DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

2017-2018

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW

FINAL DRAFT

“Examination of Validity of Arbitration Agreement under Section 8 & 11”

Submitted to: Submitted by

Ms. Kirti Singh Nishant kumar

Assistant Professor (Law) En.roll no.-083
Dr. RMLNLU, Lucknow B.A.LL.B(Hons.)

8th sem
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Behind any creative work, there are many people without the help of whom that work cannot
be completed. I am heartily thankful to those persons who have contributed in completion of
this project.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to respected teacher of Alternative Dispute

Resolution Law, Ms. Kirti Singh Ma’am and others who helped me, guided and extended
moral support. I am also thankful to the non-teaching staff for being extremely cooperative
with me. However, as I have studied from various sources, anything missing or incorrect due
to oversight is deeply regretted.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Section 8 (1) specifically speaks about party applying to the judicial authority for referring the
parties to arbitration. The expression judicial authority has not been defined & whether the
function of the Chief Justice under Section 11 is an administrative function or a judicial
function?

HYPOTHESIS

The scope under amended Section 11 is limited to the examination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement; scope under amended Section 8 appears to be broader in as much as the
judicial authority can also examine the validity of the arbitration clause. There appears to be
different standards set for examination of an arbitration agreement under Sections 8 and 11,
which ought to have been avoided.

AIM AND OBJECTIVE

Aim and objective is to deep understanding of subject matter and contribute to the existing
literature.

RESEARCH QUESTION
• What are the essential condition for enforcement of Sec 8?
• What are the duty of Court under sec 8?
• What was the position of sec 8 & 11 prior to amendment of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 in the year 2015?
• What is the position of sec 8 and 11 after amendment of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 in the year 2015?
• Whether suit can be filled under Sec11 if suit is pending under sec 8?

SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE PROJECT

The project will mainly focus on the scope and limitation of Sec11 and sec 8 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.
MODE OF CITATION
The mode of citation used in this project is blue book 19th edition.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher had gone through books, web and articles so this work is purely of doctrinal
form.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 INTRODUCTION

 POWER TO REFER PARTIES TO ARBITRATION WHERE THERE IS

AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

 ‘JUDICIAL AUTHORITY’ UNDER SEC 8

 ‘DUTY OF COURT’ UNDER SEC 8

 APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

 PENDENCY OF SECTION 8 PROCEEDING

 CONCLUSION

 BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION

The meaning of an arbitration significantly diminishes if the courts are allowed to adjudicate
on the same subject matter. Therefore, the principal 1996 Act included provisions for referral
mechanism when a judicial authority addressed with an arbitrable dispute had been required to
refer the parties to arbitration upon an application of the party. However, it was dependent on
several requirements which seriously impeded the process of issuing such court references. In
particular, the party submitting an application should have submitted an original or a certified
copy of the arbitration agreement to the court. However, the 2015 Act amended Sec. 8 having
made this provision more pragmatic allowing “persons claiming through or under parties” 1 to
apply for referral to arbitration which is in line with Sec. 45 even though the opinion of the
judge is different. The amendment widened Sec. 8(2) by providing that if the original
arbitration agreement or its certified copy is not available with the party applying for a
reference to arbitration under sub-sec. (1), and the said agreement or certified copy is retained
by the other party to that agreement, the applying party shall file such application alongside
with a copy of the arbitration agreement and a petition to the court to call upon the other party
to present the original arbitration agreement or its duly certified copy to the Court.

The amended Sec. 8 provides that the court can deny a reference to arbitration if it finds that
no prima facie valid arbitration agreement exists. This power is different from the one
stipulated by Sec. 11 and only prescribing examination of existence of the agreement.
Considering applications under Sec. 11 of this Act does not presuppose delving into the issues
of validity of such agreement. Different requirements set forth by Secs. 8 and 11 of the Act
open avenues for nuanced judicial interpretation. In case of denial of reference under Sec. 8 a
judicial appeal is possible under Sec. 37 of the Act. If the court does not refer the parties to
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal can still exercise kompetenz kompetenz under Sec. 16. Such
legal ambiguity runs the risk of undermining the kompetenz kompetenz rule under Sec. 16 by
taking away the power of the arbitral tribunal.

