claiming that the case was one against the
State. The RTC dismissed the case declaring the case is against the State in which the principle
of state immunity from suit is applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not case should be dismissed for being a suit against the State.
HELD: The DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" can validly invoke the
defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be
sued. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or
impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special
or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters
into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. However, when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity, no such waiver may be implied." "Statutory provisions waiving state
immunity are construed in strictissimijuris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty."
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TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., ET AL.
TOPIC: Disqualification of aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain
DOCTRINE: The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name of his
Filipino spouse, violates the Constitution and is thus, void.
FACTS:Cattleya sent its legal counsel, Atty. Cabilao, Jr., to Tagbilaran City to investigate at the
Office of the Register of Deeds in that city the status of the properties of Tecson spouses, which
Cattleya wanted to purchase. Thereafter, Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale
with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the subject property. Then, the
parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property. However, neither the
Contract of Conditional Sale nor the Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated on the
certificate of title covering the subject property because the then Register of Deeds of Bohol,
Atty. De la Serna, refused to annotate both deeds because of the writ of attachment that was
annotated on the certificate of title of the subject property. Atty. Cabilao, Jr. came to know that
the owner's copy of TCT had in fact been presented by Taina at the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Bohol, along with the Deed of Sale that was executed by the Tecson spouses, in favor
of Taina covering the subject property. It appears that Taina's then common-law husband, Mike
Stone, bought a portion of the beach lot in Panglao, Bohol. A Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the subject portion was executed in Taina's favor. Whereupon, Cattleya instituted against Taina
a civil action for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title with
damages.
ISSUE: Whether the sale of land by the Tecson spouses to Michael Stone, a foreigner or alien,
although ostensibly made in Taina's name, was valid, despite the constitutional prohibition
against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners or aliens.
HELD: NO. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Given the plain and
explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that "[a]liens, whether
individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony." In the case at bench, Taina herself
admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was its
real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed of sale at all
proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject
property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt or
circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring
or purchasing lands in the Philippines.
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ROM vs. ROXAS & CO.
TOPIC: Political Law; Due Process; Estoppel
DOCTRINE:Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
FACTS: Respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas, from the
coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order, asserting that CARL only covers
agricultural land., which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as land devoted to agricultural
activity, and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. He also
claimed that prior to the effectivity of CARL lands subject of its application were already re-
classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area pursuant to Nasugbu Municipal Zoning
Ordinance which was approved by HSRC now HLURB. He cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 which
provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential
use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion
clearance from the DAR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the grant for exemption
from coverage of CARL without any bond being posted by the landowner to secure payment of said
compensation.
HELD: A careful review of the records reveals that petitioners raised the issues of respondent’s non-posting
of bond and its non-compliance only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs assailed
Decision. While petitioners themselves alleged that DAR AO No. 4, was already in effect during the
pendency of their MR before the DAR, there is no showing that they raised these points therein. It is well-
settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. Thus, petitioners cannot
now be allowed to challenge the assailed Orders of the DAR on grounds of technicalities belatedly
raised as an afterthought.
13
LUZ S. ALMEDA vs. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
TOPIC: Right to Speedy trial
DOCTRINE: The right of speedy disposition of cases is akin to speedy trial as to its salutary
objective, that is, to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of litigation. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible, a mere
mathematical reckoning of time involved is not sufficient, but particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstance peculiar to each case.
FACTS: Luz Almeda was the Schools Division Superintendent of DEPED Surigao Del Norte, she was
charged administratively and criminally before Ombudsman on the alleged improper use and
disbursement of Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Almeda alleged that after she received
the Ombudsman adverse resolution, she filed her Motion for Reconsideration on June 16, 2003.
She also filed Motion to Hold Abeyance the filing of Information before Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte which in turn referred it to the Ombudsman on July 7, 2003.
However petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and all other pleadings were left unresolved for
9 years, from July 2003 to September 2012, violating her constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of her case, and despite repeated manifest and follow ups no action was taken on
her case. She also complained that the inaction and procedure taken by Ombudsman and
Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) in not taking cognizance of the case and instead indorsing
and repeatedly tossing the case back and forth to each other, prejudice her work, she thus
prayed for the case’s dismissal. On the other hand, respondent’s argued that each case must
be approached in an ad hoc basis, and that the length and reasons for the delay must be
carefully considered and balanced, and that the petitioner was equally responsible for the
delay since she filed her motions out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, warranting dismissal of her
case.
HELD:Yes. Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that “all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. It extends to all parties of the cases, whether accused or complainant, plaintiff or
defendant. It includes periods before, during and after trial. The right of speedy disposition of
cases is akin to speedy trial as to its salutary objective, that is, to assure that an innocent person
may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation. The concept of speedy disposition of
cases is relative or flexible, a mere mathematical reckoning of time involved is not sufficient, but
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstance peculiar to each case. Though
failure may not have been deliberately intended yet unjustified delay causes just as much
vexation and oppression. In the case at bar, preliminary investigation proceedings in said case
took more than 11 years to resolve, and the delay was caused solely by the repeated
indorsement of Ombudsman and the OSP, attributed to Ombudsman’s failure to realize that
petitioner was not under the jurisdiction of OSP or Sandiganbayan. The petitioner filed her
motions on time, what ensued in this case was an administrative ping pong, as petitioner puts it.
Ombudsman failed to apply a basic rule that is investigation and prosecution of public officers
and employees accused of graft, specific rules on jurisdiction based on rank apply. Petition
granted.
14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH v. SPOUSES SALVADOR
TOPIC: Power of Eminent Domain
DOCTRINE: In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property by considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,
location, and the tax declarations thereon. If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot
suffers from impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded by the
trial court, provided that the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation do
not exceed said damages suffered by the owner of the property.
FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Valenzuela City.
On the other hand, the Republic, represented by the DPWH, filed a verified Complaint before
the RTC for the expropriation of the subject property and the improvements thereon, for the
construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur
Highway. Thereafter, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic condemning the said
property. The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages
equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the
subject property in the Republic’s name.
ISSUE: Whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be
considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.
HELD:NO. Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. In this case, no
evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property
as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on
the transfer of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the
remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be
awarded to respondents.
15
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Topic Eminent Domain
DOCTRINE: Eminent domain refers to the inherent power of the State to take private property for
public use. This power has two basic limitations: (1) the taking must be for public use; and (2) just
compensation must be given to the owner of the property taken. Notably, in agrarian reform
cases, the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one
for public use. Anent just compensation, the same is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property expropriated.
FACTS: Petitioners spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado (petitioners) were the registered owners of
9.8940 hectares of agricultural land in Kilate, Toril, Davao City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-44107. Respondent, on the other hand, is a government financial institution
organized and existing by virtue of RA 3844, and is the financial intermediary for the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thru a Notice of Land Valuation and
Acquisition,7 the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Davao City informed petitioners
that 5.2624 hectares of their aforesaid property (subject portion) shall be placed under the CARP
coverage, for which petitioners were offered 287,227.16 as just compensation. In his letter dated
October 27, 2002, petitioner Nilo A. Mercado (Nilo) rejected respondent’s valuation. He claimed
that the fair market value of their property is ₱250,000.00 per hectare; that they sold the
remaining 4.6316-hectare portion, which is hilly and uncultivated, compared to the subject
portion which is flat, suited for agriculture and has improvements, for such price; and, that said
property is adjacent to "Eden," an eco-tourism area, and likewise suitable for housing and other
uses. After presenting evidences to the petitioners claim on the amount of just compensation.
The RTCfixed the just compensation of the subject portion at ₱25.00 per square meter, without
any reasons stated.
ISSUE: WON there was just compensation made by the RTC
HELD: No. the Court stated that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function and
the RTC, acting as SAC, has the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation. It
was also emphasized therein that in the exercise of its function, the RTC must be guided by the
valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657, translated into a basic formula embodied in DAR
A.O. No. 5. The factors under RA 6657 and the formula under DAR A.O No. 5 serve as guarantees
that the compensation arrived at would not be absurd, baseless, arbitrary or contradictory to
the objectives of the agrarian reform laws. However, the Court clarified that the RTC may relax
the application of the DAR formula, if warranted by the circumstances of the case and provided
the RTC explains its deviation from the factors or formula above-mentioned.It is clear that the
RTC did not strictly conform with the guidelines set forth under the said provision. Not all the
factors enumerated under Section 17 were considered and no reason for deviating from the
same was given. In its December 28, 2006 Decision, the RTC merely stated in general terms that it
exercised its judicial prerogative and considered all the facts of the case, including the
evidence and applicable laws, to conclude that the amount of ₱25.00 per square meter is
reasonable just compensation for the subject portion.
16
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON
TOPIC: Eminent Domain
DOCTRINE: Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function
and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute
the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount.
FACTS: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. R.
Zabala& L. Baylon, Tomas Aguirre, Generosa de Leon and Leonor Calub before the RTC of
Balanga City, Bataan alleging that defendants-appellees own parcels of land located in
Balanga City, Bataan and it urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected
areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Lines. Defendant-appellee Sps. Zabala moved to
dismiss the complaint averring that the Balanga City proper is already crowded and needs
additional space to meet the housing requirements of the growing population. The
Commissioners submitted their Report/Recommendation fixing the just compensation for the use
of defendants-appellees Sps. Zabala’s property as easement of right of way at ₱150.00 per
square meter without considering the consequential damages. Plaintiff-appellant NAPOCOR
prayed in its Comment to the commissioners’ report, that the report be recommitted to the
commissioners for the modification of the report and the substantiation of the same with reliable
and competent documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the time of its
taking. On their part, defendants-appellees Sps. Zabala prayed, in the Comments, for the fixing
of the just compensation at ₱250.00 per square meter. The Commissioners submitted their Final
Report fixing the just compensation at ₱500.00 per square meter. Then, the RTC rendered its
Partial Decision, ruling that NAPOCOR has the lawful authority to take for public purpose and
upon payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. The RTC likewise
ruled that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their property, they
are entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it fixed the just compensation at
₱150.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR appealed to the CA. It argued that the Commissioners’
reports upon which the RTC based the just compensation are not supported by documentary
evidence. NAPOCOR likewise imputed error on the part of the RTC in not applying Section 3A of
RA No. 639511 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value
of the property traversed by its transmission lines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in not applying of RA No. 6395 which limits NAPOCOR’s
liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the property.
HELD: We have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the
method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as
mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict
the constitutional power of the courts to determine just compensation. Just compensation has
been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to
qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the
amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less
by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or
executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property
owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped
by any other branch or official of the government.”
17
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS GALLE
TOPIC: Determination of Just Compensation
DOCTRINE: The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and in the computation
of just compensation, both Section 17 of RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
and the formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order of the Department of
Agrarian Reform should be considered.
FACTS: Respondent Susie Irene Galle (Galle) owned two contiguous parcels of land with a total
area of 410.2271 hectares or 4,102,271 sq.m. which is covered by two titles issued in her name.
The Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued 356.2257 hectares of the estate at
P6,083,545.26, which was rejected by Galle. After a tedious process of title cancellations and
reinstatements, from the Zamboanga Registry of Deeds, to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). DARAB, in its decision dated October 15, 1996, awarded the
landowner the amount of Php10,627,148.00 for an equivalent area of 373.2271, inclusive of the
1.4 hectares, which was identified by Land Bank as barangay road. The case was then elevated
to the CA. The CA ruled that under Secs. 17 and 18 of RA 6657, which illustrates the
determination of just compensation and valuation and mode of compensation, respectively,
The LBP proposed to compensate respondent for the value of the 356.8257 hectares at Seven
Million Five Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand Sixty Three Pesos and Ninety-One Centavos
(₱7,534,063.91), or at Two Pesos and Eleven Centavos (₱2.11) per square meter. The DAR did not
agree with LBP’s valuation; it pegged the value of the land at Ten Million Seven Hundred Sixty
Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos (₱10,767,469.00). Considering the documents
submitted by the respondent, the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) found both LBP’s and DAR’s
valuation as confiscatory and tantamount to unjust taking of respondent’s land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB decision is applicable
HELD: No. The LBP and DAR contends that the DARAB decision is applicable in the case at bar;
However, the SC decided in the contrary. The SC ruled that the DARAB decision was unfair,
unjust, and oppressive because said decision was erroneous on the part of Galle’s properties,
being grossly undervalued and undervaluation results in denial of due process of law. Indeed, In
its determination of the land value, LBP has used the valuation factors on Capitalized Net
Income (CNI) and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV/TD) multiplied by ninety percent (90%)
and ten percent (10%) respectively. In using such valuation factors, it has come up with a total
land value of seven million five hundred thirty four thousand and sixty three pesos
(₱7,534,063.91). However, it must be noted that LBP’s computations were based on field
investigations conducted in 1991, which is two and a half years prior to the taking of the
property in 1993; Hence, clearly outdated and is not in the form for the basis of an accurate and
fair computation of just compensation for Galle’s estate.
18
CITY OF ILO-ILO VS. CONTRERAS-BERSANA

