1-Arellano, Case Report Slides

Criminal Law
CASE REPORT
Reporter #1
Alcher Migriño
#1 Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
#2 Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426
2
1. Intod vs. Court of
Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
Alcher Migriño
3
FACTS
▣ February 4, 1979-Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasinan, Santos

Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s
house and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan.
▣ Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan
who told Mandaya the plan to kill Palangpangan due to a
land dispute and if Manday will not accompany them, he
too will be killed.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52 Alcher Migriño

4
FACTS
▣ At 10pm of the same day, they went to the house of

Palangpangan to commence their plan of killing her.
▣ When Palangpangan’s bedroom was located, it was fired
with guns only to find out that the bedroom was empty as
Palangpangan was in another city.
▣ The RTC convicted the herein petitioner with attempted
murder and the CA affirmed that decision.

5
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred

in their decision for convicting the herein
petitioner of attempted murder?

6
RULING
Yes, the RTC and the CA erred in their decision for convicting the
herein petitioner of attempted murder.
Article 4 (2) provides that the criminal liability shall be incurred by

any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.

7
2. Jacinto v. People,
592 SCRA 426
Alcher Migriño
8
FACTS
In the June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby

Aquino, handed the herein petitioner Jacinto a BDO postdated
check with the amount of Php.10 000 as a payment for the
purchases that Baby Aquino made from Mega Foam Int’l., Inc. The
petitioner was then the collector of the said company.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline
Capitle is the sister of the petitioner and the former pricing,
merchandising and inventory clerk of the aforementioned
company.
Jacinto v. People, 592 SCRA 426 Alcher Migriño

9
FACTS
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, an employee of Mega Foam

received a phone call from Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle in order to inform him that the BDO
deposited in his account had been dishonored. Thereafter,
Ricablanca called Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of
Mega Foam and told her of the news. Eventually, Valencia
instructed Ricablanca to ask Aquino to replace the check with cash.

10
FACTS
Also, Ricablanca was told of the plan to divide the money equally
into four: for Valencia, Ricablanca, Jacinto (petitioner), and
Jacqueline Capitle. Upon advise of the Mega Foam’s accountant,
Ricablanca reported the matter to Joseph Dyhengco, the owner of
Mega Foam.

11
FACTS
After verification from Baby Aquino and company records, it was

discovered that the petitioner never remitted the check to Mega
Foam. Hence, Dyhenco filed a complaint in the NBI and an
entrapment operation of its agents was worked out. Jacinto,
Valencia, and Capitle were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case of
qualified theft.

12
FACTS
The RTC convicted the accused/herein petitioner of qualified theft.

CA modified the decision of the RTC: acquitting Capitle, reducing
the penalty of Valencia, and retaining the penalty of the herein
petitioner Jacinto.

13
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused/herein petitioner

committed qualified theft?

14
RULING
No, the herein petitioner did not committed qualified theft. The Revised
Penal Code provides that the personal property subject of the theft must have
some values, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen.
Moreover, Art. 309 of the same code denotes that the penalty imposed on the
accused is dependent on the thing stolen. In the case at bar, the herein
petitioner should have committed qualified theft if not for the unfunded
check giving the said felony inherent impossibility of accomplishment as
provided in Article 4 (2) of the RPC. For this reason, the petition is granted
and the decision of the CA is modified convicting the herein petitioner
Jacinto with impossible crime with a penalty of 6 months arresto mayor and
to pay to costs.

15
RULING
In the case at bar, the absence of Palangpangan in his bedroom

which the herein petitioner fired with guns is an illustration of
factual impossibility. This rendered the intended crime impossible
of accomplishment. With this, the petition is granted and the
decision of the lower courts is modified holding that the petitioner
is guilty of an impossible crime and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

16
Reporter #2
Vanessa Mae Cabili
#1 Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-
30001, June 23, 1970
#2 People vs. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493
17
1. Director of Prisons v. Ang
Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001,
June 23, 1970
Vanessa Mae Cabili
18
FACTS
▣ Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was

granted conditional pardon in 1959. He was never to
return to the Philippines.
▣ In violation of his pardon, he returned in 1966 under the
name "Ang Ming Huy“ and got arrested.
▣ The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on
him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.
Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001, June 23, 1970 Vanessa Mae Cabili
19
FACTS
▣ He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the

Court of First Instance of Rizal denied.
▣ The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but
made a recommendation that Ang may be
allowed to leave the country on the first
available transportation abroad.
20
FACTS
▣ The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration

praying for the deletion of the recommendation. The
Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is
not a part of the decision and was uncalled for because
courts are not empowered to make such a
recommendation
21
ISSUE
Whether the courts of justice may interfere

in the exercise by the President, thru his
Executive Secretary, of his administrative
power of recommitment.
22
RULING
No. The only question to be resolved by the Court

of Appeals was whether, or not, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the
petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The
Court of Appeals was not called upon to review
any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho Kio.
23
RULING
The recommitment to prison of Ang Cho Kio was

done in the exercise by the President of the
Philippines of his power pursuant to the provision
of Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
and the courts should not interfere with the
exercise of that power.
24
RULING
The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those
expressly provided in the law — and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the
Revised Penal Code as follows:
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in
the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.
25
RULING
The Court of Appeals was not called upon

to review any sentence that was imposed
on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon
to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was
illegally confined, or not, in the insular
penitentiary under the Director of Prisons.
26
2. People vs. Genosa,
341 SCRA 493
Vanessa Mae Cabili
27
FACTS
▣ Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995,

attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led
to his death. According to the appellant, she did not
provoke her husband when she got home that night and it
was her husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her husband would
hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver
her baby safely.
People vs. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493 Vanessa Mae Cabili

28
FACTS
▣ The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has

been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense
admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty
of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked
while asleep.

29
ISSUE
1. Whether appellant acted in self-defense

and in defense of her fetus.
2. Whether treachery attended the killing
of Ben Genosa.

30
RULING
1. No. The court reiterates the principle that aggression, if

not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense
-- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.
Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances. Marivic, further be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.

31
RULING
2. No. It is in the rule that when a killing is

preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.

32
Reporter #3
Sugar Arumpac
#1 People vs. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510 (2010)
#2 People vs. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-33304, Dec. 13, 1930
33
1. People vs. Tibon,
622 SCRA 510 (2010)
Sugar Arumpac
34
FACTS
On or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of

Manila, Philippines, Honorio Tibon, murdered KEEN GIST
TIBON, 3 years of age and REGUEL ALBERT TIBON, 2
years of age, both his legitimate children, by stabbing them
several times on the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby
inflicting upon KEEN GIST and REGUEL ALBERT stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their
death thereafter.
People vs. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510 (2010) Sugar Arumpac

35
FACTS
Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law

wife Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived together as husband and
wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel
Albert (Reguel). Gina went to Hongkong to work as a
domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody.
After some time, it was revealed that Gina was apparently
having an affair in Hong Kong, Tibon then started drinking a
lot and was seen hitting his two children.

36
FACTS
At around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother

and his siblings discovered the wounded and
lifeless bodies of the children, Tibon stabbed
himself on the chest with a kitchen knife and
jumped out of the window of their house. He
confessed to stabbing their children and begged
for forgiveness to his wife.

37
FACTS
In court, Tibon denied the charges against him

and raised insanity as defense. He said that he
could not recall what happened on the night he
allegedly stabbed his two children; could not
remember being taken to the hospital and that he
was only informed by his siblings that he had
killed his two children, causing him to jump off
the window of their house.
38
ISSUE
Whether or not the exempting

circumstance of insanity applies to the
accused-appellant’s case?

39
RULING
No. Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane

person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval” is
exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or
proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense.

40
RULING
The medical records of Tibon with the National

Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable
for such refers to his condition to stand trial and
not to his mental state immediately before or
during the commission of the crimes.

41
RULING
The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this

case. Under Article 264 Parricide is committed when: (i) a
person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
Tibon was found guilty by this Court with the punishment of
reclusion perpetua.

42
RULING
Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because

of the revelation that his wife was having an affair
overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not
equivalent to insanity.

43
2. People vs. Sotelo, G.R. No.
L-33304, Dec. 13, 1930
Sugar Arumpac
44
FACTS
On the night of December 24, 1929, in the municipality of

Narvacan, Province of Ilocos Sur, the Sotelo bothers namely,
Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo, armed with a penknife,
a stick, and an iron bar, respectively, acting together and helping
one another, attacked, beat up, and commit assault upon Ignacio
Cambaliza, inflicting a mortal wound upon him on the level of the
left nipple, which penetrated the left lung and the left ventricle of
the heart, another on the outward surface of the right arm, a bruise
on the nose and another on the upper lip: as a result of which said
Ignacio Cambaliza died after a few minutes.
People vs. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-33304, Dec. 13, 1930 Sugar Arumpac
45
FACTS
Witness Baltazar Capistrano who accompanied the deceased
Cambaliza, stated that when he and Cambaliza were barely 20
meters away from the house of the Sotelo brothers, Constante
Sotelo who was in the entrance of his yard, turned his flashlight on
the passers-by to see who they were. When Ignacio Cambaliza saw
this, he walked back to where Constante Sotelo stood and inquired
why he turned his flashlight on them, and what it was he wanted,
winding up with a vulgar remark. When Constante's brothers, who
were then in the yard on the side of the road, saw Cambaliza's
attitude, they approached their brother to separate or defend him,
whereupon Cambaliza's commenced beating them with his iron
crop, once striking Constante's arm.
46
FACTS
The brothers, in turn, fell upon Cambaliza, Dominador striking him

across the face with the stick he carried, and Vicente wounding him
in the right shoulder with a penknife. At this juncture, Capistrano
attempted to intervene, but he was warned by Vicente and probably
by Dominador also, for which reason he withdrew from the scene,
and the fight then continued between Cambaliza and Constante.
47
FACTS
In the course of this fight, while Constante was under

Cambaliza and was about to get hit, the accused stabbed a
penknife into Cambaliza at about the level of the left nipple,
producing a wound which penetrated the left lung into the
left ventricle of the heart, resulting in his death a few minute
later. The appellant admits he inflicted the injury which
resulted in Ignacio Cambaliza's death, but maintains he did
so in self-defense.
48
ISSUE
Whether or not justifying circumstance of

self-defense applies to Constante Sotelo’s
case?
US vs Rivera G.R. No. L-16443 Sugar Arumpac

49
RULING
Yes, but with modifications. Under Article 11 of the RPC, justifying
circumstance need three requisites. The deceased started the
aggression, but was provoked by the offensive language used by
Constante and his brothers, imputing to him the utterance of vulgar
language against them. In such a situation the deceased naturally
used his whip against those who were in front of him, striking
Constante's arm. The court therefore believe this is a case of
incomplete self-defense, wherein the appellant was unlawfully
attacked by the deceased and compelled to employ reasonable
means to defend himself, but he is responsible for provoking the
attack.
US vs Rivera G.R. No. L-16443 Sugar Arumpac

50
Reporter #4
Juhaira M. Bula
#1 People vs Gonzales Gr no. 188602, 4 February 2010
#2 People vs. Manulit, 635 SCRA 426
51
1. People vs Gonzales
Gr no. 188602,
4 February 2010
Juhaira M. Bula
52
FACTS
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for

murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted
murder were filed against appellant.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de

oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
People vs Gonzales Gr no. 188602, 4 February 2010 Juhaira M. Bula

53
FACTS
Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the

RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and
attempted murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving

credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having
killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in
self-defense.

54
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused act in self-

defense?

55
RULING
No, the accused did not act in self defense. In claiming self
defense, the accused-appellant has the burden to prove its
element convincingly and clearly. The Requisites are as
follows;
(a) unlawful aggression on the partr of the victim;
(b)reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
accused to repel it; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.

56
RULING
While all three elements must concur, self-defense

relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful
aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.

57
RULING
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden

of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was
uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less
credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving
victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at
them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility
of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial
court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing.

58
RULING
The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts,
are enough to show that treachery was employed by
appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the
witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the
victims was not proven, and appellants testimony that the
victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence.
The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming
and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery
was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the
crime to murder
59
2. People vs. Manulit,
635 SCRA 426
Juhaira M. Bula
60
FACTS
Accused Dennis Manulit shot Reynaldo Juguilonwhile the latter was

walking with his live-in partner Anabel. The shot resulted in
Reynaldo’s death. He then tucked the gun in his waist, raised his
hands and shouted “wala akong ginawang kasalanan at wala kayong
nakita.” And he ran towards the basketball court adjoining the
barangay hall. Lydia Juguilon, Manulit’s aunt and the victim’s sister
in law, saw what happened but kept quiet about it until bothered by
her conscience, she decided to issue a statement before the
prosecutor of MAnila. Manulit offered a story of self-defense.
People vs. Manulit, 635 SCRA 426 Juhaira M. Bula

61
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused act in self-

defense?

62
RULING
No the accused did not act in self defense because he failed to

proved the existence of unlawful aggression which is one of the
requisite to prove the claim of self defense under article 11 of RPC.
RTC found him guilty of murder. The CA affirmed. The SC ruled
that in the instant case, Manulit failed to proved the existence of
unlawful aggression. In addition, there was treachery because the
victim was only walking in the street when the accused-appellant
suddenly shot him at the back several times.

63
RULING
He had no oppurtunity to defend himself, because he had no idea

that an attack was forthcoming. It likewise appears that the means
was deliberately planned. What is decisive is that the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and
unable to retaliate. Evidently, treachery attended the killing.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the accused-appellant held grudge
against the victim since the victim filed a case against the accused-
appellant before the office of the city prosecutor.

64
Reporter #5
Jasmin Baslot
#1 People vs. Lopez, 585 SCRA 529
#2 Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 579 SCRA 32
65
1. People vs. Lopez,
585 SCRA 529
Jasmin Baslot
66
FACTS
Than on or about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon of April 25, 1996 at

Bandola Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of
Surigao del Sur, appellant Rogelio Regalado, who was outside
Bantogan Tailoring, a tailoring shop at Bandola Street Corner
Villauz, Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, called out to victim, Edencito
Chu and prompted him to come out of his mother’s bakery. Chu
thereupon merged from the bakery, put his arms around
Regalado’s shoulders and asked forgives. Regalado however pushed
his arms aside, drew a curved knife and stabbed Chu on the left
nipple.
People vs. Lopez, 585 SCRA 529 Jasmin Baslot

67
FACTS
As Chu ran towards Villauz Street, Regalado chased him and picked
up two pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu.
Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back of
the tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant Aragon
also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and joined the
chase. The three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed Chu, causing
the latter to fall. He then kicked the victim. Lopez stabbed Chu
several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu was no longer
moving, the three appellants left. Chu died before reaching the
hospital.

68
FACTS
Regalado, in his defense, denied taking part in the stabbing and

claimed that Chu choked him, causing him to run away from Chu
after extricating himself from him. Appellant Lopez interposed
“defense of relative” and “self-defense” claiming that he intercepted
Chu as he was chasing, Regalado, Lopez’ father-in-law but Chu
boxed him so he stabbed him several times and thereafter
surrendered to the police. Appellant Aragon invoked an alibi that he
was at the wharf, which is 40 meters away from the scene of
stabbing at the time of the incident.

69
FACTS
RTC found the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime MURDER thus sentences them to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law.

70
ISSUE
Whether or not “Defense of a Relative” should be

appreciated on Lopez’ part.

