CASE NAME IN THIS CASE

TITLE I
Laurel v. Misa The SC confronted the theory on suspended allegiance. In this case the accused claims suspension of
Treason and suspended allegiance; However the SC held that there is no such thing as suspended allegiance. Sovereignty is
allegiance absolute what is suspended merely the exercise of sovereignty. Therefore the occupation of the Japanese
merely suspended the exercise of sovereignty. In this case petitioner contends that because of the
occupation of the Japanese, there was temporary allegiance to the Japanese. However, the SC held that
such occupation does not detract from the fact that you owe permanent allegiance, therefore the accused
was guilty of Treason.

since the preservation of allegiance or obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government does not demand from him a positive action but only passive attitude from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power to repeal or suspend the operation
of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their
legitimate government;

Moreover, adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring
the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military
operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation,
and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty.

change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of
those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people,
People v. Prieto The SC did not convict the accused because the two witnesses referred to different occasions or acts;
Treason; Two witness the first witness narrated one with the accused on a sledge; the second witness narrated one where the
rule accused was walking. The SC held that these 2 testimonies are inconsistent and did not refer to the same
act.

Also in this case; In war its not merely occupation or governing physical injury. There are atrocities
committed with treason. The Sc held that in this case all of the crimes are deemed absorbed in one count
of treason. You cannot commit treason without these overt acts that are manifested in Treason.
Further, Treason is a political offense. HOWEVER, the prosecution has the option to prosecute
separately based on that overt act.
People v. Perez As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
Treason assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance
of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as
individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him
to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by
same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason.

In this case, his "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven
the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit;

Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war
efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication,
calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the
other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their
prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature
and circumstances of each particular case.
US v. Bautista This involves a case of Filipinos who organized a Junta to overthrow the government of the Philippines;
Conspiracy to commit The appellants in this case were convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government; But where a
Treason genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused voluntarily
accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be taken
into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
 In this case the crime was committed when there was no war; hence the crime of conspiracy to commit
Treason can be committed in times of peace; cite this case if ever the facts provide;
People v. lolo-Saraw In this case the location of the crime was not in the high seas; and not in the Philippines; SC: gave
Piracy as crime against credence to International law on hostest humani generis crime against all manking; Wherever pirates
all manking are found they may be prosecuted;
Left holes on boat
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against
all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes.
People v. Rodriguez If they are members of the complement or passengers of the boat you do not use Article 122 of the RPC;
Piracy PD532 but PD 532;
People v. Tulin In this case a person is charged for supervising the transfer of cargo in Singapore; as related to piracy;
Piracy in foreign waters Hence, since it was committed in Singaporel the Philippines has no Jurisdiction. However the Court
held that such act in Singapore is a continuation of an attack in the Philippine waters, therefore transfer
need not be required to be in the Philippines; That regardless of any limiting statute Piracy is a crime
against all mankind.

Moreover, in this case the court held that RA 7659 and PD 532 only expanded the coverage of Art 122
of the RPC; with respect to covering members of the complement of the vessel (PD 532) and piracy
committed in Philippine waters(RA 7659)
People v. Siyoh The Court held that regardless of the number of persons killed; the number of persons killed on the
Piracy with numerous occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide
people killed as a special is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
complex crime. regardless of the number of victims.
TITLE II
Umil v. Ramos In this case Dural shot two NPA officers and he was thereafter hospitalized; There he was arrested. He
Arbitrary Detention claimed that a long time has passed since the shooting; and since there is no arrest warrant his arrest
Arrest was valid could not have been valid. However the Court held that
Subversion is a
continuing crime; The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule
(Section 5 Rule 113 113 of the Rules of Court
RofC)
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, asamended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act
 of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.

The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
People v. Burgos The warrantless arrest in this case was not granted; for the information given to the police was only
Arrest was illegal second hand information therefore it did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause in order to warrant
Second hand information an arrest. The Court held that in this case the police were engaged in a fishing expedition; They had
ample time to file a case first and obtain a warrant of arrest under Section 5 of Article 113 of the Rules
of Court.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok’s verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.