1
Sec. 8(1): “A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration
agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies
not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that
prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”
Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement

Section 8 (1) – A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person
claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first
statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order
of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima
facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”2
Section 8 (2) – The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it
is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof:
“Provided that where the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy
thereof is not available with the party applying for reference to arbitration
under sub-section (1), and the said agreement or certified copy is retained by
the other party to that agreement, then, the party so applying shall file such
application along with a copy of the arbitration agreement and a petition praying the Court to
call upon the other party to produce the original arbitration agreement or its duly certified
copy before that Court.”3
Section 8 (3) “Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and
that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or
continued and an arbitral award made.”
Section 8 clearly stipulates that whenever a suit is filed in a civil court and the cause of action
of said suit emanates from a contract in which the parties had voluntarily and willingly agreed
to settle the dispute via arbitration, then, if the essentials of section 8 are met, it is the bounden
duty of court to refer the parties to the arbitration. Section 8 uses the expansive expression
“judicial authority” rather than “court” and the words “unless it finds that the agreement is null
and void, inoperative and incapable of being performed” do not find a place in section 8. This
distinction clearly dictates that the legislature has intentionally endowed less power on judicial
courts with respect to section 8 applications to make sure the arbitration process is facilitated
and unnecessary intervention by courts be avoided.
Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is peremptory in nature. It provides that
a judicial authority shall, on the basis of the arbitration agreement between the parties, direct

2
Subs. By Act 3 of 2016, before substitution, stood as “A judicial authority before which an action is brought in
a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting
his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.”
3
Ins. By Act 3 of 2016
the parties to go for arbitration. It also enlists conditions precedent, which need fulfillment
before a reference can be made as per the terms of the 1996 Act.4 In P. Anand Gajapathi Raju
& Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju (Died) & Ors5., while iterating the periphery of Section 8 of the 1996
Act, the Supreme Court said that "The conditions which are required to be satisfied under Sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section 8 before the Court can exercise its powers are (1) there is an
arbitration agreement; (2) a party to the agreement brings an action in the Court against the
other party; (3) subject matter of the action is the same as the subject matter of the arbitration
agreement; (4) the other party moves the Court for referring the parties to arbitration before
it submits his first statement on the substance of the dispute. .... The language of Section 8 is
per-emptory."

The following factors are to be considered before entertaining an application under Section 8
of the 1996 Act:

First question to be analyzed is whether it can be made applicable to a civil dispute.

 The Supreme Court while answering the aforesaid question in H. Srinivas Pai and Anr.
v. H.V. Pai (D) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.6 said that "The Act applies to domestic arbitrations,
international commercial arbitrations and conciliations. The applicability of the Act
does not depend upon the dispute being a commercial dispute. Reference to arbitration
and arbitability depends upon the existence of an arbitration agreement, and not upon
the question whether it is a civil dispute or commercial dispute. There can be
arbitration agreements in non-commercial civil disputes also."

The presence of arbitration agreement is another pre-requisite for seeking a reference

under Section 8.7

 Section 7 of the 1996 Act provides the diameter of the term "arbitration agreement".
The importance of arbitration agreement, for seeking a reference under Section 8, was
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Smt. Kalpana Kothari v. Smt. Sudha Yadav and
ors.8 wherein the Court said that "As long as the Arbitration clause exists, having

4
Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Lakshmi Knits and Wovens and Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 686.
5
P. Anand Gajapathi Raju & Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju (Died) & Ors,(2000) 4 SCC 539.
6
H. Srinivas Pai and Anr. v. H.V. Pai (D) thr. L.Rs. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 521.
7
Atul Singh and Ors. v. Sunil Kumar Singh and Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 602.
8
Smt. Kalpana Kothari v. Smt. Sudha Yadav and ors., (2003) 6 SCC 503.
 recourse to Civil Court for adjudication of disputes envisaged to be resolved through
arbitral process or getting any orders of the nature from Civil Court for appointment
of Receiver or prohibitory orders without evincing any intention to have recourse to
arbitration in terms of the agreement may not arise."

Next question which might arise in the step wise analysis of Section 8 is whether the
validity of the arbitration clause can be disputed before the Court, in front of which an
application for reference is made.

