Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for the court a quo required
equired plaintiff to show cause why her
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter
alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married
on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action
for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was
rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the
complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage
and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV)
while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to
settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-
divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on
the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage,
which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely
precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage
that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in
obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of
Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3).
She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral
damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in
paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under
no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped
from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage
on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any
fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of
action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No.
21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed
the support that had been granted her. He counterclaimed for
damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant
its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim,
wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid
court to her, and pretended to shower her with love and
affection not because he really felt so but because she merely
happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could
evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate
members of her family were threatening him to force him to
marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason
intimated by him, and not because he loved her, he secretly
intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital
duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore,
he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him
were prematurely concretized for him, when in order to placate
and appease the immediate members of the family of the first
girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them of
his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with
a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited
and had several children during the whole range of nine years
that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between them
(parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court
set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed.
Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized
that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs.
Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a
defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance
thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation,
or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the
policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record. —
complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a
memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it
inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October
1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied
reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife
by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a
vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to
those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as
follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the
contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party
of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed
was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that
can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to
the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that,
of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within
the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention
were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85,
for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a
cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted,
expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by
enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to
identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and
concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress
intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress
further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds
was followed by the interdiction: "No other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with
another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances
that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may
detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel
having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief
after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she
alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-
marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her
cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply
that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention
of complying with his marital duties and obligations and
covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-
appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these
allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply
(pretended love and absence of intention to perform duties of
consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations
is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the
Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations
were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a
reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the
cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan,
76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to
allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply.
Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become
interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point
out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to
perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the
wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four
years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was
celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only
pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is
hereby affirmed. No costs.
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant,vs.LUIDA
MANGONON DE BUCCAT,defendant-respondent.
HORRILLENO, J.:
FACTS:
1.It was established before the trial court:
a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938
b. After several interviews, both were committed on September
19 of that year
c. On November 26 the same year,
the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in
Baguio
d. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days
e. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February
23, 1939f.Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant
separated.
2. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment
of marriage before theCFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed
that he consented to the marriage becausethe defendant
assured him that she was virgin.
3. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida
Mangonon (Defendant) got married on November 26, 1938.
Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939
Godofredo filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI
because he was led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the
consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?
DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme
Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn the ruling
appealed.” It is unlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had
not suspected that the defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As
she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she
must have looked very pregnant even before they were
married.) Since Godofredo must have known that she was not
a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred
Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which society
rests. To cancel it, reliable evidence is necessary.*Consent
freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
REYES, R.T., J.:
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent
Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989
at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1)
Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2)
Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel
Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both
medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition
with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-
0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in
1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a
very thoughtful person who got along well with other people.
They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got
married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did
not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a
perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his
private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.
Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a
couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to
the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother.
Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence
on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions.
For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9 She
also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw
Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain
Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied
everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left
their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery
of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma.
Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage
and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some
petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that
their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The
petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to
him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he
refused to heed the memorandum 15 released by Christ the
King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from
converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital
which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic
and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have
competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their
children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only
imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said
there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and
affection of the person who reared and looked after him and
his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her
twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in
this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous
and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to
avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any
further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity. 20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.
Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's
house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was
a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his
brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had
some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But
there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her
testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day
Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied
that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he
and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was
no other person with them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso
Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness.
However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void
from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the
same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in
favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is
awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to
all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this
Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and
Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of
Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be
issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of
Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the
surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint
and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals
that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed,
generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is
reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes
marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE
Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a II
man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS
shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
honor, and welfare of his own family.25 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied III
due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
judgment with the CA.26 UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and Our Ruling
forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children. I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to
CA Disposition serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
follows: Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the dismissed.30This is to prevent the party from benefiting from
Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00- carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of
0132. No costs.27 all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by expeditiously as possible.31
filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can
judgment. Said the appellate court: not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However,
the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the
assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this
of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may wise:
be reversed or corrected only by appeal. Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not
jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal. be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed,
he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes
exercise thereof.28 been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some
Issues cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules
assigning to the CA the following errors: would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
I demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed
exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in
the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel
seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition
before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed
grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his
marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not
the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation.
In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R.
Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC)
decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled
Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already
served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the
case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back
wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant
petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA
opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders
or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had
substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The
Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a
minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be
impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should
have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x
in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is,
indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which
should be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it
has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would
frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v.
Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy
by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion
for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this
Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court
prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner
great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of
the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest
of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better
served by giving due course to the present petition and
treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule
65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-
validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that
every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of
Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His
counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of
inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of
appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at
the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's
incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds
the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result
in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3)
where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions.
Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's
former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should
not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher
interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to
ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained
thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within
the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an
act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in
the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the
client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be
set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests
of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be
made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will
always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by
perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of
depriving their clients, of their day in court.49(Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case
from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice
require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a
case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This
Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-
Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
other words, the court has the power to except a particular
case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to
annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what
remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought
back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and
doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had
"no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the
Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment,
and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some
marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the
petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of
fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial
court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on
the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of
its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003),
when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently
denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough
to establish with certainty that defendant is really a
homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the
totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people
around him even including his own close friends doubtedhis
true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000;
pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many
forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she
heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole
world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant
threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after
that. There may have been more important matters to attend to
than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be
effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him.
Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate
or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing
his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is
certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of
doubt about his real preference continued and even got
thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a
happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their
children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein
defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the
house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is
more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit
his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence
presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of
his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly
seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the
doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The
accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the
name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should
accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense
and humiliation of their children and family as a whole. 57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The
lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also,
it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it
against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a
homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground
to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a
marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven
by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual
at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such
fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and
not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and
intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be
valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of
vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of
evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list
of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family
Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be
eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation.
Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are
talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal
separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal
separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in
Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage.
Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase
"existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of
subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground
to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a
blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a
basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity
strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage,
which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous
indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage
relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for
her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the
whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things,
they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the
Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different.
Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its
alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not
sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our
jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed
and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful
marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced
three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge
this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a
vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of
consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife
as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they
coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his
marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created
on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way
to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with
his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he
could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not
have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to
his inability to copulate with the appellee.
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as
a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant
failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of
these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion,
not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by
declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The
State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration by
fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly
administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute
community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration
and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid
marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment
of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the
community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same
breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the
children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and
subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in
the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint
administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in
the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No.
3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment
of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to
pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying
Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with
her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for
the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in
Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner
wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner
knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in
their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also
prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but
reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence,
the instant petition for review based on the following assigned
errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE
AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID
AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage
may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b)
whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they
coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are
generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance
that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was
only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than
four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious
step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the
prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that
this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that
a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal
case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of
conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the
present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his
appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x
Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of
annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an
acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this
perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his
marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created
on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well
as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed
member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to
have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in
going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For
sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the
police regarding the activities of those who were threatening
him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament
prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with
his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he
could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not
have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to
his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that
sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel
where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant
on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying
his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the
latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died,
on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date
of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse
because it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy
regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless,
during the continuation of the cross-examination of the
appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on
August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the
Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve
the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply
on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death
of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented
documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date
her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed
there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime
in December 1987, then she could not have a premature
delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the
trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by
that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had
delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact
that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light
of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with
his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s
pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that
he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of
the letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his
cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters,
appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the
appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters
admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and
concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant
suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven
(7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because
he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was
laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did
he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining
six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a
hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight
of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim
that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses
who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant
failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of
those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s
fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and
equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary
damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in
the records or in the appealed decision that would support an
award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of
Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from
the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the
perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x
x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has
no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing
her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her
to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright
and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial.
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and
should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he
purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral
damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person
could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a
fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear
in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages
have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is
necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be
recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the
question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to
moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to
moral damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed
to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus
she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of
moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS
ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by
their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on
behalf of her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified
complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00-734-A,
alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him
despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen
Esparza.
Detailing the circumstances surrounding respondent's
complained act, complainant averred that he started courting
her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that
they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on
two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first
on December 18, 19912 in the latter's Manila office, and the
second on December 28, 19913 at the Asian Institute of
Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent
admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16,
1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and
friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a
third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he
abandoned complainant and their children without providing
them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them
in precarious living conditions.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence consisting of
the marriage contract between respondent and Helen
Esparza4 and that between her and respondent,5 and
photographs6 of their (complainant and respondent) nuptials
and of captured moments in their life as a couple and a family.
