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SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, YOLANDA P.

LIONGSON
484 SCRA 452 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it is based. (Carpio-
Morales, J.)

A trial court’s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of the law violated, is not in
derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on
which it was based or the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court as long as the legal basis can
be inferred from the discussion in the decision.

Further, the requirement that the “decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it is
based” applies only to a decision of a court of justice covered by Art. VIII of the Constitution], not the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is not violative of the constitutional
requirement if the same can be inferred from the discussion of the decision.

FACTS: Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz and City Administrator Emma C. Luna
were held administratively liable for violation of the Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act in manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in
connection with the issuance of a permit to fence a lot.

Resolving in the affirmative, the Deputy Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1)
Month Salary. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in denying the
petition for certiorari

HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of the
Ombudsman, upon which its decision of May 8, 1999 was based, and which were cited by the
appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the evidence on record. Clearly,
the appellate court did not err in finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.

As for Bedruz and Luna's complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law
on which its decision was based, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
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which provides that ―[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ the same fails.

A trial court‘s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, ―is
not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly
state the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court‖ as long as the legal
basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision.

From the Ombudsman's decision, it can be gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19 of R.A.
No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4, paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No.
6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES), requiring public officials and employees to ―perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill,‖ ―act with justness and sincerity‖
and ―not [to] discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

When Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution shall be complied with by the courts.

Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

This constitutional provision applies only to cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A RESOLUTION IS ISSUED DENYING DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION AND STATING THE LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR like “the petition raised are factual or there is no
reversible error in the respondent’s court decision”, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner on the grounds that the
factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with that of the
Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals. This complies with the constitutional
requirement under Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12
months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
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(4) Even after the lapse----the court shall still decide without further delay.

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress,
submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.

FACTS: Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land
situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The
spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management
Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they
discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the
Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to
fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.
Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and
property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due
process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the
land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA
but were denied thus this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner?

RULING: YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents
have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines
the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose.
Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of
―forcible entry.‖ It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property
the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the
petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact
they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536
basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to
judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

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vs.
JUDGE MARYBELLE L. DEMOTMARINAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 8, LA TRINIDAD,
BENGUET,Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a consolidated administrative complaint against Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas (Judge

Demot-Mariiias), Presiding Judge, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, which stemmed
from (1) the judicial audit of the RTC- Branch 8 from March 30 to April 12, 2014, conducted by the
Audit Team of the Court Management Office (Team); and (2) the Indorsement from the Office of the
Chief Justice regarding the Letter from Ms. Lilia Nugal-Koh wherein the latter sought the intercession
of the Court for the speedy disposition of her case.

A.M No.14-10-339-RTC

Pursuant to Travel Order No. 32-2014 dated March 20, 2014, the judicial audit team conducted a
judicial audit in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, from March 30 to April
12, 2014. The Court is presided by herein respondent Judge Marybelle Demot-Mariñas.

On the basis of the records presented and actually audited by the Team, the subject court had a total
caseload of309 cases (135 criminal cases and 174 civil cases), with 157 cases submitted for decision
(47 criminal cases and 110 civil cases) which are already beyond the reglementary period to decide.

In a Memoradum dated October 3, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended to
the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno the following, to wit:

A. Hon. Marybelle Demot-Marifias, Presiding Judge, Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad,
Benguet, be DIRECTED to:

(1) CEASE arid DESIST from trying/hearing cases in her court, and to DEVOTE her time to (la) DECIDE
the one hundred fifty (150) cases [45 criminal cases and 105 civil cases] submitted for decision,
which are beyond the period to decide as provided by law, to wit:

(1-b) DECIDE the eight (8) cases submitted for decision although still within the reglementary period
to resolve, as of audit, to wit:

(2) FURNISH this Court copies of the decisions and/or resolutions related to the enumerated cases.
This Cease-and-Desist directive shall continue until the aforementioned 157 cases submitted for
decision and pending motions/incidents in the 17 cases shall have been finally decided/resolved by
Judge Marinas;
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(3) EXPLAIN in writing, within fifteen (15) dqays from notice, why no administrative sanction should
be taken against her for her failure to decide the aforementioned one hundred fifty (150) cases within
the mandatory period to decide.

B) The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator be directed to WITHHOLD the
salaries, allowances and other benefits of Judge Marybelle Demot Marinas, pending full compliance
with these directives; and

C) The Court Management Office be DIRECTED to prepare the necessary Administrative Order for
approval relative to the designation of an assisting judge in Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad,
Benguet, to specifically conduct hearings on all cases and attend to all interlocutory matters thereat,
but without prejudice to disposing of the same when circumstance/s warrant, such designation to
continue until further orders from this Court.

On April 7, 2015, as per recommendation of the OCA, the Court resolved to adopt the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.

In compliance with the Court's Resolution, in a Letter Transmittal dated June 4, 2015, Judge Demot-
Mariñas apologized to the Court for her failure to decide the cases within the reglementary period.
She, however, offered no explanation to such delay but nevertheless admitted her fault in the said
delay. She signified her intention to resign as she felt that she was no longer an effective member of
the judiciary. Attached with the Letter-Compliance is the Letter of Atty. Maribel Brillantes Macario
Pedro (Atty. Macario Pedro), Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet showing the partial
compliance to the court directives, to wit:

In a Resolution dated August 4, 2015, the Court referred the Letter dated June 4, 2015 of Presiding
Judge Demot-Mariñas to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

A.M. RTJ-16-2446

On February 27, 2013, the Office of the Deputy Court Administrator Raul Villanueva (DCA
Villanueva) received an indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice regarding the letter of Ms.
Nugal-Koh wherein the latter sought the intercession of the Court for the speedy disposition of her
case docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 95-SP-0086 entitled "Pedro Nugal, et al. v. Lilia Nugal-
Koh, et al.," which allegedly had been submitted for resolution for more than ten (10) years already at
the time of the complaint.

Acting on the said Letter, a 1st Indorsement dated March 4, 2013 was sent directing Judge Demot-
Mariñas to comment thereon. On June 5, 2013, another Letter from Ms. Nugal-Koh, addressed to the
Office of the Chief Justice, was received by DCA Villanueva's office again seeking assistance for the
immediate resolution of her case. Attached to the said Letter were the (1) Certification dated April 23,
2013 from Atty. Maribel B. Macario, Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet, attesting
that no decision was rendered yet in the subject case; and (2) another Letter from the Office of the
Chief Justice dated April 12, 2013, referring the letter dated February 13, 2013 of Ms. Nugal-Koh to
Judge Demot-Mariñas wherein the latter was requested to submit a feedback on the matter within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof.

Consequently, a 2nd Indorsement dated June 5, 2013 was sent to Judge Demot-Mariñas, reiterating
the earlier directive for her to comment on the status of Ms. Nugal-Koh's case, with a stem warning
that appropriate proceedings may be initiated against her for her inaction.

On September 17, 2013, the Office of DCA Villanueva again received a Letter dated September 11,
2013 from Ms. Nugal-Koh repeating her request regarding her case and appending a new certification
dated September 2, 2013 attesting that her case remained undecided. Thus, a 3rd Indorsement was
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sent to respondent judge regarding the matter with the information that initiation of administrative
proceedings against her was already being considered for her apparent delay in deciding the subject
case and her blatant disregard of directives relative thereto despite repeated orders.

In an Agenda Report dated February 18, 2014, the OCA found that Judge Demot-Mariñas indeed failed
to comply with the repeated directives from the Office of DCA Villanueva, and with the letter from the
Office of the Chief Justice requiring her to comment on the status of the subject case. Thus, the OCA
recommended that the report be treated as a formal administrative complaint against Judge Demot-
Mariñas for insubordination, inefficiency and neglect of duty.

In a Resolution dated June 2, 2014, the Court resolved to treat the OCA's Agenda Report dated
February 18, 2014 as a formal administrtive complaint against Judge Demot-Marifias for Inefficiency
and Neglect of Duty. In addition, the Court also required respondent to explain why she should not be
held administratively liable for her failure to comply with the repeated directives to comment on the
status of Special Proceedings Case No. 95-SP-0086. The Court, likewise, directed respondent to
comment and submit a report on the status of the above-mentioned case.

In a Resolution dated November 26, 2014, the Court referred the Letter dated September 11, 2014 of
Ms. Nugal-Koh to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. As contained therein, Ms.
Nugal-Koh said that as of July 9, 2014, no decision has been rendered by respondent Judge Demot-
Mariñas in her case as certified by Atty. Macario Pedro, Branch Clerk of Court.

In a Memorandum dated December 1, 2015, the OCA recommended that: (1) the two (2) instant
administrative matters be consolidated; and (2) respondent Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas be
found guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and gross inefficiency and be dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.

