Hipos Sr vs Bay GR No 174813-15 17 March 2009

Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and
two others before RTC presided by Judge Bay. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge
Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. Hipos and other filed their
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed
the Informations filed against them. However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution
holding that there was lack of probable cause. City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion hence the petition.
Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no
probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information.
Decision: Petition bereft of merit.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those
matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of either. While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e.,
to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to
Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly,
mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations,
the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the
assailed Order of Judge Bay.
People vs Asis

GR No. 142531

October 15 2002
Estino and Pescadera vs. People Case Digest
Facts:
Estino acted as Governor of Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999. Pescadera, on the other
hand, was the Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estino’s stint as Acting Governor.

In 1999, an audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period starting July 27, 1998
up to May 23, 1999 was conducted in the Provincial Government of Sulu. The COA Special
Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances,
and benefits, among others. Pursuant to such findings, three informations were filed by the
Ombudsman against Estino and Ernesto Pescadera. The said charges involve malversation of
public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code and two violations of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.
3019.

The Sandiganbayan, in the consolidated criminal cases, convicted both Estino and Pescadera for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu but acquitted them as to the
other charge for the same violation. As to the charge of malversation of public funds, the
Sandiganbayan exonerated Estino but convicted Pescadera for failure to remit the GSIS
contributions of the provincial government employees

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and New Trial which were denied in the Sandiganbayan Resolution. Petitioners insist that there
is enough evidence to show that the RATA provided for in the 1998 reenacted budget was paid
for the period January to May 1999. They presented to the Sandiganbayan a Certification dated
May 11, 2002 issued by the Provincial Auditor, stating that the RATA for the period January to
May 1999 was paid to the officials entitled to it and that the GSIS premiums pertaining to prior
years were also settled by the Provincial Government of Sulu.They also submitted sworn
statements of the provincial officials entitled to RATA, stating that they were paid such
allowance from January to May 1999 and that they did not have any complaint to its alleged
nonpayment. They also submitted 99 certified true copies of the Disbursement Vouchers
showing the payment of the RATA from January to May 1999 provided for in the 1998
reenacted budget.
Issue:
Whether or not a remand of the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial is proper

Held:
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears that
petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their
Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented
the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was
the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998
reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from
presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998
reenacted budget because the prosecution’s evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment of
RATA under the 1999 budget.

In this instance, we are inclined to give a more lenient interpretation of Rule 121, Sec. 2 on new
trial in view of the special circumstances sufficient to cast doubt as to the truth of the charges
against petitioners. The situation of the petitioners is peculiar, since they were precluded from
presenting exculpatory evidence during trial upon the honest belief that they were being tried for
nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget. This belief was based on no less than the
testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness, COA Auditor Mona Balabaran. (Estino and
Pescadera vs. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009)

Briones v. People [G.R. No. 156009. June 05, 2009]

03Oct
ROMMEL C. BRIONES, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 156009. June 05, 2009]
FACTS:
A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took
the service firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached the group where the former is
involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the
crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving weight to prosecutions positive
testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-
defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293 in relation to
par.5 of Art. 294 of RPC, and not of theft.
ISSUES:
Criminal Law
(1) Whether or not the robbery is the proper felony.
Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
RULINGS:
Criminal Law
(1) No. Briones is found guilty of theft. The SC agrees with the RTC that only the crime of theft
was committed in the case as S/G Gual’s testimony does not show that violence or intimidation
attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely grabbed the
firearm and ran away with it. Thus, the Court can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for
taking S/G Molina’s firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain. However, since there was
no evidence presented as to the value of stolen firearm, he can only be sentenced to the lightest
penalty prescribed by law applicable to the facts of the case. The lightest penalty that applies to
theft, where the value of the thing stolen does not exceed five pesos, is found in paragraph 6 of
Article 309.
Remedial Law
(1) No. The for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered
after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result
if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were
not established.
 Case Digest: Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
 By ResIpsaLoquitor - August 03, 2013
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 184537 April 23, 2010
Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused
damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to
prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new
preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or
substantial amendment of the first information.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would
warrant an new preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by causing undue injury
or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That accused may be charged under either mode
or under both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.

Lumanog vs people

FACTS:
These cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and De Jesus of the crime of murder for the death
of Col. Rolando Abadilla. Lumanog and Santos separately filed their motions for reconsideration
seeking the reversal of their conviction. They assailed the weight and credence accorded to the
identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard
Freddie Alejo.
Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who claimed to be one
of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contended that said
belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police
authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.
ISSUE:
Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify new trial
HELD:
No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.
Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument
that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting
aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the
evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that
could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court
below.
Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from
police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or
objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit
of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial
and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have
initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the
accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
MACAPAGAL
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the
value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order
dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly
filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for
having been filed out of time.
Issue:
Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of
appeal filed by the herein petitioner.
Held:
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court
cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the
denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for
estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of
petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the
rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed.
Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this
Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of
estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of
procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her
notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must
contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition.

QUIDET V. PEOPLE
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed with modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City.
petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were
charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda, stabbed,
thus sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a consequence of which
Tagarda died immediately thereafter.
On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No.
92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising
from the same incident.
Only petitioner Quidet filed the appeal before the CA.
While affirming RTC’s finding that the accused are liable for homicide for Jimmy Tagarda’s
death, CA however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the accused are liable for
frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the
accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected the
attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven days
even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
On review, SC correctly finds CA’s modification on the crime committed.
ISSUE: If SC’s findings shall also apply to other co-accused who did not appeal?
HELD: YES.
Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate courts
judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The
rule (Rule 122, Sec. 11) is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009

Balaba
vs.
People
Facts:
Accused Balaba, Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol, was charged and
convicted with Malversation of Public Funds by the RTC on it’s decision dated December 9,
2002. On January 14, 2003 filed his Notice of Appeal before the CA which was dismissed on its
December 14, 2004 decision on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because
SB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Hence this appeal on the ground that CA
erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court.
Issue:
WON CA erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court?
Held:
No. An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction
in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.
Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed
even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright. In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only
after the expiration of the period to appeal.
DAVID TIU
v.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The case stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Edgardo Postanes
(Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal
charge for grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion of Pasion, the two criminal cases were
consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC of Pasay City.
After trial, MeTC rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. Afterwards, Tiu, through
his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC of Pasay City
rendered a decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC and ordered the case to be
remanded in the MeTC. Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of
the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the two
cases. In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon
the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of
acquittal which right the government does not have.
Issue:
Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.
Held:
Yes. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant, through his counsel.
Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this
Court and the Court of Appeals. Tiu, the offended party in the criminal case is without legal
personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court. Nothing
shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before the
Court. On this ground alone, the SC says the petition must fail.
However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against Postanes
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over
the criminal case (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC
dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and order
the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress
the Constitutional proscription not to put any person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
Colinares
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide
by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals
sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then
appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable,
which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no
application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of
attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court
Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case
to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case
the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for
attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply
for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with
no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no
one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only
realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away
by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He
told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of
the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana
is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum
People vs Tuan
Esquillo vs People

FACTS:

Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the
arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting.
While the officers were coming, one of the officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag
with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was eventually caught.

Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.

The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-
frisk doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.

RULING:

The SC denied the appeal.

Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not
quash it before arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the
appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view
doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a
valid stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.