1) Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
A treaty has two (2) aspects — as an international
Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police
Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and
his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in
June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here
in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls
in the Pasay city market.
2) Guerrero’s Transport Services v. Blaylock
G.R. No. L-41518 June 30, 1976 Ponente
petitioners GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.
respondents BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABOR ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES and
JOSE CRUZ
summary The Union wanted to compel the winning bidder (Guerrero) to reinstate/re-employ
the members of their group who were ex-employees of the losing bidder Blaylock. They
based it on the RP-US base agreement and on the compromise agreement made. The court
adhered to the Union’s petition.
agreement between states, and as municipal law for the people of each state to observe.
Being part of municipal law, the provision of the treaty forms part of the contract between
petitioner and the U.S. Naval Base authorities.
In view of said stipulation, the new contractor is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the
employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor.
facts of the case
• The United states Naval Base authorities at Subic, Zambales, conducted a public
bidding for a five- year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation
services inside the naval base.
• This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner- operator of Guerrero's
Transport Services, Inc., over Concepcion F. Blaylock, the then incumbent concessionaire
doing business under the name of "Blaylock Transport Services", whose 395 employees are
members of respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN.
• Guerrero refused to employ the members of the union.
• On January, 12, 1975, filed a complaint with the NLRC against Guerrero's Transport
Services, Inc. and Santiago Guerrero, to compel them to employ its members pursuant to
Article 1, Section 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement dated May 27, 1968.
• Provincial Director of the Labor Office in Zambales furnished, on August 2, 1974, a
list of 46 members of respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN and former drivers of the Blaylock
Transport Service, who are within the coverage of the decision of the Secretary of Labor, and
requesting petitioner to report its action on the matter directly to the Chairman, NLRC,
Manila
• Santiago A. Guerrero received a letter from Col. Levi L. Basilla, PC (GSC) Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, requesting compliance with the Order
• On June 20, 1975, Labor Arbiter De los Reyes ordered the reinstatement of 129
individuals "to their former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority and
other rights and privileges"
o Guerrero says that the Orders were issued by the Labor Arbiter were without
jurisdiction.
• LA declared said Orders final and executory and directed petitioner Guerrero's
Transport Services, Inc. to reinstate the 129 complainants and to pay them the amount of
P4,290.00 each as backwages
• October 6, 1975, issued a TRO and required the respondents to file an answer
within 10 days from notice.
• At the hearing of this case on October 20, 1975, a Compromise Agreement was
arrived at by the parties wherein they agreed to submit to the Office of the Secretary of
Labor the determination of members of the respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN who shall be
reinstated or absorbed by the herein petitioner in the transportation service inside the naval
base, which determination shall be considered final.
o The determination of WON 179 employees should be admitted was based on
certain criteria .
issue
WON Guerrero can be compelled to abide by the treaty and the compromise agreement? YES
ratio
o Pursuant to Section 6 of Article I of the Philippine-U S. Labor Agreement of May 27,
1968, the United States Armed Forces undertook, consistent with military requirements, "to
provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the
United States Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment.
o A treaty has two (2) aspects — as an international agreement between states, and
as municipal law for the people of each state to observe.
o Being part of municipal law, the provision of the treaty forms part of the contract
between petitioner and the U.S. Naval Base authorities.
o In view of said stipulation, the new contractor is, therefore, bound to give "priority"
to the employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor. It is obviously in
recognition of such obligation that petitioner entered into the afore-mentioned Compromise
Agreement
o Under the Compromise Agreement as embodied in the Resolution of this Court
dated October 24, 1975, the parties agreed to submit to the Secretary of Labor the
determination as to who of the members of the respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN shall be
absorbed or employed by the herein petitioner Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc., and that
such determination shall be considered as final.
o The Compromise-Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has
the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and
their privies.
o For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of
res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.
o Since the resolution of the NLRC of October 31, 1973 required the absorption of
the applicants subject to the conditions therein contained, and there being no showing that
such conditions were complied with, the Labor Arbiter exceeded his authority in awarding
back wages to the 129 complainants.
3) People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo
53 SCRA 476 – Political Law – Sovereignty
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which
is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without
acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then
charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to
secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo
has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior
or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo
does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.
