Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 136781.
joined by other party-list organizations in a
October 6, 2000.
Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated.
On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at
least two percent of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which
obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive
Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that
the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed
their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In
allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-
vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the
party-list system," which should supposedly determine
"how the 52 seats should be filled up”
Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject
party-list election can be settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation
for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and
the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative,
how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially
GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC
are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives —
two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve
(12) qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions
are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it
glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the
two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these
statutory provisions, the COMELEC effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly
and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the
discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement
of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these
impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.
The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce
and administer election-related laws, cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing
body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law find lobby for its approval and
enactment by the legislature.
In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC
First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of
the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage
[the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two
percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to
51 . . . should have at least one representative."
In view of to whom should the seats be given
In the suits, made respondents together with the
COMELEC were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought
the proclamation of additional representatives from
each of their parties and organizations, all of which
had obtained at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo
Order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST
from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date
and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution
or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court."
In view of the 20% being mandatory
The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves
are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should
represent them.
On the contention that a strict application of the
two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should
have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the
wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election
process.
In view of the 2% threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to
modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half
percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20
million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-
and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes
nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three.
So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We
believe that there are many sectors who will be able to
get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the
operational implication of our proposal.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-
list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system of representation. Again, we quote
Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD: …but we also wanted to avoid the
problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple
votes. We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn
their seats among the fifty. . . ."
In view of the method of allocating additional seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and
the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many
party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to.
In view of the Niemeyer Formula
Under this formula, the number of additional seats
to which a qualified party would be entitled is
determined by multiplying the remaining number of
seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the
total number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will
be the number of additional seats that the party
concerned is entitled to.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for
Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both
our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements — two percent for us and five for them.
One half of the German Parliament is filled up by
party-list members. More important, there are no seat
limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as
already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to
encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.
In view of the legal and logical formula for the
Philippines
Step One. Rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the
parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in
the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number
of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able
to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
 The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it
would, in effect; deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
We said further that "no party can claim more than
what it is entitled to . . ."
In view of the formula for determining additional seats
for the first party
The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall
be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party
were to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's
number of seats and so on.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because
the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.
However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to
grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent
of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent.
The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first
party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six
percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the
first party.
In view of the formula for additional seats of other
qualified parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number
of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
In view of the 2% threshold rationale
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be
synthesized as follows:
1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will
just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties,
who are not ready and whose chances are very low,
from participating in the elections;
3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up
the system;
4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to
organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the
system;
5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the
same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who have
not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16
and
7. To ensure that only those with a more or less
substantial following can be represented.
The framers of the Constitution knew that the
sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in the
competitive election arena. They sought to remedy
this inequality through an outright constitutional gift of
reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have
to earn their seats through participation in the party-
list system.
In view of the 3-seat limit rationale
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute
party-list representation to as many party groups as
possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party
will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as
much as possible to the marginalized groups may be
defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as possible
of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to
representation to have a seat in Congress, and to have
enough seats left for those who are way below the list.
The party-list system of proportional representation
is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art.
6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which
provides that, in determining the number of seats a
party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should
be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each
party and then the product should be divided by the
sum total of the second votes obtained by all the
parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes.
First, each party receives one seat for each whole
number resulting from the calculation. The remaining
seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of
the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was
adopted in R.A. No. 7941, §11.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed
for party-list representatives, which at present are 52.
The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives to 20 percent party-list
representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-
list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact
that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions
to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio, the
entire number of seats for the party-list system, after
deducting the number of seats initially distributed to
the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's
fixation with designating the highest ranking
participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as
admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to be
allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats
of the so-called first party.
 In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply
to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for
every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking
party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2
percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the
first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which
case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes
of the first ranking party should get an extra seat..
The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all
2 percenters, which are not the first ranking party,
from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned
against the votes of the first ranking party, there will
never be an instance where the additional seats of
these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is
contrary to R.A. No. 7941, §11 which contemplates the
possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the
maximum number of seats allowed by law.
Bagong Bayani Labor Party v COMELEC G.R. No.
147589. June 26, 2001.
Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party
filed before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the
names of [some of herein respondents] be
deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14,
2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative,
that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees
not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and
Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation
of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the
respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the
COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed
COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-
extendible period of five days from notice
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed
before this Court a Petition, docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or
before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to
an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the
COMELEC may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner
therein, until further orders of the Court.

Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court
directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper
under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate
in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is
exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."
Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the
COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light
of the guidelines enunciated in
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency
determining the winners in the last party-list elections,
the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the
parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats
in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its
compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001,
directing the COMELEC "to refrain from proclaiming
any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785
Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents
to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
this
hence,no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
of
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule
13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had
filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on
that Petition.
In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner
Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. party-list system is the most objectionable portion of
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of the questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner
petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a political parties."
resolution may just be a formality because the
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for
has made its position on the matter quite clear. "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
In any event, this case presents an exception to the
thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party"
rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
policies for the general conduct of government and
and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is
which, as the most immediate means of securing their
indubitably imbued with public interest and with
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the
its leaders and members as candidates for public
composition of 20 percent of the House of
office."
Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
That political parties may participate in the party-
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
list elections does not mean, however, that any
duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
political party — or any organization or group for that
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
matter — may do so. The requisite character of these
Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is parties or organizations must be consistent with
a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy the Constitution and RA 7941.
remedy available."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to
In view of the participation of political parties
the number of people in a particular district, because
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas worke
rs, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it
that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress
under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases
with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.
In view of OSG contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park
or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list
elections.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, theOSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted — to give
them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in the larger affairs of the State.
In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like
the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down
by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the
case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the COMELEC in its work
In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza,
J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not
identical. Party list representation is a type of
proportional representation designed to give those
who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if
they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In
this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized
and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system,
representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in
proportion to the number of votes received in contrast
to the "winner-take-all"single-seat district in which,
even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he
gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or
candidate need not come in first in order to win seats
in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-
take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing
candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner are represented.
What the advocates of sectoral representation
wanted was permanent reserved seats for
"marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these
sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the
House of Representatives and only for three terms. On
the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district
elections, for whom the party-list system was
intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the
districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to
enable them to be represented in the House. They may
include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged"
sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would
have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors"
one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical.
In sum, a problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-
take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves
blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of
underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or
proportional representation. The Constitutional
Commission chose the party-list system.
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration
yields support for the view that the party-list system is
designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors.
For while the representation of "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the
law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the
aim of proportional representation is to enable those
who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district
elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e.,
labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped,
women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party List System;
Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the
Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the
People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their
seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled
to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to
3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast
for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula
being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling
or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it
would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of
party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
new computation (which shall be discussed in the
“HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the
seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a
seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit
Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner:
for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list
representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200
of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would
be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number
of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can
create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying
the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the
formula:
(Current Number of Legislative
DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total
number of the members of the lower house. However,
it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional.
There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast
are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold
creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal
80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has
two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats
as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following
rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed
seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters
are then deducted from the total available seats for
party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to
garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall
be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-
percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes
cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation
for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the
party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will
be the additional number of seats allotted for the party
list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest
total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote
garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed
so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2
seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their
guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to
the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued
to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list
elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out
that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution
or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word
“party” was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the
party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that
the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of
the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
the proceedings of the NBC.
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.
Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and
the comments of the parties in these cases, we
BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
7/17/2010 arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
0 Comments representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to constitutional?
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07- 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be
because "the Chairman and the Members of the allocated?
COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the not, can the major political parties be barred from
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." participating in the party-list elections?

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
Resolution No. 07-88. August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the
Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher declareunconstitutional the two percent threshold in
asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its the distribution of additional party-list seats.
decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No.
7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation
of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 isunconstitutional. This Court finds that
the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage
of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in
the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second,
we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we
apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-
list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-
list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-
list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties
(according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of
major political parties in the party-list system. I vote
for the formula propounded by the majority as it
benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the
Constitution with respect to the participation of the
major political parties in the election of party-list
representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs,
hence
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list
parties are no match to our traditional political parties
in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list
elections held in 2001 where major political parties
were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for.
The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that
major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162
parties which participated, the seven major political
parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties
garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of
votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each,
while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose
qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or
an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three
parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of
votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to
seat their members as party-list representatives. In
contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the
remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties
garnered more than 2%.
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and
underrepresented people at the time of the framing of
the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is
through the party-list system that the Constitution
sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying
the Constitution, our people recognized how the
interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups
can be frustrated by the traditional political parties
who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate
our political institutions. If we allow major political
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the
marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray
the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion
will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing
the entry of major political parties into the party-list
system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to
Nachura, J.)
However, I wish to add a few words to support the
proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat
in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes
cast for the party list system ─ presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution.
As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative
objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress,the
raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s
decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in
the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list
representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that
figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2%
threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically
impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system can
never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing
away completely with a threshold vote requirement.
The need for such a minimum vote requirement was
explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief
Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in
Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a
minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use
the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who
are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the
system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize,
work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the
same majesty as that of the elected representatives in
the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who have
not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they
will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less
substantial following can be represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population,
the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it
keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative
districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list
groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer
viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable
changes that come with time; and it is, in fact,
inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents
the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with
Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it
merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list
seats in Congress.But when the enabling law, R.A.
7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of
implementing the constitutional provision, contains a
condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of
realization, then we must strike down the offending
condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is
not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative
measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to
ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective
at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save
a particular legislative enactment that renders a
constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
(G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido
ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January
2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the
official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang
Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory
injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." This
provision clearly shows again that the party-list system
is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious
reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives would naturally be open to non-
sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for
sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list
seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be
no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-
list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list
structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-
list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is
to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada vs Commission on Elections
120 SCRA 337 – Political Law – Vacancy in the
Legislature
Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed
a petition for mandamus compelling the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the
vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP).
They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII
of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa
eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission on Election shall call a special election to
be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs
to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1)
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for
they are not the proper parties to institute the action;
2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to
hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.
HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is
only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders
or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C,
Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court
under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the
aforequoted provision, which is the only known
provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the
Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in
several regional districts where vacancies exist, would
entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang
Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation
for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither
be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the
holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the
funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the
initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not
the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in
the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the
sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body,
the exercise of which may not be compelled through a
petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of
Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was
intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA)
vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing
in audit the payment of the increased
salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before
December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in
salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now
Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being
that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and
who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would
have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in
the approval of said Act expired on December 30,
1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of
the House but also that of all the Senators who
approved the increase must have fully expired before
the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional
provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact
that the provision speaks of the “expiration of thefull
term” of the Senators and Representatives that
approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident
the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The
use of the word“term” in the singular, when combined
with the following phrase “all the members of the
Senate and the House,” underscores that in
theapplication of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10),
the fundamentalconsideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted
the measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when thefull
term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
Ligot vs. Mathay
56 SCRA 823 – Political Law – Salaries of
Representatives – Retirement
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-
year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965),
Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the
national government” was enacted into law and took
effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased
under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per
annum, but the Act expressly provided that said
increases “shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed
a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No.
186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No.
4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total
of at least twenty years of service, the last three years
of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
“in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the rates of
pay as provided by law.” The House of Representatives
granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The
Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed
the same.
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for
members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30,
1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathaythat
such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein
commencing December 30, 1969) should not have
been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement,
the increased salary for members of Congress “as
provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such
retirement benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would
be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during
his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,
provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To vs.
grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second
from receiving during their term of office) would be to Judicial District, Branch III, et al., respondents.
pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their FERNANDO, J.
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his
decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-
Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the
same prohibited result by enabling administrative FACTS:
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done
directly.”
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is
Martinez v Morfe (1972) case digest the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972 of senators and representatives from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner, going to and returning from the same except in cases
vs. of treason, felony and breach of the peace.

THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando
MANILA, respondents. Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional
Convention would invoke what they consider to be the
protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or
employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress,
"arrest or search any member thereof, except in case
such member has committed a crime punishable under
[such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."
Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for
falsification of a public document and for violation of
the Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the
ground that the constitutional provision does not cover
any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption
from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being
that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code
would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not senators should be immune from the
criminal charges.
HELD:
No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the
Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the
peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war
against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving
them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or
any special statute.
It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public
peace must be maintained and any breach thereof
renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it
would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition
that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated
like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished.
Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
Debate
felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on Congress, and in going to and returning from the
National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
caused the publication of an open letter addressed to not be questioned in any other place.”
the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
been allegedly three operational plans under serious
expression which refers to utterances made by
study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of
Congressmen in the performance of their official
some civilian political strategists. That such strategists
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
have had collusions with communists and that the
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a
same is in session as well as bills introduced in
coup d’état to place him as the president. The
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
“planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to
the official discharge of their duties as members of
meet such an end. The letter was said to have been
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
published in newspapers of general circulation.
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to
of the performance of the acts in question. Congress
collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging
was not in session when the letter was published and
that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
said that as a member of the lower house, he is
communication to be so published, he was not
immune from suit and that he is covered by the
performing his official duty, either as a member of
privileged communication rule and that the said letter
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
is not even libelous.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
privilege communication endowed to members of
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun
Congress.
109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative
Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.
delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In
the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos
Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña
during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said
resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers
that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity
for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred
that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been
violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does
not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member
therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities
at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d)
of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that
“for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of
Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex
officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and
thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision
allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if
no elective official may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he
may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President
to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government post
(as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the
SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of
the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase
“shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of
the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to
a cabinet post, may receive the compensation
attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress
clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may
be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official
for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may
be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as
long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position
of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence,
his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts
as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he
may be considered a de facto officer, and in
accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to
such benefits.
dEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA
June 29, 2013
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the
GR No. 134577, November 18, 1998
body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the
seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
FACTS:
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
During the first regular session of the eleventh
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of
Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly
the Senate.
elected President of the Senate. The following were
likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority
before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
leader.
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator
other member of the minority, he was assuming the
Tatad.
position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
ISSUES:
"majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate
During the discussion on who should constitute the
minority leader
Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of
the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
— numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority —
minority leader?
had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
HELD:
following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
FIRST ISSUE
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of
issue.
who was the rightful Senate President, since it was
deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because
the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation
of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate
President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of
the Court's power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full
discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not
only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was
also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the
interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it however
does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader. While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." The method
of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color
of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The
action may be brought by the solicitor general or a
public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be
successful, the person suing must show that he or she
has a clearright to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his
specific acts as minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent
Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of
the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this
party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of
"an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility." Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate
has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.
Avelino vs Cuenco
83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent
Facts:
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver
a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and
prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before
Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to
formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the
session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.
Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents
into a record:
The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that
respondent be designated to preside over the session
which suggestion was carried unanimously.
The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon
took the Chair.
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon
motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had
followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair,
was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete
text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo
warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him
the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not
been validly elected because twelve members did not
constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-
member Senate.
Issues:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject
matter.
Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly
approved.
Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare
him the rightful President of the Philippines Senate and
oust respondent.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take
cognizance of the case. The court will be against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature
of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary.
The court will not interfere in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority
of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme
Court.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators
Court has jurisdiction. who approved the resolutions herein involved could
ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was
shadow of a doubt.
the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate, because,
firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the
Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
dismissed the petition on the ground as it involved a
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in
thirdly because in view of the absence from the
this case because the selection of the presiding officer
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three
at any time to choose their officers, change or
senators.
reinstate them.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of
“each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House:
does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of Pacete v Commission on Appointments G.R. No. L-
all the members constitute “the House”. There is a 25895. July 23, 1971
difference between a majority of “the House”, the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional was appointed by the then President of the Philippines
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan,
The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter. Cotabato.

The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner
as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority.
At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more
senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and
discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was
made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted
to the Commission on Appointments at its next session
in 1965.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice,
whom he likewise included in his petition, through the
Judicial Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate
his position as municipal judge, the ground being that
his appointment had been by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating
that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of
the confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as
municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of
derogatory information which he had received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary
of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to
be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere
presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the
confirmation of the appointment in
question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through
the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner
that he should vacate his position as municipal judge,
as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing
Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise
named respondent as he had, as a consequence,
withheld petitioner's salaries.
Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment
had become final and executory upon the adjournment
of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at
midnight of May 21, 1965;
Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly
confirmed; and
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of
mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of
confirmation prayed for by petitioner.
The right of petitioner to perform his functions as
municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in
accordance with law, his confirmation having been
duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of
a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside,
even in the absence of any further action, is, as
stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided
in the Constitution. That would be moreover
tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member
of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough
if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which
is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely
worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in
operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional
prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1,
1966, it was contended that his confirmation became
final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the
fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21,
1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by
Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments,
which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any
appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a
member presented not more than one (1) day after
their approval. If a majority of the members
present concur to grant a reconsideration,
the appointment shall be reopened and submitted
anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the
vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this
shall be a final disposition of such a motion."
1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to
the argument that the motion for reconsideration of
Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect
of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's
appointmentand that, accordingly, it should be
considered non-existent. His opinion continued:
"Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of
the members present in favor of the motion for
reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the
appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation
— and to require a resubmission of the appointment
for confirmation."
2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President
shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a
move of a single member of a collective body a
decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were
to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what
respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private
rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and
executive orders are not beyond the pale of judicial
scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a
rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially
so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be
fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to
a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when
claims arising from the express language of the
Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in
this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances,
what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the
fundamental law ordains.
As due process is impressed with both substantive and
procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is
thus not unduly limited.
Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14,
1997.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on
the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation
he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of
both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed
by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into
law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because
it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that
the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and
certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties,
the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has
not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a
case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the
repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern.
Theymay be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The
prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself,
it follows that such a case does not present a situation
in which a branch of the government has "gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited
which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report,
the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter
of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then
a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
In view of the Courts jurisdiction nays of the Members be taken every time a House has
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not to vote, except only in the following instances: upon
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a
erred or has a different view. In the absence of a bill over the veto of the President.
showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to In view of grave abuse
look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion
established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
the legislature void on account merely of settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No.
7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of
the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the
following excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle
and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and
honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name
of popular government.”
(In view of justiciability according to PUNO,
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed
by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
Vera vs Avelino
Facts of the Case:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946
to the President and the Congress a report regarding
the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga,
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
J.) said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the
local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report
ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Romero – who had been included among the political in nature and therefore not under the juridical
16 candidates for senator receiving the highest review of the courts
number of votes and as proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor The case is therefore dismissed
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the
Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11,
termination of the protest filed against their election.
1924
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,
against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy hereby,declared guilty of disorderly conduct and
their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum havingtreacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente
resolution. de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion
of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the
Issues of the Case: course of the debate regarding the credentials of said
Mr. Alejandrino.
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in
the said provinces are valid. Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is
unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the reasons. He prays the court:
sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the
should be deferred pending hearing and decision on respondents enjoining them from executing the
the protests lodged against their elections. resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate
Held: null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the writ of mandamus and injunction against the
concept of separation of powers, holding that the case respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of
was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator
inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall
be admitted to its membership. Following the powers
assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be
amended to state a cause of action, it must be
dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the
court. So ordered.
Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature
nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial
process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be
sustained.
The power to control is the power to abrogate and the
power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each
department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the
others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say
what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to
decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must
determine the validity of legislative enactments as well
as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
In view of the propriety of mandamus
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in
cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at
least the executive department may be said to be
dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It
is not the office of the person to whom the writ of
mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to
be done, by which the propriety of issuing a
mandamus is to be determined."
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline
House Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this:
The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions
in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and
representatives "hold office until removed by the
Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)
They may not be removed by the Philippine
Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to
"punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective
member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may
thus punish an appointive member for disorderly
behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to
"suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a
power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by
the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power
granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it
would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld
from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an
appointive member of the Legislature.

In view of effects of punishment
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the
outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when
permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the
legislative body while giving to the constituency an
opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district
being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy.
By suspension, the seat remains filled but
the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to
punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend an appointive member from
the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what
has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ
prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the
power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take
any particular action. If it be said that conclusion
leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is
that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom
and all power.
Santiago v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055. April 18,
2001
7/28/2010
0 Comments
Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the
aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens
are disqualifiedthereby giving unwarranted benefits to
said aliens whose stay in the Philippines
was unlawfully legalized by said accused."
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other
for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No.
91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or
quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending
petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to of participation, is pending in court, shall be
the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. suspended from office.