 The answer to the question was laid in the negative by the Supreme Court in Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums9. The Court in this case held
that if the existence of the arbitration clause is admitted, in view of the mandatory
language of Section 8 of the Act, the courts ought to refer the dispute to arbitration.
The Supreme Court, while raising a presumption for the validity of an arbitration clause
in an agreement, in India Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and
Healthcare Ltd.,10 said that the Courts would construe the agreement in such a manner
so as to uphold the arbitration agreement.

Section 8 further mandates that the subject matter of the dispute is the same as the subject
matter of the arbitration agreement.

 While articulating on this pre-requisite, the Supreme Court in Sukanya Holdings Pvt.
Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya and Anr.11 said that "The relevant language used in Section
8 is-"in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement". Court is
required to refer the parties to arbitration. Therefore, the suit should be in respect of
'a matter' which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of
arbitration agreement."

An application under Section 8(1) cannot be entertained unless accompanied by original

arbitration agreement or a certified copy thereof.

9
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, (2007) 5 SCC 510.
10
Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 531.
11
Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC103.
  Laying emphasis on section 8(2) for the grant of reference, the Supreme Court in The
Branch Manager, Magma Leasing and Finance Limited and Anr. v. Potluri
Madhavilata and Anr.12 said that "An analysis of Section 8 would show that for its
applicability, the following conditions must be satisfied: that along with the application
the other party tenders the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy
thereof."

The proposition that Section 8, despite providing the explicit grounds on which reference can
be made, also lays down the implicit ground of competence of the Arbitral Tribunal, was also
read in the affirmative by the Court in the case of Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home
Finance Ltd.13 wherein it was held that where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where
a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under Section 8 of the Act.

On 23rd October, 2015, the President promulgated the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015. The said Ordinance amended Section 8 by stipulating that
joinder of non-signatories to an arbitration agreement was not permissible. Further amendment
to Section 8 requires that the judicial authority compulsorily refer parties to arbitration
irrespective of any decision by the Supreme Court or any other court, if the judicial authority
finds that a valid arbitration clause prima-facie exists. The amendment essentially nullifies the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Booz Allen Hamilton v. SBI Home finance14 where it had
ruled that serious allegations of fraud are not arbitrable.

‘JUDICIAL AUTHORITY’ UNDER SEC 8

Section 8 (1) specifically speaks about party applying to the judicial authority for referring the
parties to arbitration. The expression judicial authority has not been defined. As such when
authority other than a court in the ordinary sense, is in discharge of the duties expected to act
fairly and honestly or exercise some of the powers akin to the powers of civil court it may not
be a court in its strict sense but it would essentially fall within the definition of a judicial
authority. As held by the Supreme Court in Morgan securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. v. Modi

12
Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata and Anr., (1999) 5 SCC 688.
13
Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 53.
14
Ibid.
Rubber Ltd.,15 in its ordinary parlance judicial authority would comprehend a court defined
under the act and would also include other courts and may even include a special tribunal.

In Management committee of M.S. Secondary Scholl v. Vijay Kumar,16 a question had been
raised as to whether the school tribunal is a judicial authority and whether it exercises judicial
power in the background of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the arbitration Act. The Supreme
Court Held that School tribunal is a judicial authority as the tribunal is presided by the judicial
officer of equal rank of the District judge and its vested with same powers as are vested in a
court of law under the code of civil procedure.

DUTY OF COURT UNDER SEC 8

Sec 8 (Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement) of the 1996
Act (which is in Part I – where the place of arbitration is in India) requires courts before which
actions are brought in matters which are the subject of the arbitration agreement to recognize
and give effect to the will of the parties, and refer them to arbitration. Sec 8(1) provides that a
judicial authority in India before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of
an arbitration agreement shall refer the parties to arbitration.

However, the party (the defendant) must apply for a reference to arbitration not later than when
submitting his first statement on the substance (or merits) of the dispute. The application must
be accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. Silence
on the part of the defendant is treated as a waiver of the right to arbitration (Sec. 4).
Accordingly, a foreign defendant should not avoid appearing before an Indian court seized of
the suit (or action) on the supposition that the court will refer the dispute to arbitration: the
court has no power on its own motion to refer parties to arbitration.

In interpreting Sect. 8, the Supreme Court of India has held – relying on the provision contained
in Sec. 5 (limited extent of judicial intervention) – that since Sec. 5 and 8 have been enacted
with the object of encouraging expeditious resolution of disputes with minimum interference
by the courts, once the existence of an arbitration agreement is established, reference to
arbitration under Sec 8(1) is mandatory.