Copy of the complaint could not be immediately served upon
respondent owing to the difficulty of locating him.7
Complainant later filed a Manifestation8 before the IBP,
furnishing therein respondent's address where he supposedly
resided with his third wife Jo T. Constantino-Macarubbo. The
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereupon thrice 9 required
respondent to file his Answer. He failed to do so, however, on
motion of complainant,10he was declared in
default.11 Complainant was thus allowed to present evidence
ex parte.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner came out with a Report
and Recommendation on January 22, 2001.12
By Resolution of May 26, 2001,13 however, the IBP Board of
Governors remanded the case to the Investigating
Commissioner to "ensure proper notice or another opportunity
to serve notice to the respondent." Subsequently or on
September 5, 2001, respondent filed a Manifestation/Ex Parte
Motion to Re-Open Proceedings14 which was granted.15
By Comment of October 18, 2001,16 respondent denied
employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting
instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting
marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against
his will to a "sham wedding" to protect her and her family's
reputation since she was then three-months pregnant.
Respondent submitted in evidence the final and executory
October 30, 2000 Decision of Branch IV of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 5617,
"Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,"17declaring his
marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the
trial court's findings on the basis of his evidence which was not
controverted, that the marriage was indeed "a sham and make
believe" one, "vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation,
and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal
impediment" and want of a valid marriage license.
Respondent also submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office that complainant's name does not appear in
the National Index of Marriages for Bride;18 another
certification from the National Statistics Office-Office of Civil
Registrar General that it has no record of the December 28,
1991 marriage of complainant and respondent;19 and an
attestation from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221 which
was used in complainant and respondent's marriage is not on
file in its records.20
Admitting having sired complainant's two children, Juris Alexis
and Gabriel Enrico, respondent denied ever abandoning them.
In his Supplemental Comment,21 respondent claimed that he
left complainant and their two children with her consent after
explaining to her that the pain and shame of living in sin and
ridicule was unbearable.
To refute the charge that he had abandoned complainant and
their two children, he presented copies of fully paid educational
plans22 for the high school and college education of the
children; a Philippine National Bank check dated January 18,
1999 for P22,556.33 representing his payment of the final
amortization of his car which has been in complainant's
possession since 1997;23 a copy of a petition of complainant in
a civil case filed against respondent with the Quezon City
RTC, for judicial authorization to sell certain properties of
respondent, wherein she admitted that respondent issued
three postdated checks in the amount of P2,000.00 each for
his children's allowance covering the period October 1999 to
December 1999;24 and copy of his August 9, 1999 letter to
complainant demanding custody of his children, he having
been barred from seeing them, as well as the return of his
personal properties in complainant's possession.25
To disprove that he is of depraved moral character,
respondent submitted certifications from the Office of the Bar
Confidant,26 Office of the Ombudsman,27 Department of
Justice,28 and the Philippine National Police in his hometown in
Enrile, Cagayan29 that he has no cases of any nature pending
with them. And he too submitted letters from the Department of
Interior and Local Government30 and the Metro Manila
Development Authority31 addressed to him to show that he is a
civic-spirited person.
Finally, respondent, in his Supplemental Comment, raised the
additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment of his
marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present
administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for
admitting her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in
her letter to Josephine T. Constantino;32and that she resorted
to forum-shopping in bringing both this administrative action
and the civil case with the Quezon City RTC.
Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital
relations, respondent invoked the final and executory August
21, 1998 Decision of Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC in
JDRC Case No. 4320, "Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C.
Esparza,"33 declaring his first marriage void on the ground of
his wife's psychological incapacity.
After hearing during which both complainant and respondent
took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner
rendered a Report and Recommendation34 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is recommended that
respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be SUSPENDED
FOR THREE MONTHS for gross misconduct reflecting
unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. Moreover, it
must likewise be impressed on respondent that he should
comply with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon
him as a father of the children as a result of his relationship
with complainant. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors subsequently passed Resolution
No. XV-2003-35135 which adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now
before this Court.
It appears that respondent began his legal career in 1986 as
Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports after which he became Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission.36 He later became
an Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer, then a State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, before finally bowing
out of public service after about 14 years or in July 2000 to
engage in private practice.37
The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court38 bears reiterating.
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty of
gross misconduct in his private affairs which warrant
disciplinary action by this Court as the guardian of the purity
and integrity of the legal profession.
The incontrovertible facts show that while respondent had a
subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza with whom he had two
children,39 he entered into a second marriage with
complainant.
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has
been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his
conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his
first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21,
1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him
liable for concubinage.40 Such conduct is inconsistent with the
good moral character that is required for the continued right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine bar.41 It imports
moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social
institution of marriage.42
Even assuming arguendo that respondent was coerced by
complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as
the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after
their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with her
and even begot a second child by her.
xxx
ATTY. PAGUIA [Complainant's Counsel]
Q: Are you claiming that the complainant coerced you again to
marry her?
A: Yes, I was.
Q: Did she use a gun to coerce you?
A: A lot of people appearing around and a lot of bad mouth
from her, threats to sue me and to even kill me by people
around.
Q: So insofar as you are concerned the complainant
committed a crime of coercion against yourself?
A: Yes.
Q: And is it correct for me to say that you did not file any case
before the Prosecutor's Office.
A: I reported that matter to the police.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
Q: In what way did M[s]. Florence Teves coerce you?
A: She placed me in a place where she could guard me and
she treated (sic) to sue me, destroy my career. And at the time
of the marriage she sent people to fetch me from my place to
be there. And there are a lot of people with strange faces.
ATTY. PAGUIA -
Q: How many days or hours did this coercion last?
A: That's continuing.
Q: From what day to what day?
A: It's started when she said she was pregnant until the
date of the alleged marriage.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission who got her
pregnant at that time?
A: Although there was a carnal knowledge once.
Q: Of course you know that the complainant delivered the child
after your marriage, is it not?
A: Yes, six months after because she was already pregnant
three months during that time already.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission what is the name
of the child was (sic)?
A: Juris. I recognized the children. There's no problem about
that. I gave them educational plan, I gave them support.
Q: After the first child you continued living with the
complainant, is it not?
A: Intermittently I get out and then she would call pagka't
may sakit yong bata so I have to go back.
Q: Of course it was your responsibility as father to the child to
see the condition of the child?
A: Yes, that's why whenever she comes and tells me that the A: I cannot compute. COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION -
child is sick I go there. COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION - Q: Were you married to Josephine Constantino?
Q: After your wedding with the complainant can you tell Q: What about on a monthly basis, do you recall? A: Yes, but it's in the process of annulment.
the Honorable Commission where you resided? A: I cannot compute although when I left with her consent in x x x48 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION - 1997 I left valuables in the amount of P400,000.00. In both his marriages to his first wife and to complainant,
Q: When you say where you resided, both of them? Q: When you say with her consent, did you tell her that you are respondent claimed that he was made to enter into the marital
ATTY. PAGUIA: Yes, Your Honor. leaving? union against his will. That claim is an affront to the
A: In the residence of Florence. A: Yes, Your Honor, she agreed because I said I can no longer intelligence of the members of this Court to distinguish fact
ATTY. PAGUIA - bear living with sin. from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a
Q: How long did you live with the complainant after your x x x43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter into
wedding? The saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer any marriage. One incident of a "shotgun marriage" is
A: Intermittently again few months then I get out then in those submitted in evidence by complainant which show a believable, but two such in succession would tax one's
when the child is sick I have to visit. typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION - husband to complainant and a father to their two kids. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment
Q: When you say intermittently you don't stay there? Respondent cannot thus take refuge in the earlier mentioned case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case,
A: Not permanently. finding in the decision of Tuguegarao City trial court in the he would again put blame on his third wife in order to send the
ATTY. PAGUIA - annulment case he filed against complainant. The marriage to oblivion.
Q: How often did you come home to the residence of the decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into
complainant? as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. As multiple marriages and then leaving them behind by the mere
A: Whenever she call that the child is sick. this Court held in In re Almacen,44 a disbarment case is sui expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The
Q: So you live (sic) with her up to what year? generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is impact of respondent's conduct is incalculable upon his ex-
A: Intermittently 1995. rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its wives as well as the children he had by them, their lives having
Q: You mentioned that you have two children with the officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is been dislocated beyond recall.
complainant? not determinative of an administrative case against him,45 or if Respondent's assertion that he has not failed to support his
A: Yes. an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect children by complainant is not totally supported by the
Q: Can you remember when your second child with the its course,46 then the judgment of annulment of respondent's evidence on record. He may have secured educational plans
complainant was born? marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing for them and doled out some sums of money in the past, but it
A: I cannot remember. actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear appears that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly
Q: Do you know how old the second child with the complainant preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings support. In fact, he admitted that even before he left
is? against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.47 complainant's residence in 1995, he was only giving
A: I guess six or seven. The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the intermittent support to his children with her.49
Q: What is his name? annulment of his first two marriages and is in the process of Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the
A: Mico. procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society
Q: Who provided the support for these children from the time the finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
they were born up to the present? his own admission, contracted a third marriage: values essential to the survival and well-being of our
A: When I was there I gave for their subsistence. xxx communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
Q: Will you please tell the Commission how much was that? ATTY. PAGUIA - whole. This must be checked if not stopped.