71
RULING
Under Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,

the elements of the Justifying Circumstance of defense of
relatives as follow:
a) Unlawful Aggression;
b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and
c) In case provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the one making the defense had no part therein

72
RULING
Under Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,

the elements of the Justifying Circumstance of defense of
relatives as follow:
a) Unlawful Aggression;
b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and
c) In case provocation was given by the person attacked, that
the one making the defense had no part therein

73
RULING
The SC ruled that the “defense of a relative” cannot be appreciated on
Lopez’s part because of the absence of “unlawful aggression” which is
an essential element of “defense of a relative” under par. 2 of Art. 11 in
the RPC. Chu’s threatening words of, “Are you going to defend your
father-in-law?” was not considered by the SC as something that
amounts to unlawful aggression. Another element, “reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it” was also found
lacking by the SC in the instant case. Nowhere in the records is it
shown that when Chu allegedly chased Regalado, the former was
wielding a weapon. Thus, the intention of Lopez to get a knife for his
protection and that of his father-in-law was unwarranted.
74
2. Herrera vs.
Sandiganbayan,
579 SCRA 32
Jasmin Baslot
75
FACTS
Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat.
Roberto Barrera and Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the
Paranaque Police Station, were charged with 2 counts of murder,
for killing Shi Shu Yang and George Go, before the Sandiganbayan
(SB).
(NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file
any more pleading after they were convicted that’s why they are
not part of the case.)
Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 579 SCRA 32 Jasmin Baslot

76
FACTS
That on or about December 28,1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and
Mariano who were lighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is
the restaurant owned by Go, and when Go came down with his
pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who introduced himself
as a policeman, asked for the license of the .45 caliber pistol, and
told Go that he will bring the firearm to the police station for
verification. Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu
to board their jeepney. (In short, kinda like entrapment/
instigation)The police officers also ordered the Go and Yang to
undergo medical examination and thus they were taken to the
Paranaque Community Hospital (PCH).
77
FACTS
Thereafter, Go and Yang were brought to Timothy Street,

Multinational Village where they were killed. The defense on the
other hand claims that Herrera and Mariano were just assisting
Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination. Prior to
the shooting incident, they were informed that George Go was
previously arrested by Barrera for illegal possession of firearm.
They brought Go and Yang to the PCH and on the way back to the
police station, they heard a struggle ensue at the back of the patrol
van as Alcalde said, “George, bitawan mo ang baril ko.”

78
FACTS
And then they heard successive shots. When they looked back, they
saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm (later on, they said
it was an armalite) with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted to
pacify the trouble but alas there were more shots and they found
Go and Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified
individually but they said almost the same things.) The defense also
presented Dr. Soliven’s findings that Go was positive for alcohol
and that Go had no signs of physical injuries.

79
FACTS
What really happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along
Timothy Street which was a practically deserted area, isolated
from traffic and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera, and petitioner
Herrera brought out the two handcuffed victims from the back
portion of the patrol van in order to eventually salvage them.
Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking an alleged interrogation
and was trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity was
then not yet immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also
participated in shooting at the unarmed victims. The SB convicted
Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts of murder, and
denied petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera
and Mariano filed a petition for review on certiorari.
80
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners can assert that there was total

absence of evidence to support the theory that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime.

81
RULING
NO, the petitioners cannot assert that there was no evidence
to support the theory that conspiracy is present in the
commission of the crime.
Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused

which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common
intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the
conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
82
RULING
In this case, petitioner Herrera drove the vehicle along Timothy
Street to a place which was less conspicuous to passersby. There,
Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and petitioner Mariano brought out the
two victims from the back portion of the van in order to perpetuate
the killing. Petitioner Mariano alighted from the right front seat of
the van and stood beside Pat. Alcalde and Pat. Barrera who began
shooting the victims. According to Winterhalter, petitioner Mariano
even appeared to be writing something on a sheet of paper
immediately before the shooting, although it cannot be determined
with certainty as to whether he was making an inquiry or merely
noting the names of the victims.

83
RULING
While it was Pat. Barrera who actually shot the two victims, the
evidence showed a common design on the part of both petitioners
as they did not do anything to prevent him from killing the victims,
thus, indicative of the fact that they are in unison with the criminal
design of the Pat. Barrera. Petitioner Herrera alighted form the van
without doing anything to prevent the killing, and worse, after the
killing took place along the street, petitioner Herrera even helped
carry the two victims into the van while petitioner Mariano, the
driver, remained in the vehicle during the incident.

84
RULING
Consequently, applying the rule that the act of one

is the act of all, petitioners are thus as guilty as Pat.
Barrera and Pat. Alcalde. In fact, conspiracy need
not be established by direct evidence but may be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

85
Reporter #6
Rafa Balt
#1 People vs. Domingo, 580 SCRA 436
#2 Sierra vs. People, 591 SCRA 666
86
1. People vs. Domingo,
580 SCRA 436
Rafa Balt
87
FACTS
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder,
and frustrated homicide. On or about the 29th day of March 2000,
complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house
when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered
their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He
stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon,
complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but teh
appellant answered “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na”. Two of her
children died.
People vs. Domingo, 580 SCRA 436 Rafa Balt

88
FACTS
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the
commission of the crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of
appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to
kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one
week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and
psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of
delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior,
poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance.

89
FACTS
The doctor could not find out when the appellant

started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of
Schizophrenia which were manifested by the
patient indicated that he suffered from the illness
six months before the Center examined the
appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the
defense of insanity of the appellant.

90
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant is exempt

from criminal liability on the ground of
insanity.

91
RULING
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the

accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to
appellant’s state of mind immediately before or at the very
moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in
the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of appellant’s mental
disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the
time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it
crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to
Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,
“Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”

92
RULING
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing
voices ordering him to kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental
condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence
of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The law presumes every man to be of sound mind.
Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is
improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person
accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane
immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

93
2. Sierra vs. People,
591 SCRA 666
Rafa Balt
94
FACTS
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the

CA that affirmed with modification the conviction of Robert Sierra,
the petitioner for the crime of qualified rape rendered by the RTC
branch 159, Pasig City on April 5,2006 That on August 5,2000 in
Pasig City the petitioner, a minor, 15 years old forcefully and
unlawfully have sexual intercourse with his sister, AAA, thirtheen
years old. The petitioner invoked that be should be exempted of
criminal liability for he was only 15 years old at the time the crime
was committed.
Sierra vs. People, 591 SCRA 666 Rafa Balt

95
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner will be exempted

from criminal liability under paragraph 1, section
6, of R.A. No. 9344?

96
RULING
Yes, the CA seriously erred when it rejected that the

petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the
crime. Thus, Section 7 of R.A. 9344 expressly states how the
age of the child in conflict with the law maybe determined.
In pursuant to Section 64, R.A. 9344, Criminal Case for rape
against the petitioner was dismissed. Referring the petitioner
to appropriate local Social Welfare and Development who in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344.

97
Reporter #7
Sittie Aisah B. Hadji Amer
#1 People vs. Anod, 597 SCRA 205
#2 People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012
98
1. People vs. Anod,
597 SCRA 205
99
FACTS
Appellant and Lumbayan were charged with the crime of Murder in an Information
dated June 23,1997 which reads:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, of May 16, 1997, at Purok 1,
Barangay Borbonan, Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Samuel Anod, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one Erlando Costan with the use of a pointed
bolo, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab and hack wounds which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Costan.
People vs. Anod, 597 SCRA 205 Sittie Aisah B. Hadji Amer
100
FACTS
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 248 of the

Revisd Penal Code.
During the arraignment on November 12, 1997, appellant

and Lumbayan entered pleas of not guilty to the crime
charged.
101
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is exempt from

criminal liability by invoking exempting
circumstance of acting under the compulsion of an
irresistible force?
102
RULING
NO. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt

from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with
freedom. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case,
appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's threat or engage
Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the
time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable.
103
RULING
Therefore, under the circumstances, appellants alleged fear, arising

from the threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him
from incurring criminal liability. Indubitably, the killing of the
victim was attended by treachery. This aggravating circumstance
qualifies the crime to murder.
104
2. People vs. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 195534, June 13, 2012
105
FACTS
The appellant and his brother, co-accused Edmundo Gonzales,

were charged with murder under a criminal information which
alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation and treacheryin the
killing of Eligio Donato (victim). The records show that the victim
went to the house of the appellant at the invitation of Edmundo.
When the victim arrived, he was met by the appellant who was
armed with a .22 caliber firearm.
106
FACTS
The appellant and Edmundo immediately fired at the victim

six (6) times, hitting him three (3) times - in the arm, in his
left thigh and in his left chest. The victim expired before he
could receive medical treatment. The appellant denied the
charge and claimed that he had acted in self-defense.
107
FACTS
He narrated that he was at his house watching television

when the victim suddenly arrived, armed with a short
firearm. The victim shouted invectives at the appellant and
threatened to kill him. When efforts by the appellant to
pacify the victim proved to be futile, the appellant retrieved
his own firearm inside his house.
108
FACTS
A struggle for the possession of the appellants

firearm then ensued between the appellant and the
victim which caused the appellants gun to
discharge three times; thus, hitting the victim.
109
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is

justified in committing the crime
charged by invoking self defense?
110
RULING
NO. The first requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the

victim is patently absent. There was no circumstance showing that
the appellants life was in danger when he met the victim. What the
evidence shows is that the victim was unarmed when he went to the
house of the appellant. Likewise, there was also no evidence proving
the gravity of the utterances and the actuations allegedly made by
the victim that would have indicated his wrongful intent to injure the
appellant.
111
RULING
The second requisite of self-defense could not have been present in

the absence of any unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
However, even granting that it was the unarmed victim who first
acted as the aggressor, we find that the means employed by the
appellant in repelling the attack - the use of a firearm, the number of
times he fired at the victim and the number of gunshot wounds
sustained by the victim - were not reasonably necessary. On the
contrary, we find that the number of gunshot wounds reveals a clear
intent to kill, not merely to repel the attack of the unarmed victim.
112
RULING
The third requisite was not established given the sufficient
provocation by the appellant in placing the victims life in actual
danger. Thus, any aggression made by the victim cannot be
considered unlawful as it was made as an act of self-preservation to
defend his life. The appellants claim of self-defense was also belied
by his own conduct after the shooting. The records show that the
appellant went into hiding after he was criminally charged. He also
stayed in hiding for four (4) years and could have continued doing so
had it not been for his arrest. Self-defense loses its credibility given
the appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform
the authorities about the incident
113
Reporter #8
Remm Gaius R. Mamhot
#1 People v. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530
#2 U.S. v. Domen, 37 Phil. 57
114
1. People v. Bandian,
63 Phil. 530
115
FACTS
Josefina Bandian, 23 years old, was accused of infanticide when she
was seen by he neighbor Valentin Aguilar, go to a thicket to answer
the call of nature. Bandian emerged, covered with blood,
disoriented and dizzy Valentin rushed to her aid, and called
Adriano Comcom to help gather herbs to stop the hemorrage,
Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant went. Bandian claimed it was hers, Dr.
Emilion Nepomuceno the attending physician testifies that Bandian
gave birth to the child inside her house, then brought it to the
thicket to kill to hide her guilt from her past amorous relationship
from her husband Luis Kirol. This testimony was given credit at the
trial. Hence, the appeal.
People v. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530 Remm Gaius R. Mamhot
116
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the accused’s guilt of infanticide is proven beyond

reasonable doubt.
2. Can the mental state of the accused be taken into account in
determining criminal liability.

117
RULING
No, deliberate intent must be proven in order for infanticide or abandonment of
a minor to be punishable, or in the least, it must be a voluntary action,
conscious, deliberate act in lucid state. The evidences fall short of proving it
otherwise. Futhermore, Nepomuceno’s testimony was contradicted by the
witnesses, Aguilar and Comcom. In addition, Bandian’s past relationship was
three years ago and in fact, she has been living with Kirol for over a year and
they are expecting the baby with full certainty that the child is Kirol’s. Hence,
she had no reason to kill the infant. Lastly Bandian, while pregnant, was
suffering from three days of fever. Due to debility and dizzy, bandian was not
aware that by answering to the call of nature, accidentally gave birth. Hence,
having RPC Art 12 sections 4 and 7 in her favor, she is acquitted. Cost de
oficio
118
2. U.S. v. Domen,
37 Phil. 57
119
FACTS
URBANO DOMEN and the Victoriano Gadlit quarrelled.

Deceased attacked the defendant and struck him with a piece
of wood called "Japanese" about a vara in length and about
the sized of one’s wrist. The deceased struck at the accused
four or five times. The accused did not retreat, but struck
back wounding the deceased on the forearm. This wound
caused the death of the deceased.
U.S. v. Domen, 37 Phil. 57 Remm Gaius R. Mamhot

120
ISSUE
1. Is the defendant’s self-defence valid

2. Should “retreat to wall” or “Stand your ground”
rule be applied

121
RULING
Yes, evidences and testimonies prove otherwise contrary to the widow
and Angel Pocong’testimony that the unlawful aggression came from
the deceased first, and that the defendant in the heat of the moment,
and in preservation of his life, struck the deceased’s forearm with a
tuba knife. US common law “retreat to wall” doctrine dictates that one
must retreat as far as he can before he is justified to meet force with
force. However, the court cites Beard vs. United States ([1894] 158 U.
S., 550) which gave way to the “stand your ground when in the right
rule” justifying the act because the neccesity for reliation was present
in order to preserve his own (defendant’s) life.
122
Reporter #9
Hafidah Amama
#1 People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18
#2 U.S. vs. Rivera, 41 Phil. 472
123
1. People vs. Martin,
89 Phil. 18
Hafidah Amama
124
FACTS
Between four and five o’clock in the morning of August 1,
1948, the corpse of Laura Luiz was found inside the family
toilet, which was at a certain distance from their home, with
a rope around her neck. Upon being interrogated by the
police officer, the defendant, Aniceto Martin, at first denied
any knowledge of the event, but later made a statement in
the municipal building on the killing of his wife. He
confessed that about 4 o’clock of the same day, he had a
conversation with his wife about their marriage. He went to
the toilet for major personal necessity.
People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18 Hafidah Amama
125
FACTS
His wife came after him to the toilet with a rope in her hands
and, as she approached him she placed the rope around his
neck, which angered him so he snatched the rope from her,
and in turn placed same around her neck, and in that
position tightened the rope and his wife died. The autopsy of
the corpse stated that the cause of death was heart failure
due to fright or shock.

126
FACTS
He was accused of the complex crime parricide with abortion. He

was acquitted of abortion but found guilty of parricide and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. From the judgment, he
appealed. He contends that the death of Laura was not due to the
strangling, but to her heart disease

127
ISSUE
Whether or not the defense of Martin

would constitute as a mitigating
circumstance?

128
RULING
Yes. The court considered mitigating circumstance in favor

of the defendant that unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased without any sufficient provocation on the part of
the defendant which in this case is equivalent to incomplete
self-defense on the part of the defendant, for after having
snatched the rope from the deceased, he should not have
wound it around her neck and tightened it. The penalty next
lower in degree should be imposed, which is that of
reclusion temporal.

129
RULING
The Court imposed the penalty of from twelve (12) years of

prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.

130
US vs Rivera
G.R. No. L-16443
Hafidah Amama
131
FACTS
Leona Laciste endeavored to set fire to the house of Martina

Rivera in which the two small children of the latter were
sleeping. The two women grappled and Leona Laciste was
boloed to death by Martina Rivera. Martina Rivera was
charged with murder but was convicted of homicide. Rivera
contended that she acted in defense of her person, rights and
descendants.
US vs Rivera G.R. No. L-16443 Hafidah Amama

132
ISSUE
Whether or not Martina Rivera should be

exempted from all responsibility because of having
acted in defense of her person, her rights, and her
descendants?

133
RULING
No. Article 8 of the Penal Code exempts any one from

criminal liability who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur: (1)
Unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity for the means
employed to prevent or repel it; (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Anyone who acts in defense of the person of his descendant is
similarly exempted.

134
RULING
In this case, the first and last requisites above-

mentioned concur, but the second is lacking.
Martina Rivera acted in defense of her person, her
home, and her children but any reasonable
necessity for killing the assailant was not present.
The evidence discloses more nearly on the
mitigating circumstances.

