VICENTE SAPTO, LAUREANA SAPTO and DORA (BAGONA) vs.

APOLONIO FABIANA
G.R. No. L-11285 May 16, 1958

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
Sapto (Moro), was the owner of a land in Alambre, Toril, Davao City, under TCT No. T-
5701 (0-28) of the ROD-Davao City. When Sapto died, Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon became
the heirs of his property. On June 6, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of
sale of a portion of four hectares of the land to Apolonio Fabiana, in consideration of the amount
of P245.00, duly approved by the Governor of Davao, but was never registered. Possession of
the land conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and had been in the possession thereof
1931 up to the present. When Samuel died, he was survived by his widow Dora (Bagoba) and
two children, Laureana and Vicente Sapto. Ramon and Constancio died without an issue. On
October 19, 1954, the Saptos filed for the recovery of land sold by their predecessors to defendant
Apolonio Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale between Samuel
and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered, it was valid and binding upon
the parties and the vendors heirs, and ordered the plaintiffs to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in defendant's favor and its annotation in the certificate of title. From this judgment,
plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the deed of sale executed over the land, although never registered, is valid and
binding?

RULING:
Yes, the deed of sale is valid and binding upon Fabiana and is equally binding and
effective against the heirs of Sapto. The property has remained and still is in the possession of
Fabiana. Saptos cite several cases wherein we have held that under the Torrens system,
registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
The authorities cited refer, however, to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property
and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question.
These cases have, therefore, no bearing on the instant case, where Fabians has always remained
in the possession of the land in question and no subsequent transfer thereof to other persons has
been made either by Sapto or the heirs.
As to the execution of a deed of conveyance in favor of fabiana, no enforcement of the
contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the
sale and transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as
between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the
cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made
by their predecessors. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made
applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property
in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.

Miranda, Vienna Mae J.

 FELIX BUCTON AND NICANORA GABAR BUCTON vs ZOSIMO GABAR, JOSEFINA
LLAMOSO GABAR AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-36359 January 31, 1974

ANTONIO, J.:

FACTS:
Nicanora Gabar Bucton (wife of her co-plaintiff Felix Bucton) is the sister of defendant
Zosimo Gabar, husband of his co-defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar. Sometime in 1946,
Josefina bought a land from spouses Villarin in installment basis. Josefina then entered into a
verbal agreement whit her sister-in-law, Nicanora, that Nicanora would pay one-half of the price
and would then own one-half of the land. Nicanora paid her an intial amount of P1000 which
Josefina accepted and signed a receipt inidated as part payment of the land. Later Nicanora and
Felix took possession of the land indicated to them by Josefina and Zosimo Gabar and built a
house of strong materials and apartments for rent and even had the land surveyed, subdivided
and fenced it with the consent of Josefina. Nicanora sought to obtain separate title of the land but
Josefina declined and denied the agreement to sell to Nicanora ½ portion of the land and claimed
that the money she received were loans and not payment to the land. RTC ordered Spouses
Gabar to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the Spouses Bucton. The CA reversed the
judgement of RTC on the ground that the action of Bucton has prescribed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the spouses Bucton can compel the vendors to execute a formal deed of
conveyance.
2. Whether their action has prescribed.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that there is no question that Spouses Bucton is the owner of the
land. The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half of the
lot coupled with their possession thereof, which entitles them to a conveyance of the
property. That sale, although not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing, is
nevertheless valid and binding between petitioners and private respondents, for the time-
honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects
between the parties. Petitioners therefore became owners of the one-half portion of the
lot in question by virtue of a sale which, though not evidenced by a formal deed, was
nevertheless proved by both documentary and parole evidence.

2. No. The Court held that Buctons' action has not prescribed. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabian, SC,
explained that, under the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since
the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title
to the purchaser, and that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to
remove the cloud upon the appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to
recognize the sale made by their predecessors. And that actions to quiet title to property
in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible

Miranda, Vienna Mae J.

 RODOLFO L. CORONEL vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ELIAS MERLAN, BRIGIDO MERLAN, JOSE MERLAN, TEODORICO NOSTRATIS, SEVERO
JECIEL SANTIAGO FERNAN and FORTUNATO OCAMPO
G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago
Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the CFI of Cavite. Coronel alleged that at the time he
purchased the subject parcel of land, the defendants were already occupying a portion thereof as
"tenants at will" and despite demands to vacate, the defendants failed and refused to move out.
The defendants denied that Coronel was the owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that
the lots they occupied is part of the 1/3 undivided share inherited from their deceased father and
that the plaintiff's claim of ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is fraudulent,
void, and without effect. Third-Party Defendant denied that they had something to do with the
fraudulent acts or illegal machinations which deprived the defendants of their share in the subject
parcel of land, and that what they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel. The
RTC ruled in favor of defendants and on appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. The records show
that Coronel bought Lot No. 1950-Aof the Naic Estate from Mariano Manalo without any mention
of the 1/3 share of the private respondents land. Consequently, there was a mistake when TCT
was issued to Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Coronel contends that the claim
of the private respondents over their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot No. 1950-A 25 years after the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio Manalo in 1950 and more than five (5) years
after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or
laches.

ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delay on the part of the private respondents to claim their 1/3
portion.

