Sudan A cadem y o f Sciences SAS

Boiling Liquid Expanded Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Of

Petroleum Storage And Transportation facilities

Case Study : Khartoum State

By
E nar G asim M otw ali E latabani

B .S.C (H on.) Chemical Engineering

Thesis Submitted To The Sudan Academy O f Science In Partial

Fulfillment O f Requirements For Master Degree In

Cleaner Production

Supervisor:

D. K am al E ldin E ltayb Y assin

2010
 Dedicated
To The
Spirit And My Parents
5

Acknowledgement
Deep thanks and gratitude to the supervisor on research

D. Kamal Eldin Eltayb , who contributed to the good

advice , assistance and support to complete this research.

Also my thanks and appreciation to the General

Administration of Civil Defense - Khartoum State - Records
Section, and thanks especially to Technical Sergeant \ Tarig
Mohammed Said who contributed to the provision of
information.

I thank all staff, teachers, Sudan Academy for Research.

p a g e II
 Abstract

The objective of this study Includes the identification of possible causes

of fires and explosions resulting from Liquefied petroleum gases in
Khartoum state , methods of raising the awareness and knowledge of
risks resulting from them, in addition to the proposal of safety
precautions in the event of such incidents.

The study was conducted in highly populated Khartoum state . It was in

that context, the compilation and analysis of information on fire statistics
was carried based on data collected through field studies and records of
the civil defense - Administrative of Khartoum state ,during period
between (2007-2009).

The procedure followed include statistical analysis of the collected data

using program (e-views) method of estimation of least squares (LS). The
obtained results of this method is negative sign and the percentage of
house fires represent 98% from other types of fires (petroleum service
stations - LPG tankers).

These results, revealed that most of those fires were due to leakage of
gas in residential houses attributed to lack of awareness of possible
dangers and underestimation of safety precautions compared to those
taken in to consideration in petroleum service stations and during
transportation phases.

page III

m .. - .......^
r
The main recommendation of this study is to strengthen means of
raising public awareness of dangers caused by Liquefied petroleum
gases fire through special m edia programs and training of workers in the
field of civil defense and the empowerment of safety procedures.

p a g e IV
‫اﻟ ﻬﺪ ف ﻣ ﻦ ﻫﺬه اﻟ ﺪ را ﺳ ﺔ ﺗ ﺸ ﻤ ﻞ ﺗ ﺤ ﺪﻳ ﺪ ا أل ﺳﺒﺎ ب اﻟ ﻤ ﺤﺘ ﻤﻠ ﺔ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ وا الﻧﻔ ﺠﺎ را ت اﻟﻨﺎﺟﻤﺔ‬
‫ﻋ ﻦ اﻟ ﻐﺎ زا ت اﻟﺒﺘ ﺮ وﻟﻴ ﺔ اﻟ ﻤ ﺴﺎﻟ ﺔ ﻓ ﻲ و الﻳ ﺔ اﻟ ﺨ ﺮ ﻃ ﻮم و ﻃ ﺮ ق رﻓ ﻊ اﻟ ﻮ ﻋ ﻲ واﻟ ﻤ ﻌ ﺮﻓﺔ ﻣﻦ‬
‫اﻟ ﻤ ﺨﺎ ﻃ ﺮ اﻟﻨﺎﺗ ﺠ ﺔ ﻋﻨ ﻬﺎ ‪ ٠‬ﺑﺎ ال ﺿﺎﻓ ﻪ إﻟ ﻰ اﻗﺘ ﺮا ح ا ﺣﺘﻴﺎ ﻃﺎ ت اﻟ ﻤ ال ﻣ ﺔ ﻓ ﻲ ﺣﺎ ل وﻗ ﻮ ع ﻣﺜﻞ‬
‫ﺗﻠ ﻚ اﻟ ﺤ ﻮا د ث‬

‫وﻗﺪ أ ﺟ ﺮﻳ ﺖ اﻟ ﺪ را ﺳ ﺔ ﻓ ﻲ و الﻳ ﺔ اﻟ ﺨ ﺮ ﻃ ﻮم ﺣﻴ ﺚ اﻟ ﻜﺜﺎﻓ ﺔ اﻟ ﻤ ﻜﺎﻧﻴ ﺔ اﻟ ﻌﺎﻟﻴ ﺔ وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﻓﻲ‬

‫ذﻟ ﻚ ا إل ﻃﺎ ر ﺟ ﻤ ﻊ وﺗ ﺤﻠﻴ ﻞ اﻟ ﻤ ﻌﻠ ﻮ ﻣﺎ ت ﻋ ﻦ إ ﺣ ﺼﺎﺋﻴﺎ ت اﻟ ﺤ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ ا ﺳﺘﻨﺎدا إﻟ ﻰ ﺑﻴﺎﻧﺎ ت ﺗﻢ‬
‫ادا رة و الﻳ ﺔ اﻟ ﺨ ﺮ ﻃ ﻮم‬ ‫—‬ ‫ﺟ ﻤ ﻌ ﻬﺎ ﻣ ﻦ اﻟ ﺪ را ﺳﺎ ت اﻟ ﻤﻴ ﺪاﻧﻴ ﺔ و ﺳ ﺠ ال ت اﻟﺪﻓﺎ ع اﻟ ﻤﺪﻧ ﻲ‬

‫( ‪.) 2009 - 2007‬‬ ‫و ذﻟ ﻚ ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻔﺘ ﺮة ﻣﺎﺑﻴ ﻦ‬

‫وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ إ ﺟ ﺮاﺀ اﻟﺘ ﺤﻠﻴ ﻞ ا ال ﺣ ﺼﺎﺋ ﻰ ﻟﻠﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎ ت اﻟﺘ ﻲ ﺗﻢ ﺟ ﻤ ﻌ ﻬﺎ ﺑﺎ ﺳﺘ ﺨ ﺪا م ﺑ ﺮﻧﺎﻣ ﺠﻠﻬ ﺤ ﺴﻢ‪ -‬ﺣﺎ‬

‫ﻃ ﺮﻳﻘ ﺔ ﺗﻘ ﺪﻳ ﺮ اﻟ ﻤ ﺮﺑ ﻌﺎ ت اﻟ ﺼ ﻐ ﺮ ى رﻗإل و ﻛﺎﻧ ﺖ اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋ ﺞ اﻟ ﻤﺘ ﺤ ﺼ ﻞ ﻃﻴ ﻬﺎ ﻣ ﻦ ﻫﺬه‬

‫ﻟ ﻄ ﺮ ﻳﺜ ﺔ ﺳﺎﻟﺒ ﻪ وﺗ ﻤﺜ ﻞ ﺣ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ اﻟ ﻤﻨﺎ ز ل ‪ 98‬ه ‪/‬ه ﻣ ﻦ أﻧ ﻮا ع اﻟ ﺤ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ ا أل ﺧ ﺮﻳ ﻰ رﻣ ﺤ ﻄﺎ ت‬
‫ﻧﺎﻗ ال ت اﻟ ﻐﺎ زا ت اﻟﺒﺘ ﺮ وﻟﻴ ﺔ اﻟ ﻤ ﺴﺎﻟ ﺔ‬ ‫—‬ ‫اﻟ ﺨ ﺪ ﻣ ﺔ اﻟﺒﺘ ﺮ وﻟ ﻲ‬

‫و ﻫ ﺬه اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋ ﺞ ﻛ ﺸﻔ ﺖ أ ن ﻣ ﻌ ﻈ ﻢ اﻟ ﺤ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ ﻛﺎﻧ ﺖ ﺑ ﺴﺒ ﺐ ﺗ ﺴ ﺮ ب اﻟﻐﺎ ز ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﺎ ز ل اﻟﻤﻜﻨﻴﺔ‬

‫و ﻫﺬا ﻳﻌﺰﻳ ﻰ إﻟ ﻰ ﻧﻘ ﺺ اﻟ ﻮ ﻋ ﻰ ﻣ ﻦ اﻟ ﻤ ﺨﺎ ﻃ ﺮ اﻟ ﻤ ﺤﺘ ﻤﻠ ﺔ ﻣ ﻦ اﻟﻐﺎ ز واﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴ ﻞ ﻣ ﻦ اﺣﺘﻴﺎﻃﺎت‬
‫اﻟ ﺴ ال ﻣ ﺔ ﻣﻘﺎ رﻧ ﺔ ﻣ ﻊ ﺗﻠ ﻚ اﻟ ﻤﻠ ﺨ ﻮ ذه ﻓ ﻲ ا ال ﻋﺘﺒﺎ ر ﻣ ﻦ ﻣ ﺤ ﻄﺎ ت اﻟ ﺨﺪ ﻣ ﺔ اﻟﺒﺘ ﺮ وﻟﻴ ﺔ وﺧالل‬
‫اﻟﺜﻘ ﻞ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣ ﺮا ﺣ ﻞ‬

‫اﻟﺘ ﻮ ﺻﻴﺎ ت اﻟ ﺮﺋﻴ ﺴﻴ ﺔ ﻟ ﻬ ﺬه اﻟ ﺪ را ﺳ ﺔ ﻫ ﻲ ﺗ ﻌ ﺰﻳ ﺰ رﻓ ﻊ اﻟﻮ ﻋﻲ اﻟ ﻌﺎم ﻣ ﻦ اﻟ ﻤ ﺨﺎ ﻃ ﺮ اﻟﻨﺎﺟﻤﺔ‬

‫ﻋ ﻦ ﺣ ﺮاﺋ ﻖ اﻟ ﻐﺎ زا ت اﻟﺒﺘ ﺮ وﻟﻴ ﺔ اﻟﻤ ﺴﺎﻟﺔ ﻣ ﻦ ﺧ ال ل ﺑ ﺮا ﺀ ج إ ﻋ ال ﻣﻴ ﻪ ﺧﺎ ﺻ ﺔ واﻟﺘﺪرﻳ ﺐ‬
‫اﻟ ﻤ ﻬﻨ ﻲ ﻟ ﻠ ﻌ ﺎ ﻣ ﻠ ﻴ ﻦ ﻓ ﻲ ﻣ ﺠﺎ ل اﻟﺪﻓﺎ ع اﻟ ﻤﺪﻧ ﻲ وﺗ ﻤ ﻜﻴ ﻦ إ ﺟ ﺮا ﺀا ت اﻟ ﻤ ال ﻣ ﺔ‪٠‬‬

‫ة‬
i

contents
Dedications......................................................................................... ........................... I

icfenowledgements......................................................................................................... 11

English Abstract.........................................................................................................Ill

Arabic abstract............................................................................................................... V

Table of Contents.................... ..................................................................................VI

List of Figures........................... ..................................................................................... X

List of Tables................................................................................................................ XII

Abbreviations..................... .................................................................................. ..XIII

C H A P T E R O N E IN T R O D U C T IO N

1:2 General....................................................................................................................... 1
1:2 Objectives................................................................................................................. 2

C H A P T E R T W O L IT E R A T U R E R E V IE W

2.1 Risk Management Concepts.................................................................................. 4

2.1.1 Hazard.........................................................................................4
2.1.2 Risk.............................................................................................. 4
2.1.3 Explosion.........................................................................................4

2.1.3.1 Fire Explosion........................................................................................ 4

2.1.3.2 Vapor Cloud Explosion(VCE)............................................................. 5

2.1.3.3 Chemical Explosion...............................................................................6

page VI

F - --------------
 2.1.3.4 Mechanical Explosions.................................................................. 7

2.2 BLEVE................................................................................................................7

2.2.1 Conditions Required for a BLEVE................................................. 8

2.2.2 BLEVE Warning Signs...........................................................................10

2.2.3 Mechanism of BLEVE.........................................................................10

2.2.4 Effects of Explosions................................................................................11

2.3 Transportation and Storage of (LPG)................................................... 17

2.3.1 Properties of (LPG).................................................................................17

2.3.2 Bulk Storage..................................... ....................................................... 17

2.3.3 Storage and Transportationof Containers........................................... 19

2.3.3.1 Transportation of cylinders.................................................................20

2.3.3.2 Parking Vehicles Used to Carry LP-Gas Cargo..............................23

2.3.3.3 Marine transportation..........................................................................23

2.3.3.5 Pipelines.................................................................................................. 24

2.4 Fire Fighting...........................................................................................................26

2.4.1 Fire.............................................................................................................. 26

2.4.2 Fires are Classified...................................................................................26

2.4.3 Water.......................................................................................................... 26

2.4.4 Foam...........................................................................................................28

p a g e VII
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i'

2.4.4.1 Types of foam..,,...................................................................................28

2.4.4.2 Foam Fire Extinguishers.................................................................... 29

2.4.5 Dry Chemical Powder............................................................................. 29

2.4.5.1 Types of dry powder............................................................................30

2.4.6 Carbon Dioxide Type............................................................................ 31

2.5 Precautions to be Taken at LPG Fires and Emergencies..............................34

2.5.1 Operations at a Leak With a Fire................................................ .....35

2.5.2 LP Gas Leak Without Fire....................................................................40

Chapter Three Materials & Methods

3.1 The Study Area.................................................................................................. 42

3.1.1 The Location....................................................................................... 42

3.2 Methodology ....................................................................................... 42

3.3 Working m ethods......................................................................................43

CHAPTER FOUR RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 Results and Discussions....................................................................................... 44

4.2 Results..................................................................................................................... 44

p a g e VIII
4.3 Discussions........................................................................... ................................ 61

4.3.1 Home fires..............................................................................................61

4.3.2 Fires service stations petroleum and tankers (LPG)...................62

CHAPTER FIVE Conclusion& Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 63

5.2 Recommendations............................................................................................... 64

Appendix........................... ................................................................................. .......65

References................................................................................................................... 66

p a g e IX
 List of Figures
Figure (2 -1 ) Fire E xplosion........................................................................................... 5

Figure (2-2) Vapor Cloud Explosion.................................................................... 6

Figure (2-3) Mechanism of B L E V E ....................................................................11

i
Figure ( 2-4) Shrapnel E ffect................................................................................. 14

T'lgure ( 2-5) Explosion tank........................................................................................16

Figure (2-6) rupture of cylinder............................................................................ 17

Figure (2 -7 )) rupture of ta n k .................................................................................17

Figure (2-8) Bulk storage tank F igure............................................................ 20

Figure (2-9) Foam fire extinguisher..................................................................... 30

Figure (2-10) Dry chemical fire extinguisher.......................................................32

Figure (2-10) Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishers............................................. 33

Figure ( 4-1) Fires House In 2007........................................................................... 47

Figure ( 4-2) Fires House In 2008........................................................................ 48

Figure ( 4-3) Fires House In 2009........................................................................... 49

Figure (4-4) The relationship between time and the fire house....................... 53
pageX
Figure (4-5) Relationship between time and fires petroleum service

stations & tankers (LPG)........................................................................................ 54

Figure (4-6) fires petroleum service stations and tankers (LPG) - 2007.55

Figure (4-7) fires petroleum service stations and tankers (LPG) - (2008)...56

Figure (4-8) fires petroleum service stations and tankers (LPG) - (2009).57

Figure (4-9) Compared the proportion of fires to three years...........................58

Figure ( 4-10) Compared between petroleum service station fires and tanker LPG..... 60
*

p a g e XI
 List of Tables
Table (2-1) Maximum Filling Limit by Weight of LP-Gas containers.............20

Table (2-2) Orientation of Cylinders on Vehicles.................................................22

Table (4-1) Statistics house fires in the period 2007 -2009................................. 46

Table (4-2) Statistics Petroleum service station fire & Tanker IPG in the

period 2007 -2009...................................................................................47

Table (4-3) Table(4-3) proportion of fires............................................................. 59

Table (4-4) Estimates of fire from (2010 to 2012)................................................ 60

p a g e XII
 Abbreviations
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

PLG Pressure liquefied gases

VCE vapor cloud explosion

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

ESV Emergency Shutoff Valve

SLT Superheat Lim it Temperature

DOT U. S. Department of Transportation

HAZCOM Hazard Communication

page X III

■
Chapter one
Introduction
 INTERUDUCTION CHAPTER!

1:1 General
Demand for L iq u efied P etro leu m G as (L PG ) is rising, p articu larly in th e residential

and commercial sectors o f d eveloping and m ore developed countries. T he use o f

cleaner liquid and g aseous fuels is expected to continue to increase as po p u latio n s

grow and total dem and for energy in these regions rises roportionally.

The ( LPG ) w h ich are stored as a liquid u n d er p ressu re b u t v ap o rize into a gas

when the pressure is released, "LPG " th ey are g enerally com p o sed o f propane,

butane or some co m b in atio n thereof.

The expanded use o f (LPG ), increases the po ten tial for fires an d/o r leaks in

( LPG )containers. T hese containers include storage tan k s in com m ercial

installations, tan k trucks, railro ad tan k cars and portab le storage tanks.

The (LPG) are u sed in dom estic or industrial heating, h o t w ater and coo k in g

systems, as refrigerants, at co nstruction sites in salam anders, in to rch es, tar pots,

etc. They are also u sed on a lim ited scale as a m otor fuel. 8

LPG is particularly exp o sed to the risk o f serious accidents su ch as B L E V E

(Boiling Liquid E x p an d in g V ap o r E x plosion) is reg ard ed as a m ajor risk in the

storage and tran sp o rtatio n o f h azardous m aterials. N early all th e cases rep o rted in

the literature refer to open environm ents w hile B L E V E s in con fin ed or congested

areas are very uncom m on.

ABLEVE has been issu ed decades ago, after som e catastro p h ic dam ages could be

caused by the pressu re w av es generated due to the b o ilin g and v ap o riz atio n o f a

PLG along d epressurization. T he fragm ents o f the storage vessel at h ig h speed m ay

be projected from ex p lo sio n cen ter at h ig h speed and also cause serious dam age

accidents w ith fatalities, p roperty, facilities and operators in in d u strial activities.

This is a type o f exp lo sio th a t can occur w h en a vessel co n tain in g a pressu rized

liquid is ruptured. Such ex p lo sions can be extrem ely hazardous.

A BLEVE resu lts from th e rupture o f a v essel (Fug - 6,7) co n tain in g a liquid

substantially above its atm o sp heric b o ilin g point. T he substance is sto red p artly in

liquid form, w ith a g aseo u s v ap o r above th e liquid fillin g th e rem ain d er o f the

container.

A BLEVE can occu r ev en w ith a non-flam m able substance, som etim es one that's

known for b ein g extrem ely cold, like liquid n itro g en or liq u id h eliu m or other

refrigerants or cryogens, and therefore is n o t u su ally co n sid ered a type o f chem ical

explosion. H ow ever, i f th e su bstance in volved "is" flam m able, it is likely th at the

resulting cloud o f th e su b stan ce w ill ignite after th e B L E V E has occurred, form ing

a fireball and p o ssib ly a fu el-air explosion, also term ed a v a p o r clo u d ex p lo sio n

(VCE). I f the m aterials are to xic, a large area w ill be contam inated.

In term o f the h isto rical p ersp ectiv e for B L E V E , w e fin d th a t In th e late 1 9 60 ’s and

the early 1970’s th ere w ere a num ber o f fires and B L E V E o f p ro p an e and other

liquefied petroleum gases resu ltin g from derailm ents o f railcars carrying pro p an e

and other flam m able liq u efied gases. T hese incidents in v o lv ed fire fig h ter fatalities

and highlighted th e n eed for safety im provem ents. A s a resu lt, th e U. S.

Department o f T ran sp o rtatio n (D O T ) im plem ented n ew reg u latio n s for th e tan k

cars used to tra n sp o rt p ro p an e and other liquefied flam m able gases, and m ade them

mandatory and retro activ e in 1980.

In 1973, product control req u irem ents to p rev en t th e u n co n tro lled release o f (LPG )

from storage co n tain ers co n sisted prim arily o f m an u ally op erated v alves, b ack ­

flow check valves and ex cess-flo w check valves.

On July 3, 1973 a p ro p an e in cid en t o ccurred in K ingm an, A riz o n a in v o lv in g a

propane fire at a p ro p an e ta n k car u n lo ad in g area in a p ro p an e b u lk storage plant.

The incident resu lted in th e d eath o f several firefighters and one p la n t em ployee.
A direct resu lt o f th is in cid en t (and others th at o ccurred at approxim ately the sam e

time) w as th e ad d itio n o f a n ew fire p ro tectio n req u irem en t in the 1976 ed itio n o f

National Fire P ro tec tio n A sso ciatio n ( N F P A ) 58.

In early editions o f N F P A 58, the prim ary con sid eratio n o f w ater as th e m eans to

control a fire w as b ased on the fact th at at th at tim e, th ere w ere few reliab le w ays

to stop the flow o f L P -g as after failures in the system and th e n eed to apply w ater

quickly to storage co n tain ers b ein g im pinged by flam es w as im portant.

Another sign ifican t change in th e 1976 edition o f N F P A 58 w as the req u irem en t

for including an E m erg en cy S h u to ff V alve (E SV ) in th e tra n sfer lines u sed

between stationary storage containers o f over 4,000 gallons capacity and cargo

tank vehicles. T his rev isio n w as intended to p rev en t p ro d u ct release from storage

containers in th e ev en t o f a v eh icle p u llin g aw ay w ith its h o ses still connected. A ll

existing plants w ere req u ired to com ply w ith th is req u irem en t b y the end o f 1980.

The 1980’s enjoyed a red u ced n u m b er o f propane incidents in th e U. S., and the

next major p ro d u ct control enhancem ent w as the rev isio n to intro d u ce an optional

requirement for in ternal ta n k v alv es in containers over 2,000 gallons in th e 1992

edition o f N F P A 58.

1:2 Objective:-

The general objectiv e o f this research is to raise the aw areness and hazard

communication ( H A Z C O M ) due to B L E V E and other sim ilar risk.

The specific objectiv e o f this research is to study and p ro p o se safety p recau tio n s in

case of B L EV E and sim ilar accidents.

3
 Chapter two

Literature Review
 LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER2

2.1 Risk Management Concepts:-

Risk M anagem ent is th e Identification, A nalysis and E conom ic C ontrol o f those

RISKS w hich can T h reaten th e A ssets (P roperty, H um an, R e p u ta tio n ).

2.1.1 Hazard

A hazard is a rare o r extrem e ev en t in the natural or h um an-m ade environm ent

adversely affects h u m an life, property or activity to the extent o f causing a disaster

. 2.1.2 Risk

Probability o f h azard and consequence th at could resu lt in an a c c id e n t. or it is

expected losses (lose o f life, injuries, dam age to property, and d isruption o f

economic and social activities or livelihood) due to a p articu lar hazard .

2.1.3 Explosion

2.1.3.1 Fire Explosion

Fire and explosions to cause a h ig h toll from deaths and injuries, and the

investigator m ust be p rep ared to m ake special efforts w h en th ey occur. Since fire

and explosion injuries can lead to death hours, days, or even w eeks after the event,

every fire and explosion th at involves serious injuries should be in v estig ated in the

same way as a fire and explosion th at has im m ediate fatalities.

Explosion a release o f energy, w h ich causes a pressure discontinuity or b last w ave

show (Fug 2 -1 ) . T he ty p e o f explosion include v ap o r cloud explosion ( confined

and unconfm ed),m echanical explosion ,chem ical explosion and B L E V E .

 F igure( 2 - 1 ) Fire Explosion

(www.schischek.com/ATEX_explosion-proof.htm)

2.1.3.2 Vapor Cloud Explosion(VCE)

A vapor cloud explosion (V C E ) results from the ignition o f a cloud o f flam m able

vapor, gas, or m ist in w h ich flam e speeds are high enough to pro d u ce significant

overpressure. I f the v ap o r involved is flam m able, it is likely th a t th e resulting cloud

of flammable gas released into the atm osphere w ill ignite im m ediately after the

BLEVE has occurred, form ing a fireball. T he com bustion occurs so rapidly th at no

pressurized gases are generated, and therefore it is usually considered a gas fire,

not an explosion.
 F i g u r e (2 -2 ) V apor C loud E xplosion

(source from W ikipedia the free encyclopedia)

- Confined E xplo sio n s w h ich describes an explosion o f flam m able v ap o r-air

mixture inside a closed system (e.g. vessel or building).

- U nconfined E xplo sio n s w h ich relates to an explosion o f a flam m able

vapor-air m ixture in th e open air. T he latter term is v ery w id ely used.

2 .1.3.3 Chemical Explosion

In chemical explosions, th e generation o f high-pressure gas is the resu lt o f

exothermic reactions w h ere in the fundam ental chem ical nature o f the fuel is

changed. Chem ical reactions o f the type involved in an explosion usually

propagate in a reaction front aw ay from the p o in t o f initiation.

Chemical explosions can involve solid com bustibles or explosive m ixtures o f fuel

and oxidizer, but m ore com m on to the fire investigator w ill be the propagating

reactions involving gases, v apors, or dusts m ixed w ith air. Such com bustion

reactions are called p ro p ag atio n reactions because they occur pro g ressiv ely

through the reactant (fuel), w ith a definable flam e front separating the reacted and

un reacted fuel.

6
2.1.3.4 Mechanical Explosions
Mechanical explosions are explosions in w h ich a high-pressure gas produces a

purely physical reaction. T hese reactions do n o t involve changes in the basic

chemical nature o f th e substances in the container. A p urely m echanical explosion

is the rupture o f a gas storage cylinder or tan k u n d er high pressure resu ltin g in the

release o f the stored high -p ressure gas, such as com pressed air, carbon dioxide, or

oxygen.

2.2 BLEVE

Definition o f B L E V E is in d ependent o f the cause o f the container failure. F or a

BLEVE to occur, th e container has to be u nder pressure, the p ressure has to exceed

the strength o f the container, and the container has to be w eak en ed in som e w ay

(impact, corrosion, fire). W alls goes on to discuss different types o f B L E V E s such

as containers failing from flam e im pingem ent. I f the liquefied gas is flam m able

and released because o f a B L E V E , the im portant and dangerous dim ensions o f

fireballs and ignition o f v ap o r clouds have to be considered. W alls w arns th a t the

impression that B L E V E s are solely restricted to flam m able, liq u efied gases is false.

BLEVEs occur w ith m an y types o f liquefied gases, flam m able and nonflam m able.

liquefied gas fails catastrophically. It does n o t m atter how the container fails. It can

be by fire im pingem ent, im pact, corrosion, etc. T he B L E V E is the boiling liquid

expanding vapor explo sio n th at happens w h en the tan k opens up fully." H e goes on

to say, "A B L E V E is a p hysical explosion o f com pressed v ap o r and rap id ly

vaporizing liquid. U p o n vessel failure the v ap o r space sends out a shock w ave

from the liquid flashing to vapor. I f the m aterial is flam m able, a fireball m ay

follow it. The rap id explosion can also cause projectile effects

7
David Lesak, a n atio n ally k n o w n hazardous m aterials author, lecturer, and course

developer, defines a B L E V E as "a pressure release from catastro p h ic container

failure." The re su lt o f a B L E V E is total d evastation in the im m ediate area w ith

potentially large loss o f life and property.

The size o f the B L E V E is d ep endent on the size and w eig h t o f the co n tain er along

with the am ount o f liq u id th at rem ains inside th e co n tain er at th e m om ent o f the

BLEVE. G enerally speaking, the b ig g er th e container, the b ig g er th e B L E V E .

Most flam e-induced liq u efied gas BLEVEs o ccurred w h en there w as

approximately o n e -h a lf to th ree-fourths o f the liq u id rem ain in g in the container.

Essentially, the d estru ctio n o f the co n tain er p roduces ro ck ets th at can be p ro p elled

great distances as a re su lt o f the rem aining liq u id ’s vaporizing. A cco rd in g to the

NFPA, deaths from th ese p ro jectiles h av e occurred as far as 800 feet from the

BLEVE.

Additionally, the m aterial inside the container m ay n o t com pletely v ap o rize at the

time of the B L EV E ; instead, it m ay also be pro p elled aw ay from th e scene.

Distances for personnel from B L E V E s suggests th at four tim es the fireball radius

fora specific size tan k w o u ld be appropriate. A s an exam ple, a container o f 1,000

liters would require a safe distance o f approxim ately 100 m eters. A m inim um

distance o f 100 m eters for any size container im pinged by fire is suggested.

2.2.1 Conditions Required for a BLEVE

There are co ndition th at m u st be available to potential for the B L E V E .

-A liquid must be present

Vapors or glass alone can n o t B L E V E , liquid need n o t be flam m able and the

water can B L E V E b u t th ere w ill be no fire.

8
- The liquid must be in a tightly closed container
Vented container can be subject to B L E V E if v en t dam aged or inadequate for

pressure w ithin container.

- The temperature of the confined liquid must be above its boiling point at
atmospheric pressure
The higher the p ressu re at th e surface o f the liquid, th e h ig h er the

temperature req u ired to p ro d uce boiling. W hen a co n tain er o f liq u id is tig h tly

closed and then heated , th e v ap o r p ressure increases. T he in creased v ap o r p ressu re

is accompanied by an elev ated b o ilin g point. A fire is th e m o st com m on

occurrence th at w ill b rin g th e tem perature above the norm al b o ilin g point. H eat is

not always essential. Som e liquids have extrem ely low b o ilin g p o in ts at

atmospheric pressure. T hese liquids are already con sid erab ly above th eir b o ilin g

point, even at norm al atm ospheric pressure.

-There must be structural failure of the container

Failure m ay be due to:

Direct flam e im p in g em ent to rep resen t m ost com m on cause o f failure.

Container failure alm ost alw ays occurs in the m etal around the

vapor space. M etal in co n tact w ith the liquid is quite d ifficu lt to h eat to

the danger p o in t b ecause liquids are usu ally ex cellen t conductors and

absorbers o f h eat w h ereas v apors are not. C o n tain er failure due to m etal

fatigue, in ad eq u ate o r dam age re lie f valv e and m echanical dam age by

collision or corrosion.

9
2.2.2 BLEVE Warning Signs
There are several w arn in g occur co n tain er before th e ex p lo sio n su ch as the

pinging sound from m etal shell, d iscoloration o f co n tain er (norm ally cherry red),

flaking o f sm all m etal p ieces, bub b le or bulge on container, th e steam from tan k

Surface, shrill sou n d from p ressure re lie f v alv e (especially if in creasin g w ith

passage o f tim e) and th e te ar in tan k surface .

2.2.3 Mechanism of BLEVE

BLEVE m echanism are few and often rely on v ery lim ited experim ental data.
Where steps o f B L E V E can b e sum m arized in th e follow ing show (Fug 2 - 4 ) .

lv) Failure o f vessel. V arious causes including overload heating, external hitting
or vessel corrosion m ay lead to a failure and sudden opening o f th e vessel.

(ii) Phase transition. W hen the v essel fails, an in stan tan eo u s d ep ressu rizatio n

occurs to th e p ressu re liq u efied gas sto red inside. T he p ressu rized

liquid/vapor m ix tu re in itially in a saturated th erm o d y n am ic state w ith a

tem perature h ig h er th an its b o ilin g p o in t becom es su p erh eated w h en the

original v essel pressure decreases to atm ospheric p ressu re in few

m illiseconds.

(iii) The pressurized liq u id can endure w ith being superheated w h en tem perature

inside the vessel is w ell belo w the superheat lim it tem p eratu re (SL T ) o f the

liquid. H ow ever, i f th e tem perature is above SLT, fast bub b le nucleation

will start inside and finally lead to v io len t splashing o f liq u id /vap o r m ixture

out o f the vessel into atm osphere.

(iv) Explosion due to dep ressurization and bubble nucleation. A s intense phase

transition in su p erh eated state happens, the b o ilin g o f th e liquid follow ed

by bubble n ucleation, the expanding v ap o r from b o th v ap o rizatio n o f the

10
 liquid and th e initial v ap o r stored in the vessel w ill to g eth er lead to an

explosion (B L E V E ).S h o w fug (2-5).

(v) Blast wave form ation. W ith an increase in total volum e o f the expanding vapor,

by a factor o f a h u n d red to over a thousand fold, a pow erful b last w ave

will form and b rin g dam age to facilities nearby.

(vi) Vessel rupture. D ue to the pow erful b last w ave, the v essel ruptures and its

pieces/fragm ents fly outw ards everyw here like rocket m issiles. Show

fag (2-6)& fug (2-7).

(vii) Fireball or dispersion o f toxic fluid. T he b last w ave and the vessel fragm ents

will be the only effects o f the explosion.

Cooling water
Dump excess pressure valve

Insulation

G round for italics to avoid a builds up o f liquid gas

F ig u re ( 2-3) M echanism o f B L E V E -

11
2.2.4 Effects of Explosions
An explosion is a gas dynam ic phenom enon that, u n d er ideal th eo retical

circumstances, w ill m an ife st its e lf as an expanding spherical h eat and pressure

wave front. T he h eat and p ressu re w aves pro d u ce th e dam age characteristic o f

explosions. The effects o f ex plosions can be observed in four m ajo r groups b last

pressure w ave effect, shrapnel effect, therm al effect, and seism ic effect.

I) Blast Pressure Front Effect.

The explosion o f a m aterial p roduces a large q uantity o f gases. T hese gases expand

at a high speed and m ove outw ard from the p o in t o f origin. T he gases and the

displaced air m oved b y th e gases p roduce a p ressu re front th a t is prim arily

responsible for th e dam age and injuries associated w ith explosions.

If the BLEVE hap p en s out in the open th en the b last stren g th at a distance o f 4
fireball radii is ab o u t 30 -40 m bar p ressu re . T his is eno u g h p ressu re to brake
window glass and m ay ev en be able to k n o ck som e p erso n n el dow n .

However if the B L E V E tak es place n ear other objects or structures th en the b last
wave could cause b u ild in g to collapse , or it could p ro p el objects over considerable
distances.

You can also have a b last w ave from the com bustion o f flam m able cloud .This

could happen i f a release o f a flam m able m aterial is allow ed to m ix w ith air and

become confined in structure. I f this is ignited is could resu lt in p o w erful

explosion w ith severe blast. T his is a very difficu lt th reat to q u antify and it can be

far reaching i f a flam m able liq u efied gas is released and it does n o t ignite to form

fireball then get b ack - late ig n itio n could cause severe explosion.
ii) Shrapnel Effect
When the con tain ers, structures, or v essels th at contain or restrict th e b la st p ressure

fronts are ruptured, th ey are o ften broken into pieces th a t m ay be th ro w n over great

distances. T h ese pieces o f debris are called shrapnel or m issiles. T hey can cause

great dam age and perso n al injury, often far from th e source o f the explosion. In

addition, shrapnel can often sever electric u tility lines, fuel gas or o th er flam m able

fuel lines, or storage co n tain ers, thereby adding to the size and in ten sity o f p o st

explosion fires or cau sin g ad d itional explosions.

