Culpa Aquiliana; Contractual; Criminal – A reading of the respondent court's decision shows
Distinctions that it anchored petitioners' liability both in culpa
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS
COMPANY & ARMANDO PON, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE PAMFILO, THE
HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON
SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES,
respondents.
The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity)
driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines
Transportation Company (Superlines, for brevity)
driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway
traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon
collision resulted in the death of Aniceto Rosales,
Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several
injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon
Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046
The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was
negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake
a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of Superlines was
coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus,
Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a
belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and
tried to return to his proper lane. It was an
unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each
other.
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the
surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco Pamfilo,
Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate
cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
against BLTB and Superlines together with their
respective drivers
Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their
drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by claiming that
they exercised due care and diligence and shifted the
fault, against each other.
After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated
defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from
liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants
BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them jointly and
severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs.
Issue: THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE
ACTIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
BASED ON CULPA CONTRACTUAL. (p. 12, Rollo)
Held:
contractual and culpa aquiliana,
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck
owned by his employer, appellant Armando Pon is
primarily liable
"On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer,
appellant BLTB, is also primal y, direct and immediate
in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its
passengers was through the negligence of its employee
and such liability does not cease even upon proof that
BLTB had exercised all. the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees
The common carrier's liability for the death of or
injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual
obligation to carry its passengers safely to their
destination. That obligation is so serious that the Civil
Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious
person. They are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they have
observed extraordinary diligence"
The liability of BLTB is also solidarily with its driver
(Viluan v. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 742, 747) even
though the liability of the driver springs from quasi
delict while that of the bus company from contract
it is settled that the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the
passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the
driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and
drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed
by Traffic Rules and Regulations.
Such negligence and recklessness is binding against
petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact
that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the
court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible for the payment of the damages sought by
the passenger.
By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed
the express obligation to transport the passengers to
their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances,
and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA,
SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA
VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, respondents.
on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel
M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10
On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North
Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided
connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of
using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on
the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the exclusive control of the
cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh.
'2') between the third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and
operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was
placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started
operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana
who had already disembarked from said vessel
obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were
still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it
was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel
to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him
He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he
later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May 15, 1975,
the cause of his death according to the Death Certi cate
(Exh. 'C') being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to
traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the
urinary bladder"
Private respondents Vianas led a complaint 3 for
damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for
brevity) for breach of contract of carriage.
Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the
time of the accident, the vessel was completely under
the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the exclusive
stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the
unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is
also averred that since the crane operator was not an
employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable
under the fellow-servant rule.prcd
Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, led a third-party
complaint 5 against Pioneer imputing liability thereto
for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly
caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was
an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and
supervision.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial
court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to
reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid
the Vianas.
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial
court and respondent Court of Appeals found the
victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory
negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the
arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which
was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the
victim's death.
Issue:
Held:
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock
or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises.
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated
merely by the fact that the person transported has been
carried to his destination if, for example, such person
remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of
a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the
victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe
there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of
petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of
vessels are allotted a longer period of time to
disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of
cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such
vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume
of both as compared to the capacity of a regular
commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will
need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to
disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage
whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and
retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act
of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to
do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is
duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
their destination but also to afford them a reasonable
time to claim their baggage.
The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible
only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was
admittedly standard procedure in the case of
petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall
start only after that time. Consequently, under the
foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is
still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of
his tragic death.prcd
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for
breach of contract of carriage where all that is required
of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of
carriage and its non- performance by the carrier, that is,
the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to
his destination, 18 which, in the instant case, necessarily
includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with
extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily
negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct
cause of, because it could de nitely have prevented, the
former's death.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are
likewise bound by respondent court's declaration that
there was no negligence on the part of Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation, a con rmation of the trial
court's nding to that effect, hence our conformity to
Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on
extraordinary diligence required of, and the
corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on,
common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not
detract from what we have said that no negligence can
be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the
failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for
the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our
finding on its liability.
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and
THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA
CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDIAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT,
NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT,
SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA
CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito
Cudiamat represented by Inocencia Cudiamat,
respondents.
petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a
reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard
to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons
and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat.
instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest
hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without
regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his
other passengers and cargo to their respective
destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto
Hospital where he expired.
petitioners alleged that they had observed and
continued to observe the extraordinary diligence
required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees, even as
they add that they are not absolute insurers of the
safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that
it was the victim's own carelessness and negligence
which gave rise to the subject incident
The lower court, in declaring that the victim was
negligent, made the following findings:
This Court is satisfied that Pedrito Cudiamat was
negligent in trying to board a moving vehicle, especially
with one of his hands holding an umbrella. And,
without having given the driver or the conductor any
indication that he wishes to board the bus.
