[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective
EN BANC assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel.
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-
appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction
of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on
the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion raises the following
grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by
the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a
bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense
in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant from
preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the
father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of death
against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested
bias in the conduct of the trial.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec.
19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before
the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[1]
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time
on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge xxx, the defense attempted to
prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the
alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the
alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-
appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have
caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
1
 Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-
appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction,
we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the
criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the
Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately defending
himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that
placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court
during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only
legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on
the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the
accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any time, even during appeal.[2]
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in open
court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out
that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do the
same sexual assaults to other women."[3] Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of
desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age,
manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by
the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the
retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by
the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge."[5]
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted
of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing
testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim
herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over
the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that
the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to
defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to
whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the required
ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his
client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he
was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had
seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of
our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his line of defense. There
is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the
preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the
prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the
new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-
appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for
violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our
forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was
used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the
name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout
the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under
the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent
human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the
common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against
threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts
criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects,
the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals
in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of
criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been
perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal
Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty
provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for
the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though,
capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a
modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
2
of Harden v. Director of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v.
Puda[11] and People v. Marcos,[12] In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.'"[13]
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself
provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951
case of Limacothat:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for
its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply
the law regardless of their private opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.[15]
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The
list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the
times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s,
at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders of
the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among
them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During
martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among
others, crimes involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the
nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened following
appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated
people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights
to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the
death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among
the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how
the abolition was to be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or
by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty
should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done
by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature -- or
left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the
death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the
convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly
criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives
might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too
presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has
been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human
life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human
life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in
support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty". [16]
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate
that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never in our
history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith
during the last decade".[17] Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to
absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the
face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F.
de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we
should afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation,"[18] and his concern was
amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo,
and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following
exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has
never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even
from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view,
that right of the state is not forbidden.
3
 MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the delegated
authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is
needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or not
under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in
history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever under all
circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under
certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of the death
penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe this
Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a month,
determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the
legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most
grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating circumstances." [19]
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The
move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose
E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even as
regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the
Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and
con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion
of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect,
repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this piece of
legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the
legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to
the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but
let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised
Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these
pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it
is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think we
should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we
are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the legislature,
let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the
legislature 100 percent."[20]
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23) commissioners
voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed by more
revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in
the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty
provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of the
scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital
crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty
under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"[22] thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death
penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay,[23] People v.
Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with
the three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we
reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the
issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for
if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one
where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be
read from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as
yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the
death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining
periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into
three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the
legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it toreclusion
perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for
4
 it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language,
while rather awkward, is still plain enough".[27]
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process
consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not;
and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against
capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death
penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended
the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair
directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on
this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote
in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the
reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal
Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the
question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter, a
seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in
accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death
penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on which
death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal
voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that
certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the
discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would
vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the imposition of the
death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy
issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of
penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down,
the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules,
but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be
appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given
to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be
reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he
pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to
address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed
heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to
impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply
because the crime is heinous."[28]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention,
the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale
of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was
subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the
committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would
be the determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on
the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to
why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish
crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino
stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on
heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of drafting a bill,
a compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this Body,
the Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed originally in
the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death
penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on
heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was
affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in
the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed -- all
5
 provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by
the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such
penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many
articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that
our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making
this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed draft now
under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the
Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because
by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they
had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them
had to be amended because the Committee thought that amendments were
proper."[29]
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would
have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined and
imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the
death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised
Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death
penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we
thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as
heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble is,
when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill the case
of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty
shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of
kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same --
merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method
of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and merely adding some
aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses
originally punished in the Revised Penal Code."[30]
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until
August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the
sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for which the
supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the
death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each
and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each
crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification.[31]Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with
sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a
compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded
that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina
argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done
everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called
death penalty".[32] The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-
impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system
that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death
penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of
compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino
explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes
covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the
same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to
impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason.[33]
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines were
clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as
provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for
each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes
heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous
because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be
punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed
to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important element in
considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense
to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves connected
with the effect upon society and the government have made them fall under the
classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is
when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as indicated
in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the Gentleman
believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death
penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be
very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the
Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling reason
for each and every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is why in the
preamble, general statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And that, we
believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what
6
were considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for
these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the
preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of
Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or
punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every
offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the
power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights,
particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so
stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the
omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is
sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or less be a matter of
procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect to due
process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition and
penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of
the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the
distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as
well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe
that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state why a
certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the
Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what
the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous
nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the
matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will
go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So
that would be entirely separate from the matter of due process." [34]
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated
our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment,
the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the
United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on
them for consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the
plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this
respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol
considering that these agreements have reached only the committee level.[35]
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891
on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one
abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a
vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier
approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for
certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the Senate
killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295
was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was
introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives on October 27,
1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955,
1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the
constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-
requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter
provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall
thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty
was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the
death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo
Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future
time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and
referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
7
 We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely
possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the
capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now
committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a
mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes the
Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more, and they are all
crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their
selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent
disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an
offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous
to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the epitome of
viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive,
was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high
school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands of a
crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-
Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the lovely
and promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the
recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in
restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the people,
then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-
help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and
exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our
constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a
regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped,
raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A
law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future animalistic
behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law
that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we
hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."[36]
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the
death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death
penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous
and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general
statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous
crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros
Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House,
no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the
importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous crimes
such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal
Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080;
piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539,
when the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson
resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous
crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of
decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government,
committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance'
is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government
under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52
Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own will in
some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify
and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.
8
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by
death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the crime, thinks
nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of self-
amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are
perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the
personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and degrading
incident which has shattered the victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not
to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation
and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the
perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement of the vessel, and
because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the
rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is
punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the
sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of
subjecting the passengers to terrorism." [37]
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On
February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved
the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on
third reading. [38] The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of
Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to
incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal
Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time,
criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-
appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping
his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on automatic
review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his death
sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis
is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted
in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for rape is a
cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's view
that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin requirements of
compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as
unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the
following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to
re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power
is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress
specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the
attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous
in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition
or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, [40] traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning,
hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so
hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to
be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its
proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the
sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate
penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the
more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada grilled
the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of capital
crimes without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were oblivious
to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were
crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by
9
mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying
circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four
circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was committed
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a building
where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a building or
factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government museum;
and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or
regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed with a
deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c) the rape is
attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of
regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs confiscated by
the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another to
implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them
being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of
foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would
only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua,
instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence
proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which
the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the
victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on
the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous,
odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in
the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or
prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or
death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for
the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty
of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts
10
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subject
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of
the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in
such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated
drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum
penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in such
den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including
members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and
13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are
government officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies and the
armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death
penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of 'planting'
any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-
A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
11
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public
position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must
be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an
animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life,
and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual
personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or
she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors
or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained
for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to
kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche
of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people
it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to
cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned,
R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As
to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are
admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time
to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we
are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of
judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime
for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while
it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by
the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the
Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the
commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the
commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for
the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the
commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may
attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man
is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every
loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and
yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death
sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one
criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive
safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the
death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that
the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the
abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous crime and statistical
proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are
either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of
decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic
agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether
eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until
we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.
12
 The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to
that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required
by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-
cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of
the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an
unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death
penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a
dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during
the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did
not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that
there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in
the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant
that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the
same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that
"the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of
the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled
that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of
the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused
who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion
to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the
American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by
American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced
to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what
motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice
that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether
defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 'caste' aspect
of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised x x x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant
with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per
se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman,
it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing
juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their
death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by the U.S.
Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in
the cases of Gregg v. Georgia,[42] Jurek v. Texas,[43] and Profitt v. Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does
not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the
crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital punishment, at least
for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves
the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
13
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate
murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment
grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the
punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to
satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously authorized death for
rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a
capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their
revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death
penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson
and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again
revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not
for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to
Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972
and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for
which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty
in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and the rapist an adult, the
Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x
x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time
that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two
other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous
among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own
judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an
adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a
moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is
also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation,
to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often
accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological
damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as
well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and
of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does
involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the
rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public
has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of
rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death
penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a
dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine
experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the
biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have
already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life
simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable
acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive
effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have
so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court
has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case
of People v. Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to
justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts
not only the victim but the society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the
heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to
which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing
with the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with even more
14
basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the
meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the
rights are of the living.