There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

Anything discovered through an unlawful arrest is lawful; The arrest of the accused while he was
plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards
could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Astorga v. People In this case there was no actual detention; they were free to roam around but not to travel because of
Arbitrary Detention heavy rain. In this case the Court held that there was no contructive detention because there was no
Constructive Detention instillment of fear; There was only a simple misunderstanding;

Constructive Detention; as opposed to Physical distraint, is manifested in the instillment of fear; fear
is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective. The possibility that the mayor was being hospitable and
well settled is the rule that if an act is susceptible to two interpretations greater weight should be given
on the interpretation which upholds the innocence, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary.

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.

There is not constructive detention because there is no instilment of fear; The determinative factor
in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the
evidence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended
parties.

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, the police
officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On the contrary, what appears is that
petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
Team in his house.

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private
offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam
around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time.Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.
 People v. Flores In this case there was lack of proof of actual detention. The only proof was that the victim was seen with
Arbitrary Detention them. In order to convict an accused with Arbitrary Detention there must be direct evidence to show
Lack of proof of Actual that they dragged and locked him. Lack of Actual and Constructive Detention.
Detention
Detention
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in
an enclosure, or in any manner detaining and depriving him
of his liberty

A careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson
Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified that
accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment
headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The
fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants
does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty.

There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented
from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there was actual intent on the
part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty.

IBP Pangasinan v. DOJ The SOJ says that because he waived his right we can detain him.In this case the Supreme Court held
Article 125; that the waiver udner Article 125 does not rest on indefinite detention; his case must be resolved
Waiver is not a license to within 15 or 30 days in case of drugs; then there must be an order release;
detain a person ad
infinitum. Waiver of Article 125 does not vest unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested
person;The Court held that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO,
BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the
whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide
with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty

Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a
person ad infinitum.

Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more
followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.

Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances
must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of
Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659)
for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.

Where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case; This rule also applies in cases where
the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ
or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review.
Soria v. Desierto Soria was arrested a day before the election for illegal possession of firearms. Since it was a holiday the
Delay in the delivery of complaint was filed the next day. Soria was detained for 22 hours his offense was punishable by Prision
detained persons – Correcional, and he should only be detained for 18 hours. However the SC held that in computing the
Election day house provided in Article 125 the time is material; the accused in this case was arrest in 8:30 on
May 13, it was election the next day and he was released on 6:30 of May 14; The SC held that May
14 should not be counted, because on that day Courts were closed. His release did not exceed 18
hours.

An election day or special holiday is not included in computation of periodAs aptly pointed out by
the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and
jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests,
it being a “no-office day.” (Medina vs. Orozco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that
the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,
 only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001
at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there
could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.

Villavicencio v. Lukban This case involved the prostitutes of Manile sent by the Mayor of Manila to Davao and prohibited from
Expulsion leaving the said city. The Court held that
Prostitutes from manila
one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of
the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands—and these
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens—to change their domicile
from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public
officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.

The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The
restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila
and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.
Stonehill v. Diokno In this case the Court held that any search yielding objects as a result of unlawful search and seizure;
Fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant

region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely
and truly waived this right.

, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein;

Requisites to issue a warrant; Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.

Burgos Sr v. Chief of 1. The Court held that Personal properties seized need not be owned
Staff of AFP Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
Probable cause under a search warrant, to wit:
Search warrant
Need not be owned
“Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property:
a. Property subject of the offense;
b. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
c. Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense
 The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b]
of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property.

Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be
at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that
the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.

Probable cause for search warrant

We find petitioners’ thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. ) the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.

And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla’s application that petitioner

“is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended x x
x”

12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

The warrant in this case is a general warrant; directions to “seize any evidence in connection with the
violation of a crime is held too general.