However, respondent court, in arriving at a different
opinion, declares that:
"From the testimony of appellees' own witness in the
person of Vitaliano Safarita, it is evident that the
subject bus was at full stop when the victim Pedrito
Cudiamat boarded the same as it was precisely on this
instance where a certain Miss Abenoja alighted from
the bus. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the
appellees, the victim did indicate his intention to board
the bus as can be seen from the testimony of the said
witness when he declared that Pedrito Cudiamat was
no longer walking and made a sign to board the bus
when the latter was still at a distance from him.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross
negligence of the appellee- driver in prematurely
stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the
passenger to first secure his seat especially so when we
take into account that the platform of the bus was at
the time slippery and wet because of a drizzle.
Issue:
Held:
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bus was at
full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct.
They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell
from the platform of the bus when it suddenly
accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right
tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence
on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus
when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot
be said that the deceased was guilty of
negligence.LLphil
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers,
including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar,
or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable
length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for
injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from
the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so.
even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the
victim in boarding the same cannot be considered
negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained
in the testimony of the aforestated witness for
petitioners, Virginia Abalos, the bus had "just started"
and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the
victim had boarded and was on its platform
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the
platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining
to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held
that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as
to those alighting therefrom.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based
on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of
carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an
exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier
to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver
and the conductor failed to bring the gravely injured
victim immediately to the hospital for medical
treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their
negligence.
VIRGILIO D. IMSON, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HOLIDAY HILLS
STOCK AND BREEDING FARM
CORPORATION, FNCB FINANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
The case at bench arose from a vehicular collision on
December 11, 1983, involving petitioner's Toyota
Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered under the
names of private respondents FNCB Finance
Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding
Farm Corporation. The collision seriously injured
petitioner and totally wrecked his car.
On January 6, 1984, petitioner filed with the RTC
Baguio City1 a Complaint for Damages.2 Sued were
private respondents as registered owners of the truck;
truck driver Felix B. Calip, Jr.; the beneficial owners of
the truck, Gorgonic Co Adarme, Felisa T. Co (also
known as Felisa Tan), and Cirilia Chua Siok Bieng; and
the truck insurer, Western Guaranty
Corporation.LexLib
Defendants driver and beneficial owners failed to
answer and were declared in default.4 On May 29,
1987, however, petitioner and defendant insurer,
entered into a compromise agreement. In consequence
of the compromise agreement, the trial court dismissed
the Complaint for damages against Western Guaranty
Corporation on June 16, 1987.
Nearly eighteen (18) months later, said private
respondent moved to dismiss the case against all the
other defendants. It argued that since they are all
indispensable parties under a common cause of action,
the dismissal of the case against defendant insurer must
result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.
The trial court denied the motion.prcd
Issue:
HHeld:
In sum, Lim Tanhu states that where a complaint
alleges a common cause of action against defendants
who are all indispensable parties to the case, its
dismissal against any of them by virtue of a
compromise agreement with the plaintiff necessarily
results in the dismissal of the case against the other
defendants, including those in default.
For Lim Tanhu to apply to the case at bench, it must
be established that: (1) petitioner has a common cause
of action against private respondents and the other
defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R; and (2) all the
defendants are indispensable parties to the case.llcd
In the case at bench, it is clear that petitioner has
different and separate causes of action against the
defendants in the case. The allegations in the
Complaint show that petitioner seeks to recover from
the truck driver from his wrong which caused injury to
petitioner and his car. The cause of action against him
is based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code. Quasi-delict, too, is the basis of the cause
of action against defendants beneficial and registered
owners. But in their case, it is Article 2180 of the same
Code which governs the rights of the parties.
with respect to defendant Western Guaranty
Corporation, petitioner's cause of action is based on
contract. He seeks to recover from the insurer on the
basis of the third- party liability clause of its insurance
contract with the owners of the truck.
Quite clearly then, Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case
at bench for there is no showing that petitioner has a
common cause of action against the defendants
of petitioner's claims in Civil Case No. 248-R is
premised on the wrong committed by defendant truck
driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable
party to the suit. The other defendants, however,
cannot be categorized as indispensable parties. They are
merely proper parties to the case
if petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty
Corporation, the omission would not cause the
dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even
without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its
competency to act completely and validly on the
damage suit. The insurer, clearly, is not an
indispensable party
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of
the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA, City Judge
of Mandaue City, Second Branch, ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS
PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a
Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his automobile and a
jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being
the private respondents in this suit.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the
driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At
the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending
the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking
Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which
provides:llcd
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated
August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil
case
Issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damage to property during the pendency of
the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City
Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual,
predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case
may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to
be held that the City Court, in suspending the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, supra, which refers to "other
civil actions arising from cases not included in the
section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above
quoted), in which case "once the criminal action has
being commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to
in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal action
has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.cdp
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes
relevance when it provides:
"Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter." the jural concept
of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is
based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is
so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons
but also damage to property.
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are
constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the
City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal
case is finally terminated
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA,
and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO
INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN
TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y
DIGAL, respondents.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,
Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together
with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU
car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and
operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven
by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of
attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at
Zamboanga City.
At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a
slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No.
25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated
by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala
As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners
sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the
passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless,
grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners,
German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an
action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the
private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively,
of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the
collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo
Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil
Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with
petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the
accident was due to the negligence and reckless
imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus
No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending
the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such
precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus
causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said
private respondents could not be held liable for the
damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit
Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss
The principal argument advanced in said motion to
dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action
for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of
the present action for damages, respondent Pedro
Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double
serious and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence",
with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil
action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the
criminal case has been finally adjudicated, and,
therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is
merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final
judgment has been rendered finding the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to
said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action
for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil
liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-
delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal
Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extracontractual under the Civil Code, and the party
seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to
enforce.
Held:
There is no question that from a careful consideration
of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-
delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of
the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver
drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the
passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from
the nature and character of the action, as one based on
culpa aquiliana.
It should be emphasized that the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code.
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for
by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither
Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit
when such reservation shall be made.
there is no question that petitioners never intervened in
the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the
said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the
present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability
of private respondents to the former has ceased to be
involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an
offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in
the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extracontractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court
a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two
(22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community;
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987; the latter courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married; they therefore agreed to
get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards
her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and;
the petitioner is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages
Issue: whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code
applies to the case at bar
Held:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-
delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willfulness or intent
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting
the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts.
with certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions
are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code
In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 lls that vacuum.
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article
21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for
while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction.
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA
RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this
litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25
He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of
Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant
railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's o ce in the city of Manila where he worked,
he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled
him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the
plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily
labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San
Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making his exit
through the door, took his position upon the steps of
the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support.
As the train slowed down another passenger, named
Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the
point where the platform begins to rise from the level
of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther the
plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both
of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons
with the result that his feet slipped from under him and
he fell violently on the platform. His body at once
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted
from the train the car moved forward possibly six
meters before it came to a full stop
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a
dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly
by a single light located some distance away, objects on
the platform where the accident occurred were di cult
to discern, especially to a person emerging from a
lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on
the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting
these melons and a large lot had been brought to the
station for shipment to the market.
it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact
that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement
that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the
sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical
fees and for other expenses in connection with the
process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding
his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and in leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company's trains
Issue:
Held:
It can not be doubted that the employees of the
railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated;
that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follow s that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's
own contributory negligence
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of
these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance.
That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due
care in their selection and supervision.
rticle 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations — or to use the technical form
of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa clearly points out the difference between
"culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons
not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa
considered as an "accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . .."
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect
that in case of extra- contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes
a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12,
p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent
in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the
damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was
the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause
damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master's
negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach
of his contract.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried
with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its
trains (Civil Code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon
the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to
a complete stop before alighting.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident
was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was
caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the
damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore,
important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.
n this particular instance, tat the train was barely
moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively
by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from
the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of
persons alight from trains under these conditions every
day of the year, and sustain no injury where the
company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff
would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as
he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure
to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK
BATAL, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LUZ SAN
PEDRO AND KENICHIRO TOMINAGA,
respondents.