"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if

infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition
seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we
will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital
punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and
ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting
a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival." [47]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED[48] for LACK OF MERIT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

15
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias
"Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora.
Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang.
Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly accepted
his sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent.
The prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for
the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant punishment
meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven persons, most of
them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who
had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed
quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and
without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked
on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in
the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old, was
kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances,
the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they
were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the
four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried.
The sentence of Feliciano Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory
and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely,
Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose
Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and
asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest
surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his horse,
was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by
Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth
and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by
Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made any move to restrain or
dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son,
Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay on
the ground while the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They
then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her
husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro
and his wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro
twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their
companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed. Juana watched her husband's
death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the
accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their violence
on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on. Aquilino was
entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting
him in the head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells and fled
with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and
Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana
Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was
corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other
accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged away by
the group. The trial court especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who
positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of the others,
16
including the savage kicking of his brother by Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as
the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and
named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by confessing that she had
earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his
father although she actually did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related how
she was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband
was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino
was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood
by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also
thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully
escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it occurred
to these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay should impugn their
credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were
naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that befell their
relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report their
grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities
appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their
complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as
painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not detract
from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are
emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip
left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the
back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye practically
lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically
opened with the brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper right
jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of
the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left
clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected as
false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of
gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their adversaries,
Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from
the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano Muñoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men
in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem
his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having
seen the encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former
were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and suspicious on
the stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took
him all of one year to report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention
that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with them. 24 It is also not
believable that the group would flee because they had no more bullets when their supposed
three adversaries were already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz
was described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had
been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As
for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos,
including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as
testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having
gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there overnight with a
female companion after drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City
only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30, 1972. 27 The lawyer
corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and
Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the
face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by
these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or mercy nor could their
memory of the heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora
was with the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino were killed by
Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang
having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the
17
former's house the whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following
morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them breakfast. 30Significantly, however,
barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers from Balite
Sur. 31Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who
corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses.
The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de
Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to investigate the killings. In
fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for
the accused, might have been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz
and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
assess their credibility. The written record will not show that nuance of
tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and
the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will
affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could
be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting declarations
before him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their seven other companions,
participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for
the prosecution. The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were,
rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing and telling evidence
submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a
quo to each of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case
No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other two herein
appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muñoz was found
guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding,
the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the
accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven men
went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among
them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand. They
knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for them. They sought each of
them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of
them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora
shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready. Nobody moved
to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the rest
watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they
took him with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest
stood by with their weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop
him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing
a common design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As
such, each of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each
member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal,
regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled that in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was
treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and defenseless
when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely taken
by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the
head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three
victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of
the 1987 Constitution providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever
it was called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as
mandated by the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect
lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not
attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion
temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the
original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the maximum period was
not imposed because of the constitutional prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later,
without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v.
Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the
conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers
18
as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous,
to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by
many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief
that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the
constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death
penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping
with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that
Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties.
These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance
either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to
abolish the death penalty, we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional
Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by
dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the
provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best
thought-provoking but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death
penalty from those statutes-only the death penalty.
The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is
abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about,
because the statutes, especially in the General
Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not
necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes it
has a range of reclusion temporal to death or
reclusion perpetua to death. And what would be the
effect on the judges, for example, if the range is
reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer
impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in
computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge
will look at the specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have
difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal
to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the
range cannot go as far as death (Record, CONCOM,
July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death
remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua.
But the range of the penalty for murder consists of
three periods. The maximum period of reclusion
temporal under the present status is the minimum
period for the penalty for murder. The medium
period is reclusion perpetua. The maximum period is
death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a
duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty.
Where do we get the medium period now until such
time that Congress gets around to accommodate this
amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers
can argue with judges about. All we are saying is, the
judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record,
CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about."
Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are
still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum
period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable
from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially so since he also
said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot
impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean that they were
not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or
merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is
whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods
as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
19
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article
III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable
implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and
plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement,
express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this
might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another-or
strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases
represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two
members 42 at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look
at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the
composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after
reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can,
for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified
rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is.
While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a
fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that
means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the
penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua.
This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders
they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs
of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00
in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have
remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials, especially
the police and the prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The
courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons against
those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and frustrate justice
because they have the protection of powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are hereby
declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is
sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the heirs
of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total
indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have
arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person
originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same
medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough.
But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not
construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was
paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others
hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt
unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you
not agree with me for a penny?'

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are
prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the

20
 EN BANC
two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166401 the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in
Appellee, [Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for attempted
Present:
qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO, consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, First, the antecedent facts.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ALFREDO BON, CORONA, I.
Appellant. CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, Eight (8) Informations[2] were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. charging him with the rape of AAA[3] and BBB,[4] the daughters of his older brother. Appellant

was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while
Promulgated:
October 30, 2006 he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-

G.[5] All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him

as the man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and the
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm
medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as
the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of
documentary evidence.
attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a

consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in

both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge the

constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution,[1] we now find

it necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the
statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term
of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the
house appellant had shared with her grandmother.[6] She recounted that the incident took
place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and
vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened

21
that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.[16] On that

thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt

after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters

appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.[7] away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any

noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the
down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there
third time, again at the house of her grandmother.[8] The following year, when she was
for three (3) minutes moving up and down. Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned
twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an
to where her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who
outdoor clearing[9] after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables.
had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her
While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his
grandmothers house again.[17]
penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.[10]

It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother.

Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her

sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police station and her

statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined.

It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,[11] the Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000

brutish acts appellant had done to her.[12] Her mother thus filed a complaint against her or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellants threat of killing her

uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her and her family.[18]

birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.[13]

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew

BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became

ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother. While alone in concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was

the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the

vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon learning this,

did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellants threat that he would kill she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident that

her.[14] BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting

several occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After

the time of day.[15] examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested.[19]

22
 CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and

because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was stayed there until early morning of the following day.[24]

arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his

relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.[20]

The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T.

Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed

who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child. These that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the

medical certificates were presented in court.[21] criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason

the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces,

The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC lazy within earshot of

external sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia other family members.[25]

majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers

without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at three (3) oclock and eight (8) The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.[26] The RTC pronounced

oclock which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded appellants defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial

that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert

times.[22] the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the
AAAs medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and

external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAAs labia majora and minorawere well appellant, the latter being the formers relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could

happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were

an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermathof the

there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo[27] the present case was transferred to the

AAA.[23] Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in
court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was about thirty (30) On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to

arm stretches away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15 six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant.[28] The appellate court

January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away ratiocinated, thus:

23
 We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at
least two (2) cases. The prosecutions case which was anchored mainly on
the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith
and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court,
We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was
established with certitude that the accused on several occasions sexually
assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship
were proved by the victims candid and unwavering testimonies both of
whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their
own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried
on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to
her and her sister.[29]
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to
attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999
and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find
evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished
the slightest penetration of AAAs vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. It
stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellants penis ever touched the labia
of the pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA
was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she
answered in the negative.[30] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties
attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief[31] before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of
Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15
January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her
rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side.
However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that on that night, as
she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents house (and not at her
grandmothers), the accused passed through a window, entered their room and raped her
again.[32]Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBBs testimony as to the length of
the duration of her rape on that day. In BBBs testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that
appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that
the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001.
Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider
material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez[33] on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who
happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to
trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted.[[34]] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's
Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and
merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination
and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful
to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of
strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often than not, is
talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[[35]] "Moreover,
the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a
courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the
manner in which a witness answers questions."[[36]][37]
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on
some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the People[38] filed
with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her
first testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January
15, 2000, as regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or
house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top 3 minutes
or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration that
on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he
was moving while on her top then she felt something came out from him.
He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed
weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she
24
 was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many acts of sexual
abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January
was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving the
the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to
recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything
her own house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of
about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence
commission accuseds house or victims house is not an essential element
of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua against him.
Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court. x x x [39]
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of

CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject

In addition, we share the lower courts disbelief of appellants proffered defenses of denial her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating their

and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition,

Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony CCCs father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were

of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-

was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victims

physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[40] family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more

specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact
In the case at bar, appellants alibi that he was at his sisters house barely two (2) kilometers
committed.[43]
away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sisters house in the
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in
middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sisters house without much
truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman,

more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary

to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused,
and sincerity.[44] The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to
without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but
prevails over alibi and denial.[41] The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration
in the absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost
when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the
value.
perpetrator.[42] In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively
identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated
the credibility of such identification.
in this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant were aptly

established

25
 desistance.[47] In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration

or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the was evident in AAAs testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:

ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when
certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they were both you were eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was

the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims father, and thus, a relative of the Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted
victims within the third degree of consanguinity. also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is
Q Why?
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them and A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again
xxxx
that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated

charge.[45] Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims perception and judgment

at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough

that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse

impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident.[46] A Many times, Mam.[48] [sic]

AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.

Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No.
6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual
abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]

At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two

separate incidents of attempted rape.

xxxx

It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should

produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?

26
 A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic] from further executing the act. From the testimony of private
complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to
xxxx demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellants penis
reached the labia of the pudendum of AAAs vagina. There is no basis then
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of
vagina? the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already
A Painful, Mam. [sic] consummates the case of rape. x x x [50]

Q And what did you do when you feel painful?

A I cried, Mam. [sic] It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when

the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic] perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause

or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is
xxxx
an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape,

the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of

the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the

penetration, however slight, is not completed.[51]

Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.[49] [sic] The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established

beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts

of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA
crimes should be amended.
declared:

It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. II.
Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be
convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-
settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not
necessary to convict for consummated rape since the slightest penetration We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6)
of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
term slightest penetration was clarified to mean that there must be
sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled An Act Prohibiting the
least the labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of
penis and the external layer of the victims vagina (the stroking and the
grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the
categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There
must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed
consummated. We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial
court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the childs
vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop

27
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been
imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had
under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-
occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
Tubongbanua[52] and People v. Cabalquinto.[53]
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:

III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted
rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the Court.
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive,
of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:

The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article
71 of this Code.[56]

years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of attempted
rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to
the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the
penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law
for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.[54]
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to
our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating
such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty:

What is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for attempted rape? The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments introduced by following graduated scales:

Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes: SCALE NO. 1

1. Death
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
2. Reclusion perpetua
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
5. Prision correctional
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
6. Arresto mayor
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
7. Destierro
parent of the victim. x x x[55]
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure

28
 10. Fine[57]
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than
death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three
divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The purpose of the prescription of
minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the
privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty
to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence. [58]
convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law,
as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or
maximum periods.[59]
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a
minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act
No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning
the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion
temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of
death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of
Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu
of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape
will affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with
the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable
under two different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993
amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty
Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two
ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for reclusion perpetua to death, and death itself as an
automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the
crimes of qualified bribery if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or
Thus, present;[60] kidnapping or detention for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person;[61] destructive
arson wherein death results;[62] and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances
enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death was imposable on
several crimes, including murder,[63] qualified piracy,[64] and treason.[65]The imposition of the
death penalty for crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death depended on the
appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles 13
29

and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the
penalty imposed was death, as opposed to reclusion perpetua to death.
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such
situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of
attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the
enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not reclusion perpetua to death.
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from reclusion
perpetua to death differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it
has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision
mayor.[66] In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted
stage, the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the
offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal.[67] In People v. Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the
accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter,
was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that reclusion temporal was the proper
penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty
for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death,
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, since [RT[69]] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the
common-law spouse of [RTs] mother. The last paragraph thereof
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal,
which is the penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum
shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.[70]
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. Hence, in passing
sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the
consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several
crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale
prescribed in Article 71. Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not
similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition
30

of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress.
Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had
no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter
Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659,
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,[71] among others, were deemed to have been
passed in 1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping
amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit
for ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.
of the repealing clause, which reads, all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as

they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. While this
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as
clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is
qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the imposable
in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive
penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of
orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such
accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
felonies for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to death.

Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of

Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the
death does not refer to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
particular phrase insofar as they impose the death penalty. We can entertain two schools of

thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it

can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor

(among many examples) does not impose the death penalty, since none of the convicts

concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape.
V.
Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or

other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for

convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71,
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for
the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent.
attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of
However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on
death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article
frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.
71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe impose as to mean apply, then it could

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination: be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the

application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating

31
operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the

graduated penalty. case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping

for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was

On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an

by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was

understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and

construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he

reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,[72] a is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the

decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion. penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the conservative

interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the

If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the imposition of enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the

the death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity. death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced

For example, had Section 1 read instead insofar as they sentence an accused to death, there to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.

would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual

executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the

repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did

actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by

But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of

intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that

of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step that

runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a

VI. legislature truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have

explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in

There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the principals and accomplices in any crime at all.

physical imposition of the death penalty.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that

the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others.

32
Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were

charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are

the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides

9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. that the penalty for attempted felonies is a penalty lower by two degrees than that

Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y prescribed by law for the consummated felony. The Court has thus consistently

would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice. imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum

term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death

penalty.[74] If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties

for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still

be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the penalty lower by two degrees than that

Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for prescribed by law for the consummated felony would now be prision mayor.

ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of

simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would

Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the

notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal

same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the

accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential
justification other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so. theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in

discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect.

Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such

frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.

consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion

perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the VII.

foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or

also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties

perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical,
anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe

punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a

felonies punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,[73] such as murder, which may be means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative amendment

frustrated. that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and

33
attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks death at the top of the scale for graduated
penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word death as previously inscribed in Article 71 will
have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our
penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping
for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower
than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent
with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the
reference to death. Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence
as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the
same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of
kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having
eliminated the reference to death in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws.
Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified
rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act
No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
expansive interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible systema uniform system of
jurisprudence.[75] Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and
quasi-
legislative acts.[76] There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised
Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties
attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will
a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and
attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are
strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.[77] If the language of
the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it
would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice. [78] The law is
tender in favor of the rights of an individual.[79] It is this philosophy of caution before the
State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental
principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have
been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing
the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than
death, dependent as these are on death as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such intent were
unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we
had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have
acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the
legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or
ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would
harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws,
and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.
34
 VIII.

It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now

One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different from those in this case. Most

amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for

our ruling in People v. Muoz,[80] decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper

constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the Constitution did

modification in the other periods [in penalties], there being no expression of such a not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the

requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act

No. 9346. Otherwise framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with

the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has unequivocally

clear and unmistakable implication.[81] In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited banned the same.

pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution which expressly declares the

abolition of the death penalty.[82] Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which

provided that [n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons

It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Muoz and its progenies,

9346. More precisely, would Muoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as

9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death? opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of the
death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the

It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which time Muoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal

under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very

period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the

circumstance, and thus penalized in the penaltys medium term. Jurisprudence previous penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, as Congress very well did just four

to Muoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be the higher half of reclusion (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature

temporal maximum, with reclusion temporalmaximum, divided into two halves for that has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and

purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty for compelling

perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to reasons involving heinous crimes. Yet it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that

the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charters effects on the other dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and

periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as

Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muoz.[83] evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.

35
 The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the Yet in truth, there is no material difference between imposition and application, for

death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates

irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding death as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the

modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of

Constitution. determining the extent which a persons liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346

unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such

For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily

9346 intended to delete the word death as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.

penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article

71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the

of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal

provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of death penalty laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in

bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress

Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once

for the imposition of the penalty of death. thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional

discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the

The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word imposition in the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any
Constitution evinced the framers intent to retain the operation of penalties under the time in our political history as a nation.

Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of imposition in Rep.

Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the death penalty, as applied Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not

in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of imposition was implemented as a means of have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive

retaining death under Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the

indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being in a

employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity state of hibernation.[85] No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the sovereign people,

when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be

as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as nothing but blather reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect,
in search of meaning.[84] In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.

the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.

Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we

do not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal justification when it was decided; that its

36
application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep.

sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that

the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No. statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.

9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in

criminal law jurisprudence.

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is

IX. immediate. Henceforth, death, as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no

longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of

Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from

the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as heinous, within two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the

constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of

accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.[86] The categorization of

certain crimes as heinous, constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the

more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary free-standing penalty of death, as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged

indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other

levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes. penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our
reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that

It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the

No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as heinous. Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two

The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately

penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. Hence, as

crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion

the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special perpetua to death is prision mayor.

category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the

reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes. Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this
new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if

X. consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of

death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal

Code states that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person

37
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[[87]] x x x x although at the time of the and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day

publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the of prision mayor as maximum.

same. Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such

crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as habitual Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as

criminal[s]. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape, it

retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to persons x x x whose sentences were being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v.

reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act.[88] Miranda.[89]

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence[90] in awarding to BBB and

the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as

whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.

this decision does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may

be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under law WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty

the Public Attorneys Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of

detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against

who are so entitled by reason of this ruling. BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to
indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as

XI. civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for

each of them.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act

No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and

penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)

consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)

downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is

to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts
one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary

mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it damages.

medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months SO ORDERED.

38
 EN BANC

RICHARD O. SARCIA,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169641 Accused-Appellant.

Plaintiff-Appellee, x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Present: DECISION

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, On automatic review is the decision[1] dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision[2] of
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias Nogi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ. crime of rape[3] committed against AAA,[4] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty

of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as

- versus - moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by

Promulgated: the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00,

and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral

damages.
September 10, 2009

The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five
(5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint[5] for acts of
lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence,
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape. [6] The
Information[7] dated September 5, 2000 reads:

That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality

of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and
unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual

39
 intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took
consent, to her damage and prejudice. effect on October 15, 2004.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

SO ORDERED.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.[14]

The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor
cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied
committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the
Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision[9] finding the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
In our Resolution[15] of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief[16] on
April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I

The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
filed by the accused- appellant.[10] TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].

Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief[11] on July 15, 2004, while the People, through II
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellees Brief[12] on December 15, 2004.
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[13] modifying the pertinent provisions of
ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the
RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in Internal
III
Rules of the Supreme Court, the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition,
to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. RICHARD SARCIA.
CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by
the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief,
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused,
as follows:
Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to
pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
damages.
Crisologo near a mango tree.

Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for
to the backyard of Saling Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to
review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.

40

Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back.Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-
down movement (Nagdapadapa tabi). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her
private part and said aray. She also felt an intense pain inside her
stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters
follows:
away from them, witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs
cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt
Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered
that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be
talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and
ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard
of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however,
was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant
had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her
any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had
done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later,
when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her
private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came
to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier
made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother],
however did not say anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working
in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of
Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer,
Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr.
Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already
resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical
doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate
issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows: negative for
introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish
vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding
negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars means, in laymans
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there
is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have
been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.[17]
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of
Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for his
father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father
retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an
agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an
agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring
seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were
residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred
residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag
while his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan,
Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut
land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15)
years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992
and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high
school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00
oclock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would
usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa
Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother
suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his
mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised
when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the
latters place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard
claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose
death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for
Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the
docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are related to Salvacion,
concocted and instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the
case for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was
incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months
41
 later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed
in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a
Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him
in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because
he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a
doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape
her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape
case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also
related to his father, [AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of his
father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to
the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against
him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case
No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape
in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape case
but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked
exhibits relative to said case.[18]
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the
prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following
grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the
victim was confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was
a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the said case
was to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by
said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7,
2000. Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAAs father in filing
the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant
harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr.
Joana Manatlao, stating negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that
there was no showing of any scar or wound.
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between
AAAs and her cousins testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with
AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before
accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin
testified that when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top
of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAAs testimony that when accused-
appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said aray; (3) when the
cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother what accused-appellant had done to
AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she
invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other children were playing
at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who were
playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer
only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses.[19] The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to
overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses
were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive,
candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant
evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only
42
five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,

respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court
proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make
confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could
be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to
accord them ample space for inaccuracy.[20]
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the
incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not
an indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its
face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was
raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the
fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that
the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when
the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases,
we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and until
October 15, 1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto and on or about and sometime in the year
1988 constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a

witness.[21] In People v. Purazo,[22] We ruled:

In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15,

1996 was explained by the trial court, and we quote:

We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the
cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held
date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn
committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to
statement mention the month and date but only the year.[24]
sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint,
provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the
period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction
of the court.
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case
against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the

only reason why this case was filed against him was to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction
Also in People v. Salalima,[23] the Court held: of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death

of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000.

43
 since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of

absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.[27]
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the

truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer

silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted
been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma[25] we even considered an 8-year delay in
as follows: negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman
reporting the long history of rape by the victims father as understandable and not enough to
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound. The Court has consistently ruled
render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other
that the presence of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the
indispensable in a prosecution for rape.[28] What is important is that AAAs testimony meets
failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the
the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
complainants father in the latters testimony, thus:

Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again,
when your wife told you that something happened to Hazel way
back in 1996? we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to

concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and
A Yes, sir.
unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses.

Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants defense of denial
to file this case?
and alibi.[29] The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
reason that during that time we had no money yet to use in filing
score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough
amounts, we filed the case.[26]

True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the

Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there
is no proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of
AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is
whether carnal knowledge took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary,
instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents
finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to
realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously
[AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had
continually ignored is after all true.

44

AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the
testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is
improbable for a girl of complainants age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and
her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any
rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a
crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.[30] Parents would not sacrifice their
own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of
public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughters
transgressor punished accordingly.[31] Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss
now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, [32] was the
governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the
said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape
was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of
her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty
should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)[33] of the Revised Penal Code. When
accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which
means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age.As found by the trial court, the rape incident
could have taken place in any month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was
not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain
that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several
cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age.[34]
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with.[35] Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the
Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides
that in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The issue now is whether the
award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the
offense.
45
 A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in

offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term indemnification, nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,[37] we held:

which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:

Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for

consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
of the crime. actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
(Emphasis Supplied)

Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor[36] ratiocinated as follows: In another case, this Court also explained:

The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award

of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral
damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence
indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the
as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy
mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).[38] (Emphasis
and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual
Supplied)
or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral
damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual

and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments
her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of
for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the
form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at
which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and
than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)

In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating

circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree,

46
there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of
damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v.
Candelario,[39] a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of
damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was
lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome[40] and People v. Quiachon[41] is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the
basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of
Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of
the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of
the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00
Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need proof
other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial
courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased
to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is
still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil
indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court,
following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is
qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed
to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination
in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award
of P75,000.00 shows not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity.
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
47
 As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of
right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by
way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to
them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded
to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.[42] Since the compensatory damages, such as
the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the
exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[43]
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral
damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of
exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest
jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly
awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages
is increased to P75,000.00[44] and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise
increased to P30,000.00.[45]
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison
pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision
and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC
was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article
192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[46] and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.[47] Accused-
appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay
Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on
October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said
Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the
lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is
found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
48
 Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed
by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.[48] The said
P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38
of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.[49] Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply
the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found
guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations[50] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;
but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be
a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)
49
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been

promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38

and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.[51] However, accused-

appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which

provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the

appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.[52]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is

hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on

accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;[53] and (2) accused-appellant is ordered

to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and

exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00

is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate

disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

50
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated
FIRST DIVISION September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal
Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563
rape against the private complainant AAA.[3]
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

CORONA, C.J., On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8) counts
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

- versus -
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX],

Promulgated:
December 14, 2011
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA,
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
who was then only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against
her will.

Accused-Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[5]

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

DECISION

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of

[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-

51
year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[6]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-
year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[7]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-
year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[8]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-
year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[9]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-
year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence
succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[10]
52

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of
[AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[11]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the
municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of
[AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.[12] (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he
entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was
conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases,
the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the uncle of the
victim.[14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused
and his counsel. The cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against
the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.[15] In one
afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped
her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the exact month and date of the
incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of
her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put
it in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ
penetrated her vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so
only when she urinated.[16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five
times on different nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the
stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs house, took off her
panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it was nighttime. He
made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her
for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on
top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she
urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her
assailant since it was a moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He
entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.[17]
53
 AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August
1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and
pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was heavy. She did not know
if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he
was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes
because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a
complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary
evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which contained the
results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr.
Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case Study
Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since
8 year old for so many times. last act was
March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration
at 3 & 9 oclock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: =
NEGATIVE[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness
stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He
testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13
years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in
Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to
1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in
the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house
of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the latters parents were his
enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAAs parents because he did not work with
them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living
in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from
1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he
was still working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go
home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees with
AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies. [22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was
his sister and they were close to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995
up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated
that his parents house was about two kilometers away from the house of AAA. While he was
working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every month,
mainly on Sundays.[23]
54
The Judgment of the RTC

The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC Decision,

asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision
circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was
convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of
rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November 6,
2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter failed to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by
R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the
Court found accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as
RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the
G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The parties then filed their respective briefs.[28]On February 7, 2006,
maximum penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the
amount of FiftyThousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and we resolved[29] to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People
pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
and pay the cost.[24] (Emphases in the original.)

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was
in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision,
against the accused-appellant. If there were inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the trial court decreeing thus:
deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was pitted against a learned
opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an indication
that the charges were fabricated.Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the
medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-
01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary
alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically
damages to [AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the day after working hours while he
Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that the separate award of
was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was positively Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to
identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against each count of rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
him. The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her
uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The trial court also
appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence and nighttime.

55
 The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-
appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:
held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as
she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her straightforward, categorical and
candid testimony that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the I

physical evidence and the accused-appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not
stand against the positive identification made by AAA.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and
admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court, however, differed in appreciating II
against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs minority. The lone
testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
that the same was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
commission of the crimes of rape.In view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of COMPLAINANT.
relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.

III

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and the
same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33]dated May 27, 2008.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]

On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from
notice.[34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion[35] filed on December 24, 2008, the
plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused from
filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a
Supplemental Brief.[36]
The Issues
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight
to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the
exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-
appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of rape
charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above
inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the

56
qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment
of acquittal.

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

The Ruling of the Court

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is

otherwise unconscious;

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny
the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;

To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of
one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape
be present.
was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old.However, the
accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAAs
testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any belief. He
explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was eight
years old. Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory
July 1999, she said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
seven years old. On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.[38]
1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.

The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, [39] or
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.[40]Prior to this date, the
sexual intercourse as follows: crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[41] which provides:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

57
 1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of
unconscious; and
AAAs testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes[46] that:
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.

In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory
rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the
law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only
subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil
from good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision
hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies,
the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and
are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing
the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial
judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had
the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of
Appeals].[47]

In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we
found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of
committed the first incident of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant
law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did
as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly and
occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in
straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:
1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to
establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the commission of
the rape.
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were
the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is still 8 years old?
carnal knowledge of a woman.[44] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.[45]

58
[AAA]

Have it on record.

A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.

PROS. SABARRE:

Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?

A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry. Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A: In the afternoon.

Q: How did he rape you?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts. xxxx

Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you? Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he
do to you next if any?
A: Yes, sir in our house.
A: He went on top of me.

Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?

Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
A: My younger brother and I.
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled
down the zipper.

Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

A: In the ricefield. Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did
he do next if any?

A: He was pumping on me.

PROS. SABARRE:

Q: Did he pull out his organ?

May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
A: Yes, sir.

COURT:

59
 Q: And where did he place his organ? Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?

A: In my vagina. A: My Kuya and other siblings.

Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel? Q: You have companions why were you raped?

A: Pain.[48] A: Because they were sleeping.

Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please
narrate to the court?
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my
Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the
panty and went on top of me.
private part of AAA. [W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.[49]

Q: With whom was he drinking?

A: With my step father.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July
1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven
with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:
Q: Where did they drink?

A: In our neighbor.
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?

A: Five times.
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused
wearing at that time?

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time? A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.

A: Night time.

Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night? A: No, sir.

A: Different nights.

Q: What did he do with his penis?

60
A: He made me hold it.

xxxx

Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

A: He left. Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate
the whole incident to this honorable court?

A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
xxxx

Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?

ATTY. SABARRE:
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.

Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did
he rape you? Q: When he pump what did you feel?

A: (witness did not answer) A: Pain.

PROS. SABARRE:

Make it of record that the witness is crying again. COURT:

Q: Why are you crying? Why did you feel pain?

A: I am angry and hurt.

A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.

PROS. SABARRE:

ATTY. SABARRE;

Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding

considering that the witness is psychologically incapable of
further proceeding. How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?

61
 A: He went on top of me and pump.

A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as
cover.[50]
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?

A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.

From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She
made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were likewise
supposedly committed in the month of July 1999. Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?

A: Because he was raping me.

The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August
1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in this manner: Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A: I do not know.

Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of
August 1999?
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Two times.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was it during day time or night time?

Q: Where is he?
A: Nighttime.
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name
answered Henry Arpon).[51]

Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A: He kissed me.
It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that
the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must
pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence. [52] Thus, including the first incident of

A: He took off his shirts. rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of her.

Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?

62
 The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the
incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs
narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained an adequate
recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in
her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime
cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid
detail of a frightening experience a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience. [54]
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi
deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to
fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime when it was committed.[55][S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily
fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by
a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.[56]
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court
that:
molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with
him being her uncle, the brother of her mother.[57]
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have
been prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latters quarrel
with AAAs parents when he refused to work with them in the rice fields. [58] Aside from being
uncorroborated, we find the same specious and implausible. Where the charges against the
appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to
a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a
rape trial brings in its wake.[59]
As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we
affirm the trial courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA
when the incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on
November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel,
regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his
recollection of the age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellants
theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either
as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers

and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence,
it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of
the day after working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the
accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in
[XXX], Leyte.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is
an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic

documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and
subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can
not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual

63
 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony,
if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation
either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
need no longer be belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victims
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.[64]

Penalties
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. with any of the following attendant circumstances:

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age

of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
him. (Emphases ours.)

ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the
witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was
indeed a minor.[63] xxxx

64
 The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3)
counts of rape committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying circumstance of
the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and her relationship to the
accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.[65] In the instant case,
the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when the
incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-
appellant during the pre-trial conference of the case and again admitted by him during his
testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into
a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court,
as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which
can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-trial conference
are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein
must be given weight.Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the
second and third counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the
issues raised before the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the
settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case
wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that
may be found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the
age of a child in conflict with the law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights
of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen
(18) years of age or older. The age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons,
the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case
of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient
the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the
following conditions concur, namely: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such
as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date
of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the
age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that
the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]
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In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on
the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC
and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants minority in A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
ascertaining the appropriate penalty. of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took
effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly
states:
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.(Emphases ours.)
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled
irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, [74] i.e., from
to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they under nine years of age and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law. discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted
without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability.[75]

Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-
01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case established that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.[76] The Court, thus,
exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant,
explicit in providing that:
nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.

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For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-
appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-
appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the Court had the occasion to
reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case. In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was
satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be
credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault
she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would
kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to
conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and
that he was aware of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18)
years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always
in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile
in Conflict with the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case
given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act
No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child
reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance
of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads: years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who
twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That

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 Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is experience she underwent].[80] We also increase the trial courts award of P50,000.00
warranted in the instant case, to wit: to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein established in keeping with the
recent case law.[81]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural

Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in
coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and Development].
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held in People v.
Llanas, Jr.,[82] [t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous
conduct, but also in view of the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship
surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which were alleged in the information
and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current
jurisprudence on the matter.[83]

Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third
incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same shall be WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8,

enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

Civil Liability
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry
Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when
rape is found to have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the
award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for each count. We also explained (2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is

in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is

character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion

perpetua.[79] The trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is
therefore increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the
instant case.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the
three (3) counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.

Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other than
the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the

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(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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