On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture

Author(s): Yu. M. Lotman, B. A. Uspensky and George Mihaychuk

Source: New Literary History, Vol. 9, No. 2, Soviet Semiotics and Criticism: An Anthology
(Winter, 1978), pp. 211-232
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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 On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture*
Yu. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspensky

HERE ARE MANY WAYS of in

definingculture.1The difference
the semantic content of the concept culture in different
historicalepochs and among differentscholars of our time
willnot discourage us ifwe rememberthatthe meaning of the termis
derivable from the type of culture: every historicallygiven culture
generates some special model of culturepeculiar to itself.Therefore,
a comparative study of the semantics of the term cultureover the
centuries provides worthwhile material for the construction of
typologies.
At the same time,among the varietyof definitionsone can single
out somethingcommon to them all thatappears to answer to certain
featureswe intuitively attributeto culturein any interpretationof the
word. We will consider just two of them here. First,underlyingall
definitionsis the notion that there are certain specific featuresof a
culture.Though trivial,thisassertionis not withoutmeaning: fromit
arises the assertionthat culture is never a universal set, but always a
subset organized in a specific manner. Culture never encompasses
everything,but forms instead a marked-off sphere. Culture is
understoodonlyas a section,a closed-offarea againstthe background
of nonculture. The nature of this opposition may vary: nonculture
mayappear as not belongingto a particularreligion,not havingaccess
to some knowledge,or not sharingin some typeof lifeand behavior.
But culture will always need such an opposition. Indeed, culture
stands out as the marked member of thisopposition.
Second, the various ways of delimitingculture from nonculture
essentially come down to one thing: against the background of
nonculture,cultureappears as a system ofsigns.In particular,whether
we speak of such featuresof cultureas "being man-made" (as opposed
to "being natural"), "being conventional" (as opposed to "being
spontaneous" and "being nonconventional"), or as the ability to
condense human experience (in opposition to the primordialquality
of nature)-in each case, we are dealing withdifferentaspects of the
semioticessence of culture.
It is significantthat a change of culture (in particular, during
* This articlefirst sistemam
appeared in Trudypo znakovym [Papers on sign systems],V
(Tartu, 1971).

History,The Universityof Virginia

Copyright? 1978 by New Literary

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212 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

epochs of social cataclysms) is usually accompanied by a sharp

increase in the degree of semioticbehavior (which may be expressed
by the changing of names and designations), and even the fight
against the old ritualsmay itselfbe ritualized.On the otherhand, the
introductionof new formsof behaviorand the semioticintensification
of old formscan testifyto a specificchange in the type of culture.
Thus, the activitiesof Peter the Great in Russia largelyamount to a
struggle with old rituals and symbols,which was expressed in the
creationof newsigns(forexample, the absence of the beard became as
mandatoryas its presence had been earlier; wearing foreignstyled
clothes became as indispensable as the wearing of Russian clothes
earlier,and so on);2 but theEmperor Paul's activity,
on theotherhand,
was expressed in the semiotic intensificationof existing forms,in
particular, by increasing their symbolic character. (Compare the
increase at that time of genealogical symbolism,of the symbolismof
parades, of ceremonial language and similarcases and, on the other
hand, the fightagainstcertainwords whichsounded like symbolsof a
different ideology. Compare also such symbolic acts as the
admonitionto the deceased, the challengingof princesto a duel, and
so on.)

A keyquestion is the relationshipof cultureto naturallanguage. In

the preceding publicationsof Tartu University(the semioticseries),
cultural phenomena were defined as secondary modeling systems,a
term which indicated theirderivationalnature in relation to natural
language. Many studies, following the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,
emphasized.,and examined the influence of language on various
manifestations of human culture. Recently Benveniste has
emphasized that only natural languages can fulfilla metalinguistic
role and that,by virtueof this,theyhold a distinctplace in the system
of human communication.3 More questionable, however, is the
author's proposal in the same article to consider only natural
languages as strictlysemiotic systems,defining all other cultural
models as semantic, that is, not possessing their own systematic
semiosisbut borrowingit fromthe sphere of naturallanguages. Even
though it is valuable to contrast primaryand secondary modeling
systems(without such a contrast it is impossible to single out the
distinguishingcharacteristicsof each), it would be appropriate to
stresshere that in their actual historicalfunctioning,languages are
inseparable fromculture.No language (in the fullsense of the word)
can existunless it is steeped in the contextof culture; and no culture
can exist which does not have, at its center,the structureof natural
language.

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 213

As a methodologicalabstraction,one may imagine language as an

isolated phenomenon. However, in itsactual functioning,language is
molded into a more general systemof culture and, togetherwith it,
constitutesa complex whole. The fundamental"task"of culture,as we
will tryto show, is in structurallyorganizingthe world around man.
Culture is the generatorof structuredness,and in thisway it createsa
social sphere around man which, like the biosphere, makes life
possible; that is, not organic life,but social life.
But in order forit to fulfillthatrole, culturemusthave withinitself
a structural "diecasting mechanism." It is this function that is
performedby natural language. It is natural language that gives the
membersof a social group theirintuitivesense of structurednessthat
withits transformationof the "open" world of realia into a "closed"
world of names, forcespeople to treatas structuresthose phenomena
whose structuredness,at best,is not apparent.4Indeed, in manycases
it turnsout not to matterwhethersome meaning-forming principleis
a structure,in a strictsense, or not. It is sufficientthatthe participants
in an act of communicationshould regardit as a structureand use it as
such for it to begin to display structurelikequalities. One can well
understand how importantit is that a systemof culture has, at its
center,so powerfula source of structurednessas language.
The presumptionof structuredness,which has evolved as a result
of language intercourse,exerts a powerfulorganizing force on the
entire complex of the means of communication. Thus, the entire
system for preserving and communicating human experience is
constructedas a concentricsystemin the center of which are located
the most obvious and logical structures,that is, the most structural
ones. Nearer to the periphery are found formations whose
structurednessis not evidentor has not been proved,but which,being
included in general sign-communicational situations,functionas
structures.Such quasi structures occupy a large place in human
culture. Moreover, it is precisely the fact of their internal lack of
orderedness, theirincomplete organization,that ensures for human
culture the greater inner capacity and the dynamismnot known to
more ordered systems.

We understandcultureas thenonhereditary memory ofthecommunity, a

memoryexpressing itselfin a system of constraintsand prescriptions.
This formulation, if accepted, presupposes the following
consequences. First of all, it followsthat culture is, by definition,a
social phenomenon. This fact does not exclude the possibilityof an
individual culture in the case where the individual sees himselfas a
of the communityor in cases of autocommunication,
representative

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214 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

whereone personfulfills, in timeor space,the functions of various

membersof thecommunity and in factformsa group.However,the
cases of individualculturesare,of necessity, historically
secondary.
On the other hand, depending on the limitsplaced by the
researcheron his material,culturemaybe treatedas commonto all
mankind, or as thecultureofa particular area,or ofa particular time,
or of a particularsocial group. Furthermore, insofaras cultureis
memory or, in otherwords,a recordin the memoryof what the
communityhas experienced,it is, of necessity,connectedto past
historicalexperience.Consequently, at themomentofitsappearance,
culturecannotbe recordedas such,forit is onlyperceivedex post
facto.Whenpeople speakof thecreationof a newculture,theyare
inevitably lookingahead; thatis,theyhave in mindthatwhich(they
presume) will becomea memoryfrom the point of view of the
reconstructablefuture (of course, the correctnessof such an
assumptionwillonlybe shownbythefutureitself).
Thus, a program(ofbehavior)appearsas theoppositeofa system
of culture.The programis directedintothefuturefroma pointof
viewof itsauthor;but cultureis turnedtowardsthe past fromthe
pointof viewof therealizationof suchbehavior(of theprogram).It
thenfollowsthatthedifference betweena programofbehaviorand a
cultureis a functional one: the same textcan be one or the other,
functioning variouslyin the generalsystemof historicallife of a
particular community.
In general,thedefinition ofcultureas thememory ofa community
raisesthequestionaboutthesystem ofsemiotic rulesbywhichhuman
lifeexperienceis changedintoculture:theserulescan,in theirown
turn,be treatedas a program. The veryexistenceofcultureimpliesthe
constructionof a system,of some rules for translatingdirect
experienceintotext.In orderforanyhistorical eventtobe placedina
specificcategory, itmustfirstofall be acknowledged as existing;that
is,itmustbe identified witha specificelementin thelanguageof the
organizationwhichis committing it to memory.Then it has to be
evaluatedaccordingto all the hierarchictiesof thatlanguage.This
meansthatitwillbe recorded;thatis,itwillbecomean elementofthe
textof memory, an elementof culture.The implanting of a factinto
thecollectivememory, then, is likea translation from one language
intoanother-in thiscase, intothe"languageof culture."
Culture, as a mechanism for organizing and preserving
information in theconsciousness ofthecommunity, raisesthespecific
of
problem longevity. It has two aspects: (1) thelongevity ofthetexts
of the collectivememoryand (2) the longevity of the code of the
collective memory. In certain cases these two aspects may not be
directlyrelated to one another. Thus, for example, superstitionscan

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 215

be seen as elementsof a textof an old culturewhose code is lost; that

is, as a case where the textoutlives the code. For example:
a fragment
Superstition!
Of ancienttruth.The templefell;
And posteritycould neverdecipher
The languageof itsruins.
[E. A. Baratynsky]

Everyculturecreatesitsown model of the lengthof itsexistence,of

the continuityof itsmemory.This model correspondsto the concepta
givenculturehas of the maximumspan of timepracticallycomprising
its "eternity."Insofar as culture acknowledges itselfas existing,only
identifying itself with the constant norms of its memory, the
continuityof memory and the continuityof existence are usually
identified.
Characteristically,manyculturesdo not allow even the possibilityof
any kind of substantial change in the realization of the rules
formulated by it-in other words, the possibilityof any kind of
reappraisal of its values. Hence, culture veryoften is not geared to
knowledgeabout the future,the futurebeing envisaged as timecome
to a stop,as a stretchedout "now"; indeed, thisis directlyconnectedto
the orientationtowards the past, which also ensures the necessary
stability,one of the conditionsfor the existenceof culture.
The longevityof texts formsa hierarchywithinthe culture, one
usually identifiedwiththe hierarchyof values. The textsconsidered
most valuable are those of a maximum longevityfrom the point of
view, and according to the standard, of the culture in question, or
panchronic texts (although "shifted" cultural anomalies are also
possible whereby the highest value is ascribed to the momentary).
This may correspond to the hierarchyof materialsupon which the
textsare affixed-and to the hierarchyof places and of the means of
theirpreservation.
The longevityof the code is determinedby the permanence of its
basic structuralprinciplesand by itsinner dynamism-its capacityfor
change while still preserving the memory of preceding states and,
consequently,of the awareness of its own coherence.
Considering culture as the long-termmemoryof the community,
we can distinguishthreewaysin whichit is filled.First,a quantitative
increase in the amount of knowledge-filling the various nodes of the
culture'shierarchicsystemwithvarious texts.Second, a redistribution
in the structureof the nodes resultingin a change in the verynotion
of "a factto be remembered,"and the hierarchicappraisal of whathas
been recorded in the memory; a continuous reorganizationof the
coding systemwhich,while remainingitselfin its own consciousness

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216 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

and conceiving itself to be continuous, tirelesslyreformsseparate

codes, thus ensuring an increase in the value of the memory by
creating "nonactual," yet potentiallyactualizable, reserves. Third,
forgetting.The conversionof a chain of factsinto a textis invariably
accompanied by selection; that is, by fixingcertain events which are
translatableinto elementsof the textand forgettingothers,markedas
nonessential. In this sense every text furthers not only the
rememberingprocess,but forgettingas well.Yet sincethe selectionof
memorizable facts is realized every time according to particular
semioticnormsof the given culture,one should beware of identifying
the events of life withany text,no matterhow "truthful"or "artless"
or firsthandthe text may appear. The text is not reality,but the
material for its reconstruction.Therefore, a semiotic analysis of a
document should alwaysprecede a historicalone. Having established
the rules forthe reconstructing of realityfromthe text,the researcher
will also be able to reckon fromthe document those elementswhich,
fromthe point of view of its author, were not "facts"and thus were
forgettable,but which might be evaluated quite differentlyby a
historian,forwhom,in the lightof his own culturalcode, theyemerge
as meaningfulevents.
However, forgettingtakes place in another way as well: culture
continuallyexcludes certain texts.The historyof the destructionof
texts, of the purging of texts from the reserves of the collective
memory,proceeds alongside the historyof the creationof new texts.
Every new movement in art revokes the authorityof the texts by
which preceding epochs oriented themselves,by transferringthem
intothe categoryof nontexts,textsof a differentlevel,or byphysically
destroyingthem. Culture by its veryessence is against forgetting.It
overcomes forgetting,turning it into one of the mechanisms of
memory.
In the lightof the above, one can assume definitelimitstothecapacity
of the collectivememory,which determinesthis exclusion of some
texts by others. But on the other hand, because of their semantic
incompatibility, the nonexistenceof some textsbecomes a necessary
condition for the existenceof others.
Despite their apparent similarity,there is a profound difference
between forgettingas an element of memory and forgettingas a
means of its destruction. In the latter case there takes place the
disintegration of culture as a unified collective personality, a
personalitypossessingcontinued self-consciousnessand accumulated
experience.
It is worthrecallingthatone of the sharpestformsof social struggle
in the sphere of culture is the obligatorydemand to forgetcertain
aspects of historicalexperience. Epochs of historicalregression(the

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 217

clearestexample is the Nazi stateculturein the twentiethcentury),in

forcingupon the communityhighlymythologizedschemesof history,
end by demanding fromsocietythatit forgetthose textswhichdo not
lend themselves to being so organized. While social formations,
during the period of ascent, produce flexibleand dynamic models,
providingthe collectivememorywithbroad possibilities,and aiding
its expansion, then social decline, as a rule, is accompanied by an
ossifyingof the mechanism of the collective memory and by an
increasingtendencyto contract.

The semiotic study of culture does not only consider culture

functioningas a systemof signs. It is importantto emphasize thatthe
veryrelationofculturetothesignand tosignification comprisesone of its
basic typologicalfeatures.5
Firstof all, it is relevantwhetherthe relation between expression
and content is regarded as the only possible one or as an arbitrary
(accidental,conventional)one. In the firstcase the question,what this
or that thing is called, is crucial, and correspondingly,an incorrect
designation may come to be identifiedwith a different content (see
below). Compare the searches in the Middle Ages for the names of
certain hypostases which incidentallybecame fixed in the Masonic
ritual; one should interprettaboos against the utteringof certain
names in a similar manner. In the second case the question of
designation, and of expression in general, is not an important
principle; one can say that expression here appears as an auxiliary
and indeed more or less incidentalfactorwithregard to content.
Accordingly,it is possible to distinguishbetween cultures directed
mainly towards expression and those directed chiefly towards
content. It is clear that the very fact of emphasis on expression, of
strictlyritualizedformsof behavior,6is usually a consequence either
of seeing a one-to-one correlation (rather than an arbitraryone)
between the level of expression and the level of content, their
inseparabilityin principle (as is characteristic,in particular,for the
ideologyof the Middle Ages), or of seeing the influenceof expression
upon content.(We may note in thisrespectthat,in a sense,symbol and
ritual can be regarded as opposite poles. While a symbol usually
presupposes an external, relativelyarbitraryexpression of some
content,ritualis capable of formingcontentand influencingit.) To a
culture directed towardsexpression thatis founded on the notion of
correctdesignationand, in particular,correctnaming,the entireworld
can appear as a sortof textconsistingof various kindsof signs,where
content is predetermined and it is only necessary to know the
language; that is, to know the relation between the elements of
expression and content. In other words, cognition of the world is

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218 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

equivalent to philological analysis.7 But in typologicallydifferent

cultural models, oriented directlytowards content,some degree of
freedomis assumed both in the choice of contentand in itsrelationto
expression.
Culture can be presented as an aggregate of texts;however,from
the pointof viewof the researcher,itis more exact to considerculture
as a mechanism creating an aggregate of texts and texts as the
realizationof culture.An essentialfeatureforthe typologyof culture
is itsself-appraisalin thisregard. While it is typicalof some culturesto
regard themselves as an aggregate of normative texts(take the
Domostroy,8 forexample), othersmodel themselvesas a systemof rules
thatdeterminethe creationof texts.(In otherwords,in the firstcase
the rules are defined as the sum of precedents; in the second the
precedent existsonly where it is described by an appropriate rule.)
Cultures directed primarily towards expression have this
conception of themselves as a correct text (or aggregate of texts)
whereas culturesdirected mainlytowardscontentsee themselvesas a
systemof rules. Each typeof culturegeneratesitsown particularideal
of Book and Manual, includingthe organizationof those texts.Thus,
with orientationtowards rules, a manual has the appearance of a
generativemechanism,while withorientationtowardstext,one gets
the characteristic(question-answer)formatof a catechism,and the
anthology(book of quotations or selected texts)comes into being.
In contrasting text and rules, as applied to culture, it is also
importantto keep in mind that,in some cases, the same elementsof a
culture can serve both functions,that is, both as text and as rules.
Thus, for example, taboos which are a component of the general
systemof a given culture can, on the one hand, be examined as
elements (signs) of the textreflectingthe moral experience of the
communityand, on the other hand, be regarded as an aggregate of
magical rulesprescribingspecificbehavior.
The opposition we have formulatedbetween a systemof rules and
an aggregate of textscan be illustratedby takingliteraturewhichis a
subsystemof the whole culture.
A clear example of a systemexplicitlyorientedtowardsrules willbe
European Neo-Classicism. Although historically the theory of
Neo-Classicism was created as a generalization from a particular
artisticexperience, the picturewas somewhatdifferentas seen from
within the theoryitself: the theoreticalmodels were thought of as
eternal and as preceding the actual act of creation. In art,only those
texts considered "correct,"that is, corresponding to the rules, were
recognized as texts, i.e., having significance. It is especially
interesting,in lightof the above, to see what Boileau, for example,
considers as poor worksof art. The bad in art is whateverbreaks the

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 219

rules. But even the violationof the rules can be described,in Boileau's
opinion, as followingcertain"incorrect"rules. Therefore,"bad" texts
can be classified;any unsatisfactory work of art serves as an example
of some typical violation. It is no accident that, for Boileau, the
"incorrect"world of art consistsof the same elements as the correct
but that the difference lies in the system for combining them,
prohibitedin "good" art.
Another characteristicof this type of culture is the fact that the
creatorof the rules stands higherin the hierarchythan the creatorof
the texts.Thus, forexample, withinthe systemof Neo-Classicismthe
criticcommands markedlymore respect than the writer.
As a contrastingexample, one can pointto the cultureof European
Realism of the nineteenthcentury.The artistictextsthatformedpart
of it were fulfillingtheirsocial functiondirectlyand did not need an
obligatorytranslationinto a metalanguage of theory. The theorist
constructed his apparatus following after art. In practice, for
example, in Russia afterBelinsky,criticismplayed a most active and
independent role. But it is all the more evident that,in assessing his
own role, Belinsky, for example, gave priorityto Gogol, seeing
himselfas a mere interpreter.
Althoughthe rules are, in bothcases, a necessaryminimalcondition
for the creation of culture, the degree to which they enter into its
self-appraisalwill vary. This can be compared to the teaching of
language as a systemof grammaticalrules or as a set of usages."

According to the distinction formulated above, culture can be

opposed both to noncultureand to anticulture.Withinthe conditions
of a culture chieflyoriented towards content and represented as a
systemof rules, the basic opposition is "organized-nonorganized"
(and this opposition can be realized in particularcases as "cosmos-
chaos," "ectropy-entropy," "culture-nature," and so on). But
within the conditions of a culture oriented primarily towards
expression and represented as an aggregate of normativetexts,the
basic opposition will be "correct-incorrect,"i.e., wrong (precisely
"incorrect"and not "noncorrect":this opposition may approximate,
even coincide with,the opposition "true-false"). In the latter case,
cultureis opposed not to chaos (entropy)but to a systempreceded by
a negativesign. Generally,of course, when withina culture directed
towards a one-to-one correspondence between expression and
contentand primarilyorientedtowardsexpression,the worldappears
as a text, and the question, what is this or that called, becomes of
principalimportance.An incorrectdesignationcan be identifiedwith
a differentcontent (but not with none!), that is, with different
informationand not with a distortionin the information.Thus, for

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220 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

example, the Russian Church Slavonic word aggel [angel], writtenin

accordance withthe Greek spellingof the correspondingword,was to
be read as angel; but as it was actuallyspelled [angel],the word was
understood in Medieval Russia to signifythe devil.1' Analogously,
when, as a resultof PatriarchNikon's reforms,the spellingof Christ's
name Isus was changed to Iisus, the new form was taken to be the
name of a differentbeing: not Christbut the Antichrist."Similarly,
the distortionof the word Bog [God] in the word spasibo[thankyou]
(fromspasiBog [save us God]) may,even now, be understood by the
Old-Believers as the name of a pagan god, so that the very word
spasibois understood as an appeal to the Antichrist(in its place the
wordsspasi Gospodi[save us Lord] are usually used by the "priestless"
Old-Believers and spasi Khristos[save us Christ]by the Old-Believers
withpriests).12 The point to note here is that everythingopposed to
culture (in this case a religious culture) also has to have itsownspecial
expression,but one thatis false (incorrect).In other words,anticulture
is constructedhere isomorphicallyto culture,in itsown image: ittoo is
understood as a sign systemhaving its own expression. One can say
that anticulture is perceived as culture with a negative sign, as a
mirror image of culture (where the ties are not broken but are
replaced bytheiropposites). In thiskindof situationanyotherculture
withdifferentexpressionsand ties is seen, fromthe point of view of
the given culture,as anticulture.
This is the source of the natural tendency to interpret all
"incorrect"cultures,those opposed to the given ("correct")one, as a
unifiedsystem.Thus, in "The Song of Roland" [La ChansondeRoland],
Marsiliunturnsout to be a pagan, an atheist,a Mohammedan, and a
worshipperof Apollo all at the same time:
Li reisMarsiliela tient,ki Deu nen aimet.
Mahumetserte Apollinrecleimet:...'3
In the Muscovite"Tale of the Defeat of Mamay," Mamay is described
as follows: "Being a Hellene by his faith,a worshipperof idols, an
iconoclast,and a wicked punisher of Christians."'4Examples of this
kind would not be difficultto multiply.
Also significantin this regard was the antipathy in pre-Petrine
Russia to foreign languages, which were viewed as means for
expressingalien cultures.Note particularlythe special worksagainst
Latin and Latinate formswhichwere identifiedwithCatholicthought
and, more widely,withCatholic culture.15Typically,when Patriarch
Makariy of Antioch arrived in Moscow in the middle of the
seventeenth century, he was especially warned of "talking in
Turkish." "God forbid,"as Tsar Alexey Mikhailovichput it,"thatsuch
a holy man should sully his lips and tongue with that impure

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 221

language."'6 In these words we hear the conviction,so typicalforthat

time,thatit is impossibleto use alien means of expressionand yetstay
withinone's own ideology (in particular,one could not speak in such
an "un-Orthodox" language as Turkish, seen as the means of
expression for Mohammedanism, or Latin, seen as the means of
expression for Catholicism, and still remain pure in relation to
Orthodoxy).
Equally revealing, on the other hand, is the attempt to see all
"Orthodox" languages as one language. Thus, during that same
period Russian scribes could speak of a single "Helleno-Slavic"
language (a grammarof it was even published)17 and could describe
the Slavic languages according to the exact patterns of Greek
grammar,seeking in it, indeed, an expression of those grammatical
categorieswhich exist only in Greek.
Correspondingly,a culture chieflydirected towards content,one
opposed to entropy (chaos), where the main opposition will be
"organized-nonorganized," always conceives itself as an active
principlewhichmustexpand and sees noncultureas the sphere forits
potentialexpansion. On the other hand, in a culture directedmainly
towards expression, where the basic opposition is between "correct"
and "incorrect,"there may be no attemptwhatsoeverto expand (on
the contrary, the culture may strive to limit itself to its own
boundaries, to separate itself from all that is opposed to it).
Nonculture is here identified with anticulture and therefore,
according to its very essence, cannot be a potential area for the
expansion of culture.
Examples of how an orientationtowards expression and a high
degree of ritualizationbring withthem the tendencyto shut oneself
offmightbe Medieval China or the idea "Moscow, the Third Rome."
These cases are marked by an urge towardspreservationratherthan
expansion of theirsystem,esoterism,and a lack of missionaryzeal.
In one type of culture, knowledge spreads by its expansion into
areas not yet known to it, but in the opposite type of culture, the
spread of knowledge is possible only as a triumph over falsehood.
Naturally,the concept of science,in the modern sense of the word,is
connected withcultureof the firsttype.In the second typeof culture,
science is not opposed so markedlyto art, religion,and so on. It is
interestingthatthe oppositionof science and art,whichis so typicalof
our time and which sometimes rises to antagonistic levels, only
became possible withinthe conditions of the new, post-Renaissance
European culture which had freed itself from the outlook of the
Middle Ages and which stood to a great degree in opposition to that
outlook (let us rememberthatthe veryconcept "finearts,"as opposed
to science, only appears in the eighteenthcentury).18

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222 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

This bringsto mind the distinctionbetween the Manichaeisticand

Augustinian concepts of the devil in Norbert Wiener's brilliant
interpretation.19According to the Manichaeisticconcept, the devil is
an essence havingevil intentions,thatis, consciouslyand withpurpose
turning his power against man; but according to the Augustinian
concept,the devil is a blind force,an entropy,whichis onlyobjectively
directed against man because of man's weakness and ignorance. If
one accepts a broad enough sense of the termdevil as that which is
opposed to culture(once again, in the broad sense of the word), then
it is evident that the differencebetween the Manichaeisticand the
Augustinianapproach correspondsto the differencebetweenthe two
typesof cultureswhich we spoke of earlier.

The opposition "organized-nonorganized" can appear withinthe

very mechanism of culture as well. As we have already stated, the
hierarchic structureof culture is constructedas a combination of
highlyorganized systemsand of those allowing various degrees of
disorganizationto the point where,in order to reveal theirstructure,
they must continuallybe contrastedwith the former.If the nuclear
structureof a culture mechanism is an ideal semiotic systemwith
structurallinks realized at all levels (or more correctly,the nearest
approximation of such an ideal possible in particular historic
situations),then the formationsaround it are constructedso as to
break the various links of such a structureand to require continual
comparison withthe nucleus of the culture.
This kind of "incompleteness,"the incomplete regulatedness of
culture as a unified semiotic system,is not a shortcoming but a
condition for its normal functioning.The point is that the very
functionof the culturalassimilationof the world impliesassigningto
the world a systematicquality. In some cases, as for example in
the scientificcognitionof the world, the point will be to reveal the
systemconcealed in the object; in others-for example, in education,
missionary work, or propaganda-it will be to impart to an
unorganized object certainprinciplesof organization.But in order to
fulfillthis role, culture,and especiallyits centralcoding mechanism,
mustpossess certainqualities. Among these,two are essentialforour
present purposes:
First,it should have a high degree of modeling potential,that is,
either the abilityto describe as wide a range of objects as possible,
whichwould include as manyas yetunknownobjects as possible,this
being the optimalrequirementforcognitivemodels, or it should have
the capabilityto declare those objects which it cannot be used to
describe as nonexistent.

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 223

Second, its systematic nature should be acknowledged by the

communityusing it as an instrumentfor assigningsystemto what is
amorphous. Therefore, the tendency of sign systems to become
automatized representsan ever present inner foe of culture against
which it continuallystruggles.
The conflictbetweenthe continualattemptto take the systematicto
itslimitsand the continualoppositionto the automatizationproduced
thereby within the structureis organically present in every living
culture.

This bringsus to a problem of primaryimportance: whyis human

culture a dynamic system?Why are the semiotic systemsthat form
human culture, with the exception of certain obviously local or
secondary artificial languages, subject to an obligatory law of
evolution? The fact that artificiallanguages exist convincinglybears
witnessto the possibilityof the existenceand successfulfunctioning,
withinspecificlimits,of nondevelopingsystems.Why then can there
exista unified,nondevelopinglanguage of road signals,while natural
language necessarily has a history without which its (real, not
theoretical) synchronic functioning is impossible? After all, the
existence of diachrony itselfis not only not among the minimum
conditions necessary for the appearance of semiotic systems but
presents the researcher with a theoretical riddle and a practical
problem.
The dynamismof the semioticcomponents of culture is evidently
connected with the dynamism of the social life of human society.
However, thisconnectionis byitselffairlycomplicatedbecause we can
stillask: "But whymusthuman societybe dynamic?"Man is included
in a more mobile world than all the restof nature,and in a verybasic
way he regards the verynotion of movementdifferently. All organic
creaturesstriveto stabilizetheirsurroundings,all theirchangeability
is a strivingfor self-preservationwithoutchange in a world that is
liable to change and contrary to their interests; for man the
changeabilityof his surroundingsis a normal conditionof living; for
him the norm is lifewithinchanging conditions,a changein thewayof
life. It is no accident that from the point of view of nature man
appears as a destroyer.But it is preciselyculture,in the broad sense,
that distinguisheshuman societyfrom nonhuman societies. Thus it
followsthatdynamismis not an outer qualityof cultureimposed on it
by the arbitrarinessof external causes but is inseparable fromit.
It is another matter that the dynamism of culture is not always
acknowledgedbyitsmembers.As has already been stated,the striving
to perpetuate every contemporary(synchronic)condition is typical

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224 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

for manycultures,and the possibilityof any substantialchange of the

rules in force may not be allowed for at all (along with a typical
prohibition against their being understood as relative). This is
understandable where we are concerned not withobserversbut with
participants,with those withinthe particularculture: one can only
speak of the dynamism of culture from the perspective of an
investigator(observer) and not fromthatof a participant.
On the other hand, the process of gradual change of a culturemay
not be perceived as continuous, and so the various stages of the
process can be taken for differentcultures contrastingwith one
another. (It is exactly in this fashion that language continually
changes, but the continuityof thisprocess is not perceived directlyby
the users of the language themselvessince linguisticchanges do not
occur withina single generationbut throughthe transmissionof the
language fromone generation to the next. In this way, the users of
the language tend to see language change as a discrete process;
language for them is not an uninterruptedcontinuum but breaks
down intoseparate strata,the differencesbetweenwhichthenacquire
stylistic
meaning.)20
The question whether dynamism, the constant need for
self-regeneration, is an innerqualityof cultureor merelythe resultof
the disturbinginfluenceof the materialconditionsof man's existence
on the systemof his ideals cannot be resolved simply.Doubtless both
processes are relevant.
On the one hand, changes in a culture systemare connected with
the accumulationof informationby the human communityand with
the inclusionof scienceinto cultureas a relativelyautonomous system
with its own initiatives. Science is enriched not only by positive
knowledge but also by developing modeling complexes. The pursuit
of inner unification,whichis one of the basic tendenciesof culture(as
we will see below), causes a constant transferof purely scientific
models into the general fieldof ideas and attemptsto ascribeto them
the featuresof the culture as a whole. Therefore, cognitionwith its
initiatingtendencyand dynamiccharacterwillnaturallyinfluencethe
formof the model of the culture.
On the other hand, not everythingwithinthe dynamicsof semiotic
systemscan be explained in this manner. It would be difficultto
interpretthe dynamics of the phonological or grammaticalside of
language in thisway. Whereas the necessityfor change in the lexical
systemcan be explained by the need for a differentconcept of the
world to be reflected in the language, phonological change is an
immanent law of the system itself. Or, to take another revealing
example, the systemof fashion can be studied in connection with

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 225

various external social processes: from the laws of industrial

manufacture to social-aestheticideals. However, at the same time,
fashion is clearly a synchronicallyclosed system with the specific
qualitythatit undergoes change. Fashion is differentfroma norm in
that it regulatesa systemby directingit not towardspermanence but
towardschange. In so doing, fashionalwaystriesto become the norm,
but these concepts are by theirverynature in opposition, for hardly
does fashion achieve a relativestabilityapproximatingthe condition
of a norm than it quickly seeks to abandon it. The motivesfor the
change in fashion, as a rule, remain incomprehensible to the
communityregulated by its rules. This nonmotivationof fashion
forcesone to assume thatwe are dealing here withpure change; and
it is precisely the nonmotivation of change (compare Nekrasov's
"fickle fashion" [izmenchivaja moda]) that defines the specific social
function of fashion. It was no accident that made the forgotten
eighteenth-century writerN. Strakhov,the author ofA Correspondence
of Fashion, ContainingLettersfrom SleevelessModes, Meditationsby
InanimateCostumes, ConversationsamongSpeechlessBonnets,theSentiments
of Furnishings,Carriages,Notebooks, Buttons and AncientShirt-Fronts,
Caftans,Housecoats, etc.:
Jackets, A Moral and Critical wherein
Composition
Are Revealedin TheirTrue LighttheManners,Way of Life and Diverse
Comicaland ImposingScenesofa FashionableAge,choose Impermanence
as his leading Fashion correspondent, while among the "Rules of
Fashion" in his book we read: "We hereby decree that no color of
cloth should remain in use for more than one year."21It is quite
obvious that the change in the color of cloth is not dictated by any
urge to approximatesome general ideal of truth,goodness,beauty,or
appropriateness.One color is exchanged for another simplybecause
the one was old and the other new. We are dealing here with a
tendencyat its purest,one which in a more disguised form appears
widelyin human culture.
Thus, for example, in Russia in the beginning of the eighteenth
centurya change took place in the entiresystemof the culturallifeof
the rulingsocial stratum,a change whichallowed people of thatepoch
to call themselveswitha certain pride "new." Kantemirwrote of the
positivehero of his epoch:

Wiseis he thatletsnotfallPeter'sdecrees
By whichNwe havebecomeat once a people new.22

In this, as in thousands of other cases, one could point out many

interesting reasons for the transformations, dictated by some
correlation with other structuralorders. However, what is equally

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226 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

clear is that the need for novelty,

for systematicchange,is an equally
perceptible stimulus for change. Wherein lie the roots of this need?
The question could be posed more generallyas: "Whydoes mankind,
as distinctfromall other creaturesof the world,have a history?"One
can assume here thatmankind lived througha long prehistoric period
in which duration of time played no part, for there was no
developmentand onlyat a specificmomentdid thereoccur thatbreak
which gave birthto a dynamic structureand initiatedthe historyof
mankind.
At present the most likelyanswer to thisquestion appears to be as
follows:at a certainmoment,the moment,in fact,fromwhichwe can
begin to speak of culture, man linked his existence to a continually
expanding nonhereditarymemory;he became a receiver ofinformation
(during the prehistoricperiod he was merelya carrierof constantand
genetically given information).But this required the continual
actualizationof a coding systemwhichhad to be constantlypresentin
the consciousness of both the addressee and the addresser as a
deautomatized system.The latter made it possible for a particular
mechanism to emerge which, on the one hand, would exhibit
particularhomeostaticfunctionsto such a degree as to preserve the
unityof the memory,to remain the same, and on the other, would
continually renew itself,deautomatizing itselfat every phase and
therebymaximizingits abilityto absorb information.The necessity
for continual self-renewal,to become differentand yet remain the
same, constitutesone of the chiefworkingmechanismsof culture.
The reciprocaltensionbetween these tendenciesjustifiesthe static
and the dynamicmodel of culture,the models being defined by the
initialaxioms of description.

Alongside this opposition withinthe systemof culture of the old

and the new, the unchangeable and the mobile, there is yetanother
basic opposition, the antithesisof unity and multiplicity.We have
already noted thatthe heterogeneityof the inner organizationis a law
for the existence of culture. The presence of differentlyorganized
structures, and various degrees of organization, is an essential
conditionforthe functioningof the mechanismof culture.We cannot
name a single culture in historyin which all levels and subsystems
were organized on a strictly
uniformstructuralbase and synchronized
in their historicaldynamism.As a result of this need for structural
variety,everyculturesinglesout special spheres,differently
organized,
whichare valued veryhighlyin an axiological sense althoughtheyare
outside the general systemof organization.Such were the monastery
in the medievalworld,poetrywithinthe conceptsof Romanticism,the

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 227

world of gypsies,the backstagein the cultureof St. Petersburgduring

the nineteenthcentury,and many other examples of littleislands of
"different"organization in the general body of culture, whose aim
was to increase the structuralvarietyand to overcome the entropyof
structural automatization. Such were the temporary visits by a
member of any cultural group into a different social
structure-officials entering an artistic environment, landowners
coming into Moscow for the winter, townspeople going into the
countryfor the summer, Russian nobles in Paris or Karlsbad. And
this,as M. M. Bakhtin has shown,was the functionof the carnivalin
the highlynormativelife of the Middle Ages.23
And yetculturerequires unity.In order to fulfillitssocial function,
culture has to appear as a structuresubject to unified constructive
principles. This unity comes about in the following manner: at a
specificstage in the development of culture,there comes a moment
when it becomes conscious of itself,when it creates a model of itself.
The model definesthe unified,the artificially schematizedimage,that
is raised to the level of a structuralunity.When imposed onto the
realityof thisor thatculture,itexertsa powerfulregulatinginfluence,
preordaining the constructionof culture, introducing order, and
eliminatingcontradiction.The error of many literaryhistoriesis that
the self-interpretingmodels of cultures such as "the concept of
Classicism in the works of seventeenth/eighteenth-century
theoreticians"or "the concept of Romanticismin the works of the
Romantics,"which forma special stratumin the systemof a culture's
evolution, are studied on the same level as the facts of particular
writers'works; this is a logical error.
The assertions"everythingis differentand cannot be describedby a
single general schema" and "everythingis the same and we have to
deal withnever-endingvariationsof an invariantmodel" continually
reappear in various guises in the historyof culture,fromEcclesiastes
and the dialecticians of antiquityto our own day. And this is no
accident; theydescribevarious aspects of a singleculturalmechanism,
and in theirreciprocaltensiontheyare partof the essence of culture.
These appear to us to be the basic features of that complicated
semioticsystemwhichwe defineas culture.Its functionis to serveas a
memory; its basic feature is self-accumulation. At the dawn of
European civilizationHeraclituswrote: "Essentialto the psycheis the
self-generating logos."24 He grasped the basic characteristic of
culture.

Some of our observationsmay be generalized as follows:structure,

in nonsemioticsystems(those outside the complex "society-communi-

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228 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

cation-culture"),presupposes some constructiveprinciple of inter-

connection between elements. It is preciselythe realization of this
principle that allows one to speak of the given phenomenon as
structural.Therefore, once a phenomenon exists,it has no alterna-
tivewithinthe limitsof its qualitativedefinition.A phenomenon may
have structure,that is, be itself,or not have structureand not be
itself.There are no other possibilities.Hence the fact that structure
in nonsemioticsystemscan onlybear a fixedquantityof information.
The semiotic mechanism of culture created by mankind is
constructed according to a different principle: opposed and
reciprocally alternating structural principles are essential. Their
relationto one another,the disposition of particular elements in the
structural field which emerges here, creates that structural
regulatednesswhich allows the systemto preserve information.It is
crucial here, however,that it is not actuallyany specificalternatives
whose number is finiteand constant for the given systemthat are
given,but the veryprincipleofalternation itself,and thatall the actual
oppositions of the given structureare merelyinterpretationsof this
principleon a certainlevel. As a result,any pair of elements,of local
regularities,of particular or general structures,or even of whole
semiotic systemsacquires the significanceof being alternativesand
formsa structuralfield which may be filledwithinformation.Hence
the systemwithits ever-increasinginformationpotential.
This snowballing of culture does not exclude the fact that its
separate components, sometimes very essential ones, appear
stabilized. Thus, for example, the dynamicsof natural languages is
much slower than the development of other semioticsystemsso that
compared withany one of them,languages appear as synchronically
stabilized systems.Yet culture is able to "squeeze out" information
even fromthisby creatingthe structuralpair "static-dynamic."
The snowballingof culture gave mankind an advantage over all
other living beings that exist in conditions where the volume of
informationis stable. However, thisprocess has a darker side as well:
culture devours resources just as greedily as industryand just as
readilydestroysitsenvironment.The pace of itsdevelopmentis by no
means alwaysdictatedby man's real needs; therecomes into play the
inner logic of accelerating change in the working mechanisms of
information.In many fields (scientificinformation,art, information
forthe masses) crisescome about whichmaybringwhole sphereswon
over by cultureto the brinkof expulsion fromthe systemof the social
memory.
"The self-generatinglogos" has alwaysbeen valued positively.Now
it is evidentthata mechanismhas unavoidablycome into being which,
by its complexityand rate of growth,can smotherthat verylogos.

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 229
Culture doubtlesslystill has many reserves. But for them to be
utilized,we need a much clearer notion of itsinner workingsthan we
have available at present.
As already noted, language carries out a specific communicative
functionwithinwhich it may be studied as an isolated functioning
system,but in the systemof culture, language has another role: it
provides the collectivewitha presumption ofcommunicability.
Language structureis abstractedfromthe materialof languages; it
becomes independent and is transferredto an ever-increasingrange
of phenomena which begin to behave in the system of human
communicationas language and thus become elements of culture.
Any realitydrawn into the sphere of culture begins to functionas a
sign. But if it already has a sign character(for any quasi sign of this
kindis, in a social sense, undoubtedlya reality),thenit becomes a sign
of a sign. The presumption of language, applied to amorphous
material, changes it into language and a language system and
generates metalingual phenomena. Thus the twentiethcenturyhas
produced not onlymetalanguagesof science,but a metaliteratureand
metapainting (painting about painting) as well, and apparently is
creatinga metaculture,an all-encompassingmetalingualsystemof a
secondaryorder.Justas scientificmetalanguage is not concernedwith
solvingfactualproblems of a particularscience,but has its own aims,
so contemporary"metanovels,""metapaintings,"and "metacinema-
tography"stand logicallyon a differenthierarchiclevel than the cor-
responding first-order phenomena and pursue different ends.
Looked at together,theydo indeed seem as strangeas a logical prob-
lem in engineering.
The possibilityof self-reduplicationof metalanguage formationson
an unlimited number of levels, along with the introduction of
ever-newobjects into the sphere of communication,formsculture's
reserve in information.

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU

(Translated by George Mihaychuk)

NOTES

1 See A. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, "Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and

Definitions,"in PapersofthePeabodyMuseum(Cambridge, Mass., 1952); A. Kjoskowska,
Kultura masowa (Warsaw, 1964); R. Benedict, Patternsof Culture(Cambridge, Mass.,
1934); Stein Rokkan, ed., Comparative
ResearchacrossCulturesand Nations(Paris, 1968);
M. Mauss, Sociologieetanthropologie
(Paris, 1966); Claude LUvi-Strauss,Anthropologie

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230 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

structurale(Paris, 1958); and Yvan Simonis, "Claude L6vi-Straussou la 'Passion de

l'inceste,'" in Introductionau structuralisme(Paris, 1968).
2 Compare the special Edicts of Peter on the forms of clothingmade mandatory.
Thus, in 1700, it was ordered to wear clothes of a Hungarian pattern; in 1701, of a
German pattern; in 1702, on celebration days, French caftans. See Polnoe Sobranie
Zakonov[The complete collectionof laws], statutes1741, 1898, and 1999, according to
which, in 1714, any Petersburgmerchantwho sold Russian clothes of a nondecreed
patternwas ordered to be whipped and sentenced to hard labor; and, in 1715, it was
decreed to sentenceanyone dealing in nails forthe shoeing of boots and shoes to hard
labor (statutes 2874 and 2929). Compare, on the other hand, the protestsagainst
foreignclothingboth during the pre-Petrineperiod and among the Old-Believerswho
were the carriersof pre-Petrineculture.The Old-Believers,even up to our times,keep
the eighteenth-century patternof clothingand wear itforchurchservices;theirfuneral
clothingappears even more archaic (see the article by N. P. Grinkovaon clothingin
Bukhtarminskie [The Old-Believers of Bukhtarminsk][Leningrad, 1930]).
staroobryadtsy
It is not difficultto see thatthe verynature of the relationto the sign and the general
level of the semioticaspect of culture prior to Peter and during his reign,in the given
case, remain one and the same.
3 Emile Benveniste,"S6miologie de la langue," Semiotica,1, No. 1 (1969).
4 Thus, forexample, the structurednessof historyconstitutesthe initialaxiom of our
approach; otherwise there is no possibilityof accumulating historical knowledge.
However, this idea cannot be proved or disproved by evidence, as world historyis
incompleteand we are submerged in it.
5 Compare the remarkson the connectionbetweenculturalevolutionand the change
in relationto the sign in Michel Foucault,Les motset les choses,une archeologie du savoir
(Paris, 1966).
6 This feature becomes readily apparent in the paradoxical situation where
adherence to specificrestrictions and requirementscomes into conflictwiththe content
which,in fact,produced them."We kissthyshackles as those of a saint,but we cannot
be helpful to thee," wrote the head of the Russian Church, Metropolitan Makariy,
sending his blessingsto MaksimGrek,who was languishingin captivity(quoted by A. I.
Ivanov,Literaturnoe nasledieMaksimaGreka[The literaryheritageof Maksimthe Greek]
[Leningrad, 1969], p. 170). Even the holiness of Maksim Grek, admittedby Makariy,
and his respectfor him cannot bring him to ease the lot of the prisoner; the signs are
not subordinateto him. (It makes sense to assume thatthe head of the Russian Church,
Makariy,had in mind not his helplessness in the face of some conditionsbrought in
from outside, but the inner impossibilityof transgressingthe decision of the sobor
[church]. His disagreementwiththe contentof the decision did not lower,in his eyes,
the authorityof the decision as such.)
7 Compare the concept found in various cultures,but mostof all in the Middle Ages,
of a book as a symbolof the world (or as a model of the world). See E. R. Curtius,"Das
Buch als Symbol," in EuropaischeLiteraturund lateinisches 2nd ed. (Bern,
Mittelalter,
1954); D. Chizhevsky,"Das Buch als Symboldes Kosmos," in Aus zweiWelten:Beitrage
zur Geschichte derslavisch-wetlichenliterarischen
Beziehungen('s-Gravenhage, 1956); P. N.
Berkov, "Kniga v poezii Simeona Polotskogo" [The book in the poetry of Simeon
Polotsky],in Literaturai obshchestvennaya mysl'drevney Rusi [The literatureand social
thoughtof Old Rus'], Trudy otdela drevnerusskoyliteraturyInstitutarusskoyliteratury
AN SSSR [Papers of the department of Old Russian Literature of the Instituteof
Russian Literature AN SSSR], XXIV (Leningrad, 1969); Yu. M. Lotman and B. A.
Uspensky,"Introduzione," in RicercheSemiotiche (Turin, 1973), pp. xiv-xv.Compare
also the role of the alphabet in the conceptionsof thearchitectonicsof the universein F.
Dornseiff, "Das Alphabet in Mystik und Magie," EWroXeta,7 (1922), 33 (see in

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ON THE SEMIOTIC MECHANISM OF CULTURE 231

