G.R. No.

91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, vs NLRC and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart
where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner,
exercised this privilege in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines,
private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets
allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual
dismissal up to date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public respondent
NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of
the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which
required payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the
judgment amount" due from the private respondent.3 Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the
NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and
set aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of
garnishment. 5

In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond
the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's
claim that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her
right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner
contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm
instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be executed on motion

within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary
Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a
judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a
duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed in Lancita v.
Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been previously
withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has no
 discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments
are entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the
contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed,
either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be
issued without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to have the
judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitation has
not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her
favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by
the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she
complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with
CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00
representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on March 16,
1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until
the date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments that transpired
during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in the
compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant,
where she worked from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that business, 8 she
received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on March 16,1987,
given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total
of P1,491.33 monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her by the
decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine National
Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the
balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release
reading as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby
acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00)
Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me under the judgment award in NLRC
Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is
in full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily
waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my
present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10 May 1979 was due to
my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all claims by way of unpaid
wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in
connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or right of action of
whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to
NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate
Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have helped me and
my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of
P9,544.00 among others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying the position of
xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and other statutory
benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her
own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also
rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of
the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again
acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which
she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed
she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management
of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her
into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and
waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be
remembered that on that date the decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there
was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the
wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not
yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this should be limited to
three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is
deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid
from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted
against her) that she was actually employed during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the private respondent
to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only
when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the
case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and
inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this
Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely
hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when
tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel
must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

[ A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015 ]

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, , VS. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO,

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients. Lawyers
are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders. The privilege of the
office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the case as if it were their
own. The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy
excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The professional
relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether
the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo's (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case of her
client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits
when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant's Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her
client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review[1] filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In the Resolution[2] dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines affirmed
with modification its earlier Resolution[3] dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity to conduct fact finding
for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[4] Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty.
Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[5]

In the Complaint[6] filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo's services as legal
counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v. Ramirez."[7] The case was initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.[8]

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend of
Ramirez's sister.[9] He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be given
30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney's fees.[10] It was also agreed upon that Ramirez
would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.[11]

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. [12] Atty. Margallo
advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.[13]

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008. [14] On December
5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant's Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who
replied that she would have one prepared.[15]

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant's Brief. Atty. Margallo
informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.[16]

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no word
from the Court of Appeals.[17]

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied.[18] She told him that the
Court of Appeals' denial was due to Ramirez's failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the
basis of his claim.[19] She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the
Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.[20]

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant's Brief was filed on April 13, 2009
with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period. [21]

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[22] By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case
for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed
Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case.[23] She denied ever having entered
into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had
begged her to do so.[24] She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on January
8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had been
busy.[25] Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to
losing her client's number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her
contacts.[26]

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.[27] Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty. Margallo
having received notice.[28] The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and
were directed to submit their position papers.[29]

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and be
given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.[30] This was
based on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant's Brief
to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to
protect the interest of her client.[31] Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in
the loss of Ramirez's statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.[32]

In the Resolution[33] dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted
and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to
recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.[34] In the Resolution dated March 21,
2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration and increased the recommended
penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years.[35]

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court.[36] She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she had been
very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first time a
Complaint was filed against her.[37]

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo's Petition for Review.[38] In the Resolution[39] dated
October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez's Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her Reply[40] on October 6, 2014.

This court's ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence."[41] Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit
not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without
need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal
proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.[42]

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with
shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to client's request for information.

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,[43] a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence in a
scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution. This was aggravated
by the lawyer's failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the
litigant from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence
tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting
for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.[44] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable but
was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case and left him with
no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case,
but because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her
assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was
no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that she abandoned her
obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible
means to protect complainant Ramirez's interest, which is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of
the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or power for
their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry between the
principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must nd to that may not be
known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are expected not
only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of
action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through
familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so
with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the
client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client
chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual
engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he
or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client,
therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo's position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it is her first
infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence
for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v.
Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission
of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of
Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial
conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6)
months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against
respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6) months.[45] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other hand, respondent
Atty. Margallo's neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his legal interests. This
lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as
counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted
to them. There should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.[46] Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings
of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this
court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-year
suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in the
legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for its
members' conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is
reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty.
Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is immediately
executory.

