Cortes v.
Yu-Tibo
GR No. 911, March 12, 1903
Facts:
The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has
certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows
opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street; that these windows
have been in existence since the year 1843, and that the defendant, the tenant
of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising
the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of one of the windows in
said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large
part of the air and light formerly received through the window. The court
practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not
proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63
from making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the
complaint.
The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of
the windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an
easement of light in favor of the house No.65, and as a servitude upon house
No.63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making of any
improvements in the latter house which might in any manner be prejudicial to
the enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the easement of light is
positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the
enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine
to this case, from the time that said windows were opened with
theknowledge of the owner of the house No.63, and without opposition on his
part. However, the defendant contends that the easement is negative, and
that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from
the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by
a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which
would be lawful but for the existence of the easement.
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement of light in the case of windows opened in one’s
own wall is negative.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a
wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the
windows opened in one’s own wall is of negative character, and, as such, can
not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Civil Code, except by
counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful for him to do
were it not for the easement. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not
having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house
No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein
improvements which might obstruct the light of house No.65 of the same
street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the
complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he
has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light,
no matter how long a time might have elapsed since the windows were
opened in the wall of the said house no.65, because the period which the law
demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run,
the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.
When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more
than exercise an act of ownership inherent in the right of property with no
limitations other than those established by law. By reason of the fact that such
an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of the one
opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the
property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the
exercise of an easement. It is that the use if the windows opened in a wall on
one’s own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement
to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the
owner of the abutting property and does not create any right to maintain the
windows to the prejudice of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does
not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build
upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the
windows for the effects of possession according to Art.1942 of the Civil Code,
because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the
easement of light with respect to the openings made in one’s own edifice does
not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them. The easement
really consists in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing
anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to
the obligation of not impeding the light.
Purugganan v. Paredes
FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded
on the north by the lot of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an
easement of drainage in favor of Paredes annotated in the Decree of
registration, which read in part:
“XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion
of the lots No. 1 and 2 which is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in
length…and the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that the rainwater coming
from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins
of her brick wall…shall fall into the land of the applicant.”
Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the
length allowed in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves)
of 1.20 meters, protruding over the lot of Purugganan, which is .20 meters
wider than that allowed, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls about 3
meters inside lots 1 and 2 of Purugganan.
Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the
construction of the roof, which exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court,
in a summary proceeding decided in favor of Purugganan. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?
HELD:
No. Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the
decree of registration to the roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend
the meaning of the phrase “servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados”
constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it means the easement of
receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the
land of Purugganan because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the
rain water falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report submitted by
the court-appointed commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the
dimension allowed in the decree of registration.
Valisno v. Adriano
FACTS:
Plaintiff – appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of
land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano
Francisco. Said land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and
other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the
Pampanga River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters
long, traversing Adriano’s land. Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57 – hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a
complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications (Bureau – PWC). Bureau – PWC ruled in favour of Valisno.
Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of
the case which was granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation
canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon
fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of
Bureau – PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisno’s complaint. It
held that Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased
to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His
non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water rights did not
form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among
themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata
received from her father’s estate did not acquire any water rights with the land
purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the
defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that
under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming
a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
BureauPWC and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken
to the proper court within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity
of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there
was nothing in Valisno’s evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It
dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisno’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who
certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil
Code should apply to this case.
HELD:
The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation
canal on Adriano’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to
Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to
Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it
as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign
of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of
both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order
that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time,
theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in
the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be
removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons
(Civil Code). The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance
and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata
Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor
Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr.
Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of
land above- described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal
Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and
one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges
and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements
appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the
water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive. Water rights, such
as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land,
although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of
necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives
the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of
Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction,
disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adriano’s act of
levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the
Pampanga River.
Trias v. G. Araneta, Inc.
FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision.
Thru broker Araneta Inc (of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded
company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot should
never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of
the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that
stated “5. That no factories be permitted in this section.”
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore
illegal and existed as mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations
already prevented the erection of factories in the vicinity. Worse, the
annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly
raised the issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the
imposition resulted from a valid sales transaction between her predecessors
in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to overrule such valid
easement and impaired the right to contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid.
HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed
under art 594 which provides that “every owner of a piece of land may
establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in contravention to the
law, public policy and public order”
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet
of neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In
the absence of a clash with public policy, the easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be
repealed anytime, allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at
the very least, the original intent to bar factories remains binding.
La Vista v. CA
FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road.
The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west,
traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo
de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was
originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine
Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of
the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent
of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land.
Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January,
1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a
Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half
portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the
mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the
property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas,
was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the
easement on the road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the
easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some
guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents
of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in
turn filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of
the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public
highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the
negotiation of the easement.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?
RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged
on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established
by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find the details regarding it in
the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between admu
and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement
need not be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot
be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing
the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case
at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the
existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the
same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement is thus demandable.
The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but
merely declaring one (there no such thing as a judicial easement).