135
RULING
Judgment is affirmed, with the modification to the

penalty. Rivera shall be sentenced to three years of
prison correccional, and shall, in addition, pay the
costs of this instance.

136
Reporter #10
Princess Amaryah P. Ejares
#1 People vs. de Jesus, 118 SCRA 616
#2 People vs. Toring, 191 SCRA 38
137
1. People vs. de Jesus,
118 SCRA 616
138
FACTS
At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1978 in

Aspere Avenue, Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, Fernando de los
Santos was taking a nap in their house when he was awakened
by a boy informing him that his father, Feliciano de los
Santos is quarreling with someone. When he arrived at the
scene near Araneta Avenue, he saw one of the accused, Yalong
pointing a gun at his father.
People vs. de Jesus, 118 SCRA 616 Princess Amaryah P. Ejares

139
FACTS
Upon seeing this, he shouted at his father to run but his father
was not able to do so because Yalong already fired the gun.
Then the other accused, de Jesus grabbed the gun from
Yalong and fired a shot at his father again where he fell and
died. Petitioners interposed self-defense. Yalong admitted to
shot Feliciano twice after the victim almost stab him with a
knife.

140
FACTS
Court of First Instance (CFI) convicted Nilo De Jesus and

Wilfredo Yalong of murder qualified by treachery and
conspired in killing Feliciano de los Santos

141
ISSUE
Whether the claim of self-defense be

consider or conviction of conspiracy be
sustained?

142
RULING
Fernando's testimony states that it was De Jesus who shot the victim
was found to be fabricated. Based on the record, Yalong admitted
the shooting, corroborated by De Jesus and another witness, Mrs.
Anita Bernales' testimony. It was also found that Fernando was the
one who had a previous quarrel with the deceased, thus the former
was with motive to harm the latter. And if conspiracy existed,
accused-appellants would not have to do it at the place where they
can be seen conspicuously.

143
RULING
The qualifying circumstance of treachery by the lower court cannot

be sustained as Yalong's decision to shoot the deceased appeared to
be sudden, brought about by the latter's unlawful aggression to stab
the former by a dagger. Yalong is entitled to the benefit of the
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
inasmuch as there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased without any provocation coming from Yalong, but it was
not proven that the means employed by the latter was reasonably
necessary.

144
RULING
De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was

MODIFIED to homicide

145
2. - People vs. Toring,
191 SCRA 38
146
FACTS
At around 10:45 in the evening of May 25, 1980 at a benefit

dance held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City, the
daughter of the deceased Samuel Augusto was proclaimed
the winner of the search for Princess to reign in their sitio
fiesta. Beer and softdrinks were served all night and having
been tipsy after the coronation, Samuel stepped out for a
while to answer the call of nature.
People vs. Toring, 191 SCRA 38 Princess Amaryah P. Ejares

147
FACTS
During this time barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis

Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon in a dark area
whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to
Toring, approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left
hand with his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed with
the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen.

148
FACTS
Felix the run towards them, Toring pulled out the knife rom
Augusto and together with Berdin and Berdon, ran towards
the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was unable to do
so. He returned to where Samuel was and helped others in
taking Samuel to the hospital. Samuel was already dead upon
arrival at the hospital.

149
FACTS
The necropsy report states that Augusto died due to massive

hemorrhage secondary to stab wound on the abdomen. The
three were charged with conspiracy of killing Samuel Augusto
in a treacherous manner. Berdon was alleged to have supplied
the weapon that Toring used in the commission of the crime
and Berdin concealed the weapon.

150
FACTS
The next morning after the incident, Edgar Augusto, brother

of Samuel, shot Samuel who was at that time sleeping with his
older brother, Arsenio in their hut. He shot both off them and
Arsenio was hit at his left leg. It was also mentioned that
Toring was shot by Edgar a year ago before the incident.

151
FACTS
Toring seeks to be released by contending that his assault to

Samuel was justified because he acted in defense of his first
cousin, Joel Escoba who happens to be a prosection witness at
another case with Samuel.

152
FACTS
Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides that no

criminal liability is incurred b anyone “who acts in defense of
… his relatives … by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the net preceding circumstance are present, and
the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the one making defense had no part
therein.”

153
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a complete

defense of a relative?

154
RULING
No, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim

and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring
notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring’s claim of
defense of a relative. Toring should be credited with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

155
RULING
Luis Toring is convicted as principal in the murder of Samuel

Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
The lower court's decision is modified as follows:

(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum as maximum;

156
RULING
(b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six

(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayorminimum as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum;
(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of
Samuel Augusto, and
(d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay
the heirs of Samuel Augusto an indemnity of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00). Costs against appellants Toring and Berdon.

157
Reporter #11
Abegail Lagayada
#1 People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
#2 People vs. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619
158
1. People vs. Oanis,
74 Phil. 257
Abegail Lagayada
159
FACTS
Police officers Galanta and Oanis were instructed to arrest a

notorious criminal and escaped convict, Balagtas, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
They went to the house where Irene, said mistress of Balagtas was
living, went to said Irene’s room and saw a man sleeping with his
towards the door. They simultaneously or successively fired at the
man which resulted to the victim’s death.Later it was found that the
man shot was not Balagtas but one Serapio Tecson, Irene’s
paramour.
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 Abegail Lagayada

160
ISSUE
Whether or not Oanis or Galanta incur

criminal liability for the death of Tecson?

161
RULING
Yes. Murder, not homicide through reckless imprudence
with qualifying circumstances.
Even though an officer is justified in using force in making a

lawful arrest, he is not justified in using unnecessary force. A
mitigating circumstance of weight defined in the incomplete
justifying circumstance in Article 11 No. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code: A person incurs no criminal liability when he
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office.
162
2. People vs. Bernal,
91 Phil. 619
Abegail Lagayada
163
FACTS
On September 20, 1947, Jose Bernal, a military police had an

altercation with Alfonso Pilones. In the evening the men met again
and the dispute was renewed, Pilones inflicted bolo wounds on
Bernal. Bernal reported the incident to Captain Trinidad who later
called Sgt. Ricardo Benting to find and investigate Pilones. Benting
called Pvts. Roleda Salvoro and Lomod to accompany him.
On the way to the camp Pilones was shot and killed by appellant
Roleda by order of Sgt. Benting.
People vs. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619 Abegail Lagayada

164
ISSUE
Whether or not there was conspiracy between all of the

accused.
Whether or not accused have incurred criminal liability in the

exercise of their duty.

165
RULING
No. There was no proof of conspiracy. The patrol was

ordered by Capt. Trinidad only to investigate Piloners
regarding the trouble.
The Solicitor General believes that Roleda merely obeyed

orders. The trial court gave Roleda the benefit of the
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation. On the
other hand, Jose Bernal and Hermenegildo Salvoro are
herby acquitted with costs de officio.

166
Reporter #12
Sittie Ayra Y. Abedin
#1 U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904
#2 People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570
167
1. U.S. vs. Reyes,
36 Phil. 904
168
FACTS
Vicente Reyes, the defendant-appellant, was found guilty of

homicide for killing a soldier of the United States Army in the
name of Guiseppe Goggiano. The implement used by Reyes was a
baston (stick). The means taken by Reyes was hitting the soldier on
the head with the baston.
The appellant makes only one assignment of error which requires

consideration. This is to the effect that the trial court incurred error
in not finding in favor of the accused mitigating circumstance No. 3
of article 9 of the Penal Code.
U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904 Sittie Ayra Y. Abedin

169
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court should favor the

offender of a mitigating circumstance of having no
intention to cause so great a wrong as that
committed?

170
RULING
No. The offender hit the deceased on the head with a baston which
its force on the head of a person would ordinarily fracture the
cranium and cause death. In a decision dated March 2, 1892 stated
that “When the means employed by the accused are adequate and
proportionate to the result of the crime, circumstance No. 3 of
article 9 cannot be considered in his favor.” Furthermore, a
decision dated March 22, 1901 stated that “The lack of intention to
cause so serious an evil as that produced, can only be considered in
default of facts which may clearly show it when there is such a
disproportion between the resultant evil and the means employed
to cause it, so that the evil could not reasonably be presumed.”

171
2. People vs. Pagal,
79 SCRA 570
172
FACTS
Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide, with four aggravating circumstances. The
accused took away a cash amounting to P 1,281.00 from Gau Guan and killed
him by stabbing him with an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron pipe.
During the arraignment, the accused were informed of their intention to

enter a plea of guilty provided that they be allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. Both the
accused pleaded guilty of the charge.
People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 Sittie Ayra Y. Abedin

173
FACTS
The accused presented evidences of maltreatment/ill-

treatment by the deceased to prove the mitigating
circumstances they claim. But the court approved the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty only, which
rendered the decision to convict both the accused and
sentenced them to death.

174
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in not favoring the accused with
the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation, and passion
or obfuscation as claimed with an evidence by the accused?

175
RULING
No. The said mitigating circumstances can only be counted
as one because they arose from the same incident. The
circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be
mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated
before its execution. The maltreat of the victim claimed by
the appellants which was committed against them occurred
much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, for a provocation on the part of the victim to
be a mitigating circumstance, it must be sufficient and
immediately preceding the act.
176
Reporter #13
Dorothy Charme P. Orosa
#1 People vs. Doniego, 9 SCRA 541
#2 People vs. Lumayag, 13 SCRA 502
177
1. People vs. Doniego,
9 SCRA 541
178
FACTS
Facts: (Version of the Prosecution)
On the night of July 1, 1957, a dance was held in the auditorium of

Cabanbanan Norte, Gonzaga, Cagayan in celebration of Barrio Fiesta which
soon transferred to the residence of Severino Patubo as the rain fell. At about
10 o’clock in while the dance was still going on, Severino saw Domingo
Doniego talking to Patrocinio Viernes, Camilo Ragual, and a companion of
Patrocinio Viernes. While conversing, Severino saw Domingo suddenly lunge
at Patrocinio with a Batangas knife, but the latter was not hit because Camilo
wrested the knife from Domingo and with it stabbed the latter in his back.
People vs. Doniego, 9 SCRA 541 Dorothy Charme P. Orosa

179
FACTS
Severino called his brother Nemesio, the 2nd barrio lieutenant, and
informed him about the fight. Nemesio then sent Ciriaco Palor to
call Magno Taloza, the 1st Barrio Lieutenant. Magno Taloza arrived
with Palor and after seeing the deceased, called for rural policemen
to see the place. Later, Anselmo Garcia, a rural policeman arrived. As
Taloza started the investigation, Santos Doniego arrived and asked
who killed his son. When Severino Patubo was asked, he then
answered that it was Camilo Ragual who killed his son, Doniego went
up to the house, unsheathed his small sharped-pointed bolo and
immediately began to assault the people there.

180
FACTS
Version of the Defense:
The appellant denied he had killed the victims. He testified that while he, his
wife, step-son and his brother-in-law, Vicente Villena, were taking their
dinner at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of 1 July 1957, Ernesto Palor, a
minor, informed him that his son Domingo was quarrelling and fighting with
someone in the house of Severino Patubo. He went unarmed with his wife
and brother-in-law to the house and did not pick up any arm in the house.
There he saw the lifeless body of his son Domingo near the stairway. He
embraced his dead son and asked his brother-in-law to help him carry his
son to his house as they did. That Laureana Pastor came to his house to tell
him that Camilo Ragual stabbed his son while Patrocinio Viernes held him.

181
FACTS
According to the defense it was Patrocinio Viernes who drew his bolo from
its scabbard as he was going up the house and upon reaching the second floor
challenged the relatives of the deceased saying: "Who among you relatives of
Ingo (Domingo Doniego) would take his side;" that Patrocinio immediately
ran toward Ciriaco Palor, uncle of Domingo, but when Palor drew his bolo
and aimed at Patrocinio, the latter noticing that his adversary (Palor) had a
larger bolo backed out and ran away; that to defend his cousin Patrocinio,
Máximo Viernes drew his bolo but Ciriaco Palor struck Máximo's back when
the latter tried to escape; and that Anselmo Garcia stabbed Ciriaco Palor who
also stabbed the former.

182
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving more

weight to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses and in convicting the accused of three
murders.

183
RULING
No. The trial Court correctly found that the appellant killed
Anselmo Garcia, Ciriaco Palor and Maximo Viernes. It was most
natural and logical for the appellant to have been enraged and
obfuscated at the sight of his dead son, Domingo, who was stabbed to
death, seized by the feeling of hatred and rancour to have stabbed
indiscriminately even his brother-in-law Ciriaco Palor, a cousin of
his wife, Maximo Viernes, and the husband of a niece of the
appellant’s wife, Anselmo Garcia, and wounded three more random
people, including Vicente Pescador.

184
RULING
The crime committed by the appellant is homicide and the

penalty provided for by section 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion temporal to its full extent. There being a mitigating
circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period.
And, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is
sentenced to suffer a minimum of 10 years and one day of prision
mayor and a maximum of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal,
the accessories of the law, for each of the three homicides
committed by him.

185
2. People vs. Lumayag,
13 SCRA 502
186
FACTS
Version of the Prosecution:
At about seven o'clock in the evening of April 12, 1959, in the barrio of
Gumagamot, municipality of Lala, Lanao del Norte, Pedro Lumayag was up
in a coconut tree gathering tuba while his wife, Luzviminda Pampilo, was on
the ground lighting him with the beam of a flashlight when they heard a
scream that they recognized as Jose Pampilo, Pedro’s father-in-law. They
hurriedly ran towards the place where the shout came from. They heard the
sound of hard beating and the groaning of a man. Pedro Lumayag then
directed his flashlight towards it and saw Agrecio Lumayag, wearing a red
shirt and maong pants, straddle over a person by the road with his hands
around the person's neck. Agrecio thereupon jumped and ran away towards
his house about 300 meters from the scene.
People vs. Lumayag, 13 SCRA 502 Dorothy Charme P. Orosa

187
FACTS
Pedro Lumayag and his wife approached the man lying face
down and they confirmed it was Jose Pampilo who sustained
injuries in the nape and bruises in the right cheek and was
bleeding. Upon verifying that Jose was already dead, the
spouses reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant who, in
turn, sent a rural policeman to notify the chief of police.
Pedro Lumayag and his wife, accompanied by the barrio
lieutenant, returned to the scene of the crime.

188
FACTS
Acting upon the account given by Pedro Lumayag, the chief of
Police dispatched some policemen to summon Agrecio Lumayag.
The policemen found only Agrecio Lumayag's wife in his house
but, upon further search, found him hiding in a nearby shack
armed with a bolo and a cane. The policemen interrogated Agrecio
who eventually confessed that he killed Jose Pampilo with a cane
called "bahi".
Subsequently, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court

of First Instance charging Agrecio Lumayag with the crime of
murder. Accordingly, the accused has appealed to this Court.
189
FACTS
Version of the defense:

At about four o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1959 he and his wife left
Gumagamot by truck for Baroy. From there they crossed Pangil Bay by
banca to Tangub particularly at about six o'clock in the evening. From the
time of their arrival, they stayed in Tangub, particularly in the house of a
quack doctor, Tranquilino Melbar, until six o'clock in the morning of April
14, 1959, during which time appellant was treated by Melbar. They returned
to Gumagamot only on April 14, arriving there at about eight o'clock in the
morning, accompanied by Melbar, to whom the accused promised to give a
rooster. Shortly thereafter, a policeman arrived and arrested the accused for
the murder of Jose Pampilo.

190
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the

appellant guilty of murder in spite of the failure of
the prosecution to establish treachery and
nocturnity as qualifying circumstances.