. [ ADM. CASE NO. 9612, March 13, 2013 ]

JOHNNY M. PESTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. MARCELITO M. MILLO, RESPONDENT

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding
the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He
thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and
diligence.

Antecedents

In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with
conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence
and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the
transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;[1] that Johnny and
Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer of title [2] and P10,000.00 for the adoption
case;[3] that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his
inability to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for
the property had been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995
that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the
same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to
Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millo's office in exasperation over his stalling
tactics; and that Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties.[4]

Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated that Atty.
Millo made him and his wife believe that an interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14,
1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been
scheduled; that adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home
in Quezon City when he received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been scheduled on February 23,
1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be found; and that they learned after
an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had requested the hearing to be moved to the
afternoon without their knowledge.[5]

Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and
seeking the refund of P15,643.75 representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of
the P10,000.00 given for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his
attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wife's absence from the country.

On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer.[6] Although an extension of the period to file was
granted at his instance,[7] he filed no answer in the end.[8] He did not also appear at the hearings despite due
notice.[9]

In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings were held in
abeyance to await the appropriate motion from Johnny's counsel.[10]

The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to write to the
President of the IBP on October 28, 1998.[11] It was only on April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on June 29, 2001.[12] At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through
a representative, and presented a manifestation/motion,[13] whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died,
and that Abella would be withdrawing the complaint against him.

On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes, deemed the case
submitted for resolution.[14]

On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six
months.[15]

In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011,[16] the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the
findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty.
Millo to return the amount of P16,000.00, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount
of P16,000.00 to complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed that Abella had
already caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death; that he had already caused the
preparation of the documents necessary for the transfer of the certificate of title, and had also returned the
P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the adoption case had been finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost
contact with Johnny and Abella who resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella's brother, could have confirmed
that the charge had arisen from a simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the
complaint, except that Daquis had meanwhile died in November 2011.[17]

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millo's motion for reconsideration. [18]

Ruling

We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients' interests commences from his
engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients' interests may require.[19]
Atty. Millo's acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of
title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that moment
on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet,
he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had
assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients
about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients
liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent
attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long
period of time. Despite being given several opportunities to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He
thereby forfeited his right and chance to reasonably explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had
the complaint been untrue and unfair, it would have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and
seasonably. Indeed, a refutation was the requisite response from any worthy and blameless respondent lawyer.
His belated and terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a mere
"misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the charge against him, which omission indicated
that the complaint had substance. It mattered little now that he had in the meantime returned the amount of
P14,000.00 to the clients, and that the application for adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court. Such
events, being not only post facto, but also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not obliterate his liability
based on the neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he must now learn is that
he could not ignore without consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the IBP allowed him to justify his
neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients' concerns. Towards him the Court now stays its hand of leniency, lest
the Court be unfairly seen as too willing to forego the exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and
inept as he had been towards his clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the charges granted to
him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being residents in
Canada, would have already lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed this
world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the
Court is not about to condone such selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed
that an attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an explanation, and should
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.[20] The obvious reason for the requirement is that an
attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected
of him at all times.

Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled hearings the IBP
had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP's orders requiring his attendance in the hearings was not only
irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was
absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted
authorities.[21] Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,[22] the Court saw the respondent attorney's odious practice of
repeatedly and apparently deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of wiggling out from
the duty to explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millo's disregard is justified. Indeed, he thereby manifested
evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member of the Legal profession should nurture in himself.

Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the assurances of Abella that
she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim as nothing but a
belated attempt to save the day for himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative
charge for suspension or disbarment based on an attorney's professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish
a ground to dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed
regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore the
withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine whether the charge of
professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record.[23] This approach bespeaks the Court's
consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only
for the deserving.

Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants are the plaintiffs and
the respondent attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private
grievances. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called
to answer for every misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The complainant or any other person who
has brought the attorney's misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. [24]

The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months as the penalty to
be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law because he had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest.[25] He
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and
Abella, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his
trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the heart and mind of
a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under the circumstances, suspension from the practice of
law for six months is the condign and commensurate penalty for him.

The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title. Although he
ought also to refund the amount of P15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late payment of the capital gains
tax, the Court cannot order him to refund that amount because it is not a collection agency.[26] The Court may only
direct the repayment of attorneys fees received on the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient
service to the client. Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption
case, plus interest of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLOguilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of
six months effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the
sum of P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty days from
notice of this decision.

A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013

MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, vs. EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS,

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit1 filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte
(complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave misconduct and/or gross
malpractice.

The facts

In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent, offered for sale a parcel of
agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor)
and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of ₱2,800,000.00 and payable in installments.2 Respondent, who
was to receive the payment from Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed
of sale and owner’s copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase price. 3 She further
undertook to cause the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential, and the transfer of the
title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package agreement.4 Respondent received all the installment
payments made by Sps. Tria and issued receipts therefor.5 After full payment of the purchase price on July 11,
1997,6 and after giving an additional ₱115,000.00for capital gains tax and other expenses, 7 Sps. Tria requested from
respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the owner’s copy of the title to them but respondent failed to
comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance for conversion of the subject property from
agricultural to residential was taking time.8 Despite several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill
her undertakings under the package agreement.9

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.10 Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps. Tria, again
demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and the certificate of title of the
subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps. Jeremias informed complainant that they had
received the consideration of ₱2,200,000.00 and they had executed and turned-over the sale documents to
respondent.11

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by Sps. Jeremias and
notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on May 26, 1998 for a consideration of
₱200,000.00.12

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,13 claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997 not to proceed
with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another buyer.14 She further averred that
Nestor also demanded from her the return of the purchase price, and that she complied with the said demand and
returned the ₱2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor sometime during the latter part of January 1998. 15 However, she did
not ask for a written receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the ₱115,000.00 intended for capital
gains taxes and other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorney’s fees for the other legal services that
she rendered for him.16

In the Court’s Resolution17 dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of
respondent,18 only the complainant and her witnesses testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondent’s right to
present evidence was considered waived.19

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (Investigating Commissioner),
issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent to have violated her oath as a lawyer due to her
participation in the second sale of the subject property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale
of the same property to Sps.Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent received, and
admitted to have received, from Sps. Tria the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of ₱115,000.00 for
expenses. He further found the second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear indication that
respondent: (a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their family; (b) violated their proprietary
rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her.21 On the other hand, the Investigating
Commissioner did not give credence to respondent’s defense that she returned the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price
given by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the subject property in their favor,
absent any receipt or documentation to prove the same.22 As counsel for Sps. Tria, respondent failed in her
obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction and, as such, she was found guilty of grave
misconduct and gross malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).23 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of five years.24

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-18525 dated
October 19,2007 but reduced the suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.

Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration26 which were, however,
denied in the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10, 2012.27

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively liable for violating
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her Comment, already
admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,28 which necessarily gave rise to a lawyer-client relationship
between them. The complete turnaround made by respondent in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP
Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no lawyer-client
relationship between her and Sps. Tria,29 cannot thus be given any credence.

Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat of a real estate
broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice
and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this
case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services.30 Case law instructs that if a person, in
respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established.31 Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew respondent to be, and transacted with
her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification of her own acts as being limited to those of a real estate
broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the lawyer-client relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was
confirmed by the latter’s admission that she rendered legal services to the former. With this relationship having
been established, the Court proceeds to apply the ethical principles pertinent to this case.

It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in them.32 They are duty-bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings
and transactions with their clients.33 Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication
of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of their clients. 34 As
enshrined in Canons 17 and 18 of the Code:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1âwphi1

In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions were evidently
prejudicial to her clients’ interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject
property to her clients, she willfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person.
Accordingly, far removed from protecting the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid
the purchase price of the subject property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in bringing about
the defeat of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence
reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17and 18 of the Code. To add, by turning against her own
clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only
a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.35 These unyielding
standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a period of five years to just one year by the
IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is
bereft of any explanation showing the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." Verily, the Court frowns on the
unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Be that as it may, the Court
proceeds to correct the same.

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence reposed in them by their
clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found
them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred them. In Chuav. Mesina, Jr.,36 the Court disbarred the lawyer who,
upon his misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property subject of that
case, but instead, offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott,37 the penalty of disbarment was
meted out against the lawyer who, among others, actively sought to sell the properties subject of that case
contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the infractions in the foregoing cases are akin to those committed by
respondent in the case at bar, the Court deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her.
Clearly, as herein discussed, respondent committed deliberate violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with
her own clients and advanced the interests of another against them resulting to their loss. For such violations,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment consistent with existing jurisprudence.

As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include an order for the
return of the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of ₱115,000.00 for expenses allegedly received by
respondent, albeit the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno,38 it has been held that
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative
liability.39Thus, the Court's findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities
of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature -meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer's professional engagement40 – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature.

WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is accordingly DISBARRED.
A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013

SPOUSES . WARRINER, vs. ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN,

This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses George Arthur
Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and
dereliction of duty.

In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants alleged that they
secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-
Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and
docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to
submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did
not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants to have waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that
respondent did not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s move to dismiss the
Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants.
In a Resolution2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to this administrative Complaint.
Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000,3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was
granted.4

However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet filed his Comment.
Thus, we resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days
from notice."5 Respondent received our directive but chose to ignore the same.6 In another Resolution7 dated
August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file
his Comment and to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored this
Court’s directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we increased the fine to ₱2,000.00 but respondent continued to
ignore our Resolutions.8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved to order respondent’s arrest and detention
until he complies with our Resolutions.9

This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance10 and Comment.11 Respondent claimed
that he failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative case because he lost the records of Civil Case No.
23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail.

In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that complainant
Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country;
that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge; that he accepted the case because he was
challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriner’s
claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the
soil towards his property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of other witnesses
to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriner’s claim; that upon inquiries, he
discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish
to participate in the fraudulent scheme of Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner
authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not withdraw
from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would
only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable
for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal profession
and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.

In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to comply with our directives
not fully satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At the
same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the RTC by filing a
motion to admit the formal exhibits almost three months after the prescribed period; that respondent did not
present complainants’ Marriage Contract and General Power of Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to
represent his wife while the latter is out of the country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience; that
complainants have a son out of said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the
construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-
95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a
fabrication.

In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before the Court that
Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also
presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa
& Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses
such as Warriner’s. He insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil erosion which
again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment before this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil
erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of
damages provided by Bening’s Garden which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication
as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.

In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more than eight years have
lapsed, it is possible that Bening’s Garden relocated to another address but it does not mean that it never existed.

In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty of mishandling
Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-44218 dated August 28, 2010, approved with modification
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside
from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court,
thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by facts. He maintained
that his actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of
the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated, exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that
the exhibits were fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the
hope that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this
Court. He insisted that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere belated
filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file comment to the Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper
considering the fabricated allegations of his clients. Respondent argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP
is not commensurate to his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly
disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should have deemed his
failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file the same, and not as defiance of this Court’s orders.
Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No.
23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he disregarded or was disrespectful of the Court’s orders
because he was not given any opportunity to rebut the same.

Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He argued that with his
suspension, the other cases he is handling would be affected.

Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be disbarred or
suspended for five years from the practice of law. To this, respondent filed his Comment asserting that the
Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that
respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the
complainants. He maintained that he had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence
that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and elementary in any legal procedure, a failure
or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the controversy submitted for resolution
based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider
respondent’s failure or omission as having such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous
act x x x."

The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for
Reconsideration)19insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the administrative case does not constitute
defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a natural human expression of frustration, distraught and
disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he
averred that on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his
invaluable support to the local chapter. He claims that –

x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the [IBP] National
Office condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to the profession but will be ‘praised to the heavens’,
so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for his invaluable support to that same organization
whose object, among others, is to discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law by
serving justice in an orderly and dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and
appreciation by this local chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the
personal knowledge of undersigned’s personal character, integrity, uprightness, reputation and sacrifices in the
practice of his legal profession.

As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting aside of that
resolution adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year,
erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be. Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the
prestigious image of the [IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional
organizations in the Philippines worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory
stance of disciplining its members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on the
one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high heavens for his "invaluable support" of the
tenets and foundation of that very same organization that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND
ABSURDLY ODD.

Our Ruling

Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to
respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11,
1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.

Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the submission of his
formal offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set aside the above Order, respondent filed on February 3,
1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At
the same time, it directed E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to
Evidence. Again, respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by
the RTC. As a result, Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.

Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which
provide:

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein
complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this Court and the IBP, respondent admitted
that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were
fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent
truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to
withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "[w]hen the
client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists
that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of
damages provided by Bening’s Garden as a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
Unfortunately, respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph
C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation by claiming that
Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than eight years have passed since the
estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice
relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has ceased to exist.

We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court orders and
processes.1âwphi1 Note that we required respondent to submit his Comment to this administrative Complaint as
early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we
ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not
a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely.22

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions in his effort to
exculpate himself. In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed that Warriner was his only witness
in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from
Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a representative from DENR. Next, he
claimed in his Comment filed before this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the
latter threatened him with a disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he
submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly, respondent claimed in his Comment to complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he
stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants.
Moreover, respondent claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his
property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he
again contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of the place was the
cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an officer of the Court,
he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court."23 He "shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."24

Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had him arrested for
his adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six
months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v.
Padilla25 and Pesto v. Millo,26 commensurate to respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that
"suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal
profession."27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED
to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE,

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by
complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious
court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services
of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and
Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was
eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of
the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly
asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could
not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00
purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. 8 On September
12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before
the RTC.10

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed
complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order)
directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days
from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded
to the RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that
the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out
that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the
instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was complainant’s failure to
timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal.
According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter
insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a
desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision.16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the
penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-founded,

observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of
the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on
the issues at hand.19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that the spurious
November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to
fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation.21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the
developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he
may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client
to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the
case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave
the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must
constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of
complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such
dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult
to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way
beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment.24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the November 9,
2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given
due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of
complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests
with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in
order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant
in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in
Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of
the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional
or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of their
respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court
suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal
of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who
consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying documents,
the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court
disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property.
Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent
court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for
failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge
his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal
profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his
client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

A.C. No. 6484 June 16, 2015

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, vs .ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT

The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed
against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez, hired the respondent to file a case
against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the
Bañez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the complainant the following
afuounts: (a) ₱70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) ₱19,000.00 to cover the
filing fees; and (c) ₱6,500.00 as attorney's fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed by the
respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that the
respondent return to her the amount of ₱95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00 to the complainant.1awp++i1 He argued that a
complaint2for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by
another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the ₱95,000.00 after
deducting therefrom the ₱50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that
she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years
late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the
respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's
decision in Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and
not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the respondent to have
been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,918.03,10 and
18.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not informing his client that he was
under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these infractions, Commissioner Villanueva
recommended that the respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors agreed with the Investigating
Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but modified the recommended penalty from indefinite
suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of ₱95,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of the complainant's case to Atty.
Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria ₱50,000.00 for
accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but
were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board . of Governors, in
Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.15

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of
law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the
respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming
the complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the
complainant's case and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover the
complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for handling
the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the amounts of
₱19,000.00, ₱70,000.00, and ₱6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and
filing the necessary civil easels against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several times
thereafter to follow up on the easels to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that
actions on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in court, she
demanded that the respondent return the amount of ₱95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The
respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts
confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession"16 and to "account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client."17 In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or
property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. 18

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was
approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected
of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and
should not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This
infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of
suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an
ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nunez v. Atty.
Ricafort,19we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by
the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended him
indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no
different in character from his previous offense - we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment.
He has become completely unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP that the respondent should
return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of whether the engagement of Atty.
Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent been honest and
diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant should not be burdened with the
expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this
case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED
to RETURN the amount of ₱95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
Decision.

A.C. No. 10138 June 16, 2015

ROBERTO P. NONATO, vs. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR.,

We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Roberto P. Nonato (complainant) charging Atty. Eutiquio M.
Fudolin, Jr. (respondent) with gross neglect of duty.

Factual Background

In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto Nonato
(Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a 479-sq.m. Real property ( property) at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental.
The property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua (
Anselmo), before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil
Case No. MTC-282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represen ted by Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty. Garcia).
However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the respondent in the present case.

The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no formal
retainer agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid.

The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the complainant, engaged his services on
Restituto’s representation that they were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the case on a minimal acceptance
fee of ₱20,000.00 and appearance fee of ₱1,000.00, and did not execute any formal retainer agreement.

The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the MTC, the respondent
failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not contact
the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish Restituto copies of the
pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the complainant were
completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case.

After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Since neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim on May 26, 2005.

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. He justified his failure to file the
position paper by arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was al so burdened with numerous
other cases. The MTC denied the motion.

The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging that the ejectment case was a me
ritorious one such that its dismissal would cause injustice to Restituto (the plaintiff). He also filed a supplemental
motion, but the court denied both motions.

On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the complainant among them.

The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suit’s dismissal as the
respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTC’s dismissal order. The complainant also asserts that the
respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. The
complainant claims that he only found out that the case had been dismissed when he personally went to the Office
of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.

Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to file the position
paper could be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondent’s intervention,
entered into an oral extrajudicial compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.

On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure to
communicate with him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position paper due to his poor health. He also
claimed that he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind, which caused the delay in the preparation of
the pleadings in the ejectment case.2

In his Answer3 dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at the time he received the MTC’s di rective
to submit a position paper, he was already suffering from "Hypertensi ve Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation,
Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II." The respondent also alleged that further consultations confirmed that
he had an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous months. His health condition led to his
loss of concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case folders, among them the re cords of the
ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he focused on his health for self-preservation, and underwent
vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate with the late Restituto and the complainant.

The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings was not due
to willful negligence but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients or to the
court out of fear that his disclosure would affect his private practice.

Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suit’s dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of risking
his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order. Because the
dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the position paper did not
amount to the abandonment of his client’s case.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and Recommendation, finding the respondent
guilty of both negligence and betrayal of his client’s confidence. The Investigating Commissioner found that the
respondent’s failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise the client of the status
of the case demonstrated his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.

The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondent’s failure to promptly inform his client s, including
the complainant, of his medical condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of other lawyers.
Had he notified the complainant’s father of his illness before the case was dismissed, the latter could have engaged
the services of another lawyer, and the case would not have been dismissed on a mere technical ground.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondent’s suspension for one (1) month from the practice of
law.

In a Resolution4 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation after finding it to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rules.

The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a
resolution5 dated June 21, 2013.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for negligence in the
performance of duty.

The Court's Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.
A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.6 He should
serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to
that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client’s
counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations
diligently.7The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as
Restituto’s counsel.1avvphi1 His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed to file his
position paper despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so. His omission greatly prejudiced his client as the
Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit.

In addition, the respondent fa iled to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His failure to
file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted inexcusable
negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty.8 All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility
warranting the court’s imposition of disciplinary action. The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.

In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,9 we considered a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client to be
inexcusable negligence. We held that the lawyer’s omission amounted to a serious lapse in the duty he owed his
client and in his professional obligation not to delay litigation and to aid the courts in the speedy administration of
justice.

Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin,10 we ruled that a lawyer’s failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client
about the developments in her case fell below the standard and amounted to a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. We emphasized the importance of the lawyers’ duty to keep their clients adequately
and fully informed about the developments in their cases, and held that a client should never be left in the dark, for
to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal
profession as a whole.

We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos1 that the trust and confidence reposed by a client in his lawyer impose a
high standard that includes the appreciation of the lawyer’s duty to his clients, to the profession, to the courts, and
to the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.12

Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be adequately
and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark; to allow
this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal
profession in general.13
The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required standards. He neglected to file the required
position paper, and did not give his full commitment to maintain and defend his client’s interests. Aside from failing
to file the required pleading, the respondent never exerted any effort to inform his client of the dismissal of the
ejectment case.

We also find the respondent’s excuse – that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other illnesses –
unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous health
problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his medical condition cannot serve as a valid
reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court pleadings. Th e respondent could have requested an
extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed his client of his medical
condition; all these, the respondent failed to do.

Furthermore, the respondent’s subsequent filing of successive pleadings (after the ejectment case had been
dismissed) significantly weakens his health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that his
physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also indicate that his illnesses (allegedly
"Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II") were not at
all incapacitating.

All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We, however, find the IBP’s recommended penalty (one (1)month suspension from the
practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the infractions committed. Thus, we deem
it appropriate to impose the penalty of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the respondent's acts and
omissions, as well as the consequence of his negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon' 18, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this Decision, the
date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this Manifestation
to all the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, vs. ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR.,

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar (complainant)
against Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972,2 filed by the heirs of
one Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was
represented by respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he,
however, failed to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently,
the opposing counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order3 dated
November 27, 2003. When complainant confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and
told her not to worry, assuring her that she will not lose the case since she had the title to the subject property.

