1) SY vs CA GR No.

127263, April 12, 2000 contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,[23] in
(Marriage license)
FACTS
 On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.
 She points out that the final judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which
led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity.
 She also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and
(3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital
act only to satisfy himself.
 Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the
celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.[15]
 RTC RULING: denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
 CA RULING: testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a
marriage
o petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had
existed at the time of the celebration of their
marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of
the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surface almost ten years from the
date of the celebration of their marriage.
a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain
rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if
by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated
 THE CASE AT BAR REQUIRES THAT WE ADDRESS
THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN FILLIPINA AND FERNANDO WHICH
PETITIONER CLAIMS IS VOID FROM THE BEGINNING
FOR LACK OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE, in order to
arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent
conflict between the parties.
 The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere
do we find private respondent denying these dates on
record.
 Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in
this case. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the
Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning.
 The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of
private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of
petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the

Court of Appeals denied

Hence, this appeal by certiorari

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and

private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically

incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

RULING:

 Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the

marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. According to her, the date
of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
 Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
 2) ARANES vs OCCIANO, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1390,
April 11, 2002
(judge’s territorial jurisdiction)
FACTS
 Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent
judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law
 Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction.
 since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
 Comment of the judge:
“Respondent judge further avers that before he started the
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties
did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from a stroke”
 Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that
petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in
this Application that the marriage license shall be
issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it.
 petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license.
 Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a
Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the
marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit
the Death Certificate of his previous spouse
ISSUE:
WON the respondent judge acted with ignorance of the law
when he officiated the marriage beyond his territorial
jurisdiction
(Infos)
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined
to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.
In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However,
he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall
within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos. We held that:
- A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local
ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only
within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
- An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with.
 However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond.
 Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.
 In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6)
months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. We further held that:
 In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
 3) DE LA ROSA, et al vs. HEIRS of vda. De
DAMIAN, January 27, 2006
(Disputed existence of marriage)
FACTS:
 This case concerns the settlement of the intestate
estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.[6] The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful
heirs of the decedents.
 The claimants to the estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
[consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces,]and (2)
the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, [particularly, his
sisters,[7] his nephews and nieces,[8] his illegitimate
child,[9] and the de facto adopted child[10] (ampun-
ampunan) of the decedents.]
 Dela Rosa – substitute of her sister Luisa Delgado
(daughter of Luis Delgado) who died
 RTC RULING: Luisa dlegado is the only legal heir of
Josefa Delgado and intervenor Guillerma Rustia
(ampon-amponan of Guillermo) as the only surviving
heir of Guillermo Rustia.
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof.
 The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage.
 There are public documents (cert of identity, passport,
titles of properties) which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.[44] No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
 Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to JosefaDelgado and that
eventually, the two had lived together as husband and
wife. This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
 Third, the baptismal certificate[45] was conclusive proof
only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained therein,[46] such
as the alleged single or unmarried (Seorita) civil status
of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the
May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED

ISSUE:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

RULING:

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

AND JOSEFA DELGADO

 A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-

existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw
from proof of other facts.
 Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
turn, either conclusive or disputable.[37]

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The

following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting

themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

 In this case, several circumstances give rise to the

presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
 Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was
such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in
1975 referred to them as spouses.
 First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place.[40] Once the
 4) NINAL vs BAYADOG, GR No. 133778, March 14,
2000
(Marriage license (nature of cohabitation): father remarried
then died, children sought annulment of the second wife)
FACTS:
 Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985.
 One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license.
 Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
RULING:
Rationale of marriage license:
 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8]
 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.[9]
 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State.[11]
 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment.
 (EXEMPTION) : However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage.
 There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license.
 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what NATURE OF COHABITATION is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the
future spouses from securing a marriage license.
 Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma
have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period
should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union.
 In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
 This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
The Civil Code provides:
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment
known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
 In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
THE FACT REMAINS THAT THEIR FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
COHABITATION WAS NOT THE COHABITATION
CONTEMPLATED BY LAW.
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
 5) MANZANO vs SANCHEZ, AM. No. MTJ-00-1329, Not all of these requirements are present in the case at
March 8, 2001 bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent
(judge officiated a marriage where one was already legally Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
married) expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated
FACTS: that both were separated.

