Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38

DOI 10.1007/s12124-011-9188-1
R E G U L A R A RT I C L E

Heuristic Value of Eclecticism in Theory Development:

The Case of Piagetian-Vygotskian dialogue
about Proportional Reasoning

Jorge Tarcísio Da Rocha Falcão & Izabel Hazin

Published online: 15 November 2011

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Abstract Køppe’s proposition of four layers in theoretical building are used here in
the exploration of a specific case of eclectic combination, the use of Piagetian and
Vygotskian general approaches to the analysis of proportional reasoning as a
cognitive mathematical ability. It is proposed here that the eclectic consideration of
these contributions depends on the consideration of their specificity, in the sense that
they highlight different aspects of the phenomenon under scrutiny, and also on the
consideration of the coherence between this eclectic convergence and premises in
terms of schools of thought under which each contribution is framed. We conclude
proposing in accordance to S. Køppe’s proposal that eclecticism can be valuable and
heuristic in theory development, but this contribution will depend largely on the
effort in establishing careful relations between the four layers of theory-building.

Keywords Eclecticism . Selectivity . Heuristics . Theory development . Mathematical

abilities

(…)The opposites of great truths may also be true; it is only the opposites of
small truths that are false. Niels Bohr.1

1
Quoted by Bruner 1997.
J. T. D. Falcão (*) : I. Hazin
Department of psychology, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, RN, Brazil
e-mail: falcao.jorge@gmail.com
I. Hazin
e-mail: izabel.hazin@gmail.com
Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38 33

A very strong and widespread epistemological proposal, with its central consequence,
is critically analyzed and questioned in S. Køppe’s paper: it is the proposal according to
which a choice among theoretical systems must be made (in psychology but also in any
other scientific domain), since these systems are frequently based on specific, different
(ontological, epistemological) premises; according to this, as pointed out in the paper, a
scientific theory cannot, by definition, be eclectic; because of this, theoretical
eclecticism, seen as a combination of elements from different systems for analytical
or pragmatic goals, is frequently considered as a very problematic/dangerous/naïve
operation in the domain of theory use,2 disqualified, in Koppe’s words, as “(…)
reflection-less, merely opportunistic combination of available theoretical fragments”.

The Process of Selection

Eclecticism is based on one of the most important defining characteristics of the

scientific process—the selection of those elements, properties, characteristics which
define the empirical object. The very idea of selection is a central point here, since
the relations an entity can have to other entities are not limited in possibilities, even
if we are convinced that these relations are ontologically inherent to the real object,
as discussed by Køppe. In other words, the consideration of a recognized object
(which is always the epistemologically real focus of scientific knowledge) is always
based upon a selection of characteristics of this object.3 It is not only central for the
“defining selection which is applied at the transition from data to the empirical and it
is this process by which the object is defined as scientific”, but also to the
development of hypotheses proposition and testing, as illustrated by the case
mentioned in the next session. This case is presented here as an illustration of the
heuristic interest of eclecticism in order to better grasp a specific theoretical subject.
By this illustration we would like to join and support Køppe’s proposition about the
fact that competing theories can concern themselves with the same or similar
phenomenal areas and describe aspects which are accurate in them, but limited, their
eclectic consideration being therefore fruitful for theory development.

An Eclectic Theoretical View on Proportional Reasoning

The analysis of difficulties showed by school-children in order to build up

proportional reasoning has been extensively studied in psychology of mathematics
education4 . The very delimitation of “proportional reasoning” in terms of its
defining characteristics is clearly theory-dependent, having connections with the four
theory layers proposed by S. Køppe; in the case mentioned here, connections with

2
See, for example, J. Bruner’s analysis on Piaget-Vygotsky’s convergences and diverges in Bruner 1997.
3
The consideration by Køppe of a “real object” from which a recognized object cab be selected as a a
knowledgeable target seems very problematic, since it leads to the consideration of an object in itself,
“sanitized” from relations (and therefore “irrealistic”, as agreed by Køppe), or an object that encompasses
all possible relations. Such a “real object” is in itself (and always) a recognized object of a different order
or level, from which other recognizable objects could be derived.
4
See Nunes 1997, for a general review of research on psychology of mathematics education.
34 Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38

layers two (data-defining and hypothesis creation) and three (schools of thought)
will be briefly pointed-out. Proportional reasoning is seen in the context of Piagetian
theoretical system as a cognitive ability explained (or allowed) by logical-operational
ability to deal with second-order relational operations (Piaget 1970; Vergnaud 1981).
In this explanatory context, one must first take into account a first order relation between
“a” and “b” (say, number of students related to number of teachers in a certain school), a
second first-order relation between “c” and “d” (the same relation in another school), in
order to be able to establish a second order relation between the two previous first-order
relations which will allow to verify if these previous first-order relations are proportional
(a:b::c:d) or not. This perspective on proportional reasoning is linked to Piagetian
structuralism, according to which cognitive development might be seen in the context of
some universal, biological principles connected to the ideas of adaptation and
hierarchical stage-organized development. These principles and ideas are connected to
a larger intellectual/philosophical agenda, aimed at contributing to a better understand-
ing of the evolutional development of human logic (genetic epistemology-Piaget 1967) .
This agenda, finally, is tributary of theorization in Biology as proposed by Charles
Darwin’s theoretical principle of the origin of species .5
Proportional reasoning can be alternatively seen as historically and context
situated, socially distributed and semiotically mediated, in the context of a
sociohistorical Vygotskian perspective6; emphasis is put here not only in individual
aspects, but in social and cultural dynamics from which a co-construed knowing will
emerge. Proportional reasoning, here, is seen as a social ability linked to a cultural
meaningful context (school, business, weight-control7), to a network of semiotic
mediators including cultural prosthesis (Hazin 2006; Hazin et al. 2006) and to the
possibilities of collaborative sense-making due to the establishment of a zone of
proximal development (see Meira and Lerman 2001 on this subject). Mind, here, is
seen as a social mind, a legitimate psychological topic to be considered as both
functional and material.8 This second perspective on proportional reasoning is linked
to Vygotskian emphasis in the dynamics of interconnected personal, interpersonal,
transpersonal and historical levels in the constitution of psychology (Clot 2010).
An important point to be considered here for those effectively interested in the
research on proportional reasoning is the necessary opposition, in a mutually-
exclusive basis, of these theoretical construals, or the possibility and heuristic
interest of an eclectic consideration of both. In fact it must be firstly emphasized that
different theoretical demarcations of our object of interest “proportional reasoning”
from the general domain of “recognized object” will lead us to build different sets of
characteristics for this object. In other words, proportional reasoning, as theoretical
object, can highlight very different aspects according to its theoretical framing.
These different delimitations are connected to layer two as proposed in Køppe’s
paper, i.e. “data-defining and hypothesis creation”. In the context of this layer, these
two perspectives represent two ways of phenomenon-categorization that can be
considered in an eclectic, complementary basis. This complementarity is based on
5
See Vasconcelos and Da Rocha Falcão 2005; 2008 on the dialogue Piaget-Darwin.
6
See, among others, Vygotski 1985a; 1985b ; Brissiaud 2008; Vergnaud 2008.
7
See Lave (1988) for a discussion on this and other topics related to “cognition in practice”.
8
The contribution of Spinoza’s philosophy is present here – see Bronckart, 2008 , part IV – La
philosophie de Vygotski (pp.42-46) on this subject.
Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38 35

two assumptions: first, each theoretical view allows focusing on different aspects of
the object under scrutiny; second, both views are considered as helpful, relevant by
those who are interested in studying the topic. We mean here that theoretical
eclecticism depends also on the conviction that the contributions are not only
different but equally valuable in heuristic, pragmatic, scientific terms. For many
researchers interested in a deeper understanding of proportional reasoning, Piagetian
contribution in terms of logical-operational ability involved in individual problem-
solving performance in this domain is very robust, since there is a large consensus
on the plausibility of seeing this kind of mathematical operation as a second-order
relational thinking. On the other hand, the interest in taking into account aspects
related to the social and cultural circumscription of proportional tasks is presently
very strong. Each of these two aspects represent specific delimitations that are
lacking in the other one: Piagetian approach emphasizes the importance of psycho-
logical tools, but is “blind” to semiotic mediations in explaining proportional
reasoning, while Vygotskian approach takes into account that these psycho-logical
tools cannot be considered in the vacuum of social context, but otherwise seems to
fail in offering a description of individual mental operations underlying proportional
reasoning.
We need now to go further in the consideration of the possibility of an eclectic
convocation of both (Piagetian and Vygotsian) views for the explanation of the
emergence of proportional reasoning. Once these views are seen as really
complementary, their eclectic consideration will depend on the relationship
established by the psychologist between layers two, three (“Schools of thought”)
and four (“Ideology – conception of the world” - according to S. Køppe’s terms). If,
for example, “mind” is a theoretical construal “prohibited” by the school of thought/
ideology under which our psychologist operates, then the possibility of eclectic
combination of the views mentioned above is impossible, or incoherent. Eclecticism,
then, will be an heuristic, productive and coherent move in the context of theory-
building if contributions are considered as effectively complementary and valuable
in terms of layer two (Data-defining and hypothesis-creating) and “authorized” by
layers three (Schools of thought) and four (Ideology—conception of the world).
Productive eclecticism depends, then, on some effort from those engaged in research
and theory building in order to go beyond the illusion of data as “real objects” and
attain the levels of theoretical, methodological, epistemological and ontological
intellectual work.9
We consider then that an eclectic consideration of Piagetian and Vygotskian
approaches on proportional reasoning (layer two) is allowed by the meta-concepts of
“consciousness” and “mind” in both theories.10 Once operated this eclectic
theoretical cooperation, what do we have in hands as theoretical tool? Is it still
“Piagetian”, “Vygotskian”, or what? This is an important question since eclectic
moves, according to Køppe, can lead both to theory enrichment or disintegration.
Before offering an answer to this provocative question, it must be clearly
emphasized that for researchers in psychology of mathematics learning this eclectic

9
See Machado et al. 2000 on the need of this intellectual effort.
10
See J.-P. Bronckart 2008, pp. 27–53, on the importance of the concept of consciousness as “analyzer”
(“analyseur”) of Piagetian and Vygotskian epistemologies.
36 Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38

move leads to a clearly better approach of the development, teaching and learning of
proportional reasoning.11 Having eclectically crossed the two approaches mentioned
above allow amplifying the comprehension of mathematical abilities in general and
proportional reasoning in particular, in terms of two main aspects: a) better
explanation of developmental ways and obstacles12 of mathematical knowing at
school and in other social contexts; b) enrichment of pedagogical hypothesis on the
proposition of auxiliary cultural tools13 . As for the theoretical “DNA” of the product
of this eclectic cooperation, we propose here that it could both be considered as a
Piagetian or a Vygotskian download of innovation, depending in fact on the context
of use and the historical road of the theory-customer.

Conclusion

According to Mikhail Bakhtin-Volochinov (1977), authoring is always an activity

based simultaneously on social conformity (“ventriloquism”, i.e. speaking and being
in accordance with a social gender) and innovative, singular, personal acting
(“stylization”), by which some novelty can emerge from regular, stable, consensual
norms. In this context, the history of western ideas is a narrative about conformity
and innovation in many degrees, from radical, paradigmatic moves (Kuhn 1978) , to
slight non-critical improvements in research programs (Lakatos 1987). Eclecticism,
presented in the paper proposed by S. Køppe, is viewed in the context of theory-
guided selection of aspects of phenomena that allows for the constitution of
“recognized objects”. We agreed in this commentary that eclectic moves are positive
under certain conditions, related to the consideration of both horizontal (layers two
in each theory) and vertical scrutiny inside each theory-space (layers two and three),
in order to go beyond the merely immediate usefulness that characterizes negative
eclecticism. This careful intellectual work will be crucial for theory-development,
including here enrichment, critical change leading to attacks to the central nucleus of
the theory, and so on. None of these possible outlets for theory-development are
anyhow dramatic, since a theory might not be considered as a sacred temple, but as a
workplace, as once proposed by Georges Canguilhem (1990/2011).
We finally propose that modern history of theoretical ideas in psychology are full
of struggles motivated by exegetic disputes about “right” interpretations (including
translations, like “zone of proximal development” for the “same” concept in
Russian), and problems in the use of terms with similar “surface-value” in different
theoretical contexts (like egocentric speech in Piagetian and Vygotskian texts, “ego”
in European-Freudian psychoanalysis and North-American Ego-Psychology, “adap-
tation” in Darwin and Piagetian texts), or finally philosophical (ideological)-
theoretical affiliations (“can socio-historical soviet psychology be considered as a
Marxist psychology”?). These struggles are good examples about how difficult it is
to interpret, apply and combine theories, inside or between different domains.

11
See Frade and Da Rocha Falcão 2008, on this subject
12
Including those presented by children with special needs – see Hazin 2006; Hazin et al. 2006, on this
subject.
13
See Da Rocha Falcão and Clot 2011; Hazin 2006; Hazin et al. 2006.
Integr Psych Behav (2012) 46:32–38 37

Eclecticism, then, will be sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but always risky
and hard. Nevertheless, we completely agree with Køppe’s proposition about the
positive role of this metatheoretical move in theory development.

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Dr. Jorge Tarcísio da Rocha Falcão is Full Professor in Cognitive Psychology, Department of
Psychology, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil). He obtained his MA in cognitive
psychology (1985), Docteur in psychology of development and learning from University of Paris-5
(1992). His research interest include psychology of mathematics education, psychology of labor and
theory-building in psychology. Can be reached at falcao.jorge@gmail.com.

Dr. Izabel Hazin is Associative professor in Neuropsychology, Department of Psychology, Federal

Univerdity of Rio Grande do Norte (Brazil). She obtained her MA in cognitive psychology (2000), Doctor
in cognitive psychology from Federal University of Pernambuco (2006). Her research interest are centered
in neuropsychology of development and learning. Can be reached at izabel.hazin@gmail.com.