G.R. No.

164527 15 August 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring
the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP,
among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted
by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc.
(RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the
Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.
If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and
construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the
design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the
issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO
No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been
turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:

Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner

Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use

Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain

Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP

Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and
on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation
project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency
(NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project
for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the
DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that
originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.

The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.

Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39
that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and
disposable lands under the BOT law.

Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it
may deem appropriate.

There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain
Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on
May 18, 1992.

RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the
lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any
qualified person.

This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and
Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in
question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner,
being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.

-------------------------------------------------

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB

GR No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?

(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant
to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their
enjoyment:

a) The right to breathe clean air;

b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development;

c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the
decision-making process;

d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;

e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice
of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;

f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;

g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel
the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of
a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the
issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these
cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs
to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

--------------------------------------------------------
Social Justice Society, et. al. vs. Honorable Jose Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 156052

Facts:

Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are
engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing and marketing of petroleum products. Petitioners sought to compel
Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was enacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and became effective upon approval by
Mayor Atienza. This ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial to commercial and directed the owners to cease and desist from
operating their business within 6 months. Among the business is the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil companies intervened in the
issue attacking the validity of the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or not

Held:

Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the area which many were put into danger, the Manila Municipal Office shall do its
ministerial duty to protect all property and health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities. The court ordered the transfer of
Pandacan Terminal within a non extendible period of 90 days. The life of the people shall be the utmost priority of the government in terms of its
security, though the business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.

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WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16

Facts:

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
ordinance

They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government
Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was
distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15]
and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No.
0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial
spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive,
and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the
30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the
motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general
welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to
enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements,
namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it
satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the
ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that
are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given
the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of
three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period
under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of
police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being
confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that
amounts to taking without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of
the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty
equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law
demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation
by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality
among equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on
substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1)
discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition
against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents
and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial
distinction?We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual
spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the
community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In
the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Principles:

Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.

Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property