On February 17, 2016, as per recommendation of the OCA, considering the similarity of the issues of
both cases, the Court resolved to consolidate the instant administrative complaints against
respondent Judge Demot-Mariñas.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance
of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.1

Here, there is no question as to the guilt of Judge Demot-Mariñas. As shown by the records, she has
been remiss in the performance of her responsibilities. She failed to decide cases and resolve pending
incidents within the reglementary period, without any authorized extension from this Court.
Respondent judge failed to: (1) decide 150 cases submitted for decision [45 criminal cases and 105
civil case] which are beyond the period to decide, and to (2) resolve the pending motions/incidents in
17 cases [2 criminal cases and 15 civil cases]. 2Some of the cases were already submitted for decision
since 2002, particularly Civil Case No. 2831 and Civil Case No. 2217. 3More appalling is that she did
not give any reason/explanation for her failure to comply with the reglementary period for deciding
cases. There were, likewise, no previous requests by her for extension of time to decide said cases.
Thus, in the instant case, Judge Demot-Mariñas' gross inefficiency is, therefore, evident in her undue
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delay deciding 150 cases within the reglementary period and her failure to resolve pending
motions/incidents in 17 cases.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months
within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and
decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down the guidelines in SC
Administrative Circular No. 134which provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges shall observe scrupulously the
periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of
all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts, while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-995which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. 6

This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate. Respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards
of duty and responsibility that her position required. As a trial judge, Judge Demot-Mariñas is a
frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all times acted with efficiency and with probity. 7

A.M. RTJ-16-2446

We likewise find similarly concerning is Judge Demot-Mariñas' indifference to the indorsements

requiring her to comment on the accusations against her. In all three (3) indorsements issued by the
OCA, as well as one (1) Letter from the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Demot-Mariñas ignored the
directives for her to file the required comment since no comment or compliance has been submitted
despite several opportunities given to her which ran in a span of more than three (3) years. Also, as
per verification by the OCA of the status of Special Proceedings No. 95-SP-0086, as of December
2015, Judge Demot-Mariñas has yet to decide the case which was already submitted for decision
since May 12, 2003. It is then apparent that failure to comment despite several directives, as well as
the failure to comply with the immediate resolution of Ms. Nugal-Koh's letter, show her propensity to
disregard and disobey lawful orders of her superior.

We would like to further stress that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests, but should be
complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, Judge Demot-Mariñas' unexplained disregard of the
orders of the OCA for her to comment on the complaint shows her disrespect for and contempt, not
just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the OCA. Her indifference to, and disregard of, the directives
issued to her clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will not tolerate. 8

We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court
is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is verbalized
in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:9

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and
enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in
the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
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The obligation to uphold the dignity of her office and the institution which she belongs to is also found
in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01, which mandates a judge to behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Under the circumstances, We can thus conclude that the conduct exhibited by Judge Demot-Mariñas
constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against the Court's authority. Her conduct also reveals
her deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by her failure to heed
our warnings and directives.

We cannot tolerate this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the judiciary can
only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the
public office they are holding. Judges should avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or
diminish the authority of the Supreme Court. 10Clearly, Judge Demot-Mariñas' attitude, as shown by
her unexplained failure to decide 150 cases as well as motions and incidents, and her failure to
respond to any of the court's directives despite several reminders, betray her lack of concern for her
office. In sum, Judge Demot-Mariñas has been remiss in the performance of her official duties
exacerbated by her audacious stance in defying this Court's orders. We cannot tolerate the attitude of
respondent judge in defying this Court's authority and undermining its integrity.

Penalty

The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. 11Further, Judge Demot-Mariñas' deliberate and
repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA constitutes Gross Misconduct which is a
serious offense under Section 8,12Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

In Re: Audit Report in Attendance of Court Personnel of RTC, Branch 32, Manila, 13We held that it
is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit
indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint
thoroughly and substantially. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak
in character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful order and directive.

Likewise, in Alonto-Frayna v. Astih,14a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to
comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination, and was
dismissed from service.1âwphi1

Judging by the foregoing circumstances, the Court can only conclude that Judge Demot-Mariñas is
guilty of gross inefficiency resulting in her unexplained failure to resolve pending cases and motions
within the reglementary period despite several reminders and follow-ups, and gross misconduct for
her non-compliance with the directives/orders of the OCA and this Court.

In this scenario, Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if the
respondent judge is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be
that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating
circumstances.15The most serious of the charges against respondent judge is her gross misconduct,
and her gross inefficiency is considered an aggravating circumstance.

We would have imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on Judge Demot-Mariñas, however,
considering that on December 10, 2015, she has filed her certificate of candidacy to run for public
office, she is now deemed resigned from judicial office. Nevertheless, cessation from office by reason
of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against her at the time
that she was still in the public service. 16Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal for her unethical
conduct and gross inefficiency in performing her duties as a member of the bench, We, however,
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impose instead the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits. Furthermore, she is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Mariñas, former Presiding Judge of

Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct and Gross
Inefficiency. Her retirement benefits, if any, are declared FORFEITED as penalty for her offenses,
except accrued leave credits, in lieu of dismissal from service which the Court can no longer impose.
She is likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN … Complainant

vs
PRESIDING JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, ETC … Respondent

RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF THEN JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is a petition for judicial clemency filed by Victoria Villalon-Pomillos (respondent), former
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malolos City, Bulacan, through a letter 1 dated
December 28, 2016.

The Facts

On July 7, 2009, the Court rendered a Decision, 2 dismissing respondent from service, after having
been found guilty of gross misconduct, i.e., borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before
her court, aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders, and violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives, and circulars. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos City, is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
(borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court) which is also a gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay in
rendering decision or orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. She
is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon
service on her of this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her office and her authority to act as
judge is considered automatically terminated.
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SO ORDERED.3

On August 8, 2016, respondent filed a Petition for Absolute Pardon from 'Dismissal from the Service
Sentence'4 accompanied by a letter5 dated August 4, 2016 addressed to the Office of the President
(OP), which was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for appropriate action. 6 In a
Resolution7 dated November 8, 2016, the Court denied the said petition for being an improper
pleading.

Meanwhile, on November 3, 2016, respondent also filed a letter 8 addressed to the OCA, informing the
OP's transmittal of her petition for judicial clemency to the Court, and requesting that the same be
subject for judicial review and, consequently, the subject Decision be reversed in her favor. The Court,
in a Resolution9 dated November 29, 2016, noted the said letter without action.

On December 28, 2016, respondent filed another letter, 10 reiterating her plea for judicial clemency.
Respondent insists that she has endured almost eight (8) years of unfounded punishment as the
charges and findings against her were based on mere gossip. 11Likewise, she cites the Court's
exoneration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, begging that the same privilege be
extended to her in the spirit of Christmas.12

The Court's Ruling

Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge. 13 It can be
granted only if there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable.14

Proof of remorse and reformation is one of the requirements to grant judicial clemency. As held by the
Court in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency:15

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
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4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, records are bereft of showing that respondent has exhibited remorse for her past
misdeeds, which occurred more than eight (8) years ago. Apart from respondent's submission to the
Court's disciplinary authority, there were no signs of repentance showing that at the very least, she
accepted the judgment of the Court in her case. In fact, she even sees nothing wrong with her
actions. In her petition, respondent narrates that she "stood her ground against offers of bribery for
her to agree to issue orders that would give a go signal to the anomalous Bullet Train Project of Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo."17 She even touts herself as a judge who committed "honest acts and
deeds,"18 and submits that the only way to give her justice is through absolute pardon. 19 In this
relation, she firmly insists that she was unduly deprived of her fundamental rights under the
constitution when she was unceremoniously disrobed, raising doubts as to the integrity and
impartiality of the court process.

Likewise, respondent points out that the charge of borrowing money from a litigant, for which she was
dismissed, occurred more than fourteen (14) years ago and, at that time, she had a very "slim
chance"20 of borrowing money since: (a) her "salary as a judge was substantially big enough
compared against other employees or lawyers or businessman"; 21 and (b) both her parents are
lawyers who left her "substantial real and personal property that would easily be sufficient for her and
her children to live for a lifetime." 22 She claims the same of her late husband who was "well-off' and
landed thus, making the act imputed against her unbelievable.23

Far from exhibiting remorse and reformation, the tenor of respondent's petition only demonstrates her
attitude of impenitence, self-righteousness, and even, vindictiveness, which unquestionably renders
her undeserving of judicial clemency. Neither did she show compliance with the other requisites for
judicial clemency as cited above. Accordingly, there is no quibble that the instant petition should be
denied.

The Court, in numerous cases, has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against
members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. 24 Judicial
clemency is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time, 25 as the Court will grant it
only if there is a showing that it is merited.26 Verily, clemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. 27

WHEREFORE, the petition for judicial clemency is DENIED.

