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Parallel to and reflecting this framework for operations are organized elements within the
armed forces which prepare for and conduct operations at various levels of war. While
there is a general correlation between the size of units, the area within which they
operate, and the scope of mission they perform, the correlation is not absolute. In fact, it
is ultimately the mission that a unit performs that determines the level of war within
which it operates.[1]
Military operations can be classified by the scale and scope of force employment, and
their impact on the wider conflict. The scope of military operations can be:
Effects-Based Operations
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EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views [1] on what it meant and how it
could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab,
the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to
annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are
slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft to
attack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to
attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied
forces or friendly civilians.
In 2008, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine,
noted the failure of US Army's EBO tool and issued memorandum and a guidance
documents from the commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based
Operations. In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis says, "Effective
immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts
related to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint
Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that the
term "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is at
odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of
predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver."[2]
Contents
[hide]
• 1 Definition
o 1.1 Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
o 1.2 Center of gravity
• 2 EBO in practice
• 3 See also
• 4 References
[edit] Definition
As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-
based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the
enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military
and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." The intent and desired outcome of
an effects-based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and
minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat. [3]
Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resulting
in the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasizes end-
state goals first, and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals. For
instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other
non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force
while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While
effects-based operations does not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in a
series of operational choices for military commanders.
JFCOM's description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet,
author of the April 2002 study Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?[4]
He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-
reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement
such theories in practice.
The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the
enemy's systems, lies in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical)
center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities,
or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will
to fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and field
military). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value
(NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be
targeted by operations.[5]
The first examples of effects-based approach to the use of limited military actions to
create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU-
94B anti-electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber. These
were employed on high-voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short
them and "knock the lights out." On the first attack, these knocked out 70% of the
electrical power supply, crippling the enemy's command and control and air defense
networks.
During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91, USAF LtCol (now Ret LtGen) Dave Deptula
argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, instead opting for alternate
and unconventional means to achieve desired effects. For example, as chief air power
planner, he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first, removing opposition that would
have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks. This allowed
him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions, reserving those critical assets for
future missions. [6][7]
The January –February 2004 issue of Field Artillery magazine featured a report on the
implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an
environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."[8] United States
policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of
preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts are
undertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military
maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of the
Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and
determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives
from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects
Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates
to the JECB based on three priorities:
This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems,
and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.
A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in
the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over
reliance on EBO concepts.[9]