DALY ## #6077 vawenens & ASSOCIATES PATRICIA ANN HO AIR Your ref: Our ref: 7086-CHT 24 October 2018 ‘The Chief Executive Office of the Chief Executive ‘Tamar Hong Kong By Fax only: 2509 0580 Executive Council Secreté Tamar Hong Kong Attn.: Ms. Wendy Leung C to the Executive Couneil By Fax only: 2845 0176 Dear Madams, Recommendation of the Assistant Societies Officer for an Order prohibiting the operation or continued operation of the Hong Kong National Party We act for Mr. Chan Ho Tin and refer to the Order made by the Secretary for Security (“SS”) on 24 September 2018, purportedly in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 8(2) of the Societies ORdinance (Cap. 151), prohibiting the operation or continued operation of the Hong Kong National Party ("HNP") in Hong Kong. We write pursuant to section 8(7) of the Societies Ordinance to appeal to the Chief Executive in Council against an order by the Secretary for Security to prohibit the operation or continued operation of the HKNP in Hong Kong in accordance with section 8(2) of the Societies Ordinance which took effect on publication in the Gazette on 24 September 2018. Mr. Chan relies on and adopts all written submissions he and his legal representatives have submitted to the SS in relation to the captioned matter, and the correspondence between the SS and Mr. Chan and his legal representatives, as well as the submissions made by Mr. Chow Ho Fai in his letter to you of 24 October 2018. We enclose herewith Mr. Chan's written submissions dated 14 September 2018 (with attachment) for your easy reference, In addition to Mr. Chan’s written representations submitted to the SS, Mr. Chan also has the following responses to the SS’s reasons for deciding to make the Order: L As a matter of procedural fairness, Mr. Chan’s various requests, essential to his preparation of his written representations, had not been acceded to. This includes any correspondence between the Assistant Societies Officer (“ASO”) and the Companies {rd Floor Yam Tze Commercial Building, A MIFIEEM2SHR 1 +052 2781-2008 www dalyarsaciotornet 28 thomsonFead, Wanchai,Mong Kong. EFERAWM — f'+852278S-8072 iiceadalyassociatennetRegistry while the ASO prepared her Recommendation, which Mr. Chan had sought to request from the SS, the ASO, and the Companies Registry. 2. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the essence of the decision to make the Order was the SS's impeachment of the credibility of Mr. Chan and/or the HKNP in their express disavowal of the use of force. Apart from there being no basis at all to so impeach their credibility, the SS had also refused Mr. Chan’s request to be orally heard in order to answer their concerns. Essentially, without having even seen Mr. Chan in person, the SS found that he must not be a trustworthy person. Such a finding is procedurally unfair, unreasonable, and causes one to suspect whether such a finding was simply out of prejudice or bias against Mr. Chan or HKNP on the basis of their political views. 3. __At §14 of the Reasons, the SS basically repeated the ASO’s observations about HKNP's activities, and asserted that what HKNP had done was “beyond what is ‘part of ordinary political activity”. First, the SS completely failed to respond to Mr. Chan's point that all of HKNP’s activities have been “peaceful, lawful and non-violent”. Second, HKNP's activities are no less “part of ordinary political activity” than many well- established political parties are in many countries: the New Flemish Alliance has substantial representation in Belgian and even European political institutions; the Scottish National Party is the largest party in the Scottish Parliament and the third largest party in the British Parliament; and the Parti Quebecois again has representation in the Canadian House of Commons. All these parties openly (and peacefully) advocate for the independence of a region from their respective countries, yet they are accepted as ordinary political party in these democracies. Unless the SS is of the view that Hong Kong is somehow less capable of enjoying democracy and freedom of political participation than these other countries, the SS’s assertion that HKNP is beyond “ordinary political activity” simply because it advocates for independence is entirely naive and absurd, 4, Furthermore, the SS completely failed to appreciate the significance of the human rights principles referred to in Mr. Chan’s written representations - this is the only reason why the SS could erroneously equate “peaceful, lawful and non-violent” pursuit of Hong Kong independence with a “threat to national security” (at §14), and why the SS could completely fail to appreciate that HKINP's activities is far from bearing any “direct and immediate connection” with any threat to national security (at §15). Without repeating the authorities from European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee cited in Mr. Chan’s written representations, it suffices to reiterate Principle 29 of the Siracusa Principles: “National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat of force.” (Emphasis added) 5. The S$ based his reasons relating to public order and public safety on one essential basis: that he does not believe in Mr. Chan and HKNP's repeated disavowals of the use of force (at least since mid-2016). ‘Their disavowals are supported by their track record: the HKNP has indeed never done any violent acts in pursuit of their political ‘The SS could not point to any specific and clear examples of Mr. Chan or HKNPadvocating the use of violence or threatening the use of violence. Instead, the SS relied solely on ambiguous and oblique statements taken out of context such as at §18 where the SS relied on ASO’s observation that the HKNP would use “whatever effective means” and at §21 picked on certain political rhetoric used (mostly from 2 or 3 years ago) to infer that HKNP is a threat to public order. Pathetically, even the SS could eventually only resort to such bare speculations as “the possible effect of [HKNP’s] statements on its followers who may be motivated to follow suit and cause violence and public disorder” (emphasis added) (22) and some unspecified “tendencies and attitudes” of HKNP's supporters which were asserted to be a “high risk factor” in public assemblies ($24). It is telling that even the SS could not bring himself to conclude that HKNP would use force or threat of force in the pursuit of its goals. 6. The SS had to resort to some of the common non-violent protest methods that HKNP once mentioned, i.e. workers’ strikes, class boycotts and market strikes (“fE-T. - HEAR > HEH”), and speculate that such actions might be “coupled with a large sit-out blocking major thoroughfares” and “cause widespread disruption to Hong Kong” (§23). Similar actions have been supported and advocated by many Hong Kong political parties, (including “pro-cstablishment” groups) without facing prohibition. That the SS had to condemn such common industrial actions and protest methods by HKNP is unfortunate and simply exposes the flaws in his decision, 7. As for so-called “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, Mr. Chan reiterates that his views are that the relationship between Hong Kong and China is one that is similar to colonialism, and that domination and subjugation are apt to describe that relationship. It is within his freedom of expression and freedom of opinion to hold these views, whether or not the government agrees with him. Moreover, as Mr. Chan had said in his written representations, it is hypocritical and disingenuous (o accuse Mr. Chan of stirring up hatred towards people from the Mainland, when it was the Hong Kong Government who had, at the turn of the century, used exaggerated figures and rhetoric to stir up fear against Mainland immigration in the circumstances surrounding the Ng Ka Ling case, and later, in the Kong Yunming case, argued that Mainland immigration was one of the reasons to withhold social security benefits from non-permanent residents. It is clear that the SS was not genuinely concerned about rights and freedoms of people of Mainland origin, but was simply using this as a disguise to dress up his attempt to suppress the unfavourable political ideas that HKNP holds. 8. As for the necessity to make the Order now (at §§34-38), the essence of the $$°s case was that the public might accept HKNP's advocacy. This is not a legitimate reason to stifle political speech, as it amounts to little more than the intention to prevent the spread of political ideas other than those approved by the government. It is rather ironic that the SS bears no confidence in being able to convince the public to reject the independence of Hong Kong, but feels that he must suppress the messenger and the idea itself. Prior to the making of the decision, Mr. Chan and his legal representatives should be given an opportunity to make oral submissions before the Chief Executive in Council. Such an opportunity may allow Mr. Chan and the office-bearers of the HKNP to make their views known and to answer the concerns of the Chief Executive, and the members