 The solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez
 For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano
charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law
 Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano
 Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the
Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered
to pay a fine of P2,000
ISSUE:
 Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
SUBSISTING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE IS A DIRIMENT
IMPEDIMENT, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void
 The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart
from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a
case the marriage bonds are not severed
 Just like separation, free and VOLUNTARY
COHABITATION WITH ANOTHER PERSON FOR AT
LEAST FIVE YEARS DOES NOT SEVERE THE TIE OF A
SUBSISTING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

WON the judge is guilty of ignorance of law for officiating a

marriage where one of the couple is already married
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court
RULING: Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed
We find merit in the complaint. upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
SO ORDERED.
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital

cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together

as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry

each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the

parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that

they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement

that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage
 6) CARLOS vs SANDOVAL, GR. No. 179922,
December 16, 2008
 ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the
marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced
prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of
a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment.
FACTS
 Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.
 During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer
his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.Teofilo, in
turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of
the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel
No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner.
 On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was
survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5
& 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
 petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity
in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
 Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts
he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect
to the subject real properties. He also prayed forthe
cancellation ofthe certificates oftitle issued in the name
of respondents. He argued that the properties covered
by such certificates of title, including the sums received
by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to
him.
 Evidence used by respondents for existence marriage: o
affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the
marriage. o Certificate of Live Birth of respondent
Teofilo II. → late Teofilo Carlos and respondent
Felicidad were designated as parents.
 Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a party outside of marriage can file for
nullity of marriage
2. Whether or not Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is
applicable in this case
RULING
1) it depends:
General rule: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions:
(1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of Rule onDeclaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” (March
15, 2003)
(2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage.
Reason:
● they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
● Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity ofthe marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
● State’s concern is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
 husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only
ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously
the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life
play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to
take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds
allowed by law.
 The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the
end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to
bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse. BUT THE RULE NEVER INTENDED TO
DEPRIVE THE COMPULSORY OR INTESTATE HEIRS
OF THEIR SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS
 They can still protect their successional right, for,
asstated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can
still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
 [The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a
nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to
be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the
real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.
(2) No.
 Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962.

 The marriage having been solemnized prior to the

effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this
mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?

 True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in
the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate“proper
interest”can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on acause of action. Thus,
in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children
have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights

7) REPUBLIC vs IYOY, GR No. 152577, September
21, 2005
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on
05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to
Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent
Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no
more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may
had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment
and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.
. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married
her American husband and acquired American citizenship.
RTC RULING
RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the
basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties
such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual
love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him.
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND
A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE
IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE
ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
Hence this petition
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before
this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual
infidelity of respondents wife do not per
se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has
decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
I
The totality of evidence presented during
trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized
by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.[22]
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the fabricated or suppressed.
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the Petition is GRANTED
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time

of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I do's.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by

respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family

Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision

cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to

intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the

Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may
intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the
Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
 8) REPUBLIC vs ORBECIDEO (OR MANALO) III, GR
No. 221029, April 24, 2018
respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in
the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino
Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by the petitioner Manalo
in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court.
Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the civil registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a japanese court
and that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, Manalo.
Ruling of the RTC
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code which
does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, whether
married to a filipino or to foreigners or if they celebrated
they marriage in the Philippines or in another country and
that unless Filipinos are naturalized citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall have conrol over issues
related to Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with
the determination of the condition and legal capacity to
enter into contracts and civil relations including marriages.
Ruling of the CA
The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision
and held that Article 26 of the Family code of the Philippines
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for Divorce
against her Japanese husband because the Decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer maried to the former,
capacitating him to remarry; that the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequetial. CA
ruled that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese National,
who in turn is no longer married to her
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES A FILIPINO CITIZEN
HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY AFTER INITIATING A
DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A
FAVORABLE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN
SPOUSE.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes, the filipina spouse who initiated the divorce and has
succesfully obtained a divorce decree against an alien
spouse may remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Laws should be construedas not to defeat
but to carry out its intent and purposes
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.
The Purpose of Article 26 (2) of the Family code of
the Philippines is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Even if the word obtained should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still the court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise
yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act.
the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry
Whether the filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result. Therefore, the subject
provision shall not make a distinction.
The Nationality Principle is not
absolute and unbending rule
The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code of the
Philippines is a testament that the state may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
 9) REPUBLIC vs COTE, GR. No. 212860, March 14,
2018

Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace

Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the
time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and
were already blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel
Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
of America

Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court

of the First Circuit of Hawaii

Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for

recognition of foreign judgment granting the divorce before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the
cancellation of her marriage contract

RTC RULING: granted the petition and declared Florie to be

capacitated to remarry

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not

the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC 12 applies in a case
involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce

It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not

recognize absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and
wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family courts
from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an
alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen. Article 26
of the Family Code states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity

must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted speci@cally
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.

petition is hereby DENIED.