G.R. Nos.
L-58674-77 July 11, 1990 proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate
a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in
violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered
any employment for a fee. " 2
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial
court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on
certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under
Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable.
However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without
definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the
acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or m•re persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement
of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of
an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and
are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an
offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or
more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not
explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that
the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing
with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment
and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win
constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of
a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property.
In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the
force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and
placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for
lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the
Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble
with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without
previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel
or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant
case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually
reported in the legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed
funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at
the hands of theirown countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the
four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
15. Skippers United Pacific, Inc. vs. Doza, G.R. No. 175558, February 8, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner deployed De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom
Star.
On December 3 1998, Skippers alleges that De Garcia smelling strongly of alcohol, went to
the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, MV Wisdom Stars’ Master. Skippers claims that he was rude
and shouted noisily to the master. De Gracia left the master’s cabin after a few minutes and
was heard shouting very loudly somewhere down the corridors. The incident was evidenced
by the Captain’s Report sent on said date.
Furthermore, Skippers also claim that on January 22, 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and
Daza arrived in the master’s cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they
were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy
any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments due to them. The incident is
evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to skippers but had conflicting dates.
De Gracia claims that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments, compelling them
to vent their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Union. On January 28, 1999, the
Filipino seafarers were unceremoniously discharged and immediately repatriated. Upon
arrival in the Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA.
The LA dismissed the seafarers’ complaint as the seafarers’ demand for immediate
repatriation due to the dissatisfaction with the ship is considered a voluntary pre-
termination of employment. Such act was deemed akin to resignation recognized under
Article 285 of the LC. The LA gave credence to the telex of the master’s report that the
seafarers indeed demanded immediate repatriation.
The NLRC agreed with the LA’s decision.
The CA however reversed the LA’s and the NLRC’s decision. The Court deemed the telex
message as a self-serving document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify the conclusion that petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their
immediate repatriation.
Aggrieved, Skippers appeals the case with the Supreme Court.
second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an
opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be
made under a just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause
of their dismissal. Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local
manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated because the latter
voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the
Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment
contract "akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the
CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated
their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment
contract by "serving written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance."
Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement of a written notice of
resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer
terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999, giving doubt to
the veracity and authenticity of the document. In 22 January 1998, De Gracia, et al., were
not even employed yet by the foreign principal.

Issue:
Whether or not the seafarer’s demand for immediate repatriation can be considered an act
of voluntary resignation.

Held:
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and
substantive due process. The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due
process, while the legality of the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and
hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the
 ACTI v Echin 10. As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
632 SCRA 528 (2010) 8042, the Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers, directors an
d partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable wit
Facts: h the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
1. Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in beha
lf of its principal co- 11. MR denied, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
medical technologist under a twoyear contract, denominated as a Memorandum of A 12. Petitioners Contention:
greement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
a. maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contra
2. Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of 1 ct specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service La
year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. w and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the lab
or tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing pr
3. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employmen obationary employment in deciding the present case.
t on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
b. that even the POEA Rules relative to master employment contracts accord respect to
4. As the Ministry denied respondents reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on the customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host
March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. country.

5. Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint c. Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represente applicable, given that the foreign principal is
d by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any
document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise
6. Labor Arbiter: be held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as
finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a
regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordere Issue:
d petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract. Held:
The petition fails. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
7. On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision responsibility for the money claims of
OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign pri
8. MR denied. ncipal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
They appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreig principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and
n government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to t solidarily liable.
hem; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performa
nce rating within the one The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to p
year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contende rotect and alleviate the plight of the working class.[9] Verily, to allow petitioners to
d that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI. simply invoke the immunity from suit of
its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
9. CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution and noted liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability
that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for t inutile.
he implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it c
an be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on
recruitment agreement or contract of employment. probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respon
dents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations
as in fact POEA Rules
accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same
was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who
can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenien
t, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long a
s they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption
which, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI<Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC[10] illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes
for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties
(lex loci intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the ter
mination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor
arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed
to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove th
e pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed*identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumpti
on is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in de
termining the issues presented before us.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law,
the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 2
5 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by a
n official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal cus
tody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in th
e Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in whic
h the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secreta
ry of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent o
r by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign coun
try in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must
state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:
a. MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides t
hat the employee is subject to a probationary period of one year and that the host c
ountrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply;
b. a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating t
hat she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, a
nd a translated copy of the certificate of termination,both of which documents were
certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs
Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit;
c. and respondents letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her
first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of Excellent albeit it change
d due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that
respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil s
ervice laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly aut
henticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, w
hat petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of
the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all
that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog
and
or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the s
ame was/were
found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the conte
nts of the document/s.
 This certification is being issued upon request of
the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitmentand
placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to
work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed
Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report
to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she
only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover
her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of
the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to
illegal dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s
salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the
employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this
court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No.
8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that
is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic
Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the
circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.
19. APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC
FACTS:
 Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining
Company, Inc to perform laundry services at its staff house.
 On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was
hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a
result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was
permitted to go on leave for medication.
 De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased
to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and
preferred to return to work.
 Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4,
1988.
 Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor
and Employment, which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex
Mining Co. to pay Candida the total amount of P55,161.42 for salary differential,
emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential and separation pay.
 Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed
for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or
domestic servant or a regular employee.
HELD:
 Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term
"househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and
shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and
about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable
for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the
personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
 The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen
working in staffhouses of a company, like private respondent who attends to the
needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
 The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with
its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is
and should be considered as a regular employee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public
respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990
FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the present Head
Monk of the Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as the President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines,
Inc., and in his private capacity, respondents.
L.B. Camins for petitioner.
Lino M. Patajo and Jose J. Torrefranca for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari (which We treat as a special civil action for certiorari)
seeks to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November
29, 1988, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 10, 1988 in NLRC
NCR Case No. 12-4861-86 (Filomena Barcenas v. Rev. Sim See, etc., et al.) on the ground that
no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties.
Petitioner alleged in her position paper the following facts:
In 1978, Chua Se Su (Su for short) in his capacity as the Head Monk of the Buddhist Temple
of Manila and Baguio City and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Phils. Inc. hired the petitioner who speaks the Chinese
language as secretary and interpreter. Petitioner's position required her to receive and
assist Chinese visitors to the temple, act as tourist guide for foreign Chinese visitors, attend
to the callers of the Head Monk as well as to the food for the temple visitors, run errands
for the Head Monk such as paying the Meralco, PLDT, MWSS bills and act as liaison in some
government offices. Aside from her pay and allowances under the law, she received an
amount of P500.00 per month plus free board and lodging in the temple. In December,
1979, Su assumed the responsibility of paying for the education of petitioner's nephew. In
1981, Su and petitioner had amorous relations. In May, 1982, of five months before giving
birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon
the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985,
respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the
Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for
short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment
of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00 effective 1983. In addition, petitioner
and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers.
She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel
where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist
temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted
threats against her and her son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were
never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua and DEE on the other hand, claimed that petitioner was never an employee of the Poh
Toh Temple but a servant who confined herself to the temple and to the personal needs of
the late Chua Se Su and thus, her position is coterminous with that of her master.
On February 10, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the complainant Filomena Barcenas, and the respondent corporation is
hereby ordered to pay her the following:
1. P26,575.00 backwages from August 9, 1986 up to date hereof.,
2. P14,650.00 as separation pay;
3. P18,000.00 as unpaid wages from August, 1983 up to August 8, 1986;
and
4. P10,000.00 moral damages.
Complainant's charge of unfair labor practice is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 1
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which, as earlier stated,
reversed the above decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this instant petition.
A painstaking review of the records compels Us to dismiss the petition.
At the outset, however, We agree with the petitioner's claim that she was a regular
employee of the Manila Buddhist Temple as secretary and interpreter of its Head Monk, Su
As Head Monk, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist
Association of the Philippines, Su was empowered to hire the petitioner under Article V of
the By-laws of the Association which states:
. . . (T)he President or in his absence, the Vice President shall represent
the Association in all its dealings with the public, subject to the Board,
shall have the power to enter into any contract or agreement in the name
of the Association, shall manage the active business operation of the
Association, shall deal with the bank or banks . . . 2
Respondent NLRC represented by its Legal Offices 3 argues that since petitioner was hired
without the approval of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the
Philippines, Inc., she was not an employee of respondents. This argument is specious. The
required Board approval would appear to relate to the acts of the President in representing
the association "in all its dealings with the public." And, even granting that prior Board
approval is required to confirm the hiring of the petitioner, the same was already granted,
albeit, tacitly. It must be noted that petitioner was hired in 1978 and no whimper of protest
was raised until this present controversy.
Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as
mere domestic work. Thus, We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese
language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before
Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these visitors and
Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide
of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment for
the temple's Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed
activities of a household helper. They were essential and important to the operation and
religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in
May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su The records do not show that
petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her. Neither did she return
to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert
Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that
she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner's pleadings failed to rebut this
finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position which
she had already abandoned. Petitioner herself supplied the reason for her return. She
stated:
. . . (I)t was the death-bed instruction to her by Chua Se Su to stay at the
temple and to take care of the two boys and to see to it that they finish
their studies to become monks and when they are monks to eventually
take over the two temples as their inheritance from their father Chua Se
Su. 4
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su's mistress
who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. In
her pleadings, the petitioner claims that they were forcefully evicted from the temple,
harassed and threatened by respondents and that the Poh Toh Buddhist Association is a
trustee corporation with the children as cestui que trust. These claims are not proper in this
labor case. They should be appropriately threshed out in the complaints already filed by the
petitioner before the civil courts. Due to these claims, We view the respondents' offer of
P10,000.00 as indicative more of their desire to evict the petitioner and her son from the
temple rather than an admission of an employer-employee relations.

Anent the petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May, 1982 which she filed only in 1986,
We hold that the same has already prescribed. Under Article 292 of the Labor Code, all
money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall forever be barred.

Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died,
there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk. In fact, she
herself manifested that respondents made it clear to her in no uncertain terms that her
services as well as her presence and that of her son were no longer needed. 5 However, she
persisted and continued to work in the temple without receiving her salary because she
expected Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies of the two boys. 6 Consequently,
under these circumstances, no employer-employee relationship could have arisen.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November
29, 1988 is hereby AFFIRMED for the reasons aforestated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.