1.
LBP vs CA and PASCUAL
Facts: Private respondent Pascual owned three (3)
parcels of land located in Cagayan covered by TCT. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed these
lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
EO 228 - Hence, the formula for computing the Land
Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn
lands is 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
In compliance with EO 228, the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) of the DAR in an "Accomplished
OLT Valuation Form No. 1" dated 2 December 1989
recommended that the "Average Gross Productivity"
(AGP) based on "[3] Normal Crop Year" for Parcels 1 and
2 should be 25 cavans per hectare for unirrigated lowland
rice and 10 cavans per hectare for corn land.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (SAR) also conducted its own valuation
proceedings apart from the PARO. On 10 October 1990
Secretary Benjamin T. Leong of the DAR using the AGP
of 25.66 cavans for unirrigated rice lands and requiring
herein petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
pay the amount. On 1 February 1991 petitioner LBP
approved the valuation.
After receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD,
private respondent accepted the valuation. However,
when the judgment became final and executory,
petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of
PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay thus forcing private
respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the
PARAD which the latter issued on 24 December 1992.
Still, petitioner LBP declined to comply with the order.
Petitioner LBP remained adamant in its refusal to pay
private respondent. It reiterated its stand that the PARAD
had no jurisdiction to value lands covered by PD 27.
Again, petitioner LBP rejected the directive of Secretary
Garilao. Petitioners Executive Vice President, Jesus Diaz,
then sent a letter to Secretary Garilao arguing that (a) the
valuation of just compensation should be determined by
the courts; (b) PARAD could not reverse a previous order
of the Secretary of the DAR;[15] and, (c) the valuation of
lands under EO 228 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the DAR and not of the DARAB.
Issue: Who has the authority to determine land valuation.
WON the valuation of just compensation should be
determined by the courts
Ruling: Thus, petitioners contention that Sec. 12, par. (b),
of PD 946 is still in effect cannot be sustained. It seems
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in issuing
Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing the
DARAB to refrain from hearing valuation cases involving
PD 27 lands. For on the contrary, it is the DARAB which
has the authority to determine the initial valuation of
lands involving agrarian reform[30] although such
valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final
determination of just compensation is vested in the
courts
2. GABATIN VS CA [G.R. No. 148223. November virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of palay at
25, 2004] that time was at P35. Prescinding from the foregoing
Facts: Petitioners Gabatin were registered owners of discussion, the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which
three parcels of rice land situated in Sariaya, Quezon, was the GSP at the time of the taking of the subject
under separate certificates of titles. properties.
In 1989, the properties, pursuant to the Land Reform
Program of the Government as defined under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 228, were placed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under its Operation Land
Transfer (OLT). The properties were distributed to
deserving farmer beneficiaries through the issuance of
emancipation patents.
Issue : Whether just compensation in kind (palay) at the
time of the taking of the properties shall be appraised at
the price of the commodity at the time of the taking or at
the time it was ordered paid by the SAC?
Ruling: The taking of private lands under the agrarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceeding. In computing the just
compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the
value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time
of the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into
consideration. Then in determining the value of the land
for the payment of just compensation, the time of taking
should be the basis. In the instant case, since the dispute
over the valuation of the land depends on the rate of the
GSP used in the equation, it necessarily follows that the
GSP should be pegged at the time of the taking of the
properties.
In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was
deemed effected on 21 October 1972, when the petitioners
were deprived of ownership over their lands in favor of
qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by
3. LBP vs NATIVIDAD
Facts: On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a
petition before the trial court for the determination of
just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in
Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the
government pursuant to PD 27. The petition named as
respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of
court, the petition was amended to implead as co-
respondents the registered tenants of the land.
The court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioners and against respondents, ordering
respondents, particularly, respondents Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to
pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the
subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform
program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per
square meter, as the just compensation due for payment
for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or
Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also
ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and
to pay the cost of suit.
DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its
Order[5] dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the
same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the
prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled.
Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and
the assailed Decision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order
Dated 30 July 1996,[6] citing excusable negligence as its
ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were
two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include
in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was
due to accident and/or mistake
The trial court, in its Order of November 18, 1996, denied
the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in
law due to its own negligence.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have
sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their
properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial
court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in
declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 are
mere guidelines in the determination of just
compensation, and in relying on private respondents
evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of
possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of
the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Issue: WON there is contradiction between DARs
primary jurisdiction and the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over just
compensation.