The petition assails the authority of the

Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to
the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of
the suspension order.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
issuing suspension to petitioner.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. No costs.
Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the
court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed
before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient
in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office"
would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused
must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2)
the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures
to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right
to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed
to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his (3) Those aliens were disqualified;
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of (4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is (5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in partiality in the execution of her official functions.'
Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the
Constitution
In view of multiple petitions The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 discipline its own ranks.
(e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts
complained therein were authorized under Executive
Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals
the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of with the power of each House of Congress inter alia
approving applications for legalization of spouses and to'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of
though they had arrived in the Philippines after all its Members subject to the qualification that the
December 31, 1983. She concludes that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be
quash the information (Rollo, pp. 25-31). quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section
13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but
a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
hypothetically the allegations of fact in the Representatives."
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]).
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:
(1) She was a public officer, In view of the power of the Court
(2) She approved the application for legalization of
the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
January 1, 1984; coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case
of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution
No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
was duly enacted by Congress.
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting
herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned,
appropriate to render this decision for future guidance even if both the journals from each House and an
on the significant issue raised by petitioner. authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123)
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8
in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
representatives. The three senators were suspended
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
passage of the law and did not bother itself with
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one
the lower House except in the election of the House
had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look
Reps were not considered in determining the required
into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which
copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
same time, the votes were already entered into the
appears to have been noted between the two
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
documents and the court did not say or so much as
Resolution was passed but it could have been
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
favor of the proposed amendment would have been
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
the due enactment thereof.”
branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition
of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by
the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified
by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order;
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez
Facts of the Case:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers, bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the
main raw materials in the production of the said glues.
They paid P33,765.42 in November and December
1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the
petitioner sought the refund of the first and second
sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary
Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of
the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and
approve the said refund on the ground that the
exemption granted by the board in not in accord with
the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by
law from the payment of the margin fee.
Held:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee.
Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which
is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The
petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the
terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not
reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of
the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was passed the only remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against
the petitioner.
FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare
unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices”
as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office
of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for
President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of
Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same
embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what
the constitution mandates. Further, it violated
the equal protection clause since the said law didn’t
repeal provision relating to appointive officials.
Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure
resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.
HELD:
Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run
for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of the contested law, which deal with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title
rule”. The Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and they may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of
the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not
absolute especially if the classification is reasonable.
There is reasonable classification between
an elective official and an appointive one. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Another substantial distinction is that by
law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in
partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote.
United States vs Juan Pons
34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness
of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On
April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopezarrived in
Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine.
The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso.
Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house.
On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed
that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were
not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being
one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of
wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of
trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed
the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved
while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in
session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said
law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at
12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act
2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the
recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the
date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond
the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals
are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature,
when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that
the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February
28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did
not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The
SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill
in this particular case.
ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS
FACTS: RA 4065 was passed which amended the
Revised Charter of the of the City of
Manila and provided for the power, duties and rights of
the vice-mayor of the city. It tumns out that the
bill which was signedinto law contained amendments
different form those approved
by theSenate, The President of the Philippines after
learning of such, had already withdrawn his signature
therefrom. This being the case, the Mayor of Manila
issued circulars to the various departments of the local
govemnment unit to disregard the provisions ofthe
said law. thus, thepetitioner, then vice-mayor of Manila
filed a petition for Mandamus, lnjunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction to compel the necessary parties
to comply with the law. Respondents alleged, hovever,
that the bill never became a law as itwas not the bill
approved by Senate, and in such a case, the entries in
the journal, and not the enrolled bill itself should be
the basis for thedecision of the Court.
RULING:
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
due to coequal and independent departments. which Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
requires the judicial department to accept, as having the purpose.
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated. If the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may Morales v Subido G.R. No. L-29658. February 27, 1969.
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
That attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government
conclusive proof of due enactment of the law cannot Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred,
apply in this case because the Senate President reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute
himself had already declared his signature on the bill bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form
to be invalid. Thus, the enrolled bill doctrine cannot and substance.
apply.
"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in
CERTIFICATION OF BILLS the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has
served the police department of a city for at least 8
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
which the petitionerherein, who is at least a high
officers. It is merely a mode
school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner
of authentication.The lawmaking process in Congress
finished the second year of the law course) could
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
process the phrase ["who has served the police
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In
department of a city or"] was dropped and only the
other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
Rodrigo amendment was retained."
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS The present insistence of the petitioner is that the
version of the provision, as amended at the behest of
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated
Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate
and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. The Court is
the conference committee the only change made in
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has
Bill No. 9266 signed by the chief Executive was the
served as chief of police with exemplary record."
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under

In support of this assertion,
the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of
the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the
various changes made. In what purport to be the page
proofs of the bill as finally approved by both Houses of
Congress.
It is unmistakable up to this point that the
phrase, "who has served the police department of a
city or," was still part of the provision, but according to
the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire
provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of
a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner also submitted a certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to
him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division, and can be found attached to the page proofs
of the bill, explaining the change in Section 10,
thus: "Section 10 was recast for clarity. (with the
consent of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."
Issue: Whetherthe change an employee, as
purportedty was a rewriting to suit some stylistic
preferences, was in truth an alteration of meaning.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration
are denied.
Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest
to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like
this Court to make can be better done in Congress.
After all, House cleaning — the immediate and
imperative need for which seems to be suggested by
the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants
thereof.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy
is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree."
In view of Harwood v Wentworth
What the Justice Harlan said in Harwood v.
Wentworth: “How much greater is the danger of
permitting the validity of a legislative enactment to be
questioned by evidence furnished by the general
endorsements made by clerks upon bills previous to
their final passage and enrollment, — endorsements
usually so expressed as not to be intelligible to any
one except those who made them, and the scope and
effect of which cannot in many cases be understood
unless supplemented by the recollection of clerks as to
what occurred in the hurry and confusion often
attendant upon legislative proceedings."
In view of two foreign landmark cases on enrolled bill
doctrine
Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v.
Wentworth involved claims similar to that made by the
petitioner in this case. In both the claims were
rejected.
Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended that
the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was a nullity because
"it is shown by the congressional records of
proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and
other papers printed by authority of Congress, and
having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of
the bill as it finally passed, was not in the bill
authenticated by the signatures of the presiding
officers of the respective houses of Congress, and
approved by the President."
In rejecting the contention, the United States
Supreme Court held that the signing by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and by the President of
the Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation
by the two houses that such bill is the one that has
passed Congress. And when the bill thus attested is
signed by the President and deposited in the archives,
its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
In Harwood the claim was that an act of the
legislature of Arizona "contained, at the time of its final
passage, provisions that were omitted from it without
authority of the council or the house, before it was
presented to the governor for his approval." The Court
reiterated its ruling in Marshall Field & Co.
In view of Mabanag v Lopez-Vito & CASCO v Gimenez
It was not until 1947 that the question was
presented in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, and we there held
that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts." This court held itself bound by
an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the
vote of three-fourths of the members of the Congress
(as required by the Constitution to approve proposals
for constitutional amendments) was not actually
obtained on account of the suspension of some
members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate.
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was
adopted. Whatever doubt there might have been as to
the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in
view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, was
finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. Speaking for the
Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion
said: "Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled
bill — which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead
of 'urea and formaldehyde' — is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito, 78
Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961).
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-
10520, February 28, 1957
10JAN
En Banc
[CONCEPCION, J.]
FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary
injunction be immediately issued directed to
respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to
usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said
public offices respectively being occupied by them in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent
Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the
salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered
ousting respondents from the aforementioned public
offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they
be altogether excluded therefrom and making the
preliminary injunction permanent.
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of
fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and
private secretaries to said respondents Senators.
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the
action of the Senate in choosing the members of the
Electoral Tribunal
ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political
question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen “upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and
hence, is null and void. This is not a political question.
The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary
authority” in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is
subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed
to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
“.. whether an election of public officers has been in
accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute
prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in
a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or
statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only
jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.
Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal
January 22, 2012
166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative
Department – Electoral Tribunals – Inhibition in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the
SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three
(3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6
senator members from partaking in the said election
protest on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
process imperatively require the mass disqualification
sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification,
Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s
Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of
whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context
of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices
of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given
due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,
creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed
by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate,
the Constitution intended that both those “judicial”
and “legislative” components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to
the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be
misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of
the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of
a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.