ANIANO TORRES AND JOSEFINA TORRES

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS

ORIENTAL, BRANCH 34, AND ADELA B. FLORES,

G.R. No. 92540 11 December 1992

Facts

The contracts related to this case are ten parcels of land belonging to Flores that she leased to
the spouses Torres, for a specified term of four agricultural years commencing from 1985 and
at stipulated rentals payable in piculs of sugar. The parties agreed on their renewal under the
original terms, subject to the condition that the lessees would deliver to Flores the amount of
P50,000.00 not later than February 15, 1989. Flores said she would need the money for her
projected trip abroad. Flores claims that the petitioner failed to comply with this condition and
that consequently she informed them. In their answer to the complaint, the petitioners submitted
that the contracts had been validly renewed because they had complied with the above-
mentioned condition. They contended that the lease had been continued under the rule of tacita
reconduccion and that the complainant was estopped from denying that she had granted them
an option to renew the contracts. After trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge
Teopisto L. Calumpang held that the contracts had not been validly renewed because the
Torreses had failed to deliver the amount of P50,000.00 in cash to Flores as promised.

Issue

Whether or not the contract has been validly renewed.

Ruling

No. We begin by reiterating the familiar rule that the findings of fact of the lower courts are
binding on this Court unless they come within the specified exceptions, which are also well-
known. None of such exceptions has been established in the case at bar. We therefore accept
that there was an oral agreement between the parties to extend the original contracts of lease
provided that the petitioners could deliver to the private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 in
cash not later than February 15, 1989. This was a suspensive condition that was not met.
 JOVEN YUKI v. WELLINGTON CO

G.R. No. 178527 27 November 2009

Facts

Mr. Joseph Chua was the registered owner of a parcel of land, together with a commercial
building erected thereon, situated at the corner of España and Instruccion Sts., Sampaloc,
Manila. In 1981, he leased a portion of the building to petitioner Joven Yuki, Jr., who put up a
business therein under the name and style "Supersale Auto Supply." The contract of lease
between Mr. Chua and petitioner had a term of five years but was not reduced into writing.
Thereafter, the lease was renewed through a series of verbal and written agreements, the last
of which was a written Contract of Lease covering the period of January 1, 2003 to December
31, 2003 at a monthly rental of P7,000.00.

In November 2003, Mr. Chua informed petitioner that he sold the property to respondent
Wellington Co and instructed petitioner to thenceforth pay the rent to the new owner.

After the expiration of the lease contract, petitioner refused to vacate and surrender the leased
premises. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of
Manila.

Issue

Whether or not the lessee-petitioner's attempt to hold on to the property subject of the instant
unlawful detainer case.

Ruling

Petitioner's alleged preferential right to buy subject premises has no basis.

In view of the above disquisition, petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his preemptive
rights because he was not notified of the intended sale, likewise crumbles. Besides, the right of
first refusal, also referred to as the preferential right to buy, is available to lessees only if there
is a stipulation thereto in the contract of lease or where there is a law granting such right to
them (i.e., Presidential Decree No. 1517 (1978), which vests upon urban poor dwellers who
merely lease the house where they have been residing for at least ten years, preferential right
to buy the property located within an area proclaimed as an urban land reform zone). Unlike
co-owners and adjacent lot owners, there is no provision in the Civil Code which grants to
lessees preemptive rights. Nonetheless, the parties to a contract of lease may provide in their
contract that the lessee has the right of first refusal.

In this case, there is nothing in the Contract of Lease which grants petitioner preferential right
to buy the subject premises. We are likewise unaware of any applicable law which vests upon
him priority right to buy the commercial building subject matter of this case. In fact, aside from
the sweeping statement that his preferential right to buy was violated, petitioner failed to cite
in his Petition, Reply, or Memorandum any specific provision of a law granting him such right.
In other words, petitioner failed to lay the basis for his claim that he enjoys a preferential right
to buy.

And even assuming that he has, the same will not prevent the ejectment case filed by the
respondent from taking its due course. A contract of sale entered into in violation of preemptive
right is merely rescissible and the remedy of the aggrieved party whose right was violated is to
file an appropriate action to rescind the sale and compel the owner to execute the necessary
deed of sale in his favor. In Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, we categorically
held that an action for unlawful detainer cannot be abated or suspended by an action filed by
the defendant-lesseee to judicially enforce his right of preemption.
 VICENTE J. SANTI