Ruling: There is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation.
Primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in
a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts.
Section 17 of RA 6657, provides the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
Meneses vs DAR
Facts:
Petitioners were co-owners pro-indiviso of an irrigated
rice land in Barangay Batasan, San Miguel, Bulacan,
measuring 60.8544 hectares and registered in the name
of their grandparents, the spouses Ramon Meneses and
Carmen Rodriguez-Meneses. On October 21, 1972, the
property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27).
On July 16, 1993, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 13, a complaint for
determination and payment of just compensation.
Petitioners alleged that from the time the land was
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries in 1972 up to the time
of the filing of the complaint, no payment or rentals has
been made, and titles have already been issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners also alleged that the fair
market value of the property is P6,000,000.00
The DAR Secretary, on the other hand, alleged that the
valuation of the property was pursuant to the Operation
Land Transfer under P.D. No. 27 and the reckoning date
should be at the time of the taking of the property, i.e.,
October 21, 1972.
Lastly, the DAR claimed that the filing of the case is
premature since there is no valuation yet made by the
DAR based on E.O. No. 228, and petitioners must
cooperate with the DAR by submitting all the necessary
papers for proper valuation and expeditious payment of
the land. The DAR also claimed that it must first
determine the valuation before resort to the court can be
made.
Thereafter, in an Order dated June 22, 1994, the RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
According to the RTC, the determination of just
compensation must first be filed with the DAR and not the
Special Agrarian Court.
On October 5, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for
determination and payment of just compensation with the
DARAB. The DARAB, however, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide valuation cases covered by P.D. No. 27, as the
same is within the exclusive administrative powers of the
Office of the Secretary.
Issue: W/n PD 27 or RA 6657 is applicable in this case
Held:
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court deems it
more equitable to apply the ruling in the Natividad case.
In said case, the Court applied the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 in computing just compensation for property
expropriated under P.D. No. 27, stating, viz.:
Land Bank's contention that the property was
acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD
27, ergo just compensation should be based on
the value of the property as of that time and not at
the time of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang,
Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
seizure of the landholding did not take place on
the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take
effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case,
the agrarian reform process is still incomplete
as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering
the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA
6657) before the completion of this process,
the just compensation should be determined
and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD
27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
xxxx
land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor's value and the volume and value of its
produce. This Court is convinced that the trial
court correctly determined the amount of just
compensation due private respondents in
accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence.
As previously noted, the property was expropriated under
the Operation Land Transfer scheme of P.D. No. 27 way
back in 1972. More than 30 years have passed and
petitioners are yet to benefit from it, while the farmer-
beneficiaries have already been harvesting its produce
for the longest time. Events have rendered the
applicability of P.D. No. 27 inequitable. Thus, the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 should apply in this case.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just

compensation based on the guideline provided by
PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure
to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO
228, is especially imperative considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial,
full and ample.

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just

compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated
Lubrica vs Land Bank of the Philippines
Facts:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee of Federico
C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located
at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area
of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326) of the Registry of Deeds of
Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said
property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed
under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (1972) and Executive Order No. 228
(1987). The land was thereafter subdivided and
distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of
the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited
in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and
Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a
parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-
128[6] of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro,
consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of
165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2
was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only
128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued
the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties,
hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for determination of just
compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed
the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for
the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and
P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-
128).
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17,
2003, two separate petitions[8] for judicial determination
of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339
for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT
No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly
ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally
determined by the PARAD as there is no law which
prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the
final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there
is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit
considering that the DAR already took possession of the
properties and distributed the same to farmer-
beneficiaries as early as 1972.
W/n the value of the realties should be computed as of
the time of payment or when PD 27 took effect?
