Balogbog vs.

CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their
Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents’ estate at
the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in
1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino
by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their
brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted
during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the
son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent’s marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias
Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that
they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumably
the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence
in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that
the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been
proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in
force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only
by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not
been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any
other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and
wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in evidence”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of
their grandparents’ estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension
of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case
was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it

would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in
this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo,
died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

ermosisima v. CA
Nature of the Case: Acknowledgment

Doctrine: "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost 10 years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior
thereto.

One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise.

Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised
to marry the complainant.

The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was, on
February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees

CA affirmed this decision.

Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
Ruling: NO
Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June
1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a
sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled
that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and
bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the
two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint
affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their
spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both
have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage
contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage.

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa,
the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace
Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19,
1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated
in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.

FACTS: Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband in Pasay
City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing
her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and convinced her to
go for confession. They fetched Father Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter
upon hearing the confession of the bed-ridden Matea and knowing that she is living with
Felipe without the benefit of marriage then ratified the union of the two by solemnizing
their marriage in articulo mortis with the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from her
illnes but died subsequently after few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria,
granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint and complete delivery of the property of
the deceased contending that they are the succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the
marriage of the latter is not valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the
contracting parties. Felix resisted the action standing his rights as the widower. CFI
ruled in favor of the complainants but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis is valid.

HELD:

YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis, where all the requisites are
present renders its validity. The failure of the solemnizing priest to make and file an
affidavit as required under Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not affect the
validity nor renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence, CA’s devision is affirmed.
Corpuz v sto tomas

Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on
the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in
the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to
submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus
standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to
alien’s national law.

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on
the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said
decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is void.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered
t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.

BAYOT V CA

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a
child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as
Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No.
406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental
orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage
between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an
American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one,
being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli
granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American
passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's
property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In
determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

SAN LUIS V SAN LUIS

San Luis v San Luis
2007

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:

FACTS:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file
the petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus,
a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court

ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the
Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law
Tags: Divorce, Marriage

1
Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for

thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of

Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went

to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that

Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she

attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and

dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the

certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name

as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was

already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted

thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic

marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual

alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of

psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore

manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage.

It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the

matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties
will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his
special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of
whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained
by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the
divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed
divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and
he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.

QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Short summary: A Filipina wife divorced her Filipino husband then remarried twice. When her
former husband (who also remarried and had kids) died, she now claims a share from his estate,
claiming that the divorce decree she obtained is not valid as she is a Filipino national. Court held
that the 2nd wife of the decedent was not the surviving spouse because they were married even
before the divorce decree was obtained by the 1st wife. The court remanded the case just to
determine WON the 1st wife was already an US citizen when divorce decree granted.

Facts:
-Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan (both Filipinos) were married May 1941.
-Arturo Padlan married Blandina Dandad April 1947.
-Fe Quita obtained a divorce decree in California in July 1954. She remarried 2x
-1972: Arturo died intestate, leaving his 2nd family and Fe

WHO WAS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE? FE OR BLANDINA? Secret!

-Blandina's side implied that Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen when she acquired a divorce
decree. However, not threshed out during the trial so remand the case (the TC merely said that
since divorce is not valid in RP, divorce decree was also not valid)
-However, as the marriage between Blandina and Arturo was contracted when the 1st marriage
between Arturo and Fe was still subsisting, it is considered bigamous and thus void. Blandina is
clearly not the surviving spouse.
-but as the children of Blandina were all recognized by Arturo as his children, these children are
assured of shares in the intestate estate

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

Short Summary: Filipino wife and foreigner husband had properties in RP but got divorced,
acknowledging that they had no community property. Foreigner husband now sues wife for
accounting of their conjugal property in RP. SC held that since they are already divorced, no
community property. Unfair if Filipina is still bound to someone who does not consider her his wife.
:p

Facts:
ALICE (RP Citizen) and RICHARD (US Citizen):
-married in HK
-resided in RP as husband and wife for 10 years
-divorced in US
-afterwards, Alice married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada

RICHARD sued Alice for accounting of conjugal property and to manage conjugal property (the
Galleon Shop in Ermita)
-MTD by Alice: there was a previous judgment of divorce by the Nevada court ruling that they had
no community property
--DENIED: (1) property invoked is located in RP; (2) Divorce decree has no bearing in this case

WON DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED AS VALID IN RP? It depends…But here it was recognized.

-though it is true that DIVORCE is against public policy in RP, but absolute divorce is just not
applicable to Filipino nationals but NOT on aliens who may obtain divorce abroad validly under
their national law. If such was the case, divorce would be recognized in RP.
-In NEVADA LAW: Divorce dissolves the marriage. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. …
-Thus, pursuant to RICHARD's national law, HE IS NO LONGER THE HUSBAND OF ALICE. He would
have no standing to sue in the case as Alice's husband entitled to exercise control over the conjugal
estate.
-To maintain that under RP laws, American Richard should still be considered married to Alice
cannot be considered just. Alice should not be discriminated against in her won country if the ends
of justice are to be served.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with
Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
 (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter
and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine
consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to
Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included
the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the
reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and
was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent
belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
constitution.

De Santis v.Intestate Estate Jalandoni, December 1, 2010

FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother, Bernardino Jalandoni filed with RTC a petition for
issuance of letters of administration. Anonuevo et al intervened and claimed that their mother Sylvia De
Santis was daughter of Isabel and John. They alleged that at the time of Rodolfo’s death, their grandmother
Isabel was the lawful wife of Rodolfo based on a marriage certificate. Rodolfo’s brother opposed asserting
that the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married, hence, Isabel and Rodolfo’s
marriage was null and void. Petitioners argued that the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia could not be
used as proof that Isabel and John were indeed married.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Isabel and Rodolfo was valid

HELD: No. The birth certificate of Sylvia which indicates that Isabel and John were married is sufficient
proof that indeed they were married. Therefore Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void because at that time,
she was still married to John. Consequently, her descendants have no share in the estate of Rodolfo. While
a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that
she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for
only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration
for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro
is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license

. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

Facts:

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above
named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo
Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to
partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3) individual share of his
late father, but the defendants refused.

Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied
that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that
Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied
that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in
the complainthad been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that
they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.

Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the
uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where the respondents were with
Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and
he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN,
72 years old and a widow testified that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of
Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents
of Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan,
by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon
the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD,
himself, was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by the
LCR that his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also testified that he
lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.

On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was
not married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware
that his brother married anybody and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon
also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been
married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio.
The CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and
his filation.

Ruling:

The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that
petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would,
in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting
marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).

When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the
birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention
of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is
not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its
place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel
Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which
Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.

The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private

respondent’s self- serving negations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000

FACTS: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 in Quezon City. They
had two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal dwelling. Since then, they lived
separately with the children in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for
legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga which was later amended to a petition for
separation of property. In 1988, she filed a case of attempted parricide against Fernando. However, the
case was lowered to slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed for a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was denied. On appeal, she raised the issue of their marriage
being void ab initio for the lack of marriage license. Their marriage license was obtained on September 17,
1972 while their marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973. Hence, the marriage license was expired
already.

Issue: W/N the marriage is valid

Held: No. Evidence shows that there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Marriage is
void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Issue on psychological incapacity is hereby mooted.

Vda de Chua vs. CA

GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994

FACTS:

Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28,
1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship
of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.

Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife
of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a
pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and
died a bachelor.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.

HELD:

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She
could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage
certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no
such marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage,
that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.

Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to
produce.
Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189
Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes, his
siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following evidence.

a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.

Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturio’s claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a neighbor.
She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio,
together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturio’s filiation are sufficient.
Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of
marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other documents.
Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced, other evidence like
the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.