People v. Baes This case involved the act of holding the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” an letting the
Offending Religious funeral pass through the churchyard of the Roman Catholic Church
Feelings
The Court held that
Whether or not the acts are offensive is determined by the feelings of the one offended; Moreover the
Court held that the fiscal must admit that although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises
a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or not the act complained of is offensive
to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to
the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may
offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings
of those professing another faith.

We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and
penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
TITLE III
People v. Hernandez This case involves Hernandez who is charged for rebellion complexed with murders, arson, robberies;
Political Offense The Court held that There is no complex crime of Treason.
Doctrine on Rebellion
134 Political Crimes and Common Crimes; In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof." then said offense becomes stripped of its "common"
complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the
political character of the latter.
 Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that

Common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character
as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Enrile v. Salazar In this case what was raised was the applicability of PD on the occasion of rebellion; whether to include
Political offense doctrine the graver offenses such as murder;
onf Rebellion 134 covers
both types of Complex In this case Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
Crimes committed during a failed coup. The Court held that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating
to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
Enrile v. Amin This case involves Enrile who is charged for committing murder and violating PD 1829 (A special law)
Political Offense The Court held that There is only one single crime of rebellion. The crime of rebellion consists of
Doctrine on Rebellion many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
covers violation of Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves
Special laws are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.

Even crimes punishable by special law if mere components are NOT separate crimes. In the light
of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves.

People v. Loviendero In this case Loviendero was charged with murder; he now seeks refuge under the political offense
Mere membership in doctrine claiming that he is a member of the NPA; However the Court held that Membership in a rebel
Subversive group will not organization does not automatically qualify criminal acts as absorbed in rebellion. The burden is to
warrant application of Loviendero who must demonstrate conclusively that his criminal acts were committed in furtherance
Political Offense with rebellion. If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
doctrine; burden of proof common crime and not of rebellion
is to the accused
Ocampo v. Abando This is the case involving a discovered mass grave; the accused in this case seeks remedy udner the
Burden of proof to use Political defense doctrine; The Court held that Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
Political Offense absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
Doctrine is to the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as
accused its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for
the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

In this case; Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged
murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as
co- conspirators.
Burden; We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof
showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
 present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the
instant petitions.

People v. Umali This involved the case of burning the house of an elected Congressman due to a bitter rivalry; whereby
Sedition accused employed the help of subversive groups in conducting the raid.
Does not absorb other
crimes In this case the Court held that unlike Rebellion which absorbs other crimes made in furtherance thereof.
Burning of house raid SEDITION DID NOT ABSORB THE OTHER CRIMES; The crimes committed are, therefore,
congressman those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical. The crimes committed are,
therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical The killing may,
however, be qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were
defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be
punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should
be life imprisonment.
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder
and physical injuries.

Moreover there is No Impossible Crime

1. The crime committed is not that of a crime against the person or property
2. Sedition is a crime against public order
3. Nature of sedition is to rise publicly or tumultuously

People v. Cabrera Sedition does not distinguish as to persons; Sedition applies even to public officers for so long as you
Sedition can be commit any of the acts of sedition.
committed by any person
whether a private citizen Sedition
or public officer Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any 'one of five objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular Government or of a Provincial or Municipal Government. Subdivision 3 of section 5 of the
Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.

In the case: In one sense there was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government,
but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.

US v. Tolentino This case involves the tagalog theatrical work of Aurelio Tolentino'Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas'
Sedition (Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow).
Theatrical work The prosecution contends that various parts of the said drama are seditious.
(1) or which tend to The Court held that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tended
instigate others to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite
to cabal or meet rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
together for disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government.
unlawful
purposes; Appellant’s contention that there is no intent and that the drama was merely for entertainment
purposes., While the appellant contends that there was no intent to commit the crime of which he is
(2) or which suggest
charged, for no intent was proved in the evidence of record; and that the drama is, in itself, a purely
or incite literary and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as
rebellious imagined by the author, are presented merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
conspiracies or
riots; The Court held that this contention cannot be maintained. The public presentation of the drama took
place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years after the establishment of the Civil Government.
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions,
renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or artistic production, and
the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events
portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and
immediate application, nor should they blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and
director of the play.