Held: In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of
their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just
compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already
subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries
thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their
use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly
inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the
just compensation using the values at the time of the
taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment,
considering that the government and the farmer- and by the government to the property as well as the
beneficiaries have already benefited from the land nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred government financing institution on the said land shall be
in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their considered as additional factors to determine its
properties without payment of just compensation which, valuation.
under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in
be taken away from its owners. The transfer of 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just
possession and ownership of the land to the government compensation.Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to
are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the determine just compensation based on the guideline
corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title the failure to determine just compensation for a
remains with the landowner. considerable length of time. That just compensation
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657
instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important
agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering considering that just compensation should be the full and
that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
yet to be settled.Considering the passage of R.A. No. expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full
6657 before the completion of this process, the just and ample.
compensation should be determined and the process
concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is
the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228
having only suppletory effect.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP
or as may be finally determined by the court as the just
compensation for the land. In determining just
compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers

APO vs CA
Facts:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc.
(HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.)
located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995,
the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR.
DAR offered P86.9 million for AFC’s land and P164.40
million for HPI’s land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC,
HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the
Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was
filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February
1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the
valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the
government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines,
deposited P26M into AFC’s account and P45M into HPI’s
account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused
the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to
farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program).
Due to DARAB’s failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a
complaint for determination of just compensation before
the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of
AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it
gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should
be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the
purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is
to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed
to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not there was just compensation.
Held: No. AFC’s and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without
just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which
was commissioned by law to determine just
compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was
the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the
RTC. The RTC’s finding is to be sustained as it based it’s
ruling on evidence. DAR was given chance to support its
ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower
amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow
the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation
is undoubtedly oppressive.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report,
permanent improvements on AFC’s and HPI’s lands have
been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road
network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses,
among others, wherein substantial amount of capital
funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a
stone’s throw from the residential and/or industrial
sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore.
The market value of the property (plus the consequential
damages less consequential benefits) is determined by
such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or
potential use, its size, shape and location. Therefore, AFC
and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation
(Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per
annum plus attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the just
compensation or P138 million.
LBP v Luz Lim and Purita Lim Cabochan, G.R. No. 171941, 2007 social and economic benefits contributed by the
Facts: farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
Pursuant to RA 6657, the DAR compulsorily acquired 32.8363 to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or
hectares agricultural land of the Lims in Sorsogon. LBP loans secured from any government financing
computed the value of the property at P725K. The Lims rejected institution on the said land, shall be considered as
the valuation and a proceeding was conducted before the additional factors to determine its valuation.
PARAD to determine the valuation of the property. The PARAD These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR
set the amount at P725K. AO 6-92, as amended:
Dissatisfied, the Lims filed a petition for determination of just Land Value = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) +
compensation with the RTC. The RTC valued the property at (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)
P1.5M following the report submitted by the Lims’ nominee, as The formula shall be used if all the three factors are present,
opposed to the P947K value given by the LBP’s nominee. The relevant and applicable.
RTC reconsidered, taking into consideration the comparable In computing Capitalized Net Income, the Average Gross
selling price of the adjoining land (acquired by LBP at P68K per Production of the latest available 12 months immediately
hectare), neighborhood, utility, size and the time element preceding the date of notice of coverage, and the average
involved and increased the valuation to P2.2M (at P68K per Selling Price of the latest available 12 months prior to the date
hectare). of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP for processing, should be
The CA affirmed the RTC decision and ordered the LBP to pay used.
legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until The date of notice of coverage would have to be sometime
actual payment. prior to the date of the Field Investigation Report, because the
Issue: field investigation is conducted after the notice of coverage is
Whether or not the lower courts erred in determining just issued. Also, the claimfolder would have been received by LBP
compensation under Section 17 of R.A. 6657 on or before the year the property was distributed to the
Held: agrarian reform beneficiaries, because land distribution is the
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus: last step in the procedure. However, the data used for the AGP
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In and SP was the data for the year prior to the date of ocular
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition inspection, or 3 years after the property was distributed.
of the land, the current value of like properties, its Finally, it was not taken into consideration that, except for
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by seven hectares, the whole area of the property was planted
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment with coconut intercropped with abaca or vice-versa, contrary to
made by government assessors shall be considered. The DAR AO 6-92, as amended which provides that the total income
shall be computed from the combination of crops actually
produced on the covered land whether seasonal or permanent.