TOPIC: Constitutional Law; Just Compensation
DOCTRINE: When taking of property to be expropriated occurs before expropriation
proceedings have been commenced, the fair market value of the land on the date of filing of
the complaint shall be appreciated in determining just compensation.
FACTS: Eminent domain proceedings were filed by the city government seeking to expropriate
two parcels of land for the construction of a school. The city government filed motion for the
issuance of writ of possession as it claimed to have deposited an initial payment in the bank. The
motion was granted, and the writ issued. After which, the expropriation proceedings remained
dormant for sixteen years. The owner of the land sought to withdraw the alleged payment in the
bank, only to discover that no deposit was ever made. The owner filed for recovery of
possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. The owner asserts that fair market
value of the property should be determined from the date when property was condemned by
the court since petitioner's possession of the property was questionable at the time of actual
taking. RTC nullified the decision concerning the issuance of the writ of possession and ruled that
just compensation is to be determined by the fair market value of the property at the time the
complaint was filed in court. However, RTC issued an amended order ruling that just
compensation was to be determined by the fair market value of the property “at the time this
order was issued”. A third order was issued, reasoning that the court “in the interest of justice can
amend its order because there was no deposit by plaintiff.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of deposit made by the government is material in determining the
reckoning point for the value of the property to ensure just compensation.
HELD: The lack of deposit made by the government is immaterial. The general rule is that the
reckoning point shall be the date of filing of the complaint. There is no reason to depart from the
general rule on just compensation. Though the property has been in use by the city government
for several years, the owner slept on his rights in verifying the veracity of the deposit made by the
city government. However, the actions of the city government would entitle the owner to
damages in the form of the legal interest from the value of the land at the time of filing up to the
point when full payment is made as well as exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
19
TANENGGEE V. PEOPLE
TOPIC: Custodial Investigation
DOCTRINE:The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by
the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means
any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
FACTS: Five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
filed against petitioner. Accused was the branch manager of MetrobankCommercio Branch.
One of the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution was the signed written statement
(marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and answers made during an internal audit and
administrative investigation after the discovery of irregular loans. The RTC found petitioner guilty.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA but was denied. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.While he admits signing
a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was
only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement
was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his
right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the
same should not have been admitted in evidence against him. On the other hand, respondent
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that
petitioner's written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription
invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but
is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of
the appealed CA Decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner's written statement was taken under custodial interrogation
HELD: No.The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by
the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means
any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under
custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz.: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while
it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly
discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank;
and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner
during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation
and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written
statement.
20
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA

TOPIC: Presumption of Regularity on Arrest
DOCTRINE: A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending
drug pushers. In this regard, police authorities are given a wide latitude in employing their own
ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed
method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v. Garcia, the absence of
a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is
no text book method of conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights of the
suspected drug dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld.
Thus, in People v. Salazar,we ruled that "if carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards, buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction."
FACTS: On March 26, 2004, the Station of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID),
Police Station 2 in Moriones, Tondo, Manila received information from a civilian informer that
"Kalbo" (appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal drugs in Parola Compound. An entrapment
operarion was planned.The civilian asset led PO2 Tubbali to the target area while others
positioned themselves in strategic places. Not long after, appellant came out with a companion
who was later identified as Umali. Upon approaching the two, the civilian informer introduced to
them PO2 Tubbali as a friend and a prospective buyer of shabu. PO2 Tubbali then conveyed his
desire to buy P100.00 worth of shabu and handed Umali the marked P100.00 bill. After accepting
the money, Umali ordered appellant to give PO2 Tubbali one plastic sachet of shabu to which
the latter readily complied. PO2 Tubbali then looked at the plastic sachet, placed it in his
pocket, and made the pre-arranged signal by scratching his butt. The rest of the team rushed to
the scene and arrested appellant and Umali. When frisked by PO2 Juano, one plastic sachet
suspected to contain shabu was found inside appellant’s pocket. Appellant and Umali were
afterwards brought to the precinct where the investigator marked the seized items. After
qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found the items positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug.Appellant was accordingly charged with violation of RA 9165 in two separate Informations.
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded "not guilty" in the two cases.
After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits immediately ensued. After trial, the RTC
rendered a verdict of conviction. Appellant asserts that the alleged buy-bust operation is
tainted with infirmity due to the absence of a prior surveillance or investigation. Moreover, per
the testimony of PO2 Tubbali, appellant did not say anything when the former was introduced to
him as an interested buyer of shabu.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged notwithstanding the police officers’ failure to
regularly perform their official functions.
HELD: This Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the
apprehending police officers.The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No.
9165 was not raised before the trial court but only for the first time on appeal. This cannot be
done. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Moreover, "non-compliance
with Section 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is essential is the ‘preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.’" The records reveal that at no instance did appellant hint a doubt on the
integrity of the seized items. Undoubtedly, therefore, the suspected illegal drugs confiscated
from appellant were the very same substance presented and identified in court.
21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SOBREPEÑA SR., et al.
TOPIC: Right to Bail
DOCTRINE: In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of

whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with
the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of
it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties.
FACTS: Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna, an educational
institution in Santa Cruz, Laguna. They were charged in several informations for allegedly
committing Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment before the RTC of Santa Cruz, Laguna. By
reason thereof, respondents were incarcerated. Invoking the provisions of Section 13, Article III of
the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and in their belief that the
evidence of their guilt is not strong, respondents filed a Petition for Bail.After a summary hearing
conducted and based on the summary of evidence, the RTC denied the Petition to Bail holding
that the evidence of guilt for all the accused is strong. Unsatisfied, respondents filed before the
CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders of the RTC for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Bail should be granted.
HELD: NO. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with
the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of
it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties. From a perspective of the CA Decision, the issue therein resolved is not
so much on the bail application but already on the merits of the case. The matters dealt therein
involved the evaluation of evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of the CA to resolve in a
Petition for Certiorari. The Court stressed that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It does not include correction of the trial court's evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings thereon.
22
SPOUSES HING V. CHOACHUY
TOPIC: Right to privacy
DOCTRINE:The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference
demands respect.||
FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B);
that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. located at Lots 1901
and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-
repair shop building on Lot 1900-C; that Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO; that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners
were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy
the wall of its building; that the court denied Aldo's application for preliminary injunction for
failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners' property; that respondents, through their employees
and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners' on-going
construction; and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners' right to privacy. Thus,
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. Respondents claimed that they did not install the
video surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners'
construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders. The RTC granted the TRO. The RTC denied the MR. The CA granted the Petition
for Certiorari explaining that the right to privacy of residence was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence and since respondents are mere
stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality, they could not have installed
video surveillance cameras. Thus, they are not the proper parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners' right to privacy.
HELD: No. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. It is the right of
an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference
by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. Simply put, the right to
privacy is "the right to be let alone."In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person's expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
23
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUANG TE FU
TOPIC: Naturalization
DOCTRINE:This case reiterates the rule in naturalization cases that when full and complete
compliance with the requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law, or Commonwealth Act No.
473 (CA 473), is not shown, a petition for naturalization must be perfunctorily denied.
FACTS: Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a sworn
Declaration of Intent to Become [a] Citizen of the Philippines6 with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). On April 27, 2005, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(trial court) a Petition for Naturalization,7 which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251
and assigned to Branch 96 and was thus granted. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 91213. Petitioner contended in its Appellant’s Brief13 that
respondent may not become a naturalized Filipino citizen because: 1) he does not own real
estate in the Philippines; 2) he does not have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation; 3) he is not gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his
family and was merely given allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his family; 4) in
an August 2001 Deed of Sale14 covering a parcel of land in Antipolo City he and his wife
supposedly purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino citizen, thus
exemplifying his lack of good moral character; 5) his income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003
and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly income as declared in
his petition for naturalization, leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or
concealing the truth regarding his income; and 6) on cross-examination by petitioner, he could
not cite any of the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to
believe in.
ISSUE: won the Respondent had complied the requirement of CA 473 and may be admitted as
a Citizen of the Philippines?
HELD: No. In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise,
his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that "the courts must
always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.
24
REPUBLIC V. BATUIGAS
Topic: Citizenship; Naturalization
DOCTRINE:It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an

alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family.
FACTS: Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is
engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied
upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion. Thereafter, the
hearing for the reception of Azucena's evidence was then set. Neither the OSG nor the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena's counsel
moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC
designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena's evidence. During the ex-
parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice. Azucena
presented evidence that she was born in Zamboanga to Chinese parents and has never
departed since birth; that she can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano; that her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools; that She then
practiced her teaching profession in the Philippines; that in 1968, at the age of 26, she married
Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen; that they have five children, who all
studied in Philippine; that Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra; that as proof of their income,
Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets; that the business name
and the business permits issued to the spouses' store, 'Azucena's General Merchandising,' are
registered in Santiago's name, and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice
and corn business; that during their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land;
that as proof of no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine
National Police and by the National Bureau of Investigation; that she also presented her Health
Examination Record declaring her as physically and mentally fit; and as further support to
Azucena's Petition, Santiago and witnesses EufemioMiniao and Irineo Alfaro testified. The RTC
granted the petition. The OSG appealed to the CA but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for Naturalization of Azucena should be granted
HELD: YES. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA
473, which provides that: "[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines." Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to
submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which
has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then
reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
25
REPUBLIC V. ONG
TOPIC: Burden of Proof, Naturalization, Citizenship
DOCTRINE: Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show
full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.
FACTS: The respondent, Kerry Lao Ong, was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents. He grew up
and studied in the Philippines. Later on, he married another Chinese national named Grezilda
Yap and begot four children, who were also raised in the Philippines. In 1996, he filed a petition
for naturalization. In compliance with the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in
Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law, Ong alleged being a business
man since 1978. He presented tax returns as “proof” of his income from his businesses. The trial
court granted his petition and was admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Republic, through the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the CA, which was then
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation in accordance with Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law
HELD: No. no evidence was presented to disclose the nature of the business of Ong. Based on
jurisprudence, the qualification “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation”
under Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires an employment which
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.
Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic needs, but there is
simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of income
over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his family’s expenses, his
income cannot be expected to provide him and his family "with adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work."
26
ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC
TOPIC: Applicability of R.A. 9225
DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
FACTS: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after
he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America. Subsequently, and in preparation
for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act No. 9225[5] before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and, on even date, an Order of
Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition was issued in his favor. Arnado executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanaodel Norte for the May 10,
2010 national and local elections. Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among
others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry
to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. While Balua's
petition remained pending, elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate., the
Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use of his US passport
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office
for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly
nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be followed.
ISSUE: Won Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the
time he filed his CoC
HELD: Yes. He has not satisfied. The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the
first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for
public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently
availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign
passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the
issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined the
possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with
leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with
qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the
Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to
correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is
with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the
qualifications to run for local elective office.
27
SAÑO VS. COMELEC

TOPIC: Election Law; Pre-Proclamation Controversy
DOCTRINE: Invoking grounds for pre-proclamation controversies without sufficient evidence will
not justify exclusion of election returns which appear regular and authentic on their face.
FACTS: Complainant is a candidate for municipal mayor under the majority party. He allegedly
witnessed election irregularities during the preparation of election returns in several precincts.
During canvassing, complainant orally objected to five election returns. The following day, the
candidate filed a petition for exclusion with the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) on the
grounds of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously
manufactured returns. Complainant attached the affidavits of his two (2) supporters who
attested that certain ballot boxes were open, and no other evidence was presented by
petitioner. COMELEC dismissed the case.
ISSUEs: Whether or not the pre-proclamation controversy was meritorious.
HELD: The pre-proclamation controversy had no merit. Procedurally, petitioner did orally object
to the inclusion of the election returns. However, only 1 petition for exclusion was filed for all 5
contested election returns. A lapse of over 12 hours long after the ERs have been presented for
canvass, is simply inexplicable and unacceptable. Substantially, there is absolutely no indication
that the contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. Petitioner failed to substantiate these
alleged irregularities. COMELEC en banc did not give due credence to affidavits filed due to
their infirm nature. Moreover, the complainant is a part of the dominant majority party during the
elections thus its watchers would have been given a copy of the ERs in the questioned precincts
by the BEI itself. Second, official watchers from the majority party and from petitioner had the
opportunity to take down the tally of votes and obtain a Certificate of Votes from the BEI.
Despite this, there has been no allegation that the votes recorded in favor of petitioner were not
the true votes cast in the election. Also, BEI members from the questioned precincts themselves
affirmed that they prepared the contested ERs. Lastly, petitioner did not exert effort to present
any proof on his claims. As such, there was no valid ground to delay the proclamation.
28
REPUBLIC VS NAMBOKU PEAK, INC.
TOPIC: Quasi-judicial Function of Administrative Agencies
DOCTRINE: The court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions is bereft of any right or
personality to question the decision of an appellate court reversing its decision.
FACTS: Namboku is a corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower services to