191
RULING
The Solicitor General recommends a judgment for homicide instead of murder. The
information cites as qualifying circumstances "treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of nocturnity to better insure the commission of the offense." As
appellant points out, however, these aggravating circumstances were not proved. While
there is sufficient evidence to establish the killing of Jose Pampilo by the accused, there
is none, however, to show that he acted with treachery or evident premeditation or that
he specially sought the advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
crime. We may therefore apply the doctrine laid down in U.S. v. Bañagale, 24 Phil. 69,
to the effect that when the details and circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime are unknown, and there appears no evidence in the case that may indicate
the situation of the victim when he was killed or when it is not conclusively shown that
the violent death of a person was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
specified in Article 248, the crime must be classified as homicide, and not murder.

192
RULING
Appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of homicide without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, and condemned to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. It is so ordered.

193
Reporter #14
Hannani C. Langcua
#1 U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162
#2 U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217
194
1. U.S. vs. Taylor,
6 Phil. 162
Hannani C. Langcua
195
FACTS
The accused and his companions, in violations of a

lawful ordinance in the city of Manila, made use of
threatening and insulting language on the public
streets of the said city, in the presence and within
the hearing of a policeman. The said policeman
came to arrest them. It was proven at the trial that
while resisiting the arrest, the accused violently
assaulted the said policeman.
U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162 Hannani C. Langcua
196
ISSUE
Whether or not mitigating

circumstance should be taken into
consideration in this case?

197
RULING
The accused committed the offense in an uncontrollable burst of

sudden burst of passion but the fact that the offense was committed
under stimulus of a sudden burst of passion should not be taken
into consideration unless it appears that it was provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts. The anger and indignation of the accused
resulting from the arrest cannot be considered passional
obfuscation, because the policeman who arrested him was
performing a lawful duty.

198
2. U.S. vs. Hicks,
14 Phil. 217
Hannani C. Langcua
199
FACTS
For about 5 years, Augustus Hicks and Agustina

Sola illicitly lived together until trouble arise
between them causing Augustina to live Hicks’
house. A few days later, Augustina had a new
relations with another man. Hicks went to where
the two live and enraged by such conduct, he had
killed Agustina.
U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217 Hannani C. Langcua

200
ISSUE
Is mitigating circumstance present in

the defendant’s act?

201
RULING
No mitigating circumstance is present. Even if it is true that

the accused acted with obfuscation because of jelousy,
mitigating circumstance does not favor him. Loss of reason
and self-control produced by jelousy as alleged by the
defense, in as much as the only causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

202
Reporter #15
Moh'd Farhan A. Magomnang
#1 U.S. vs. de la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429
#2 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150
203
1. U.S. vs. de la Cruz,
22 Phil. 429
204
FACTS
Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his

querida when he caught her red-handed in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. Trial court
found defendant guilty of homicide without any extenuating
circumstances present. Defendant was sentenced to 14 years
8 months1 day of reclusion temporal (medium degree of
penalty prescribed by the code).
U.S. vs. de la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429 Moh'd Farhan A. Magomnang

205
ISSUE
Whether or not there is an

extenuating/mitigating circumstance
present?

206
RULING
YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present

in the case. The Court is of the opinion that the
defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance.

207
RULING
De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was

MODIFIED to homicide

208
2. U.S. vs. Rodriguez,
19 Phil. 150
209
FACTS
This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez,

Raymundo Revilla, Doroteo Rojas, Feliciano Pantanilla,
Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella,
Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin
Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Oalipusan and
Valentin Multialto from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Moro Province, Hon. Herbert D. Gale
presiding, convicting them of the crime of murder and
sentencing them each td death.
U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 Moh'd Farhan A. Magomnang

210
FACTS
From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears

that the appellants, with nine others, being members of the
second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao,
mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during
the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior
officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately after such
revolt the mutineers, having taken arms and ammunition
from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched
toward the mountains of Lipada

211
FACTS
From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears

that the appellants, with nine others, being members of the
second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao,
mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during
the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior
officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately after such
revolt the mutineers, having taken arms and ammunition
from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched
toward the mountains of Lipada;

212
FACTS
that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers returned to Davao
for the purpose of attacking the town; that the inhabitants thereof,
having received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared
themselves to meet it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M.
Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been detailed
by those commanding the defense of the town, on the afternoon of
the day referred to, advanced to the cemetery within the limits of
the town, forming an outpost for the purpose of awaiting the
coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they sighted the
mutineers;

213
FACTS
that immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others,
which came from near the cemetery, where the mutineers had
halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had been exchanged
Roy Libby was struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost
retreated to the convent and took refuge therein ; that the
mutineers advanced against the town, attacking it at various points
and especially the convent, where a portion of the residents of the
town had gathered, including the women and children:, for
the purpose of defending themselves; that no other person
except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or
less severely wounded.
214
ISSUE
Whether or not there was

present premeditacion conocida, qualifying
the crime as murder?

215
RULING
No, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim

and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring
notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring’s claim of
defense of a relative. Toring should be credited with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

216
Reporter #16
Daneva Anticamara
#1 People vs. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308
#2 People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570
217
1. People vs. Rodil,
109 SCRA 308
Daneva Anticamara
218
FACTS
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast
Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang,
Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market.
While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant,
appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having
been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian
clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the
restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying
himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a
license.
People vs. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308 Daneva Anticamara

219
FACTS
Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved

one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's
waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the
appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table
about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's
three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica. After the two were
already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table.

220
FACTS
After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from
his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after
signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant
refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to
him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they
would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly
pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt.
Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death
several hours thereafter.

221
FACTS
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt.
Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and
policeman Felix Mojica stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police
Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in
the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the
combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and
thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building
of Indang, Cavite, while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to
the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as
a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused.

222
ISSUE
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of

disregard of rank should be appreciated.

223
RULING
Yes. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank

should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim.
Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is
merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.

224
RULING
Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED

BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC
AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE
RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.

225
2. People vs. Pagal,
79 SCRA 570
Daneva Anticamara
226
FACTS
Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the crime of robbery
with homicide, with 4 generic aggravating circumstances. They stole the
amount of P1,281.00 and killed Gau-gan, their then employer, by stabbing
him with an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron pipe. During the
arraignment, the counsel for the accused informed the court of their
intention to plead guilty, provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove
the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the
victim immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. The judge asked
if that is truly what the accused wanted to do, and the accused agreed.
People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570 Daneva Anticamara

227
FACTS
The accused were arraigned and both pleaded guilty. The accused
were then allowed to present their evidence, which were claims of
maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased. After they rested their
case, the prosecution presented the statements of the accused and
other pertinent documents. After considering the aggravating
circumstances, and accepting only the mitigating circumstance of
pleading guilty, the court rendered its decision finding both accused
GUILTY, and sentenced to death. The case was elevated to the SC
for mandatory review on account of the death penalty imposed.

228
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in not

appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation
as claimed via evidence by the accused.

229
RULING
No. The trial court found the appellant’s contention devoid of

merit. First, mitigating circumstances presented can only be
counted as one, because they arose from the same incident. Second,
the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating
in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its
execution. Third, The maltreatment that appellants claim the
victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than
the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation, in order to
be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act.

230
RULING
After reviewing the case, the court held that there was only
one generic aggravatingcircumstance, instead of four, and
this was then offset by the only accepted
mitigatingcircumstance of the guilty plea. Through this, the
appellants were each imposed upon with thelesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

231
Reporter #17
Jamal H.I. Sangca
#1 People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689
#2 U.S. vs. Punsalan, 3 Phil. 260
232
1. U.S. vs. Taylor,
6 Phil. 162
Jamal H.I. Sangca
233
FACTS
On about 6 o’clock in the evening of March 3, 1923, the offended

party Inocencia Salva, a girl of 13 years old being in the kitchen of
the house herein accused, Teodoro Luchico as a servant of the latter
preparing a decoction of Senna Leaves, her master Approached her.
The accused threw her to the ground, caught hold to her knees
covered her mouth and mounted her, and taking out his genital
organ, wet it with saliva and introduced it with difficulty and great
suffering of the girl into her private parts and although on account
of the pain, she attempted to call for help, she could not do because
her mouth was covered by the accused.
People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689 Jamal H.I. Sangca

234
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty

of the act of Rape?
U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162 Jamal H.I. Sangca

235
RULING
Yes, the evidence of the prosecution has

established beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of
the accuse. That in imposing the penalty the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse
of confidence should be taken into consideration.
U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162 Jamal H.I. Sangca

236
2. U.S. vs. Punsalan,
3 Phil. 260
Jamal H.I. Sangca
237
FACTS
On August 10, 2002 at 5 or 6 pm, seaman 1 ST Class Amulfo Andal,

SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1
Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members
of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at a Naval Education and
training command at San Miguel, San Antonio Zambales. And on
about August 10, 2002 at 5 or 6 pm they went to the ALL in One
canteen to drink and at 10 pm transferred to Aquarius a videoke bar
where SN1 Bacosa and the appellant punsalan got into a fight. The
Navy group walked back to NETC Camp to avoid aggravating
conflict.
U.S. vs. Punsalan, 3 Phil. 260 Jamal H.I. Sangca

238
FACTS
The appellant however drunk drove Nissan and follow the group to
the camp. The Navy sentries flagged down punsalan and heard him
threaten the member of the Navy he fought in the Bar. Punsalan
charged forward despite being flagged down, hit the group of navy
personnel from behind and sped away resulting to the death of
Andal and Duclayna and injuries of the rest of the group. The
appellant was charged with complex crime of Double Murder
qualified by treachery with attempted murder attended by the
aggravating circumstances.

239
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime is qualified

as murder?

240
RULING
Yes, Treachery is clearly present in the crime.

There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means
methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tends directly and specially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended part might make.

241
Reporter #18
Putri Salam Diampuan
#1 U.S. vs. Barredo, 87 Phil. 800
#2 People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610
242
1. U.S. vs. Barredo,
87 Phil. 800
243
FACTS
On September 17, 1947 at about 11 o’clock in the evening,
Rafael Deita, accompanied by eight other men including the
three appellants Jorge Barredo, Crisologo Bandelion and
Salvador Falcis, fired at Jaime Boday outside the latter’s
house hitting him on the upper part of his right thigh which
caused his death on October 9, 1947. Afterwards, the band
entered the deceased house and took all the money they can
find and some valuables of the deceased’s wife. They were
charged of the crime of robbery with homicide under
paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the RPC.
U.S. vs. Barredo, 87 Phil. 800 Putri Salam Diampuan
244
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused entered

into conspiracy.

245
RULING
Yes. At the beginning, the accused may not have entered into
conspiracy to commit robbery but at the later part, before
the robbery took place, they learned about the evil plan and
entered into it. It is shown in the affidavits of the appellants
that two of them joined the actual act of robbery while the
other one was stationed at the house to act as a guard and
afterwards received their share of the loot.

246
2. People vs. Aguinaldo,
55 Phil. 610
247
FACTS
On April 29, 1930, the couple, Anselmo Oao and his wife
Geronima Lacar, went to a hill to dig up some roots to be
used as a medicine for the latter’s toothache and while
Anselmo was stooping down and digging up the roots, the
accused, Juan Aguinaldo, appeared and suddenly rushed to
Anselmo Oao and stabbed him from behind thru his bolo
which caused Anselmo’s death. Aguinaldo is charged with
the crime of murder penalized in Article 403 of the Penal
Code.
People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610 Putri Salam Diampuan

248
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty of

murder.

249
RULING
Yes. The dead man’s position when he received the

first blow was with his back and bent down because
he was digging up medical roots, entirely
unprepared and unable to defend himself from his
assailant. It clearly shows the defendant’s treachery
in attacking his victim, thereby qualifying the
crime as murder, defined and penalized in article
403 of the Penal Code.
250
Reporter #19
Jamimah Disomangcop
#1 People vs. Lungbos, 162 SCRA 383
#2 People vs. Licop, 94 Phil. 839
251
1. People vs. Lungbos,
162 SCRA 383
Jamimah Disomangcop
252
FACTS
On July 12, 1980 at about 7:30 in the evening, Narido and Jackariya Lungbos
alias "Nasser," with two unidentified companions, entered the Sweet Angel
Gardens Restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Tetuan Highway, Zamboanga City. They
occupied table No. 21 and ordered beer, cigarettes and some "pulutan." At
about 10:00 P.M., Lungbos went out of the restaurant. After closing the
door, Narido proceeded to table No. 16 and collared the customer Rolando
Chiong who was seated there. When the latter attempted to stand up, Narido
shot him with a pistol. His two companions proceeded to the counter and
poked a gun at the cashier, Elizabeth Mahinay, and at Julian Legarde, father-
in-law of the restaurant owner, who was seated behind the counter. They
demanded money from Mahinay and Legarde.
People vs. Lungbos, 162 SCRA 383 Jamimah Disomangcop

253
FACTS
They divested Legarde of his wrist watch and wallet

containing P40 and took the day's earnings of P800. A burst
of gunshots rang from the counter, then the malefactors fled
with their loot. Chiong, Legarde and the restaurant's cook,
Flaviano Gonzales, were hit. Legarde was rushed to the
Doctor's Hospital where he succumbed to a gunshot wound
in the abdomen. Chiong and Gonzales were brought to the
Zamboanga General Hospital. They survived.

254
ISSUE
The decision of the trial court is before Us for mandatory review.

Narido alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. In considering the aggravating circumstance of "robbery in band" despite
the absence of proof that more than three of the accused were armed;
2. In considering nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance despite lack of
evidence that the accused purposely sought it to commit the crime;
3. In holding that the appellant admitted the crime charged in the amended
information without mental reservation, including the aggravating
circumstances alleged therein; and
4. In imposing the supreme penalty of death upon the appellant.

255
RULING
The first assignment of error is well-taken. There is a band whenever
more than three malefactors acted together in the commission of the
offense (Art. 14, subpar. 6, Revised Penal Code). The crime was not
committed by a band because the prosecution failed to establish that
all four of the malefactors were armed.
The trial court properly considered nocturnity as an aggravating

circumstance, even if there was no direct evidence showing that the
conspirators sought the nighttime to commit the robbery for it
cannot be gainsaid that nocturnity facilitated the successful
commission of the crime.

256
RULING
The trial court did not err in holding Narido bound by his judicial
confession of guilt under the amended information. There is no
higher evidence of guilt than the accused's own confession. Unless
nullified by evidence of duress a voluntary plea of guilty is
admissible as evidence of guilt of a high quality.
The last assignment of error has become moot in view of the

abolition of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.

257
RULING
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding the accused Romeo Narido y Remigio

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code is affirmed, except his penalty which is reduced to reclusion
perpetua with all the accessories provided by law, in consonance with Section
19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He is further ordered:
1. To indemnify the heirs of the deceased Julian Legarde in the amount of
P30,000 plus the sum of P540 representing the value of the wrist watch
and money that he and his companions took from the deceased, and
2. To pay the restaurant-owner Andres Enriquez y Fernandez the sum of
P800 that was taken from the restaurant's receipts.

258
2. People vs. Licop,
94 Phil. 839
Jamimah Disomangcop
259
FACTS
Carmen Licop y Suarez, hereinafter to be referred to as Carmen, was
prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in two information, one
for serious illegal detention and another for robbery. After a joint trial,
Carmen was acquitted in the latter case on the ground that the prosecution
had failed to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
but was convicted of the court over the subject matter, but was convicted of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized by article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, and, in
view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, aid of armed women
and the use of a motor vehicle, as against the sole mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction, was sentenced to death. This judgment of conviction is
now before us on review section 9 Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.
People vs. Licop, 94 Phil. 839 Jamimah Disomangcop

260
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable of

the crime of serious illegal detention and
kidnapping?

261
RULING
The crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention penalized
by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18,
with reclusion temporal in its maximum to death, the victim being not only a
minor but also a female. In view of the presence of the three aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, aid of armed women, and the use of a motor
vehicle and the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, the
penalty imposed by the trial court, which is death, is proper; but for lack of
necessary votes, said penalty is reduced to life imprisonment.
It being understood that the defendant Carmen Licop y Suarez is hereby

sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment is affirmed. So
ordered with costs.

262
Reporter #20
Humphrey James Jaraba
#1 People vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611
#2 People vs. Ompad, 26 SCRA 750
263
1. People vs. Lagarto,
196 SCRA 611
264
FACTS
On May 25, 1983, Reynato Aducal who was buying fish in the public market
of Poblacion, Laoang, Nothern Samar, was stabbed using a Balisong by
Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. The wound incurred to the deceased were
fatal causing immediate death. The wounds were located at the chest area.
The perpetrator was immediately apprehended by Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan
while on his routine patrol over the area. After the apprehension, the
accused admitted to killing the deceased over revenge for stabbing his
brother last 1980. The record shows that, during arraignment, the accused
pleaded a guilty plea. The court asked the accused if he understands the
meaning or consequences of pleading guilty, to which the accused
responded with certainty. Nonetheless, the court still directed the
prosecution to present its evidence to determine the degree of culpability of
the accused.
People vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611 Humphrey James Jaraba
265
FACTS
Based on the accused guilty plea and the presentation of the prosecution, the trial court
rendered judgment which is read as follow:
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, appreciating in
his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH with all the accessories provided
for in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the
amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the cost. So ordered.

266
FACTS
(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)
The judgement of Death penalty automatically warrants the review
of the Supreme Court. However, upon review, the Supreme Court altered
the decision of the lower court to reclusion perpetua. As per decision of the
Supreme Court, the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the
time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal
Code. Herein accused had been convicted of the crime of homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No.
1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein accused alleged that the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983,
hence when the accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal
Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.
267
FACTS
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial"
is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment. The phrase "at
the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to
mean the date of arraignment.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that they have not found an
evident display of premeditation and treachery committed in this
case. According to them, premeditation requires 3 requisites which
are as follows:

268
FACTS
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his
determination; and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704; People vs.
Montejo, 167 SCRA 506).

269
FACTS
According to the Supreme Court, the admission of the accused that he longed
plan to kill the deceased as an act of retaliation is not enough to consider the act
premeditated. It was necessary to establish meditation from the time is was
conceived to the time the crime was actually perpetrated. Thus, the defendant’s
admission was only considered an expression of his determination to commit the
crime and not as a manifestation of premeditation. Treachery cannot also be
established as there was no enough evidence establish in this trial. There is no
evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the
perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that the victim might put
up. There is an absence of evidence to show the means employed by assailant and
the mode of attack. Treachery may not be simply deduced from assumptions; it
must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the crime into
murder.

270
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the

existence of recidivism and the qualifying circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery.

271
RULING
No. The Trial Court’s judgment was modified by the Supreme

Court. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, the Court sentenced said accused to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an
indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).

272
RULING
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall
have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September
15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final
on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on
October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the
accused is a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final
judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the
second offense.

273
RULING
The court also found no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident
premeditation and treachery existed in the commission of the crime. It is a
rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation
and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the
existence of these qualifying circumstances.
Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites; (a) the

time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.

274
RULING
To adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish

that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the
time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant’s proposition in killing Reynaldo
Aducal in retaliation for the act of Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, was
nothing but an expression of his own determination to commit the crime which is
entirely different from premeditation.
In addition, in order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the

manner in which the victim was attacked. Treachery can in no way be presumed but
must be fully proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden
and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, the circumstance of
treachery cannot be taken into account.

275
RULING
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode

of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the
perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that
the victim might put up. There is an absence of evidence to
show the means employed by assailant and the mode of
attack.

276
2. People vs. Ompad,
26 SCRA 750
277
RULING
On around 8:00 pm of May 7, 1962 in Sitio Inalaran, Barrio San Isidro,

Municipality of Sta. Rita, Samar, Simplicio Tapulado, together with his
common-law wife were about to retire for the night when they have heard
someone calling out from the outside of their house asking Simplicio to
come out. After identifying the identity of the caller, who is Vicente Ompad,
Simplicio got up to push open the shutter when a gunshot was heard fired
by Vicente Ompad. Simplicio fell down the ground immediately lifeless.
Meanwhile, the common-law wife, Dominga del Monte, who has risen
almost simultaneously with Simplicio, was about to light the lamp when
another gunshot was fired but this time by one Angel Libre who was
standing beside Vicente Ompad.
People vs. Ompad, 26 SCRA 750 Humphrey James Jaraba

278
RULING
Hit on the chest, Dominga instinctively tried to run to the

inner room for safety but fell dead after a few steps.
However, Dominga’s 17 year old son, Pablo del Monte, was
able to escape such misfortune when he hid himself in the
kitchen. From the position he was hidden, he was able to
identify the assailants and narrate the scenes that took place
as he become a witness to the case.

279
RULING
Upon apprehension of the assailants by Sgt. Exequiel Loreno of the

64th PC stationed at Catbalogan. It was later found out at the
investigation that Pastor Libutin, Vicente Ompad and other
individuals in company, while drinking alcoholic beverages, were
already planning to kill the deceased earlier that evening.
According to the narration of the state witness, Lucio Samar, which
also one of their company earlier of that evening, it was Pastor
Libutin who proposed to Vicente Ompad to kill the deceased
because he has a grudge towards him. In fact, the bullets fired by
Vicente Ompad were supplied by Pastor Libutin.

280
ISSUE
Whether or not an evident premeditation

was present in this case?

281
RULING
Yes. The evident premeditation is present in this case. Premeditation is
evident as the instigator of the crime, Pastor Libutin, is the one who
instigated and planted the idea of committing the crime to Vicente Ompad
(triggerman) even if there is an absence of grudge between Vicente and
Simplicio (deceased). He even supplied the ammunition towards Vicente
when hesitation from the triggerman presented. He also staged the
intoxication of his companions to provide him with a suitable and
convenient avenue to present his idea of a crime. He was also close with the
triggerman when walking towards the house of the deceased until the
shooting. Thus, with these series of event, it is clear that Pastor Libutin
carried out his plan deliberately before planning implying evident
premeditation.

282
Reporter #21
Charity Niel S. Casas
#1 People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579
#2 People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534
283
1. People vs. Carillo,
77 Phil. 579
284
FACTS
On June 4, 1947, between 8 and 9 p.m., Emma Foronda-Abaya and her fried Marcelino
Lontok Jr., while walking side by side on Pampanga Street, Manila. on their way home
from the Far Eastern University, were held up by two men, each at the point of a pistol,
and were robbed of their personal belongings. After robbing Emma, one of the two
robbers took her to a secluded place, a vacant lot south of the street, and attempted to
rape her. The satyr did not succeed in raping his victim because she valiantly resisted
and in the course of the struggle both of them fell on the mire beside the log. At that
precise the other robber left Marcelino and approach his companion, telling him to
stop and inviting him to leave the place. Marcelino escaped to seek help. At a distance
of about 15 meters he heard two shots. When later in the same evening he returned to
the place with a police patrol, they found Emma dead, her chest and abdomen pierced
by two bullets. Two empty shells were found at the scene of the crime.
People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579 Charity Niel S. Casas

285
FACTS
The court declared Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio

the guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of robbery with homicide and robbery with violence against
and intimidation of person respectively, without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

286
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in not

considering the aggravating circumstances
which facilitated the commission of the
offense.

287
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, the trial court erred in
not considering the aggravating circumstances of:
(1) recidivism, said appellant having been convicted twice of
robbery;
(2) nocturnity, which facilitated the commission of the
offense and rendered detection difficult; and
(3) abuse of superior strength, considering his sex and the
weapon he used in the act which overcame the victim and
rendered her unable to defend herself from his savage
aggression (United States vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil., 612).
288
RULING
The attempted rape committed by Carillo on the

same occasion may be penalized separately, but
the court think there is no need to do so, and that
they consider it only as a further aggravation of the
offense. There is no mitigating circumstance.

289
2. People vs. Yturriaga,
86 Phil. 534
290
FACTS
The appellant was municipal mayor of Robon, Province of Samar.
On August 3, 1947, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accompanied
by a policeman, he raided a house where a game of monte was
being or was to be played. Upon seeing the accused, the gamblers or
would-be gamblers fled from the house and were not arrested,
except one whom the defendant caught up with and grabbed. When
he emerged from the gambling house, the accused met Jose Balite
walking down the street with a 12-year old daughter. And there shot
Jose Balite. Later he voluntarily surrendered and confessed his guilt
before the court about the crime. It also appears that Balite had
been a rival candidate for mayor and was a political enemy of the
accused.
People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534 Charity Niel S. Casas
291
FACTS
The appellant was charged with murder in the Court of First

Instance of Samar allegedly with two aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and taking advantage of his public position.
The court, therefore, sentences the accused to suffer an

imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with civil interdiction for life
and perpetual absolute disqualification, indemnify the heirs of Jose
Balite in the sum of P4,000 and pay the cost of this action.

292
FACTS
There he appealed that he voluntarily surrendered and pleaded

guilty of the crime but pleaded not guilty of the two aggravating
circumstances.
In finding the concurrence of evident premeditation as a generic

aggravating circumstance, the court relied solely on the testimony
of witness that the defendant in a speech in February 1947 has said
that he will going to kill Jose Balite.

293
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant is guilty for the

aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his public
position.

294
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the remarks attributed to the

accused, granting he was correctly quoted, are utterly
insufficient to warrant the finding of evident premeditation.
It is more reasonable to believe that the accused made those
remarks, if he made them, in a fit of anger without meaning
what he said. It is worth noting that the defendant is
impulsive and hot tempered, as the record abundantly
indicates.

295
RULING
In the second place, supposing again that the accused was in
the earnest when he made the threat, yet there is no showing
that he persisted in his plan and that the killing was the
culmination of it. It should be kept in mind that the alleged
threat was made six months before Balite was murdered.
Living in the same town as the deceased all that time, the
defendant could easily have killed his enemy long before
August, 1947, if he had not given up his determination to slay
him. We are inclined to the theory that there was some
provocation.
296
RULING
Based in the case of U.S. v. Gil ( 13 Phil. 530) and other
decisions of the court, it was laid down as a rule that the
circumstance of evident premeditation must be evident and
not merely suspected, by which is meant “ a period sufficient
in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation
and reflection and sufficient to allow the conscience of the
actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to
harken to its warnings.” Judged by this standard, the
aggravating circumstance of evident premediation has not
been satisfactorily established in this case.
297
RULING
The allegation that the defendant took advantage of his

office is also unwarranted by the proof. In killing the
deceased, the appellant did not avail himself of "the
influence, prestige or ascendancy which go with his position
as a means of securing the execution of the crime." In other
words, his being a mayor did not in any way facilitate the
murder. He could have committed the crime in the same
form or manner and with the same ease if he had been a
plain citizen.

298
Reporter #22
Yrrem Ubagan
#1 People vs. Tadeo, 389 SCRA 20
#2 People vs. Belgar, 195 SCRA 98
299
1. People vs. Tadeo,
389 SCRA 20
Yrrem Ubagan
300
FACTS
On 4 November 1993, around 11:30 in the morning, accused-

appellant Michael Tadeo was drinking with the deceased Mayolito
Cabatu and several others in a party hosted by Nicomedes
Cabacungan in Sto. Domingo, Quirino, Isabela, to celebrate the
successful installation of a water pump that would supply potable
water to their barangay. Mayolito shouted "barako," apparently to
tease accused-appellant and titillate him into a "fight" who, true
enough, took offense against the mocking remark. accused-
appellant Michael Tadeo instantaneously grabbed a beer bottle and
tried to whack Mayolito with it on the head.
People vs. Tadeo, 389 SCRA 20 Yrrem Ubagan

301
FACTS
But Ricky Cardona and Florencia Cabatu quickly intervened to prevent

accused-appellant from inflicting harm upon Mayolito. Accused-appellant
briskly went home exclaiming, "Aguray kadta a!" which means "Wait, I will
come back!" Then he hastily returned clutching a .38 cal. revolver and
confronted Mayolito, Ricky and Florencia why they were intervening.
Mayolito vainly tried to grapple with accused-appellant who lost no time in
shooting Mayolito six (6) times, some bullets piercing his head. Accused-
appellant then trained his gun on Florencia, but unfortunately, the pistol did
not fire as it was already empty. accused-appellant retreated towards his
house to reload his gun, and upon his return, immediately shot Florencia on
her left buttock. Afterwards accused-appellant surrendered to authorities.

302
ISSUE
Whether or not Aggravating circumstances

treachery and evident premeditation was present
in this case.

303
RULING
In this appeal, accused-appellant does not challenge the finding of

the trial court that he killed Mayolito Cabatu and injured his
mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the possessor of the .38
cal. revolver, but questions the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and claims
that he should instead be held guilty of homicide and frustrated
homicide only. accused-appellant Michael Tadeo and the deceased
Mayolito Cabatu were both drunk and the fight was preceded by
rising tempers.

304
RULING
Invariably, accused-appellant was not in full possession of his

faculties which would have been necessary for him to kill Mayolito
Cabatu, or try to kill Florencia Cabatu with the attendant evident
premeditation, i.e., the execution of the criminal act must come
with sober thought and reflection upon the In turn, because of
accused-appellant's mental and moral stupor at the time of the
perpetration of the criminal acts, the prosecution could not have
proved the requisites of this qualifying circumstance:

305
RULING
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the

crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to
his determination; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between
the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and for his conscience to
overcome his will.

306
RULING
In the same vein, having been inebriated and overtaken by anger
immediately prior to the assault, accused-appellant cannot be
accused of treachery. Under this state, he did not have the time nor
the proper disposition to reflect on the means or mode of attack for
it to be said that he deliberately and consciously pulled out his gun
and fired at the deceased to insure the commission of the crime
without risk to himself. Furthermore, the heated exchanges
between him and the deceased prior to the attack must have placed
the latter on his guard, hence, we cannot rule that Mayolito Cabatu
was caught completely by surprise when accused-appellant took up
arms against him.

307
RULING
For there to be treachery by reason of the suddenness and

unexpectedness of the attack, there must have been no warning of
any sort to the deceased or offended party. Verily, the statement of
accused-appellant to Mayolito Cabatu, viz, "Aguray kadta a!"
meaning "Wait, I will come back!" which the deceased took
seriously, as he did confront Michael Tadeo when he returned,
shows convincingly that the victim was not unprepared nor stunned
to see accused-appellant wielding a gun and firing at him. The
element of a sudden unprovoked attack indicative of treachery was
therefore missing.

308
2. People vs. Belgar,
195 SCRA 98
Yrrem Ubagan
309
FACTS
This is a case of rape of a 12-year old girl, a mental retardate with

the mentality of a 6-year old. The assailant is a young man who is a
habitual drug addict. Belgar committed rape when he approached
Lorelyn, the victim,while watching television. Meanwhile, Edu, a
nephew of accused, four years of age, approached the mother of
Lorelyn and informed her "Lorelyn is pinapatungan by Kuya Boy."
Belgar claims that Lorelyn herself testified that she was not rape but
only was kissed and fingered, and that he came from a pot session
just before the incident occurred. The court later found out that
Lorelyn was deflowered by Belgar long before the current case
People vs. Belgar, 195 SCRA 98 Yrrem Ubagan

310
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant’s conviction of rape be

reverse and whether was there any aggravating
circumstance involved?

311
RULING
Article 335, paragraph 3, which states rape committed against a

woman under 12 years of age. In this case, the appellant was
charged with rape through force and intimidation of the
complainant who is a 12-year-old minor, and a retardate. And
although the complainant was already 12 years old at the time, she
was undeniably a retardate with the mentality of a 6-year old child,
so that she also falls under the fourth category, for being under 12
years of age.