RULING:
NO. The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a reconveyance to
them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has not prescribed.As lawful possessors
and owners of the lot their cause of action falls within the settled jurisprudence that an action to
quiet title to property-in one's possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession of more
than 25 years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the private
respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to annul TCT accrued only in 1975
when they were made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that time that, the
statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against them. In the same
manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert their right over 1/3 of the disputed property. It
is shown that the private respondents is in possession of the 1/3 portion, exercising ownership
thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975 when the petitioner tried to remove them
by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire Lot. It was only at this point that private respondents
knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they
immediately resisted. The Registrar of Deeds of Cavite is ordered to segregate the 1/3 portion of
Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate (4,063 square meters) from the entire portion embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the heirs of
Gabriel Merlan over the disputed one-third portion and another new certificate of title over the
remaining two-thirds portion of the land in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
Miranda, Vienna Mae J.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO L. FERNANDEZ AND VIVENCIA B. FERNANDEZ vs HON. COURT
OF APPEALS AND ZENAIDA ANGELES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 83141 September 21, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:
On Nov 28, 1966, petitioners-spouses Florentino and Vivencia Fernandez and private
respondent Zenaida Angeles-Fernandez and the latter's husband Justiniano Fernandez
purchased in common a parcel of land with an area of 310 square meters. The vendors Torres
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of spouses Zenaida only. When Spouses Florentino
they were not included as vendees they confronted Zenaida who then executed an affidavit
acknowledging the sale to Spouses Florentino of a portion of the land consisting of 110 square
meters and the receipt of the consideration therefor in the amount of P5,500.00. A duplex building
was constructed occupied by Spouses Florentino and the other unit occupied by spouses
Zenaida. On Jan 26, 1970, Spouse Zenaida caused the issuance of TCT only in their name. On
Feb 26, 1976, Zenaida and Justiniano filed a petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal
partnership before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The couple prayed for judicial
approval of their compromise agreement wherein Justiniano waived all his rights to the conjugal
properties including the subject parcel of land. Court awarded the parcel of land to Zenaida. Later
she demanded that petitioners vacate the the lot awarded to her. Spouses Florentino filed an
action to quiet title and damages against Zenaida only. Petitioners filed the instant petition for
review contending that CA erred in not declaring them part owners of the lot in question despite
the fact that it is not disputed that they and Zenaida and Justiniano entered into an agreement
with the vendors-spouses Santos and Matilde de Torres that the subject land would be purchased
by them in common.

ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Florentino and Vivencia is entitled to a share of the land in question.

RULING:
YES. The affidavit executed by Justiniano and Zenaida acknowledged the sale of one-
third (1/3) portion of the land to spouses Florentino and the receipt by the former of the amount
of P5,500.00 as consideration thereof. The issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Zenaida
does not preclude Spouses Florentino from asserting their right of ownership over the land in
question. Time and again it has been ruled that the torrens system should not be used as a shield
to protect fraud. Moreover, prescription cannot be considered against petitioners who had been
in possession of subject premises from the time it was purchased from the de Torres spouses in
1967 and continue to possess the same under claim of ownership.
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the
deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But
where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect
of registration as to him. The torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442. As far as private respondent Zenaida Angeles and her
husband Justiniano are concerned, the non-registration of the affidavit admitting their sale of a
portion of 110 square meters of the subject land to petitioners cannot be invoked as a defense
because knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration.

Miranda, Vienna Mae J.

 SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMADSUAL and HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUAL vs
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, SPOUSES KAGUI ABDULA MACARAPAN and KAGUI
RAKMA MACARAPAN and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF COTABATO
G.R. No. 92557 September 27, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:
On Nov 14, 1988, Spouses Hadji filed a complaint against Spouses Kagui for "Quieting of
Title To Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages,
With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a
District at Cotabato City. Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city was impleaded as
a nominal party. on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification
of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack
of Jurisdiction." The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint that in order that an action
for quieting of title shall prosper, it is necessary that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to the property which is the subject-matter of the action. In the case at bar, plaintiffs have no legal
or equitable title to the land.

ISSUE:
Does the Spouses Hadji has legal or equitable title to the land in question and may file
an action to quiet title.

RULING:
YES. The Spouses Hadji has legal or equitable title to the land. In reading of the complaint,
it is alleged that petitioners are in "actual, continuous, and adverse possession" of the land in
question "since time immemorial" in the concept of owners. The complaint shows that it is an
action for quieting title. An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession
of the property. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner
of the property in question.
In Chacon, this Court considered the action to be one for quieting of title where the
plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession since time immemorial of the property in
question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a
certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.
Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title.
It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed,
one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under
the law.
Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property whereby petitioners claim to
have acquired title to the same by prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn
from the public domain and became property of private ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial
court that the action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute the same has
no cogent basis. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court
dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990 are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
records of the case are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Miranda, Vienna Mae J.

 SPOUSES VICENTE and LOURDES PINGOL vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO,
G.R. No. 102909 September 6, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan
described in TCT No. 7435. Later, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN
UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged
before a notary public. Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol immediately took
possession of the subject lot and constructed a house and started paying monthly installments up to 1972.
On 1984, Donasco died and had paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance
of P10,161.00. On Oct 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for "Specific Performance and
Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against the spouses Vicent. They averred that
after the death of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated legal rate of interest
thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter rebuffed their offer. defendants admitted the execution of the
aforementioned deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold and the preparation and approval of the subdivision
plan, but set up the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed;
(2) the deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the
assumption that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when Francisco died, he had not
fully paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the breach by Francisco the sale was deemed to
have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of Francisco after 1976 and by his heirs thereafter was by mere
tolerance of Vicente Pingol.

ISSUE:
Whether the action of quieting title has prescribed.

RULING:
No. The Court held that prescription cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is
aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible.
The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the
buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was
made upon the execution of the deed of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected when the private
respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that
he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his
demand for rescission was made either judicially or by a notarial act.
That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the
title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of
the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private
respondents and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered
ineffectiveThe rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is invaded or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real property, but not
in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute. Possession is a
continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. So it has been determined that an owner of real
property in possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or trespass which is
treated as successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued without interruption
for a length of time sufficient to affect a change of title as a matter of law.
Miranda, Vienna Mae J.