 Page 12 of 38

R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. DAVID, respondents

Re: Corpus vs. Cuaderno: Corpus was an employee of the Central Bank who was illegally dismissed. He filed a case against the
government his lawyer is Atty. Juan david knowing that Corpus has no money. David said “I will be very happy if you remember me
if we win this case”. David represented him up to the SC. In 1965, submitted a 350 pages Brief. Has a backwages of over a half
million. David wrote corpus asking for 50% as atty’s fees. David filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City, he won. Corpus went to
CA but CA said David is entitled of 50%. Corpus went to SC. David being 85 y/o asked the RTC to issue a writ of execution which
was granted for him to get his atty’s fees. Corpus went to SC saying that there is no need to wait for their decision because if you are
going to decide in 2 years as if you are affirmed the lower court decision on appeal.

SC was forced to decide it and gave only 25%.(innominate contract is the basis of attorney David to claim his attorney’s fee.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 14, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 40583-R, affirming the decision of the court of Instance of Manila,
Branch V. dated september 4, 1967, in Civil Case no. 61802 entitled "Juan T. David,plaintiff, versus R.
Mariano Corpus, defendant', for the recovery of attorneys fees for professional services rendered by
the plaintiff, private respondent herein, to defendant, petitioner herein.

Having been close friends, aside from being membres Civil Liberties Union, petitioner Corpus
intimately calls respondent David by his nickname "Juaning" and the latter addresses the former
simply as "Marino".

The factual setting of this case is stated in the decision of the lower court, thus:

It appears that in March, 1958, the defendant was charged administratively by several employee of
the Central Bank Export Department of which the defendant is the director. The defendant was
represented by Atty. Rosauro Alvarez. Pending the investigation and effective March 18, 1958, he
defendant was suspended from office. After the investigating committee found the administrative
charges to be without merit, and subsequently recommended the immediate reinstatement of the
defendant, the then Governor of Central Bank, Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., recommended that the
 Page 13 of 38

defendant be considered resigned as on the ground that he had lost confidence in him. The Monetary
Board, by a resolution of July 20, 1959, declared the defendant as resigned as of the date of
suspension.

On August 18, 1959, the defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injuction and
damages against Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., the Central Bank and Mario Marcos who was appointed to the
position of the defendant, said case having been docketed as Civil Case No. 41226 and assigned to
Branch VII presided over by Judge Gregorio T. Lantin. On September 7, 1959, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the petition, alleging among other grounds, the failure of the defendant to exhaust,
available administrative remedies (Exh. X). On September 25, 1959, the defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez,
filed his opposition to the said motion. On March 17, 1960, during the course of the presentation of
the evidence for the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, Atty. Alvarez manifested
that the defendant was abandoning his prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
asked for a ruling on the motion to dismiss. On June 14, 1960, Judge Lantin dismissed Civil Case No.
41226 for failure to exhaust she administrative remedies available to the herein defendant.

On June 24, 1960, Atty. Alverez received a copy of the order of dismissal It was at this state that the
plaintiff entered into the case under circumstances about which the parties herein have given
divergent versions.

According to the plaintiff, six or seven days prior to the expiration of the period for appeal from the
order of dismissal, he chanced to meet the late Rafael Corpus, father of the defendant, at the Taza de
Oro coffee shop. After they talked about the defendant's having lost his case before Judge Lantin, and
knowing that the plaintiff and the defendant were both members of the Civil Liberties Union, Rafael
Corpus requested the plaintiff to go over the case and further said that he would send his son, the
herein defendant, to the plaintiff to find out what could be done about the case. The defendant called
up the plaintiff the following morning for an appointment, and the plaintiff agreed to am him in the
latter's office. At said conference, the defendant requested the plaintiff to handle the case because
Atty. Alvarez had already been disenchanted and wanted to give up the case. Although at first
reluctant to handle the case, the plaintiff finally agreed on condition that he and Atty. Alverez would
collaborate in the case.

The defendant's version of how the plaintiff came into the case is as follows:

After the order of dismissal issued by Judge Lantin was published in the newspapers, the plaintiff
sought a conference with the defendant at Taza de Oro, but the defendant told him that he would
rather meet the plaintiff at the Swiss Inn. Even before the case was dismissed the plaintiff had shown
interest in the same by being present during the hearings of said case in the sala of Judge Lantin
When the plaintiff and the defendant met at the Swiss Inn, the plaintiff handed the defendant a
 Page 14 of 38

memorandum prepared by him on how he can secure the reversal of the order of dismissal by means
of a formula stated in said memorandum. During the said occasion the plaintiff scribbled some notes
on a paper napkin (Exhibit 19). On June 28, 1960, the defendant wrote the plaintiff, sending with it a
copy of the order of Judge Lantin dated June 14, 1960 (Exhibit S Inasmuch as said letter, Exhibit S
already mentions the 'memorandum' of the plaintiff, the defendant contends that it was not six or
seven days prior to the expiration of the period of appeal (which should be on or about July 2 or 3,
1960) but on a date even earlier than June 28, 1960 that the plaintiff and the defendant met together
to discuss the latter's case.

Laying aside for the moment the true circumstances under which the plaintiff started rendering
professional services to the defendant, the undisputed evidence shows that on July 7, 1960, the
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal under the joint signatures of the
plaintiff and Atty. Alverez (Exhibit B). The plaintiff argued the said motion during the hearing thereof
On August 8, 1960, he file a 13-page 'Memorandum of Authorities in support of said motion for
reconsideration (Exhibit C). A 3-page supplemental memorandum of authorities was filed by the
plaintiff on September 6, 1960 (Exhibit D)

On November 15, 1960, Judge Lantin denied the motion for reconsideration. On November 19, 1960,
the plaintiff perfected the appeal from the order of dismissal dated June 14, 1960. For purposes of
said appeal the plaintiff prepared a 232-page brief and submitted the same before the Supreme Court
in Baguio City on April 20, 1961. The plaintiff was the one who orally argued the case before the
Supreme Court. In connection with the trip to Baguio for the said oral argument, the plaintiff used his
car hich broke down and necessitated extensive repairs paid for by the plaintiff himself.

On March 30, 1962, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision reversing the order of dismissal and
remanding the case for further proceedings. On April 18, 1962, after the promulgation of the decision
of the Supreme Court reversing the dismissal of the case the defendant wrote the plaintiff the
following letter, Exhibit 'Q'. .

xxxxxxxxx

Dear Juaning

Will you please accept the attached check in the amount of TWO THOUSAND P2,000.00) PESOS for
legal services in the handling of L-17860 recently decided by the Court? I wish I could give more but
as yu know we were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimburse my backstage I had
been wanting to offer some token of my appreciation of your legal fight for and in my behalf, and it
was only last week that I received something on account of a pending claim.

Looking forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, I remain

 Page 15 of 38

Sincerely yours, Illegible

xxxxxxxxx

In a reply letter dated April 25, 1962, the plaintiff returned the check, explaining said act as follows:

April 25, 1962

My dear Marino:

Yesterday, I received your letter of April 18th with its enclosure. I wished thank you for your kind
thoughts, however, please don't take offense if I have to return the check. I will explain.

When I decided to render professional services in your case, I was motivated by the value to me of
the very intimate relations which you and I have enjoyed during the past many years. It was nor
primarily, for a professional fee.

Although we were not fortunate to have obtained a decision in your case which should have put an
end to it. I feel that we have reason to be jubilant over the outcome, because, the final favorable
outcome of the case seems certain irrespective of the length of time required to terminate the same.

Your appreciation of the efforts I have invested in your case is enough compensation therefor,
however, when you shall have obtained a decision which would have finally resolved the case in your
favor, remembering me then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will make me happier by just
keeping the check.

Sincerely yours,

JUANING

xxxxxxxxx

When the case was remanded for further proceedings before Judge Lantin, the evidence for the
defendant was presented by Atty. 'Alvarez with the plaintiff cooperating in the same-'On June 24,
1963, Judge Lantin rendered his decision in favor of the defendant declaring illegal the resolution of
the Monetary Board of July 20, 1959, and ordering the defendant's reinstatement and the payment of
his back salaries and allowances - The respondents in said Civil Case No. 41226 filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the herein plaintiff. The said decision was appealed by the
respondents, as well as by the herein defendant with respect to the award of P5, 000. 00 attorney's
feed The plaintiff prepared two briefs for submission to the Court of Appeals one as appellee (Exhibit
 Page 16 of 38

H) and the other as appellant (Exhibit H-1). The Court of Appeal however, certified the case to the
Supreme Court in 1964.

On March 31, 1965, the Supreme Court rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Court of
first Instance of Manila.

On April 19, 1965 the plaintiffs law office made a formal de command upon the defendant for
collection of 50% of the amount recovered by the defendant as back salaries and other emoluments
from the Central Bank (Exhibit N). This letter was written after the defendant failed to appear at an
appointment with the plaintiff so that they could go together to the Central Bank to claim the
possession of the office to which the defendant was reinstated and after a confrontation in the office
of the plaintiff wherein the plaintiff was remanding 50% of the back salaries and other emoluments
amounting to P203,000.00 recoverable by the defendant. The defendant demurred to this demand
inasmuch as he had plenty of outstanding obligations and that his tax liability for said back salaries
was around P90,000.00, and that he expected to net only around P10,000.00 after deducting all
expenses and taxes.

