JURISDICTION a.
Exclusive jurisdiction – confined to a particular court to the
 Jurisdiction – power and authority of the court to hear and
decide a case involving controversies or conflicting rights of the
parties and to carry its judgment into effect
o Power to resolve & power to enforce
o It is the court that is vested with jurisdiction. The judge
merely presides over it.
o It does not refer to the decision itself, rather, it is the
authority to decide a case.
o TEST: WON the law has given the court the authority to
take cognizance of the particular case.
 Judicial power – includes the duty of the courts of justice
1. to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable (If there is no actual controversy,
not yet RIPE)
2. Power of judicial review to determine WON there has been gross
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govt
Note: A right even violated is not enforceable – Damnum absque injuria
CLASSES OF JURISDICTION
I. AS TO NATURE
A. As to cases tried
a. General jurisdiction – exercised by courts with competence to
decide on their own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all
cases except those expressly withheld from them either by the
rules or by law
 These courts have competence to decide jurisdiction over cases
not falling within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial/quasi-judicial functions (e.g. RTC).
b. Limited Jurisdiction – exercised by courts whose jurisdiction
extends only to particular or specified cases (e.g. Family
Courts, CTA)
B. As to the nature of the cause
a. Original jurisdiction – exercised by courts which under the
law have the power to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time under the conditions
set by the law
b. Appellate jurisdiction – exercised by courts which have the
power to review on appeal the decisions or orders of a lower
court
C. As to nature and extent of exercise
exclusion of other courts.
b. Concurrent jurisdiction – possessed by the court together
with another or other courts over the same subject matter
 The court obtaining jurisdiction first retains it to the exclusion of the
others
D. As to Situs
a. Territorial jurisdiction – exercised within the limits of the place
where the court is located
b. Extra-territorial jurisdiction – exercised beyond the confines
of the territory where the court is located
II. AS TO OBJECT
a. Jurisdiction over the subject matter – power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong and conferred by the Constitution or by law
a) HOW IS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
CONFERRED:
1. It is by law:
 Constitution
 Statute
 Not any procedural rule
2. EFFECT:It cannot be
 Granted by the agreement fo the parties
 Acquired, waived, enlarged, or diminished by
any act of omission of the parties
 Conferred by the acquiescence of the Court
 Conferred by the administrative policy of any
court
 Conferred by a court’s unilateral assumption
of jurisdiction
 Conferred by consent or waiver
 Cannot be waived by the parties
 Cured by their silence, acquiescence,
or even express consent
 Cannot be changed by mere agreement of the
parties for jurisdiction may not be a subject
matter of the contract
b) DUTY OF THE COURT: DISMISS an action whenever it
appears that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter
1. Upon filing of the action, Courts will resolve first what
is the subject matter of the complaint and does it have
juris over the said subject matter
 2. Even if the question of jurisdiction wasn’t raised by
either of the parties, the Courts will still have to first
address such question before delving into the
procedural and substantive matter of the case.
c) ERROR IN JUDGEMENT
 Does not make the judgement void.
 Here, the Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, but there were mistakes
committed in the appreciation of facts and evidence
d) ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
1. GR: may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
even on appeal and is not lost be waiver or estoppel
2. XPN: Estoppel by laches (Tijam v Sibonghanoy)
 A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of the
court over a particular matter to secure
affirmative relief cannot be permitted to
afterwards deny the same to escape liability
 Tijam ruling still remains to be an XPN to the
GR
e) HOW JURIS OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS
DETERMINED:
1. By the allegations of the complaint
 Determines the nature of the action and
 Jurisdiction of the court.
 Juris depends on what the allegations
in the initiatory pleading define and
describe.
 Defenses in the answer are deemed
irrelevant and immaterial.
 Amount of award does not determine
juris.
o However, the amount in
excess of the jurisdiction of the
Court promulgating the
judgement cannot be rendered
for such excess is considered
outside of its juris
2. Character of the relief sought
f) OMNIBUS MOTION RULE
 G.R.- Rule 15, sec. 8. If not invoked, considered waived.
Example of this is the motion to dismiss.
 EXC- Rule 9, sec. 1. Even though not invoked, not waived:
o Lack of juris over the subject matter
o Litis pendencia
o Res Judicata
o Prescription
b. Jurisdiction over the parties/person – power of the court to
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the
action.
 Over the Plaintiff –
o by filing of the complaint or
o petition or other initiatory pleading
 Over the Defendant –
o i. service of summons
o ii. Voluntary appearance (seeking affirmative relief)
c. Jurisdiction over the issues – power of the court to try and
decide the issues raised in the pleadings of the parties
 May also be determined by stipulation of parties (pre-trial) or by
waiver or failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a
matter not raised in the pleadings
d. Jurisdiction over the Res – it refers to the court’s jurisdiction
over the thing or the property which is the subject of the action
 Necessary when the action is in rem or quasi in rem
Acquired by:
1. Seizure of the property under legal process (e.g. attachment)
2. As a result of institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective (e.g suits
involving status of parties or property in the Philippines of NR
defendants)
N.B. It is sometimes a substitute for jurisdiction over the person.
e.g When the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant like
when he is abroad but if the court acquires jurisdiction over the res,
the case may go on. The action is converted from one in personam to
one in rem
If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not required. What is required is jurisdiction over
the res although summons must also be served upon the defendant
in order to satisfy the reqt of due process
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
I. SUPREME COURT

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
 SC exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction
1. Original Jurisdiction(No. 1)
Par. 1 Par. 2
On cases of Ambassadors, On Cases of certiorari, final
etc. judgements, and orders of
lower courts
GR- cannot expand the
enumeration given.
EXC- when Congress was
given permission to expand
the coverage.
Fabian v. Desierto
FACTS
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged
in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was
the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian
and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing
acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus
Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred
that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of
 the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to
give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised
over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-
judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition
for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Cr: uberdigest.
2. Appellate Jurisdiction (No.. 2)
 Decisions MUST come from lower courts
II. COURT OF APPEALS
B.P. 129
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto,and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3)
months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
 CA exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction
1. Original (No. 1 and No. 2)
 Can issue whether or not in aid of legislation
2. Appellate( No. 3)
a. In cases of final decisions of the RTC
b. Quasi-judicial bodies
 The right to appeal is not a consti right. It can only be granted by law.
Due process requires that one may be heard only once, not twice.
 Constitutional bodies can only raise jurisdictional issues.
 Q: When can an administrative decision be appealed to CA?
o When such body exercises quasi-judicial powers.
 G.R.- Admin decisions are not appealable
 EXC- When there is grave abuse of discretion or a justifiable cause.

LIMITATIONS ON CA’S APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1. Cases falling within SC’s appellate jurisdiction
2. When a case is given to another court
3. Labor cases.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES V. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations
Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6,1995.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him
and petitioner nor was his name included in thesemi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00.Petitioner on the other hand claims that
private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the
owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 19
96, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter took overthe
management of the business.Amelita made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer
allowed to participatein the management thereof. As a consequence, the
latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated
hisemployment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationshipexisted
between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of theNLRC. The use of the word appeal in
relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a
lapsus plumaebecause appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellatecourts. The important distinction between them, however, and
with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that thespecial civil
action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas toindulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intentionof the Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.Therefore, all references in
the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court areinterpreted and hereby declared to mean
and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such
petitionsshould henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as theappropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Cr: Scribd. Com.
III. RTC (sec. 19-24 of B.P. 129)
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
 (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
*NOTE: 100,000= 300,000. 200,000= 400,000.
SOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SEC. 19 (1), (2), AND (8)
 TEST: always look into the subject matter at hand.
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION(Sec. 19 (1))
19(1) 19(8)
Incapable of pecuniary Capable
estimation
Claim for money is Claim for money is the
merely incidental main issue
 considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
ORTIGAS V. HERRERA
(NATURE OF THE QUESTION TEST))
ISSUE
WON the issue is one for specific performance.
RATIO
YES. The action involved in this case is one for specific
performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore incapable of
pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the
performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a
refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or
established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the
collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the
obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or
matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other
party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions
and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under
the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental
which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the
performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into.
Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is
designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of all
the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private
respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the
written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per square
meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having
himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a
matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RAYMUNDO V. CA
Private respondent's complaint is an action to compel the
petitioner to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at
Unit AB-122 of the condominium which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation and falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court under paragraph (1), Section 19 and paragraph (1), Section 21.
"In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
the municipal courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of first
instance [now regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance [now regional trial courts]."
In the instant case. the claim of attorney's fees by the private
respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal
cause of action which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized
installation of the glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said
amount is not determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
LAPITAN V. SCANDIA
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like
in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment
or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The
rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the
determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which
the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136
of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly
pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De
Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturers'
Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no
cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why
an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a
rescission being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In
both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation
into facts that would justify one act or the other.
PS.Wala to sa outline.
RUSSEL V. VESTIL
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of
said court.
TEST: IN SINGSON vs SAWMILL: In determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those
for
1. specific performance,
2. support, or
3. foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; 14 also a
4. ctions questioning the validity of a mortgage, 15
5. annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price
paid 16 and
6. for rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.
The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null
and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves
as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria
Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property.
While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
Radio Communication v. CA
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts.11 In Manufacturer’s Distributors,
Inc. v. Siu Liong,12 the Court held that actions for specific performance
are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.13 Here, the averments in the
complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily
one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year
lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if
the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As
alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for the period from
January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had
the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years
1997 and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a premature and
unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the closure of and
removal all communication equipment in the leased premises.14 Under o Expropriation
the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable  Real actions outside the jurisdiction of RTC:
laws in order to determine whether there was indeed a violation of their o forcible entry and
lease agreement that would justify the award of rentals and damages. o unlawful detainer of lands or buildings
The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of o Juris within MTC
P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental
to the main action for specific performance. COPIOSO V. COPIOSO

REAL ACTION (Sec. 19(2))
19(1)
 The controversy involves an
issue wherein the claim for
money is incidental to the main
issue.
 Jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations set forth in the
pleading
19(2)
 The controversy involves a real
property, wherein the issue is
the title of ownership,
possession or any interest
thereof.
 Jurisdiction is determined by
the real property’s assessed
value
o For civil actions outside
Metro Manila exceeds
(P20,000.00) or
o For civil actions in
Metro Manila, where
such the value exceeds
Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00)
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which
comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any
interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to
annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim
for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved
herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita
Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for
reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property,
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before
stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is
intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence
within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of
the parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt
with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not
determinative of its jurisdiction.

Ouano v. PCGG
Jurisdiction is based on assessed value in an action for recovery
of ownership and possession of real property with damages; Section
19(8) applies to other cases; Section 19(8) and 33(1) excludes damages
in determining jurisdiction when they are merely incidental.
The complaint seeks to recover from private respondent the
ownership and possession of the lots in question and the payment of
damages. Since the action involves ownership and possession of real
property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is
determined by the assessed value, not the market value, thereof,
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691.
Section 33 (paragraph 3)
 Instances considered as real actions:
o Partition
o Foreclosure
HUGUETE V. EMBUDO
(ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE TEST)
OBTAIN TITLE REAL PROPERTY (SEC. 33(3))
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the
complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the
property which they purchased from respondents. Petitioners’ cause of
action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion
of the land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of
the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or
any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased
was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial
Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-
Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in
the complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be
partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be
conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners’ argument that the present action is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale
and partition is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is
not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by
the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in
this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the assessed value of the property subject thereof(MTC).
SEBE V. SEVILLA
the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the
Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance
rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The
action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful
owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit
is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the
Sebes claim are merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are
excluded in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.
NATURE OF ACTION OF PARTITION
Roque v. IAC
An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming
to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether
the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue,
there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-
owner.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this
connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of the thing
owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe." 13 This statement bears some
refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how long the co-ownership
has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and
provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly
or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set up as a
defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the defendants
show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to
the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to
require recognition of his status as a co-owner will have been lost by
prescription and the court cannot issue an order requiring partition.
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar.
First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co-owner seeking partition
— has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a
three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. The Court
notes in this respect the finding of the trial court that petitioner, following
execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November 1961, had
been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot ... up to the
present, and whereon plaintifrs house and that of her son are erected. "
14 Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact, although they would
claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Second,
prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither
of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute
and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that
of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-ownership of the
property had continued to be recognized by all the owners.
Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of
fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the
action below.
Vda de Daffon v. CA
An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch
or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed
by the court, as the case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may
be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order.In the latter case,
the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon
WHAT CONSTITUTES DEMAND (SEC. 19(8))
 This section covers claims which are:
o purely money(demand) or
o property involved is personal property
 The threshold is:
o exceeds One hundred thousand pesos 300,000 or,
o in such other abovementioned items Metro Manila exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos 400,000.
 G.R.- In computing the demand, one must exclude:
o interest,
o damages of whatever kind,
o attorney's fees,
o litigation expenses, and
o costs
SOLIVEN V. FASTFORMS
RATIO
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified
the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the
Circular provides:
"2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court."
(underscoring ours)
Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money
amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by
petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action.
Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. It is
plain from R.A. 7691 and our Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the instant case.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:
"Conformably, since the 1. action is principally for the collection of
a debt, and the2. prayer for damages is not one of the main
causes of action but merely a consequence thereto, it should not
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court."
INIEGO V. PURGANAN
We cannot give credence to petitioner’s arguments. The distinction he
made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and
those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more
apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from
the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the
employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer
in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed,
without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and
exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-
delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional
purposes is still proper. All claims for damages should be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose
from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section
5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action
as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said
section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action
are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.15
Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a
single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount
thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with
the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral
and exemplary damages claimed, isP490,000.00.
In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction
of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of
damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages
that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the
claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of
action.
 EXC- when the main action is claim for damages, do not exclude.
 MENDOZA V. SORIANO
The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP
Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause
of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for
the damages for tortious acts.13 In this case, respondents’ claim
of P929,006 in damages and P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court
appearance represents the monetary equivalent for compensation of the
alleged injury. These money claims are the principal reliefs sought by
respondents in their complaint for damages.14 Consequently then, we
hold that the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City possessed and
properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
 IMPT.: Use 19(8) only when the claim is exclusive of section 19’s
number 1 to 7 because of the wording, “In all other cases.”
NLRC
Primero v. IAC
It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is
intimately related to the issue of the legality ofthe manner by which that
act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the
nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first — the employee's
separation from employment — it does not at all deal with the second —
the manner of that separation — which is governed exclusively by the
Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the
Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears
to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the
reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal
from employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally
dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence,
the fact that the issue-of whether or not moral or other damages were
suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should
properly be awarded to him in the circumstances-is determined under the
provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not
meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal
and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction.
Thus, an employee who has been illegally dismissed (i.e., discharged
without just cause or being accorded due process), in such a manner as
to cause him to suffer moral damages (as determined by the Civil Code),
has a cause of action for reinstatement and recovery of back wages and
damages. When he institutes proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, he
should make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot, to be sure, be
permitted to prosecute his claims piecemeal. He cannot institute
proceedings separately and contemporaneously in a court of justice upon
the same cause of action or a part thereof. He cannot and should not be
allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the Labor Arbiter for
reinstatement and recovery of back wages, or for separation pay, upon
the theory that his dismissal was illegal; and two, before a court of justice
for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that the
manner of his dismissal was unduly injurious, or tortious. This is what in
procedural law is known as splitting causes of action, engendering
multiplicity of actions. It is against such mischiefs that the Labor Code
amendments just discussed are evidently directed, and it is such duplicity
which the Rules of Court regard as ground for abatement or dismissal of
actions, constituting either litis pendentia (auter action pendant) or res
adjudicata, as the case may be. 18 But this was precisely what Primero's
counsel did. He split Primero's cause of action; and he made one of the
split parts the subject of a cause of action before a court of justice.
Consequently, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter granting Primero
separation pay operated as a bar to his subsequent action for the
recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance under the
doctrine of res judicata, The rule is that the prior "judgment or order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
Pepsi v. Gal-lang
In sustaining its jurisdiction over the case at bar, the respondent court
relied on Calderon vs. Court of Appeals, where We ruled that an
employee's action for unpaid salaries, alowances and other reimbursable
expenses and damages was beyond the periphery of the jurisdictional
competence of the Labor Arbiters.
HLURB
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1344
EMPOWERING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION
 UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957
WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction over the real estate
trade and business;
WHEREAS, the Decree did not expressly provide the means to enforce
its decision in favor of the prevailing party, thereby rendering such
decisions inutile;
WHEREAS, many subdivision lot buyers have been appalled by the
inability of the National Housing Authority to enforce decisions rendered
in their favor, thereby giving rise to disillusionment and skepticism about
the noble objectives of Presidential Decree No. 957; and
WHEREAS, it has become necessary to strengthen the powers of the
National Housing Authority to enable it to enforce and execute its
decisions.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby decree and order:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become
final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its
receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the Philippines and in the
event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or amended
within a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof
of the appeal of the decision must be furnished the National Housing
Authority.
Section 3. As soon as the decision has become final and executory, the
National Housing Authority shall, on motion of the interested party issue a
writ of execution enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the
rules of Court of the Philippines.
Section 4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Pilar Dev’t v. Villar
Here, it must be noted that the case was filed by the subdivision
owner and not the buyer of a subdivision lot, and the cause of action is
one for recovery of possession of the property on account of the
cancellation of the parties' contract to sell for nonpayment by the
respondent spouses of the monthly amortizations pursuant to the terms
and conditions stated in their written contract. The respondent spouses,
as buyers of the subdivision lot in question, had no cause of action
against petitioner PDC as subdivision owner, which may possibly give
rise to or constitute any actionable act under the aforequoted paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c) of Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. No jurisdiction could,
therefore, be possibly vested upon the HLURB.
In fine, the RTC erred in applying to this case the ruling in Francel
Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,2where therein defendant buyers
of the subdivision lot had previously filed a case against therein plaintiff
subdivision owner for incomplete development of the subdivision,
which infraction on the part of therein plaintiff subdivision owner became
the basis of the buyers to discontinue their payment of the monthly
amortization. Reliance on Francel is, therefore, misplaced considering
that the nonpayment by the spouses Villar as subdivision lot buyers of
the monthly amortization was not caused or preceded by any breach on
the part of the herein petitioner as subdivision owner. Consequently,
jurisdiction on the legal issue involving the right of possession over the
subject lot rightfully belongs to the regular courts, in this case the MeTC
of Las Piñas City.

Cadimas v. Carrion
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over the
case based on the allegations of the complaint. Nothing in the complaint
or in the contract to sell suggests that petitioner is the proper party to
invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is nothing in the allegations
in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to sell that
would suggest that the nature of the controversy calls for the application
of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the
powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as
worded, where the HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns cases
commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to
paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," the logical
complainants would be the buyers and customers against the sellers
(subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and
realtors), and not vice versa.20
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer.
The contract to sell does not contain clauses which would indicate that
petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer,
owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate
business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell,
petitioner is an ordinary seller of an interest in the subject property who is
seeking redress for the alleged violation of the terms of the contract to
sell. Petitioner’s complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a
townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and respondent
Carrion and that the latter breached the contract when Carrion
transferred the same to respondent Hugo without petitioner’s
consent.21 Thus, petitioner sought the cancellation of the contract and the
recovery of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the
complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Francel Realty v. CA
It is important to first determine whether the MTC has jurisdiction
over petitioners complaint. For if it has no jurisdiction, then the award of
damages made by it in its decision is indeed without any basis. It is only if
the MTC has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action that it is
necessary to determine the correctness of the award of damages,
including attorneys fees.
Petitioners complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally
speaking such action falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a
consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real
property. Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under P.D.
No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice
to the owner or developer of his decision to do so because of petitioners
alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium project
according to the approved plans and within the time for complying with
the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights and
obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957. Private
respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound
real estate business practice with the HLURB.
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising
from the failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply with the conditions
of a lease agreement or vacate the premises after the expiration of the
lease. Since the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the
HLURB, the question of the right of petitioner must be determined by the
agency.