On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision4 (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to vacate and
turn-over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful
detainer complaint.5 Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s ruling and reinstated the MTC
Decision.6 Respondent received a copy of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant
about the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did respondent
pursue any further action.7 As such, complainant decided to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose
of seeking other available remedies. Due to respondent’s failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and
documents in the case, such other remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant
filed the instant administrative complaint, alleging that respondent’s acts amounted to gross negligence which
resulted in her loss.8

In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the administrative complaint
within ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance10 dated May 19, 2008, admitting to have agreed to
represent complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the subject property owned by the
late Pelagia Lascano (Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint,
he noticed a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as
opposed to that which complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets
of properties which are distinct and separate from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference
conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of further proceedings and proposed that a
commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the true identity of the property in
dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the manner of the proposed re-survey, leading
to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose. In
relation, the heirs’ counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in his office11 certain documents which indicated the
subject property’s description. Thus, pending the conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary conference
was tentatively reset to November 27, 2003.12

As it turned out, the heirs’ counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated documents,
notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary conference scheduled on
November 27, 2003 would not push through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened to
coincide with an important provincial conference which he was required to attend. As such, he inadvertently
missed the hearing.13 Nonetheless, he proffered that he duly appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the
RTC,14 resulting to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer complaint, albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the disputed property
was subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 15 filed by Pelagia
against complainant’s mother, Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents furnished to him by certain
DAR personnel, respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property for a long time and actually
tilled the same in the name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information,
respondent was convinced that Placida – and consequently, complainant (who took over the tilling) – was indeed
entitled to the subject property. Hence, he advised complainant that it would be best to pursue remedies at the
administrative level, instead of contesting the appeal filed by the heirs before the CA. It was respondent’s
calculated legal strategy that in the event the CA reverses the decision of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of
a writ of execution or a motion to quash such writ may be filed based on the afore-stated reasons, especially if an
approved plan and later, an emancipation patent covering the subject property is issued.16
Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,000
square meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the
title of Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of
her own choice, and promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do.
Later, complainant accused respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client
relationship to turn sour and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the
services of another lawyer.17

In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 200919 and required the
parties to submit their respective position papers.20

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating Commissioner),
issued a Report and Recommendation (Commissioner’s Report),21 finding respondent to have been negligent in
failing to attend the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the
immediate submission of the said case for decision and eventual loss of complainant’s cause.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring
from the court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push through, considering that the November
27, 2003 setting was only tentative and the heirs’ counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact that
respondent had to attend an important provincial conference which coincided with the said setting hardly serves
as an excuse since he should have sent a substitute counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned any
legal remedy that he undertook when the heirs elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not file
any comment or opposition to the heirs’ appeal. Finally, respondent’s enumerations of his legal options to allegedly
protect the complainant’s interests were found to be thought only after the fact.22

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise ordinary
diligence in handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.23

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XIX-2011-
26624dated May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and in accord with
applicable laws and rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-2012-
51726dated December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.27 Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code
embody these quintessential directives and thus, respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting
for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.28

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.29 While such negligence
or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.30

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant’s cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing in Civil Case
No. 1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the
said hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and considering further that he was
yet to confer with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent had an important commitment during that day
hardly exculpates him from his omission since the prudent course of action would have been for him to send a
substitute counsel to appear on his behalf. In fact, he should have been more circumspect to ensure that the
aforesaid hearing would not have been left unattended in view of its adverse consequences, i.e., that the
defendant’s failure to appear at the preliminary conference already entitles the plaintiff to a judgment.31 Indeed,
second-guessing the conduct of the proceedings, much less without any contingent measure, exhibits respondent’s
inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause.1âwphi1

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs’ appeal before the CA. Records
disclose that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected to inform her about the CA ruling
which he had duly received, thereby precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As regards respondent’s
suggested legal strategy to pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state that the same does not
excuse him from failing to file a comment or an opposition to an appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse
resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably, these are basic courses of action which every diligent lawyer is expected to
make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the above-cited
provisions of the Code.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence
for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v.
Elayda,32 a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the
submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months.
In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the
pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6)
months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against
respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in violation of Canon 17,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET ,vs. ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN,

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint against
respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be
made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true
copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand
Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress
of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same
provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty.
Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court,
Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the
amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of
₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants
fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the
photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he
participated in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf
of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to
have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and
despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without
any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against
complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6)
months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to
the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot
despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.