On the same date, April 19,1965 the plaintiff wrote the Governor for of Central Bank requesting that
the amount representing the sack salaries of the defendant be made out in two one in favor of the
defendant and the other representing the professional fees equivalent to 50% of the said back
salaries being claimed by the plaintiff (Exhibit 8). F to obtain the relief from the Governor of Central
Bank, the plaintiff instituted this action before this Court on July 20, 1965 (Emphasis supplied).

As therein defendant, herein petitioner Marino Corpus filed in August 5, 1965 an answer with counter-
claim. On August 30, 1965, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein, filed a reply with
answer to the counterclaim of petitioner.

After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment on September 4, 1967, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P30,000.00 in the concept of professional fees, and to pay the costs (pp. 112-113, CA Record on
Appeal p. 54, rec.)

After receipt on September 7, 1967 of a copy of the aforequoted judgment, petitioner Marino Corpus,
defendant therein, filed on October 7, 1967 a notice of appeal from said judgment to the Court of
Appeals. In his appeal, he alleged that the lower court erred:

1. In not holding that the plaintiff's professional services were offered and rendered gratuitously;
 Page 17 of 38

2. Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to compensation — in holding that he was entitled to attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00 when at most he would be entitled to only P2,500.00;

3. In not dismissing plaintiff's complaint; and

4. In not awarding damages and attorney's fees to the defendant (p. 2, CA Decision, p. 26, rec.)

Likewise, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein, appealed to the Court of Appeals on
October 9, 1967 assigning one error, to wit:

The lower court erred in ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff only the sum of P30,000.00 in the
concept of attorney's fees (p. 1, CA Decision, p. 25, rec.).

On February 14, 1975, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court, with costs against petitioner Marino Corpus (Annex A, Petition for
Certiorari, p. 25, rec.)

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner — contending that the respondent Court
of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner accepted private respondent's services "with the
understanding of both that he (private respondent) was to be compensated" in money; and that the
fee of private respondent was contingent (pp. 3 & 5, Petition for Certiorari, pp. 17 & 19, rec.).

On October 1, 1975, the case was deemed submitted for decision (p. 177, rec.), after the parties filed
their respective memoranda.

On January 31, 1978, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed a petition to remand the case to the
court a quo for execution of the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 61802, dated September 4, 1967,
alleging that said decision is already deemed affirmed pursuant to Section 11(2), Article X of the New
Constitution by reason of the failure of this Tribunal to decide the case within 18 months. Then on July
7, 1978, another petition to remand the case to the lower court to execution was filed by herein
private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed with The court a quo a motion dated
September 13, 1978 for the issuance of a writ of execution of the lower court's decision in the
aforesaid civil case, also invoking Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution. In an order dated
September 19, 1978, the lower court, through Judge Jose H. Tecson, directed the issuance of a writ of
execution. The writ of execution was issued on October 2, 1978 and a notice of garnishment was also
issued n October 13, 1978 to garnish the bank deposits of herein petitioner Marino Corpus in the
Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Makati Branch.
 Page 18 of 38

It appears that on October 13, 1978, herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
September 19, 1978 order. Private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on October 19, 1978 an
opposition to said motion and herein petitioner filed a reply on October 30, 1978. The lower court
denied said motion for reconsideration in its over dated November 7, 1978.

It appears also that in a letter dated October 18, 1978, herein petitioner Marino Corpus requested this
Court to inquire into what appears to be an irregularity in the issuance of the aforesaid garnishment
notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, by virtue of which his bank deposits were
garnished and he was prevented from making withdrawals from his bank account.

In OUR resolution of November 3, 1978, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David and the
Commercial Bank and Trust Company to comment on petitioner's letter, and for the bank to explain
why it did not honor petitioner's withdrawals from his bank deposits when no garnishment order has
been issued by the Supreme Court. This Court further inquired from the lower court whether it has
issued any garnishment order during the pendency of the present case.

On November 27, 1978, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company filed its comment which was noted
in the Court's resolution of December 4, 1978. In said resolution, the Court also required Judge Jose H.
Tecson to comply with the resolution of November 3, 1978, inquiring as to whether he had issued any
garnishment order, and to explain why a writ of execution was issued despite the pendency of the
present case before the Supreme Court.

Further, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David Lo explain his failure to file his comment,
and to file the same as directed by the resolution of the Court dated November 3, 1978. Private
respondent's compliance came on December 13, 1978, requesting to be excused from the filing of his
comment because herein petitioner's letter was unverified. Judge Tecson's compliance was filed on
December 15, 1978, to which herein petitioner replied on January 11, 1979.

In OUR resolution dated January 3, 1979, WE set aside the order of Judge Jose H. Tecson dated
September 19, 1978, the writ of execution as well as the notice of garnishment, and required private
respondent Atty. Juan T. David to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure
to file his comment as directed by the resolution of the Court dated December 4, 1978, and for filing a
motion for execution knowing that the case is pending appeal and review before this Court Likewise,
the Court required Judge Jose H. Tecson to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
issuing an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution and for issuing such writ despite the
pendency of the present case in the Supreme Court.

On January 12, 1979, Judge Jose H. Tecson filed his compliance explanation as directed by the
aforesaid resolution of January 3, 1979, while private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on January
 Page 19 of 38

30, 19 79 his compliance and motion for reconsideration after the Court has granted him an extension
of time to file his compliance.

Private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on February 28, 1979, a petition praying that the merits of
his compliance be resolved by the Court en banc. Subsequently, on March 26, 1979, another petition
was filed by herein private respondent asking the Chief

Justice and the members of the First Division to inhibit themselves from participating in the
determination of the merits of his compliance and for its merits to be resolved by the Court en banc.

The main thrust of this petition for review is whether or not private respondent Atty. Juan T. David is
entitled to attorney's fees.

Petitioner Marino Corpus contends that respondent David is not entitled to attorney's fees because
there was no contract to that effect. On the other hand, respondent David contends that the absence
of a formal contract for the payment of the attorney's fees will not negate the payment thereof
because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an implied understanding between
the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney's fees when a final
decision shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in
the Central Bank and paying his back salaries.

WE find respondent David's position meritorious. While there was express agreement between
petitioner Corpus and respondent David as regards attorney's fees, the facts of the case support the
position of respondent David that there was at least an implied agreement for the payment of
attorney's fees.

Petitioner's act of giving the check for P2,000.00 through his aforestated April 18, 1962 letter to
respondent David indicates petitioner's commitment to pay the former attorney's fees, which is
stressed by expressing that "I wish I could give more but as you know we were banking on a SC
decision reinstating me and reimbursing my back salaries This last sentiment constitutes a promise to
pay more upon his reinstatement and payment of his back salaries. Petitioner ended his letter that he
was "looking forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, ... to which the certiorari-
mandamus-quo warranto case was remanded by the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

Moreover, respondent David's letter-reply of April 25, 1962 confirms the promise of petitioner Corpus
to pay attorney's fees upon his reinstatement and payment of back salaries. Said reply states that
respondent David decided to be his counsel in the case because of the value to him of their intimate
 Page 20 of 38

relationship over the years and "not, primarily, for a professional fee." It is patent then, that
respondent David agreed to render professional services to petitioner Corpus secondarily for a
professional fee. This is stressed by the last paragraph of said reply which states that "however, when
you shall have obtained a decision which would have finally resolved the case in your favor,
remembering me then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will make me happier by just
keeping the check." Thereafter, respondent David continued to render legal services to petitioner
Corpus, in collaboration with Atty. Alverez until he and Atty. Alvarez secured the decision directing
petitioner's reinstatement with back salaries, which legal services were undisputedly accepted by,
and benefited petitioner.

Moreover, there is no reason to doubt respondent David's assertion that Don Rafael Corpus, the late
father of petitioner Corpus, requested respondent to help his son, whose suit for reinstatement was
dismissed by the lower court; that pursuant to such request, respondent conferred in his office with
petitioner, who requested respondent to handle the case as his lawyer, Atty. Alvarez, was already
disenchanted and wanted to give up the case; and that respondent agreed on the case. It would have
been unethical for respondent to even offer his services when petitioner had a competent counsel in
the person of Atty. Alvarez, who has been teaching political, constitutional and administrative law for
over twenty years.

Likewise, it appears that after the Supreme Court affirmed on March 31, 1965 the order of the lower
court reinstating petitioner Corpus with back salaries and awarding attorney's fees of P5,000.00,
respondent David made a written demand on April 19, 1965 upon petitioner Corpus for the payment
of his attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 50% of what was paid as back salaries (Exh. N p. 75,
Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. 61802). Petitioner Corpus, in his reply dated May 7, 1965 to the
aforesaid written demand, while disagreeing as to the amount of attorney's fees demanded, did not
categorically deny the right of respondent David to attorney's fees but on the contrary gave the latter
the amount of P2,500.00, which is one-half (½) of the court-awarded attorney's fees of P5,000.00,
thus impliedly admitting the right of respondent David to attorney's fees (Exh. K, p. 57, Folder of
Exhibits, Civil Case No. 61802).