A: I buy groceries for them and I gave also for their leisure and Q: After getting married to the complainant is it a fact that you As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
for their education. entered into a third marriage to one Josephine Constantino? good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good
Q: When you gave this support during the intermittently that A: I think that is . . . moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
you had with them? Q: I will reform, Your Honor. Do you know a person by the highest moral standards of the community.50 The moral
A: Intermittently also. name of Josephine Constantino? delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
A: Roughly, Compañero, can you tell the Honorable A: Yes continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the
Commission from that time they were born to this time how Q: What relation if any do you have with her? inviolable social institution of marriage,51 outrages the
much you were giving them? A: I am separated to her since 2000. generally accepted moral standards of the community.
In sum, respondent has breached the following precepts of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a
consequence of his grossly immoral conduct, than to be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. 52 The penalty
of 3 months suspension recommended by the IBP is, not
commensurate to the gravity of his conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found
guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory
evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this
Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the
regular support of his two children by complainant.53
Let respondent's name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,
vs.REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the
Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85,
in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment
of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was
filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but
respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at
2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23
October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop.
While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with
petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered.
About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-
teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come
home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was
not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when
respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’
house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner
went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo,
Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s
whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been
living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the
Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner
concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause
for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons,
together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served
upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a
Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family
Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27
November 2002 an Order6 directing the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed
between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear
in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was
not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de
Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that
she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner
and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never
participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted
that no collusion took place between the parties, and
measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence
between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial
be conducted to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint was
meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance
of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the
allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated
petitioner’s testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following
psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected
data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying
personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious
psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her
normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the
undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden
breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent
was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically
incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential
roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies
the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be
grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any
treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are
known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning
by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates
achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power,
brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only
be understood by, or should associate with, other special or
high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of
especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with
his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others
to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the
feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious
of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be
attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing
psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was
recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother’s
second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation
composed his immediate environment in his growing up years.
Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from
his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early
in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More
so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed
to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the
love and attention he yearned which led to develop a
pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a
cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other
people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop
relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no
capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is
characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed
long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started
early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and
becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby
rendering such to be permanent and incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering
the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have
their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is
regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust,
respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife,
mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no
lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the
above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent.8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who
replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no
objection to the admission of petitioner’s evidence and
manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the
State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying
petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her marriage to
respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the
respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living
with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi
Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was
denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12dated 24
May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision
dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC
did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s
psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove
respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court
ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least
one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that said person could not have known the marital
obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations,
could not have validly assumed the same. At most,
respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for
legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally
filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of
marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code,
which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act
of sexual intercourse.17 Non-consummation of a marriage may
be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be
caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one
of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions
or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where
such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and
before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no
physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no
ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent.
Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As
can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and
the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint
before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross
ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s
Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that
the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel
in the realm of procedural technique.20 Although this rule is not
a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where
the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable
as to result in the violation of his client’s substantive
rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional
circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the
Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36
of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack
of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner
during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code
is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was
not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner
soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when
respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later,
he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving
for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondent’s psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and
hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag
was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent
did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s
invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological
state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence,
we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in
her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since
her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly
impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s
experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally
bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not
particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that
respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality
disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the
burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result,
we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too
long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much
as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse
are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can
falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties
to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where
no marriage could have validly been concluded because the
parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life
and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As
we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.29
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent
declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual
infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated
21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was
informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same
barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state.31
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at
bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to
communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to
work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country,
are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in
finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no
longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers
to every individual problem.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006
Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June
2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City,
Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the
municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the
office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the
penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the
time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was
summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not
file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the
city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a
collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for
copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March
1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from
notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and
submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack
of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the
evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11
April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the
city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the
defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established
as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she had refused to be examined; that instead of
annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for
contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical
examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the
decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to
married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or
connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of
them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the
wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending
resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from
the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration
was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question
may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent
during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it
with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition
that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law,
not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the
legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, becase from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet
from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing
violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination.
She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being
an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with
this decision, without pronouncement as to costs