Espuelas v. People This case involves the fake suicide letter written by Espuelas which includes several scurrilous libels
Fake suicide letter; against the government; The Court held that The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
the writing, publishing, Statutes against sedition are not violative of Freedom of speech
or circulating of
scurrilous libels against In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of
the Government of the speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to
United States or the speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives
Insular Government of immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
the Philippine Islands; freedom." So statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative of such fundamental
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the citizen's freedom of
expression to agitate for institutional changes.

However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government setup. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than
an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination one will find no
particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is
called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with
malevolence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all
public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would
teach the younger generation to destroy.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to "persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with
its failure to particularize. When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the readers
but on creating disturbance, the rationale of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer
is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President
Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government
but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof."

As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up the people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who
may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to
the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those
provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.

Martinez v. Morfe This case involves Martinez who are delegates of the constitutional commission; facing criminal
Violation of prosecution for falsification of public documents; They invoke their constitutional Immunity; as well as
Parliamentary neutrality Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the
sessions of Congress, “arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed
a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.”

When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning
from the same.

There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should
such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that
may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to
such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is
of the essence.
People v. Beltran Beltran was indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct assault. Passing by the Puzon
Direct Assault Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted at them, “Oki ni inayo” (Vulva of your mother).
They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he
 went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter. The newly elected Mayor
told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his
companions to surrender considering that he knew them personally as all of them were once working
for Congressman David Puzon. And then there was a shoot-out

The Court held that Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their
official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that
appellants are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico
and Pat. Tolentino is correct.

People v. Dollantes While the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes
Brgy Captain while went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the visayan as
trying to pacify dancing ‘nagkorantsa’, brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people
with knife was stabbed present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not
Direct Assault to disturb the dance. However, the Dollantes instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain,
stabbed the barangay Captain.

Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro
Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties.
In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that “As the barangay captain, it was
his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs,
the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority.”
Justo v. CA In this case the person in authority agree to fight they went outside and fought. The Court held that \
Direct Assault
Attacked by reason of The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public
office official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the
He agreed to be attacked. duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority; so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty.

This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks
upon person in authority "while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such
performance" the words "on occasion" signifying "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of
official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged.

No other construction is compatible with the evident purpose of the law that public officials and their
agents should be able to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being
assaulted or injured by reason thereof.

Alberto v. Dela Cruz In this case Orbita left Denaque unattended giving him the opportunity to escape; because there was a
Delivery of Prisoners ntoe from Gov. Cledera asking Esmeralda to send him men to work in the contruction of a fence in his
from Jail house.

The offense under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any
person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or
charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalized under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Gov. Cledera, as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Tanega v. Masakayan Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:

Evasion of Service; he (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;
must be in service of his (2) he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty; and
sentence; in this case (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
there is no service
For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades service of his sentence, by escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. That escape should take place while serving
sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a
 higher penalty if such evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution. Evasion
of sentence is but another expression of the term jail breaking.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription
shall only begin to run when he escapes from confinement;
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
In this case
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who—sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment—was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in
her favor.

People v. Abilong The Court agreed with the contention of the Solicitor General in that destierro is a deprivation of
Evasion of service of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro is punished destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.

“it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes
from the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area.”

where it was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited
area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.

In conclusion the Court finds and holds that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of
destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he
entered said City.