4) Bayan Muna v. Romulo and Ople
Then US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note 0470 to the DFA proposing
the terms of the Non-surrender Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Via
Exchange of Notes BFO-028-03, the Philippines, through Sec. Ople, agreed and accepted the
US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note and put in effect the Non-surrender
Agreement with the US government.
The Non-surrender Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the
Philippines and the US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals. It provides that the persons of one party present in the
territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first party be surrendered
or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose or by any means to
any other entity or third country or expelled to a third country for the purpose of surrender
to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council. When the US/Philippines extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers
a person of the Philippines/US to a third country, the US/Philippines will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of
the Government of the US/Philippines.
Petitioners argue that the Exchange of Notes BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding an agreement, that it cannot partake the nature of a treaty without being ratified
by the Senate, that the Non-surrender Agreement does not fall under any subject-categories
enumerated in a previous case, and that the Non-surrender Agreement infringes the
effectivity of the Rome Statute insofar as it unduly restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Issues
1) Can the Non-surrender Agreement be validly concluded through exchanges of notes? Is
the Non-surrender Agreement a violation of the obligation of the Philippines under the Rome
Statute?
Held
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Ratio
1) An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements
which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. It as a record of
routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement
consists of 2 documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text
of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government
ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is
frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or sometimes to avoid the
process of legislative approval. The terms exchanges of notes and executive agreements have
been used interchangeably, the former being a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action.
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements
mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading case is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules
on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or executive agreement as an
instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of
agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form
they so wish to further their respective interests.
There is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting parties, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage, the
validity of which has never been seriously questioned by the Court. The President as head of
state and government is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements,
subject to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But agreements may be validly
entered into without such concurrence as the President wields vast powers and influence;
her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is executive altogether. The President by
ratifying through her deputies the Non-surrender agreement, did nothing more than
discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to the Office.
2) The Non-surrender agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute. The
jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction of signatory
states. It is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes. The primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes
rests, at the first instance, with the State where the crime was committed; secondarily with
the ICC in appropriate situations. The Non-surrender agreement does not violate the
Philippines’ duty required by the imperatives of good faith to refrain from performing any act
tending to impair the Rome Statute.
The Philippines has not abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the
ICC to prosecute US national who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the
Philippines. The Non-surrender agreement is an affirmance of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction. The Philippines may decide to try persons of the US under our national
criminal jurisdiction. Or the country may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction and defer
to the ICC. As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country
would in effect accord discretion to the US to exercise wither its national criminal jurisdiction
or consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial. By their nature, international
agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing nature of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects
of their state power. In this partial surrender, greater benefits are derived from a pact or
reciprocal undertaking. Evidently, there is as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone
prevalent practice, among the different countries in the world that the prosecution of
internationally recognized crimes should be handled by a particular international criminal
court.
Rome Statute – This establishes the International Criminal Court with the power to exercise
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties:
1) State Party – is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith
2) Signatory State – is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty.
As of writing the ponencia, the Philippines is only a signatory state to the Rome Statute and
not a State Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Any argument obliging the Philippines
to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
Treaty – international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation. International agreements may be in the
form of 1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification or 2)
executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters
that treaties.
Jus cogens – means the compelling law. It holds the highest hierarchical position among all
other customary norms and principles. Jus cogens norms are deemed peremptory and non-
derogable. When applied to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed so
fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that state cannot derogate
from them, even by agreement.
5) DBM vs. Kolonwel G.R. No. 175608 June 8,2007
July 25, 2009 at 11:46 am (1)
This is a petition for review, with a prayer for temporary restraining order to nullify and set
aside the Order dated Dec. 04, 2006 of the Manila RTC.
In the middle of 2005, DepEd requested the services of the DBM-PS to undertake
procurement project which is to be jointly funded by the World Bank (WB), thru the Second
Social Expenditure Management Program (SEMP2) of the RP-IBRD Loan Agreement No. 7118-
PH and the Asian Development Bank (ABD) thru SEDIP Loan No. 1654-PHI. In October 2005,
the DBM-PS called for a bidding for the supply of the Makabayan textbooks and teachers
manuals. Of the entities, foreign and local, only eleven (11) bidders submitted, including
private respondent Kolonwel.
Following the bid and the book content/body evaluation process, DBM committee issued a
resolution disqualifying, among others, Kolonwel for “failure in cover stock testing “.