airline companies. The Philippine Aircraft Loaders and Cargo Employees Association- Solidarity of
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reform (PALCEA-SUPER) filed a Petition for direct
certification election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
Namboku assigned at the Cargo and Loading Station of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) in Ninoy
Aquino International Airport alleging that it is a local chapter affiliate of Solidarity of Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms; that its members are composed of regular rank and-
file employees of Namboku and that Namboku is an unorganized establishment. Namboku
opposed the Petition on the ground of inappropriateness. It claimed that the members of the
PALCEA-SUPER are project employees. They cannot represent its regular rank-and-file employees
because in doing so, the combination of project and regular employees would render a
bargaining unit inappropriate for lack of substantial-mutual interest. The Med-Arbiter issued an
Order holding that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are regular employees of Nambokubecause
while Namboku informed them that their employment is for a fixed period of time, it did not,
however, apprise them that the same is for a specific activity, the completion or termination was
not made known to them at the time of their engagement, and the tasks for which Namboku
engaged their services do not appear to be separate and independent activities with pre-
determined duration or completion; Hence, ordering the conduct of certification election.
Namboku appealed the Med-Arbiter’s Order to the Secretary of the Labor. In a letter-resolution,
the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. Namboku filed
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The CA issued its Decisiongranting Namboku’s Petition
and reversing the letter-resolution of the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor filed another
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the secretary of labor can file a petition for review
HELD: No.The Secretary of Labor is a nominal party because of her decision but she is not the
real party-ininterest vested with personality to file the present petitions. The real party in interest
would have been the unions to appear and defend the ruling of the Secretary of Labor. Only
real parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA canavail of an
appeal by certiorari. It shall be the duty of the party litigant, whether in an appeal under Rule 45
or in a special civil action in Rule65, to defend in his behalf and the party whose adjudication is
assailed, as he is the one interested in sustaining the correctness of the disposition or the validity
of the proceedings. The Secretary of Laborshould have remained impartial and detached from
the cases. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal
hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent.
29
BALASBAS VS MONAYAO
TOPIC: Administrative Offenses
DOCTRINE: An administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official

functions as long as it constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
FACTS: Atty. Michaelina Ramos Balasbas accused Patricia B. Monayao of misrepresentation,

fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement an Order issued by the DENR in a land dispute filed
by petitioner’s brother against respondent’s father. In the said case, respondent appeared in
lieu of her father, who she claimed passed away. The DSWD informed petitioner that
respondent was no longer an employee thereof, but was devolved in 1992 to the local
government of the municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao Province. Petitioner thus filed with the
Mayor of Alfonso Lista a sworn letter-complaint against respondent. In a reply to petitioner,
however, Alfonso Lista Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano refused to take action on the complaint,
citing an opinion of the CSC-CAR, which stated that petitioner’s complaint against respondent
may not be acted upon as the acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s duties and
responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer. Petitioner then sent a letter to the CSC,
appealing the opinion of CSC-CAR. CSC denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the opinion of
CSC-CAR. CSC had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint as it stemmed from a private
transaction between the protagonists; petitioner’s remedy was instead to seek execution of the
DENR’s Decision. Petitioner sought a reconsideration in the CSC, arguing that: under Section 4 of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the jurisdiction of the CSC
over public officers or employees is not limited to their acts or omissions that are work-related;
disciplinary action may be taken for their acts of dishonesty, immorality, oppression, notorious
undesirability, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, habitual drunkenness, or
gambling. Even the lending of money at usurious rates, conducting illicit relations, and willful
failure to pay just debts are grounds for disciplinary action. Petitioner concluded that
respondent’s misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement the DENR’s Order
constitute acts unbecoming a public official and fall within the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC
dismissed the appeal, and the CA dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monayao may be disciplined for her alleged acts
HELD: No. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty" by the public officer, for it "inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service." Misconduct is a
transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of
duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More
particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The acts complained of constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not
be related to respondent’s official functions. However, petitioner’s allegations are nothing more
than bare imputations against the respondent. She did not present any evidence to support her
claims.
30
ARAULLO VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
TOPIC: Liability of Public Officers
DOCTRINE: A public officer who acts pursuant to the dictates of law and within the limits of
allowable discretion can hardly be considered guilty of misconduct.
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo R. Araullo was involved in a labor case for illegal dismissal against Club
Filipino in which the Court ruled in his favor. Thus, the labor case was remanded to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for petitioner’s actual entitlements. The Labor Arbiter
handling the case, Arbiter Panganiban, directed the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit
to compute the liabilities of Club Filipino. Subsequently, Panganibanissued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from handling the labor case “to obviate any suspicion of partiality.”
Meanwhile, the case was raffled to respondent Labor Arbiter Anni. LA Anniissued a Writ of
Execution ordering the collection of the award, but Club Filipino moved to quash the said Writ.
Even before Club Filipino’s motion to quash could be heard, Anni quashed said Writ, then he
issued another order voluntarily inhibiting himself from the case on the ground that his “sense of
impartiality may be questioned by any of the parties because of his rapport with the President of
Club Filipino and respondent’s counsel, who are both his fraternity brothers. Petitioner filed a
Complaint before the Ombudsman, contending that Arbiter Anni entertained Club Filipino’s
motion to quash despite the fact that only he, and not his counsel, was furnished with a copy
thereof; that he hastily resolved to quash the Writ of Execution and lift the notices of garnishment
even before the scheduled date of hearing of Club Filipino’s motion to quash; and that after
quashing the Writ of Execution, he voluntarily inhibited himself from further proceeding with the
labor case to "wash his hands" of the improper quashal of the Writ of Execution. Petitioner
accused Arbiter Anni of conspiring with his fraternity brothers in Club Filipino to delay the
execution of the decision in the labor case. On the other hand, petitioner accused the
respondent Commissioners of gross misconduct for improperly affirming and "legitimizing" Arbiter
Anni’s order quashing the Writ of Execution. Whereas the respondents contended that they
acted lawfully and regularly in the performance of their functions and that if they allowed the
execution to proceed, Club Filipino’s right to due process would have been violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondents Arbiter Anni and
Commissioners liable for grave misconduct
HELD: No. The SC ruled that given petitioner’s threats of exacting criminal and administrative
liability if he did not have his way, respondents chose to act with extreme caution and took an
academic and literal approach in construing and applying the NLRC Rules. Nor may it be said
that in quashing the Writ of Execution or in inhibiting himself from the labor case, Arbiter Anni
unduly favored Club Filipino. On the contrary, Arbiter Anni risked being dragged to court on a
gross ignorance charge by issuing the Writ of Execution in disregard of the NLRC Rules; if he did
not quash the writ, he would likewise have been perceived as favoring petitioner. Moreover, it
could also be said that if Arbiter Anni favored his fraternity brothers in Club Filipino, he would not
have issued the Writ of Execution in the first place; and he would have stayed on with the case,
instead of inhibiting himself therefrom. On the part of the respondent Commissioners, the Court
detects no irregularity in their actions either. While petitioner accuses them of gross misconduct
for improperly affirming, Arbiter Anni’s order quashing the Writ of Execution, the Court believes
otherwise; they acted pursuant to the NLRC Rules, and averted further mistake and damage by
affirming the quashing of an otherwise improvident writ.
31
SPOUSES HIPOLITO, JR. VS. CINCO
TOPIC: Finding of facts by Administrative Agencies
DOCTRINE: Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if
not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito alleged that EdeltrudisHipolito y
Mariano entered into an agreement with Francisco Villena) to rent a portion of the property
located San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the
existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement,
Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners
inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis. After 13 years, the execution of
the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing in the property, were
informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco acquired the subject property through a deed
of sale sometime in 1976. In 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, TeresitaCinco and Dr. Carlota
BaldeCinco filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of the subject structure.
OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their demolition. DPWH
dismissed the appeal of the petitioners for lack of merit and affirmed the Resolution of the OBO
and the issuance of the Demolition Order. OP likewise denied with finality petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without
addressing the issue of ownership.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the resolution of the administrative
authorities sustaining the recommendation of the Office of the Building Official of Manila
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The petition lacks merit. By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. Such findings
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of the appellate court to
once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence.
32
DAZON VS. YAP

