ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
It was not
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to
the swimming pool operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After
paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools
is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display
in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing
the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they
had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in
such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of
the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic
provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are
available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room
to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong
noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the lifeguard in
attendant (Manuel Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body
was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple
times but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting
its employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other testified
that Abaño was reading a magazine and was chatting with a security guard
when the incident happened and that he was called a third time before he
responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming that there was no
negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last
Clear Chance” for having the last opportunity to save the Dominador, its
employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.
HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting
its employees as all of them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent in
managing the pools as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due
diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper defense in this case. Further,
the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was belied by
the statements they have given to the investigators when they said that the
lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was called about the boy
at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application here.
established as to how Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to
the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body was
retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously (how
can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to
the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
LBC AIR CARGO vs. CA
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on
board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a
dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of
LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport
entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass
by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started
to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the
right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the
dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the
accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner
Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for
the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant
case, the victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to
be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that
could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's
part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
ASSOCIATED BANK v, TAN
FACTS:
Respondent Tan is a businessman and a regular depositor-creditor of the
petitioner, AssociatedBank. Sometime in September 1990, he deposited a
postdated check with the petitioner in the amountof P101,000 issued to him
by a certain Willy Cheng from Tarlac. The check was duly entered in his
bankrecord. Allegedly, upon advice and instruction of petitioner that
theP101,000 check was already clearedand backed up by sufficient funds,
respondent, on the same date, withdrew the sum of P240,000 from hisaccount
leaving a balance of P57,793.45. A day after, TAN deposited the amount of
P50,000 making hisexisting balance in the amount of P107,793.45,
because he has issued several checks to his businesspartners.
However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him
alleging that the checks heissued bounced for insufficiency of
funds. Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner to take
positivesteps regarding the matter for he has adequate and
sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless,
petitioner did not bother nor offer any apology regarding the incident.
RespondentTan filed a Complaint for Damages on December 19,
1990, with the RTC against petitioner. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay damages and
attorney’sfees. Appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
CA ruled that the bank should not haveauthorized the withdrawal
of the value of the deposited check p rior to its clearing. Petitioner
filed aPetition for Review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner has the right to debit the amount of the dishonored check from
the account of respondenton the ground that the check was withdrawn by
respondent prior to its clearing
HELD:
The Petition has no merit.The real issue here is not so much the right
of petitioner to debit respondent’s account but, rather, themanner
in which it exercised such right. Banks are granted by law the right
to debit the value of adishonored check from a depositor’s account but they
must do so with the highest degree of care, so asnot to prejudice the depositor
unduly. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of agood
father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors is concerned.In this case, petitioner did not treat respondent’s
account with the highest degree of care. Respondentwithdrew his money upon
the advice of petitioner that his money was already cleared. It is
petitioner’spremature authorization of the withdrawal that caused
the respondent’s account balance to fall to insufficient levels, and the
subsequent dishonor of his own checks for lack of funds.
ASTUDILLO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his
death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire
connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros,
in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted
an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric
Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render
it liable for damages.
Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages
for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies
are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends
to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been
foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the
defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place
frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them
losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively
insulated wire.
SYQUIA vs. CA
1. Petitioners were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased
Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint in the then
Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract
and/or quasi-delict.
2. According to the complaint, the petitioners and respondent to inter the
remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of
July 25, 1978. They also alleged that the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter. Upon
opening the vault, it became apparent that there was evidence of total flooding,
the coffin was entirely damaged and the exposed parts of the deceased’s
remains were damaged.
3. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-
appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages,
P500,000.00 for moral damages, etc.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. Trial Court: dismissed the complaint. the contract between the parties did
not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be
no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence,
and because there was a pre- existing contractual relation.
Contention of the defense: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete
vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be
filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth
would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."
2. Court of Appeals: affirmed dismissal.

ISSUE: whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its
contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was
guilty of a tort.

RULING:
NO, there was no negligent act on the part of the cemetery.

Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no
reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was
no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict

Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract
entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" on August 27, 1969.
That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their
respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on
the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable
not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided
by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care
and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
that the vault would be waterproof.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which

is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In
the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.

Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in

preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.