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incident has been admitted by the appellant and his only defence was that the deceased Savita

committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself which has been found to be false by both the
courts below. Thus, the circumstantial evidence of the deceased being present at the place of
occurrence and the death being not suicidal rule out the chance of the appellant being innocent.
The circumstantial evidence itself proves the guilt of the appellant

16. Coming now to the second question of admissibility and reliability of DDs Exhibits 41 and
43 it will be necessary to refer to the text of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, which is as
follows :

“32 Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc ., is
relevant. —Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who
cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot
be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case,
appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:—

(1) when it relates to cause of death. —When the statement is made by a person as to the
cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in
his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such
statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time
when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the
proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.” (emphasis added)
A bare perusal of the section shows :
(i) Statement should be of a person who is dead/cannot be found/has become incapable
of giving evidence etc;
(ii) It should relate to the relevant facts; and
(iii) (It should relate to cause of ‘his death’ or circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in ‘his death’, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into
question

In the present case, we are concerned with Point (iii) as we are concerned with the question
whether statement of Prabhabai is relevant for determining cause of death of Savita. In other
words, when charge is of murder of Savita, whether cause of death of Prabhabai which is
integral part of the incident can also be held to be in question

On a plain reading, the statement is admissible about the cause of death or the circumstances
of the transaction which resulted in the death of the person making the statement. Question is
what happens when two deaths have taken place in the same transaction and circumstances of
the transaction resulting in one death is closely interconnected with the other death.
Admittedly, the DD of Prabhabai is admissible as to cause of her death as well as the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death. Such statement may not by
itself be admissible to determine the cause of death of anyone other than the person making
the statement. However, when the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death of
the person making the statement as well as death of any other person are part of the same
transaction, the same will be relevant also about the cause of death of such other person

Expressions “Relevant” and “facts in issue” are defined in the Evidence Act as follows:
"Relevant" - One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the
other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of
facts. "Facts in issue" -The expression "facts in issue" means and includes--any fact from
which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, nonexistence, nature or
extent of any right, liability, or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding,
necessarily follows. Section 6 is as follows : “6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same
transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form
part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place
or at different times and places.

= Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire- It implies that a man who is on death bed would
not tell a lie to falsely implicate innocent person[6]. No one at the point of death is presumed
to lie because A man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth— is the philosophy in
law underlying admittance in evidence of dying declaration. A dying declaration made by
person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is
most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the
guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or
circumstances leading to his death. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence
of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the Courts, it
becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the Court is satisfied that
the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by
itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration.

Admissibility

It is not always necessary that a dying declaration should be certified by a doctor before reliance
could be placed on the same. But then in the absence of any such certificate, the Courts should be
satisfied that from the material on record it is safe to place reliance on such uncertified
declaration.

Unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the preview of Section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act, there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in
evidence. In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible (written or oral), the
statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the transactions
which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into question.

Similarly in State of M.P. vs. Dal Singh and Ors., (2013) 14 SCC 159, the Supreme Court at
para 14 has held:

"The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that law does not provide who can record
a dying declaration, nor is there any prescribed form, format, or procedure for the same. The
person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind
and is capable of making such a statement. Moreover, the requirement of a certificate provided
by a Doctor in respect of such state of the deceased, is not essential in every case

Corpus menti

0. In burn cases, usually it is argued that the victim was possibly not capable of making the dying
declaration because of burns or due to sedation given by the doctors, which is, in a way, the
preliminary or first treatment to relieve and soothe the pain and anxiety. However, expert
medical opinion does allay such suggestions, for they reject that the impact of burn wounds or
drugs used to treat burns, affect the higher functions of brain. They accept the proposition that
compos mentis is neither affected by burns nor by treatment (refer Gupta BD, Jani CB. Status of
compos mentis in relation to dying declaration in burn patients. Journal of Indian Academy of
Forensic Medicine(JIAFM) 2004; 25(4): 133 to 136). Thus such arguments should not be
accepted, without reference to the factual matrix and the deposition of the witness recalling and
asserting that he had recorded the dying declaration.

21. In cases of 100 per cent burn injuries, a person can make a dying declaration or put a thumb
impression. There are several decisions where the Supreme Court has relied on such dying
declarations (See Mafabhai Nagarbhai Rawal vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 2186; Rambhai
vs. State of Chattisgarh, (2002) 8 SCC 83; Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC
2973; Koli Chunilal Savji vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 SC 3695; Smt. Laxmi vs. Om Prakash
and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2383; Govindappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533
and The State of Punjab vs. Gian Kaur and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2809).

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