Most projectiles fall sh o rt o f 4 -6 fireball radii d ep en d in g on th e ta n k size , fill

level, liquid tem p eratu re and p o sitio n relativ e to th e tan k m ain axis. S evere ro ck et

type projectiles go as far as 15 fireball r a d i i .

Figure ( 2-5 ) show s p ro jectiles data from 13 B L E V E o f 400 1 tanks . A s can be

seen projectiles w ere th ro w n in all directio n . p rim ary p ro jectiles are actual pieces

of the tank w hereas seco n d ary projectiles are nearby objects th a t w ere th ro w n by

energy o f the B L E V E .

13
iii) Thermal Effect.
Combustion explosions release quantities o f energy th at h eat co m b u stio n gases and

ambient air to hig h tem p eratu res. T his energy can ignite nearb y co m b u stib les or

can cause b u m injuries to anyone nearby. T hese secondary fires increase the

damage and injury from th e explosion and com plicate the in v estig atio n process.

Often, it is difficult to determ in e w h ich occurred first, the fire or the explosion.

All chemical ex p losions p ro d u ce g reat quantities o f heat. T he therm al dam age

depends on the n ature o f th e explosive fuel as w ell as the d u ratio n o f the high

temperatures. D eto n atin g ex p losions produce extrem ely h ig h tem p eratu res o f very

limited duration, w h ereas d eflag ratio n explosions produce low er tem p eratu res, b u t

for much longer periods.

Fireballs and firebrands are p o ssib le thertnal effects o f explosions, p articu larly

BLEVEs involving flam m able vapors. F ireballs are the m om entary ball o f flam e

present during or after th e explosive event. H igh-intensity, sh o rt-d u ratio n therm al

radiation may be p resen t w ith a fireball. F irebrands are h o t or b u rn in g fragm ents

propelled from the explosion. A ll these effects m ay serve to initiate fires aw ay

from the center o f th e explosion.

iv) Seismic Effect

As the blast pressu re w av e expands, and as the dam aged p o rtio n s o f large

structures are k n o ck ed to th e ground, sig n ifican t localized seism ic or earth trem ors

can be transm itted th ro u g h th e ground. T hese seism ic effects, u su ally n eg lig ib le for

small explosions, can p ro d u ce additional dam age to structures and u n d erg ro u n d

utility services, p ip elin es, tanks, or cables.

15
 Figure ( 2-5 ) E xplosion o f tank

(vAvw.youtube.com Fuel tank explosion )

16
 Figure ( 2-6 )Rupture of cylinder

(PDF Gas cylinder ruptures at filling station)

F igure ( 2-7) Rupture of tank

(source from explosion science - workshop - Saint Denis La plaine - 11/2006 )

17
2.3 TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF (LPG)
2.3.1 Properties of (LPG)
LP G are non-toxic and non-poisonous. They are however slightly anesthetic.
When inhaled over a long period of time, LPG w ill cause headache or nausea.
Asphyxiation can occur due to oxygen displacement and it is odorless, an
odorizing agent is added only when it is processed for domestic consumption, they
are flammable. In the liquid state, LPG present a hazard sim ilar to a highly volatile
flammable liquid but w ith more rapid vaporization and they are heavier then air.

2.3.2 Bulk Storage

Storing and handling LPG at fixed storage installations where tanks are filled on
site .Design, Installation and Operation of Vessels Located above Ground. Matters
covered include storage tank location and safety distances; the storage tanks
themselves; their piping, valves and fittings; pumps; compressors and meters;
vaporizers; electrical considerations; fire protection; B u lk PlasaL z.
facility, the primary purpose of which is the storage and distribution of LP-Gas,
that receives LP-Gas by cargo tank vehicle, railroad tank car, or piping,
distributing this gas by portable container (package) delivery, by cargo tank
vehicle, or through gas piping ..Show fug (2-7).

Always store the tanks in an upright position. That's because the top of the tank is
where the pressure re lie f valves (safety valves) are located. When upright, if
excessive pressure builds up, these valves w ill pop and bleed vapor off. W hile this
is not good, it is not as bad as the consequences of having the tanks resting on their
sides. In that position, the safety valves would bleed off raw liquid propane.

18
Certainly you should never store tanks near a water heater, furnace, or other
potential source of ignition. .

Also make sure that all valves are securely closed. Bleed valves, if not securely
closed have been known to work themselves open due to the expansion and
contraction caused by temperature changes.

Any storage area should be w ell ventilated, but don't put the tanks right next to a
vent for washers or dryers, as any leaking vapors could be sucked into these
machines or your home and create a potential hazard disaster. And never store
tanks under a stairway that might be needed to escape in the event of a fire.

As a general rule allow ten feet of clearance around the storage area. And if your
tanks become rusty, bent, or deformed in some other way, have them pressure
tested immediately.

All of us should be fam iliar w ith the danger of storing propane tanks in a van or
enclosed trailer. Ventilation is always a concern, so be sure to provide plenty. And
always check for any leaks before storing the basket w ith tanks in an enclosed area
ofyour vehicle.

19
 Figure (2-8 ) Bulk storage tank
(source from propane transportation storage ,distribution & market developm ent)

2.3.3 Storage and Transportation of Containers

Container any vessel, including cylinders, tanks, portable tanks, and cargo tanks,
used for the transporting or storing of LP-Gases. Storage of cylinders the LP Gas
Storage of Full and Empty LPG Cylinders for various situations where LPG could
bestored. These include open-air storage, and indoor storage .
The capacity of an LP-Gas container shall be determined either by weight in
accordance w ith table ( 2-1 ) or by volume.
Location of cylinders in storage shall be located to minimize exposure to
excessive temperature rises, physical damage, or tampering and having individual
water capacity greater than 2.7 lb (1.1 kg) [nominal 1 lb (0.45 kg)] LP-Gas
capacity shall be positioned so that the pressure re lie f valve is in direct
communication w ith the vapor space of the cylinder, they are stored in buildings
shall not be located near exits, stairways, or in areas normally used, or intended to
beused, for the safe egress of occupants. -If empty cylinders that have been in LP-
Gas service are stored indoors, they shall be considered as fu ll cylinders for the
purposes of determining the maximum quantities of LP-Gas , they shall not be
stored on roofs.

Table ( 2 - 1 ) M axim um Filling L im it by W eight o f L P-G as C ontainers

(percent o f m arked w ater capacity in pounds)

Specific Oto 1200 U.S. Over 1200 Underground

Gravity gal (0 to 4.5 U.S. Containers
at 60°F m3) gal (0 to 4.5 All Capacities,
(15.6°C) Total Water rp3) %
Capacities, % Total Water
Capacities, %
0.496-0.503 41 44 45
0.504-0.510 42 45 46
0.511-0.519 43 46 47
0.520-0.527 44 47 48
0.528-0.536 45 48 49
0.537-0.544 46 49 50
0.545-0.552 47 50 51
0.553-0.560 48 51 52
0.561-0.568 49 52 53
0.569-0.576 50 53 54
0.577-0.584 51 54 55
0.585-0.592 52 55 56
0.593-0.600 53 56 57

2.3.3.1 Transportation of cylinders

The cargo space of the vehicle shall be isolated from the driver’s compartment, the
engine, and its exhaust system. Open-bodied vehicles shall be considered to be in
compliance w ith this provision. Closed-bodied vehicles having separate cargo,
driver, and engine compartments shall also be considered to be in compliance w ith
this provision.
T
Cylinders and their appurtenances shall be determined to be leak-free before
being loaded into vehicles . Cylinders being transported by vehicles shall be
positioned in accordance w ith Table (2-2 ).

Cylinders shall be loaded into vehicles w ith flat floors or equipped w ith racks
for holding cylinders. Cylinders shall be fastened in position to minimize the
possibility of movement, tipping, and physical damage.

The vehicle used for carriage must be properly designed, of adequate strength,
good construction and properly maintained, thus making it suitable for its purpose.

The type of vehicle carriage of gas cylinders is

-Enclosed vehicle

Transporting LPG cylinders in enclosed vehicles poses significant additional risks.

For enclosed vehicles a person must not carry a cylinder of more than 30L (13.5
kg) in size. 9kg cylinders or larger gas cylinders can only be transported in
enclosed vehicles for the purposes of getting the cylinder refilled (or exchanged).
When you do have to transport your cylinder make sure it is stored securely in an
upright position (so it cannot fall over or become a projectile), and in a way that
avoids excess exposure to sunlight or heat.

- Open veh icle

Transportation of Portable Containers of More Than 1000 lb (454 kg) Water

Capacity shall be in accordance w ith the following:
-Containers and their appurtenances shall be leak-free before being loaded into
vehicles.
-Containers shall be transported in a rack or frame or on a flat surface.

22
 \
-Containers shall be fastened in a position to minimize the possibility of
movement, tipping, or physical damage, relative to each other or to the
supporting structure, while in transit.
Containers shall be transported w ith pressure relief devices in communication with
the vapor space.

Table (2-2) Orientation of Cylinders on Vehicles

Propane Capacity Open Vehicles Enclosed Spaces of

of Cylinder Vehicles

lb w.c. m3

<45 0.17 Any position

>45 0.17 R elief valve in
communication
with the vapor space
<4.2 0.016 Any position
>4.2 0.016 R elief valve in
communication with
the vapor space

23
233.2 Parking Vehicles Used to Carry LP-Gas Cargo
Vehicles carrying or containing LP-Gas parked outdoors shall comply w ith the
following:
(a) Vehicles shall not be left unattended on any street, highway, avenue, or
alley, except for necessary absences from the vehicle associated with
drivers’ normal duties, including stops for meals and rest stops during
the day or night.
(b) Vehicles shall not be parked in congested areas. Where vehicles shall
be permitted to be parked off the street in un congested areas, they
shall be at least 50 ft (15 m) from any building used for assembly,
institutional, or multiple residential occupancy. Where vehicles
carrying portable containers or cargo tank vehicles of 3500-gal (13-
m3) water capacity or less are parked on streets adjacent to the driver’s
residence in uncongested residential areas, the parking locations shall
be at least 50 ft (15 m) from a building used for assembly, institutional,
or multiple residential occupancy.

2.3.3.3 Marine transportation

It is vital that LPG installation standards are strictly adhered to. A ll reasonable
steps must be taken to avoid gas leakage to ensure the safety of marine and river
craft, their owners, hirers and users. Other factors such as the use of suitable gas
appliances for the situation, the provision of flues and vents, and the correct
location of cylinders and warning notices are also extremely important.

• General cargo, compressed gases, other than ships’ general stores for the LP-
Gas tank vessel, shall not be handled over a pier or dock w ithin 100 ft (30.5
m) of the point of transfer connection while LP-Gas are being transferred.

24
___________________________________________________________________________________________

Ship bunkering operations shall not be permitted prior to or during cargo

transfer operations.

• The shore mooring equipment shall be designed and maintained to safely

hold the vessel to the pier or dock.

• If the terminal conducts transfers between sunset and sunrise, the pier or
dock area shall have a lighting system that illuminates the transfer
connection area, control valves, storage containers, other equipment and
walkways of communications, fire fighting, and other emergency areas.

• A ll lighting shall be located or shielded so that it is not confused w ith any

aids to navigation and does not interfere with navigation on the adjacent
waterway.

• Prior to the start of the transfer, warning signs be placed in the marine
transfer area, visible from the shoreline and berth areas. The warning signs
shall read as warning, dangerous cargo, no visitors, no smoking and no open
light.

• A LP-Gas detector shall be readily available for use at the berth.

23.3.5 Pipelines
It is generally the case that all crude oils, natural gas, liquefied natural gas,
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and petroleum products flow through pipelines at
some time in their migration from the w ell to a refinery or gas plant, then to a
terminal and eventually to the consumer. Aboveground, underwater and
underground pipelines, varying in size from several centimetres to a metre or more
in diameter, move vast amounts of crude oil, natural gas.

25
• Pipelines shall be located on the dock or pier so that they are not
exposed to damage from vehicular traffic or other possible cause of
physical damage. Underwater pipelines shall be located or protected so
that they are not exposed to damage from marine traffic.
• Pipelines used for liquid unloading only shall be provided with a
check valve located at the multiple adjacent to the multiple isolation
valve.

• A ll pipelines, conduits and other conductive lines on the berth, capable

of carrying an electrical charge, shall be equipped w ith insulating
flanges or other means to electrically isolate them from stray currents
and the rest of the terminal.

26
 — - — — — —

2.4 Fire Fighting

Fire protection shall be provided for all u tility LPG. The extent of such protection
shall be determined by an evaluation based on quantity, and size of storage
Containers; an analysis of local conditions; hazards w ithin the facility; and
exposure to and from other property.

2.4.1 Fire

The rapid oxidation of a fuel evolving heat, particulates, gases and non-ionizing
radiation. Fires need four elements in order to occur fuel, oxygen, heat and
chemical Reaction.

2.4.2 Fires are Classified

Class A:- Ordinary combustibles or fibrous material such as wood, paper, cloth,
rubber and some plastics.

Class B:- Flammable liquids such as gasoline, kerosene, oil, paint, paint
thinners and propane.

Class C:- Energized electrical equipment such as appliances, switches, panel

boxes and power tools.

2.4.3 Water

Ofthe great importance of water are used in the event of fire , petroleum reservoirs
and most importance of theses uses in the cooling tank to reduce the temperature as
much as possible, the protection of reservoirs adjacent to the burning tank of high
heat, processing of the foam solution and mixing it w ith solution center percentage

27

r* ~—
required and washing of petroleum product falling on the ground and expel the
water in the direction of sewage to keep afire risk .

The type of water

• Plain water Is non-water mixture or processor in any other additional

material which has a Surface tension high and this Surface tension
high does not help the speed of sliding and movement of objects in
addition to double penetrate porous materials.

• Wet water is the treated water with chemicals the other to reduce
surface tension and this water has the ability to penetrate the porous
materials thus to allow for more efficient cooling

• Thick water Is the treated water with additional material the other to
reduce the flow ability and therefore this is slow movement and
remains in place to be cooled more and not have the ability to
penetrate porous materials, but it helps of sliding .
• Rapid or Slippery water Is the treated water chemically to reduce
the viscosity and thus reduces the pressure loss caused by friction loss
inside the hose reel which maintains the water pressure required and
helps to deliver water to the distant.

Water used in firefighting is either sweet or salty. Wet water is the best among all
types of water mentioned above, normal water is the most common use because
provided of large quantities.

Fire extinguishers water are intended prim arily for use on Class A fires. The
stream in itia lly should be directed at the base of the flames. After extinguishment
of flames, it should be directed generally at smoldering or glowing surfaces.

28
2.4.4 Foam

Fire-fighting foam is an aggregate of air-filled bubbles formed from aqueous

solutions and is lower in density than flammable liquids. It is used principally to
form a cohesive floating blanket on flammable and combustible liquids and
prevents or extinguishes fire by excluding air and cooling the fuel. It also prevents
re-ignition by suppressing formation of flammable vapors. It has the property of
adhering to surfaces, which provides a degree of exposure protection from adjacent
fires.

Foam can be used as a fire prevention, control, or extinguishing agent for

flammable liquid hazards. Foam for these hazards can be supplied by fixed piped
systems or portable foam-generating systems.

Foam Solution. A homogeneous mixture of water and foam concentrate in the

proper proportions .The percent of foam concentrate contained in a foam solution.
The type of foam concentrate used determines the percentage of concentration
required. For example, a 3 % foam concentrate is mixed in the ratio of 97 % parts
water to 3 parts foam concentrate to make foam solution.

2.4.4.1 Types of foam

• Chemical foam which is carbonate of soda and aluminum sulfate.

• Protein-Foam or mechanical foam which is a liquid composed of residues

of proteins such as bones and hoofs . It is able to prevent corrosion of
equipment and containers, to resist bacterial decomposition and to control
viscosity. They are diluted w ith water to form 3 percent to 6 percent
solutions depending on the type.

29
• Fluoroprotein-Foam ( protein + fluorine) it is more effective ,resistant to
heat and pollution . They are diluted with water to form 3 percent to 6
percent solutions depending on the type.

2.4.4.2 Foam Fire Extinguishers

AFFF (aqueous film-forming foam) and FFFP (film-forming fluoroprotein)-

type fire extinguishers are rated for use on both Class A and Class B fires. They
are not suitable for use in freezing temperatures. An advantage of this type of
extinguisher when used on Class B flammable liquid fires of appreciable depth
is the ability of the agent to float on and secure the liquid surface, which helps
to prevent re-ignition . Fire extinguishers of these types are usually available in
hand portable models of 1.6 gal (6 L )’and 2 1/2 gal (9.46 L) and in wheeled
models having a liquid capacity of 33 gal (125 L).

C€

Figure ( 2-9) Foam w heeled extinguisher & Foam extinguisher

(www.fire-safety-equipment.co.uk/fire-extinguishers/foam-fire-extinguishers )

30
 2.4.5 Dry Chemical Powder

This powder works to break the chain of chemical interaction and the heroes of
continuity , cooling due to chemical interaction of this powder or thermal
decomposition which it is heat absorption and decrease the temperature, asphyxia
(interaction of dry powder (B C )) and prevents thermal radiation.

There are two methods whereby a dry chemical agent can be discharged from a fire
extinguisher shell, depending on the basic design of the fire extinguisher. They are
thecartridge/cylinder-operated method and the stored-pressure method. Regardless
of fire extinguisher design, the method of agent application is basically the same.
Stored-pressure fire extinguishers are available in capacities from 1 lb to 30 lb (0.5
kgto 14 kg) for hand fire extinguishers and 125 kg to 250 lb (57 kg to 113.5 kg)
for wheeled fire extinguishers. Cartridge/cylinder-operated fire extinguishers are

Dry chemical fire extinguishers are also available in no rechargeable, no refillable

types that contain the agent and expellant gas in a single, no reusable, factory-filled
container. Most dry chemical fire extinguishers having ratings of 20-B and less
will discharge their contents in 8 seconds to 20 seconds. Fire extinguishers with
higher ratings could take as long as 30 seconds. Therefore, since there is little time
for experimentation, it is important that the operator be prepared to correctly apply
the agent at the outset. A ll dry chemical fire extinguishers can be carried and
operated simultaneously, and can be discharged intermittently. The discharge
stream has a horizontal range of 5 ft to 30 ft (1.5 m to 9.2 m), depending on fire
extinguisher size. When used on outdoor fires, maximum effectiveness can be
achieved when the direction of the wind is on the back of the operator.

31
2.4.5.1 Types of dry powder

• Multipurpose dry chemical (ABC) a mixture of Mono ammonium

phosphate w ith Ammonium sulphate . The ammonium sulphate is
part of the basic in extinguishing the fire. Which are help increased
speed and efficiency of the firefighting process.

• Dry chemical powder(BC) the characteristic of this type is alkaline

and include the sodium bicarbonate, potassium bicarbonate,
potassium bicarbonate urea base, bicarbonate urea base, or potassium
chloride base are intended prim arily for use on Class B and Class C
fires.

Figure (2 -1 0 ) D ry chemical fire extinguisher & Dry chemical Wheeled unit fire extinguisher

(www.fire-extigusherl 01 .com/cached-similar)
2.4.6 Carbon Dioxide Type
Thistype of fire extinguisher is prim arily intended for use on Class B and Class C
fees. On all fires, the discharge should be directed at the base of the flames. The
discharge should be applied to the burning surface even after the flames are
extinguished to allow added time for cooling and to prevent possible reflash.

Hie carbon dioxide agent extinguishes by diluting the surrounding atmosphere

with an inert gas so that oxygen levels are kept below the percentage required for
combustion. When this type of fire extinguisher is used in an unventilated space,
suchas a small room, closet, or other confined area, prolonged occupancy of that
spacecan result in the loss of consciousness due to oxygen deficiency. Hand fire
extinguishers of this type are usually available at capacities from 21/2 lb to 20 lb
(1.1kg to 9.1 kg). Wheeled carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are usually available
incapacities from 50 lb to 100 lb (23 kg to 45 kg).

Figure (2 -1 1 ) W heeled Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishers & Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishers

(www.ilpi.com/safety/extinguishers.html)
2.5 Precautions to be Taken at LPG Fires and Emergencies
Whenever possible, approach the fire or leak from upwind. Keep nozzle low and
aim it upward to disperse gases or flaming vapors. Use multiple lines where
necessary.
Figure ( 1 ) D isperse the gases or flam ing vapors in form ascending

Clear all Persons out of the vapor cloud area, evacuate areas in the path of the
vapor cloud immediately. Shut off all sources of ignition at the same time. Keep in
mind that LP gas is heavier, than air.

Figure ( 2) E vacuate areas in the p ath o f the vapor cloud

Keep everyone, not actually engaged in operations, at least 1000 feet from the front
and rear of the tank and 500 feet from the sides.

34
 Figure ( 3 ) Safety distances from the source of danger

If not present, call for police assistance to establish and maintain safety zone. If
necessary, call for additional Fire Department Units. However, keep operating
personnel to a necessary minimum.

2 .5.1 Operations at a Leak With a Fire

Do not extinguish the fire until the leak has been stopped, except under extremely
unusual conditions.
Figure ( 4 ) Control the leak

35
If the only valve that can be used to stop the flow of gas is involved in fire or is
exposed to heat or flame, consider the possibility of using a heavy fog stream to
protect member while he shuts off the valve. Proceed slowly to prevent flashback
which may entrap the member in flames. Members involved should wear masks
and protective fire clothing.
Figure ( 5 ) U sing a heavy fog stream to protect m em ber w hile he shuts o ff the valve

Tank surfaces that are exposed to heat, either from auto exposure or fire
from another source, can be protected by supplying large quantities of water on
them. Approach the tank from the sides, applying water to all exposed surfaces as
well as piping and valves.

36
 Figure ( 6) P rotect o f tan k by supplying large quantities o f w ater

Consult chauffeurs, operating personnel or any qualified person regarding methods

ofstopping the flow of gas or any pertinent information that may assist our
operations.

Where escaping gas is on fire and the flow cannot be shut off, application of large
quantities of water on the tank and piping w ill permit controlled burning, allowing
thefire to consume the contents of the tank without the danger of tank or pipe
failure. Make certain that fire is NO T extinguished.
Figure ( 7 ) controlled burning by using large quantities o f w ater

37
Portable dry chemical extinguishers are effective on small LP gas fires. Carbon
dioxide extinguishers can also be used. They should be applied at the base of the

Figure ( 8 ) U sing fire e x ti n g u is h e r s

Tank failure under fire conditions usually occurs in the vapor area of the tank when
sufficient water cannot be applied to prevent the metal from softening or
weakening to a point where metal failure occurs.

Figure ( 9) T ank failure under fire conditions

38
Before tank failure occurs, the rise in pressure w ithin the tank w ill cause an
increase in the volume of fire, or a rise in the noise level or both. This may or may
not be accompanied by a bubble or blister forming on the tank shell. When any of
these symptoms are present, the operating forces should be withdrawn to a safe
area.

Figure ( 10) The rise in pressure w ithin the tank

Ordinarily no attempt should be made to move a tank involved in a fire. Usually

little would be gained in reducing the hazard. However if specific conditions
develop that make it desirable to move the tank, it should be moved in an upright

position. Never drag it in a manner that might further damage valves or piping.
Any attempt to turn the tank upright, to remove it to some remote location or to
facilitate product withdrawal, should be done carefully to avoid damage to valves

39
and piping, Portable LP gas cylinders th at are exposed to a serious fire should be

removed to a safe location.

Figure ( 1 1 ) P ortable LP gas cylinders should be rem oved to a safe location

2.5.2 LP Gas Leak Without Fire

If escaping LP gas is not on fire, close any valve available that can stop the flow of
gas. Small lines such as copper tubing could be flattened to stop the flow. If an LP
gas vehicle is involved, consult the driver; or if storage facilities are involved,
consult plant personnel regarding possibilities of shutting off leaks.
Figure (12 ) C lose valve to stop the flow Figure( 13) Lines flattened to stop the flow

40
Water spray is effective in dispersing LP gas vapor. It should be used as soon as
possible, directing the spray stream across the normal vapor path and dispersing
thevapor to a safe location. Members handling the hose should avoid entering the
vapor cloud and should keep low behind the spray so that they w ill be somewhat
protected from radiant heat if the vapor should be ignited unexpectedly.

Figure ( 14) U sing spray stream o f w ater from a safe distance

If water spray is not effective in dispersing the LP gas vapor, then heavy streams of
water should be used from a safe distance.

41
 Chapter three
Materials and Methods
 M aterials & M ethods
CHAPTER3

3.1 The Study Area

3.1.1 The Location

The study area is located in Khartoum is the capital of Sudan located in the
confluence of the White N ile, Blue N ile between longitudes 31.15-34 east and
latitudes 15-16 north. Area of about 28.165 square Kilom eter .
Consisting city of Khartoum from three large cities (Khartoum - Omdurman -
Khartoum North), therefore called the capital triangle .

Selected this region as a model because it.is considered one of the largest regions
interms of space and high population density and thus represent the m ajority of the
terms of the number of accidents.

3.2Methodology

- This study is based on the statistics records of fires taken from the General
Administration of C ivil Defense - Khartoum State - Department records to
determine the extent of the damage caused by these fires and physical effects of
explosions and determine the consequences on people and structures .

■This study is also based on facts taken from interviews conducted w ith officers -
and non-commissioned officers w ithin the offices of civil defense to take the
information on those fires.

■As well as reports of fires already been used to strengthen and confirm the
validity of such accidents, and know the implications of injuries and property
losses.

42
3.3 Working methods

Statements have been prepared for fires Liquefied petroleum gases through the
book of daily reports of incidents of civil defense of Khartoum State has been
monitoring such incidents during the three years (2007-2009).
These data were analyzed using the program (e-views) method of estimation of
least squares (LS).

E- view method
E-Views is a simple but flexible econometric software package that runs on both
Windows machines and Macintoshes. It is prim arily designed to work w ith time
series data, but can also be used for cross-section and panel data. The primary
function of E-Views is to enable the user to perform time series regressions and the
associated hypothesis tests, diagnostics, and correction procedures,

least squares (LS)

This method are able to extract equations for polynomials and lines from a series
ofpoints (aka trend line)? If so, you may find the following information
enlightening. Excel uses a method of numerical analysis called the "least squares
method".

The least squares method for multiple regression has the same concept as the least
squares method for simple linear regression. The goal is to minimize the sum of
thesquare of the errors of the predicted y-values from the actual y-values.

We can calculate for us the fu n c tio n ^ ) = ax + b that is obtained if one would

apply the Least squares method to a given set of points.
 Chapter four
*

Results and Discussions

 RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 Results and Discussions

This chapter presented the fires B LEVE in the period from 2007 to 2009, which
include house fires resulting from gas leak cooking fires and fires petroleum
service stations, which occurs when the discharge of tank fuel in addition to
Vehicles vector Liquefied petroleum gases.

4.2 Results
Thetable (4-1) shows the Statistics house fires, It also the figures from (4-1) to
(4-3) the relationship between months (time) and frequency of fire accidents in
homes. Figure (4-4) shows the relationship between time and the fire in the form of
curve.
The figures(4-5) to (4-9) represent the relationship between time and the fire
petroleum service stations and tanker of (LPG) in period from 2007 to 2009 . The
figures(4-10) shows the comparison between petroleum service stations and tanker
of(LPG).
Thetable (4-4) shows estimates of fires for the years (2010 - 2011 -2012) and that
compensation in the equation (x=c +By +e ).

Where X = Time
Y = Fire
B & C = Coefficient
e = Coefficient error

44
-

Statistics house fires in the period 2007 -2009

Month Fire house 2007 2008 2009

Jan Leak of gas 24 18 21
Feb - 26 27 27
M ar - 36 31 35

A p ril - 39 29 37
May - 27 37 38
Jun - 25 23 39
Jul - 20 • 21 23

Aug - 31 16 34
Sep - 27 26 12
Oct - 33 37 23
Nov - 22 23 28
Dec - 21 22 24

Table (4-1)

45

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
■

Statistics Petroleum service station fire & Tanker IPG in the period 2007 -
2009

nth Jan Feb M ar A p ril May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Sum
r 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007

roleum 1 1 2
vice
don

cer - - - “ “ - “ - - - -
5

ar 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008

toleum
sice
ion ' ' ' ' '

iker - - - - - - - - - - - - -

p 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009

loleum 1 1
lice
ion

ker - - - - - - - - “
1 1 2

Table (4-2)

46
R elationship betw een m onths (time) and frequency o f fire accidents in
hom es(2007)

F igure (4 -1 )

47
Relationship betw een m onths (time) and frequency o f fire accidents in
hom es(2008)

Figure ( 4-2)

48
 Relationship betw een m onths (time) and frequency o f fire accidents in
hom es(2009)

I 2009
Jan Febi M a r April May J j Jul Au Sep O c Nov Dec

Figure (4-3)

49

MM
 ■

Method: Least Squares

Date: 11/04/10 Time: 02:59

Sample(adjusted): 2007:02 2009:12

Included observations: 35 after adjusting endpoints

Variable C oefficien Std. E rror t-Statistic Prob.

t

Y -0.002761 0.000777 -3.555134 0.0012

C 3.313785 0.016026 206.7769 0.0000

R (-l) 0.038670 0.001180 32.^5808 0.0000

Squared 0.971278 M ean dependent var 3.266517

Adjusted R -squared 0.969483 S.D. dependent var 0.265556

IE. of regression 0.046391 A kaike info criterion

3.221625

iumsquared resid 0.068867 Schw arz criterion

3.088309

.oglikelihood 59.37843 F-statistic 541.0601

Durbin-W atson stat 2.244799 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000000

50

< ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 '

Y: Time

X: Fire

1= 3.313785 + -0.002761 Y + 0.038670

Breusch-Godfrey Serial C orrelation LM Test:

I F-statistic 2.470909 Probability 0.101540

Obs*R-squared 4.950047 P robability 0.084161

Test Equation:

Dependent V ariable: R E SID

Method: Least Squares

! Date: 11/04/10 Tim e: 03:01

Presample m issing value lagged residuals set to zero.

V ariable C oefficient Std. E rror t-Statistic Prob.

Y -0.000221 0.000750 -0.294284 0.7706

C 0.002749 0.015386 0.178641 0.8594

R (-l) -7.66E-05 0.001133 -0.067582 0.9466

R E S ID (-l) -0.211884 0.175526 -1.207136 0.2368

R ESID (-2) -0.368408 0.179113 -2.056843 0.0485

51

..................................................................................... ........-
 R-squared 0.141430 Mean dependent var -9.36E-16

Adjusted R-squared 0.026954 S.D. dependent var 0.045005

S.E. of regression 0.044395 Akaike info criterion -3.259826

Sum squared resid 0.059127 Schwarz criterion -3.037633

Log likelihood 62.04695 F-statistic 1.235454

Durbin-Watson stat 2.135564 Prob(F-statistic) 0.316951

■
The relationship betw een time and the fire house

X -------- Y

Figure (4-4)

53
Relationship betw een tim e and fires petroleum service stations & tankers (LPG)

fires

2009 2008 2007

Figure (4-5)
fires petroleum service stations and tankers (LPG) - (2008)

Figure (4-7)

56
fires petroleum service stations and tankers (LPG) - (2009)

Figure (4-8)
Compared the proportion of fires to three years

Figure (4-9)

Petroleum service station 0.008695652

petroleum tanker LPG 0.005797101

Home Fires 0.985507246

Table (4-3) proportion of fires

58
Table (4-4) Estimates of fire from (2010 to 2012)

2012 2011 2010 Month

3.173 3.209 3.245 Jan

3.17 3.206 3.242 Feb

3.167 3.203 3.239 Mar

3.164 3.2 3.236 April

3.161 3.197 3.233 May

3.158 3.194 3.23 Jun

3.155 3.191 3.227 Jul

3.152 3.188 3.224 Aug

3.149 3.185 3.221 Sep

3.146 3.182 3.218 Oct

3.143 3.179 3.215 Nov

3.14 3.176 3.212 Dec

2012 2011 2010

37.878 38.31 38.742 Sum

59
C om pared betw een petroleum service station fires and tanker LPG

o
petrolum service station petrolum tanker LPG

Figure (4-10)

60
4.3 Discussions
4.3.1Home fires
We note in the fires of the gas leak at home is higher in summer and autumn, as
shown in the figures ((4-1) to (4-3)), which indicates that there is a clear relation
between fires and the high temperature and humidity and this is clear between the
decline and height as shown in Figure (4-4).
We also find that the percentage of house fires resulting from gas leak constituted
the highest percentage among other types of fires (gas stations -o il tankers), where
the percentage form 98% as shown in Figure (4-10) and Table (4-3) and this is due
to: -
* Increasing population density, which leads to increase the number of users of
cooking gas.
* Get rid of the traditional methods of cooking (the use of coal) w ith the
availability of modem techniques in cooking (LPG).
*Lack of commitment with the tools of home safety.
Note when the use of data and analysis of least squares we find that the coefficient
ofthe fire amount is negative, which means that the relationship between time and
the fire is an inverse relationship Table (4-1) and rates of fire in the decrease with
time and perhaps this is due to the proportion of high awareness of the dangers of
this gas and this is reflected in estimates of fires for three years (210 -2011) Table
1(4-4 ).

61
 4.3.2 Fires Service stations petroleum and tankers (LPG)
It is noted that the fire service stations petroleum and tankers (LPG) Small fraction
of home fires and this is clear from Figure (4-5) to (4-10).
Most of the fires, petroleum service stations produced during discharge due to
; static electricity, as w ell as tankers to fires .May come back the reasons for these
I
fires to lack of training and lack of commitment to the implementation of safety
measures.
 Chapter five
Conclusion and Recommendations
 Conclusion& Recommendations
CHAPTERS

5.1 Conclusion

Fire protection is one of the most important factors that lead to reducing the
incidents because they play a major role in reducing and mitigating the risk of fire
and save lives and protect property.

This study dealt w ith fires Liquefied petroleum gases B LEVE and relied on
statistics from records of C ivil Defense -Khartoum state, which includes the three
provinces (Khartoum -Omdurman -Khartoum North) in respect of house fires
resulting from gas leak (cooking gas) in addition petroleum station fires and
Liquefied petroleum gas tankers. It was found that

-More than 98% of house fires resulting from gas leak to a lack of awareness and
perception and how to act in case of a gas leak. Add to that the growing
population and the resulting increase in the use of cooking gas .

-Small percentage of the fire stations and fuel tankers, which result from static
electricity or lack of training .

-Attached reports indicate the fire events of this disastrous fire .

These defects may lead to fire accidents, which shows that the commitment to the
safety requirements to ensure life and property protection .

63
5.2 Recommendations
Based on the finding and result of this research many recommendations can be
drawn from this study are:-

(1) Raise awareness of the dangers of fires BLEVE, through the media
devices in coordination with the General Directorate of C ivil Defence
which is represented in the following

-knowledge of B LEVE and warning signs which occur before the

explosion and the catastrophic damages caused by explosion the
B LEVE.
(2) Take measures of prevention and caution in dealing w ith gas kitchens
in homes through awareness-raising to do the following :-
-Knowledge of prevention and safety measures necessary provided
in the gas cylinder and to provide guidance before dealing with
them .
-Raising awareness of how to act in case of gas leak.
-Requiring the owner of each house of the need to provide
extinguisher and learn how to use them to be placed near the
kitchen.
(3) Enforce workers service stations petroleum to make training courses
in the fire protection equipments before start jobs.

(4) Training drivers (LPG) tanker on the application of safety procedures

and how to deal w ith liquid gases, and factors that lead to an
explosion

64
Appendix
Appendix
The annex to the reports of fire from the diary reports of the fire to the
General Administration of C ivil Defense -Khartoum State, describes the fire
and the reasons they occur and the losses and injuries.

• The first report and second in the regions o f Khartoum and

Omdurman the contains a fire caused by gas leak in houses.

• The third report represents of fire in fuel tanker explosion in the

Khartoum area and clear the effect of rupture of the tanker.

• The fourth report in the words of a fire service station petroleum in

the area of Khartoum North caused by static electricity.
 ‫ﺑ ﺴ ﻢ اش اﻟ ﺮ ﺣ ﻤ ﻦ اﻟ ﺮ ﺣﻴﻢ‬

‫ﺑﺘﺎ رﻳ ﺦ اﻟﻴﻮم اﻟﺜ الﺛﺎﺀ ‪ ٣٢ * ٠.٧١ ٠^ ١٣‬ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟ ﺴﺎ ﻋ ﺔ ‪ ٠‬ﻣﺎ‪ /‬ر ﺻﺒﺎ ﺣﺂ و ر د ت ا ﺷﺎ رة ﻣ ﻦ اﻟﻨ ﺠﺪة ﺗﻔﻴﺪ‬ ‫—‬

‫ﺑ ﻮ ﺟ ﻮد ﺣ ﺮﻳ ﻖ ﺑ ﺘ ﺎ م وﻗ ﻮد ﻓﻠ ﺮ غ ﺑ ﺠﺒ ﺮا ﺷﺎ ر ع اﻟ ﺸﻬﻴﺪ اﺑ ﺮاﻫﻴﻢ ﺷ ﻤ ﺲ اﻟﺪﻳ ﻦ ﺟ ﻮا ر ﺻﻴﻨﻴ ﺔ ﺷﺎ ر ع‬

‫اﻟﻤﺪ ر ﻋﺎ ث وﺗ ﺤ ﺮ ﻛ ﺖ ﻧ ﺤ ﻮ اﻟ ﺤﺎد ث ا ﺷ ﺢ ا الﺗ ﻲ ‪— :‬‬

‫ﺗ ﻌ ﺮ ض اﻟﺘﺎﻧﻜ ﺮ رﻗﻢ رب ح أ ‪ ٧ ٠ ٧ ٨‬؛ ﻣ ﺮ ﺳﻴﺪ س ﻳﻨﻴ ﻊ ﻟ ﺸ ﺮ ﻛ ﺔ اﻟﻤﻴﺜﺎ ق اﻟ ﻤ ﺤ ﺪ ودة ﻟ ﺤ ﺮﻳ ﻖ واﻧﻔ ﺠﺎ ر اﻗﺎ‬ ‫—‬

‫ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎ ت ﻟ ﻤﺎ م ﺑ ﻮ ر ﻗ ﺔ ﺑ ﺸﻴ ﺮ اﻟﻌ ﺠ ﺐ‬
‫ﻣ ﻤﺎ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻤ ﻮا ﻃ ﻦ ﻣﺎﻟ ﻚ اﻟﻌﺠ ﺐ ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﺤﺎل ﺣﻴ ﺚ ﻛﺎ ن ﻳ ﺠ ﺮ ي ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻠ ﺤﺎم وﺟﺌﺘﻪ ﺑﺪ و ن را س واص‬ ‫—‬

‫ﻣ ﻌ ﻪ ﺛ الﺛ ﺔ ا ﺧ ﺮﻳ ﻦ ﻧﻘﻠ ﻮا ﻟ ﻤ ﺴﻨ ﺸﻔ ﻲ اﺑﺮ اﻫﻴﻢ ﻣﺎﻟ ﻚ وا ﺣﺪ ﺣﺎﻟﺘ ﻪ ﺳ ﻨ ﻘ ﺮ ة و ا ﻗ ﻴ ﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺘ ﻬ ﻢ ﺧ ﻄ ﺮة ﺗ ﻮﻓ ﻲ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ‬

‫‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗ ﻢ ا ﺧ ﻄﺎ ر ا الدﻟﺔ اﻟ ﺠﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﻀ ﻮ ر ﻟ ﻤ ﻮﻗ ﻊ اﻟ ﺤﺎد ث‬ ‫—‬

‫ﺳﺒ ﺐ اﻟ ﺤ ﺮﻳ ﻖ وا الﻧﻔ ﺠﺎ ر ; ان اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺗ ﺖ ﺑ ﻄ ﺮﻳﻘ ﺔ ﻏﻴ ﺮ ﺻ ﺤﻴ ﺤ ﺔ ا ﻋ ﻘ ﺪ ان ﻋ ﻤﻠﻴ ﺔ اﻟﺘ ﺴ ﺨﻴ ﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﺠﺔ‬ ‫—‬

‫ﻣ ﻦ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎ ت اﻟﻠ ﺤﺎم ﻟﻠﺪاﺋ ﺮة اﻟ ﺨﻠﻘﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻨ ﻈﺎ ز ﻗ ﻄ ﺮة ‪ ٣٢^ ٢‬ﻟﻢ ﺗ ﻢ ﺑ ﻄ ﺮﻳﻘ ﺔ ﺻ ﺤﻴ ﺤ ﺔ ﻛﺎ ن ﻋﻠﻴ ﻪ ﻏ ﺴﻴ ﻞ‬
‫اﻟﻘﻨ ﻄﺎ ر ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﺒ ﺤ ﺮ وا ن ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﺘﻘﻴ ﺲ ﻟ ﻢ ﺗﺘ ﻢ ﻣ ﻦ اﻋﻠ ﻲ اﻟﻔ ﻄﺎ ز ﺣﺘ ﻲ ﺗﺘ ﻤ ﻜ ﻦ ا الﺑ ﺨ ﺮة اﻟﻨﺎﺗ ﺠ ﺔ ﻣ ﻦ‬
‫ﺑ ﻮاﻗ ﻰ اﻟﺒﺘ ﺰﻳ ﻦ ﻣ ﻦ اﻟ ﺸ ﺮ ب‬
‫أد ي ذﻟ ﻚ اﻟﻲ ﺣﺪ و ث اﻧﻔ ﺠﺎ ر و ﺣ ﺮﻳ ﻖ ‪ ,‬ﻃﺎر ت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪاﺋ ﺮة ﻣ ﺴﺎﻓ ﺔ ‪ ١٥٠‬ﻣ ﺶ ﺗﻘ ﺮﻳﺒﺎ و ﺳﻘ ﻄ ﺖ دا ﺧ ﻞ‬ ‫—‬

‫ﻏ ﺮﻓﺔ ﻟ ﻮ ر ﺛ ﺔ اﺑ ﻮا رﻓﺄ ن اﻟ ﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ ﻟ ﺼﻴﺎﻧ ﺔ اﻟﺒ ﺼﺎ ت اﻟ ﺴﻔ ﺮﻳﺔ واﻟ ﺸﺎ ﺣﻨﺎ ت ﺻﺎ ﺣﺒ ﻬﺎ ﻣ ﺤ ﻤﺪ ﻃ ﻰ ﻋ ﺸﺎ ن‬

‫ﻧ ﺰ ﻛ ﻲ اﻟ ﺠﻨ ﺴﻴﺔ ﺗﺎﻧ ﺮ ت ﻏ ﺮﻗﺘﻪ ﻓ ﻲ اﻟﻜ ﻮ رﻗ ﺮ اﻟ ﺸ ﺮﻗ ﻲ ﻓ ﻲ ﻣ ﺴﺎ ﺣ ﺔ ‪ ^ ١‬ا م و ﺳﻘ ﻄ ﺖ داﺋ ﺮ ة اﻟﻔﻘ ﻄﺎ ر داﺧﻞ‬
‫اﻟﻐ ﺮﻓﺔ وا ﺣ ﺪﺋ ﻚ ذ ك ﺑﺎﻟ ﻐ ﺮﻓ ﺔ و ﺗ ﺎ و ت اﻟﺘ ﺮ ﺻﻴ ال ت اﻟﻜﻬ ﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﺔ واﻟﺜ الﺗﺠﺔ وﻟ ﻢ‪ ,‬ﺗ ﺤ ﺪ ث ا ﺻﺎﺑﺎ ت ﻓ ﻲ‬
‫‪.‬‬ ‫ا ال ر وا ح‬
‫ا ﺷﺘ ﺮﻛ ﺖ ﻋ ﺮﺑ ﺔ اﻟﺪﻓﺎ ع اﻟﻤﺪﻧ ﻲ ( ‪ ) ٦ ٨ ٦ ٣‬ﻓ ﻲ اﻟ ﺤﺎد ث وﻣﻌﻬﺎ ا ﻟ ﺘ ﺎ م‪٦ ٨ ٤ ٧ .‬‬ ‫—‬

‫اﻟﺪﻓﺎ ع اﻟﻤﺘﺠﻲ اﻟ ﻮ الﻳ ﺔ واﻟ ﺴﻴﺪ اﻟﻌﻘﻴﺪ اﺑﻮﺑﻜﺮ‬ ‫—‬ ‫ﺣ ﻀ ﺮ ﻟ ﻤ ﻜﺎ ن اﻟ ﺤﺎد ث اﻟﻤﻴﺪ راﻟﻌﻘﻴﺪ ﺑﺪ ر اﻟﺪﻳ ﻦ ﻋﺜﻤﺎ ن‬ ‫—‬

‫زاﻟﺮاﺋﺪ‬ ‫ﺳ ﺪ ا ﺣ ﻤ ﺪ ~ ﻣ ﺴﺘ ﻮد‪-‬ﺛﺂ ت أﻟ ﻔ ﺠ ﺮ ة‬
‫ﺷ ﺮ ﻃ ﻢ ﻋﻴﺪ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ اﺣﻤﺪ اﻟﺒ ﺸﻴ ﺮ — رﺋﻴ ﺲ ﻗ ﺴﻢ ﺷ ﺮ ﻃﺔ اﻟ الﻣﺎ ب واﻟ ﻤ ال زم ‪ /‬ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌ ﻈﻴﻢ ﻣ ﺤ ﻤﺪ ﻃﻲ‬
‫ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮ ي اﻟﺒ ال غ — ﺷ ﺮ ﻃ ﺔ اﻟ الﻣﺎ ب وﺗ ﻢ ﻓﺘ ﺢ ﺑ ال غ ﺑ ﺸ ﺮ ﻃ ﺔ اﻟ الﻣﺎ ب ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴ ﺪ ر ‪) ٢٦ ١‬‬