particular,the remarks on the coincidence of the seven Ionic vowels with the seven
planets).
Characteristically,in connection with the above, the Skoptsy sectarians called the
Virgin Mary "the living book"; perhaps one can see here the genetic tie with the
widespread identificationamong the Orthodox retaining its Byzantine roots, of
"Wisdom," that is, of Sophia with the Virgin Mary (see on the question of this
identificationUspensky, Iz istoriirusskikhkanonicheskikh imen [From the historyof
Russian canonical names] [Moscow, 1969], pp. 48-49).
8 [Sixteenth-century Russian book of religious,social, and domesticprecepts. Tr.]
9 In connection with this opposition there are various modes of "teaching" culture
which we will not consider in detail here since theyare the subject of another article
(Lotman, "Problema obucheniya kulturekak ee tipologicheskayakharakteristika" [The
problem of teaching a culture as its typologicalcharacteristics],Trudypo znakovym
sistemam [Papers on sign systems],V [Tartu, 1971]).
10 See Uspensky, Arkhaicheskaya sistematserkovnoslavyanskogo proiznosheniya[The
archaic systemof Church Slavonic pronunciation](Moscow, 1968), pp. 51-53, 78-82.
11 See Uspensky,Iz istorii,p. 216.
12 There is a legend on this theme, apparentlynot recorded anywhere,where it is
said thatthe phrase spasi,Ba! (going back to the pronunciationof the wordspasibowith
akanye,i.e., change of unstressedo intoa [save us Ba]) was shoutedby thepagans in Kiev
to the pagan idol, floating down the Dnieper, which had been overthrownby St.
Vladimir.The verytendencyto identifythe pagan god withthe Antichrist(Satan), that
is, incorporatingit into the systemof Christianideology,is verycharacteristicfor the
type of culture being examined. See, for example, the identificationof the pagan
Volos-Veles with the demon, who, in other cases, could be identifiedwith St. Vlasiy
(Vyach. Vs. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov, "K rekonstruktsiiobraza Velesa-Volosa kak
protivnikagromoverzhtsa"[Towards a reconstructionof the image of Veles-Volosas an
opponent of the thunderer], in Tezisy dokladov IV Letneyshkolypo vtorichnym
modeliruyushchim sistemam [Theses of papers at the fourthsummer school on secondary
modeling systems][Tartu, 1970], p. 48); also compare the remarkfurtherin thispaper
about an analogous concept of Apollo. It is characteristicthat the eighteenth-century
Old-Believers' authority,Feodosiy Vasil'ev, called the devil "wicked leader, unholy
lamb," explainingwithreferenceto St. Hyppolitus: "In everythingthe deceiver wishes
to resembleChrist,the Son of God: Christthe lion,the lion Anti-Christ;thereappeared
Christ the lamb, there appears too the Anti-Christas a lamb" (see P. S. Smirnov,
"Perepiska raskol'nich'ikhdeyateley nach. XVIII v." [The correspondence of the
leaders of the schismin the beginningof the eighteenthcentury],Khristianskoye chtenie
[Christianreadings], No. 1 [1909], pp. 48-55).
Inasmuch as in a cultureof the kind existingin the Middle Ages thereis a given sum
of correcttextsand a notionof the mirror-imagecorrespondenceof the correctand the
incorrect,the negative texts may be constructedfrom the sacral ones as a result of
applying systemsof antitheticalexchanges to them. A strikingexample of this is the
exchange in the Russian admonition of the correctdesignation rab bozhiy[servantof
God] for a "black" one, par bozhiy,where par is the result of a backward (mirrored)
reading [char]whichis the actual pronunciationof the word rab (withthe change of a
voiced consonant into a corresponding voiceless one in the final position). See A. M.
Astakhova, "Zaogovornoe iskusstvona reke Pinege" [Admonitional art on the river
Pineg], in Krest'yanskoeiskusstzoSSSR [Peasant art of the USSR], II (Leningrad, 1928),
50-52, 68.
13 "La Chanson de Roland," in Henri Clouard and Robert Leggewie, eds., Anthologie
de la littiraturefranlaise
(New York, 1960), I, 10: "King Marsiliunholds it,who does not
love God; he serves Mahomet and confesses Apollin."

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232 NEW LITERARY HISTORY

For a number of textsthe identificationof Apollo withthe devil can be explained,

besides the general considerationsjust given, by the identificationof the pagan god
withthe referenceto Satan in Revelation 9:11 as "Apollion."
14 M. N. Tikhomirov,V. F. Rzhiga, and L. A. Dmitriev,eds., Povestio Kulikovskoy bitve
[Tales of the battleof Kulikovo Field] (Moscow, 1953), p. 43.
15 See V. V. Vinogradov, Ocherkipo istoriirusskogoliteraturnogo yazykaXVII-XIX vv.
[Essays on the historyof the Russian literarylanguage of the seventeenth-nineteenth
centuries](Moscow, 1938), p. 9; Uspensky,"Vliyanie yazykana religioznoe soznanie"
[The influenceof language on religiousconsciousness],in Trudypo znakovym sistemam,
IV (Tartu, 1969), 164-65. See also the textsedited by M. Smentsovsky,Brat'yaLikhudy
[The Likhud brothers] (St. Petersburg, 1899) (appendices); N. F. Kanterev, "O
greko-latinskikh shkolakhv Moskvev XVII veke do otkrytiya Slavyano-greko-latinskoy
Akademii" [On the Greco-Latinschools in Moscow in the seventeenthcenturyup to the
opening of the Slavo-Greco-LatinAcademy], in Godichnyy aktv Moskovskoy Dukhovnoy
Akademii1-gooktyabrya 1889 goda [Yearly act of the Moscow Religious Academy of the
firstof October 1889] (Moscow, 1889). Even PatriarchNikon in his polemic withthe
(Orthodox) MetropolitanPaisiyof Gaza is able to exclaim in answerto the latter'sreply
in Latin: "O cunning slave, from thine own lips I judge thee not to be an Orthodox
since you have addressed us basely in the Latin tongue" (N. Gibbenet,Isotoricheskoe
issledovaniedela patriarkhaNikona [A historical investigationconcerning the case of
PatriarchNikon], Pt. 2 [St. Petersburg,1884], p. 61).
16 See Pavel Aleppsky, Puteshestvie Antiokhiyskogo patriarkhaMakariya v Rossiyuv
XVII v. [The journey to Russia of PatriarchMakariyof Antiochin the middle of
polov'ine
the seventeenthcentury],tr. fromArabic by G. Murkos (Moscow, 1898), pp. 20-21.
17 See Grammatika ellino-slovenskago
dobroglagolivago yazyka[A grammarof
ABe)rporrg
well-spokenHelleno-Slavic] (L'vov, 1591).
18 See in thisregard the observationson the influenceof Galileo's aestheticviewson
his scholarshipin Erwin Panofsky,"Galiley: nauka i iskusstvo(esteticheskievzglyadyi
nauchnaya mysl')"[Galileo: science and art (aestheticopinionsand scientificthought)],
in U istokovklassicheskoy nauki [Among the sources of classical science] (Moscow, 1968),
pp. 26-28. Compare Panofsky,Galileo as a Criticof theArts(Hague, 1954), and the
remarks on the meaning of artisticform for Galileo in accounting for his scientific
conclusions in L. Olyshki,Geschichte derneusprachlichen Literatur,Vol.
wissenschaftlichen
III of Galileiund seineZeit(Halle, 1927), where Olyshkiwrites:"By means of adapting
expression to content,the latteracquires an obligatoryand thus artisticform.Poetry
and science are forGalileo the spheres whichgive shape to the world.The problem of
contentand the problem of formcoincide for him."
19 See N. Viner,Kibernetika i obshchestvo
[Cyberneticsand society](Moscow, 1958), pp.
47-48.
20 See Uspensky, "Semioticheskieproblemy stilyav lingvisticheskomosveshchenii"
[Semioticproblemsof stylein a linguisticinterpretation], in Trudypo znakovym sistemam,
IV (Tartu, 1969), 499.
21 PerepiskaMody, (Moscow, 1791), p. 235.
....
22 Satiryi drugiestikhotvorcheskie sochineniyaknyazyaAntiokhaKantemira[Satires and
other verse compositionsof Prince Antiokh Kantemir](St. Petersburg,1762), p. 32.
23 See M. M. Bakhtin,Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnayakul'turasrednevekov' ya i
Renessansa[The worksof FrangoisRabelais and the folkcultureof the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance] (Moscow, 1965).
24 Heraclitus, fragmentscited according to Antichnye filosofy.Svidetel'stva,
fragmenty,
teksty[Philosophers of antiquity: certificates,fragments,texts], compiled by A. A.
Avitis'yan(Kiev, 1955), p. 27.

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