15
Morgan securities and Credit Pvt. Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 683.
16
M.S. Secondary Scholl v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 2005 SC 3549.
The power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement can never be
construed as empowering a court (directly or indirectly) to restrain an arbitral tribunal from
proceeding with the arbitration.17

The court's power to refer does not prevent an arbitral tribunal from proceeding with an
arbitration, nor do pending court proceedings (or an application filed in them) preclude an
arbitral award being made (Sect. 8(3)).18 Sec. 8 of the 1996 Act does not empower the judicial
authority before which the action is pending to determine whether “the arbitration agreement
is null and void and inoperative or incapable of being performed”, presumably as a
consequence of the competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.

APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

Prior to amendment

Appointment of arbitrator(s) is the prerogative of the parties which they appoint on mutual
consensus. Another contentious issue in the principal 1996 Act was the provision regarding
appointment of arbitrator or arbitrators in case of a deadlock between the parties. In such cases,
a party under Sec. 11 of that Act was entitled to approach the Chief Justice of the High Court
of India as for domestic arbitration; Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as for international
commercial arbitration; or any person or institution designate by the Chief Justice. However
this appointment by the Chief Justice of the High Court/Supreme Court had become
complicated as shown in two judgements of the Supreme Court of India. In the first judgment,
i.e., Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd.19 the Supreme
Court held that the Chief Justice’s or his designator’s order under Sec. 11 nominating an
arbitrator is not an adjudicatory order and the Chief Justice or his designate is not a tribunal.20

However, this decision of the Supreme Court was overruled in the case of S.B.P & Co. v. Patel
Engineering Ltd.21, where the Court held that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the
High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Sec. 11(6) of the 1996 Arbitration & Conciliation
Act is not of an administrative nature but it is a judicial power. It further held that while
appointing arbitrators the Chief Justice is also empowered to decide on “his own jurisdiction

17
Ardy International (P) Ltd. v. Inspiration Clothes and U and another, 2006 (1) SCC 417.
18
In the past, however, arbitral tribunals sitting in India generally did not proceed with the arbitration if the
question whether the dispute should be so referred was pending in court.
19
Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 778.
20
Ibid, para. 31.
21
S.B.P & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd, (2005) 8 SCC 618.
to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or
otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on
the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators” and such a decision is final. This judgement
was fundamentally flawed as it not only took away the power of arbitral tribunal to decide the
validity of the arbitration agreement under Sec. 16 of the 1996 Act but also to make the order
passed under Sec. 11 of the Act a judicial order that can hence be subject to appeal – which
was beyond the legislative intent of the Act.

After amendment

The 2015 Amendment Act attempted to nullify also the effect which was created by this case
by the Supreme Court. The Act introduced a limitation in sub-sec. (6A) providing that the
Supreme Court or the High Court shall limit its examination only with the existence of an
arbitration agreement, and not with other issues such as, e.g., live claim, qualifications,
conditions for exercise of power, etc.22

The second case, i.e., the Patel Engineering case provided that hat the Chief Justice can delegate
his/her power under Sec. 11 of the 1996 Act only to another judge of that court but not to any
other person or institution considered to have judicial powers as judicial power can only be
delegated to judicial authority. However, the 2015 Amendment Act took this aspect into
account and specified in a new sub-sec. (6B) that “The designation of any person or institution
by the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, for the purposes of this section
shall not be regarded as a delegation of judicial power by the Supreme Court or the High
Court.”

Thus, one of the main problems revealed under application of the said Sec. 11 is whether the
function of the Chief Justice under this Section is an administrative function or a judicial
function. The 2015 Amendment Act has ultimately solved this issue by replacing the “Chief
Justice” with the “Supreme Court or High Court”. The provision incorporated in sub-sec. (8)
of this Sec. 11 required a prospective arbitrator to submit a declaration following Sec. 12 of the

22
“The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-
section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court,
confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.”
Act.23 This provision ensures that a prospective arbitrator who due to his/her schedule may not
be able to carry out an expedite arbitral proceedings will not be appointed. Another important
addition was included in sub-sec. (14) of Sec. 11 stipulating that the High Court can formulate
rules for the purpose of determining the fees of the arbitrators.24 This provision which could
possibly incorporate a fixed fee for ad-hoc arbitrations is unique for Indian legislation as
matters relating to arbitrators’ fees is not usually covered by any statutes in other states.

