PT&T vs NLRC

PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991
and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by
our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor
code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.”
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right
of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment
and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to
choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage
as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy
must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct
derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine
Air Lines, 33 a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air
Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically
separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate
in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with

the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of
the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the
prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight
attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen
profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew
that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when
Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law,
was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in
challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary
reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision
reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May
1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor
Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True,
Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the
safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation
require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in
special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor
that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been
established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued
any regulation affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are
as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal.
This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the
 rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just
and humane conditions of work . . . .

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from

employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable
standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has
been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against
the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as
observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-
pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill
effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel
that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the
Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking
the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution,
respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent
predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as
contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual
conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has
narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked
the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing
circumstances and events.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations,
or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be
it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by
Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women.

Lakpue Drug Inc. vs. Belga

G.R. No. 166379

Oct. 20, 2005

Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Belga (Belga), respondent herein, worked at Tropical Biological Philippines, a subsidiary of
Lakpue Drug Inc., petitioner herein. On March 19, 2001, Belga, brought her daughter to the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of broncho-pneumonia. While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant
experienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day. Two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned
Belga to report for work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her situation. Belga
was dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct.

Tropical alleged that Belga concealed her pregnancy from the company. She did not apply for leave and
her absence disrupted Tropical’s financial transactions.
Issue:

Whether or not Belga is illegally dismissed.

Rulings:

Yes. The alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the situation contemplated by the law. Her
absence for 16 days was justified considering that she had just delivered a child, which can hardly be
considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty; much less does it imply wrongful intent on the part of
Belga. Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument, however,
begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy. We agree with respondent’s position
that it can hardly escape notice how she grows bigger each day. While there may be instances where the
pregnancy may be inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belga’s case is such.

Belga’s failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be considered as grave misconduct
directly connected to her work as to constitute just cause for her separation.