ECIJA, NORMAN JOYE 2-C

ARMANDO C. CARPIO vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
GR NO 148267, AUGUST 8 2002

FACTS:
This case originated from a petition filed by respondent
[Sulu Resources Development Corporation] for Mines
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131,
covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner
[Armando C. Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim
thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in
Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by
respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right
to explore and extract the quarry resources on his
properties. After due proceedings were held, the Panel
of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of
the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim. Respondent appealed the
foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal
on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with the
requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered
the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the
Board. An appeal was filed with the CA but same was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders
of the Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly
to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and
the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to
the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. Factual controversies are
usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA
is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this
Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In
Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA
have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and
orders, but the review of such decisions included
questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual
findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have
been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present
case, the CA may review them, consistent with the
constitutional duty of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings
authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.
First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and consent.” On
the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that
decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a
“petition for review by certiorari.” This provision is
obviously an expansion of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not
consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases
involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions,
such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does
not impair the substantive and vested rights of the
parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is
preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still
have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this
remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule
43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their
judgments and final orders are now required to be brought
to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-
judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of
government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other
quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides,
the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91
-- “among these agencies are” -- indicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial
agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be
deemed included therein.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual
controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to
resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve
them. By including questions of fact among the issues
that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly
expanded the list of such issues.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of
courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v.

MACROASIA CORPORATION, BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION,
and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION consolidated with BLUE
RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION v. HON. ANGELO REYES

GR NO. 169080 GR NO. 172936

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and

Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta)
entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050. Infanta’s
corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings
Corporation and subsequently to its present name,
Macroasia Corporation. After sometime, Celestial filed a
Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered
by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB) of the DENR. Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-
petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek
cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining
rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining
Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brooke’s Point.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering

such areas contiguous to Infanta’s (now Macroasia) mining
lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the
government which covers 2,835 hectares located at
Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two pending
applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay
Mainit also in Brooke’s Point. Celestial sought the
cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts. Macroasia
refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by
Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings

of the field investigations, the POA granted the petition
of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of
Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right
to Macroasia’s mining areas.1 It upheld Blue Ridge’s
petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract
areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority
right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims.
Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required
memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the
above resolution became final and executory. The MAB made
a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel
the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia. However,
the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its
previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor the
MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly
entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held
that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement
was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.

Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal. The CA

Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which
upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to
approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA
also denied Celestial’s Motion for Reconsideration. While
the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s
petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the
MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease
agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942,
explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes,
which is the greater power, necessarily includes the
lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who

has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and
privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has

jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO

279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations,
executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR
Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel
existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements
based on the following reasons: The power of the DENR
Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and
control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV
of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages,

supervises, and regulates the use and development of all
mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive
jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public
domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from
said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and
police our natural resources which include mineral
resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers
of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements
and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said
agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision

of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend
cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements. The DENR Secretary’s
power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the
MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR
AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of
a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.

LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNG

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

Facts:
The director of lands filed a criminal case against the
defendants on the ground of misrepresentation and false
data and information. The defendants in the three cases
filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the
complaint in intervention. The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had
complied with all the legal requirements in the
acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by
the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the
alleged falsification of public documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are entitled to ownership
of the land.
Held:
Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land
in question. Section 44 of the Land Act in its second
paragraph states:
A member of the national cultural, minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at
the time he files his free patent application, he is not
the owner of any real property secured or disposable
under this provision of the Public Land Law.
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national
cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral
abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain.

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. v. RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004
FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A.
No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act “shall
govern the exploration, development, utilization, and
processing of all mineral resources.” Such declaration
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually cover
all the modes through which the State may undertake the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources.
The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is
accorded the primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization thereof. As
such, it may undertake these activities through four
modes:
(1) The State may directly undertake such
activities.
(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations.
(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance.
R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second
and fourth modes. Petitioners submit that, in accordance
with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to “technical or
financial assistance” only. They observe, however, that,
contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP
FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining
corporation, to extend more than mere financial or
technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP
to manage and operate every aspect of the mining
activity.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a
letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop
the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,
giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon.
The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on
petitioners’ letter.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order. They allege that at the time of the
filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already
been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64
of which applications are by fully foreign-owned
corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares,
and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company
over offshore areas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void the
following:
(1) Provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:
(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq),
(b) Section 23,
(c) Section 33 to 41,
(d) Section 56,
(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81
and Section 90.
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision, and
(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40
contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP,
hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable
to WMCP, govern the FTAA. In addition, R.A. No. 7942
explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
agreements.
R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.