312
RULING
MORE IMPORTANTLY, Under Section 17 of the Dangerous Drugs Act

of 1972, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, "when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous
drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the
penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code." This should serve as a
sufficient deterrent if not a warning to those who are inclined to if not
actually habitually addicted to drugs. Their addiction will be no excuse
but will aggravate any offense they commit.

313
Reporter #23
Johayra Yusoph
#1 People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1
#2 People vs. Verzo, 129 Phil. 628
314
1. People vs. Madrid,
88 Phil. 1
Johayra Yusoph
315
FACTS
▣ On February 1947, Yosua (S.B. Young), a Chinese merchant in

Manila, together with Ponciano Felicisimo, who drove, and two
laborers by the name Demetrio Sinio and Feliciano Guyapo,
made a trip to Isabela in an International truck, to buy palay. All
four went missing and unheard for.
▣ Lina Cayetano, Young’s business partner and co-owner in the
truck, reported their disappearance to the authorities. The
missing truck, or most of what remained of it was found in
Cabanatuan, in the possession of one Valentin Magno.
People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1 Johayra Yusoph

316
FACTS
▣ Pursuant to an informant’s tip, the authorities called for Paciano

Madrid for questioning. Madrid was a driver by profession and a
special agent of the military police. He went to Isabela, in his
own jeep and ran into Soriano, Lacalinao and Manuel, his
townmates, and they asked for a ride in his jeep. On the way to
Nueva Ecija, they stopped when they came upon on overturned
bulldozer.

317
FACTS
▣ Soon after, Young’s truck appeared and Madrid signaled the

driver to halt. Madrid requested the driver to pull the bulldozer
out of the way and the driver replied that he had no chain. After
that, Vicente de los Santos boarded the truck, drew his revolver
and hauled down the Chinese, while Macario did the same with
the two laborers. He (accused) was also carrying a pistol as special
agent of the military police. Vicente put the Chinese in the jeep
and Macario did likewise to the two laborers upon Madrid’s
orders.

318
FACTS
▣ Madrid and Vicente agreed to kill the four men.The first one
Madrid killed was the Chinaman, shooting him in the forehead
then killed the other two while Vicente killed the other one then
drove the truck to Cabanatuan where he sold the rice for P2,300
and gave the truck to Valentin Magno.

319
ISSUE
• Whether or not the crime was committed with treachery.

• Whether or not Madrid being a law officer is an aggravating
circumstance.

320
RULING
• Yes. The victims were killed in such a way as to be deprived of

opportunity to repel the attack or escape with any possibility of
success.
• Yes. He took advantage of his position. He committed the crime with
the aid of a gun which he had been authorized to carry as a peace
officer; and he succeeded in going through the check point with the
stolen truck and its cargo unsuspected of misdeed, thanks to his
official position.

321
2. People vs. Verzo,
129 Phil. 628
Johayra Yusoph
322
FACTS
On July 6, 1962, the three (Getulio, Reynaldo and Roberto Verzo) defendants
attacked Camino with their bolos which resulted to the latter’s death. After
attacking Camino who was able to run away from them before he died, the
defendants turned their fury at Filemon Casis whom they hacked and
stabbed, until Filemon fell down unconscious. Policeman Lope Jariel, who
was escorting Filemon that time, bade Getulio not to take the law into his
hands and fired warning shots to dissuade the Verzos from furthering the
crime, but to no avail.
Defendants were charged with murder of Benjamin Camino and of
frustrated murder for the injuries inflicted upon Filemon Casis. The
defendants argued that the lower court erred in appreciating the presence of
treachery and abuse of superior strength.
People vs. Verzo, 129 Phil. 628 Johayra Yusoph

323
ISSUE
• Whether or not the lower Court erred in appreciating the

presence of treachery and abuse of superior strength.
• Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities.

324
RULING
• No. Although the defendants may be given the benefit of doubt on whether
or not there had been treachery, it is manifest that they had acted with abuse
of superior strength, for whereas the three of them were wielding bolos,
Benjamin Camino was unarmed and trying to flee.
• No. Although Patrolman Jariel was present at the scene of the crime, it can
not be said that the same has been committed in contempt of or with insult to
the public authorities, inasmuch that a policeman is merely an agent of a
person in authority, not a person in authority.

325
Reporter #24
Naim Nohar Suba
#1 People vs. Fontillas, 638 SCRA 721
#2 People vs. Mondigo, 543 SCRA 384
326
1. People vs. Fontillas,
638 SCRA 721
Naim Nohar Suba
327
FACTS
Narration (as summarized by the Court of Appeals):

July 18, 2006 &
December 8, 2001 June 24, 2002 September 23, 2002 October 28, 2005 November 16, 2006 January 29, 2008
In the evening of December 08, 2001, while private complainant was sleeping in their
house in Bamban, Masinloc, Zambales with her younger brother, she was awakened by
the arrival of their father, appellant Andres Fontillas, whom she heard coughing. She
stood up and helped appellant enter their house because he was drunk. She let him
sleep beside them. After a while, she was roused by appellant who was then taking off
her short pants. She cried but he warned her not to make any noise. After removing his
own pants, appellant pressed down ("inipit") both her hands and feet and covered her
mouth with his hands. She kept quiet because she was afraid of him.
People vs. Fontillas, 638 SCRA 721 Naim Nohar Suba

328
FACTS
July 18, 2006 &
After satisfying his lust, appellant went out of the house. When
appellant left, she went to report the incident to her Aunt who lived
nearby. After hearing her story, her Aunt did not allow her to go
back to their house. Complainant also informed her Uncle about the
incident. He then brought her to the police station where she
executed a sworn statement. After the investigation, complainant was
brought to the Home for Girls where she resided.

329
FACTS
July 18, 2006 &
Accused-appellant Andres Fontillas, also known as "Anding," was qualified of rape by

his relationship with and the minority on the evening of December 08, 2001 as defined
and penalized under Articles 266-A(1)(c) and 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and Verified Complaint of the
daughter, the offended party; Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Liezl dela Llana Edaño (Dr.
Edaño), the medico-legal who physically examined the offended party for signs of
sexual abuse; Ana A. Ecle’s Letter and Social Case Study Report, a social worker from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who referred and placed the
offended party under the protective custody of said institution; and offended party’s
Certificate of Live Birth.

330
FACTS
July 18, 2006 &
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of accused-

appellant who denied offended party’s accusation; and accused-appellant’s
relative and neighbor, who testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on December 8,
2001, he saw accused-appellant under a tamarind tree, drunk, with his head
bowed down.

331
FACTS
July 18, 2006 &
RTC’s decision dated October 28, 2005 decreed that accused Andres Fontillas y Calpo is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Incestuous Rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. Accused is ordered to pay the
victim ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua. In his present
appeal, Fontillas argues that his severe intoxication from consuming eight bottles of gin
with two drinking buddies on the night of 8 December 2001 was corroborated by his
cousin, who saw him drunk under a tamarind tree, and even by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses themselves. The RTC and the Court of Appeals should have at
least appreciated his intoxication as a mitigating circumstance that would absolve him
from any criminal liability.
332
ISSUE
Should Fontillas’ intoxication be

appreciated as a mitigating circumstance,
as provided for in Article 15 of RPC?

333
RULING
No. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the accused-appellant's
assertion that his extreme intoxication from alcohol on the night of
the rape should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that intoxication is an

alternative circumstance. The intoxication of the offender shall
be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the
same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony;
But when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

334
RULING
The person pleading intoxication must present evidence that his intoxication
was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. Moreover,
he must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as it would blur his reason. Accused-appellant did
not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent
to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must
likewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly
failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication
on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had
taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties.

335
2. People vs. Mondigo,
543 SCRA 384
Naim Nohar Suba
336
FACTS
The prosecution evidence showed that in the morning of September 27,

1998, the appellant, Perlito Mondigo, along with Damaso Delima, Damaso’s
son, Delfin Delima, and three other unidentified individuals were having a
drinking spree in Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. At around noon, Damaso’s other
son, Anthony Delima, joined the group. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant
Perlito Mondigo, using a bolo, suddenly hacked Anthony on the head,
causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked
Damaso.
September 27, 1998 February 15, 2002 March 16, 2005
People vs. Mondigo, 543 SCRA 384 Naim Nohar Suba

337
FACTS
A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing shouts coming
from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant
repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward
off appellant’s blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained.
While Anthony sustained a 15.25-centimeter long lacerated wound on his
left temporal area.

338
FACTS
The trial court found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of Damaso
and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony, mitigated by
intoxication. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Anthony and Lumagi, and correspondingly found
unconvincing appellants claim of self-defense. The trial court also held
that treachery qualified Damaso’s killing.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the modification
of the trial court’s judgment by holding appellant liable only for
Homicide for the killing of Damaso.

339
FACTS
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling with the
modification that appellant was liable for Frustrated Murder for the hacking of
Anthony. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are credible despite the inconsistencies appellant noted as these had
nothing to do with the central question of whether appellant attacked Anthony
and Damaso with a bolo; (2) the lack of motive for appellant to attack the victims
does not negate the commission of the crimes in question as motive becomes
material only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt; and (3) Damaso’s
killing was attended by treachery as appellant launched his attack without any
warning, leaving the victims no chance to defend themselves.

340
FACTS
Appellant was charged before court with Murder and Frustrated Murder
qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, and taking advantage of
superior strength.
Appellant invoked self-defense. According to him, a quarrel broke out
between him and Anthony during their drinking spree. Damaso and Delfin
arrived and ganged-up on him. He ran home, followed by Anthony,
Damaso, and Delfin. Upon reaching his house, he got hold of a flat bar and
whacked Anthony’s head with it. Damaso attacked him with a bolo but
Damaso lost hold of the weapon which fell to the ground. Appellant
retrieved the bolo and used it to hack Damaso.

341
ISSUE
The issue is whether appellant is guilty of

Murder and Frustrated Murder, as charged.

342
RULING
• The court find appellant guilty of Homicide and Frustrated Murder.

• By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was
charged albeit under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of
the crimes. Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended
by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the location and nature of the wound inflicted
against Anthony and the manner by which appellant carried out his attack shows intent
to kill and treachery.

343
RULING
• Intoxication as mitigating circumstance not proven. The trial court made a mistake in crediting
appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because the stabbing
incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree. For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to
be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual,
not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused’s drunkenness affected his mental
faculties. Here, the only proof is appellant’s testimony that he drank about 3 to 4 bottles of
beer. The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor that the appellant drank, and the
absence of any independent proof that appellants alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all
negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to
mitigate his liability.
• In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, it is proper to impose upon appellant
a prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of Damaso civil indemnity
of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 which are awarded automatically.

344
Reporter #25
Roxan A. Tecson
#1 People vs. Abello, 582 SCRA 378
#2 People vs. Latag, 420 SCRA 695
345
1. People vs. Abello,
582 SCRA 378
Roxan A. Tecson
346
FACTS
Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted

of one count of violation of paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended; and two (2) counts of
violation of sexual abuse under RA 7610 committed against
his step daughter, AAA.
For these crimes, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of twelve (12) years or prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, and two reclusion
perpetuas, respectively.
People vs. Abello, 582 SCRA 378 Roxan A. Tecson

347
FACTS
The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she
was just 7 months. On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock
morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas with her
sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello
again mashed the breast of AAA under the same situation while the
latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to
recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside. Then on
July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello placed his soft penis inside
the mouth of AAA. The victim on the same date reported the
incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
348
ISSUE
Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not

absolving the accused-appellant of the crime.

349
RULING
Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other

arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons:
• First , the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice

between the offended party’s positive testimony and the
denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that
the mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot
take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party.

350
RULING
• Second , we flatly reject Abellos argument that his relationship
with AAA insulates him from the crimes charged. Our judicial
experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the
relationship between the offender and the offended party has
never been an obstacle to the commission of the crime against
chastity.
• Third , we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of
the incidents complained of, to be preposterous. In the normal
course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks unless she
is certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against
the perpetrator.

351
2. People vs. Latag,
420 SCRA 695
Roxan A. Tecson
352
FACTS
Appellant was charged with two counts of rape, one in the criminal complaint filed by
Charen May L Sarmiento and in another, by Stephanie L Sarmiento.
For Criminal Case No. 1458-97:
“ That on or about the 5th day of April, 1997 in the evening, at Sitio Santol,
Baranga Nangkaan,[3] Municipality of Mataasnakahoy,[4] Province of Batangas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of the said twelve
(12) year-old girl, Charen May Sarmiento y Latag, against her will and consent.”
People vs. Latag, 420 SCRA 695 Roxan A. Tecson

353
FACTS
Criminal Case No. 0460-97:
“That sometime in the month of April, 1997, at Sitio Santol, Barangay Nagkaan,
Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
with and have carnal knowledge of the said ten (10) year-old girl, Stephanie
Sarmiento y Latag, against her will and consent.”
For insuffiency of evidence, the trial court acquitted appellant of the rape of Charen
May. However, it found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping Stephanie and
sentences him to suffer the death penalty.

354
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in

imposing the penalty of death upon accused-
appellant.

355
RULING
We affirm the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape, but reduce the
penalty to reclusion perpetua for the failure of the complaint to allege his
relationship with the victim.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
“When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.”

356
RULING
Indeed, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon the perpetrator, if his
relationship with the victim is not duly alleged in the complaint or
information. If the offender is merely a relation -- not a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim --
the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is a
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.
Both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; if not, a
conviction for rape in its qualified form will be barred. In the present case,
while the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the Complaint, her
relationship with appellant was not specifically stated therein.

357
Reporter #26
Indirah M. Gaffar
#1 People vs. Sumarago, 422 SCRA 324
#2 People vs. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374
358
1. People vs. Sumarago,
422 SCRA 324
Indirah M. Gaffar
359
FACTS
Teodora Brigole have her in her custody her four children

with his spouse who left her. Two of them were girls
Norelyn and her older sister Doneza. In 1991, Teodora and
the appellant, Levi Sumarago, an eighteen-year-old
mestizo Subanen, started living together as husband and
wife. They had two children. Teodora and Levi often
quarreled because of their myriad problems. In 1993, then
thirteen-year-old Doneza went to Malaysia for
employment.
People vs. Sumarago, 422 SCRA 324 Indirah M. Gaffar

360
FACTS
In the morning of March 5, 1995, Norelyn, who was then

barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the
appellant in the latter’s farmland. While they were nearing
a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the
stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness.

361
FACTS
She had her clothes when she woke up. It was

about noon. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in
her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of
her right leg. The appellant warned her not to tell her
mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.

362
FACTS
On March 13, 1995, Norelyn and the appellant were again

gathering firewood. The appellant ordered her to follow
him to the banana plantation owned by Mejorcada
in Barangay Manlin, Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He walked
ahead, while Norelyn followed. She then lost sight of the
appellant.

363
FACTS
As she passed by the banana plantation, the appellant

suddenly appeared and grabbed her. He then forced her
to lie down. He removed her panties and when she tried
to shout, he covered her mouth with his hand. He
mounted and raped her. After he was satiated, he warned
her “Don’t you ever tell, I will surely kill you”.

364
FACTS
After that occurrence, Norelyn and the appellant

were again gathering firewood. She was raped
again and this incident continued on the
following dates March 24, 1995, April 2, 1995,
and April 11, 1995.

365
FACTS
On October 29, 1996, Teodora and Norelyn filed a criminal

complaint for rape against the appellant with the
Municipal Trial Court of Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. The
appellant was charged with five counts of rape in five
Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 20. The appellant denied the
charges.