The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro
Tominaga (Kenichiro) are the owners of a parcel of
land, on which their house was erected, described as
Lot 1509-C-3 with an area of 700 square meters
situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan
The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the
services of Frank Batal (Frank) who represented
himself as a surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot
for the sum of P6,500.00. As Luz and Kenichiro
wanted to enclose their property, they again procured
the services of Frank for an additional fee of P1,500.00
in order to determine the exact boundaries of the same
by which they will base the construction of their
perimeter fence.
Consequently, Frank placed concrete muniments
marked P.S. on all corners of the lot which were used
as guides by Luz and Kenichiro in erecting a concrete
fence
Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz
and Kenichiro before the barangay on the ground that
the northern portion of their fence allegedly
encroached upon a designated right-of-way
Upon veri cation with another surveyor, Luz and
Kenichiro found that their wall indeed overlapped the
adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not
Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a
licensed geodetic engineer. ISHaTA
During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank
admitted that he made a mistake and offered to share in
the expenses for the demolition and reconstruction of
the questioned portion of Luz and Kenichiro's fence.
He however failed to deliver on his word, thus the
filing of the instant suit.
In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and
Erlinda Batal submitted that Frank never represented
himself to be a licensed geodetic engineer. It was
Erlinda who supervised her husband's work [and t]hat
the house and lot of plaintiffs, Luz and Kenichiro, were
already fenced even before they were contracted to do
a resurvey of the same and the laying out of the
concrete muniments
Issue:
Held:
The petitioners failed to demonstrate this point. On the
contrary, the nding of the courts a quo that the damage
caused to the respondents was due to petitioners'
negligence is suf ciently supported by the evidence on
record.
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two
different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a
vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between
two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation
culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence
incident in the performance of an obligation which
already existed, and which increases the liability from
such already existing obligation
Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code and the immediately following Articles;
whileculpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to
1174 of the same Code
it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their
contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in the placement of the markings for the
concrete perimeter fence that was later constructed.
The placement of the markings had been done solely
by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic
engineer.
It was later discovered that it was not he but his wife,
petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic
engineer and who is, therefore, the one quali ed to do
the work. Petitioner Frank Batal's installation of the
concrete cyclone muniments had been done without
the adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a
result, the placement of the muniments did not
accurately re ect the dimensions of the lot.
The respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner
Frank Batal that they could proceed with the
construction of the perimeter fence by relying on the
purported accuracy of the placement of the muniments,
erected their fence which turned out to encroach on an
adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, the
respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence
and, thus, suffered damages.
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners
are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in
accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989,
private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the
jeepney was lled to capacity of about 24 passengers,
Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat,"
a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end
of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental,
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured
She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia- bula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation.
Her con nement in the hospital lasted from August 23
to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certi ed she
would remain on a cast for a period of three months
and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period. dctai
On October 9, 1989, Sunga led a complaint for
damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, led a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as
third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who
was responsible for the accident.
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No.
3490), led by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held
Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to
rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier
an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends
that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by
Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the
award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it
is not supported by evidence. prLL
Issue:
Held:
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 nding the driver and the owner of the
truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle
of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi- delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The rst, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence
of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or
culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case
the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, nding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck
driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as
far as human care and foresight could provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney
was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in
more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
the jeepney,
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
Quasi Delict
VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO
AZARCON, respondents.
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176
of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent
against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular
accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a
cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on"
the store-residence of the private respondent, causing
damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed
at P53,024.22.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged
principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte operated
said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner;
that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort
and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite
application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the
store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and
that the said accident was an act of God for which he
cannot be held liable."
Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against
Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging
that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident,
belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third
party defendant insurance company.
Issue:
Held:
Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred
in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is not
tenable. It was established by competent evidence that
the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at
bar. These requisites are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant,
or some person for whose acts he must respond, was
guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent
court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show
that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident"
was sufficiently established by the policy report and the
testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of
negligence may be deduced from the surrounding
circumstances thereof. According to the police report,
"the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the
road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center
line and went to the left side of the highway; it then
bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then
said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the
plaintiff."
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R.
ANDAMO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division)
and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.LexLib
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action for
destruction by means of injunction
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed
another action against respondent corporation, this
time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748,
for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
the trial court issued on August 27,1984 the disputed
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order
was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule
111 of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action."
Issue: Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-
748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Held:
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint
shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioners' complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There
is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.
the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently
alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue
to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed,
the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault
or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties make a clear case of a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.llcd
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability
on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, Article 2176, whenever
it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary o
negligent

onsequently, a separate civil action lies against the

offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.