It is further shown by the records that in the motion filed on March 5, 1975 by petitioner Corpus
before the Court of Appeals for the reconsideration of its decision the order of the lower court
granting P30,000.00 attorney's fee's to respondent David, he admitted that he was the first to
acknowledge that respondent David was entitled to tion for legal services rendered when he sent the
chock for P2,000.00 in his letter of April 18, 1962, and he is still to compensate the respondent but
only to the extent of P10,000.00 (p. 44, rec.). This admission serves only to further emphasize the
fact that petitioner Corpus was aware all the time that he was liable to pay attorney's fees to
respondent David which is therefore inconsistent with his position that the services of respondent
David were gratuitous, which did not entitle said respondent to compensation.
 Page 21 of 38

It may be advanced that respondent David may be faulted for not reducing the agreement for
attorney's fees with petitioner Corpus in writing. However, this should be viewed from their special
relationship. It appears that both have been friends for several years and were co-members of the
Civil Liberties Union. In addition, respondent David and petitioner's father, the late Rafael Corpus,
were also close friends. Thus, the absence of an express contract for attorney's fees between
respondent David and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the payment of attorney's fees,
considering their close relationship which signifies mutual trust and confidence between them.

II

Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of the
innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one
shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." innominate contracts have been elevated to
a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be
regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of obligations and
contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the
people. The rationale of this article was stated in the 1903 case of Perez vs. Pomar (2 Phil. 982). In
that case, the Court sustained the claim of plaintiff Perez for payment of services rendered against
defendant Pomar despite the absence of an express contract to that effect, thus:

It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for the employment
of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was entered into but
whethertheplaintiffsservicesweresolicitedorwhethertheywereoffered to the defendant for his
assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must
consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise
to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the
bilateral obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the
service rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).

xxxxxxxxx

... Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez rendered to Pomar
services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon
the defendant, he having accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation therefor, by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des implicitly established.

xxxxxxxxx

... because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should permitted to enrich himself to the
damage of another" (emphasis supplied; see also Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 388, Vol.
 Page 22 of 38

IV 119621, citing Estate of Reguera vs. Tandra 81 Phil. 404 [1948]; Arroyo vs. Azur 76 Phil.
493119461; and Perez vs. Pomar. 2 Phil. 682 [1903]).

WE reiterated this rule in Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (73
SCRA 564 [1976]) citing the case of Perez v. Pomar, supra thus:

Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted by the latter, in the
absence of proof that the service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a
reasonable remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should be
permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another (emphasis supplied).

Likewise, under American law, the same rule obtains (7 CJS 1079; FL Still & Co. v. Powell, 114 So 375).

III

There was no contract for contingent fee between Corpus and respondent David. Contingent fees
depend on an express contract therefor. Thus, "an attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the
amount recovered by his client in the absence of an express contract to that effect" (7 C.J.S. 1063
citing Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 66, 128 Neb. 141).

Where services were rendered without any agreement whatever as to the amount or terms of
compensation, the attorney is not acting under a contract for a contingent fee, and a letter by the
attorney to the client stating that a certain sum would be a reasonable amount to charge for his
services and adding that a rate of not less than five percent nor more than ten would be reasonable
and customary does not convert the original agreement into a contract for a contingent fee (7 C.J.S.
1063 citing Fleming v. Phinizy 134 S.E. 814).

While there was no express contract between the parties for the payment of attorney's fees, the fact
remains that respondent David rendered legal services to petitioner Corpus and therefore as
aforestated, is entitled to compensation under the innominate contract of facio lit des And such being
the case, respondent David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.

IV

In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent David as compensation for his services, on a
quantum meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
particularly the following:

The extent of the services rendered by respondent David should be considered together with the
extent of the services of Petitioner's other counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, It is undisputed that Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez had rendered legal services as principal counsel for more shall six (6) years while
 Page 23 of 38

respondent David has rendered legal services as collaborating counsel for almost four (4) years. It
appears that Atty. Alvarez started to render legal services after the administrative case was filed on
March 7, 1958 against petitioner Corpus. He represented petitioner Corpus in the hearing of said case
which was conducted from May 5, 1958 to October 8, 1958, involving 56 sessions, and this resulted in
the complete exoneration by the Investigating Committee of all the charges against the petitioner. It
appears further that after the Monetary Board, in its resolution of July 20, 1959, declared petitioner
Corpus as being considered resigned from the service, Atty. Alvarez instituted on August 18, 1958
Civil Case No. 41126 in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the setting aside of the aforestated
resolution and for the reinstatement of petitioner Corpus. Atty. Alvarez actively participated in the
proceedings.

On the other hand, respondent David entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner Corpus
sometime after the dismissal on June 14, 1960 of the aforesaid civil case. From the time he entered
his appearance, both he and Atty. Alvarez rendered legal services to petitioner Corpus in connection
with the appeals of the aforementioned civil case to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court.
The records disclose that in connection with the appeal from the June 14, 1960 order of dismissal,
respondent David prepared and signed pleadings although the same were made for and on behalf of
Atty. Alvarez and himself And it is not far-fetched to conclude that all appearances were made by both
counsels considering that Atty. Alverez was the principal counsel and respondent David was the
collaborating counsel. Thus, when the case was called for oral argument on April 20, 1961 before the
Supreme Court, respondent David and Atty. Alverez appeared for petitioner Corpus although it was
David who orally argued the case.

When the Supreme Court, in its decision of March 30, 1962, remanded the case to the lower court for
further it was Atty. Alverez who conducted the presentation of evidence while respondent David
assisted him The records also review that respondent David prepared and signed for Atty. Alverez and
himself. certain pleadings, including a memorandum. Moreover, after the lower court rendered
judgment on June 2 4, 1963 ordering the reinstatement and payment of back salaries to petitioner
Corpus and awarding him P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, both petitioner Corpus and the
respondents in said case appealed the judgment. At that stage, respondent David again prepared and
signed for Atty. Alvarez and himself, the necessary pleadings, including two appeal briefs. And in
addition, he made oral arguments in the hearings of motions filed in the lower court before the
records of the case were forwarded to the appellate court. Furthermore, while it appears that it was
Atty. Alvarez who laid down the basic theory and foundation of the case of petitioner Corpus in the
administrative case and later in the civil case, respondent David also advanced legal propositions.
Petitioner Corpus contends that said legal propositions were invariably rejected by the courts. This is,
however, of no moment because the fact remains that respondent David faithfully rendered legal
services for the success of petitioner's case.
 Page 24 of 38

The benefits secured for petitioner Corpus may also be considered in ascertaining what should be the
compensation of respondent David. It cannot be denied that both Atty. Alvarez and respondent David
were instrumental in obtaining substantial benefits for petitioner Corpus which consisted primarily of
his reinstatement, recovery of back salaries and the vindication of his honor and reputation. But, note
should also be taken of the fact that respondent David came at the crucial stage when the case of
petitioner Corpus was dismissed by the lower court.

Atty. Rosauro Alvarez admittedly was paid by petitioner Corpus the sum of P20,000.00 or at most
P22,500.00 (T.s.n., Jan. 11, 1967, pp. 34-35; T.s.n., Feb. 10, 1967, pp. 48-49). On the other hand,
petitioner Corpus, after WE suggested on August 15, 1975 that they settle the case amicably has, in
his September 15, 1975 pleading filed before this Court (p. 166, rec.), manifested his willingness to
pay P10,000.00 for the services of respondent David. However, respondent David has not manifested
his intention to accept the offer.

In his complaint in the instant case, he asked for P75,000.00 as his attorney's fees. The records reveal
that petitioner Corpus actually received only P150,158.50 as back salaries and emoluments after
deducting taxes as well as retirement and life insurance premiums due to the GSIS. The amount thus
claimed by respondent David represents 50% of the amount actually received by petitioner Corpus.
The lower court, however, awarded only P30,000.00 and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Considering the aforestated circumstances, WE are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation
of respondent David should be P20,000.00.

WE find private respondent Juan T. David and Judge Jose H. Tecson, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch V, guilty of contempt of court.

Respondent David filed on or about September 13, 1978 a motion with the court a quo for the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision in Civil Case No 61802, subject of the present
petition, knowing fully well that it was then still pending appeal before this Court. In addition, no
certification that the aforesaid decision is already deemed affirmed had as yet been issued by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution; because
respondent David's petitions filed with the Supreme Court on January 31, 1978 and on July 7, 1978 to
remand the case to the trial court for execution and for the issuance of such certification had not yet
been acted upon as the same were still pending consideration by this Court. In fact, this Court has not
as of this time made any pronouncement on the aforesaid provision of the New Constitution.

