Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case digests.
FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall
be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls
ABS-CBN: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and
that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are
the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots,"
as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the
constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State
in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the
community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to
sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit
poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with
the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear
and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.
Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are
selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general
sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at
par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can
only be indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and
confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or
not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting
centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in
voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near
an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally
prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that
could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain
unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the
electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and
other factors on voters' choices.
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy
of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters.
The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification.
Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making
copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding
out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who
have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the
purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This
result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a
pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of
whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their
identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize
or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of
our people.##
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after
they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an
advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had
not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections
VERY
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Yason also sent a formal letter to COMELEC, copy furnished the Roxas Election Registrar,
embodying the same protest.
After the canvass of election returns was completed on February 1, 1980, the respondent Board of
Canvassers certified that the number of votes obtained by the candidates were:
Yason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933
Suarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,568
thus indicating that Yason won by 365 votes over Suarez. Incidentally, only Yason and one councilor
in his line-up won. The winning candidate for vice-mayor, Oscar C. Sison, and seven of the eight
councilors who won were in the ticket of respondent Suarez. Councilor Venancio Yap, the sole
candidate who won with petitioner Yason placed fifth among the elected councilors.
A day later, on February 2, 1980, Suarez filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Yason
as candidate for mayor. Notice of the petition or a copy thereof was not furnished the petitioner. Two
days later, on February 4, 1980, without the petitioner having been given an opportunity to
controvert, comment upon, or answer the petition, the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution
which denied due course to the candidacy of Yason. Having secured a copy of the resolution on his
own initiative, Yason filed on February 11, 1980 a motion for reconsideration followed by a motion to
suspend proclamation of the mayor of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
On February 13, 1980, the COMELEC ordered the citizens' election committee and the election
registrar of Roxas to consider all votes cast for Yason as stray and to declare Lucio T. Suarez as
duly elected mayor.
The petitioner contends that respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions.
On February 26, 1980, this Court restrained the respondents from enforcing the questioned
resolutions. The restraining order was later modified to enjoin respondent Suarez from assuming the
office of mayor and from discharging the duties of the mayorship.
On March 18, 1980, respondent Suarez filed a comment and counter-petition with this Court. In this
counter-petition, Suarez stated that the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Yason as mayor-
elect on March 2, 1980. He also asks that this proclamation be set aside.
In this petition, Yason raises the following issues for consideration:
I. THE COMELEC, AFTER THE ELECTION AND ALL THE VOTES WERE
PROPERLY CANVASSED (AND WINNER PROCLAIMED) HAVE NO MORE
POWER OR JURISDICTION TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OR
DISQUALIFY PETITIONER AS A CANDIDATE;
The private respondent has introduced affidavits to show that the local Nacionalista Party of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro campaigned for Yason as its own candidate for mayor. Apart from protesting his
inclusion in the NP line-up of the provincial chapter and formally disowning such support in a
telegram and letter to COMELEC, the petitioner has not shown what other measures he took.
Nevertheless, we cannot categorically tag Yason as a "turncoat" under the law simply because he
did not reject more strongly the support which another party voluntarily gave to him.
SO ORDERED
COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List of Voters “on the ground of massive irregularities committed
in the preparation and being statistically improbable”, and ordering a new registration of voters for the
local elections.
Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to “obvious manufactured returns,” a proper
subject matter for a pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that
election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of
Voters had already been finally annulled.
Issue: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the
results since the original List of Voters had been finally annulled.
Held: The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters,
there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only
36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801 voters.
Petitioner’s cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the
COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the
subsequent annulment of a questioned registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence
of persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a voter’s
list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to
challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors and such
challenge should relate to specified election returns against which the petitioner should have made
verbal elections.
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution in SPR No. 45-96, dated April 29, 1997. Petitioner ABAD had sought
COMELECs review of respondent Judges orders issued in the election protest filed
against private respondent SARENAS. In said Resolution, the COMELEC denied review,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, considering that the June 3, 1996 Order of the Court a quo had already attained finality at
the time of the filing of this Petition, thus, must remain undisturbed, and there being no showing that
the drawing of lots mandated by the Courts Order dated October 3, 1996, was attended by fraud or
irregularities, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit.[1]
The October 3, 1996 Order of the MTC, is issued in implementation of the June 3, 1996 Order, declaring
a tie between Petitioner and Respondent Sarenas and directing a drawing of lots to break it. Having
become executory as of October 3, 1996, its implementation become mandatory. Records show that
Petitioner was duly notified of the proceedings. He did not appear despite notice. He can not invoke his
non-appearance as an excuse for questioning the proceedings. The same was conducted in public. No
irregularity or anomaly attending the proceeding was proven by Petitioner. There is therefore no cogent
reason to warrant the setting aside of the result thereof.[8]
Hence, this petition. While petitioner raises principally the issue of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for not declaring as null and void the challenged
orders of the trial court, the more fundamental issue here, in our view, involves the
COMELECs own jurisdiction. The Court cannot proceed further in this case without
resolving that issue.
Note that from the trial court, petitioner proceeded directly to the COMELEC en
banc. Apparently, he was proceeding pursuant to Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824, which provides:
xxx The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of
the MetC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. xxx
But we find this rule not in accord but in conflict with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the
Constitution, which states that:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en bancor in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)
Facts: The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclaimed petitioner
Ramirez winner in the vice-mayoralty race over another candidate, private respondent Go based on
the results showing that Ramirez obtained more votes than Go.
Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming that owing to error in addition, he
was credited with lesser votes. The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to
reconvene and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate.
Acting on separate motions filed by Ramirez and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier
resolution.
Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc resolutions and to reinstate
his proclamation as the duly elected vice-mayor. He alleged that the COMELEC en banc had no
jurisdiction over the controversy since it was not yet acted upon by a division of the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of
manifest error filed by private respondent Go?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules which provides correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the
canvassing as one of the pre-proclamation controversies which maybe filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc.
The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions but directed COMELEC to reconvene the
MBC or if this is not feasible, to constitute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to
promptly revise the Statement of Votes based on the election returns from all the precincts of the
Municipality and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.
AMENDEDDECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari petitioners seek to annul and set aside the Resolution
dated June 4, 1998 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division directing
the proclamation of private respondent as Mayor of the City of Manila for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess, of jurisdiction.
The backdrop of the instant case reveals the following antecedent facts:
Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein
private respondent Jose L. Atienza were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the
COMELEC a complaint for disqualification against private respondent, docketed as SPA
No. 98-319, on the ground that the latter allegedly caused the disbursement of public
funds in the amount of Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
(P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the prohibited forty-five-day period before
the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261 (g) (2)[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The alleged
disbursement was intended to be distributed in the form of financial assistance to the
public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in that city
during the elections.
On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)*issued an order suspending the
proclamation of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it appearing that the evidence presented consisting of disbursement voucher
and the general payroll evidencing payment to the teachers in the form of financial assistance dated
May 5, 1998, in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
SEC. 68 Disqualifications. - Any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Section 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any Section 80, 83, 85, 86
and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived hi (sic) statues (sic) as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws (Sec. 25, 1971
EC) (underscoring ours).
show a probable cause of commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification, and
the evidence in support of disqualification is strong, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila is hereby
directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the City of Manila, but to suspend
proclamation of respondent Jose L. Atienza, Jr. should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of City Mayor of Manila, until such time when the petition for disqualification against him shall
have been resolved.
The Executive Director of this Commission is directed to cause the immediate implementation of this
Order.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
sought to set aside the afore-quoted order directing the suspension of his
proclamation as mayor.
On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)*handed down a resolution granting
the motion for reconsideration, ratiocinating thusly:
The Commission En Banc finds correct respondent's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 for his
cause. The Resolution, promulgated by the Commission in order to formulate the rules governing the
disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 6 of Republic Act 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987,
pertinently provides:
The applicability of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 on cases of such nature as the one at bench, had
been upheld by the Supreme Court in Lozano vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. 94628, October 28,
1991, when it declared:
Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The
COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in
general. Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.
Considering therefore, that the petition for disqualification was filed after the election but before
respondent's proclamation, the Commission En Banc, conformably with Resolution No. 2050, hereby
dismisses the same as a disqualification case but refers Petitioners' charges of election offense against
respondent to the Law Department for appropriate action.[3]
SO ORDERED.[4]
That same day at around eleven oclock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion
to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the
same day, petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Second Motion
to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent before COMELEC en
banc.
Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three oclock in
the afternoon of the same day, June 4, 1998, and proclaimed private respondent as
the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.[5]
On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant
petition to set aside the June 4, 1998 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division.
Records reveal, however, that said motion for reconsideration pending before the
COMELEC en bancwas denied in its Order of July 2, 1998 at the instance of herein
petitioners themselves for the reason that they had already filed a petition before this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 134047.[6]
The instant petition seeks to strike down as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion COMELEC First Division Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the
petition for disqualification and referring the case to the COMELECs Law Department
for preliminary investigation, based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Petitioners
contend that Resolution No. 2050 had already been nullified by the decision of this
Court in Sunga vs. Comelec.[7] Such being the case, petitioners argue that the COMELEC
should be compelled by mandamus to assume jurisdiction and continue to hear and
decide the disqualification case.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed by
virtue of the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of
this nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition or disqualification cases contemplated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a
strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of this specific class of disqualification
cases;
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of
disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds
specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the
Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the
Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the
respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the
disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or an
(sic) motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the law Department of the Commission as the
instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of
all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective
of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been
proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case.However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate,
the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall
be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with
the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the
respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission enbanc within
five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima faciefinding of guilt,
it shall submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate court.
Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,
which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case.--Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong (italics supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word 'shall' signifies
that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be
enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election.Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows
what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. xxx[9]
The ruling in Sunga is not applicable to the case at bar. There, the complaint for
disqualification was filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. Under Section 6 of R.A.
6646, where the complaint was filed before the election but for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
COMELEC shall continue with the trial and hearing of the case. Thus, the facts
in Sunga fall under the contemplation of Section 6, namely: (1) the complaint for
disqualification was filed before the election; (2) for any reason, the issue of
disqualification was not finally resolved before the election; and (3) the candidate
sought to be disqualified is voted for and received the winning number of
votes. Consequently, the COMELEC should have continued with the hearing and
decided the case on the merits. Instead, COMELEC erroneously dismissed the
disqualification case and referred the matter to the Law Department for preliminary
investigation of the criminal aspect of the case. The deleterious effect of the
premature and precipitate dismissal was pointed out by this Court, thus:
xxx A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the
dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for
any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by
the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ
delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not
be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main
intent and purpose of the law.[10]
xxx
xxx Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a definite policy and procedure for disqualification
cases. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions, which include disqualification cases, in
general. Hence, as between a specific and a general rule, the former shall necessarily prevail.
xxx[12]
It bears stressing that the Court in Sunga recognized the difference between a
disqualification case filed before and after an election when, as earlier mentioned, it
stated that the referral of the complaint for disqualification where the case is filed
before election is totally different from the other two situations contemplated by
Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the
proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation
winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed
as a disqualification case.
Why there is a difference between a petition for disqualification
filed before and after the election proceeds from the fact that before the election,
thequestion of disqualification is raised as an issue before the electorate and those
who vote for the candidate assume the risk that should said candidate be disqualified
after the election, their votes would be declared stray or invalid votes. Such would not
be true in the case of one filed after the electorate has already voted.[13]
Petitioners further postulate that the proclamation of private respondent on June
4, 1998 is void because it was made without awaiting for the lapse of the five-day
period for the finality of decisions rendered by a division in special actions," citing
Sec. 13 (c) Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of procedure providing that unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and
Special cases. xxx
We find this contention without merit.
The mere filing of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate. In the absence of an order suspending
proclamation, the winning candidate who is sought to be disqualified is entitled to be
proclaimed as a matter of law. This is clear from Section 6 of R.A. 6646 providing that
the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified is suspended only if there
is an order of the COMELEC suspending proclamation. Here, there was no order
suspending private respondents proclamation.Consequently, private respondent was
legally proclaimed on June 4, 1998.
Neither did the COMELEC err in not ordering the suspension of private
respondent's proclamation. The second paragraph of paragraph 2 of Resolution No.