Torres v. Gonzales This involved the condition not to violate any law; In this case the Court held as to whether conviction
Violation of Conditional of subsequent crime is needed such choice is in the exercise of the president’s executive prerogrative
Pardon and not subject to judicial scrutiny. Section 64 of RAC – no need of Judicial pronouncement; but RPC
need;
People v. Dioso In this case the Court held that due to the fact that the accused is a quasi-recidivist, regardless of the
Quasi Recidivist presence or absence of mitigating or aggravatmg’ his penalty of death will not be lessened by degree to
RPC. Abarca was previously convicted of the crime of HOMICIDE; and subsequently convicted of the
crime of MURDER;
TITLE IV
Manuel v Siquian The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
Falsification by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
Making untruthful document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:
of facts; (a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the
mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts
contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa
Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his
office is a public document. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom
the certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was
prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically
the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a
public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of
which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available
for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself
did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.

Criminal Intent is not an Element of Falsification of Public Document

 Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary
when the falsified document is a public document.

When there is Abuse of Public Office

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying
the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document
by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy
which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse
of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the
duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the
preparation of a document
People v. Manansala Manansala is found with the possession of stolen checks; It is an established rule that when a person
Falsification; possession has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is
gives the presumption justified that such person is the forger.
US v. Capule Falsification Of A Document Has Been Committed It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the
crime of falsification of a document has been committed because the defendant executed upon said
notarial document of an official character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting therein the
intervention of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, to whom he ascribed statements
different from what they had made to him and by preventing the truth in the narration of facts, getting
two persons to sign in the name of said married couple through deceit, after giving them to understand
that the document contained a commission or power of attorney, when in fact was a deed of sale of a
piece of land, the legitimate owners whereof had never intended or consented to its alienation.

None of the persons who appear to have signed said document and seem to have been present at its
execution were informed of its true contents, because they all confined with the greatest good faith in
the false and deceitful statements of the defendant, believing what he said to the effect that said
instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred upon him by the couple executing it, who never
intended to execute any document of sale of their property to the defendant , who went to the extreme
of getting a notary to certify to its ratification before him, made apparently by the alleged vendors in the
contents of the said false documents.
US v. Castillo However, we do hold that the utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence
Falsification; possession tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged,
of falsified goods and that this evidence, taken together with the further evidence set out above and brought out on the
trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime with which he was charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Dava v. people The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a
Article 172; judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following:
Elements of USE (a) The offender knew that a document was falsified by another person;
(b) The false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172;
(c) He used such document (not in judicial proceedings),
(d) The use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause
such damage.
Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.
Gigantoni v. People Falsely represented himself as a legal officer of the Philippine Constabulary;
Usurpation 177
Usurpation of Authority The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service
“knowingly and falsely” negates the charge that he “knowingly and falsely” represented himself to be a CIS agent. The
constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and
never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did.

Prosecution failed to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented
himself as a CIS agent by presenting proof that he knew he was no longer a CIS agent. A mere disputable
presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.

As to the contention that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from
service for both imply absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority, it is correct if the
accused were charged with the usurpation of official function, but not if he is charged merely with
usurpation of authority.
Estrada v. Desierto Hefti was designated as Officer in charge of the BIR hence it necessarily follows that Hefti can now
Usurpation of Authority legally exercise the duties and functions pertaining to the BIR Commissioner, including the issuance of
a constructive distraint.
 Suffice it to say that when respondent Hefti issued the notice of distraint, she was clothed with authority
to issue the same in view of her appointment as the then Officer-InCharge of the BIR. Hence, the charge
for Usurpation of Official Function does not apply to said respondent.
Hock Lian Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from
Anti-Alias Law the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court.

Aside from the name “Ong Hock Lian,” appellee is using the alias “Julian Ong.” There is no evidence
that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or
that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-
Alias Law.
Legamia v. IAC The use of Mrs. Reyes;
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name
of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to
be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon.

A number of women can be identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and
social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man’s wife and uses his family name blithely
ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating
the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light
of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.

In the case: Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public
as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material
gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of
tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize
what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.
Limson v. Gonzales The use of Eugenio JUAN Gonzales; Eugenio Gonzales;
Anti Alias Law
Use of middle name On the Issue of Alleged Use of Illegal Aliases The Court observes that respondent’s aliases involved
the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio
Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance.