The determination of just compensation involves the exercise
of judicial discretion, however, it must be discharged within the
bounds of the law. The amount adopted by the RTC was not
based on any of the mandatory formulas.
The case is remanded to the RTC to determine the just
compensation in accordance with the procedures provided.



LBP v Pedro Yap, G.R. No. 118712, 1995 bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
Facts: before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under
Pedro Yap alleges that, without notice to him, the TCTs of his Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
land were cancelled and transferred to the farmer beneficiaries Issue:
by the RD, based on the request of the DAR together with a (1) Whether or not AO No. 9 is valid, insofar as it provides for the
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735K and P719K opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
have been earmarked for Yap. (2) Whether or not the owners can withdraw the amounts
The heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that, the Landbank, deposited in trust pending resolution of the cases for just
without giving notice to them, required the tillers in their lands compensation
to pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of the farmlots; that
Held:
the DAR issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
(1) Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides that the deposit must be
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds" and not in any other
in the amount of P135K; that the Landbank reserved in trust form.
P135K in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago; and that the tillers (2) The settled rule is that, there must be full payment of just
stopped paying rental s to the landowners after they compensation before the title to the expropriated property
committed themselves to pay rentals to the Landbank. is transferred. The owners have already been deprived of
Agricultural Management and Development Corporation the possession and use of the properties, to withhold the
(AMADCOR) alleges that the DARAB fixed the compensation for right of the owners to the compensation is an oppressive
their land in Quezon at P2.7M and ordered the Landbank to pay exercise of eminent domain.
or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR.
With respect to AMADCOR's property in Albay, it is alleged that
emancipation patents were issued covering the area but no
action was taken by the DAR to fix the compensation for said
land; and that a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was
established in the amount of P12.2M, three notices of
acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR.
The landowners argued that Administrative Order No. 9 was
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible
Gonzales v GSIS, G.R. No. L-51997, 1981 institution, which is to be paid directly to the latter by the Land
Facts: Bank in Land Bank bonds.
Spouses Gonzales obtained a housing loan from GSIS, secured While the statute did not provide that the bonds must be
by two residential lots and a 15.7880 & a 9.4602 hectare accepted at face value, it can be inferred that it is the intent of
agricultural land. The spouses weren’t able to pay the the law in the absence of any provision expressly permitting
obligation. discounting, as differentiated from other laws expressly
By virtue of PD 27, the agricultural lands were subdivided and allowing it.
awarded to the tenant-farmers. However, the payment by the The bonds fall within the purview of the non-impairment clause
LBP became remittable only seven years later. of the Constitution. The value of these bonds cannot be
The appraised value of the land was tendered by the Land Bank diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said
to the GSIS at 20% in cash and 80% in bonds. The GSIS refused bonds are fully guaranteed by the Govemment of the Republic
acceptance unless the payment in bonds were given a of the Philippines.
creditable/discounted value lower that its face value.
Spouses Gonzales accepted under protest the condition of the
GSIS. However, they appealed to the Office of the President
offering to pay the balance of their obligation in cash provided
GSIS would accept at par value the Land Bank bonds. The GSIS
did not reconsider.
Subsequently, the Petition for mandamus was filed praying that
the GSIS be directed to accept the payment of Land Bank bonds
at par value so that the collaterals could be released.
Issue:
Whether or not the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank
bonds at face value in payment of outstanding loans secured
partially by lands taken by the Land Bank under Operation Land
Transfer.
Held:
Section 80 of RA 3844 provides that, when lands with existing
encumbrances are acquired under the land reform program,
the land owner is paid the net value of the land minus the
outstanding balance of his obligation to a government lending
Republic vs CA
FACTS:
On September 10, 1955, Irene Bullungan (now
deceased) applied for a free patent covering lots situated
in Fugaru (now San Guillermo), Angadanan, Isabela. The
lots consisting of 1.04 hectares, which Vicente
Carabbacan claimed.
Irene Bullungan stated that the land applied for by her
was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that
it was public land which had been continuously occupied
and cultivated by her since 1925.
Upon certification of Assistant Public Land Inspector
that Irene Bullungan had been in actual, continuous, open,
notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the land
since 1925, the Director of Lands approved Bullungans
application on June 4, 1957.