Petitioners cause of action against private respondent should
instead be filed as a counterclaim in HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80
in accordance with Rule 6, 6 of the Rules of Court which is of suppletory
application to the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure per 3 of the same. In
the case of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte
and Erlinda Sarte[6] the developer filed a complaint to collect the balance
of the price of a lot bought on installment basis, but its complaint was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed
the order to this Court. In dismissing the appeal, we held:
The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is
a complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection
with a sale of a subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and
accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to
regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases
of unsound real estate business practices. Although the case involving
Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and
there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of
payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its
warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting
amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to
the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative
duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to
P.D. 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the motion to dismiss was
properly granted on the ground that the regular court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the complaint.
Accordingly, we hold that the MTC correctly held itself to be without
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. But it was error for the MTC to
grant private respondents counterclaim for damages for expenses
incurred and inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a result of the
filing of the ejectment case.[7]
Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may file a counterclaim only if the court
has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot
be filed.[8]
Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of
damages to private respondent must be disallowed for the following
reasons:
(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its
counterclaim was filed out of time or more than 10 days from private
respondents receipt of summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent
did not make any counterclaim.
(2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification
for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As
held in Buan v. Camaganacan,[9] an award of attorneys fees without
justification is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly
left to speculation and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken out.
With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is
bereft of any proof that petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing
the present action which would warrant such an award.
JURISDICTION IN THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
Agustin v. Bacalan
ISSUE
May the Court of First Instance then, on appeal, award defendant-
appellee's counterclaim beyond that amount?
RATIO
NO. The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court
cannot be entertained in the Court of First Instance on appeal (Francisco,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 26, citing the
cases of Bernardo v. Genato, 11 Phil. 603 and Yu Lay v. Galmes, 40
Phil. 651). As explained in Yu Lay v. Galmes— "Upon an appeal to a
court of first instance from the judgment of a justice of the peace, it is not
possible, without changing the purpose of the appeal, to alter the nature
of the question raised by the complaint and the answer in the original
action. There can be no doubt, therefore, of the scope of the doctrine laid
down in the several decisions of the Court. Consequently, We hold that,
upon an appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff as well as the
defendant cannot file any pleading or allegation which raises a question
essentially distinct from that raised and decided in the justice of the
peace court. "This rule was reiterated in cases from Ng Cho Cio v. Ng
Diong (1 SCRA 275) to Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals (116 SCRA 636).
Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the
jurisdictional amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as
having been deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought
before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee
on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action
began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the
appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its
decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not only a
continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been
executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the
original and appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise
of the same judicial power (See 2 Am. Jur. 850; Stacey Cheese
Company v. R.E. Pipkin, Appt. 155 NC 394, 71 S.E. 442, 37 LRA 606) It
is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not
create that cause
Maceda v. CA
Maceda's petition for review (G.R. No. 83545) has no merit. The Court
of Appeals correctly ruled that the municipal trial court did not have
original jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000.
Correspondingly, the regional trial court did not have appellate jurisdiction
over the claim. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan
awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of the Regional
Trial Court raising the award to P182,200, were invalid for lack of
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action
for sum of money (Maceda's counterclaim for the value of his
improvements is one such action) is limited to a demand that "does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but
inclusive of damages of whatever kind." (Sec. 33, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg.
129.) A counterclaim in the municipal or city court beyond that
jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense to weaken the
plaintiffs claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief.
Vital-Gozon v. CA
An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the
auxiliary writ of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or
receivership which the Court of Appeals has the power to issue in
common with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts, 43
payable by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ, upon
seasonable application and summary hearing. Since it cannot but be
assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the provision
governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant
provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as well as the rule against
multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Appeals
original jurisdiction over the special civil action ofmandamus, among
others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the
Batasang Pambansaclearly intended that said Court should exercise all
the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to
said action of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of
damages to the petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.
JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
 G.R.- The issue of lack of Court’s jurisdiction may be raised anytime
even for the first time on appeal
 EXC- Tijam v. Sibonghanoy where petitioner raised the question of
lack of jurisdiction after 15 years. Thus, the Court adjudged their
claim as estoppel by “laches” or an unreasonable or unexplained
negligence to assert a right within a reasonable length of time.
o NOTE: Apply the exception only within the same facts and
circumstances of the Tijam case.
Metromedia v. Pastorin
"The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction
or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist
as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not
be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that
the lower court had jurisdiction”
Figueroa v. People
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred
by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the
departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not
as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s
lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by
the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.