Moreover, new Fifth Schedule and Seventh Schedule were added in the 2015 Amendment Act.
The Fifth Schedule touches upon the issue of independence and impartially of the arbitrators
and lists the grounds justifying doubts in their independence or impartiality. Another list of
grounds is stipulated by the Seventh Schedule and entails relationships between arbitrators and
the parties or the counsel making an arbitrator ineligible for appointment. These two schedules
listing grounds for challenging arbitrators are influenced by the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of
Interest in International Arbitration. The 2015 Amendment Act also prohibits parties to agree
in advance and appoint an arbitrator who had previously been an employee of either of the
parties. These provisions ensure independence and impartiality of arbitrators to be appointed
and the equal opportunities for parties to have a say in the appointment process regarding their
arbitrators.

Pendency of Section 8 Proceeding

On the controversy, namely, whether the hearing of application under Section 11 of the said
Act should be suspended pending the hearing of the Section 8 proceeding, the Division Bench
Judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Modi Korea Telecommunication
Ltd. v. Appcon Consultants Pvt. Ltd.25 will throw some light. The issue in Modi
Korea (supra) was whether hearing an application under Section 11 of the said Act can be
made subject to the disposal of an application filed under Section 8 of the said Act.

23
“The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or the person or institution designated by such
Court, before appointing an arbitrator, shall seek a disclosure in writing from the prospective arbitrator in terms
of sub-section (1) of section 12, and have due regard to –
(a) any qualifications required for the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties; and
(b) the contents of the disclosure and other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent
and impartial arbitrator.”
24
“For the purpose of determination of the fees of the arbitral tribunal and the manner of its payment to the arbitral
tribunal, the High Court may frame such rules as may be necessary, after taking into consideration the rates
specified in the Fourth Schedule.”
25
Modi Korea Telecommunication Ltd. v. Appcon Consultants Pvt. Ltd., 2000 (Suppl.) Arb LR 618.
Speaking for the Division Bench, Justice Ruma Pal held “the Court before which an application
is made for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11 must proceed to decide the same.
The fact that an application has been filed under Section 8(1) has by statute and for the purpose
of Section 11, been made an immaterial consideration.”

In paragraphs 32 and 33 of the same judgment, this aspect has been made explicit by the learned
Judge and which I quote:

“32. The learned Single Judge therefore could not have adjourned the Section 11
application for appointment of an Arbitrator because of the pendency of the application
under Section 8(1) and make the exercise of power under Section 11(5) dependent upon
the disposal of the application under Section 8(1) by the Munsif.

33. In making the appellant's right to have an Arbitrator appointed in terms of Section 11(5)
subject to the outcome of the application under Section 8(1), the learned Judge has acted in
a manner which is not envisaged under the 1996 Act. The order is not one which is referable
to Section 11(5) or any other provision of the Act.”

This Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid declaration of law in Modi Korea. This
Court proceeds to hear this application under Section 11 irrespective of the pendency of the
controversy arising out of the proceeding under Section 8 of the said Act.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that the amendment has limited the scope of a party refusing to refer a dispute
to arbitration. Under the amended provisions, even if there is a judgment, decree or order of
the Supreme Court or any court, the judicial authority must refer the parties to arbitration unless
it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.

The amended Section 8 empowers the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration when
there is an arbitration agreement, unless it finds prima facie that no valid arbitration agreement
exists. While Section 8(1) refers to "judicial authority", inexplicably, in Section 8(2) the word
"Court" has been used instead of "judicial authority" which appears to be an oversight.

Sec 8(3) stipulates that pending application under section 8 will not affect proceedings under
section 11. According to this, there’s always a risk of reference being denied under section 8
on the basis that the court agreed with the objection that the dispute in question is non arbitrable,
and on the flip side, arbitrator gets appointed under section 11 of the act as the court deem it fit
to refer the dispute to arbitration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

 Commentary on “The Arbitration And Conciliation Act” by Justice S.B. Malik

 “The Arbitration and Conciliation Law of India” by G.K. Kwatra

 “The Law and Practise of Arbitration & Conciliation” by O.P. Malhotra.

Web Sources

 www.scconline.com

 www.kluwerarbitration.com

 www.mondaq.com

Bare Act

 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996