On December 26, 1957, Original Certificate of Title
No. P-8817 was issued in the name of Irene Bullungan.
Alleging that a portion of Lot covered by the free patent
issued to Irene Bullungan overlapped which he was
occupying, Vicente Carrabacan filed a protest
on September 7, 1961.
The District Land Officer at Ilagan, Isabela
recommended the dismissal of the protest on the ground
that the Bureau of Lands no longer had jurisdiction over
the matter as a result of the grant of a free patent to Irene
Bullungan. But the Director of Lands on March 23,
1982 ordered an investigation of the protest.
On November 22, 1972 the court rendered a decision,
dismissing the complaint of Vicente Carabbacan and
ordering him to vacate the land, even as it upheld the
ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been
in possession of the land in question, was finally ousted.
The Director of Lands ordered an investigation of
Carabbacans protest. The investigation found that Vicente
Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of the land
since 1947, having acquired the same from Tomas
Tarayao on May 4, 1947. The land investigator stated that
due to a big flood which occurred in December 1947, the
Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east,
resulting in the emergence of a piece of land, which is the
subject of this dispute. Carrabacan took possession of the
land and cultivated it. He was in the continuous, peaceful,
open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the land
from December 1947 until 1981 when he was ejected by
virtue of the decision in Civil Cases.
The Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines a complaint for the cancellation of Free
Patent on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in
obtaining the free patent.
The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela which, on September 25, 1989,
rendered a decision declaring Free Patent null and void.
 The lower court found that Irene Bullungan made
misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free
patent that she was in possession of the disputed portion
of Lot, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupying
and cultivating the land.
The court justified the reversion of the land in question as
an assertion of a governmental right.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed
the lower courts ruling on the ground that, after the lapse
of one year from the date of issuance of the patent, the
State could no longer bring an action for reversion.
The appellate court held that the certificate of title
issued in the name of Irene Bullungan became
incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of one
year from the issuance of the free patent.
The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of indefeasibility of
Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of an action for
cancellation of title and reversion of land even if more than
one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent
in case of fraud in obtaining patents.
Issue: Whether or not upon the lapse of one year from the
issuance of the free patent bar the filing of an action for
cancellation of title.
Held:
No. It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act
No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
the public domain and becomes private property over
which the Director of Lands will no longer have either
control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the
basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as
indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the
expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent as
provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32 (formerly Act No. 496,
38). However, as held in Director of Lands v. De
Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State may still
bring an action under 101 of the Public Land Act for the
reversion to the public domain of lands which have been
fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has been
the consistent ruling of this Court.
The failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente
Carrabacan was in possession of the portion of land in
dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a
ground for annulling her title.
This is not so. Where public land is acquired by an
applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, as in the
case at bar, the State may institute reversion proceedings
even after the lapse of the one-year period.
Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a
public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of
the land even. before Irene Bullungan bought the
possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a
misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a
free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in
question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there
ahead of her.
 industrial area, which became the subject of the strike of
Fortich vs. Corona (AJG) the farmers.
The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which
Facts: commanded nationwide attention that
even church leaders and some presidential candidates
On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries tried to intervene for their “cause”.
commenced a hunger strike in front ofthe Department of
Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec.
protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) Corona, to issue the so-
dated March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a called “Win-Win”Resolution, substantially modifying its
144-hectare land from agricultural to agro- earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after
industrial/institutional area. Note that this decision already it hadalready become final and executory.
became final and executory.
It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-
The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares,
owned by NQSRMDC (NorbertoQuisumbing Sr. and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to
Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
pineapple plantation to Del Monte.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998,
interested in the property, and enacted an ordinance ruled for Fortich and company and declared that the “Win-
converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a Win” Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considering
view to attract investors in order to achieve economic that the March 29, 1996 resolutionof the OP already
vitality. became final and executory.
Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the
land conversion and instead opted to put the same under
CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to the
farmers.

