owners are fictitious.
Respondent further claims that the registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land to different
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG, complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother, Concepcion Tabang, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct,
deceit and gross dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the legal advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father
of herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
which consists of several parcels of land belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia that under the agrarian reform
program of the government, she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land, as she already owns other parcels of
land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put the title of the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for
easy disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land using fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia
was able to secure individual titles over these parcels of land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion decided to sell the subject parcels of land because they needed money
for their medication and other necessary expenses. On the pretext that he is going to help them sell the subject property to
prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven land titles from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from the
time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the property. He informed herein complainants that he
lost all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance of title. Following
respondents advice, Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting as the authorized agent-representative of the fictitious owners, filed a case
for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of land. However, in the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed
that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang
appear to have been signed by the same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The public prosecutor informed the trial
court of this fact prompting the latter to summon the alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the
court because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing of the same.
Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-issuance of title, changing the signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon
knowledge that a new set of cases was filed, respondent executed or caused to be executed several documents, among which were
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia Tabang.
Respondent caused the annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the subject properties. Thereafter, respondent
caused the publication of a notice representing himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire
to sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven individuals. However, only
three of these buyers were legitimate, while the remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels
of land, respondent was able to receive P3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was remitted to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery,
affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership
over the said lands upon himself, respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise allege
that this is not the only case wherein respondent sold properties of his clients to third persons without his clients knowledge and
consent.[1]
Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the material allegations of the complainants. He claims that the
seven land titles covering the subject properties are valid and duly executed; and denies complainants allegations that the alleged
individuals and his only participation in the said sale is that he was authorized by the registered owners to collect from the buyers
the full payment of the lands sold. He further denies that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she merely acted as
a broker who was trying to promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to know that the properties were sold by their
registered owners, she called up the law office of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or balato in the sale of the
properties equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of
land; that when respondent turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light and seek his disbarment. Respondent further
denies complainants allegation that he sold real properties of some of his clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases
his role was merely to notarize the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of their properties. [2]
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro for report and
recommendation. Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory conference on November 25, 2003 after which she required the
parties to submit their respective position papers, together with all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of their
witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3]Accordingly she recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.[4]
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution adopting the report of Commissioner Navarro.
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed the supreme punishment of disbarment.[5]
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not
preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits
in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein. [6]
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[7]
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed
with except for valid and compelling reasons.[8] Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of investigation in disbarment and
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate
speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and
counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended
for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for
indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which
shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such
hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of
Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which
shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
 In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal investigation by conducting a mandatory conference
between the complainants and the respondent after both parties have filed their complaint and answer, respectively. The mandatory
conference was supposedly held for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate facts. However, no
definitive result was reached during the conference as respondent continued to deny all the allegations of the complainants. After
the mandatory conference was held, no further hearings were conducted. Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely required
the parties to submit their respective position papers, including all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of
witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents attached thereto, the Investigating
Commissioner submitted her Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the respondent and the imposition of the penalty of disbarment being
prayed for by complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should not have simply relied on the parties position papers and the
pieces of documentary evidence submitted by them. She should have proceeded with the investigation by conducting formal
hearings and calling upon the parties to present additional evidence to support their respective contentions. In the case of the
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should have required the presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the
affidavits presented in evidence to prove the veracity of the allegations contained in said affidavits, at the same time affording
respondent the opportunity to cross- examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the complainants to move for the presentation
of the persons alleged to have executed the subject affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further investigation,
considering its power to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have compelled the persons named by the respondent as the
original owners as well as the buyers of the subject properties to appear before her. The appearance of these witnesses could have
easily been facilitated considering that the residence and office addresses of the three of the supposed buyers are all located in
Makati while the residence of three of the original owners are located within Manila and the remaining four are residing in the
province of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat, under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is
authorized to issue subpoena to compel the appearance of persons and witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants and respondent consists of affidavits
and photocopies of documents. Not one of the persons who executed these affidavits and instruments was presented or subpoenaed
by the Commissioner to identify their affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in a formal
hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely on the issues raised in the subject administrative matter.
not return until around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent. When finally complainant was able
to see the respondent after thirty minutes of waiting, the complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he
placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry
Division for examination. Respondent’s hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked
money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was
photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case,
invoking his right against self-incrimination. Thereafter, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. The NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the
institution of disbarment proceedings against him. An administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent with
malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. In an answer to such complaint, respondent asserted that complainant
surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case
(IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In
connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination,
perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer,
complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that
the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by his business rival. In a resolution dated December
23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors
for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further ISSUE
proceedings. Whether or not the extortion committed by Atty. Salavador Gaa shall be considered as a ground for disbarment?
SO ORDERED.

HELD
WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA YES. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a
A.M. No. 1048/ 246 SCRA 64 July 14, 1995 violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968 [1958]) imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his
Case Nature: DISBARMENT- Violation of lawyer’s oath (RULE 138, Section 27, Rules of Court) obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Where the misconduct of a
lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The
FACTS
respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Wellington Reyes, a complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim
of extortion by Atty. Gaa, a respondent lawyer and a former Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint
for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971
and a total of P1, 500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another “payoff” was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. on the same day in
respondent’s office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI after complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso
bills totaling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently
returned to complainant for use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent’s office, he was told that the latter would
A.C. NO. 2033 MAY 9, 1990 WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it
denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.
E. CONRAD AND VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, COMPLAINANTS,
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
VS. Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on
the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, RESPONDENT.

A.C. NO. 2148 MAY 9, 1990

ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. AND ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, COMPLAINANTS,

VS.

ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, RESPONDENT.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.

Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

FACTS:

PER CURIAM:

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in
Administrative Case No. 2148 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law during the
pendency of these cases.

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976
in G.R. Nos.

L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable
thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively from
said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

ISSUE:

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the
latter; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.

RULING: