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the specific acts or omissions committed by them which

amount to incompetence and gross negligence. (De Jesus vs.
Guerrero III, 598 SCRA 341 [2009])
As a just cause for an employee’s dismissal, inefficiency
or neglect of duty must not only be gross but also habitual;
A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a
just cause for the dismissal of the employee. (St. Luke’s
Medical Center, Incorporated vs. Fadrigo, 605 SCRA 728
[2009])
——o0o——

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190. April 23, 2010*

 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2909-RTJ)

HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE

MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, respondent.

Administrative Law; Judges; Bias and Partiality; Repeated

rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously
and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a
judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.—As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and
vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for
disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision
may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge’s
integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge.
Same; Same; Same; Not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his official duties renders him liable; In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although
the same acts

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

may be erroneous.—As a matter of public policy, not every error or

mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders
him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute
misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a
judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof
that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent
to cause an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge
need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the
performance of his official functions.
Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; While a judge may
not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal
principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.—While a judge may not be
held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a
judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every
erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is
not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a
judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the
performance of his official functions. This is because if judges
wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the law, there will
not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; It is a pressing responsibility of judges to
keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the
latest decisions of the Supreme Court; One cannot seek refuge in a
mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules;
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no
one—not even judges.—When an error is so gross and patent, such
error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable
for gross ignorance of the law. It is a pressing responsibility of
judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well
as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot

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seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and

procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to
know, excuses no

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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

one—not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE

SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross

Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an Affidavit-Complaint1 dated May
12, 2008, filed by complainant Hadja Sohurah Dipatuan
against respondent Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Regional Trial
Court) of Iligan City, Branch 1, for Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the
records, are as follows:
On September 5, 2001, a criminal case for murder,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3620-01 was filed against
Ishak M. Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan, complainant’s
husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City,
Branch 10, then presided by Judge Yusoph Pangadapun,
for the killing of Elias Ali Taher. Judge Pangadapun died
during the pendency of the case. The case was transferred
to different judges designated by the Supreme Court to act
as Presiding Judge of Branch 10, namely, Judge Amer
Ibrahim, Judge Rasad Balindog, Judge Macaundas
Hadjirasul, Judge Moslemen Macarambon, respondent
Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, and Judge Lacsaman
Busran.
Before Judge Macarambon could render a decision on
the case, he was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner.
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 201-20072 dated
November 16, 2007, the Supreme Court designated
respondent Judge

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

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2 Id., at p. 7.

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Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

Mamindiara Mangotara, Presiding Judge of the RTC of

Iligan City, Branch 1, Lanao Del Norte, as Acting Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 10. Later on,
Mangotara suffered a mild stroke; hence, the Supreme
Court, in a Resolution dated December 26, 2007, revoked
the earlier designation of Judge Mangotara and designated
Judge Lacsaman M. Busran as the new Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 10, by virtue of Administrative Order No.
220-2007.
On December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed
Decision3 in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 and found both
accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced them to
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The trial court ruled
that the prosecution was able to establish that Abdul and
co-accused Dipatuan acted in conspiracy in shooting and
killing the victim Elias Ali Taher. The court, likewise,
increased the accused’s bail bond from P75,000.00 to
P200,000.00.
On January 21, 2008, the accused filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision. In an Order dated
February 1, 2008, Mangotara denied the motion for lack of
merit.4 In another Order of the same date, Mangotara
applied the same increased bail bond with regard to
accused Ishak M. Abdul.5 However, again on the same
date, Mangotara issued another Order recalling the
foregoing Orders.6
Thus, on May 14, 2008, complainant filed the instant
complaint. Complainant alleged that Judge Mangotara
displayed bias and prejudice against her husband Dipatuan
when he did not inhibit himself from the case, considering
that he is a relative by affinity and consanguinity of the
victim Elias Ali Taher and that he also came from
Maguing, Lanao Del Sur where Taher also used to reside.
Complainant also pointed

_______________

3 Id., at pp. 8-19.

4 Id., at p. 46.
5 Id., at p. 47.
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6 Id., at p. 48.

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52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

out that despite the designation of Judge Busran as Acting

Presiding Judge of Branch 10 on December 26, 2007, Judge
Mangotara, acting with grave abuse of authority, illegally
and maliciously rendered the December 28, 2007 Decision
as well as the two Orders dated February 1, 2008.
On May 26, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) directed Mangotara to file his Comment on the
instant complaint.7
In his Comment8 dated June 24, 2008, Mangotara
averred that he decided the case on December 28, 2007 as
it had been pending for almost seven (7) years. He clarified
that his relationship to the victim is distant and not a basis
for disqualification of judges under Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court. Mangotara explained that he received notice of
Judge Busran’s designation as the new Presiding Judge
only on January 26, 2008 and that when he issued the two
Orders dated February 1, 2008, Judge Busran had not yet
assumed office; and in the honest belief that Abdul was
also entitled to the benefits of the bail bond fixed by the
court for Dipatuan. Mangotara added that, upon realizing
the irregularity of the two Orders issued on February 1,
2008, he immediately rectified the same and recalled the
Orders on the same day. Finally, Mangotara maintained
that his decision was supported by the evidence on record
and that the instant administrative complaint was only
meant to embarrass him and destroy his honor and
reputation.
Subsequently, in its Memorandum9 dated May 18, 2009,
the OCA found Mangotara guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and abuse of authority. The OCA, likewise,
recommended that the instant complaint against
Mangotara be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter.