The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision Issue:

reversing the DAR and converting the land to agro-
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should
have been to file a petition for review directly with the
Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution
before filing the present petition; and
Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of
petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error
is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand,
an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the
Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final
order or resolution, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in
Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent
Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said
resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision
of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and
executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus,
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof
provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the
person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a
verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The
proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in
Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction
of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the
petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which
exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or
omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
provided by law or the Rules of Court.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to
be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so
as to promptly put an end to the present controversy
which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find
the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the
Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by
special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless
a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party
shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of

Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated

June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996
final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had
lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis
of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion
for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion
for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in
exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said
motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably
filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
 BALBOA VS. FERRALES
G.R. No. L-27059 February 14, 1928 ISSUE: whether the validity of the sale of the land in question
JOHNSON, J.:
should be determined under the provisions of Act No. 926 or
FACTS: Sometime in the year 1913, plaintiff Buenaventura under those of Act No. 2874.
Balboa filled with the Bureau of Lands an application for
homestead under the provisions of Act No. 926, covering a Ruling: The Supreme Court is of the opinion that, the right,
tract of land situated in the barrio of Culis, municipality of title and interest of Buenaventura having become vested
Hermosa, Province of Bataan, containing 14 hectares, 49 ares under the provisions of Act No. 926, his rights cannot be
and 77 centares. Five years thereafter, Balboa submitted affected by any law passed subsequent thereto. The
proof, showing his residence upon, and cultivation of said provisions of Act No. 2874 cannot be invoked for the purpose
land, as well as his compliance with all of the other of defeating the vested right acquired by him before its
requirements of section 3 of said Act No. 926, which final adoption.
proof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 15, Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of
1918. On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed by Act homestead land during the period of five years subsequent to
No. 2874. the issuance of the patent or certificate of title upon which
On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in rests the decision of the court a quo, cannot be invoked to
consideration of the sum of P950, sold said land to the annul the sale in question. Said prohibition, if applied in the
defendant Cecilio L. Farrales and on October 16, 1924, the present case, would impair and diminish the vested rights
latter secured in his name transfer certificate of title No. 650 acquired under Act No. 926, contrary to the uniform doctrine
of said land. Now, Buenaventura commenced the present followed in the United States, and in violation of the express
action for the purpose of having said sale declared null and provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law.
void on the ground of lack of consent on his part and fraud on
the part of the defendant, and on the further ground that said
sale was contrary to, and in violation of the provisions of
section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The trial court ruled in favor of Buenaventura that said deed
was null and void, in view of the fact that it was executed
before the lapse of five years from the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title in favor of Buenventura Balboa, in
violation of the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No.
2874.
 SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO VS. DAR ISSUE: Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006 Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
registration proceedings.
FACTS: Petitioners herein with the exception of two, were
recepients of Emancipation Patents (EP’s) over a parcel of RULING: YES. The Supreme Court said that the date of
lands located at Barangay. Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. issuance of the patent, corresponds to the date of the
The parcels of land disputed herein, were formerly part of a issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because
forested area which have been denuded as a result of the the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to
logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director
Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the
these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI land applied for to the applicant. This is in consonance with
never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation
peaceful cultivation thereof. of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public
527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the domain. Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such
therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the
cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead
under said law. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was after complying with the requirements thereof.
conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the Hence, the TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 interest are declared valid and binding.
hectares were issued to petitioners.
However, In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA and claimed
that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the
area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid
therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated,
sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed
277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners.
 CORPUZ VS. GROSPE landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo,
G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000 Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27
PANGANIBAN, J.:
recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the
FACTS: Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the beneficiaries.”
Department of Agrarian Reform. Pursuant to PD No. 27, he ISSUE: Whether or not by voluntary surrender, petitioner
was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer over two parcels of Corpuz forfeit his right as a beneficiary
agricultural land with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in
Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. To pay for his wifes Ruling: YES. Given the fact that the land was surrendered to
hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on the government, not transferred to another private person. It
January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the
contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent landholding to the private respondents who were declared as
Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary
years. surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations,
Petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly
recovery of possession. In his Complaint, he alleged that they and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. Hence,
had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on Petitioners voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon
January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because
planted on the land. such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who
between them and petitioner allowed the former to take over refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.
the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter
paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly
executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over the
landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of
P54,394.
However,Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over
the landholding and alleged that his and his childrens
signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P.
Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the