Salimbangon v. Tan
A lot was inherited by Guillermo Ceniza’s children which they subdivided into
5 portions (Lot A, B, C, D and E). The first 3 was adjacent to the street, while
D and E needed an easement through the first three lots to get to the street.
Two plans were drawn up for the easement. The first involved a 1.5m
easement on both Lot A and B, but the heirs adopted the 3m easement
solely on Lot B because Lot A was already small so it seemed unfair to
further deprive it of space. The Spouses Salimbangon owned Lot A, who
built a house and two garages there. One garage could get to street only by
means of the easement. Lot B, C, D and E were bought by Spouses Tan
who introduced improvement on Lot B and closed off the access that
Spouses Salimbangon had on the easement. The Salimbangon’s filed a
complaint against the Tans, while the Tans filed with the RTC a motion to
extinguish the easement. The RTC ruled in favor of the Salimbangons, but
the CA reversed this.
The Supreme Court ruled that Spouses Tan was able to prove that the intent
of the parties for the easement was solely for the benefit of Lots D and E.
Also, since Lot A was not an intended beneficiary, and the easement was
solely on Lot B, the consolidation of the ownership of the four lots
extinguished the easement by operation of law.
Telmo v. Bustamante
FACTS: The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real
property of 616 square meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known
as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-957643 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the
owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C,
respectively, located at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was
transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road,
respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused
because they said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being
covered by the roads 10-meter easement.
The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the
resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed
that the Telmos encroached upon respondents lot. Petitioner then
uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo
makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building
permit.
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However,
around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly
destroyed the concrete poles. The following day, respondents relatives went
to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete
poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he
was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the
incident in the barangay blotter.
Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any
just compensation from the government when it took a portion of their
property for the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse,
they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the
abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo.
ISSUE: W/N property claimed and enclosed with concrete posts by
respondent was validly taken by the National Government through its power
of eminent domain, pursuant to Executive Order No. 113, as amended by
Executive Order No. 253, creating the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. In this
context, petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent
were a public nuisance under Article 694 (4)
HELD: Petitioner contends that respondents concrete posts were in the
nature of a nuisance per se, which may be the subject of summary
abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again, we disagree.
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner
did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which
would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did,
at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free
passage of people to and from the national road.
AC Enterprises v Frabelle
DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The term
“nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person,
property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one
which violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few
persons while a nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of
public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a
common injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common to the
general public. In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning
system is considered a private nuisance.
Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se – Noise
becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment
to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of
the listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially
sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance.
Whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the
courts.
Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether rights of
property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in
question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical
Discomfort]which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by
the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact
devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care
is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property
of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable
regard for the rights of those affected by it.
Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estiation – an
action to abate private nuisance, even wehere the plaintiff asks for damages
is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey
building in Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a condominium corporation
who's condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent
complained of the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the air-
conditioning units of petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of
proceedings or a nuisance per se?
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise
generated by the blower of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff
prays for damages, one incapable of pecuniary estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of
complaint?
HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of
proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise becomes actionable
only whenn it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of
the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury
to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the house an actionable nuisance–– in the
conditions, of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of
many necessary occupations.
(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.
(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is
of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance
to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable.
Lucena Grand Terminal v. JAC Liner
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena
with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been
caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-
jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the
other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the
right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance
1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance
1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena
then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The
Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has
concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for
review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not duly oppressive upon individuals.
HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to
a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and
jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow
the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper,
the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying
routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. The true role of Constitutional Law
is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus
requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From
the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be
the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the
streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed
to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals
per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to
operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able
to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from
operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various
barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal,
and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which
were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an
individual‘s rights.
Parayno v. Jovellanos
FACTS: Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in
Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of
the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal
Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire
Protection for investigation. Upon their advice, the Sangguniang Bayan
recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's
gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the
gasoline station in question. Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was
then denied. She then filed a special civil action for prohibition and
mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered
by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits
gasoline service stations which are within 100meters away from any public
or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based on
the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building
nearest the lot if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of
the gasoline station. Petitioner contended that hers was not a "gasoline
service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21
thereof. Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos
against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the grounds invoked
by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against
petitioner by applying the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline
filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was
met by the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be
likened to that of a gasoline service station as provided for in Section 44 of
the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.
HELD: The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality
made a clear distinction between a gasoline service station and a gasoline
filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said ordinance. It
was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from
the other, which the respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality
cannot invoke the principle of Ejusdem generis which means "of the same
kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of others.
With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that
"gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline
filling station" under Section 21.
The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed
against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had
effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle
of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the
former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the case at bar
and that of the previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation
should already end since the concerns had already been resolved. The
Court stated that an individual should not be vexed twice for the same
cause.
Manila v. Laguio
FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or
operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include
motels and inns, was enacted by herein petitioners contending that the said
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the
ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power on the grounds that the
Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but
not to prohibit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan
FACTS: Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of
P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice
plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The
factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the
gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate.
Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was
playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began
playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of
the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of
‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the
parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of
attractive nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in
this case?
RULING: NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us
that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of
water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case
bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.