‫ﻟﻠ ﻜ ﺮ م ﺑ ﺎ ﻟ ﻌ ﻠ ﻢ وﻟﻜﻢ اﻟ ﺸﻜﺮ‬

‫ﻖ؛‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻴ ﻖ ﻗ ﻮ ﻃ‬

‫ﻳﻖو؛!أل؛ﻓﻴﻖ ﺀﻫﻤﺤﺈج ﻣﺤﺒﻤﻪ إﻣﺒﻤﻘﻬﻖ‬

‫‪:‬‬ ‫ﻋﺎ‪ /‬ﻟ ﻮا ﺀ ﺷ ﻮ ﻃ ﺔ‬

‫ﺻﺪﻳﻮادادة اﻟﺪﻓﺎع اﻟ ﺒ ﻨ ﻲ‬
‫ؤالﻳﺔ اﻛﺮظﺀﺀم‬
‫؛‬ ‫ﻧ ﺴ ﺨ ﺔ اﻟ ﻲ‬
‫اﻟﻤﻴﺪرﻣﺬﻳ ﺮ ﺷ ﺮ ﻃ ﺔ و الﻳ ﺔ اﻟ ﺨﺮ ﻃﻮم‬
‫ﻣﺪﻳ ﺮ ا إلدا رة اﻟﻤﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻓﺎ ع اﻟﻤﺪﻧ ﻲ‬
 ‫ه اﻟﺮﻇﻤﻦ اﺗﺮﻫﺪم‬ ‫ﻟﺼﻢ‪1‬‬

‫ﻫ ﺖ أﺟﻮاﺑﺎ إﻫﺎﺑﺔ م اﻛﺒﻤﺪة ﻫﻤﺪ ﺑﻤﻴﻮ ب م‪.‬د ق ﻓﻲ ﻃﻠ ﺐ‬ ‫( ‪) ٤٤‬‬ ‫ﺑﻤﺎدح ا ﺑ ﻲ ا ﺋ ﺐ ‪ ، ١ ٠/ ٤/ ٢٤‬؟م اﻟﻤﺎﺻﺔ ‪ ٢٣٠٠٦‬و ﺑ ﺎ ﻟ ﺪ ل‬
‫م ا آل م دار ا ﻟ ال م اﻳﻠ ﻎ ‪ /‬اﻫﻮص ﻧﻬﺮ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ت ‪، ٩١٢٣ ^ ٢٠٠٣‬وﻋﻠﻲ اﻟ ﻔ ﻮ ز * ر ﻛ ﺖ اﻛﺮﺑﻤﺔ‬ ‫ﻳ ﺸ ﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎج ﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﺀرئﺀ*م‬
‫‪ ٩٨٣‬إﻃﻔﺎﺀواﻟﺘﺎﻧﻜﺮ ‪ ٧٤‬ﺀ ‪ ٨‬اﻟﻲ ﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺨﺎث*ث و ﻛﺬﻟ ﻚ ﻧﺤﺮف اﻟﻴﻌﻮﺋ ﺢ اﺧﺮﻳﻖ اﻛﺮﺑﺔ إﻃ ﺊ ﺀا‪/‬ة ‪٩٩‬‬ ‫‪،‬‬

‫وﻳﻌﺪ اﺋﺆﺻﻮل اﻟﻲ ﺀوﻟﺞ ا‪-‬زاﻗﺚ ﻣﺘﻲ إ ن اﻟﺨﺮق !ﻣﺤﺎك ﻓﻲ ﺗ ﺎ ﺋ ﻢ ^‪ ،٠‬وﻟﻢ ‪ ٠٩٨‬ج ﻗﺎم ﻳﻄﺮى ﻣ ﻠ ﻪ ﺑﻤﻦ اﻳﺘﺮﻳﻦ أﻗﺪر ﺀاﻟ ﻒ ﻟ ﻢ ةاخﺀ=ل‬
‫اﻟﻄﻠﻤﺔ ﺗﻤﺖ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة ﺀﻟ ﺔ ﺑﺠﻌﺪ اف ﻣﺤﺎﻟﻲ وﻣﺊ ﻟ ﺖ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﺜﺎ ر ﻛ ﺔ ﻓﻲ إﻃﻔﺎﺋﻪ ﺑﻤﺪم ا ﻳ ﺌ ﺎ ر‪- ،‬ﺀﺀث ﺗﻢ ﺑﻤﺎوﺗﻪ اﻟ ﻮا ﺟﺪﻳ ﻦ ﺑﺎﻟ ﻄﻠﻤﺔ ﺷﺒﻤ ﺺ‬

‫ﺀدف (أم ) ﻃ ﻔ ﻲ ﺑﺪره آ ك وﺀدد (ا)‪-‬ﺗﺮوﻟﻲ ﺑﻠﺪة ‪ ،‬ﺀ ك ﻓﻲ ارﻳﻔﻰ ‪-‬‬

‫ﻣ ﺤ ﺘ ﻰ ‪ - :‬ﻓﻲ ط(ﻣﺔ ﺑﻤﺎﺋﺮ ﻳﺎﻟﺨﺎج ﻳﻮﺳﻒ صﺀع ‪. ٣٠‬‬

‫س ‪ :‬ﺳﺲ‪-,‬ر ه ‪. .‬‬ ‫ض ا‬

‫‪ 1‬ﻳ ﻤ ﺤ ﻔ ﻤ ﺤ ﻢ‪ :‬ﻛﻬﻮإﺀ ‪ -‬ا ﻛ ﺄ‬

‫‪-‬‬ ‫ﻳ ﺎ ﻳ ﺔ ﻳﺘﺮﻓﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﻖ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ ب ﺧ ﺮ ﻃ ﻮ ﺷﺘﻘ ﺮ خ اﻟ ﺮ ﻳ ﻦ‬ ‫؟‬ ‫ﻣ ﺤ ﺺ أ ﻟ ﻌ ﻔ ﺶ ت ﻋﺪد‬

‫د‪<-‬‬ ‫إﻟﻨ ﺠ ﻄ ﻞ ‪ .‬ة ‪ < < < :‬ا ج‬

‫ا ﻣ ﺤﺌﺌ ﺆ ت ﻣﺒﻴﻮن ﺟﻴﻪ ﺳﺆدار]‬

‫ا ‪- /‬ﺑﻤﺪ‪،‬ي ﺋ ﻬ ﺰ‪ ،‬ا‪-.‬ﻣﺪم ﻣ ﻊ ر م داقا ع ﺀﺀدي ‪-‬ﺀاج‪-‬ﻳﻮﺳﺔث أ؛ﺻﺠﻪ ﻓﻲ د م‪ ،‬اد ﺀ ن ؟ ‪/ /‬ﺣﻨﻞ‪-‬زن ﻣﺢ^ﺗﻲ ص ض أص— ؛ إ‬ ‫‪£ 4 (1^ 1‬‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻓ ﻢ ‪ ،‬اﻳﻬ ﻦ ﻣﻢ ‪ /‬وأﺻﻴﺐ اﻟﻮاﻃﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﻟﺪﺧﻮي ﻣﻦ ﺻﺎل اﻟ ﻈﻠﻤﺔ اﺻﺴﺠﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺑ ﻢ ‪ 1‬ﻟﻴﻤﺈؤﻳﻮؤ إ ﺳﺎ ف اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻳﺘﻲ ﻳﺎﻟﻮﻣﺢﺀدة ‪ ٠ ٠‬أ ﺀورﺑﻤﺎ‬
‫‪.‬‬ ‫ﻏﻮﻃﻖ إﻟﻰﻣﺢ‪-‬ﺀﻏﺾ اآلﻳﺎن ﺟﺪﻳﺪ‬

‫م؛‬ ‫*‬ ‫ﻚ ‪۴٤ ^ ٠٧ :‬‬ ‫ﺳ ﻤ ﻤ‬

‫آ‬ ‫و ﺀدﻗﺎﺑﻢ ﻋﺮﻳﺔ ﻗﻮر;ﻣﺤﺔ ﺑﻤﻦ ﺷﺮﻃﺔ ﻣﺤﻠﺔ ا ﻓﺄ ج ءﻧف‬ ‫ﺣﻤﺪدة ﻋﺮﺑﺎت دﻓﺎع ﻣﺪي‬
‫; ‪-‬‬ ‫إﻓ ﻀ ﻂ‪ .‬ط ي‪ -‬م؟ال* آ إﺛﻤﺄ*ﺷﺚ‬
‫؛ إ إل؛ ﺟ ﻲ د ‪-.‬ة‬
‫م‬ ‫ؤز‬ ‫‪;.‬ﺀ ; ‪: .‬‬ ‫ا ﻟﻢ ﺀد ال*قﺀد ﺷﺮﻃﺔ ‪/‬جﺀص ﻣﺤﺰﻣﻤﻮن‬
‫ا ﻟ ﻤ ﻪ اﻟﻘﺪم ﻗ ﻄ ﺔ ‪ /‬إﺑﺮا ﻫﻢ ﻃﻪ اﻟﺨﻮش‬

‫ن ~; ‪.‬‬ ‫•‪.٠١‬‬ ‫ا ﺋ ﺐ اﻟﻘﺪم ﺑﺸﺮﻃﺔ ‪ /‬ﻳﺎﺳﺮ ﻋﺜﻤﺎن اﻟﻄﺌﺐ‬

‫‪،.‬؛‪.‬؛**‬ ‫؛‬ ‫ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺪ اﻟالزم ﺷﺮﻃﺔ ‪ /‬ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻳﺎﻳﻜﺮ إﺑﺮاﻫﻢ‬

‫‪١‬‬ ‫‪٠‬‬ ‫*‬

‫ﺿ ﻢ ﺷﺮﻃﺔ اﻟﺨﺎج ﻳﻮﺳ ﻒ رﻗﻢ اﻳ ال غ^ ‪ ٢ ٤‬ﻧﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﺎدة ‪ ١‬ة إ ﺟﺮاﺀا ث ﻣ ﺤ ﻤ ﻲ> ﺀرﻳﻒ ﻫﺮﺀﻟﺔ ﻣ ﺪ اﻟﺪﻣﻢ ﻫﻤﺪ اﻟﺮ ص‬ ‫وﺗﻢ ﻓ ﺞ ﻳ ال غ‬

‫ﻣ ﺤ ﻚ‬
‫اﻟ ﺴﻴﺪاﻣﺪﻳﺮ ﺷﺮﻃﺔ والﻳﺔ ا ﻟ ﺨ ﺮ ﻃ ﻮ م‬
‫اﻟﺌﺪرﻳﺪ‪/‬ﻣﺪﻳﺮ ا إل دا ر ة ا ﻟ ﺘ ﺎ ﻣ ﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻓﺎع اﻟ ﻘ ﺬ ﻧ ﻲ‬
‫اﻟ ﻨﻠ ﻤ ﺰ‬ ‫‪-‬‬ ‫اﻟ ﻤﻠ ﻒ‬
References
 References

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- Apr 1,2002-27/11/2010 - M P - 11:45
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1,1989- h\Xp://www.firetactics.com/CARBON%20MONOXIDE.pdf -

5 / 9 / 2010-10:01 AM.

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12, 000 - http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/fr/marin/4300-l.tlp.pdf
- 5/2/2010-10:24PM
4) Fire Safety Analysis Manual LP-Gas Storage Facilities -

Phani K. Raj, Ph.D., Technology and Management

Systems, Inc. Theodore C. Lemoff, PE, 2006 - 8/5/2010 -
12:04 PM
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Industries- Prepared by a Working Party of the Engineering Practice Committee
of the Institution of Chemical Engineers-
http://www.manganese.org/...data/ assets/pdf-fil - 5/9/2010-
10:01AM
6) National Fire Code Subscription Service -NFPA 58- Liquefied
Petroleum Gas Code ■■2001 Edition - 20/9/20210 - 8:46AM
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8 ) The Nature Of LPG Products , Their Storage Measurement and
Delivery - - http://ts.nist.gov/WeightsAndMeasures/upload/LPG-
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9) — 2003 — (JjlujI —

2 0 1 0\8\12