IN RE: VICENTE Y. BAYANI [A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000] a.
a. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility)
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani failed to submit proof of service of the appellants
brief on the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 115079 (People v. Albior) and the consequent
inability of the latter to file the appellee's brief. The Supreme Court referred the
matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, IBP
Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes sent a letter to Atty. Bayani requiring
the latter to submit his comment within 5 days from receipt thereof but to no avail.
Hence, the IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bayani be suspended from
the practice of the law profession for a period of three (3) months and until the time
he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court. In turn, the IBP – Board of
Governors adopted and approved said report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Is the report and recommendation meritorious?
RULING:
Yes. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Atty. Bayani's failure to
submit proof of service of appellant's brief on the Solicitor General in G. R. No.
115079 and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience
to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of
professional ethics. A counsel must always remember that his actions or omissions
are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence
and capability in that representation.
Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law
and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to his client's cause.
TEODULFO B. BASAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. MIGUEL I. ICAWAT, respondent.
Doctrine:
connection therewith shall render him liable.
b. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client
Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers
in their complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision.
Basas and his fellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty.
Icawat, however, failed to file the required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an
administrative complaint, also alleging that Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an
amount less than that which they had paid him.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Icawat fall short of the diligence required by the legal
profession?
Held: Yes. Respondent’s failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the
NLRC Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law.
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that
a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
Further, his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from his
clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
TEODORO R. RIVERA v. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES A.C. No. 2519, August 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer.
FACTS: Complainants filed against Atty. Sergio Angeles a case for disbarment on the
grounds of deceit and malpractice. Based on the affidavit-complaint, Atty. Angeles is
their counsel in two civil cases which obtained a final judgement by the Supreme
Court. Thereafter, an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases. However, the
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sheriff’s return stated that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the
defendants. When they talked with the defendants, one of the defendants revealed
that they have already given the amount of P42,999 to Atty. Angeles for partial
settlement of the judgement. This was evidenced by a photocopy of the partial
settlement of judgement and receipt of payment. All these transpired without the
knowledge of the complainants. A demand letter was sent to Atty. Angeles but to no
avail.
Respondent, in his comment, denied the accusations. He said that he had
the right to retain the amount and to apply the same to professional fees due him
under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later
with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment or under the
previous agreement of P20% of P206,000.00. Complainants, in their reply, denied the
assignment of their rights to respondent.
The case was referred to the OSG for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The OSG submitted the case for resolution because the lawyer
failed to attend the scheduled hearings. The IBP issued an order requiring the parties
to manifest their intent to continue prosecuting the case. The investigating
commissioner submitted that Atty. Angeles violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01 of the, Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 thereof and
recommends his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution adopting the report
and recommendation of the investigating commissioner. However, instead of the
indefinite suspension, the sanction was only for a one-year suspension from the
practice of law for deceiving his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Angeles should be sanction for practicing deceit in
dealing with his client.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Angeles should be sanction for practicing deceit in dealing with his
client.
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer.
Here, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the IBP. Respondent’s
act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his
sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of
his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession
is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and
confidence.
[Atty. Angeles was suspended for one year.]
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice
of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." At this point, it might be
helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law.
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission
on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed
office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Monsod is qualified for the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. After
graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank.
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Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal
and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative.
Lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The appointing process in
a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination;
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission
(in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . The power of the Commission
on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution. We should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
AQUINO v. PASCUA
Petitioner: Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy
Respondent: Atty. Edwin Pascua, Notary Public in Cagayan.
Facts: Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents. According
to Fr. Aquino, Atty Pascua made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-
Complaint of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. But none of the documents
notarized appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua.
Atty. Pascua: admitted having notarized the two documents but they were not
entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie
C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
Petitioners: Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.
On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion. Thereafter, we referred the case
to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
Office of the Bar Confidant:
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in
such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec.
249, Article VI).
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional
but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case,
Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into
his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is
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 a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound
by the acts of his staff.
The act was not simple inadvertence as Atty. Pascua
claims it. The last entry in his notarial register is Document No. 1200
on December 28, 1998 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998are
Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Also, the only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary
which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public,
Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for
any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court
has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were
found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of
their duties.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct?
RULING:
We resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the
Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his
duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph
B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term,
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In the present case, considering
that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-
month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his
offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
EN BANC, A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J.
Doctrine: The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers. The practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines. In 1975, IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No.
75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
The respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the IBP are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines
was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws. Section 10 of the Court Rule reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.
— Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing,
to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he
4
is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The respondent similarly questions
the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
Issue: Whether or not Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the IBP are
unconstitutional or illegal.
Ruling:
No. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration
of justice — as an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity
of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397. Even without the enabling Act
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and
are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon should is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
------ ----------------------------------------------------------
--------
First objection posed by the respondent: Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate
(and not to associate).
Court: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member
of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that the
questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.
Second objection posed by the respondent: Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void.
Court: Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) —
which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
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Third objection posed by the respondent: The enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights.
Court: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Fourth objection posed by the respondent: The power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys.
Court: The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain
a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light
of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that
we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and
references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not
reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of
the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this
Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict
him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase
"in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware
that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of
"direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought
to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made
both in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and
the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the
Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through
the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required
respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in
respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to
present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon
the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct
contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for
this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules
of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139
(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
6
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer
to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule
139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and
was not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that
under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the
removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its
own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing"
(Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is
the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon
sworn complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required for
proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable
that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not
find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a
case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine
if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent"
(Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The
Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular
case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in
the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him"
and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his
defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but
that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here
are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled
to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through
Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power
to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal
contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does
the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one
year be based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or
less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is
indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act
conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of
eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five member including
the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been
delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth,
Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William
Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less than
nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention.
And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led
Congress to define more explicitly the summary power vested in
the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of the power but
merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an
Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of
Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this
Court throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this
Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal
courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted without
question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather
he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial
institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who
appears before it, and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this
Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and
present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was,
more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a
magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels
a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof
7
of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of
assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court,
speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held
in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on
the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation
(Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test,"
we believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the
per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the
"substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does
not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or
similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of
the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the
bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is
not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less
deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of
misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate
the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far
as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He
will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not
irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in
his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution,
p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied
from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was
that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot
prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate
the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state
of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute
that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by
simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs,
he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this
Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court
publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of
contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or
persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state
of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the
circumstances of this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which
has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to
consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it
8
 were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his
contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The denial is FINAL.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.
Facts:
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong
for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). After
Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC
rendered a resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties
attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for
Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when
the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as
such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s
motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals (CA). CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA,
which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued
to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter
notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum dated
September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to
withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.
Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality
because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its enforcement.10 Moreover,
Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the
case against her.
Issue: Whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court
Interpreter III of the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was
administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November
1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Pursuant
to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law," Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008
Decision’s modification and reversal.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray." [Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial
employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not have been appointed as
a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she
committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s] present
status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves.
Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement
benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly
suffer the same.
It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official
duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve
the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge
to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here,
Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does
not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.21
9
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS (A.C. No. 9317, June 4,
2014)
SERENO, CJ:
RATIO: The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or
abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
FACTS:
A disbarment case filed by complainant against her lawyer (respondent), who
represented the complainant who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding case
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
ON NLRC case
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision. Upon appeal, it was
reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision, and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf. A Petition for Certiorari
was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the
LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by the lawyer on November
23, 2010.
After the Petition was filed before the CA, Quiachon would always ask respondent
about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there was no decision yet.
Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for
him to arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor
case printed thereon. The complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the
envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of
the CA’s Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact respondent,
but to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that "it
was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were ever communicated to
complainant.
On Special Proceeding
The RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing
to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28
October 2008.
The disbarment complaint
The complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of
Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He
claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a Petition
for Review with the Supreme Court." Thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the
decision of the Court of Appeals."
In a Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. During the pendency of the
proceedings, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda) declared that respondent had been
remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being
handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform
complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the client
from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard. He, however,
recommended the dismissal of the case against him, stating that "with the decision
to withdraw the complaint, there does not appear basis to go ahead with the
proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding
of liability."
A Resolution was subsequently passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP resolving
to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of investigation
commissioner Almeyda. The case against respondent was dismissed with a warning
that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case shall be dismissed due to the filing of motion to
withdraw complaint
HELD: No.
The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate
the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding
against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary
objective.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwp Thus, it should have imposed the
appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the
charges.
10
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any
justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an
appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain
another counsel.
In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the
status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote
the client's cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they
must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of
that cause.
Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise
due diligence in protecting the client's rights; their failure to exercise that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy
of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable to the client,
the courts and society.
People vs Castaneda
Facts: Myrna Garcia and Custodio Vestidas, Jr. were charged before the CTA of falsely
declaring goods (Sec. 3602 Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue).
Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CTA dismissed the
case against Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. The prosecution filed its motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the CTA in 15 May 2013 resolution.
On 24 July 2013, the Run After the Smugglers Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group, as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the
CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled that: 1) the
pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were
not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identifythe
accused as responsible forthe misdeclaration of goods.
Issue: WON CTA was correct in ordering the dismissal of the case against respondents.
Decision: Yes. Court agrees with CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period for the filing under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the 15 May
2013 Resolution was received by the BOC 2 days after its promulgation, or on 17 May
2013. RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on 24 July 2013, when
Atty. Campos received the 15 July 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties.
According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the 15
May 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given due
course despite its late filing.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid
any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a
speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with
the rules.
No convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was
filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on
July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the
other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent
standing rules of procedure. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the
petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed
by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency
Even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result
would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be
shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process. A perusal of the challenged resolutions of the
CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial
of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed
the demurrer.
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,
SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan,
Bataan.1 n 4 September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid
11
₱35,000.000 for all the lots that would be sold in the subdivision.2 For that purpose,
they executed a Pecial Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all
agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign those agreements on their
behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and
failed to accout for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that
he had sold a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds
over to them. Neither were complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the
subdivision project.5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had
previously executed in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of
₱10,000,000, but the latter again failed to pay them.7
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of
assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute
actions against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed
a contract of legal services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay
acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay
respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In preparation
for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least
195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown
to him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and
convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter
dated 10 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and
revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006.13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they
terminated the services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint
against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on
5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the
RTC, alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint
had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a
Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-
Captioned Cases.16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration.18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter
denying the former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the
suspension/disbarment of respondent through a Complaint20 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007. Complainants alleged
that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of
their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal
problems" brought about by respondent.21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons 1.01,22 1.03,23
1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27 and 20.0428 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation29 of the investigating commissioner. It
suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering
into a champertous agreement.30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012,
this Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not
violate any of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe
that complainants only filed the instant complaint against him at the prodding of
Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against
Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of
₱10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under
which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers
have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective client
and pursue the ends of justice.31
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal
under the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint
against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The
claim of complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is more
appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of respondent. He was never
informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was
he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants and Fevidal.
We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received various amounts
12
as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,32 they could not spare
even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more
below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch up" with Fevidal
despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latter’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not convince Fevidal to
meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.33
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording
of his attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying
the fruits of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an
attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his
compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien
upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services
have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene
in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI,34 we
granted counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated
his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and
respondent had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the
parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the
determination of whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the
discretion of the court before which the lien is presented. The compensation of
lawyers for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court,
not only to guarantee that the fees they charge remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services they have actually rendered, but to maintain the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well.35
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his
services.36
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable
for disciplinary action.1âwphi1 Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not
without fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed
with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce
the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute.37
Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest
of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are
handling for the client. A reading of the contract for legal services40 shows that
respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also
paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse claim.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are
handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances
be subject to reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer
acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract
for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondents
shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client
relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal
loans that he extended to complainants.42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients
interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding
circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however
dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance of
impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the
litigation expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for
terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severly.
TAPAY AND RUSTIA V. BANCOLO
Doctrine:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. A
lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
Facts:
Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one
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Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for
insufficiency of evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. They stated further
that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report which examined three other letter-
complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. Complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
Respondents admitted that the cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants
before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases,
he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. The Board
of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution suspending Atty. Bancolo from the
practice of law for 2 years.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Bancolo be administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we
agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
De Leon vs. Atty. CasteloAC No. 8620 (January 12, 2011)
FACTS:
On April 29, 2010, De Leon initiated an administrative case against Atty. Castelo for
alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of
the defendants in the civil action (Civil Case No. 4674MN) in which De Leon
intervened. He alleged that various pleadings were filed for defendants Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.
As such, complainant submits that respondent violated his Lawyer’s Oath and The
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Castelo, in his comments, explained that the persons who had engaged him as
attorney to represent the Lim family were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; that they were already actively managing the
family business, and now co-owned the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute
sale their parents had executed in their favor; and that they had honestly assumed
that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names.
Likewise, a Motion for Substitution of Defendants was filed. Thus, whether Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial. Also, he assured that he had no intention to commit
either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death certificates of
the Spouses in order to apprise the trial court of that fact.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent violated the letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the pleadings of the
defendants
HELD:
No. A plain reading of the pleadings indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary,
he directly stated in his answer and clarification that the Spouses were already
deceased. He was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when
he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. As such, his pleadings were
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privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Also, since his wife’s surgical operation are not considered mistake and/or negligence
the Spouses were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties, the fact contemplated under the law as to warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of
that they are already deceased is immaterial. petitioners appeal for failure to file appellants brief.
De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses were no longer
living. As voluntary intervenor, he was charged with notice of all the other persons
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s contention is tenable
interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons,
as his own complaint in intervention. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any
RULING: NO.
other party.
Court also emphasized that good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and In relation to Criminal Law: A criminal case may be dismissed by the CA motu
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice. prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the appellant means that a notice must
first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed

Hence, the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty.

Eduardo G. Castelo is dismissed for utter lack of merit. In relation to Legal Ethics: Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and
negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional
depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.
Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia VS. People of the Philippines GR. 183975

There are exceptions to this rule, such as:

FACTS: Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 98-M-98 for Frustrated Murder.
(1) when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
After trial, on September 11, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision[3] convicting
of law,
petitioner of frustrated homicide. Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief,
petitioner thru his counsel de parte requested and was granted additional period of (2) when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones
twenty (20) days within which to file said brief. property or liberty through a technicality
(3) where the interests of justice so require
On August 29, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to the fact that
the accused-appellant failed to file his appellants brief within the reglementary
In this case, negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the
period which expired on June 6, 2007. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
appellants brief within the reglementary period. None of these exceptions obtains
his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants brief due to
here. For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
personal problems emanating from his [counsels] wife’s recent surgical operation. He
abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. The court found no reason to
also cited his advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30, 2008) and medical condition
exempt petitioner from the general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to
(hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema), attaching
attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses
copies of his birth certificate, medical certificate and certifications from the barangay
should have prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and
and church minister.
replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to
allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in
the hope of moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason
The CA denied the omnibus motion holding that petitioner is bound by the mistakes
of petitioners age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from
and negligence of his counsel, such personal problems of a counsel emanating from
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lawyers but also from their clients. HELD: No. With regard to the petitioners argument that they should be excused from
the procedural blunder committed by their former counsel, the Court finds it bereft
of merit. The petitioners were not denied due process and their rights were not
GILBERT URMA, TEOFILO URMA, DANTE URMA, and JERRY URMA VS. HON. violated when their counsel, Atty. Raul Morales, agreed that the only issue that
ORLANDO BELTRAN, G R. No. 180836. needed to be resolved was the authenticity of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner
Teofilo Urma.
There was nothing amiss in entering into such stipulations. The petitioners only cried
KEYWORD: MISTAKE / NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL
foul when the examination result turned out to be unfavorable to them.
FACTS:
Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering into such stipulations, such
The petitioners and respondents are blood relatives being the nearest of kin procedural error unfortunately bound them. The Court has consistently held that the
of the deceased spouses Laureano Urma (Laureano) and Rosa Labrador-Urma (Rosa). mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of procedural technique binds the
They are the children of Laureanos brother who predeceased him. The petitioners client unless such mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that would
claim ownership of the lot they are occupying by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly require the courts to step in and accord relief to the client who suffered thereby.
executed by Laureano on April 10, 1985 in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma, and in Without this doctrinal rule, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new
agreement with respondent Marcela Urma-Caingat. On the other hand, six (6) of the counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
respondents claim ownership over portions of the subject property by virtue of a sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.
deed of donation executed in their favor by Rosa in February 1996.
During the pre-trial, both parties agreed the only issue of fact to be revolved
was the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale dated April 10, 1985 allegedly
executed by Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma; that said document be examined by
the NBI; that both parties would accept the result of the dactyloscopic examination
to be conducted; and that said result would be the basis of the judgment to be
rendered. It was further stipulated that if the NBI report would state that Laureano
indeed executed the deed of sale, the judgment would be in favor of the petitioners.
Otherwise, the decision should favor the respondents.
Upon orders of the trial court, the NBI performed the examination and
found that the questioned fingerprint was not identical with the genuine specimen
thumbmark. Hence, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents by declaring them the
absolute owners of portions of the disputed land and ordering the petitioners to
vacate said portions
In the belief that their counsel committed gross negligence in handling their
case, the defendants filed a Motion For New Trial. They argued that their counsel
should not have joined the motion for a judgment on the pleadings because their
answer contained specific denials and defenses which tendered an issue. They
likewise claimed that they were uneducated and not too familiar with the niceties of
the law and legal procedures. Hence, they should not be bound by the mistakes and
omissions of their counsel.

ISSUE: WON the counsel is guilty of mistake/negligence.

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