366
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erroneously

sentenced him to suffer the death penalty
despite the absence of any allegation in the
Information that he was the victim’s
stepfather?

367
RULING
No

368
RULING
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the accused
may be sentenced to death if rape is committed
under any of the following attendant
circumstances:

369
RULING
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age

and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

370
RULING
The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her filiation

with the appellant or the fact that the appellant was the
common-law husband of Teodora, Norelyn’s mother, must
be alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and proved
by the prosecution.

371
RULING
Although the crimes were committed before the

effectivity of the new Rule, it should be applied
retroactively, as the same is favorable to the
appellant.

372
RULING
The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship

presupposes a legitimate relationship a valid
marriage between the accused and the mother of
the private complainant. And the best evidence to
prove the marriage between the accused and the
mother of the private complainant is their
marriage contract.

373
RULING
Norelyn’s bare testimony and that of her mother

that the appellant is her stepfather is insufficient
evidence to prove such allegation. No less than the
presiding judge of the trial court stated during the
trial that the appellant was merely Teodora’s
common-law husband.

374
RULING
In these cases, the Information failed to allege that the

appellant is the legal or common-law husband of Teodora; or
that he was Norelyn’s stepfather. Hence, the appellant should
be found guilty only of four counts of simple rape and not of
rape in its qualified form. Accordingly, the appellant should
be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count of rape.

375
2. People vs. Ulit,
423 SCRA 374
Indirah M. Gaffar
376
FACTS
The appellant, Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy, is found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified
rape. In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of
two counts of acts of lasciviousness.
People vs. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 Indirah M. Gaffar

377
FACTS
For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to

suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for each count
of acts of lasciviousness the appellant was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. The appellant was, likewise, ordered
to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano.

378
FACTS
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano,

four information were filed against her uncle, the
appellant. The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases
ensued. In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing
psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General Hospital.
On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first
witness.

379
FACTS
In her sworn statement, Lucelle alleged that sometime in

November 1996, she was sleeping in a room in the house.
It was about 6 oclock in the evening, when she was
awakened by her uncle and raped. She was threatened not
to tell anyone about that.

380
FACTS
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the

appellant entered and kissed her and raped her. Sometime
in February 1997, the appellant again abused her
(sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11
o’clock in the evening. He again warned her not to divulge
to her parents what he did to her.

381
FACTS
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter,

Celso and Lourdes brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to
Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. Lucelle told the
barangay chairman that the appellant sexually abused her.
Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the barangay
chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting
Lucelle.

382
FACTS
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6,

1997, the barangay chairman ordered him and Barangay
Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant
to the barangay hall.

383
FACTS
A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the

Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that
he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997,
despite her resistance, and that he threatened to kill her
and her family if she divulged the incidents to her
parents. The appellant signed his statement in the
presence of the barangay chairman and the barangay
tanods.

384
FACTS
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought

to the Makati City Police Headquarters where Celso,
Lourdes, and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for
rape and acts of lasciviousness.

385
ISSUE
Whether or not the death penalty should be

imposed on the appellant, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime.

386
RULING
No

387
RULING
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has

been adequately established. The allegations in both
information that the appellant is the victim’s uncle, a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree is specific
enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship.

388
RULING
The prosecutions evidence has also shown that the

appellant is the victim’s uncle, being the older
brother of the victim’s mother, a fact that the
appellant himself admitted.

389
RULING
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of

the victim. In People v. Pruna, the Court, after noting the
divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases,
set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as qualifying circumstance.

390
RULING
No birth certificate or any similar authentic

document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Lucelle’s age

391
RULING
While the victim testified that she was born on February 19,
1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice raped
her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not
expressly and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna.

392
RULING
The corroboration of Lucelle’s mother as to her age is not

sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said
certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was unavailable
without the fault of the prosecution. The fact that there was
no objection from the defense regarding the victim’s age
cannot be taken against the appellant since it is the
prosecution that has the burden of proving the same.

393
RULING
In the determination of whether the death penalty should be

imposed on the appellant, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the
cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece
between the appellant and the victim has been duly proven,
the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against the appellant.

394
RULING
While it is true that the alternative circumstance of

relationship is always aggravating in crimes against
chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a
relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended
party, it is only taken into consideration under
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

395
RULING
When the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,

descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister,
or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.
The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of

the relationships mentioned.

396
RULING
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age

of the victim by any means set forth in Pruna, and
considering that the relationship of uncle and niece
is not covered by any of the relationships
mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the appellant can only be convicted of
rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
397
Reporter #27
Melschie Erica Mancia
#1 People vs. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742
#2 People vs. Semanada, 103 Phil. 790
398
1. People vs. Lauas,
58 Phil. 742
399
FACTS
On the morning of June 28, 1932, the body of an Igorot boy,

Juanito Mangeyew, was found in a creek, in the municipal
district of Itogon, Benguet. Investigations set and in less than
a month the appellant, Hilado Lauas, a 19 year old native
Igorot of Bontoc, was arrested. At first, he denied his
responsibility but then, upon being quizzed by Constabulary
officers, he signed a statement before Justice of Peace M.
Montilla admitting he killed Mangeyew.
People vs. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742 Melschie Erica Mancia

400
FACTS
The information through his town mate named Malota whom one
forenoon, as he was on the bridge, he met Lauas. Malota greeted him and
indicated a disposition to talk, but Lauas was uncommunicated and pale.
After a few moments, Lauas stated that he had killed someone without
giving the name, and said that he was leaving for Cadaclan. At this time
Malota had no knowledge of the fact that Juanito Mangeyew had been slain,
but after the body of the youth had been discovered, Malota informed the
investigators that the act had been done by Higino Lauas and that he had
returned to his native place. This information led a few days later to the
arrest of Lauas, and upon being questioned he at first denied his
responsibility.

401
FACTS
Later on, he said the deed had been committed by him in

conjunction with Malota and Malengta. The two were arrested and
questioned, they denied their guilt and soon became evident that
Lauas’ implication was false. Lauas then took the responsibility for
the crime upon himself alone.

402
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant is guilty

of the offense of homicide.

403
RULING
Yes, the appellant is guilty of the offense of homicide because

although the offense savors strongly of murder, but in view of the
lack of details as to the facts connected with the killing, it must be
qualified as homicide only. The trial court appreciated in favor of
the accused the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction and
placed the penalty in the minimum degree appropriate to homicide.

404
RULING
The concession to the appellant of this mitigating circumstances was

proper, for the confession itself shows that the appellant, in
committing this homicide, acted upon an impulse drawn from the
sources of uncivilized life, and although he had received instruction
in the schools that are now established among the non-Christian
people of the Mountain Province and had attained a respectable
command of the English language, this veneer of education had not
changed his fundamentally savage character.

405
2. People vs. Semanada,
103 Phil. 790
406
FACTS
17 year old Felix Semanada joined the Hukbalahap in 1950 as a
courier whose job was to deliver letters and messages. On the
evening of 12 June 1952, Semada, along with two other Huks,
arrived at the house of spouses Serapio Villate and Nieves Magtibay
in Gumaca, Quezon. The couple having dinner when Semanada
ordered Villate to come out, because the latter resisted, was forced
before being tied up by the two companions of Semanada. As the
two companions held Villate, Semanada stabbed him several times
with a bolo in a torturous ordeal that lasted for about 30 minutes.
After killing Villate, Semanada and his companions then went up
and looted the house.
People vs. Semanada, 103 Phil. 790 Melschie Erica Mancia
407
FACTS
A complaint of "robbery in band with murder" was filed against Felix
Semanada in the Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon without
naming the two other accomplices who were still at large. The defendant
admitted that he was at the place and time when the crime took place but
said he was just guarding the road outside the house. He stated that on that
day, he was in barrio Labnig waiting for letters to be delivered when the two
Hukabalahap companions - who happened to be from the "liquidation unit"
- arrived. The two notorious Huks ordered Semanada to accompany them
to Gumaca but the latter refused, that as a courier, he had his own job to do.
But the two Huks forced him at gunpoint to guide them to the house of
Serapio Villate. Semanada was told that they were just visiting Villate
without any intention of killing the man, thus he went on out of
"uncontrollable fear".
408
ISSUE
Whether or not the grounds of

"uncontrollable fear" is sufficient for the
defendant to claim the case at bar in his
favor.

409
RULING
No. In order for fear to be a valid defense, it should be based on real,

imminent or reasonable fear for one's life. A person should not commit
such serious crime, i.e., a torture that lasted for 30 minutes, out of mere
fanciful or speculative fear. Nevertheless, the evidence on record does not
show that the defendant acted by such uncontrollable fear. The government
also contends that the purported fear was merely made up, and that the
appellant was a willing participant in the act. Considering all the facts and
records on hand, Felix Semanada is found guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide aggravated by the circumstance of treachery, dwelling and
cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely increasing the suffering of the
victim.

410
RULING
Therefore, he should be sentenced to the penalty of death.

The said penalty, however, cannot be imposed upon him
since there were not enough votes. Thus, the decision of the
court is hereby lowered to reclusion perpetua in accordance
with the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 296, with the corresponding accessories of
the law and the payment of the costs.

411
Reporter #28
Rosemarie Tumapon
#1 People vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428
#2 David, Jr. vs. People, 562 SCRA 22
412
1. People vs. Acebedo,
18 Phil. 428
Rosemarie Tumapon
413
FACTS
L. W. Berry, auditor of the district, testified that on the 10th

of April, 1909, he was in Palo, Leyte, for the purpose of
investigating certain irregularities alleged to have been
committed by the municipal president of said pueblo in
relation to certain fines and costs imposed by the justice of
the peace of that place. In examining previously the records
of the justice of the peace the witness had found that certain
sums due from the municipal president to the justice of the
peace had not been turned over to the latter.
People vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428 Rosemarie Tumapon

414
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of First Instance

erred in its decision convicting the appellant
of the crime of MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS.

415
RULING
The evidence completely fails in showing that any portion of the
money in this case actually into the hands of the Appellant. It fails
utterly to establish that he had any knowledge of the peculations of
his secretary. It, therefore, fails to demonstrate that he, directly or
indirectly, embezzled the money in question or any portion
thereof. Nor is it shown that the accused was guilty of negligence or
bad faith in leaving the collection and remitting the said sums to his
secretary. The fact that the appellant permitted his secretary to
make these collections and to turn the sums collected over to the
justice of the peace does not constitute such abandonment, fault or
negligence as is described and penalized in the law.

416
RULING
A person, to be guilty of a crime, must commit that crime

himself or he must, in some manner, participate in its
commission or in the fruits thereof. The appellant in this
case so far as appears from the record, has done none of
these things.
For these reasons the judgment of conviction is hereby

reversed and the discharge of the defendant from custody
ordered forthwith.
People vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428 Yrrem Ubagan

417
2. David, Jr. vs. People,
562 SCRA 22
Rosemarie Tumapon
418
FACTS
On June 29, 2003, around 1:00 p.m., the search team composed of
PO3 Mario Flores, PO2 Henry Balabat, SPO1 Rustico Basco and PO1
Roger Paras, implemented the search warrant with the presence of
Barangay Captain Antonio Canono. The search team, before
conducting the search, sought permission from the petitioner. The
two-storey house had two rooms one downstairs and the other one
upstairs. According to petitioner, the room downstairs was occupied
by his brother, Rael David, who was not present during the search,
and the room upstairs was occupied by the former.
David, Jr. vs. People, 562 SCRA 22 Rosemarie Tumapon

419
FACTS
PO3 Flores found six (6) sachets of marijuana and three (3)
plastic sachets of substance suspected to be shabu on top of a
padlocked cabinet underneath the stairs. During that time,
appellant was around two (2) meters away in the sala.
Thereafter, the police operatives took pictures of the items
searched and the barangay captain signed a certificate of
good search. The confiscated items were then turned over to
Investigator Simplicio Cunanan of the Concepcion Police
Station for investigation.

420
FACTS
It was revealed in Chemistry Report No. D-143-20035 of

Police Inspector Jessica R. Quilang that the specimens in the
three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with "RB-A,"
"RB-B," and "RB-C" markings were positive for 0.327 gram
of shabu, a dangerous drug, while the specimen in the six (6)
heat-sealed plastic sachets with markings "RB-1" up to "RB-6"
were positive for 3.865 grams of marijuana.

421
ISSUE
Did the CA erred in affirming with modifications the decision

of the RTC?

422
RULING
Thus, appellant was charged in the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. 1811

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 29 June 2003, at
Brgy. San Jose, [M]unicipality of Concepcion, [P]rovince of Tarlac,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possessed Six
(6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing dried marijuana leaves
weighing more or less 3.865 gram[s] without being authorized by
law.

423
RULING
Criminal Case No. 1812

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 29 June 2003, at
Brgy. San Jose, [M]unicipality of Concepcion, [P]rovince of Tarlac,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possessed
three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing
[METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE, better known as
Shabu, weighing more or less 0.327 gram without being authorized
by law.

424
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 in
Criminal Cases No. 1811-1812, finding accused-appellant Raul David y Erese, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) In Criminal Case No. 1811 for illegal possession of marijuana, he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000.00);
2) In Criminal Case No. 1812 for illegal possession of shabu, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000.00).

425
Reporter #29
Teodoro R. Llanes II
#1 People vs. Montesclaros, 589 SCRA 320
#2 People vs. Bi-ay, 637 SCRA 828
426
1. People vs. Montesclaros,
589 SCRA 320
427
FACTS
ABC, a 13 year old at the time of the incident was the daughter of
Ida Montesclaros. Both of them are renting a room owned by
Bartolome Tampus, a barangay tanod. Ida worked as a waitress in a
beer house. On April 1, 1995 at 4pm, ABC testified that she was in
the house with Ida and Tampus, both of them are drinking beer.
She was forced to drink beer and became intoxicated after three
and a half glasses. While laying on the floor, she overhear that
Tampus requested Ida to have “remedyo” / sexual intercourse with
her.
People vs. Montesclaros, 589 SCRA 320 Teodoro R. Llanes II

428
FACTS
Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave soon as he is finished.

She left Tampus with alone with ABC and headed to work. ABC
woke up with loose garter of her panties and pain over her body
and blood stain on her genitalia. Her mother arrived home the
following morning, ABC cried but was ignored by her mother.
Another testimony of ABC that on April 4, 1995 around 1AM, she
was left alone in her room since Ida was working. Tampus went
inside her room and threatened to kill her if she ever shouts, he
then performed sexual act on ABC and left after consummating the
act. ABC told her mother about the incident but was ignored again.

429
FACTS
ABC sought the help from her Aunt Nielle Montesclaros. They filed
a complaint . ABC revealed a deep healed laceration on her hymen,
which was examined by an expert, who later testified on Court.
Both Ida and Tampus appealed and deny allegations against them.
Ida claimed that she left for work at 4pm on April 1 and came back
6am on the following day. She said would always bring her
daughter with her for work and there was never an instance that she
was left alone in the house.

430
FACTS
Tampus claimed that he was on duty on April 3 and 4 from 7pm to

5am. Guillermo Berdin, a defense witness of Tampus, testified that
he reported on 8pm and left at 5am as reflected on the logbook but
on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature
on the logbook belonged to Tampus. It was noted that handwriting
of Tampus in logbook entry of April 2 is different from April 3. It
was also revealed that the house of Tampus is 500 meters away or
three minute walk from barangay tanod outpost and he could leave
unnoticed without permission.

431
FACTS
A medical certificate of Ida Montesclaros was brought to court

showing that she was an outpatient at Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center Psychiatry Department from Nov 11, 1994 to Jan 12
1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid
type.

432
FACTS
On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the

attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have
diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not
deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of
Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was
completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995.

433
FACTS
Foregoing considerations, Court finds Tampus guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape, as principal.
Tampus died during pending resolutions of his appeal and
his case was dismissed. Ida is found guilty as an accomplice
of two counts of rape by Tampus.