This act of respondent David constitutes disrespect to, as well as disregard of, the authority of this
Court as the final arbiter of all cases duly appealed to it, especially constitutional questions. It must
 Page 25 of 38

be emphasized that as a member of the Philippine Bar he is required "to observe and maintain the
respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers" (Section 20 (b), 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court). Likewise, Canon 1 of. the Canons of Professional Ethic expressly provide that: "It is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judgement office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." And this
Court had stressed that "the duty of an attorney to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering
no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold'" (Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967] citing the case of Lualhati v. Albert, 67 Phil. 86, 92
[1932]).

Moreover, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that herein respondent David, in the previous
case of Integrated Construction Services, Inc. and Engineering Construction, Inc. v. Relova (65 SCRA
638 [1975]), had sent letters addressed to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal and later to
the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, requesting for the issuance of certification on the basis of the
aforementioned provision of the New Constitution which were not given due consideration. And
knowing this, respondent David should have been more prudent and cautious in g with the court a
quo any motion for execution.

Furthermore, there was even a taint of arrogance and defiance on the part of respondent David in not
filing his comment to the letter- complaint dated October 18, 1978 of petitioner Corpus, as required
by this Court in its November 3, 1978 and December 4,1978 resolutions which were duly received by
him, and instead, he sent on December 13, 1978 a letter requesting to be excused from the filing of
his comment on the lame excuse that petitioner's letter-complaint was not verified.

On the part of Judge Jose H. Tecson, his presumptuous and precipitate act of granting the motion for
execution of dent David likewise constitutes disrespect to, as well as of, the authority of this Court
because he know for a that the case was still pending apply as the had not yet been remanded to it
and that no certification has been issued by this Court. As a judicial officer, Judge Tecson is charged
with the knowledge of the fact that this Court has yet to make a definite pronouncement on Section
11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution. Judge Tecson should know that only the Supreme
Court can authoritatively interpret Section 11 (2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Yet, Judge
Tecson assumed the role of the Highest Court of the Land. He should be reminded of what Justice
Laurel speaking for the Court, has said in People v. Vera (65 Phil 56, 82 [1937]):

A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy
in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judged system of the nation.

It may also be added that the improvident act of respondent David in firing the motion for execution
and the precipitate act of Judge Tecson in issuing the writ of execution are intriguing as they invite
suspicion that there was connivance between the two. Respondent David would seem to imply that
 Page 26 of 38

his claim for attorney's fees should be given preference over the other cams now pending in this
Court. Certainly, such should not be the case because there are cases which by their nature require
immediate or preferential attention by this Tribunal like habeas corpus cases, labor cases and c cases
involving death sentence, let alone cases involving properties and property rights of poor litigants
pending decision or resolution long before the New Constitution of 1973. Nobility and exempt
forbearance were expected of Atty. David, who is old and experienced in the practice of the legal
profession, from which he has derived a great measure. of economic well-being and independence

Consequently, the filing of the motion for immediate tion and the issuance of the writ of execution
constitute a defiance and usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As a disciplinary
measure for the preservation and vindication of the dignity of this Supreme Tribunal respondent Atty.
Juan T. David should be REPRIMANDED for his precipitate action of filing a motion for execution as well
as Judge Jose H. Tecson for his improvident issuance of a writ of execution while the case is pending
appeal before the Supreme Court, and a repetition of said acts would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER R. MARINO CORPUS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN
T. DAVID THE SUM OF TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.

RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID AND JUDGE JOSE H. TECSON OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH V, ARE HEREBY DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND ARE HEREBY REPRIMANDED,
WITH A WARNING THAT REPETITION TION OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR ACTS WILL BE DEALT WITH MORE
SEVERELY.

COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

SO ORDERED.

DIONISIO MALACORA, and LUCIA, MARABULAS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO LIBARNES and RODRIGO LIBARNES, respondents.

Is the 24 months period mandatory – SC said that is impossible to comply with because decisions of the Sandiganbayan,
COMELEC will be elevated to the SC,decisionof lower court involving question of law be elevated to SC so how can they cope
up.

SC: Not mandatory, it is merely discretionary.

Decision must clearly and distinctively states the fact or the law applicable.
 Page 27 of 38

DE CASTRO, J.:

Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified the judgment of the
trial court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Butuan City. the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, questioned orders of June 27,1978 and August 1, 1978, as wen as the writ of execution
of October 7, 1974, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale are hereby annuled
and set aside, with costs against the private respondents." 1

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the following facts as set forth therein are undisputed:

On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6, entitled "Dionisio
Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes", the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the herein defendants
RODRIGO LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the herein plaintiffs DIONISIO MALACORA and
LUCIA MARABULAS the total amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00)
PESOS for onehalf of all the coconut trees and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the banana
plants said plaintiffs planted on the defendants' land and after payment of said amounts their
tenancy relation will be considered as terminated and the said plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender
and leave their tenanted holding.

Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay their
one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the improvements as herein above
ordered.

Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which modified the
judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the petitioners
are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the coconut trees which the private
respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to costs.

After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the respondent court, plaintiffs,
private respondents herein, filed a motion for execution. Acting on the motion, the respondent court,
on September 20, 1974, entered an order of execution; and on October 4, 1974, the Clerk of Court
issued a writ of execution which commanded petitioners 'to pay plaintiffs Dionisio Malacora and Lucia
Marabulas the total amount of P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees planted by the plaintiffs.

On October 30, 1974, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte enforced the writ of
execution by levying upon the property of petitioners herein, located in Bo. Mabini, Municipality of
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Sur. In the ensuing auction sale conducted on December 16, 1974, the
property was sold for the sum of P3,500.00 to private respondents, who were then issued the
corresponding certificate of sale.
 Page 28 of 38

As petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption, the respondent sheriff on February 21,
1976, executed a final deed of sale in favor of private respondents.

On May 12, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession, which
motion was opposed by petitioners on the ground 'that the writ of execution did not conform to the
judgment of the trial court as modified by the decision of this Honorable Court of August 27, 1973,'
The above motion was resolved by the respondent court in the questioned order of May 12, 1977 in
this wise:

This is a motion for the issuance of writ of possession on the ground that defendants, the losing party,
refuse to surrender the possession of the property subject of execution of which the Sheriff's final
Deed of Sale has already been issued in favor of plaintiffs. On record is also a motion in opposition to
the issuance of the writ.

In going over the case, we find that the decision of this Court granted unto plaintiffs the sum of
P2,595.00 corresponding to one-half of P5,190.00 which is the total valuation of the 213 fruit bearing
coconut trees at P20.00 per tree (P4,260.00) and 62 non-bearing coconut trees at P15.00 per tree
(P930.00).

On appeal, the valuation was modified by the Court of Appeals to P8.00 per coconut tree, be it fruit
bearing or not. The total number of trees is 275. Multiply this by P8.00 we get a result of P2,200. One
half of this is P1,100. There is then a difference of P1,495.00 of what ought to have been executed
and of what was actually executed which was P2,595.00.

This Court feels that this variance in amount is not sufficient to cancel and/or declare as null and void
an otherwise regular and lawful execution proceedings undertaken by the Sheriff. A simple restitution
would better serve the ends of justice than have us follow the complexities of technical rules of
procedure and of law (Sec. 16, PD 946).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiffs are hereby ordered to restore/return and/or reimburse
unto defendants the sum of P1,495.00 within 15 days from receipt of this Order.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order, and after due hearing, the
respondent court modified the said order as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated May 12, 1977, is hereby modified as follows:

1. Ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his Deputy to place plaintiffs in effective
possession of the above-described property as owners thereof,

2. Ordering plaintiffs to reimburse the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIFTY FIVE PESOS and 50/100
(P1,055.50) unto defendants within a period of Thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.

Thereafter, petitioners filed the instant petition. 2

The issue raised for Our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ of
execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale and the sheriff's final deed of sale, and the orders of June 27
and August 1, 1978 in CAR Case No. 6 Agrarian '68 as annulled and set aside.

The writ of execution is supposed to be to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 Page 29 of 38

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut tree for one-half of all the coconut trees which the
private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to cost. 3

The variance between the writ of execution and the final judgment of the court of Appeals sought to
be enforced is at once noticeable. On the basis of the judgment to be executed, the amount to be
paid by the private respondents to petitioners should be only P1,100.00, the value of 1/2 of the 275
coconut trees planted, at the rate of P8.00 a tree already fruit bearing or not. The writ of execution
fixed the value at P2,184.00. Not being in accordance with the judgment to be enforced, in a very
substantial manner, the writ of execution was correctly set aside as a nullity by the respondent Court
of Appeals, properly acting on the authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Gutierrez, et al. 4

The dispositive portion of decision controls in execution of judgment. 5

Consequently, the judgment appealed from must be sustained, being fully supported by
jurisprudential authority on the matter treated therein.

Furthermore, the records show that despite the Resolution of this Court of June 11, 1980 requiring the
parties to submit their memorandum simultaneously within thirty (30) days from notice, after the
petition was given due course, the petitioner failed to file their memorandum, while the private
respondents filed their own. The petitioners, as the appellants, should feel more under obligation to
file his memorandum, just like the appellant in an ordinary appeal, which would be dismissed for
failure to file the appellant's brief.