APEX MINING CO., INC., v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING

CORP. ET AL,
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE v. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., APEX MINING CO., INC., ET
AL,
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON.
VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO
MARCELO (Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member) v.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION

FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12
July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM), of this Court’s Decision dated 23 June
2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in
favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated
in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation
(MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not
claim or submit evidence that it was a designated agent
of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of
the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It
also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the
assignment of a mining right be made with the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the
Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-
renewal since it was not renewed before or after its
expiration.
The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of
Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its
validity. In view of this, and considering that under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as
the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral
reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or
through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of
ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said
proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision
that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations
of the disputed area or to award the operations to private
entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject
to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided
that these private entities are qualified.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court
En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of
the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate
on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining operations,
are now, therefore within the full control of the State
through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this
Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to
accept its application for an exploration permit.
In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006,
Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the
actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in
the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector.
In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB
to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be
awarded to them.

ISSUE:
Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a
vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes a
property right protected by the Constitution.

HELD:
NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights
had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill
of 1902 was still the operative law. Surely, it is
impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it
acquired mining rights over the disputed area in
accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984
that MMC, SEM’s predecessor-in-interest, filed its
declaration of locations and its prospecting permit
application in compliance with Presidential Decree No.
463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a
Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued
to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no possibility
that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining
claim under the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly
transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be considered “mining rights” as contemplated under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized in McDaniel and
Gold Creek Mining.

SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise

equates its supposed rights attached to the exploration
permit with the rights that a private property land owner
has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in
law. As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, national wealth, such as mineral
resources, are owned by the State and not by their
discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop
and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he has
complied with all the requirements set forth by
applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him
such right through permits, concessions or agreements.
In other words, without the imprimatur of the State, any
mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over
the mineral land because, unlike a private landholding,
mineral land is owned by the State, and the same cannot
be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated
in Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

All lands of public domain, waters, minerals

x x x and all other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. (Emphases supplied.)
BENGUET CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES

G.R. No. 163101

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement

with Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was
acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a
total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also
executed a Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims were
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty
as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet,

Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G.
Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims.
However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L.
Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet
informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP.
The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the
provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of
royalties and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated
therein. J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision,
cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement.
BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was
denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with

the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:

NO. The instant petition can be denied outright as

Benguet resorted to an improper Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA)

7942 or the “Philippine Mining Act of 1995” states, “A
petition for review by certiorari and question of law may
be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision of the [MAB].”

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to

provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments
and final orders are now required to be brought to the
CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial
agency or body has been defined as an organ of government,
other than a court or legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it
is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies
enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words
in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91––“among these agencies
are”––indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-
judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed,
should be deemed included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts

dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies
to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower
tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling
within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. Thus, Benguet should have filed the appeal
with the CA. Petitioner having failed to properly appeal
to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has
become final and executory. On this ground alone, the
instant petition must be denied.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION v. MINES ADJUDICATION

BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
ET AL.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing

under Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining.
On 31 March 2000, petitioner’s Application for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration,
development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite
ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land
in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-
1 was issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines and engaged
in the business of mining. Private respondent filed an
Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the
same properties covered by and during the subsistence of
APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In
turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to
the Application for Exploration Permit of the private
respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of
Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the
latter on 5 September 2005.

Prior, however, to petitioner’s filing of its Verified

Protest/Opposition to the private respondent’s
Application for Exploration Permit, petitioner’s MPSA No.
153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied. The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to
private respondent. Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu
proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner.
Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also
dismissed. The case was elevated to the Court of appeals
but judgment was rendered against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to

cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB
to private respondent.

HELD:

NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to

cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB
to private respondent. Section 77 of Republic Act No.
7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators, thus:

Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. – x x x. Within thirty

(30) working days, after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive
and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
following:

1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

3. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and

claimholders/concessionaires; and

4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the

Department at the date of the effectivity of this
Act.

The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over

adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to
applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not
over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and
existing.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing

exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40
explicitly provides:

Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration

Permit. – The Director/concerned Regional
Director may cancel the Exploration Permit
for failure of the Permittee to comply with
any of the requirements and for violation(s)
of the terms and conditions under which the
Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration
Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation
of the Director shall cause the cancellation
of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, “Director” means

the Director of the MGB Central Office, while “Regional
Director” means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional
Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit
is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes
the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the
same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or
cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already
lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of
Arbitrators.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro

B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive
Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (“Marcopper”), a corporation engaged in
mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been
storing tailings from its operations in a pit that
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of

Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the
Water Code of the Philippines (“PD 1067”), Section 8 of
PD No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of
1976 (“PD 984”), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (“RA 7942”), and
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the

following grounds:

(1) the Information were “duplicitous” as the

Department of Justice charged more than one offense
for a single act;
(2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul
Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Information took place; and
(3) The Informations contain allegations which
constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC issued a Consolidated Order”), granting partial

reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a
petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.
The RTC granted public respondent’s appeal but denied
petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside the
Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and
ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts
complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942 are “the very same acts complained
of” in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365
of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except

one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only
the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand.

HELD:

NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not

be quashed. There is no duplicity of charges in the
present case. There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of
charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The
Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here,
however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with
four offenses, with each Information charging only one
offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On
this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al.

G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims
in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February
02, 1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining
claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September
1988, which claims were subsequently converted into
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).

On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option

Agreements over the mining. Under the Agreements,
petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable
right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years
with provision for extension. On December 23, 1982 and
March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit
Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development,
DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the area
covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and
with DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other
portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.

On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat

rejected petitioner’s Prospecting Permit Application
(PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991
endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines
revealed that the area covered was outside government
reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with
existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively
explored in the early 1980's. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel
Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that
petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that
the existing rights of mining claim holders be respected;
and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over subject
area be recognized.

As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it

appeared that it was issued a clearance to prospect for
six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public

respondent Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner
maintained that subject area was within the Magat River
Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of
the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining claims of
respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had been
converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A.
7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due course.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area

subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation.

HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of
Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying
petitioner's PPA. The disapproval of Marcopper’s PPA
moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation
of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early
as May 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims
which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its
own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the
Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside
proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks
and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered
by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May
1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of
Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting
provided by the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of
the maps to the office of the Regional Executive
Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest
Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical
error committed by somebody in the Engineering Section
of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation
does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied
upon in denying the PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for
the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the
Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the
sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land
Use map of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area
covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government
reservation.
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. v. HON. MINISTER OF
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF
MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner, Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of
fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was

issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease
application within one (1) year from the approval of the
Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease
application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978,
with a reservation annotated on the back of its
application that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.

On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil

action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by
said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree
No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had
already been declared as its own private and exclusive
property in final judgments. The respondents, on the
other hand, alleged that petitioner has no standing to
file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust
administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is

constitutional.

HELD:

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. It

is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State,
as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over
the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits
are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this
connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining
claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to
obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still
avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease
prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development
Resources Decree of 1974. Presidential Decree No. 1214
is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION v. BALITE

PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated;
and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF
DAVAO (PMRB-Davao)

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known
as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.” Located at Mt. Diwata
in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del
Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since
the mid-80 due to the scramble over gold deposits found
within its bowels.

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation

(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP
No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the
hotly-contested Diwalwal area. Not long thereafter,
Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076,
or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act. The law
established a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR
Secretary’s direct supervision and control. The statute
also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-
scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR
Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale
miners under certain conditions.

On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.

Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No.
66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-
forest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was
made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary
by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. On June 24, 1997, the DENR
Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which directs
the DENR to study thoroughly and exhaustively the option
of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in
the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include,
but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the
feasibility of entering into management agreements or
operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate
government instrumentalities or private entities, or
both, in carrying out the declared policy of
rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for
profit-sharing between the state and the said parties,
including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale
miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous
cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary
for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for
Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and
the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are
hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals
against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite
Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which
represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the
nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No.
97-03 on the ground that the “direct state utilization”
espoused therein would effectively impair its vested
rights under EP No. 133. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not
abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-
03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct
studies on the various options available to the
government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it

concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not
adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving
the Diwalwal dispute.

Held:

We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the

challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt “direct
state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of
this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, it did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any
party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR
officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO,
GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS
ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION
G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987

FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines
granted mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay
Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and
other private individuals. Way back on October 30, 1959,
John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their
rights to their mining claims in favor of the
petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2,
1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on

July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the
Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and
transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book
of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the
Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original
certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No.
496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos
Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were

granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the
corresponding original certificates of titles were issued
by the Register of Deeds to private respondents. All of
the above patents covered portions of the lots covered
by the patents belonging to the petitioner. The
petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of patents against the private respondents
and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in
their favor for properties over which original
certificates of title had already been issued in its
favor be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the
public domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
petitioner had no personality to institute the same

HELD:

No.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provides:

"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the

public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case

at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents
on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in
1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the
right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface of the land. On the other
hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent
Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private
respondents granted to them the ownership and the right
to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding
the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize,
the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's

stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus,
making such acquisition outside its purview and scope.

Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality

to institute the action below for annulment and
cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which
it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the
Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can
bring an action for reversion.