434
ISSUE
Whether or not records for Ida Montesclaros liable

as an accomplice for rape of ABC?

435
RULING
Yes, Ida Montesclaros is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her
daughter, ABC. Accomplices are persons who, not being included in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The following
requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered
an accomplice
(a) community of design, I.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
436
2. People vs. Bi-ay,
637 SCRA 828
437
FACTS
On Dec. 26, 1996 at 7pm, victim Rodrigo Claro, together with

his son Baby Boy Claro were in the house of his father,
Francisco Claro in Sitio Barangay Caliling, Cauayan, Negros
Occidental. While Rodrigo and Francisco were talking, all
accused Jorge Bi-ay, Alex Lingasa and Elisio B-iay Jr. arrived.
Jorge approached Francisco to ask some coffee and was
accommodated. After the coffee was ready, Jorge asked
Rodrigo to serve coffee to his two companions outside.
People vs. Bi-ay, 637 SCRA 828 Teodoro R. Llanes II

438
FACTS
Rodrigo went out carrying two coffees, and noticed that his
10-year old son Baby Boy was following him. He asked him
to stay behind and when he was about to give the coffee,
Eliseo suddenly hacked him on nape which causes his lose of
balance and fall. Baby Boy ran over to his grandfather
Francisco for help. Francisco saw Eliseo delivering hacking
blows to his son while Jorge and Alex withdrew as they saw
that they are being approached. Eliseo ran away after all of
them took turns in hacking the victim.

439
FACTS
By the time Francisco finally reached his bloodied son, the victim
already succumbed to the multiple stab wounds he sustained which
caused his untimely death. Dr. Lorna V. Transmontero, Municipal
Health Officer of Cauayan, Negros Occidental conducted an
autopsy and yielded the post mortem findings of the victim having
11 different wounds over the body.

440
FACTS
Eliseo denies the accusation against him and he claimed an alibi

that on Dec 26, 1996 5PM, he was with Jerry Siblag in Sitio
Kalapisan, Barangay Inawayan and was renting a sound system
from Uldarico Alipan in celebration for the birth anniversary of
their deceased grandmother. They all left Uldarico’s house with the
sound system and headed to their father's house at Sitio Kantyang
about 7mi away, arrived at 7pm, stayed entire evening and never
left the place. However, this was not proven. The court finds no
inconsistencies on the testimonies of Baby Boy and Francisco Claro.

441
FACTS
Case was hold for Alex because he is still being apprehended

and case for Jorge was dismissed because he died. Eliseo is
charged for murder of Rodrigro Claro. Eliseo appealed the
RTC decision for he is only liable as an accomplice instead as
principal and that the court failed to show an existence of
conspiracy in killing the victim.

442
ISSUE
Whether or not Eliseo Bi-ay Jr,

guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder?

443
RULING
Yes, the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals that he
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Indeed, the
accused is guilty as principal by direct participation. By his
own admission, he delivered the first blow on the unwary
victim. He initiated the deadly assault by hacking the
helpless victim on the nape, causing the latter to
immediately lose his balance and fall to the ground. Right
after his initial attack, his co-accused rushed towards the
poor and helpless victim and stabbed him several times in
the back until he died.
444
Reporter #30
Rubayyi Ibrahim
#1 People vs. Alpapara, 604 SCRA 800
#2 U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447
445
1. People vs. Alpapara, 604
SCRA 800
Rubayyi Ibrahim
446
FACTS
Domingo Alpapara, Pedro Alpapara and Alden Paya

challenged Gomez Relorcasa to come out of his house.
Shortly thereafter, the three accused stormed into the
victim’s house. He was pinned down and was then shot twice.
Alden fired upwards and warned those present not to testify
to what happened. The three then took off in a passenger
jeep driven by Mario Bicuna.
People vs. Alpapara, 604 SCRA 800 Rubayyi Ibrahim

447
ISSUE
Whether or not the court erred in finding

the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

448
RULING
Yes. There was clear conspiracy when the

three named appellants killed Gomez.
However, there was no sufficient evidence
to charge Mario Bicuna. He cannot also be
held liable as an accessory for helping the
escape of the appellants.

449
2. U.S. vs. Macasaet,
11 Phil. 447
Rubayyi Ibrahim
450
FACTS
In September 1907, Agripino Macasaet had been selling

native wine at retail without the necessary license. He was
charged with and convicted for violation of the Internal
Revenue Law punishable by a fine. While the case was
pending trial, Act No. 1732 took effect which provides
subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine. The
court in imposing the payment of the fine also imposed
subsidiary imprisonment in view of the new law.
U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 Rubayyi Ibrahim

451
ISSUE
Whether or not penalties provided in Act.

No. 1732 be applicable to the case of
Macasaet.

452
RULING
No. Art. 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.” Penal
statutes cannot be made retroactive, except in the
case they are favorable to the accused. Inasmuch
as Act No. 1732 did not go into force until after the
commission of the crime by Macasaet, subsidiary
imprisonment cannot be imposed.
453
Reporter #31
Sahanie Mohammad Ali
#1 People v. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95
#2 Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 518
454
1. People v. Villaraza,
81 SCRA 95
455
FACTS
On October 16, 1974, Caesar Puerto issued two bouncing

checks for the total sum of P4,966.63.
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976

noted that the accused had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the Court of First Instance or the Circuit
Criminal Court.
People v. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95 Sahanie Mohammad Ali

456
FACTS
His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa
committed by the accused is punishable by prision
mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which
amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

457
FACTS
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance

of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII returned
the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the
city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the
case, should try it.

458
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 818 is

applicable to the Puerto’s case.
2. Whether or not the case can be elevated for trial to the

Court of First Instance.

459
RULING
1. No. The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years

and one day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree
No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing
bouncing checks committed on or after October 22, 1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to estafa committed
on October 16, 1974 because it would make the decree an ex
post facto law.

460
RULING
2. No. City courts shall try parties charged with an offense, in

which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Since the case
of estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under Article
325 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correctional minimum or four months and one day to
two years and four months, the case shall be returned to the
city court.

461
2. Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals, 277 SCRA 518
462
FACTS
Version of the Prosecution:

On May 20, 1984, at about six o’clock in the evening, petitioner
arrived outside the house the Verdes (victims) and without
provocation started to attack Zenaida (Verde), Jaime (Verde) tried to
restrain the petitioner which made the latter turn on the former.
Petitioner pulled out his gun and fired at Jaime but missed his
mark. It was reported to the authorities, and the paraffin test
showed that the petitioner’s right hand was positive for gunpowder
residue.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 518 Sahanie Mohammad Ali

463
FACTS
Version of the Defense:

Petitioner testified that on the day of the incident he was with his barrio
mates when a commotion attracted their attention. A group of persons were
chasing and unidentified person who was running towards their direction
with a gun in hand while the mob was shouting “harangin.” The unidentified
person accidentally fell and dropped the gun he was holding which
petitioner then grabbed. The former hastily boarded a passing bus, and the
Verdes who turned out to be the persons giving chase demanded the gun
from the petitioner who refused to give it. A scuffle issued during which the
gun accidentally went off without hitting anybody.

464
FACTS
The court a quo acquitted the petitioner of the offense of

attempted homicide but found him guilty of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm, with the latter charge the Court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner was sentenced 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 18 years,

8 months of Reclusion Temporal, without pronouncement
as to costs. Petitioner filed an appeal, Which did not
persuade the appellate court.
465
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of illegal

possession of firearm.

466
RULING
YES. There is no doubt that the petitioner is indeed guilty of

having intentionally possessed an unlicensed firearm. On this
score, we note that a prosecution witness testified that
petitioner pulled the gun from his waist and fired a shot
aimed at Jaime Verdes foot. The court did not find
compelling reason in departing from the factual findings of
the two courts, petitioner’s conviction is affirmed.

467
RULING
The initial ruling of the court is modified, reducing the sentence of

the petitioner in view of the passage of R.A. No. 8294 wherein the
penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms has been lowered.
Since penal laws when favorable to the accused shall be given
retroactive effect, the enacted law applies to the case at bar. Prior to
the passage of R.A. 8294 the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearm was penalized with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua, after its enactment, the penalty was
reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

468
RULING
Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the principal penalty
for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is four (4) years and two
(2) months as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum and a fine of
P15,000.00. Consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case
throws the whole case open for review, the appellate court may, applying the
new law, additionally impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject the convict
to subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
The decision of the CA in the conviction of the petitioner is affirmed with
modification that the penalty is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months,
as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Since the petitioner has already
served the punishment which is well beyond the current penalty, the court
ordered his immediate release.

469
Reporter #32
Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad
#1 People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002
#2 Go v. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451 (2005)
470
1. Baking v. Director Prisons,
28 SCRA 851
471
FACTS
Petitioners concededly had been under detention

for more than 18 years under the charge of
respondent, Director of Prisons on May 16,
1969.The convicted petitioners were charged of
the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them
to 10 years imprisonment. The decision has since
becomes final.
Baking v. Director Prisons, 28 SCRA 851 Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad

472
FACTS
Previously, On march 31, 1969, petioners Baking et al. had

filed their petition for Habeas corpus. They claimed that
they had been denied the right to a speedy trial.
Consequently, on May 24, 1969, after the court render its

conviction for the accused, the petitioners filed a petition for
their immediate release on the grounds that they have
already served the 10 year sentences.

473
ISSUE
Whether or not the Article 97 of the Revised

Applicable to detention on prisoners or prisoners
who just serving their preventive imprisonment.

474
RULING
The petitioners as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of

imagination, be said to be serving sentence during the period of
their preventive imprisonment.
The sid detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances

if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be
assigned to them. In which case, the credit they receive shall be
deducted. From such sentence as may be imposed upon them in
the event of their conviction.
People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002 Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad
475
RULING
In this case, there is no proof that the petitioners have

voluntarily offered in writing to perform such labor as may
be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told that
they’ve worked during the period of preventive
imprisonment.
People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002 Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad
476
2. Go v. Dimagiba,
460 SCRA 451 (2005)
477
FACTS
▣ Respondent, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of

violation of BP 22, for allegedly issuing a 13 checks
(bounced checks) to petiotioner Go.
▣ On February 27, 2001, the said respondent filed a Motion

for Reconsideration. He prayed for the recall of the order
of arrest and the modification of the final decision,
arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment, should have been imposed on him.
Go v. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451 (2005) Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad
478
FACTS
▣ The RTC held that the rule be retroactively

applied in favor of the Respondent Dimagiba. It
further noted that he was a first time offender
and an employer of at least 200 workers who
would be displaced as a result of his
imprisonment and the civil liability had been
satisfied through the levy of his properties.

479
ISSUE
Whether or not the application of penalty

through its retroactivity be considered
valid.

480
RULING
• The retroactive effect of the law should be applied to the

respondent. SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not a
penal law. Article 22 of the RPC is not applicable.
• SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule
of preference of the penalties for violation of BP 22. It does not
the legislative intent behind.
• The said law further urges the courts to take into account not
only the purpose of the accused-whether he acted in good faith
or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence.

481
RULING
• Therefore, Administrative Circular does not confer any

new right in favor of the accused, much less those
convicted by final judgment. Hence, the court ruled that
the said respondent can seek the retroactive application of
the said law in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged
settlement of his civil liability.

482
Reporter #33
Celso Amatiad Jr.
#1 People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002
#2 People v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 109614-15, March 29,
1996
483
1. People v. Bensig, G.R. No.
138989, Sept. 17, 2002
Celso Amatiad Jr.
484
FACTS
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1996, at about 2:00

o’clock dawn, in Brgy. Don Potenciano Larrazabal, Ormoc
City, during a barangay fiesta and there was dancing thereat,
the above-named accused attack, assault, stab and wound the
person of the victim LEONIDES VILLEGAS, without giving
the latter sufficient time to defend himself, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wound which caused his instantaneous
death.
People v. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002 Celso Amatiad Jr.
485
FACTS
On August 5, 1996, an order of arrest was issued against the accused

but he was nowhere to be found and remained at large for over a
year. Finally, on January 10, 1998, he was arrested.
During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime of

murder by setting up the defense of denial and testified that a
certain Pepe Boya was the one who killed the victim.
486
FACTS
The RTC, however, convinced by the evidences presented by the

prosecution, ruled against the accused thereby finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder sentencing him to
forty (40) years of imprisonment, pay the aggrieved party the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity, Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000) as moral damages.
Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, the accused filed an appeal.
487
ISSUE
Whether of not the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of

forty (40) years imprisonment, pay the aggrieved party the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity, Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000) as moral damages.
488
RULING
The decision of the RTC finding the accused-appellant Erlindo Bensig

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS.
The penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant is the indivisible penalty

of reclusion perpetua instead of 40 years reclusion perpetua .
The award of actual damages is hereby deleted for lack of evidence.

Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
489
1. People v. Gregorio, G.R.
No. 109614-15, March 29, 1996
Celso Amatiad Jr.
490
FACTS
That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the
Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, the above-named defendants-appellants, armed
with a samurai and a bolo, conspiring and confederating and
mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, and with intent to kill, attack, assault, stab and
hack CARLOS CATORSE y APELYEDO and MARCELO LO
y NICAVERA thereby inflicting multiple stab and hack
wounds upon the body of the victims, which caused their
instantaneous death.
People v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 109614-15, March 29, 1996 Celso Amatiad Jr.
491
FACTS
The incident transpired during the wake of the grandson of one of

the accused wherein the victims, Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo
and some other people namely Jovito Nicavera, Renato Calabas,
Tunggak (son of Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio were also
attending the wake and playing pusoy (russian poker).
At around 1:00 AM of May 8, 1986, Ricardo, in a very loud noise,

reprimanded Tunggak from peeping at the cards of other players.
Overhearing this, Adronico ordered Tunggak downstairs and
scolded and boxed the latter several times.
492
FACTS
Seeing the incident, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from
further hurting his son. While in this act of pacifying, suddenly Ricardo
stealthily stabbed Carlos Catorse with a samurai several times and fell to the
ground. For his part, Adronico also repeatedly hacked the victim with a
bolo.
Meanwhile, Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out of the house but Adronico
hacked him instead hitting his left shoulder. Jovito’s nephew, Marcelo Lo,
tried to help his uncle but Ricardo hacked him on his forearm. Adronico
followed and hacked Marcelo in the nape. Although wounded, the latter
managed to run out of the house but the former overtook him and hacked
him again.
493
FACTS
After the incident, both the accused fled from the place of the crime
but was pursued by authorities and succeeded in apprehending
them.
The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims

revealed that Carlos Catorse sustained twelve (12) hack and four (4)
stab wounds while Marcelo Lo sustained six (6) hack wounds which
caused their death.
494
FACTS
Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed
against both accused and another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo
was filed against Adronico Gregorio. Later, the two cases were consolidated
and tried jointly by the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch
43.Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged against them.
The trial court, however, convinced by the evidences presented by the

prosecution, find both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder sentencing them to life imprisonment and indemnify the
heirs of the victims the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (30,000) with no
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
495
FACTS
The herein accused instituted an appeal on the following grounds:

1) the RTC erred in giving weight and credence to the theory of the
prosecution and disregarding that of the defense,
2) the RTC erred in rejecting the appellants defense of self-defense,
3) the RTC erred in finding that their exist conspiracy and treachery,
4) the RTC erred in finding both the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder.
However, Ricardo Gregorio died prior to the filing of their appeal.
496
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC was correct in

imposing the penalty of life imprisonment
against the accused.
497
RULING
The Court modify the decision of the RTC with regards to

the penalty imposed against Adronico Gregorio wherein he
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo
the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) each. As to
Ricardo Gregorio, his death extinguished both his criminal
and civil liability arising from the said crime.
498

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