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO A. REYES, JR.,

REPRESENTED BY ALEXANDER REYES

GR NO. 93625 08 NOV 08 1993

Facts

Esperanza Jose was in her lifetime the registered owner and in absolute possession of a parcel
of land known as Lot 3, Block 89, situated in Cavite City, more particularly described in TCT
No. 5508 (RT-3159) with an area of 1, 472 square meters; that sometime on July 12, 1957 she
leased a portion of the property unto spouses Eugenio Vitan and Beatriz Francisco for a period
of 20 years "automatically extended" for another 20 years but with a rental of P220.00 per
month as per Lease Contract ratified before Notary Public Abraham F. Aguilar (Exhibit '8')
and on which the lessees constructed a cinema house; that sometime in 1962, the lessees sold
all their rights, interest and participation over the cinema house together with the leasehold
rights on the lessor's property unto Augusto A. Reyes, Jr. and a new contract of lease was
entered into between the new owner and Esperanza Jose (Exhibit 'A') for a period of 20 years
from and after April 1, 1962 with a monthly rental of P180.00 payable in advance, said period
of lease being 'extendable' for another period of 20 years with the monthly rental increased to
P220.00 also payable in advance on or about the first day of each month (Exhibit '2-B'). In the
interim, Esperanza Jose sold all her rights and participation over the parcel of land to Vicente
J. Santi and TCT No. T-3968 of the Land Records of Cavite City was issued in his favor, on
February 23, 1982 the lease having expired, plaintiff wrote Alexander Reyes as representative
of Augusto Reyes, Jr., who had died, informing him of the termination of the lease on March
31, 1982 and demanding peaceful turn-over of possession, defendant refused on the ground
that after consulting his lawyer, Atty. Gregorio R. Familiar the latter informed him that the
lease was automatically extended for another 20 years at the rate of P220.00 a month and which
amount he tendered unto the plaintiff who refused and by virtue thereof, religiously deposited
the said amounts with the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Cavite City (Exhibits
'5' and '6'). In view of defendant's refusal to vacate plaintiff filed a routine complaint against
Alexander Reyes with the office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay 34, 'Lapu-lapu' of the
City of Cavite; and no settlement having been reached the Barangay Captain issued a
certification to file action (Exh. 'B').

During the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only question to be resolved in this case is the
interpretation of Par. 3 of the Contract of Lease, Exhibit 'A', of the plaintiff and Exhibit '2' for
defendant which reads as follows:

"That this lease shall be for a period of twenty (20) years from and after the date of the
execution of this document with a monthly rental of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS
(P180.00) payable in advance, said period of lease being extendable for another period of
twenty (20) years with a monthly rental of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (P220.00)
also payable in advance on or before the 1st day of each month;" (pp. 73-75, orig. rec.),
Emphasis supplied.

Issue

Whether or not a new contract of lease requires a subsequent agreement between the parties
as the phrase "being extendable".

Ruling

The trial court's decision more in accord with the true intention of the parties except that portion
wherein private respondents were ordered to pay a monthly rental of P1,000 starting from April
1, 1982 up to and until they shall have vacated and turned over the possession of the premises
unto herein petitioner.[9] This is in error.

The law in point is Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has
previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of
the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms
of the original contract shall be revived."

Article 1687 provides as follows:

"If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the
rent is weekly, and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a
monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term
for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly,
the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for
over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee
has stayed in the place for over one month."

The law provides that if after the end of the lease contract, the parties continue to enjoy the
thing leased, an implied lease is created for the period mentioned in Article 1687, hence, herein
private respondents may continue to occupy the leased premises provided such is with the
permission and consent of herein petitioner-lessor. Since the lease contract provided for a
monthly rental of P220 to be paid by the lessee upon the expiration of the first twenty years,
the latter shall be bound by such amount which shall be paid by herein private respondents to
petitioner-lessor.

ACCORDINGLY, herein private respondent is hereby ordered to turn over the possession of
the disputed property and to pay a monthly rental of P220 starting from April 1, 1982 up to and
until they shall have vacated and turned over the possession of the premises to herein petitioner,
and to pay the sum of P5,000 as attorney's fees.
 JOSE ITURRALDE, plaintiff-appellant

vs.

ANTONIO GARDUÑO, defendant-appellee

G.R. No. L-2997 16 January 1908

Facts

The defendant or his ancestors had built a house valued at 550 pesos, and planted fruit trees on
the land in question, which, according to the judgment appealed from, impresses upon the
contract the character of an indefinite term and implies long duration, does not prove the claims
of the defendant, for the reason that the duration of lease contracts depends on what may have
been stipulated by the parties at the time when the same were entered into, and not on the more
or less importance of the improvements introduced or effected by the tenant on the leased
property. Nor has the circumstance alleged by the defendant in his answer, that the fruit trees
above alluded to require from eight to eleven years to yield the first crop, any importance in
this case for the effects of article 1577 of the Civil Code, not only because no evidence has
been adduced in the premises but also because the contract, according to the statement of the
defendant himself, is more than fifty years old.

Issue

Whether or not the defense alleged by the defendant has been proven, to the effect that the
rental of 1 peso and 50 cents per annum is not susceptible of being either increased or decreased
and that he, the defendant, cannot be ejected so long as he punctually pays the rent according
to the condition stipulated in his contract.

Ruling

Therefore, there being no proof, not even by implication from the nature and circumstances of
the contract, that the duration thereof was left in any way to the will of the defendant, it is not
proper to apply to this case the legal provision and the settled rule of this court, quoted in the
judgment appealed from.
The judgment of the court below is hereby reversed and the defendant is directed to return to
the plaintiff the land in controversy, and pay to him the sum of 1 peso and 50 cents as rent for
the year 1902 and the sum of 9 pesos for each of the succeeding years, beginning with 1903,
until the time when the judgment entered in this suit shall be executed; and in view of the fact
that, in the complaint, only payment of the rentals for the years 1902 and 1903 is asked, an
amendment thereof is ordered, in pursuance of the provisions of section 126 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, so that the demand shall include the rent for the years following the year 1903,
until the execution of the judgment, with the costs of the first instance against the defendant.
hh) On The Bulk Sales Law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

FELIPE MAPOY AND R. M. MAIPID,

G.R. NO. L-48336 21 September 1942

Facts

Defendants were charged with violation of the Bulk Sales Law in that they mortgaged all of
their stock of goods, etc., without any notice to Daido Boeki Kaisha, Ltd., one of the offended
parties, to which they were indebted. They pleaded guilty and its sentenced by the Court of
First Instance of Manila to pay a fine, and the costs, and to indemnify Daido Boeki Kaisha,
Ltd., jointly and severally, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Issue

WON in violation of bulk sales law,payment of indemnity will lie.

Ruling

That it was error for the trial court to consider said indebtedness as a liability arising from the
crime charged, and to order defendants to indemnify Daido Boeki Kaisha, Ltd., with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Inasmuch as under section 4 of the Bulk Sales Law, the
mortgaged in question was fraudulent and void, and there being no proof that the mortgaged
goods have disappeared, the same are still subject to attachment for the satisfaction of creditors'
lawful claims against the defendants. Daido Boeki Kaisha, Ltd., may still bring a separate civil
action against defendants herein for the collection of any indebtedness that may be due from
defendants, and if the latter will not pay the judgment in such civil case, the goods involved in
the instant case may be seized and sold. Therefore, the obligations of defendants to pay Daido
Boeki Kaisha , Ltd., which was already existing when the mortgage was signed, was not the
result of the violation of the Bulk Sales Law, nor was it affected by said violation.

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER

vs.

RAMIREZ

GR 18700 26 September 1922

Facts

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also
in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity &
Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by
Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.

Issue

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

Ruling

1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property
mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335
of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be
mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)

2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is

sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property
shall be such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable
inquiry and investigation, to identify the same. In the case at bar, “his half interest in the drug
business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125, District
of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.

3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the
debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the
registration of the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety company

4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can the
mortgage executed be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as there
was a mere stipulation about personal security during said date, but not a mortgage upon
property, and much less upon the property in question.
 HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND HYMAN YAP

vs.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT), ET AL.,

G.R. No. 170217 10 December 10 2012

Facts

This case involves a complaint for an issuance of search warrant to HPS Corporation for
Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and Theft of Telephone Services and
violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipment.

The witnesses testified that the Mabuhay Card (used for international outgoing calls) were
being reflected only as local calls and upon verification the card was registered to Philip Yap
whose address is the HPS Software Corporation.

After evidence was presented, the trial court issued two search warrants for violation of Art.
308 of the RPC and P.D. 401, which were immediately carried out by the police.

The Joint Order directs the Philippine National Police-Special Task Force Group-Visayas to
retrieve possession and custody of all seized items pending to PLDT.

Philip Yap then filed a Motion to Squash and suppresses the seized evidence on the basis that
they did not have any probable cause and were served as general warrants.

The same court granted Motion to Squash that directed to return the seized items at once to
HPS Corporation.

PLDT filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the
decision of the release of equipment despite the fact that the Joint Order dated May 23, 2001
was not yet final.

The court granted said petition insofar as it released the item seized.
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
that seeks to annul a ruling regarding a Joint Order by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 2001.

The other petition seeks to nullify the March 26, 2004 decision as well as September 27, 2005
Resolution.

The March 26, 2004 decision modified the May 23, 2001 Joint Order directing the immediate
return of the seized items to HPS Corporation.

Issue

WON PLDT committed forum shopping.

Held/Ratio

No. There is forum shopping when, between an action pending before the court and another
one, there exists (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the requisites for after
action pendant or lis pendens. In this case forum shopping cannot be considered because the
appeal that PLDT elevated to the CA examines the validity of the trial court’s action on
quashing the search warrant while the other is a petition for certiorari is an inquiry whether
trial court committed grave abuse when he ordered the release seized items.