DE LEON, Inna Elyjah Beatrice C.

September 26, 2018

2017-0471 Torts and Damages, W 7:30-9:30PM

CASE DIGESTS

1. PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 147703)

FACTS:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court
further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled
that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.

HELD:
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the
court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.
The accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action. What is deemed instituted in every
criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but
not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.

2. PACIS v. MORALES (G.R. No. 169476)

FACTS:
Alfred Pacis, 17 years of age, died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. His parents, Alfredo
Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against the gun store owner,
Jerome Jovanne Morales.
Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he
was at the gun store. The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in
by a customer for repair. The said gun was kept in a drawer of a table located in the
 store. At the time of the incident, Morales was not in the store. The store was left to
Matibag and Herbolario, who was entrusted by Morales’ employee to hold the keys to
the drawer where the gun was kept. They later brought out the gun. Alfred got hold of
the gun, and when asked to return it on the table, the bullet went off and consequently
hit him.
The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under A2180
in relation to A2176, ruling that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his
death was partyl due to the negligence of Morales’ emplyee – Matibag. CA reversed,
ruling that there was no employee-employer relationship because Matibag was not
under the control of Morales with respect to the means and methods in the
performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if Matibag was an
employee, Morales still cannot be held civilly liable because there is no negligence
can be attributed to Morales because he kept the gun.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is civilly liable

HELD:
YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair
and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales himself was negligent.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a
gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.
As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to
avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Morales has the duty to ensure
that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready access
defensive use.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
accepting the defective gun for repair, Morales should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, Morales should never accept a
firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally
checked that the weapon is completely unloaded
Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of
a good father of a family, much less the the bullet which killed Alfred was fired from
a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.

3. AIRFRANCE v. CARRASCOSO

FACTS:
Defendant Rafael Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. While en route to Rome from Manila,
he was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because
a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. A commotion ensued when
Carrascoso refused to give up his seat, but upon the advice of other Filipinos on
board, he eventually transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
 Upon returning to the Philippines, Carrascoso sued Air France for damages for
the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. He testified in court that he was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent, but against his will. This
testimony was corroborated by a journal entry of a plane purser who was present in
the plane at that time.
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court
eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that
the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony
regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages

HELD:
Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There
was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract
was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated”
and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the
issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a
first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air
France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.

4. RAMOS v. CA (G.R. No. 124354)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused
by stones in her gall bladder. Dr. Orlino Hosaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda
should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Rogelio, husband of Erlinda, asked
Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.
Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, administered the anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka
arrived three hours late from the scheduled procedure. Nonetheless, the operation
continued and Herminda then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her
saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka issued an
order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. The patient was
placed in a trendelenburg position for decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00
PM, the patient was taken to the ICU.
Four months after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the
patient has been in a comatose condition.
Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private
respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
Petitioners contended that the faulty management of her airway casused the
lack of oxygen in the patient’s brain. On the respondent’s part, they contended that the
brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD:
Yes. The Court finds the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at
bar.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused
by the defendant's want of care.
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find
a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care.
Erlinda submitted herself soundly and fit for surgery. However, during the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she
suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went
out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously,
brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in
the process of a gall bladder operation.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is
injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and
exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice
dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur.
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, the court finds her negligent during the
anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
properly intubate the patient which she admitted.
During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the
gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea.
Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into
 the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. Even granting that
the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too
late.
An experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-
operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short neck and
protruding teeth.
Hence, she was negligent.
For Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the head of the surgical team and as the so-called
captain of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility to see to it that those under him
perform their task in the proper manner
Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record
exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez
properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape the court that
respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's operation, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional
duties towards his patient.
Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas
condition.
As for the hospital (employer) itself, the Court ruled that for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of
the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which
it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition.

5. CASTILEX v. VASQUEZ (G.R. No. 132266)

FACTS:
Romeo Vasquez was driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmena Rotonda.
He was not wearing any protective helmet or goggles. He was only carrying a
Student’s Permit to Drive.
Benjamin Abad, a Production Manager of Castilex Industries Corp., was then
driving the company-owned Toyota Pick-Up after office hours. He took a shortcut in
the rotunda and went against the flow of the traffic. In the process, a collision
occurred between the motorcycle and the pick-up.
Vasquez sustained severe injuries as a result, and was rushed to the hospital by
Abad. Several days later, Vasquez died. Abad signed an Acknowledgement of
Responsible Party where he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees
and other incidental charges that may incur.
 Vasquez’ parents filed an action for damages against Abad and Castilex. The
trial court ordered Castilex and Abad to pay jointly and severally the spouses and
Cebu Doctors’ Hospital.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but held that the
liability of Castilex is vicarious and not solidarily with Abad.

ISSUE: Whether the employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting
from the negligent operation by the managerial employee of the company-issued
vehicle.

HELD:
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-
employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may
find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Abad did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu
City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, Abad took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when Abad was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
occurred.
To the mind of this Court, Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the
normal working hours. Abad's working day had ended; his overtime work had already
been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a
"haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to
petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or
one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.