2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the elections but before
proclamation, as in this case, the complaint must be dismissed as a disqualification
case but shall be referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. If
before the proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and
the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of respondent with
the court before which the criminal case is pending and that court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.[14] It appearing that
none of the foregoing circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima facie finding
of guilt yet, a suspension of private respondent's proclamation is not warranted.The
mere pendency of a disqualification case against a candidate, and a winning candidate
at that, does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the
election. To hold otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless and
malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the suspension of the
proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also
to the defeat of the sovereign will of the electorate, and for the undue benefit of
undeserving third parties.[15]
Before we end, we take note that when petitioners filed the instant petition on
June 25, 1999, they had before the COMELEC en banc a pending motion for
reconsideration of the June 4, 1998 resolution of the First Division. The Court does not
look with favor the practice of seeking remedy from this Court without waiting for the
resolution of the pending action before the tribunal below, absent extraordinary
circumstances warranting appropriate action by this Court. This makes a short shrift
of established rules of procedure intended for orderly administration of justice.
The COMELEC (First Division) in its June 4, 1998 resolution correctly referred
petitioners complaint for disqualification to its Law Division for appropriate
action. There being no temporary restraining order from this Court, that body as an
instrument of the COMELEC should have continued with its task of determining
whether or not there exists probable cause to warrant the criminal prosecution of
those who may be liable for the alleged election offenses.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The respondent
Commission on Elections is hereby directed to RESOLVE with great dispatch the
pending incident relative to the preliminary investigation being conducted by its Law
Department.
SO ORDERED.
CANICOSA V. COMELEC
Petitioner Canicosa and private respondent Lajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna during
the May 1995 elections. After the canvassing, Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of
Canvasser. Thereafter, Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare failure of election and to
declare null and void the canvass and proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies
in casting and accounting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, unregistered voters voting and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from
the precincts to the office of the Municipal Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the
petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.
HELD:
(1) There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
i) The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
ii) The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
iii) After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes.
(2) Averment that more than one-half of the legitimate voters were not able to vote is not a ground which
warrants a declaration of failure of election.
(3) The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Sec.
6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must concur:
i) No voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and
ii) The votes that were not cast would affect the result of the election. From the face of the instant petition,
it is readily apparent that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
(4) The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which is a
justiciable issue properly recognized by the regular courts. — Fifteen (15) days before the regular
elections, the final list of voters was posted in each precinct. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa
could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular courts.
(5) The correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere clerical task of the
board of canvassers. The remedy invoked was purely administrative. The issue concerning registration
of voters, which Canicosa cited as a ground in his petition for declaration of failure of election, is an
administrative question. Likewise, questions as to whether elections have been held or whether certain
returns were falsified or manufactured and therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not
involve the right to vote. Such questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to pass
through any of its divisions. The provision in the constitution mandating the COMELEC to hear and
decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by COMELEC en banc, not
applicable if the case about to be resolved is purely administrative in nature.
Facts: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was
designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area
for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions
of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel
Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd
District of Davao City. Alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases questioning the
validity of the proclamation. The cases filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is an administrative
charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty,
Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service”, instituted in the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to take action on the
administrative case when in fact the petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the Administrative
jurisdiction.
Held: The COMELEC’s authority under Section 2 (6-8), Article 9 of the Constitution is
virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in
relation to the performance of his duties as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor.
The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and
control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and local
law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into
charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the
regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of
such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process
to the official or employee concerned.
271 SCRA 767 – Law on Public Officers – Ineligibility – SK Chairman – “Labo Doctrine”
Applied
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her
rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months
at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a
candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with
a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face
the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of
21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement
is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a
year but still less than 22 years – so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible
because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must
be:
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not
equivalent to “less than 22 years old.” The law does not state that the candidate be less than
22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they
should have expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be
declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the
second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winner’s
eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply because he
did not get the majority or the plurality of votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would
have been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite
knowing her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes “stray”.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK
member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such
vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not
SK membership.)
The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when
the SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily
resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent
without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s case is not what Section
435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility.
Being “eligible” means being “legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility,
on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section
435 for succession of the SK Chairman
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No.
135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions
of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to
1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as
a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in
terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995
election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and
void on the ground of failure of elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated
the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez,
Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served
three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was
duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for
local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the
May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as
the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under
Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot
be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It
has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned
by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents’
contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-
1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term
limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation
but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the
full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as
a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding
him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be
set aside.
2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption
of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to
resolve it on the merits.
In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the
substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid.
Facts:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of
the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of
bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing.
(Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction
has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.)
Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica
before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because:
a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and
disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate.
Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his
nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.
Issue:
WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having
been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.
Ratio Decidendi:
NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person
belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced.
Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for
Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS
Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination
as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's
nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute
candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be
nominated as such.