Under the provision of Article X, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution which provides for a period of
eighteen (18) months within which an appealed case should be decided by this Court, the appealed
decision may also be deemed affirmed, this case having been submitted for decision on October 8,
1980. I wish to go on record that I am personally for applying the aforesaid provision with due respect
to my colleagues, who may have a different view.

During my first days in January, 1979 in the Supreme Court, I had occasion to bring up, while the
Court was in session en banc, the question of why the aforementioned provision has not been
implemented despite the lapse of so long a period as more than six (6) years, at the time, from the
effectivity of the New Constitution. The answer given was that the constitutional provision referred to
is merely directory, not mandatory, and furthermore, the court was not then in its full strength of
fifteen (15) members.

We have since May 14, 1982, been brought to the full membership of (15) justices, including the Chief
Justice, as provided by the Constitution. We have heard that both the President and the Batasan
Pambansa have taken the view that the provision is mandatory. This is, too, the view of the Court of
Appeals which, while I was still there, had already started to draft internal rules for the
implementation of the cited constitutional provision and had, some years ago, already approved said
rules. Actual application of the said internal rules was, however, held in abeyance in deferrence to the
Supreme Court which has not seemed as eager to avail of the benefits as envisioned by the provision.

I have always felt very strongly, and more so now, for the reasons above stated, that the provision of
Article X, Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been complied with
immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution. This has always been my position, basically,
on the legal principle that all provisions of the Constitution which direct specific acts to be done, or
prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed as mandatory. To construe them as merely
directory would be to thwart the intention of the Constitution which, its command being of the highest
order should, under no circumstance, be permitted if they are the 'great ordinances' as Justice Holmes
had caned the provisions of the Constitution (Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Island, 27
U.S. 189, 216 [1928].
 Page 30 of 38

The provision in question states:

Section 11. (1) Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or
matter shall be decided or solved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen (18) months for
the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve (12) months for an inferior
collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other inferior courts.

(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the applicable
maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision or resolution
because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be
deemed affirmed except in those cases where a qualified majority is required and in appeals from
judgment of conviction in criminal cases; and in original special civil actions and proceedings for
habeas corpus, the petition in such cases shall be deemed dismissed; and a certification to this effect
signed by the chief magistrate of the court shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record
of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the plain language of the provision, the Constitution could not have intended anything but full
and immediate compliance therewith. The manifest purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the
disposition of cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice
delayed is justice denied." It would, at the same time, ease up the clogged dockets of the courts,
which had long presented a problem that defies solution, despite the striving of this Court in constant
quest of one.

To begin with, it is, to me, not correct to say that it is impossible to comply with the provision of
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. There is nothing hard to just follow its simple mandate of
considering an appealed decision affirmed if no decision is rendered before the lapse of time limit set
therefor. What may be impossible is for the Supreme Court, for example, to decide a case on the
merit within the eighteen (18) months given to it from its submission for decision, because so many
other appealed cases had already accumulated and will increasingly do so, as long as We do not
apply the clear mandate of the Constitution. It is precisely with full cognizance of this fact-the
impossibility of avoiding delays in disposing of appealed cases on the merits-that prompted the
adoption of this special remedy by no less than the Constitution because similar time limitations as
provided by mere statutes, without an alternative prescription of what would be the effect of failure to
meet the deadline, had been held merely directory. To hold the Constitutional provision as also merely
directory would render it nugatory, because the unmistakable and clear intent of the framers would
be put to naught. The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision in case of failure to decide or
resolve within the time limit is precisely the alternative prescription, believed to' better serve the
cause of justice than waiting, no n-latter how long, for a decision on the merit.

This may be illustrated with a case in which a money award is made in favor of the plaintiff. By
applying the Constitution, the appealed decision is deemed affirmed if no decision is rendered within
the applicable maximum period allowed. Without the constitutional provision, it may take many years
more from the lapse of that period before decision is actually rendered on the merits. If statistics
showing that 95% more or less, of the appealed cases to this Court are affirmed is accurate, the
appealled decision would, in all probability, be affirmed, if decision on the merits is rendered. The
injustice caused by the delay becomes instantly patent when it is considered that if the award is paid
earlier, the money would have a greater purchasing value than when it is paid years later. This is due
to inflation which had long since gripped the whole world so tightly and unrelentingly as the
Constitutional Convention was obviously aware of, for which it saw the need of inserting the unique
and novel provision in the new Constitution, as a much needed extraordinary remedy.

Under Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, eight (8) votes are required for a decision of the Court
en banc, five (5) votes, for a decision of a Division. If the necessary vote is not obtained, the petition
is dismissed, and the appealed decision, order or resolution is then deemed affirmed. This is what
 Page 31 of 38

happens when this Court acts on the case within the period fixed in Section 11 of Article X of the
Constitution, but fails to obtain the necessary vote. From this observation, it becomes apparent that
to hold the provision of Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution as only directory would make said
provision serve no purpose at all, because notwithstanding the lapse of the applicable maximum
period without a decision or resolution having been rendered, the case may nevertheless still be
decided on the merit, as if the provision did not exist.

It seems to me crystal clear that the Constitution intends that aside from the way an appealed
decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed because of lack of necessary vote under Section 2 of
Article X, the same effect is contemplated by reason of the lapse of the period fixed without the case
being decided on the merits. If however, the maximum periods fixed in Section 11, which is the real
core of said provision, its heart and soul, as it were, may be disregarded, because the provision is
merely directory, We would be attributing to the framers of the Constitution, with all their vision and
wisdom, an act of colossal absurdity. They have inserted a new provision which would have no
different effect than what is already covered by Section 2 of the same Article, thus rendering Section
11 a complete surplusage. Only by holding that Section 11 is of mandatory character would such an
absurdity be avoided, as both Section 2 and Section 11 would each be given distinct Identity
achieving a common objective but through two different and separate ways: (1) the necessary vote
could not be had, under Section 2, and (2) the period fixed had lapsed, under Section 11.

It is elementary that all parts of a statute, and this should be more so of the Constitution, should be
given effect and made to serve its own distinct purpose, as no useless provision or one without any
purpose at all could have been intended to be made part of, or incorporated in, the law. This is
actually what had happened with Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution on its being considered as
merely directory, not mandatory. There has been, to my knowledge, never any instance where
Section 11 had been applied despite that it has been in the Constitution for more than nine (9) years
now. This is unheard of with reference to no less than a constitutional mandate.

Examining how the provision works with the Court of First Instance, a one-man court, not a collegiate
court, may help in reaching the correct construction Of the provision in question. If the Court of First
Instance fails to decide the case within the 3-month period given it, what happens? If the case is an
ordinary civil action, there is no provision that after the lapse of the 3-month period this case would
be dismissed. What the provision of Section 11, paragraph 2, makes specific mention of are only (1)
appealed cases and (2) original special civil actions. In a one-man court, the condition, "because the
necessary vote could not be had" has no application. If the period has lapsed without the decision or
resolution being rendered, that is all that is required for the appealed decision to be deemed affirmed,
or the original special civil action, dismissed, if the provision in question is to be given meaning and
purpose.

What the above observation proves is that all that paragraph 2 of Section 11 requires for the
appealed decision to be deemed affirmed and original special civil actions, dismissed, is that the
applicable maximum period has lapsed without the decision of the merits being rendered, because of
failure to act on the. case and put it to a vote, not that it was put to a vote, but "the necessary vote
could not be had." This phrase would thus appear to be either a mere surplusage or as merely
descriptive of how a decision is reached in the Supreme Court, where alone that phrase has
application. It cannot apply to the Court of Appeals, because there the necessary votes can always be
had for a decision to be reached, just like in the oneman Court of First Instance, as long as the Court
acts. What the Constitution has in and, therefore, is "inaction" on the part of the court during the
applicable period, as the reason or cause for the failure to render a decision or resolution within the
applicable period, not that "the necessary vote cannot be had.

If the arguments thus far presented is not enough to support the view that the provision in question is
mandatory, not merely directory, We need not go outside of the text of the provision to look for
perhaps the argument that will end all arguments. The express mention by Section 11 itself of
 Page 32 of 38

exceptions to the automatic affirmance of appealed decisions, orders or resolutions when not
reversed or modified within the prescribed period, namely, (1) cases where a qualified majority is
required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in c cases, which even after the lapse of the
fixed period may still be decided on the merits, clearly, means under the maxim "expressio inius est
exclusio alterius," that aside from the exceptions expressly mentioned, all other cases may no longer
be decided on the merits after the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The appealed decision,
order and resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall then be so certified by the chief magistrate
of the court, as provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of Section 11. Said provision would be
rendered also useless by holding Section 11 merely directory because the occasion for the
certification will never arise. It will thus be seen that the exceptions expressly mentioned in the
provision and the certification required thereby as just pointed out, argue most eloquently and
convincingly in favor of the mandatory character of Section 11 of Article X of the New Constitution.