_______________

7 Id., at p. 49.
8 Id., at pp. 50-53.
9 Id., at pp. 125-130.

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Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

     However, in its Resolution10 dated July 22, 2009, the

Court resolved to re-docket the instant complaint as a
regular administrative matter and refer the complaint to
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos for investigation, report and
recommendation.
We adopt the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice.
On the charge of bias and partiality
resulting to grave abuse of authority
We rule in the negative. As correctly observed by the
Investigating Justice, complainant indeed failed to specify
the degree of relationship of respondent Judge to a party in
the subject case. She failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that respondent Judge was related within
the prohibited degree with the victim. Section 1, Rule 137
of the Revised Rules of Court states:

“Sec. 1. Disqualification of Judges.—No judge or judicial

officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.”

This being the case, the inhibition was indeed

discretionary or voluntary as the same was primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
respondent Judge. When Mangotara chose not to inhibit
and proceed with the

_______________

10 Id., at pp. 131-132.

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54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

promulgation of the disputed decision, he cannot be faulted

by doing so. Significantly, complainant while asserting that
Mangotara should have inhibited in the said case, she
nonetheless failed to institute any motion for inhibition.
Moreover, complainant failed to cite any specific act that
would indicate bias, prejudice or vengeance warranting
respondent’s voluntary inhibition from the case.
Complainant merely pointed on the alleged adverse and
erroneous rulings of respondent Judge to their prejudice.
By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias
and prejudice.
  To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be
shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings,
although erroneous, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do
not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the
judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a
litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and
consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification
of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although
the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence,
the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case
against the judge.11
Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must
be sufficient evidence to prove the same, as well as a
manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an
extrajudicial source or some other basis. A judge’s conduct
must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice
before it can be stig-

_______________

11 Webb v. People, July 24, 1997, G.R. No. 127262, 276 SCRA 243, 253-
254.

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matized as biased and partial. As there was no substantial

evidence to hold Mangotara liable on this point, the
Investigating Justice correctly recommended the dismissal
of this charge against him.
Moreover, we likewise found no basis to hold respondent
Judge administratively liable anent his issuance of the
Decision dated December 28, 2007. As aptly observed by
the Investigating Justice, Mangotara acted in good faith
when he issued the subject decision, since he received
notice of his replacement by Judge Busran, dated
December 26, 2007, only on January 26, 2008. It must be
stressed that not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence
of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge can find refuge. In this
case, complainant adduced no evidence that Mangotara
was moved by bad faith when he issued the disputed order.
As to the charge of gross
ignorance of the law
As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law in so far as
his act of increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of
cancelling it, Mangotara did not deny his issuance of said
Order. However, he claims that the issuance thereof was
merely an error of judgment.
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although the same acts may
be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error
of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This
does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe
propriety, dis-

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56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

creetness and due care in the performance of his official

functions.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure is clear on the issue. It provides:

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“SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the

Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable,
the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
xxx xxx xxx”

The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is

discretionary on the part of the respondent Judge. It is
imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal
principles and possessed sufficient proficiency in the law.
In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the
accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is
strong.12 Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-
01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail
should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as
respondent Judge did.
While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance
of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is
also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every
erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative
immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It
does not mean that a judge need not observe propriety,
discreetness and due care in the

_______________

12  Managuelod v. Paclibon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1726, March 29,

2004, 426 SCRA 377, 381.

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VOL. 619, APRIL 23, 2010 57

Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

performance of his official functions. This is because if

judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the
law, there will not only be confusion in the administration

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of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic

requirements of due process.13
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in
increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of cancelling
it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment on the part of respondent Judge, but a patent
disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross
and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.14 It
is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with
the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in
a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is
bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges.
IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE
15
TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.
We come to the imposable penalty.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under
Section 11(A) of the same Rule, as amended, if the
respondent is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however,
that

_______________

13 Reyes v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 244,
258-259.
14 Id., at p. 259.
15 Rivera v. Mirasol, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1885, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 315, 320.

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58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dipatuan vs. Mangotara

the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave

credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
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In this case, a fine of P20,000.00, as recommended by

the Investigating Justice, would thus appear to be an
appropriate sanction to impose on respondent Judge,
considering that this is his first infraction in his 13 years of
service; his admission of his mistake; and his prompt
correction of such mistake.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds JUDGE MAMINDIARA
P. MANGOTARA, retired Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 1, GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which he is FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000,00), to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

Corona (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Retired Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara meted with

P20,000.00 fine for gross ignorance of the law.

Notes.—It is completely inexcusable for an experienced

judge, to ignore basic law, already well-ingrained through
constant usage. (In Re: Partial Report on the Results of the
Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu
City, 543 SCRA 105 [2008])
While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance
of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is
also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law; When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith,
making the 

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