The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name
resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant,
however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and
that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have
used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the
charge against him was justified in fact and in law.

Alias, defined An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at
birth or baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s
name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which
they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases. An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a
name that is not different from his true name.

The “alleged falsification of names” were just variation of Gonzalez name for it was not made in a
fictitious manner.
Diaz v. People Falsified transcript; This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and
corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material
matter.

ELEMENTS OF PERJURY
a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath.
c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
 d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.

IN THE CASE: All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar. Perjury under Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating
circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one
(1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
People v. Pudol Subornation of Perjury is fully within the scope of that defined in article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised
Penal Code Therefore, the fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in the Revised
Penal Code does not mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased
to be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope of that defined in article 17, subsection 2, of
the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, Alberto Reyes, as already stated, is charged in the present case
not only as subowner of the perjury committed by his coaccused but also as principal by cooperation
and participation in the preparation of the false affidavit subscribed by Esminia Pudol.
Ouano v. CA IN THIS CASE: Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration
for Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in
fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction of
the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public
auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code.
Mendoza and Binay - Binay is charged with Anti-Graft; accused of corrupt activities;
Law Offices v. CA - AMLA initiated investigations; into the bank accounts;
- SECTION 11. They used under the Anti Money Laundering Act. Section 11; authority to
inquire into the bank accounts.
- The banks accounts of the lawfirm SPCMB was included in the inquiry; it was treated by
AMLA as a related account;
- You can inquire not only at the account of person accused but also of related account
- Related Account - Accounts funds or sources originated from are materially linked subject to
the police order.
- Link of lawfirm was Abigail Binay; former client
- AMLA applied for an order to look into the bank accounts of SPCMB lawfirm
- One argument by SPCMB is that they were not given the opportunity to be heard; no due
process;
- Ex Parte Application – apply without notice to party concerned
- That AMLA applied without notifying SPCMB lawfirm; how can they contest then on the
proceedings;
What did the SC say with respect to the issue on Due Process;
What is an extra-judicial **; After finding probable Cause what happens?
- The nature of the investigation was not in furtherance of a quasi-judicial functions;
merely fact finding; meaning there was no adjuct of rights;
- Right to due process attaches to judicial proceedings
- In this case it is similar to NBI
- They cannot assert to due process because it is merely fact-finding
- Eventually they can during proceeding or trial but not during fact-finding by AMLA
- Therefore Ex Parta is not a violation of the constitutional right to procedural due process;

Section 10 – Freezing of the monetary instruments tied to an unlawful activity to avoid its ready disposal
by the suspect; (Read this) AMENDED BY RA 10927 - Order for asset preservation;

Penal Provisions; Penalty; (check the law) – Section 14

Q: When you apply for freeze order; or authority to inquire into bank; is there requirement of prior
pending case for violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act?
A: SC: NO. These remedies are in furtherance to functions of AMLA; these are remedies to obtain
evidence; it would render these remidies futile; diminish its essence as tools of investigation if you
would require a proper case; What is necessary is PROBABLE CAUSE: that proceeds are related
to unlawful activity;

There is an exception; NO Court order required in cases involving activies in 3i. 1, 2, 12 punishable
in the penal laws of other foreign countries; NO requirement to apply for probable cause to issue
order of inquiry;
Criminal liability in Anti Money Laundering; separate offense and punishment; from that act of
predicate acts; offense shall not bar prosecution of predicate acts;

- One of the Arguments of SPMBC violated act to confidentiality of Bank Deposits.

- SC: Constitutional right to privacy; manifested under zones of privacy; RA 1405 – Bank
Secrecy law; Basis of this right of Bank Secrecy is statutory nature; therefore congress
can introduce exceptions to the general rule; and one of such exceptions is the AMLA.
- Hence AMLA is an exception of the RA 1405 Bank Secrecy law.