It may have to be stressed that in any case where, by operation of the constitutional provision, the
appealed decision, again for example, of the Court of Appeals, is deemed affirmed by the Supreme
Court, because the latter has not been able to decide the appeal on the merits within the prescribed
period, no member of the Court is meant to be singled out for any culpability or dereliction of duty.
Neither is any adverse reflection meant to be made against the Court as a whole, because there is in
the Constitution an implicit recognition of the probability of many appealed cases not being decided
or resolved within the period as short as that prescribed, not because of culpable neglect, inefficiency
or incompetence of any member of the Court or of the Court itself as a body, but because of sheer
physical impossibility. A contrary view which to me is completely unfounded, seems to be what has
created a very strong influence towards holding the provision as merely directory, to avoid incurring
in some form of guilt or culpability for not deciding an appealed case within the time limit set.

Another deterrent, as has been perceived during our deliberation, to holding the provision in question
as mandatory, is the fear that an our decisions already rendered reversing or modifying the appealed
decisions afterthe lapse of the period prescribed, would be questioned even at this late hour. I do not
share in this fear because to me, what the provision does is to give a party the right to invoke its
mandate and enjoy its beneficial effects. As all rights go, the particular right to demand for the
certification of the Chief Magistrate that the appealed decision is deemed affirmed by the lapse of the
specified period without a decision on the merits having been rendered, is waivable, and is deemed
waived if not invoked within a reasonable time from notice of the questioned decision. At least, the
Supreme Court can come up with this ruling, should a case be brought up to raise the question as
above intimated, a ruling, I believe, would be impressed with absolute rationality and soundness.

In any event, what should engage the Court's attention is to work out a procedure that would avoid,
as much as possible, having to apply the automatic affirmance as provided in the Constitution. I am
convinced of the possibility of the adoption of such a workable procedure.

The Constitution provides that the conclusion of the Court shall be reached in consultation before the
case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court (Section 8, Article X). Setting
a case for that required consultation can reasonably be done within just months from its submission
for decision, long before the lapse of the applicable period. This same case had already been
discussed among the members, and dismissing it or giving due course to it is not so difficult a matter
to determine. Either of these actions is usually taken in the session when the agenda in which the
new petition is placed is discussed just one day or so after the new cases are assigned to the
members for report and recommendation as to what action to take. There should perhaps be less
difficulty in reaching the final conclusion when, after a long period of study, and with the aid of briefs
and/or memoranda, the Court next sits in consultation to reach its decision. It is seldom that the
taking of the vote of each member on the issue to be resolved has not been held forthwith, following
the consultation or exchange of view. After the voting, the case is actually decided on the merits, or
the appealed decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed by operation of the Constitution,
depending on the result of the voting.
 Page 33 of 38

If this procedure is adopted, no unnecessary delay need be incurred in. What really takes some time
is the writing of the decision by the ponente who is chosen after a final conclusion is reached,
because most often if not always, he has many other opinions to write. But if by appropriate
Resolution, which may be just a Minute Resolution, it would be made of record that in that session
when the voting was held after the required consultation, the Court had reached its conclusion the
case has, in fact, been already decided, at least for the purpose of compliance with the Constitution.
The decision complete with the opinion as written by the ponente chosen for the purpose may be
actually released later, as indeed, there have been instances when decisions were promulgated
without prejudice to the writing of the extended opinion.

It is believed that under the procedure as roughly described above, but with the finer details to be
laid down, the disposition of any case in this Court can take place well within the period fixed by the
Constitution, specially if greater strictness is observed in giving due course to every petition filed with
this Court, which at times tends to be quite liberal in this regard.

As to the original special civil actions including habeas corpus, my recollection fails me as to whether
any such kind of action has not been disposed of on the merits within the applicable period. In any
event, all that the Constitution mandates with respect to original special civil actions is that the
petitions in such cases shall be deemed dismissed if the necessary vote cannot be had within the
period fixed, which as previously explained, is actually another way of saying that no decision has
been rendered. And to repeat, no culpability is intended to attach to anyone of the Court for the
happening of this eventuality.

I really see no impossibility in complying with what the Constitution intends to be an urgently needed
remedy to avoid injustice, as earlier stated, under the well-known dictum that 'justice delayed is
justice denied," at the same time helping solve the vexing problem of clogged dockets. Why, indeed,
can We not just consider the appealed decision as affirmed, as the Constitution so unequivocally
ordains, if, by reason of physical impossibility, which would free the Court on any of its members from
any fear of guilt or culpability, a decision of the appeal on the merits within the period considered by
the Constitution long enough for an appealed case to remain unresolved may not be rendered? Is it
because a decision is the correct decision only when We, ourselves, render that decision on the merits
when the case is brought to Us on appeal? Who knows but that had there been a court higher than
the Supreme Court, the latter's decision may also be reversed or altered? Many a time a judgment of
a Court of First Instance was reversed by the Court of Appeals, but when an appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and that the lower court sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, and the instant petition, dismissed, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr.

121 SCRA 51 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Period to Resolve a Case from Date of Submission – Promulgation vs
Rendition of Judgment – Constitutional Period to Decide not Mandatory
 Page 34 of 38

FACTS: Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution finished presenting
evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for
time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until
September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.

On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his decision bears the same date of
November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the
court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower
courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of the memoranda by
the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on
the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the
decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November
28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.

The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the reckoning date because
the same necessarily comes at a later date.

Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?

Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this constitution, the
maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall
be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In
practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely
directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory will only be
detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the
prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
 Page 35 of 38

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April
30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as
guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed
by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included.1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their
evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent
rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has
no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the decedent, when she made the
donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two
adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the deed of donation contained no
express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net
estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod
ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na
BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang
lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng
mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay
hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng
aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6
 Page 36 of 38

The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under
Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a
lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to
suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if
that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion
that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's
estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious
The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule
announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is
categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by
the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we
held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been recorded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987
Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy
disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being
taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

• A & B - Sections 1-8
• Constitutional Commissions independent with the Constitution:
1. CSC
2. COMELEC
3. COA
They are INDEPENDENT:
-They can only be removed by impeachment.
-In the performance of their duties, they are allowed to promulgate rules.
-Their decisions could only be elevated to the SC on certiorari within 30 days unless a law provide otherwise.(under rule 43:
Decision of the CSC should be appealed to the CA.)
-The power to appoint their employees.
-Cannot decrease their salaries.
 Page 37 of 38

IX – A : Requirement to be appointed as Chairman:

-College Graduate but with proven capacity for public administration.

TWO MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE CSC:

1. The power to approve or disapprove appointments in government office.(all branches, agencies, subdivisions,
instrumentality of the government including GOCC with original charter)

Two sets of government corporations:

a. GOCC with original charter – appointment be approved by the CSC. Cases be filed at the CSC.

b. GOCC in accordance with BP 68 (Corporation Code) – no original charter and not covered by the CSC. Cases be filed to the
NLRC as if you are an employee in a private corporation.

2. Power to ratify or reject appointments.

•It must always be based on Merit and Fitness as far as practicable through examination except if the position that you are
being appointed is:

a. Highly technical
b. Policy Determining
c. Primarily Confidential

Government employees cannot be removed except with just cause and due process. But if you belong to the 3
exception, you can be removed anytime.

CSC VS. MAGNAYE

• The former mayor appointed you in an ordinary position. Election cam, he lost. Can the new mayor dismiss you
because you are just a probationary employee?

• SC said whether probationary or permanent, still entitled to security of tenure. They can only remove you through
when there are just causes and due process.

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case brought before it…Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the SC on Certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt thereof.

NOTE: Section 1, Rule 43 allows the Court of Appeals to have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC in accordance
with RA 7902)
 Page 38 of 38

Section 2, Article IX-B. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government owned and controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

[2] Appointments in the CS shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical,
by competitive examination.

[5] The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

Policy determining is one charged with laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that head of a
department.

Primarily confidential position is one denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office
but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or
betrayals of the personal trust on confidential matters of the state (Example: Chief Legal Counsel of the PNB, Besa vs. PNB, 33
SCRA 330)

Highly technical position requires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior
degree.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the government or any government owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

a. Government and controlled corporations

These cases were decided under the 1973 constitution where it was held that employees of government owned and
controlled corporations, with or without charters are within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under the 1987
Constitution, there is now a distinction and only those with original charters shall be under the CSC while those created
under the Corporation Code are not.

b. Checking function of the CSC

DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289

Diosdado Macapagal was elected and they were trying to appoint those belonging to their parties during the election.
He wanted to change all city engineers including the city of Baguio. Can he do that? Yes if the position is highly technical
because there is no security of tenure.

Question before the SC: Is the position of the City Engineer of Baguio highly technical?

SC says “the position of city engineer of Baguio if technical but not highly technical.”