TOPIC: Administrative Law; HLURB Jurisdiction
DOCTRINE: HLURB does not exercise criminal jurisdiction over violations of PD 957
FACTS: Complainant and developer entered into contract for the purchase of a condominium
unit which the latter failed to build. Complainant demanded a refund pursuant to PD 957 or “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree” which developer did not comply with.
A criminal complaint was filed before the city prosecutor which led to a filing of an information
with RTC. Meanwhile, respondent-developer filed a petition for review before DOJ which
rendered a resolution ordering the withdrawal of the information on the ground of jurisdiction. A
motion to withdraw was filed by the prosecutors, hence granted by RTC. On appeal, petitioner
argues that there is no law expressly vesting on the HLURB exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
actions arising from violations of PD 957. Respondent contends that the real issue is not of
jurisdiction but the existence of probable cause.
ISSUEs: Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from
violation of PD 957
HELD: RTC has jurisdiction. NHA (precursor to HLURB), as an administrative agency, was vested
with jurisdiction to regulate the real estate business. Administrative agencies, being tribunals of
limited jurisdiction can only wield such powers as are specifically granted to them by their
enabling statutes. The penal provisions of PD 957 did not vest jurisdiction over NHA. Not having
been specifically conferred with power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in nature,
as well as to impose penalties therefor, its successor HLURB has likewise no jurisdiction over
criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957. Hence, it is the RTC which will exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.
33
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ET.AL. vs. SONIA R. LORENZO, ET.AL.
TOPIC: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
DOCTRINE: Judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. This
principle goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which precludes courts
from resolving, in the first instance, controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. Hence, a premature invocation of the court's judicial power is often struck down,
unless it can be shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued a Resolution announcing the
reorganization of all offices of the municipal government which was approved by the
SangguniangPanlalawigan. Likewise, a Resolution approving and adopting the proposed new
staffing pattern of the municipal government was approved. Acting on these Resolutions, the
Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and respondent Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a
memorandum informing all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the
reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their
respective applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern on
or before the set deadline. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly
created positions.
Instead of submitting their applications, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with application for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order
to prohibit the implementation and nullify the said Resolutions. While the case was pending,
respondent Mayor issued a letter terminating he services of those who did not re-apply as well as
those who were not selected for the new positions. Later, the CA dismissed the case on the
ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents and that the
acts complained of are discretionary, not ministerial, to which mandamus does not lie.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administative remedies
HELD: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter
and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. The instant case clearly does
not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners' filing of a petition for mandamus and prohibition
with the CA was premature because these remedies may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus,
instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought the
matter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which has primary jurisdiction and the sole arbiter
of controversies relating to the civil service. Considering that petitioners belong to the civil
service as former local government employees of the municipal government of San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office.
34
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner, vs. JEROME JAPSON
TOPIC: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
DOCTRINE:The Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is

allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
FACTS: Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from
the Baguio Colleges Foundation , but graduated with a deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science
for he was allowed pursuant to school policy that allows student to graduate provided each
student will not have more than a deficiency of 12 units. In 1985, petitioner found employment
with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra, the personnel head of the SSS in
Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that the Civil Service Commission was conducting a Career
Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October of the same year. Petitioner filed an
application to take the examination, believing that the CSC still allowed CSPE applicants to
substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency which they may
have. However, the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since January
1993 pursuant to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and
Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992. Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests and obtained a
rating of 80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge
Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued, Abra., respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member
Services Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his
CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he
graduated in 1995 only and was not a graduate of a 4yr college course.After preliminary
investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.
Petitioner filed with the CA and held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it,
petitioner should have interposed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
ISSUE: won the Petitioner should have exhausted his administrative remedies?
HELD: Yes. As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service
Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service
Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of
heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities
imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt
thereof." "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office. It is only the
decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review, under
Section 50 of MC 19.
35
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
TOPIC: Administrative Law
DOCTRINE: Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered
employees of the National Government, and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service
laws and regulations. Petitioner cannot evade liability under the pretense that another agency
has primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.
FACTS: Petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca, appointed into the PNP service with the rank of Police
Officer 1 (PO1), was conferred a permanent status by the Regional Director of Police Regional
Office XIII after passing the PNP Entrance Examination and the Career Service Professional
Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT). Later, the CSC Caraga Regional Officece XIII
(CSC Caraga) informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the
CSP-CAT which he took to which a preliminary investigation was conducted. To prevent the CSC
Caraga from further proceeding with the administrative investigation, PO1 Capablanca filed a
Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction. CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case arguing inter
alia that there was failure of exhaustion of administrative remedies and invoking its original
disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies. The trial court
denied the motion. The appellate court, however, ruled in favor of CSC Caraga. In the instant
petition, petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred in declaring that respondent
CSC has jurisdiction and disciplinary authority over herein petitioner, a member of the Philippine
National Police and it is the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) which has the jurisdiction
to conduct initiatory investigation of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not whether the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for
alleged CSP examination irregularity.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is
mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. It is clear that it
acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the
alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner as conferred to it by
law. The appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative
cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office,
and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service
examinations.
36
LEAH M. NAZARENO, ET. AL. vs. CITY OF DUMAGUETE
TOPIC: Administrative Law
DOCTRINEs: The Civil Service Commission (CSC) has statutory authority to establish rules and
regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service including the power to
ISSUE rules and regulations and to review appointments. There is no reason not to apply the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments to those mass appointments made by
chief executives of local government units since they are precisely designed to ensure that
appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the basis of qualifications,
instead of political loyalties or patronage.
FACTS: The Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 992411 which granted the City
Government of Dumaguete the authority to take final action on all its appointments, subject to
the condition that they are made in accordance with Civil Service Law, rules and regulations
and within the limits and restrictions of the implementing guidelines of the CSC Accreditation
Program. Outgoing Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, having lost to respondent
Mayor Agustin R. Perdices, appointed and regularized various city employees including herein
petitioners. Mayor Perdices, however, publicly announced that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor. This prompted petitioners to file a petition for mandamus
with injunction and damages to enjoin respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders
nullifying their appointments. When the CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City revoked and
invalidated the appointments of the petitioners as the same were done in violation of the CSC
Resolution No. 010988, petitioners sought reconsideration but was denied consecutively by the
CSC Region Offices, the CSC En Banc and the Court of Appeals. In the instant
petition,petitioners maintained that CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the
Commission is without authority to ISSUE regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local
government level and that Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take "final action"
on all appointments in accordance with Resolution No. 992411.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the authority to issue CSC Resolution No.
010988 which consequently makes the invalidation of petitioners' appointments warranted.
HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. The Commission has statutory authority to establish rules
and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service including the
power to review appointments. There was a substantial reason for the implementation of CSC
Resolution No. 010988. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are
prohibited, except under the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid
animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a
free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not
used as a tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local
officials.
37
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MANALO
TOPIC: Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct of Public Employee
DOCTRINE: Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence ‘refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a
flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving
public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
FACTS: Rogelio F. Manalo, Computer Operator IV, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
was assigned as membership processor at the Membership Department I (Manila) where his
main duty was to process membership applications. Particularly, he was tasked to check the
completeness of the documents submitted to support membership application and verify the
authenticity of the signatures of the authorized officials before creating an applicant's
membership record and policy. Later, the Internal Audit Service Group (IASG) of the GSIS
conducted an audit examination and found that Manalo’s operator code and terminal ID was
used in creating the membership records and policies of fictitious and terminated employees of
the City Government of Manila (CGM). These fictitious and terminated employees were granted
loans because of their membership records and policies. Thereafter, the IASG concluded that
the processor and the official tasked to review his output failed to detect the apparent defects
in the supporting documents used to create membership records and policy contracts. Hence,
membership records were created in the database and policy contracts were issued in favor of
the fictitious and separated CGM employees. Finding no merit in his explanation, Manalo was
formally charged with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Gross Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
HELD: YES. The evidence on record, which respondent does not dispute, shows that apart from
failing to discover at once that the loan applicants were fictitious individuals and/or separated
employees of the Manila city government, respondent relied on source documents that were
signed, certified and/or issued by a) unidentified individuals, b) individuals who were not even
authorized signatories or representatives of the Manila city government in the first place, and c)
individuals purporting to sign in behalf of authorized signatories but whose names and positions
were not indicated; application forms were not backed by the corresponding plantilla; and
signatures of officers appearing on source documents were materially different from those in the
specimen signature cards submitted by the city government. All these indicate that respondent
failed to perform his duty, not only once or twice, but repeatedly, and that he was grossly
negligent for ignoring the patent irregularities in the source documents submitted to him.
38
RONNIE H. LUMAYNA, ET. AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
TOPIC: Laws on Public Officers
DOCTRINE: Public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties. Absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable
and the latter is not personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official
duties absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith.
FACTS: The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) adopted Local Budget Circular No.
74 (LBC No. 74) authorizing the grant of a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the
Local Government Units (LGUs) and Local Budget Circular No. 75 12 (LBC No. 75) providing
guidelines on personal services limitation, pursuant to Section 325 (a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC). For the purpose of adopting a first-class salary scheme for the municipality
and implementing the 5% salary increase for its personnel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Mayoyao,
Ifugaoissued Resolution No. 94, s. 2002 re-aligning the amount of P1,936,524.96 from the 2002
Annual Municipal Budget. Reviewing the 2003 Annual Municipal Budget by the Sangguniang
Bayan, the SangguniangPanlalawigan initially disallowed the proposal but eventually adopted
the same upon finding of good faith.Meanwhile, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office
(RLAO) of the COA-Cordillera Administrative Region (COA-CAR) issued a Notice of Disallowance
of the amount of P895,891.50 because the grant of the increase was not in accordance with
Sections 325 and 326 of the LGC and that the limitation on personal services had been
exceeded. When their Notice of Appeal before the Director of LAO-Local of COA was denied,
they filed a Petition for Review before the COA which was also denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the amount of
P895,891.50, representing the 5% salary increase of the personnel of the municipality of Mayoyao
and in ordering petitioners to refund the same.
HELD: The Court partly grants the petition. The COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the
amount of P895,891.50. Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field
of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing
that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive and should not be disturbed. However, the petitioners should not be ordered to
refund the disallowed amount because they acted in good faith. Although the 5% salary
increase exceeded the limitation for appropriations for personal services, this alone is insufficient
to overthrow the presumption of good faith in favor of petitioners as municipal officials. Mistakes
committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
39
FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS vs. DR. AMELIA C. ALMIRANTE

TOPIC: Political Law; Decision of the Ombudsman
DOCTRINE: Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, or in case of conviction, where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman's decision shall be final, executory, and
unappealable. The CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the order or
decision of the Ombudsman
FACTS: In 2003, petitioner Orais, Veterinary Quarantine Inspector-Seaport of the Veterinary
Quarantine Service-Seaport, Region VII Office of the DA, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Complaint for corruption and grave misconduct against his superior, respondent
Almirante, Veterinary Quarantine Officer-Seaport. Petitioner accused respondent of (1)
Ordering, directing, persuading and inducing Veterinary Quarantine Inspector Luz Tabasa to
receive money in check or in cash, from importers of meat products and other imported items
for the preparation and issuance of Clearance Certificates without issuing any official receipt
therefor; (2) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving money in check or in cash from
importers of meat products and other goods allegedly as inspection fee without issuing official
receipts therefor; (3) Knowingly approving granting permit authority or privilege to private or
contractual workers of the office to perform some veterinary quarantine; In support of his
Complaint, petitioner attached the affidavits of Tabasa, Agriculturist II – Veterinary Quarantine
Inspector; Agriam, Bohol Veterinary Quarantine Officer; Barbon, Janitor-Utility employed by
Perfect Clean General Services, janitorial and maintenance contractor; Mainit, DA utility driver,
and Tidoso, representative of Gusay Customs Brokerage. Respondent claimed that there was no
truth to the accusations against her; that all payments were received by the DA Regulatory
Division through its duly authorized Collection Officers who issue the proper official receipts
therefor, pursuant to Orders of Payment issued by respondent; that all Clearance Certificates
were issued by the Veterinary Quarantine Office, and not by respondent. On July 31, 2003, the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision in favor of respondent. The Ombudsman held
that respondent’s acts were in accordance with law and the regulations of her office. On
appeal, the appellate court added that absent compelling reasons, it may not disturb the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman in keeping with the principle of non-interference with
the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the office. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely erred when it simply concurred
with the office of the ombudsman in dismissing (the) complaint.
HELD: The Court agrees with the CA that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman’s decision
shall be final, executory, and unappealable. Indeed, in one case, "it follows that the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse" the order or decision of the
Ombudsman. The above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if
they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law,
or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such
nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
findings." However, there is no reason to apply the above stated exception.
40
FAJARDO V. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
TOPIC: Powers of the Ombudsman
DOCTRINE: The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not
merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Fajardo, an employee of Bureau of Customs (BOC) designated as a

Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customs House,
Collection Division, was charged with plunder for failing to remit a sum of money amounting to
P53,214,258.00 collected from sales of accountable forms with money value and stamp. After
failing to return the money and duly account for it, an administrative investigation commenced.
In the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was found guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct. As a consequence, his dismissal was ordered. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration but was subsequently denied. When petitioner elevated the case to the CA, the
CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power or authority to directly dismiss petitioner
from government service
HELD: The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision. In Atty. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, it has been established that “the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action [under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law." Also, it is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to
determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually
mandatory."
41
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V. HEIRS OF PUYAT
TOPIC: Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
DOCTRINE: Land acquisition processes which commenced under Presidential Decree No. 27 but
remained incomplete upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 become the subject of the
newer law.
FACTS: Several hectares of land of Gloria and MaximoPuyat were placed under Operation Land
Transfer by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In December 1989, several emancipation
patents over said lands were issued in favor of various farmer-beneficiaries. All of the said
patents were annotated on Puyats’ Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1773 on March 20,
1990, and thereby caused the concomitant partial cancellation of Puyats’ title. The Puyats
did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of
the subject property. In September 1992, LBP received an order from the DAR to pay the just
compensation to the Puyats. They used the formula for properties acquired under PD 27 in
determining the value for the just compensation. The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for
determination and payment of just compensation with the RTC of Cabanatuan City on
November 24, 1998.Using the provisions provided under RA 6657 and EO 228, the trial court
declared that the reasonable compensation for respondents was much higher than that
computed by LBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 can be valued using the factors
appearing in Section 17 of RA 6657
HELD: Yes. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court held that it becomes more
equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657 in accordance with the ruling in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad. When the acquisition process under PD 27 remains
incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, the process should be completed under RA 6657, with
PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory effect only. This means that PD 27 applies only insofar as
there are gaps in RA 6657.
42
RODRIGUEZ vs. SALVADOR
TOPIC: Political Law; Agriculture Tenancy
DOCTRINE:Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee.
FACTS: Respondent TeresitaSalvador, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners
Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively, before the MTC of
Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner a parcel of land, that
petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-
interest; and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused
to vacate the subject land. In their Answer, petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural
tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the
consent and permission of respondents predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador,
under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and
share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties,
petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Agricultural Tenancy Relationship exist in the case
HELD: Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee. In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists
between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their
neighbors. In her affidavit. Petitioner Lucia declared that she and her late husband occupied the subject
land with the consent and permission of the original owners and that their agreement was that she and
her late husband would cultivate the subject land, devote it to agricultural production, share the harvest
with the landowners on a 50-50 basis, and at the same time watch over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias
attested in his affidavit that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been cultivating the subject
land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio, petitioner Lucia and her children continued to cultivate
the subject land; and that when respondents predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he would often see
them and respondent get some of the harvest.
43
BUADA VS. CEMENT CENTER, INC.

TOPIC: Social Legislation; Land Reform
DOCTRINE: tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided
by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of
achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints
and practices.
FACTS: Complainants are tenant farmers cultivating 3 parcels of land owned by respondent-
corporation. The tenants signed a Compromise Agreement representing that the land was no
longer viable for agricultural purposes. Tenants claim that respondent promised that the land
would only be surrendered upon the approval of the application of land conversion; that
compensation would be given to them in the form of Php 3,000.00 for each tenant; that they will
be hired for the planned project for the land; and if the conversion fails, petitioners shall be
tenant-beneficiaries under CARP Law. However, the Corporation filed a complaint for
confirmation of voluntary surrender and damages against the tenants before DARAB.
Corporation claims that petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings upon voluntary
surrender of the landholdings and payment of the compensation, and that other conditions that
the tenants were claiming were not contemplated in their Agreement. The tenants contend that
they were not aware that these conditions were not incorporated in the Agreement because
they were not literate in the English language used and neither were they represented by
counsel nor were the contents explained to them.
ISSUEs: whether petitioners as tenants-farmers intended to absolutely and voluntarily surrender
their tenancy rights over the subject landholdings.
HELD: No voluntary surrender existed. As to the amount of compensation, Administrative Order
12, Series of 2004 requires beneficiaries to be compensated “should not be less than 5 times the
average of the annual gross value of the harvest of the actual landholdings during the last 5
years.” The money to be given as disturbance compensation must be advantageous to the
families of farmers as it would have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood. The
corporation.Failed to present evidence to show that the disturbance compensation package
corresponds with the compensation required by the said Administrative Order. Neither was there
any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the average annual
gross value of the harvest on petitioners' actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar
years. Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up
their sole source of livelihood. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed
advantageous to petitioners' families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. To
stress, tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by
law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a
dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
Hence, no voluntary surrender existed.
44

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POLITICAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

POLITICAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2018 – 2019

CHAIRPERSON Catriona Janelle Gayatin

San Beda College Alabang School of Law Administration

Dr. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III

Dean and Adviser

ATTY. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad

ATTY. Carlo D. Busmente

Prefect of Student Affairs

POLITICAL LAW TEAM

HADJI HASHIM ABDUL V. SANDIGANBAYAN

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.MARGARITA M. GALON vs.

ROM vs. ROXAS & CO.

LUZ S. ALMEDA vs. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND PEOPLE OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH v. SPOUSES SALVADOR

CITY OF ILO-ILO VS. CONTRERAS-BERSANA

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA

SPOUSES HING V. CHOACHUY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUANG TE FU

ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC

SAÑO VS. COMELEC

Araullovs Office of the Ombudsman

DAZON VS. YAP

MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner, vs. JEROME JAPSON

EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

LEAH M. NAZARENO, ET. AL. vs. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MANALO

RONNIE H. LUMAYNA, ET. AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS vs. DR. AMELIA C. ALMIRANTE

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V. HEIRS OF PUYAT

RODRIGUEZ vs. SALVADOR

BUADA VS. CEMENT CENTER, INC.

HadjiHashim Abdul v. Sandiganbayan

Topic: Moot and Academic; Justiciable Controversy

ISSUE: Whether or not the present petition should be dismissed

TOPIC: Political Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion

TOPIC: Political Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA.MARGARITA M. GALON vs.

TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., ET AL.

TOPIC: Disqualification of aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain

ROM vs. ROXAS & CO.

TOPIC: Political Law; Due Process; Estoppel

LUZ S. ALMEDA vs. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND PEOPLE OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DPWH v. SPOUSES SALVADOR

TOPIC: Power of Eminent Domain

Topic Eminent Domain

ISSUE: WON there was just compensation made by the RTC

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS GALLE

TOPIC: Determination of Just Compensation

ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB decision is applicable

CITY OF ILO-ILO VS. CONTRERAS-BERSANA

TOPIC: Custodial Investigation

DOCTRINE:The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

HELD: No.The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SOBREPEÑA SR., et al.

TOPIC: Right to Bail

DOCTRINE: In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Bail should be granted.

SPOUSES HING V. CHOACHUY

TOPIC: Right to privacy