Kolonwel was informed of this and subsequently filed with RTC Manila a special civil action
for certiorari with a prayer for TRO. In support of its TRO application, Kolonwel alleged,
among other things, that the supply-awardees were rushing with the implementation of the
void supply contracts to beat the closing-date deadline. After summary hearing, the Manila
RTC issued a 20-day TRO, and later issued a decision wherein Resolution 001-2006-A of the
DBM was annulled and set aside. Hence this petition.
ISSUE : Will the petition prosper?
RULING : The petition is granted and the assailed decision of the Manila RTC is hereby
nullified and set aside.
Under the fundamental international principle of pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as borrower
bound itself to perform in good faith the duties and obligations under Loan No. 7118-PH.
Applying this postulate, the DBM IABAC, was legally obliged to comply with, or accord
primacy to the WB guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the
bidding/procurement process in question.
Foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions, such as Loan No. 7118-PH,
partake of an executive or international agreement within the purview of Sec. 4 of RA9184.
Significantly, whatever was stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the
procurement of goods necessary to implement the main project.
6) Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading
FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion
and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure
and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other
hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an
executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the
Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from
Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO
was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the
Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of
at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall
short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common
in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and
conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless
to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under
the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would
seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are
not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by
the Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on
shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization
but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.
7) Bayan v Zamora
FACTS: The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to
herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what
is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds
of all the members of the senate.
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the
Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners
have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the
absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally
expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus
standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in
the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National
President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of
the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of
the petitions.
 further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
Constitution?
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent,
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of
foreign military troops in the Philippines.

The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties
or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the
establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient”
and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is
made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that
Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign
troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops
and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military
treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article
XVIII.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which 3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the
YES
general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular
designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render
compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on (a) it must be under a treaty;
the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,
be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so
required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the
US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that
the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts
or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence
of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent
to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
8) PHILIP MORRIS V. CA (G.R. NO. 91332)
Facts: Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business in the
Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’ used in
their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin respondent Fortune Tobacco from
manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the symbol ‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical
or confusingly similar with their trademarks. Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the
Trademark Law to bring their suit and the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The
court denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in
the Philippines, respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to petitioner.
CA granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.
Ruling:
(4) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat
the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines
to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been
acknowledged in La Chemise.Given these confluence of existing laws amidst
the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding
principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business
in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily
because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue
is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business
activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question
whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the
controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with
Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for
infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the
Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual
use of the emblem in the local market.
(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as in the very
petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for
these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right
which can breached. Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that
there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered
by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged
in the manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes who might be
retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a
result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency
of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented
to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is
maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they
are not doing business in the Philippines. In view of the explicit representation of petitioners
in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows
that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.
9) THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, et al .
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF,
thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to
the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which
consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral
domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum
was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central
Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the
Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing
the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other
hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was
provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-
AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive
Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution
and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
4) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the
Constitution and the laws.
HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public
at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of
Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28
complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill
of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as
the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold
public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy
of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-
hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is
already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions
involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot
thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such
policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of
the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary
to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The
imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and
to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O. No. 3. The erambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to
further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the
comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the
sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the
government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one
community. Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-
building and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3
contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations,
contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient
consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP,
one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and
other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as
to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for
the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the
peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local
levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections
against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it
would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different
provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly,
the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph
11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision,
however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity
shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may have been
intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact.
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the
MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles
the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA
indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association
is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even
the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already
requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following
provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict
with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that
―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered
by the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD
would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2€ on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2€,
the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another 2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made
then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
(ticket was purchased in San Francisco so that’s where the contract was made);
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in
4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which final
the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes
destination is San Francisco).
and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have
While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the
the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, Warsaw Convention.
in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial
conducive to national unity.
review.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is bound
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the Senate. Until & unless
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.
independence.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with
the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the legislative and the executive. The
the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same
presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before
does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
it was adopted and given the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of
offer any compelling argument to overcome the presumption.
the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.

10) Augusto Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines

FACTS: Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he
bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in San Francisco. His flight
would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled
flight was in December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he
made no reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident, he
sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which
provides that complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in:

1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA);