Petitioners now come before this Court, contending
that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN,
TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON.
CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a
plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at
the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and
in effect.
law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces,
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions
of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
shall become the new legislative district of San
Juan with its first representative to be elected at
the same election."
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1)
of the Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed
Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing
two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of
the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two
separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated
subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the
title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject
distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-
one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article
VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to
wit:
"Sec. 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations."
"Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standard provided in this section."
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of
not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in
the Constitution:
". . . Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5 (3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated
constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed
under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title
of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not
to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.
Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA
496 [1967]), to wit:
"Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and
the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues
raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in
the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and
San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the
validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption
of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep.
considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact
the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article
been diminished, which development could hardly be
VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides considered as favorable to him.
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." of merit.
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present SO ORDERED.
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the ||| (Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, [December 8, 1994], 309
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. PHIL 100-107)
7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and
San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the
assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No.
7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should
have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district.
The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the
subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the
 EN BANC governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local
[G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995.]
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et
al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON 2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE THAT LAW MUST BE
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, ENFORCED WHEN ASCERTAINED, ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL CONSISTENT WITH THE STRICT LETTER OF THE STATUTE;
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Congress did not intend that laws
MAKATI, respondents. creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as
petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as
[G.R. No. 118627. March 7, 1995.] a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very
purpose which the Local Government seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner, vs. THE them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the
MAKATI, respondents.
Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment
of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced
Villamor Legarda & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 118627.
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute
Acosta & Corvera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 118577.
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
Emmanuel P.J . Tamase for private respondents. or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Tañada v. Cuenco,
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
SYLLABUS
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; DRAWING
OF TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES; REQUIRED; RATIONALE. — The 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW, WHEN
importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial CHALLENGED; REQUIREMENTS. — The requirements before a
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of the case itself. (Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 24)
4. ID.; REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT; RULE;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — In the recent case of Tobias v.
Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city
or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable
situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle
of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
(R.A. No. 7160); REQUIREMENT THAT TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES BE
IDENTIFIED BY METES AND BOUNDS WITH TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION;
WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. — Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7
of the Local Government Code of 1991(R.A. No. 7160). One of these
is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be
created or converted should be properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions. The omission of R.A. No.
7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the
territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not
make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal.
The Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and
bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another. The
criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854are not absolute,
for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No.
7160 is unavailing. Said section only applies to the conversion of a
municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not
a highly urbanized city.
2. ID.; R.A. NO. 7854; INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE
SEATS; JUSTIFIED. — Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of
legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No.
7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed
by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That
clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as
follows: "Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section." In short, the clause
refers to a general reapportionment law. The increase under R.A.
No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano,
Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others
assails Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the
are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
same grounds as aforestated.
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52
of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly
identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter
or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for
local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional
for:
(a) it increased the
legislative district of Makati
only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision
requiring a general
reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the
return of every census; dctai
(b) the increase in legislative
district, was not expressed
in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another
legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with Section
5 (3), Article VI of
the constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000."
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
area of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
"SEC. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality
of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City,which
shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on
the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the
City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of
Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without
prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes
or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the
adjoining local government units." (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this
delineation violates Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define
the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty
in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot
perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply
the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be
any clearer, Section 2 stated that the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a
legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854,
the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of
government, the legislations felt that the dispute should be left
to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the
dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact
that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government
units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does
not per se present an unsurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress form defining with reasonable certitude the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at
bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering
these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that
Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the
submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz:
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz: 'the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions' — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities
may be reasonably ascertained. In other words,
the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of
local government units. It is not an end in
itself.Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction
of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then,
it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws
creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem
to imply. To require such description in the law
as a condition sine qua non for its validity would
be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them their rightful
due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents
while at the same time serving as a vital cog in
national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type
of description was used in the law would serve
the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the
slave, instead of the other way around. This
could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be
enforced when ascertained, although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the
statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise
yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. (Torres v.Limjap, 56 Phil.
141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo
v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws
have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72
SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably
apply to the case at bar."
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the
constitutionality of Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 51 states:
"SEC. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The
represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City
of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials
and employees of the City shall likewise
continue exercising their functions and duties
and they shall be automatically absorbed by the
city government of the City of Makati."
They contend that this section collides with Section 8, Article X
and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
"SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
 provided by law at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives
shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected." cdll
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective
local officials, including Members of the House of
Representatives, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive
terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, Section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials
of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them. In
particular, petitioners point that Section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has
already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further
argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win
as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the
same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive
term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners
conclude that said Section 51 has been conveniently crafted to
suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-
delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision
on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in
this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are
not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail
the constitutionality of Section 52, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
"SEC. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its
conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati
shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two
(2) existing districts created under Section 3 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7166 as implemented by the
Commission on Elections to commence at the
next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmariñas, and Forbes shall be
with the first district, in lieu of Barangay
Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the
second district." (Emphasis supplied)
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot
made by a special law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is
not expressed in the title of the bill; 7 and (3) Makati's
population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members,unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an
increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for
an indeterminate period of time. 10 That intolerable situation
will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of
their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3),
Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention
that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit. we reiterated the policy of
the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure,
the Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its
details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance
if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that
"[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of
these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions. LexLib
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known
as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of
the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No.
7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not
provide for a description by metes and bounds as a
condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria
provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for,
as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A.
No. 7160 is unavailing. Said section only applies to the
conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a
COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently
reads as follows:
"SEC. 450. Requisite for creation. — (a) A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created
city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. . . .
The Constitution classifies cities as either highly
urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof
provides:
"SEC. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as
determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent
of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their
right to vote for elective provincial officials."
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
"SEC. 451. Cities Classified. — A city may either
be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing
cities.
Independent component cities are those
component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province."
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of
legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No.
7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise
fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph
(4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:
"Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section."
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible
increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution which reads:
"SEC. 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the House of Representatives of
the First Congress of the Philippines under
the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent
elections, and until otherwise provided by law,
the Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
MAKATI, one (1)
"Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may
be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created, or where the city,
whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but
such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election."
(Emphasis supplied)
||| (Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118577,
118627, [March 7, 1995], 312 PHIL 259-276)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118702. March 16, 1995.]
CIRILO ROY G.
MONTEJO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. SERGIO A.F.
APOSTOL, intervenor.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
Jose S. Songco for Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Gumaro and Bagua Law Offices for Intervenor.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS; COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; POWERS; REDISTRICTING MUNICIPALITIES BASED
ON AN ORDINANCE APPORTIONING SEAT IN THE CONGRESS TO
DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS AS APPENDED IN THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, NOT VALID; CASE AT BAR. — Our first inquiry
relates to the constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another
legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of
respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election
laws, are spelled out in black and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of
the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC does not invoke this
provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
Manila Area." The Ordinance was made necessary
because Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining theProvisional Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. The Ordinance
was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court. The records
reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several
prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections
under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether
the members of the House of Representatives would be elected by
district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of
the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be
made. Commissioner Davide, Jr., offered three (3) options for the
Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the
apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make the
apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by
way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The different
dimensions of the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide,
Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. On the basis of their extensive
debate, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC
the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised
the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of the
reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase
"minor adjustments" was again clarified in the debates of the
Commission. That consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from
one legislative district to another district. The power granted by
Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number
of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created. . . ." Prescinding from these
premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality
of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
2. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES; POWER; REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS. — It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from
a sub-province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the
five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's
vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time
for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his
legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment
of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with
Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of
the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section." In Macias vs. COMELEC, (No. L-18684, September 14,
1961, 3 SCRA 1) we ruled that the validity of a legislative
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can
strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to
do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province of Leyte.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at
bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First
District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged
inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality
of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province.
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District,
vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We
gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it
involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the
COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts. 1
The first district 2covers Tacloban City and the
municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta.
Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district 3 is composed of the municipalities
of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro,
Julita, La Paz, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Tunga. Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to
five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per
The third district 4 is composed of the municipalities of
the 1990 census. LLphil
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba,
Second District: Population Registered
Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution
Villaba. of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Voters
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with
The fourth district 5 is composed of Ormoc City and
the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, the incumbent representatives of the province and other
(1990) (1994)
interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it
Merida, and Palompon.
promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it
The fifth district 6 is composed of the municipalities of transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
Abuyog, Bato, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Mahaplag, and Matalom. 1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition 2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 enacted on of the Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of
April 8, 1959. 7 Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative 3. Carigara, 38,863 22,036
municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz: "Almeria, districts appeared as follows:
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and First District: Population Registered 4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
Naval and all the territories comprised therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took Voters 5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran
became a regular province. It provides: (1990) (1994) 6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139

"Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted 7. Julita, 9,944 6,196

into regular provinces upon approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be 1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679 8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
held in the sub-provinces and the original
provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall 2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543 9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously
with the national elections following the 3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929 10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
effectivity of this code. The new legislative
districts created as a result of such conversion 4. Palo, 38,100 20,816 11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
shall continue to be represented in Congress by
the duly-elected representatives of the original 5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167 12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
districts out of which said new provinces or
districts were created until their own 6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497 13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
representatives shall have been elected in the
next regular congressional elections and 7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357 ——— ———
qualified."
8. Tolosa, 13,299 7,700 TOTAL 272,167 156,462
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. ——— ———
As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the
Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria,
 Third District: Population Registered 5. Matagob, and 15,474 9,407 the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District
has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has
Voters 6. Merida 22,345 12,474 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered
voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the
(1990) (1994). ——— ——— municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 registered voters be
transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion
TOTAL 269,347 155,995 was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649 municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial
composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415 Fifth District: Population Registered with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916 Voters adjacent territory. LibLex

4. Tabango, 29,743 15,487 (1990) (1994) In this petition, petitioner insists that Section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227 representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry
v.Sanders, 8 he argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595 1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682 constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474 2. Bato, 28,197 16,130 another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred
with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
——— ——— 3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923 opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2)
TOTAL 214,499 125,763 4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871 assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with
the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659 alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
We find Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
Fourth District: Population Registered 6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue,
Voters 7. Javier, 18,658 11,713 our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of the
respondent COMELEC 9 to transfer municipalities from one
(1990) (1994) 8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616 legislative district to another legislative district in the province
of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247 and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black
and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly,
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140 ——— ——— respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies
on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493 TOTAL 309,148 181,242 source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889 entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873 Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the
calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between
 "SECTION 1. For purposes of the election of
Members of the House of Representatives of
the First Congress of the Philippines under
the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent
elections, and until otherwise provided by law,
the Members thereof shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections is
hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made.
"SECTION 3. Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may
be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created or where
the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but
such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary
because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She then
exercised legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution. 12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished
member of this Court. The records reveal that the
Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial
issues before authorizing the first congressional elections
under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were:
whether the members of the House of Representatives would
be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the
apportionment should be made. 14 Commissioner Davide, Jr.,
offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1)
allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2)
empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let
the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance
appended to theConstitution. 15 The different dimensions of
the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas
S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates
in extenso, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
"MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple
motion by way of amendment by substitution
and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed
amendment. Also, the chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative said that he was
proposing a vote first by the Chamber on the
concept of whether the election is by province
and cities on the one hand, or by legislative
districts on the other. So I propose this simple
formulation which reads: 'FOR THE FIRST
ELECTION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED
BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.' I hope the
chairman will accept the proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the
same insofar as the apportionment is
concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento, et al.
proposal would also provide for a mandate for
the apportionment later, meaning after the first
election, which will in effect embody what the
Commission had approved, reading as follows:
'Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.'
"So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a
suspension of the session, so that all the
proponents can work together.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The
session is suspended.
"It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The
session is resumed.
"Commissioner Davide is recognized.
"MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a
compromise, I wonder if the Commission will
allow this. We will just delete the proposed
subparagraph (4) and all the capitalized words in
paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what
would be left would only be the following:
'Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.'
"But we shall have an ordinance appended to
the new Constitution indicating specifically the
following: 'FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL
OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE
ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES
AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS
FOLLOWS.'
"And what will follow will be the allocation of
seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the
provinces and to the cities, without indicating
the municipalities comprising each of the
districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate
the COMELEC to make the actual apportionment
on the basis of the number of seats provided for
and allocated to each province by us.
"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
"MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision
which will give mandate to COMELEC to do the
redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the
baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres
of influence; in other words, gerrymandering.
This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a
nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best
possible situation under the circumstances to
undertake that responsibility. We are not
wanting in expertise and in time because in the
first place, the Committee on the Legislative has
prepared the report on the basis of the
recommendation of the COMELEC.
"MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Ople is recognized.
"MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position
taken by Commissioner Aquino in this respect.
We know that the reapportionment of provinces
and cities for the purpose of redistricting is
generally inherent in the constituent power or
in the legislative power. And I would feel very
uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-
judicial body even if it is one of the
constitutional offices created under
this Constitution. We have the assurance of
Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative, that even given
the very short time remaining in the life of this
Commission, there is no reason why we cannot
complete the work of reapportionment on the
basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee
has already thoroughly studied and which
remains available to the Constitutional
Commission.
"So, I support the position taken by
Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and
the most workable approach that is available to
this Commission.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What
does Commissioner Davide say:
"MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this
body will make the apportionment itself or
whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So,
there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for
the body to decide. I would propose that the
Commission should now decide what body
should make the apportionment. Should it be
the Commission or should it be the COMELEC?
And the Committee on the Legislative will act
accordingly on the basis of the decision.
"MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
"MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to
inform the body that I believe the Committee on
the Legislative has precisely worked on this
matter and they are ready with a list of
apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned
the whole country into various districts based
on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So
they are ready with the list and if this body
would wish to apportion the whole country by
district itself, then I believe we have the time to
do it because the Committee on the Legislative
is ready with that particular report which need
only to be appended to the Constitution. So if
this body is ready to accept the work of the
Committee on the Legislative we would have no
problem. I just would like to give that
information so that the people here would be
guided accordingly when they vote.
"MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
"MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask
Commissioner Davide some questions.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Davide may yield if he so desires.
"MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
"MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which
we are considering apply only to the first
election after the enactment of
the Constitution?
"MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla
proposal, it will be for the first election; on the
basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only
apply to the first election.
"MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will
have the power to reapportion. LibLex
"MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
"MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to
the Constitution — the reapportionment based
on the COMELEC study and between the
approval of the Constitution and the first
election — the COMELEC no longer has the
power to change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
"MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory
question to Commissioner Davide?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The
Gentleman will please proceed.
"MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the
Commissioner's proposed apportionment and
considering the fact that there will be a
corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would
there be instances of underrepresentation or
non-representation?
"MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I can assure the Commission that there will be
no case of inequitable distribution. It will come
out to be one for every 350 to 400,000
inhabitants.
"MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the
standard that we refer to.
"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
"MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor
Leader is recognized.
"MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that
there was a motion by Commissioner Sarmiento
to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting.
This was also almost the same motion by
Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had
some kind of meeting of minds. On the other
hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question,
an amendment to the amendment as suggested
by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the
COMELEC, it should be this Commission that
shall make the redistricting. So may I ask
Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea,
to please formulate it into a motion so we can
vote on that first as an amendment to the
amendment.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
"MS. AQUINO. The motion is for this
Commission to undertake the apportionment of
the legislative districts instead of the proposal
that COMELEC be given the mandate to
undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr.
Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the
proposed amendment?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The
proposed amendment.
"MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the
approval of this proposed amendment which we
substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
"MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be
treated merely as a motion to be followed by a
deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not
really appear as a paragraph in Section 5;
otherwise, it will appear very ugly in
the Constitution where we mandate a
Commission that will become functus officio to
have the authority. As a matter of fact, we
cannot exercise that authority until after the
ratification of the new Constitution.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What
does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
"MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding
Officer. So, may I move for the approval of this
proposed amendment. llcd
"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
"MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds
vote or a simple plurality to adopt that motion?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will
require a two-thirds vote.
"MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The
Gentleman may proceed.
"MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this
Commission do the reapportionment of the
legislative districts.
"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is
the pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?
"MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the
motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento, therefore,
adopting my motion? Would it not be right for
him to move that the COMELEC be mandated?
"MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the
amendment. It is already the Commission that
will be mandated.
"MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentleman has accepted
the amendment.
"Thank you.
"MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this
Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us
proceed to vote.
"As many as are in favor, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)
"As many as are against, please raise their hand.
(No Member raised his hand.)
 "The results show 30 votes in favor and none
against; the motion is approved."
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to
the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as
it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase
"minor adjustments" was again clarified in the debates 17 of the
Commission, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr.
Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the Commission
on Elections is empowered to make minor
adjustments on the apportionment made here.
"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time
limit for this.
"MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit
unless during the period of amendments a
proposal is made. The authority conferred would
be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that
we may have forgotten an intervening
municipality in the enumeration, which ought to
be included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
"MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo).
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning
of minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one
municipality in a district be transferred to
another district and call it a minor adjustment?
"MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be
done. Mr. Presiding
Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no
change in the allocations per district. However,
it may happen that we haveforgotten a
municipality in between, which is still in the
territory of one assigned district, or there may
be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the
interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas
pambansa enacted by both the interim and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the
names of municipalities.
"MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may
be made only if one of the municipalities is not
mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it
will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to
put such municipality to a certain district.
"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For
instance, we may not have the data regarding a
division of a municipality by the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang
Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a
mother municipality and the new municipality,
but still actually these are within the
geographical district area.
"MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment
which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if , for
example, my municipality is in the First District
of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other
district.
"MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor
correction. It is a substantive one. LexLib
"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfermunicipalities from one legislative district to another
district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgatedSection 1
of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of
Leyte. cdrep
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a
sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5)
legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance,
depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in
violation of the equal protection clause of theConstitution. Be
that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise
this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts
and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article
VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section." In Macias v. COMELEC , 18 we ruled that the validity of
a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while
this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. prcd
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the
Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is
annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for
the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District
to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Montejo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702, [March
16, 1995], 312 PHIL 492-513)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG
BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA,
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and
LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMEN-POWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP,
PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS — All Being Party-List
Parties/Organizations — and Hon MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., in his Capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000.]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY),
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN
(AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
(APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS,
AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L",
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000.]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-
LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF
SMALL (COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
Romeo G. Roxas for petitioners in G.R. No. 136781.
Gregorio A. Andolana for petitioner A.K.O.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for Intervenor-Movant ABB-
OFW.
Romero Valdecantos Arreza & Magtanong Law Offices for
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Ruth R. Aldaba for Intervenor in G.R. No. 136786.
R.A.V. Saguisag for petitioner in G.R. No. 136795.
Arturo M. Tolentino and Ricardo Blancaflor for Kabataan ng
Masang Pilipino, National Urban Poor Assembly, Bantay Bayan
Foundation Party, People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social
Advancement.
SYNOPSIS
Petitions for certiorari were filed assailing two (2) Comelec
Resolutions ordering the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional
party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52
seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
Comelec, together with the respondent parties, averred
that the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
the House under the Constitution was mandatory and that the two
percent vote requirement in RA 7941 was unconstitutional, because
its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill
up the house party-list complement.
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in granting additional seats which violated the two
percent threshold and proportional representation requirements
of RA 7941.
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 (2), Art. VI of
the Constitution stating that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list" is not
mandatory; that this percentage is a ceiling the mechanics by which
it is to be filled up has been left to Congress; that in the exercise of
its prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941 by which it prescribed
that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list
election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the system to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives but
that no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats therein; that Congress has the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement; and that
the two percent threshold is consistent with the intent of the
framers of the law and with the essence of "representation."
SYLLABUS
 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 5, ARTICLE VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION; TWENTY PERCENT ALLOCATION IN THE HOUSE
FOR PARTY-LIST LAWMAKERS IS A MERE CEILING AND NOT
MANDATORY; CASE AT BAR. — The Constitution simply states that
"[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list." [A] simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation"
in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-
list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. [T]he
foregoing statutory requirements, show that Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE INTENT OF LAWMAKERS AND WITH THE ESSENCE OF
"REPRESENTATION." — In imposing a two percent threshold,
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent
can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. . . The
two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised
by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features
the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THREE-SEAT-PER-PARTY LIMIT ENSURES
ENTRY OF VARIOUS INTEREST-REPRESENTATIONS INTO THE
LEGISLATURE. — An important consideration in adopting the party-
list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of
representation . . . Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each
qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House. EScaIT
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; GRANT BY COMELEC OF ADDITIONAL PARTY-LIST
SEATS IN VIOLATION OF THE TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD AND
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS OF RA 7941, A
CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. — [T]he Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent
parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list
seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the
two percent threshold and proportional representation. In
disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions,
the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what
theConstitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these
impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
are beyond judicial review.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p * :
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list
election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate
at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the
assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or
amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and
formulas to implement election laws — not to reject, ignore, defeat,
obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list
system — a normal feature of parliamentary democracies — into
our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino
statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into
mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-
tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for
Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution 1 of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election
Matter 98-065; 2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution 3 of the
Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional
party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52
seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and
the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our
presidential system of government — the party-list method of
representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral
party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who,
upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of
Representatives as regular members. 4 In effect, a voter is given two
(2) votes for the House — one for a district congressman and
another for a party-list representative. 5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SETAcC
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution,one half
of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty toprovide by law the
"selection or election" of party-list representatives, Congress
enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute's policy
declaration, the State shall " promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the
House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections
the first five (5) major political parties on the
Party/Organization/
basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Coalition
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled
to participate in the party-list 1.
system.APEC
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed: 2. ABA
(a) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and
regulations governing the election of party-list representatives
through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen
Party-list Representatives
May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation
was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one
hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed
thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which
obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the
votes cast in their favor were as follows: 6
Number of Percentage of Nominees
Votes Obtained Total Votes
503,48 5.5% Rene M. Silos
` Melvyn D. Eballe
321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Mont
 312,500 3.41% PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a
Diogenes S. Osabel 2. AKAP
Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, 3. AKSYON
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, 4. PINATUBO
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP,
CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU 5. NUPA
255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
and BIGAS.
6. PRP
239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division
7. AMIN
promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's
238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents 8. PAG-ASA
Y 235,548 2.57% who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-
Patricia M. Sarenas
list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of 9. MAHARLIKA
232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P.congressional
Rosales 9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent 10. OCW-UNIFIL
district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. representatives."
Cruz In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two 11. FCL
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo 12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be 13. KAMPIL
189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable
14. BANTAY BAYAN
After passing upon the results of the special elections held the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented
on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined in the House of Representatives." Second,"the system should 15. AFW
that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters' Federation, Inc.) was represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent 17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list
proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least one 18. FEJODAP
representative. 7 representative." It thus disposed as follows:
19. CUP
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for "WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus 20. VETERANS CARE
Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No.
21. 4L
[the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by 7941 and other election laws, the Commission
the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the 22. AWATU
membership of party-list representatives in the House of instant petition and motions for intervention, to
include those similarly situated. 23. PMP
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the 24. ATUCP
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the 25. NCWP
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 list of names submitted by their respective
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list parties, organizations and coalitions are 26. ALU
representatives who should actually sit in the House. PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to
27. BIGAS
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations 8 filed their wit:
respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that 28. COPRA
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
 29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in
the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of
inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated
June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated
a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of . . . Party
List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these
Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every
two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its
Annex "A". It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed
the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for
the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it
abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its
three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents. 10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier
been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least
two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to
the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats
in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not
exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the
Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties — movants and oppositors alike
— had agreed that the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en
banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was:
Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons
be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered
at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 —
herein private respondents — even if they had not passed the two
percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only
to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will
mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and
four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry . . . . Such
strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence
and object of the Constitution and the legislature — to develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives . . . ." Additionally, it "will
also prevent this Commission from complying with the
constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to
compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the
Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority — with three
commissioners concurring 11 and two members 12 dissenting —
affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in
abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of
manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the
two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission
blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that
there were more important considerations than this statutory
threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary
restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed
before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained
at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system. 13 In the suits, made respondents together with the
Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had
been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each of their
parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order
directing the Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself
as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any
other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties,
organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions
at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution,
until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the
parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in
GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No.
136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all
the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervener
NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon
invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P.
Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required
to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their
verbal arguments. 14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of
how to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can
be fully settled by addressing the following issues: aIDHET
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should
the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with
petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but
disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision 15 of the Constitution on the
composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution,one half
of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector."
Determination of the Total
Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
———————————— x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation 16 means that any increase in the number
of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of
party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the
number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
—— x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy
enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this:
Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up
all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation
a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the
mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In
the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for
a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision
must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If
there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations
or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House,
then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately
the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their
right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together
with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent
allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two
percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its
strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up
the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy
to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-
list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning
party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section
11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
 those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes;
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be
shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two
percent threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility,"
suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. 17 Our
task now, as should have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can,
as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all
judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a
statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of
law.
Second Issue:
The Statutory Requirement
and Limitation
The Two Percent
Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent
portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of
continuity, I would want to follow up a point
that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña
when he said that a political party must have
obtained at least a minimum percentage to be
provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat
under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A
party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes
cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast.
Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who
have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get
to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system, Mr.
President." 18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill
sponsor in the house of Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a
mathematical formula which this computation is
based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which
would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a
mathematical formula which is, I think,
patterned after that of the party list of the other
parliaments or congresses, more particularly the
Bundestag of Germany." 19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in
mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they
left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable
to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has
two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat.
There are about 20 million who cast their votes
in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent
would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide
deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that
down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is
three. So, here we are talking about 134,000
families. We believe that there are many sectors
who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of
over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying
to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve
seat system. We believe that it is our job to
open up the system and that we should not
have within that system a reserve seat. We think
that people should organize, should work hard,
and should earn their seats within that
system." 20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the
very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. 21 But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 22 to ensure meaningful
local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two
percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is
clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention. 23
The Three-Seat-Per-
Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list
system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of
representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I
just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also
 wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
operation in the implementation of a concept three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
that has very serious shortcomings of qualified parties (Integer.
classification and of double or triple votes. We One Additional Seat decimal)
are for opening up the system, and we would Per Two Percent Increment
like very much for the sectors to be there. That One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of
ceiling on the number of representatives from two percent vote requirement for the first seat. 25 Translated in the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
any single party that can sit within the 50 figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be
allocated under the party list system. This way, still be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent as follows:
we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be
maybe regional groups, to earn their seats entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of
among the fifty. . . . ." 24 simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
when the parties get very lop-sided votes — for example, when
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's Votes Seats Seats Seats
Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B. to 5 seats and Party C,
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the 1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire 2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number
House.
of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, 3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the proportional representation will be contravened and the law
three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court 4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
cases. discarded it. TCaEAD
FEDERATION
Third Issue: The Niemeyer Formula
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the
Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, 7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats 8. ABANSE! 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party PINAY
coalitions are entitled to. The very first step — there is no dispute and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by
on this — is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective entitled to. Thus: 10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two No. of remaining seats 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat
to be allocated No. of additional 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in 13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
————————— x No. of votes of = seats of party
proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to
 Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three
(3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the limit will
have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts,
the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous
proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for
Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of
our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have
threshold requirements — two percent for us and five for them.
There are marked differences between the two models, however. As
ably pointed out by private respondents, 26 one half of the German
Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there
are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion
of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the
Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the
Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of
fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer
formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical
Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system
is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In
crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we
need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in top Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate
"proportional representation" into a mathematical formula that will
not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula,
step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the
public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this
Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each
party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of
seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to
the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is
determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified
party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same
number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes
won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes
relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already
been predetermined, the second party should be given less than
that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less
additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio
between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1,
(2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an
arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of
such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of
facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such
constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales 27 that a fractional membership cannot be converted into
a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive
another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said
further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to . . .
."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the
fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not
provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The
Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given
set of facts.
Formula for Determining
Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first
party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to
one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice
the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is
as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
———————— = first party relative to and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to first party (APEC)
those of the first party.
Total votes for total votes for party-list system Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it
Formula for Additional would be entitled to is computed as follows:
party-list system Seats of Other Qualified Parties
No. of votes of
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of
If the proportion of votes received by the first party
additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, Additional seats ABA No. of additional
without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total
based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed
valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall
by the following complex fraction: for concerned = ——————— x seats allocated to
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If
the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater No. of votes party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall of
have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is first party (APEC)
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to concerned
any additional seat. party Substituting actual values would result in the following
equation:
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first ——————
party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional Additional seats 321,646
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the Total no. of
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein votes for concerned = —————— x 1 = .64 or 0 additional
18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to seat, since
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all Additional for party-list system No. of additional
the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party- seats party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to
list seats reserved in the House of Representatives. be applied
for = ———————— x seats allocated to
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of concerned Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the
the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
two seats. party No. of votes of the first party

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in first party
determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled Organization Votes % age of Initial Additional Total
to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of —————— No.
the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same
Total no. of votes Garnered Total of Seats Seats
formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
Votes
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the
for party list system
total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said
parts would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three In simplified form, it is written as follows:
seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly 1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the No. of votes of
same number of seats as the second party would violate the 2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 /1
statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party Additional seats concerned party No. of additional 503,487 * 1 =
getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of 0.64
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 /1
party No. of votes of the first party 503,487 * 1 =
 0.62 0.37 In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory
provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 /1 Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
503,487 * 1 = additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
0.61 party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these
would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or
FEDERATION as well. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
are beyond judicial review. 28
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 /1 The above formula does not give an exact mathematical
503,487 * 1 = representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases —
0.51 since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole both petitioners and respondents — have failed to demonstrate
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 /1 proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
503,487 * 1 = reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or
0.47 awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. excess of jurisdiction.29
Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 /1 restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and
503,487 * 1 = two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of administer election-related laws, 30 cannot simply disregard an act
0.47 additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 /1 rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the
set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work
503,487 * 1 = law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
within such extant parameter.
0.47 legislature. TIAEac
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining
PINAY additional seats happily coincides with the present number of Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals
incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 /1 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of
503,487 * 1 = unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a
0.46 that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits. 31
different formula and methodology.
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 /1 In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology Neither can we grant petitioners' prayer that they each be
503,487 * 1 = for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula merely given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting
0.43 translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 /1
modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998
503,487 * 1 =
modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
0.39 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in
Epilogue fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should
12. COOP- not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 /1 discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
503,487 * 1 = parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our
0.38 seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in
two percent threshold and proportional representation. the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 /1
form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
503,487 * 1 =
litigants should not despair.
 Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for
party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral
parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation
and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and
more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be
more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time,
will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under
the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives — two for APEC and one each for the remaining
twelve (12) qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion
of J. Mendoza.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:
I. Prefatory Statement
The case at bar is one of first impression and of immense
difficulty. The constitutional issues involved are full of slippery
slopes but the most difficult one concerns the apportionment of
additional seats to the parties that hurdled the 2% threshold
requirement. There is much to be admired in the mathematical
formula forwarded by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, but with due respect, I find more attractive the
majority formula, crafted with equal expertise by another esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio Panganiban. To be sure, the two
formulae may be faulted by mathematicians obsessed with
exactitude but the fault lies with the inexactitude of the law itself.
However it may be, I join the majority of my brethren for I find its
geometry of the phrase "proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system" more expressive of the spirit of the Constitution, albeit,
arguable.
II. Issues
The case at bar, however, is suffused with other significant
constitutional issues. They are:
1. Is it a mandatory requirement that a
party/organization/coalition should obtain at least 2% of the total
votes cast for the party-list system to be entitled to a seat?
2. Is it mandatory to fill up all the 52 seats allotted for the
party-list representatives of the House of Representatives as
provided for under Article VI, Sec. 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution? If
so, how are the seats to be allocated?
3. Whether Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution requires
that every time the number of district representatives is increased
from 200 there should be a corresponding increase in the number of
party-list representatives so that, as there are now 208 district
representatives, there should be 52 party-list representatives
constituting 20% of the total number of members of the House of
Representatives;
4. Whether the 2% threshold requirement in Section
11(b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional; and
5. Whether the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional.
In addition to the scholarly disquisitions of the majority
opinion, I humbly offer the following:
III. Submissions
A. The 2% threshold requirement
Respondent Commission refused to give a strict and literal
interpretation to the 2% requirement of Section 11 of R.A. 7941 on
the ground that it runs contrary to theConstitution and the law
which is "to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society
to be represented in the House of Representatives," "to represent
the broadest sector of the Philippine society," and "to encourage
multi-party system." It likewise proffered the thesis that to allow
only the 13 proclaimed parties/organization to be represented in
the House of Representatives will result in the concentration of
party-list representation to only a few sectors, namely urban poor,
veterans, women and peasantry. Thus, respondent Commission
holds that all the sectors should be equally represented and hence
should be given one seat each.
Like the majority of the brethren, I cannot support such a
stance. The Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, as well as
that of the Senate deliberations, will clearly disclose a specific intent
to impose a minimum percentage of votes to be obtained, that is, at
least two (2%) percent of the total votes cast nationwide, in order
that a party/organization/coalition under the party-list system may
have a seat in the House of Representatives. I quote relevant
excerpts from the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"a) MR. MONSOD. . . . [A]nybody who
has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies
and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of
these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of
the vote.
"What does that mean? It means that
any group or party who has a constituency of,
say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for
that? When we allocate legislative districts, we
are saying that any district that has 200,000
votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a
group that has a national constituency, even if it
is a sectoral or special interest group, should not
have a voice in the National Assembly. . . . If
each of them gets only one percent or five of
them get one percent, they are not entitled to
any representative. So, they will begin to think
that if they really have a common interest, they
should band together, form a coalition and get
five percent of the vote and, therefore, have
two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.
"We feel that this approach gets
around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making
sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a
chance to have a seat in the National
Assembly. 1
"b) MR. MONSOD. . . . When these parties
register with the COMELEC, they would
simultaneously submit a list of the people who
would sit in case they win the required number
of votes in the order in which they place them. .
. . If they win the required number of votes, let
us say they win 400,000 votes, then they will
have one seat. If they win 2 million votes, then
they will have five seats. 2
"c) MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want
to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid
the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very
serious shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can
sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. When we talk
about limiting it, if there are two parties, then
we are opening it up to the extent of 30 seats.
We are amenable to modifications in the
minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is
that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of
the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million
who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-
and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes.
Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000
votes, nationwide, deserves a seat in the
Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent,
we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there
are many sectors who will be able to get seats in
the Assembly because many of them have
memberships over 10,000. In effect, that is the
operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors,
the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our
job to open up the system and that we should
not have within that system a reserve seat. We
think that people should organize, should work
hard, and should earn their seats within that
system. 3
"d) MR. TADEO. . . . Ngayon, sa ganitong
kalagayan, gusto ko po lamang ipaliwanag ang
party list. Ang ibig sabihin nito, doon sa ilalim ng
two-party system, kapag kumuha ka ng 51
percent, iyong ibang partido ay wala nang
nakuhang puwesto sa legislature. Ang ibig
sabihin ng party list system, makakuha ka
lamang ng 2.5 percent ay mayroon ka nang
isang puwesto. 4
Similarly, I call attention to the pertinent debates in the
Senate, viz.:
"a) Senator Gonzales: Yes, Mr.
President. But nonetheless, if his party qualifies,
at least, for the minimum number of the
requirement to be entitled to a seat, then he
would be proclaimed by the Commission as
having been elected under the party-list
system. 5
"b) Senator Gonzales: For purposes of
continuity, I would want to follow up a point
that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña
when he said that a political party must have
obtained at least a minimum percentage to be
provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat
under the party-list system. DaACIH
"They do that in many other countries.
A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the
votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes
cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who
have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get
to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of party-list system, Mr. President. 6
"c) Senator Tolentino: . . . Mr.
President, the required number of votes here
refers to the votes that will qualify it for certain
number of representatives. The phrase
"required number of votes" simply means here
the number of votes that will qualify it to have a
certain number of representatives in the House
of Representatives. 7
"d) Senator Gonzales: Would not all of
them be entitled to a proportionate seat in the
three categories allocated for the party-list
members?
"Senator Tolentino: If they do not
receive the votes that would be needed in order
to give them a proportionate number of seats,
then, of course, they would not have any seat in
the category in which they are.
"Senator Gonzales: That is why in my
interpellation during our last session, I
suggested that, probably, it would be better to
set a minimum percentage of votes to be
received by them in order to qualify for a seat so
that we can, more or less, limit the party-list
members to those who obtain a substantial
portion of the votes cast, Mr. President.8
"e) Senator Gonzales: . . . The idea is to
open the system so that it is not all or
nothing. Kahit na hindi manalo ang kaniyang
 kandidato but he obtained at least the minimum
number of votes cast, which I would propose
later in order to ensure that only those with a
more or less substantial following can be
represented, then the purpose of party-list
system has already been achieved. 9
"f) Senator Gonzales: My amendment,
Mr. President, will be . . . add the following:
"Provided, however that a political party or
group whether national, regional, or
sectoral must obtain at least two (2) percent of
the votes cast to be entitled to a seat."
"Senator Tolentino: A minimum of 2
percent of what?
"Senator Gonzales: My initial position,
Mr. President, is the total votes cast
nationwide. At least, it would have a right to
demand representation. Imagine a political
party obtaining only 10,000 votes nationwide, it
is already entitled to a seat; I do not think that is
doing justice to the representative system. 10
"g) Senator Gonzales: . . . we said that
in the minimum number of votes for a political
party, whether national or regional or a sectoral
organization to be entitled to the party list, it
must have received at least 2 percent of the
votes cast in that category." 11
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized
as follows:
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the
party-list system as a fallback position; 12
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are
not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the
elections; 13
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the
system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work
hard, and earn their seats within the system; 14
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same
majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative
body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative
body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment
by the President of the Philippines; 15
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by
the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16 and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial
following can be represented. 17
We are not at liberty to pass judgment on the wisdom of
the law. The principle of separation of powers prohibits this Court
from engaging in judicial legislation. Both the legislative intent and
the language of the law as to the 2% threshold requirement are
clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for further interpretation.
It demands our obeisance.
Respondent Commission is of the mind that the sectoral
groups have a vested right to a seat in the House of Representatives.
It assumes that this is mandated by the law which aims to provide a
party-list system where the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society can actively participate and attain the broadest
possible representation in the House of Representatives. The
assumption cannot stand scrutiny.
First, in order that a sectoral group or party can participate
under the party-list system, it should comply with certain statutory
requirements such as the filing, before the Comelec, of a
manifestation (Section 4) and a petition (Section 5) expressing its
intent to participate in the party-list system. Comelec is required to
verify and review such petition, and is empowered to refuse or
cancel the registration of a sectoral party on grounds stated in the
law.
Second, during the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission and the Senate, it was clear that the party-list system is
not synonymous with that of sectoral representation. Sectoral
representation means that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; under the party-list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. 18 The party-list system recognizes the right of sectoral
parties or organizations to register. Nonetheless, it only enables
these sectors to be part of the party, if they have the capacity, but it
does not reserve any seat for the sectors. To stress, it is not a
reserve seat system. 19
Third, the framers of the Constitution knew that the
sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in the competitive
election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through an
outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three terms
of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have
to earn their seats through participation in the party-list system.
Thus:
"MR. OPLE. . . . The ideal manner of
securing functional representation is through a
party list system through popular suffrage so
that when sectoral representatives get into a
legislative body on this basis, rather than direct
regional or district representation, they can rise
to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather
than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the
President of the Philippines. I think, therefore,
this proposed amendment now meets this test.
There is an outright constitutional gift for the
first two terms of the sectoral representatives
but, after that, they will have to earn the seats
through participation in a party list system or,
even beyond that, to be direct competitors with
established and more orthodox parties in the
general political arena. I see no reason why after
having occupied seats in the House of
Representatives for two terms, the
representatives of the sectors may not be able
to combine their forces in order to form their
own political parties or become powerful
adjuncts to existing political parties so that they
will enjoy not only the benefits of a party list
system but also the benefits of being able to
compete directly in the wider political arena.
". . . And after two or three terms, then
they will be in a position to take full advantage
of the party list system so that on the basis of
 two-and-a-half percent or two percent of all the
qualified voters in the country, one seat is
earned . . . . Let us assume that the
representatives of these organizations . . .
occupy the seats for two terms, will not six years
be enough for them to amalgamate their forces
if there is enough basis of unification so that,
from their platform in the legislature, they can,
through a party list system, amass as many seats
as are available now outside territorial
representation? And beyond that, they can even
rise to the level of a major political party able to
compete for territorial representation both for
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
". . . Therefore, I support this
amendment. It installs sectoral representation
as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of
being elected representatives later on through a
party list system, and even beyond that, to
become actual political parties capable of
contesting political power in the constitutional
arena for major political parties." 20
Fourth, the objective of the party-list system is not alone to
provide representation to sectoral groups but also to accord
proportionate representation for political parties participating in the
election, so that those political parties whose candidates did not win
in any district but obtained a substantial amount of the votes cast by
the people will not be completely denied representation in the
House. 21
Fifth, in the Senate, it was proposed that all the sectors
mentioned in the law should be entitled to at least one seat
each. 22 This proposal was not approved for it is nowhere to be
found in the present law. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the
lawmakers did not contemplate a reserve seat system for the
sectoral groups. Verily, the ruling of respondent Commission that
the party-list groups from rank nos. 1 to 51 shall be given one seat
each so that all sectors are represented runs contrary to the
intendment of the legislature.
There is no constitutional right to win elections, only the
constitutional right to equal opportunity to participate in and
influence the selection of candidates. It is not a violation of equal
protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates. The fact
that minorities or interest groups in an electoral unit find
themselves consistently outvoted and without a person elected
from their particular group is no basis for invoking constitutional
remedies where there is no indication that the complaining minority
or interest group has been denied access to the political system. 23
And neither can the sectoral groups claim discrimination
simply because they failed to get a seat in the House of
Representatives. It is not enough to prove that some of the sectors
are not represented because the party or organization representing
them failed to win in the elections. It must be shown that the party-
list system was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to
further discriminate against them. 24
In the past, it cannot be gainsaid that there was a hostility
against sectoral groups as their unelected representatives were
criticized as people who owed their seats to a constitutional
provision and could not rise to the same status or dignity as those
elected by the people. 25 This criticism was laid to rest with the
passage of the party-list system where sectoral representatives had
to undergo an election. To be sure, these sectoral candidates were
given a favored treatment. During the Senate deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 1913, which later became R.A. 7941, Senator
Tolentino emphatically declared that the purpose of the party-list
system is "to give access to the House those who are considered as
marginal political groups that cannot elect a representative in one
district, but when taken together nationally, they may be able to
have a representative." 26 But while given a favored treatment, the
sectoral candidates were not guaranteed seats. Indeed, the party-
list system was devised to replace the reserve seat system. For
unlike the reserve seat system which assured sectoral groups of a
seat in the House of Representatives, the party-list system merely
provides for a mechanism by which the sectoral groups can run for
election as sectoral representatives. The very essence of the party-
list system is representation by election.
The lack of success in the elections is not indicative of a lack
of access to the political system but rather from a failure of the
parties/organizations to turn out as many of the voters as will
enable them to meet the required number of voted. The access
guideline touches upon whether the political processes are open to
minorities or sectoral groups, not on whether such groups are
successful once access has been obtained. 27 The party-list system
was conceived in order to open the system to sectoral
representation, but it does not warrant representation for these
sectors with absolute certainty.
Finally, Section 6 of R.A. 7941 provides that the Comelec
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party if it fails to
obtain at least two percent of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered. If a sectoral party cannot even register when it fails
to obtain the 2% required number of votes, with more reason that it
should not be entitled to get a seat in the House of Representatives.
An absurdity may arise where a sectoral party which failed to meet
the 2% threshold is given a seat in the House but is actually
disqualified for registration and therefore has no legal personality
and standing as such.
B. The 20% membership requirement for sectoral
representatives
Respondent Commission held that a restriction on the
allocation of seats only to those obtaining the 2% threshold will
prevent compliance with the purported constitutional and statutory
mandate that the party-list representatives shall be composed of
20% of the entire membership of the House of Representatives,
including the party list. The ruling is predicated on the supposition
that the 20% requirement is mandatory and that the law requires
that all the seats apportioned to sectoral representatives must be
filled up.
Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of
the Constitution provides that "the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members . . .
who shall be elected from legislative districts, . . . and those who . . .
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations." The record of the
ConCom will show that the delegates considered this provision as a
grant of authority to the legislature, and hence should not be viewed
as either directory or mandatory. 28
Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof,
that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list." Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of law
must be read in harmony with the other provisions. Consequently,
subparagraph (2) should be accorded a similar treatment as
subparagraph (1), i.e., that it is neither directory nor mandatory, but
simply a grant of legislative authority.
In the exercise of such authority, Congress passed R.A.
7941 which contains exactly the same provision as that found in
the Constitution. The query is whether Congress intended the 20%
requirement as a ceiling or whether it intended all the seats
allocated to sectoral groups to be filled up. Section 5 of Article VI, as
originally worded, provides that "the sectoral or party-list
representatives shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the entire
membership of the House of Representatives." From the language
thereof, it is clear that the framers intended to simply impose a
ceiling. Nevertheless, in its final form, the phrase "in no case
exceed" was deleted. Does this mean then that the 20%
requirement was meant to be mandatory? A perusal of the Record
of the ConCom will negate this implication, thus:
"MR. GASCON. In the Gentleman's
proposal, he has replaced the words "SHALL
APPOINT" by "MAY APPOINT" which means
there is a possibility that the President will not
appoint. Will it not be best that to make that
assurance — since it was the intent, I believe,
during our deliberation that either we should
write an ordinance with regard to sectoral
representation or encourage an appointment by
the President — we change the words "MAY
APPOINT" to "SHALL APPOINT"?
"xxx xxx xxx
"MR. MONSOD. . . . I would be more
comfortable by just saying: "THE PRESIDENT
MAY FILL."
"The President may have her
commitments to labor and the peasant sector.
But a directive on this point may in fact be
counterproductive because she may not have
the full period to look into how to implement
the selection. If we do it that way, the President
may be hurried into a selection because she has
to comply with it by July and it may not be a
good or meaningful selection. It may be
necessary that there will be, as Commissioner
Lerum said, various congresses in order to make
it a real systematic choice. I do not know if there
is enough time. But why do we not leave it to
the President to determine if there is time to do
this properly?" 29
The word "may" was used in the final version of
the Constitution. Ostensibly, ConCom wanted to give the President
the discretion whether to appoint sectoral representatives or not. If
the President does not, then there can be vacancies in the seats
allocated for sectoral representatives. Perforce, such an eventuality
is not highly improbable and cannot thus be disregarded or ignored.
The Senate deliberations on the matter are
more revealing:
"1) Senator Alvarez: But, Mr.
President, we already have a ceiling of 20
percent for party-list representatives. 30
"2) Senator Herrera: So that if there
will only be two organizations participating,
even if we have to give them the maximum,
these two organizations will only be entitled to
ten seats, and that will be less than the number
of 25 seats that are supposed to be covered
under the party list system.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.
That is what is going to happen if we limit to five
seats. But as had been brought out in the
interpellations last night, if we use as a basis the
total number of votes cast for the parties that
are participating in the party-list system of
election, then, perhaps, there would be no need
of a limitation to five seats because the
proportion can be strictly applied.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Senator Maceda: Mr. President, just
on this point. In the example given, if a party
gets a certain percentage of votes that should
entitle it to seven seats or eight seats and then it
is cut down to five seats — the first computation
will be to compute the percentage of all the
parties, and they get a corresponding number of
seats — what happens to the excess since there
is a limitation on five seats?
"Senator Tolentino: What is going to
happen is, there may be vacancies under this
system.
"Senator Maceda: I just wanted to
clarify that.
"Senator Tolentino: That is why, I think,
the basis must always be the total number of
votes and give them what is due them in the
mathematical proportion.
"Senator Maceda: But even based on
the total number of votes, we may have one or
two major parties or major labor organizations,
for that matter, really getting more than five
seats.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, that is going to
happen, Mr. President, if there is no limitation.
But the alternative is we will have some
vacancies in the House of Representatives.
"Senator Maceda: Because the
alternative to vacancies, if it is so provided in
the law, would be to further redistribute the
vacancies. After providing for the parties that
get a maximum of five seats, then the excess
could be reapportioned among all the parties
that would not be getting the maximum of five
seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That could be
expressly provided for.
"Senator Maceda: Yes, that could be
the other alternative. But as framed now, the
result would be that there would be vacancies if
some parties get more than five seats.aDTSHc
"Senator Tolentino: That is right, Mr.
President. 31
 It bears to stress that in imposing a limitation on the
number of seats to which a sectoral group or organization may be
entitled, the lawmakers anticipated that vacancies will occur. To
obviate the possibility, it was proposed in the Senate that "the
excess of seats, if any, shall be proportionally allotted to the
participants entitled to a smaller number of seats." The purpose was
to distribute proportionately the excess seats to those who are
lower in rank. 32 The proposal was approved in the Senate, but was
not included in the final version of the law. Hence, it stands to
reason that the lawmakers did not intend to fill up the entire 20%
allotted to the sectoral groups. This is not at all surprising given the
sentiment shared among members of the House of Representatives
against sectoral representation. 33
Respondent Commission further held that allocating the
seats only to those obtaining the 2% threshold will prevent
compliance with the alleged constitutional mandate that the party-
list representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire
membership of the House of Representatives. Again, I beg to
disagree for it unduly assumes that the 2% threshold is not
mandatory and that it is essential to fill up the entire 20% of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives. In effect, the
respondent Commission effectively voids the 2% threshold using the
mandatory or directory nature of certain provisions of the law. This
is too artificial a technique of interpretation for what we ought to
decipher is the real legislative intent, which can only be ascertained
from the nature and object of the act, and the consequences which
would result from construing it one way or another.34 Using these
guidelines, it is clear that the 2% threshold is mandatory while the
20% requirement is but a ceiling.
A corollary issue raised is whether Article VI, Section 5(2) of
the Constitution requires that everytime the number of district
representatives is increased from 200 there shall be a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list representatives. The answer can
be found in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
"MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a
question. Is the intent of the proposal of
Commissioner Monsod to maintain the ratio of
80 percent legislative district and 20 percent
party list representatives on a constant basis?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
"MR. GASCON. Regardless of the
number of legislative representatives and the
number of the party list representatives?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding
Officer."
Similarly, the Senate records reveal the following exchange
between Senator Osmeña and Senator Tolentino:
"Senator Osmeña: . . . Going to
paragraph (2), it states:
"The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party list.
And paragraph (1) states:
"The House shall be composed of not
more than 250 members. Twenty percent of 250
would be 50. Is that the total number to be
elected? Or is it 20 percent of the existing
membership of the House which, I think, is 207?
"The membership of the House is
changing because every time we enact a law
creating a province, a new member is added.
Like in the case of Mandaluyong, a newly
created city, a new member is added.
"As a matter of fact, we have a bill
before us — which I do not think is the right
thing to do — which creates one more seat in
Makati through the operation of a simple law
and not through reapportionment.
"In effect, Mr. President, the number of
members of the House is not static. It can
change from time to time. It can increase or it
can even conceivably decrease if there are
mergers.
"What is the 20 percent going to be
based on, Mr. President?
"Senator Tolentino: The 20 per
centum would be what is provided already by
law. I think the creation of new cities may not
automatically involve an increase in the number
of members of the House but may have to wait
until a new district is provided by law, Mr.
President.
"In other words, if that is the
interpretation, then the membership will remain
the same.
"But if we take a different view that
every city or every new province is entitled, by
the Constitution itself, to a member, that means
the number will actually change depending
upon the number of seats that we add by the
creation of new urbanized cities or new
provinces.
"That will mean that in every election
where there is a party list system, the
computation of the number of seats for the
party list will change." 35
Upon further clarification by Senator Lina, it was explained
by Senator Tolentino that it will not be a fixed and definite number
of seats but that the party-list representatives shall constitute a
given percentage of the total number of the Members of the House
of Representatives to be elected including those under the party-
list. 36
C. The 3-seat limitation
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list
representation to as many party groups as possible. According to
Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate, then
the idea of giving as much as possible to the marginalized groups
may be defeated. 37 The purpose is to allow as many as possible of
the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to
have a seat in Congress, 38 and to have enough seats left for those
who are way below the list. 39 There is nothing offensive to this
requirement as to warrant a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Indeed, the parties do not attack this provision as legally infirmed.
IV. Conclusion
 The party list-system of election is one of the major
innovations in our 1987 Constitution. The system gives the poor and
the powerless in our society a fighting chance to elect
representatives in Congress who will act as their real mouthpieces.
In a country like ours where vested interest reigns and may reign till
kingdom come, this rare opportunity given by the Constitution to
our less privileged people should be re-examined so that the
exercise of the privilege will not be diluted by undemocratic
restraints. R.A. 7941 while brimming with good intention can stand
a lot of improvements. Hopefully, the bills filed and that may still be
filed in Congress improving R.A. 7941 may bring about the day when
our democracy will be more vibrant, as they who have less in life will
have more in law because they themselves can make the law.
I vote with the majority.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
My disagreement with the majority is in respect of its
computation of the number of seats to which the parties,
organizations, and coalitions, which obtained more than 2 percent
of the votes for the party-list system are entitled to have under
the Constitution and the implementing law, R.A. No. 7941. Beyond
affirming the election of the 14 party-list representatives as the
majority does, I contend that 25 more should be proclaimed to give
each of the winning parties, organizations, and coalitions the
maximum three seats allowed by law, thus bringing the total
number of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives
to 39. I am afraid that today's ruling, denying additional seats to the
winning groups, bodes ill for the future of the party-list system in
this country.
I first Assembly will be in March or April. But
To be sure, those who drafted the Constitution simply
sketched out the basic features of proportional representation,
leaving it to Congress to flesh out the bare bones of an idea. The
record of the Constitutional Commission shows:
MR. RODRIGO: Then, I will propound
my question to Commissioner Monsod whose
name appears as number one in the list.
My question have reference to the
party list system and the sectoral representation
in the House of Representatives. I would like to
preface my questions by stating that I am in
favor of the basic idea of having sectoral
representation and representation by means of
the party list in the House of Representatives.
However, from the very beginning, I already
expressed my misgivings about the mechanics,
the practicableness of this idea. I think this is in
line with the thinking of the Constitutional
Commission on this matter. We like this party
list and sectoral representation, if they can be
implemented properly. And we should leave to
the legislature the enactment of the
implementing laws or the enabling acts. The
legislature will have more time to study the
problem on how this can be implemented. The
legislature can go into details on the mechanics.
This we cannot do in the Constitutional
Commission because a Constitution must be
brief, concise and broad.
So, I am very glad when I read this
proposed amendment which stated twice the
phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW." . . .
And so, my first question is: in the light
of the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," do I take
it that this party list system and the sectoral
representation provision will not take effect
until an enabling act or an implementing
legislation shall have been enacted by Congress?
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, the
when we say "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," it could
really mean that it may be by ordinance
appended to this Constitution or an executive
order by the incumbent President or, as the
Gentleman has said, by law provided by the
incoming Congress. So, it could be any of these
ways.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, we
are all witnesses to the difficulty in arriving at a
consensus of these very novel ideas on the
disputes that we have had. And up to now,
there is no real consensus yet. Does the
Commissioner believe that we should really try
to go into the details by enacting an ordinance
to the Constitution? In other words, should we
force the issue? Should we insist that before this
Constitution is submitted to the people in a
plebiscite, we shall have already defined the
details on how this party list system and sectoral
representation can be implemented in the first
election after the ratification of
the Constitution?
MR. MONSOD: we just want to
establish the principle of the party list system
with sectoral representation in the present
Constitution. We can discuss whether the body
in its collective wisdom feels that it is qualified
or should go into the ordinance after we have
established the principle, and we will be guided
by the vote or judgment of this Commission. 1
When the fundamental law, therefore, emerged from the
Commissions Art. VI, §5 merely provided:
SEC. 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national,
regionals and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution,one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor,
 peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural system, in out case the membership of the House of seat each." Since only 13 parties, organizations and coalitions
communities, women, youth, and such other Representatives is composed of 80 percent district and 20 percent obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes cast, only they should
sectors as may be provided by law except the party-list representatives. initially get one seat each. The results of applying Steps 1 and 2 are
religious sector. shown in Table 1:
The party-list system of proportional representation is
Pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution, Congress based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of the Table 1
enacted R.A. No. 7941 which in pertinent parts provides: German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining
the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, DETERMINATION OF 2 PERCENTERS AND INITIAL
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List seats should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS TO THEM
Representatives. — The party-list party and then the product should be divided by the sum total of
representatives shall constitute twenty per the second votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least
centum (20%) of the total number of the 5 percent of the votes. First, each party receives one seat for each Group Actual votes Percentage of Guaranteed
members of the House of Representatives whole number resulting from the calculation. The remaining seats
including those under the party-list. are then allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal received votes cast for seat
xxx xxx xxx fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted inR.A. No. 7941, §11.
party-list
As Representative Espinosa said:
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure MR. ESPINOSA: [T]his mathematical
shall be observed: computation or formula was patterned after
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1
that of Niemeyer formula which is being
(a) The parties, organizations, and practiced in Germany as formerly stated. As this 2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to is the formula or mathematical computation
the lowest based on the number of votes they which they have seen most fit to be applied in a 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1
garnered during the elections. party-list system. This is not just a formula
arrived at because of suggestions of individual 4. VETERANS 304,902 3.33% 1
(b) The parties, organizations, and
Members of the Committee but rather a pattern FEDERATION
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
which was already used, as I have said, in the
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall 5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1
assembly of Germany. 3
be entitled to one seat each;Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of The rules in §11 require a four-step process of distributing 6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the seats for the part-list system. Using the results of the last
proportion to their total number of elections, the application of the rules in §11 is as follows: 7. NCSCFO 338,303 2.60% 1
votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not Step 1. R.A. No. 7941, §11 states that "the parties, 8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1
more than three (3) seats. organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the 9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1
Rep. Tito R. Espinosa, co-sponsor of the bill which elections." The first step, therefore, is to rank the groups taking part
became R.A. No. 7941, explained that the system embodied in the in the election for party-list seats and get the total number of votes 10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1
law was largely patterned after the mixed party-list system in cast for all of them. Then determine which of them obtained at least
Germany. Indeed, the decision to use the German model is clear 11. SAN LAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1
2 percent of the total votes cast. The application of this rule shows
from the exchanges in the Constitutional Commission between that only 13 parties, organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1
Commissioners Blas F. Ople and Christian S. Monsod. 2 The percent of the total votes (9,155,309) cast for the party-list system.
difference between our system and that of Germany is that whereas 13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1
in Germany half (328) of the seats in the Bundestag are filled by Step 2. R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "the parties,
direct vote and the other half (328) are filled through the party-list organizations, or coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of 14. SENIOR CITIZENS 143,444 1.57%
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
15. Other Parties 5,582,427 Each with excess seats superfluous is that the 2 percenters are not sufficiently
numerous.
less than Group Total votes Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-
2% obtained seats seats seats list representatives, which at present are 52. Thus, Art. VI, §5(2) of
the Constitution that "the party-list representatives shall constitute
————— ———— —— (1) (2) (3) (4) twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list." This provision thus fixes a ratio of 80
Total 09,155,309 100% 13 percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list
representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-list
Step 3. R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "those garnering 1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5 limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each.
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The
To maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list
initial allocation of seats to the 13 parties and organizations which
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4 system, after deducting the number of seats initially distributed to
obtained at least 2 percent of the votes leaves 39 seats (52 minus
the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
13) available for further distribution. How should this be done? As
4. VETERANS 304,902 1 3.47 4
stated earlier, Congress adopted the Niemeyer formula for The above formula is similar to that used by this Court in
distributing seats in the Bundestag. FEDERATION determining the proportional representation of political parties in
the Commission on Appointments of Congress. Art. VI, §18 of
Accordingly, the number of additional seats to which a 2
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4 the Constitution provides that the Commission shall be composed of
percenter is entitled should be determined by multiplying the
"the President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators
number of seats remaining by the total number of votes obtained by 6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4 and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by
that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
(3,429,438) garnered by all the 2 percenters. The 2 percenters are 7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4 political parties and parties or organizations registered under the
each entitled to the additional seats equivalent to the integer
party-list system represented therein." In Guingona Jr. v.
portion of the resulting product. Thus, APEC will have five additional 8. ABANSE!PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
Gonzales, 4 this Court held: 5
seats computed as follows:
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 1 2.64 1 4 As a result of the national elections
39 x 503,487
held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
—————— = 5.73 of the following members or Senators
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3 representing the respective political affiliations:
3,429,438
LDP — 15 senators
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
The result of the application of this formula is shown in
NPC — 5 senators
Column 4 of Table 2, with 32 seats (the sum of the integer portions 13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
of the resulting products) being apportioned among the 2 LAKAS-NUCD — 3 senators
percenters. The seats remaining after the distribution of seats in ——— — —— — —
accordance with Step 3 should be distributed to the two percenters LP-PDP-LABAN — 1 senator
in the descending order of the decimal portions of the products Total 3,429.438 13 32 7 52
shown in Column 4. This distribution of the remaining seats is shown Applying the mathematical formula
It may be asked why, despite the fact that most of the
in Column 5. agreed to by the parties as follows:
parties have already exceeded the three-seat limit while the rest
Table 2 have obtained three seats the computation is still brought forward. No. of senators of a political party
The answer is that it is possible that every party will get three or
SECOND DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS more seats after following the procedure in Step 3. The only reason —————————————— x 12 seats
why, in the cases at bar, the results seem to make the distribution of
Total No. of senators elected 3. ALAGAD 4 1 3 3. The decision of the COMELEC en
banc allocating seats to 38 other
the resulting composition of the senate 4. VETERANS 4 1 3 parties, all of which failed to obtain at
based on the rule of proportional FEDERATION least 2 percent of the total votes cast, is
representation of each political party with set aside.
elected representatives in the Senate, is as 5. PROMDI 4 1 3
follows: 4. The proclamation of 25 additional party-list
6. AKO 4 1 3 representatives will leave 13 seats for
Political Party/ Proportional party-list representatives vacant. While
7. NCSCFO 4 1 3 Art. VI. §5(b) of the Constitutionfixes a
Political Coalition Membership Representatives ratio of 80 percent district to 20
8. ABANSE! PINAY 4 1 3
percent party-list representatives, does
9. AKBAYAN! 4 1 3 not really require that all seats allotted
LDP 15 7.5 members to party-list representatives — at
10. BUTIL 3 — 3 present 52 — be filled.
NPC 5 2.5 members
11. SANLAKAS 3 — 3 The results of the application of the foregoing steps are
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members summarized and explained in the Consolidated Table appended to
12. COOP-NATCCO 3 — 3 this opinion.
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
13. COCOFED 3 — 3 II
Step 4. Finally, R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "each The majority holds that "the Niemeyer formula, while no
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than TOTAL 52 13 39 doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
three (3) seats." Hence the 2 percenters, which are determined to setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
be entitled to more than three seats are finally allotted three seats On the basis of the foregoing computations, I reach the
character of the twenty percent allocation." Claiming that it is
each, or 38 seats in all, as shown in Column 8 of Table 3. This following conclusions:
"obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique model
incidentally leaves 13 seats in the House of Representatives for the 1. The proclamation by the COMELEC of the 13 which demands an equally unique formula," the majority instead
party-list vacant. STaHIC parties, which obtained at least 2 allocates seats to the winning groups in a manner which cannot be
percent of the votes cast for the party- justified in terms of the rules in §11. While it disavows any
Table 3
list system, should be affirmed. intention to "reinvent or second-guess [the law]," the majority in
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS reality does so and in the process engages in a bit of judicial
2. The 13 parties should be given two (2) legislation.
additional seats, with the exception of
APEC which should be allotted only one First. In determining the number of seats to which the first
Party/organization/ Total numberSeats inTotal number party is entitled, the majority applies the "one seat for every 2
(1) additional seat, thus giving each
of excess of percent" rule. 6 But after once applying the rule to the highest
party the maximum three (3) seats
allowed by law, on the basis of votes ranking party, the majority does not apply it to the rest of the 2
coalition seats of 3 seats allowed
obtained by them in proportion to the percenters. Indeed, it cannot consistently do so because it is
obtained
votes cast for all of them. This means a mathematically impossible to require that the 52 seats for party-list
total of 25 party-list representatives representatives be filled at the rate of 2 percent per seat. That
belonging to the 13 parties will be would mean that the votes needed to win the 52 seats is 104
1. APEC 7 4 3 added to the 14 now in office, bringing percent of the votes cast in the election. The majority admits this. It
to 39 the total number of party-list says that its "formula will be applicable only in determining the
2. ABA 5 2 3 representatives in the House. number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be
used to determine the additional seats of the other qualified
parties."
If the formula applies only to the first party, then it is no
formula at all because it is incapable of consistent and general
application. It is even iniquitous. If a party got 5.5 percent of the
votes and is given two (2) seats. it is hard to see why the next
ranking party, which got 5 percent of the votes should get only one
(1) seat.
Indeed, the law does not distinguish between the first
ranking party and the rest of the other 2 percenters insofar as
obtaining additional seats fire concerned. The law provides that
"those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The operative word is "their" which refers to none other
than the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. The plain
language of the law is that the basis for the allocation of additional
seats is the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. This rule
applies to all parties obtaining more than 2 percent of the votes cast
for the winning parties.
Second. In determining the additional seats for the 2
percenters after determining the number of seats for the first
ranking party, the majority uses the following formula:
No of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ————————— x seats allocated to
the
party No. of votes of first party
first party
R.A. No. 7941, §11 requires the determination of two
types of proportions. The first is the determination of the
proportion of the votes obtained by a party in relation to the total
number of votes cast for the party-list. The purpose of the rule is to
determine whether a party was able to hurdle the 2 percent
threshold. The second is the determination of number of votes a
party obtained in proportion to the number of votes cast for all the
parties obtaining at least 2 percent of the votes. The purpose for
determining the second proportion is to allocate the seats left after
the initial allocation of one (1) seat each to every 2 percenter. The
total number of votes obtained by a party in relation to the total
number of votes obtained by all 2 percenters is multiplied by the
remaining number of seats.
If an analogy is needed to explain this formula, the
remaining 39 seats may be likened to a pie to be distributed among
the 2 percenters. The way to distribute it is to use the weight of
their individual votes in relation to their total number of votes.
There is no reason for using the number of votes of the first party as
a divisor since it is not the votes obtained by the first ranking party
which are being distributed.
In truth, §11 does not say that those garnering more than 2
percent of the votes ''shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to the number of additional seats given to the highest
ranking party." What it says is that such additional seats must be "in
proportion to their total number of votes," the antecedent of "their"
being "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes."
Third. I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's
fixation with designating the highest ranking participant as a "first"
party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority, assumes that the
seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats of
the so-called first party. One will search in vain the proceedings of
both Houses of Congress for a discussion of this procedure or even
just a reference to it. There is none.
Fourth. Still it is argued that there should be a distinction
between the number of seats for the first ranking party and those
for the rest of the 2 percenters. As an example, the majority cites
the case of a first ranking party obtaining 20 percent of the votes
and the second ranking party obtaining 6 percent of the votes.
According to the majority, to give the two parties the same number
of seats would be to violate the "proportional representation
parameter."
As already stated, however, the majority's inordinate
concern with the first ranking party is not consistently carried to the
other 2 percenters. The result is that if the first ranking party
obtains 5.99 percent of the total votes cast, the second ranking
party 5.98 percent, and the last ranking party 2.0 percent, under the
majority's formula, the .01 percent difference between the first and
the second ranking party will justify the difference of one (1) seat
between them. However, the 3.98 percent difference between the
second ranking party and the last ranking party is disregarded by the
majority. Indeed, even under the majority's novel formula of
proportional representation, its own parameters are violated.
Fifth. In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to
the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for every 2%" rule
in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2) with respect
to the rest of the 2 percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless
the first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which case all 2
percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking
party should get an extra seat. I cannot see how this formula could
have been intended by Congress. Only in a Pickwickian sense can
the result of the application of such "formula" be considered
proportional representation.
Sixth. The formula adopted by the majority effectively
deprives party-list representatives of representation considering
that it eliminates the ratio 4 district representatives to 1 party-list
representative in the House. This is so because, under the rule
formulated by the majority, it becomes very difficult to reach the
ceiling of 20 percent of the House. In the case at bar, to fill 52 seats
in the House, the first ranking party would have to obtain exactly 6
percent of the votes and 25 other parties must get at least 3
percent. In practical terms, this formula violates
the Constitution insofar as it makes it improbable to obtain the
ceiling of 20 percent thereby preventing the realization of the
framers's intent of opening up the system to party-list
representatives.
Seventh. The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent
all 2 percenters, which are not the first ranking party, from
obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so because, with
their votes being proportioned against the votes of the first ranking
party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of
these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A.
No. 7941, §11 which contemplates the possibility of more than one
(1) party obtaining the maximum number of seats allowed by law.
——————
Already, the proportion of party-list representatives to
district representatives is small compared to the mixed system in
Germany where half of the seats (328) of the Bundestag are district
representatives and the other half (328) are reserved for party-list
representatives. The ruling announced today would ensure that the
proportion of party-list representatives to the district
representatives who constitute 80 percent of the total membership
in the House of Representatives is even less than 20 percent. The
constitutional intent to afford marginalized groups in our society to
be represented in the House is thus frustrated if not subverted.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions in these
cases and to order the Commission on Elections to proclaim as
elected one additional nominee of APEC and two additional
nominees of each of the following parties, organizations, or
coalitions: ABA, ALAGAD, VETERANS FEDERATION, PROMDI, AKO,
NCSCFO, ABANSE! PINAY, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, SANLAKAS, COOP-
NATCCO, and COCOFED.
||| (Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
136781, 136786 & 136795, [October 6, 2000], 396 PHIL 419-486)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY
(under the acronym OFW), represented herein
by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH;
MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG
LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS
(OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under "Organizations/Coalitions"
of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political
Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP);
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA;
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.
Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch
Foundation, Inc.
Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law
Offices for The True Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier
Law Office for Chamber of Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas
Contract Workers (OCW).
Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buñag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang
Pilipino.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law
Office and Antonio R. Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan
Muna filed the present petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 37851 issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious.
The Court remanded the case to the Comelec and directed the
Commission to conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the
party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. According
to the Court, such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system.
Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the very
reason for the establishment of the party-list system is the
fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life
should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list system
was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine
power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent
the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give
them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down
some guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work of conducting
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65
OF RULES OF COURT. — Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec
Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the
party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court
in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. — These cases present an
exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held
that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case
is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of
the House of Representatives.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY
BE GLOSSED OVER TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. —
Procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social
justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available."
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER
SECTION 1(D), RULE 13 THEREOF. — The assailed Omnibus
Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO
FORMULATE GUIDING AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR RULES. — These cases raise
transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules." acCTIS
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY
PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED
UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. — Under theConstitution and RA 7941,
private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution, provides that members of
the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-
list system. Furthermore, Section 11 ofRA 7941 leaves no doubt as
to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably, therefore,
political parties — even the major ones — may participate in the
party-list elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Commissioner Monsod stated that
the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-
list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. — For its part,
Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION,
CONSTRUED. — "Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA
7941 does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5
of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY,
EXPLAINED. — "Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of
a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES; WHERE LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE
APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS TERMS. — The intent of
the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we
repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives."
Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according
to its express terms.
12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE
LIMITED, QUALIFIED OR SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE
ASSOCIATION. — While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY
SOURCE FROM WHICH TO ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR
PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF PROVISION ITSELF. — The fundamental
principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is
the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction
and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain
the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; WHEN A
LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY VIOLATES OR
IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE
STRUCK DOWN BY THIS COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. —
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission
on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its
action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to
reinvent or second-guess it.
15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT
NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. — Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately
rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because
"it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such
factual allegations.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA
7941); POLITICAL PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION
MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED
GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5 THEREOF. — First, the political
party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5
of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government
and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW
THAT THEY REPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED. — Second, while even major political parties
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate
in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the
House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE
REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. — In view of the objections
directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS
POLITICAL PARTIES. — Furthermore, the Constitutionprovides that
"religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." The
prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political
party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR
ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6
THEREOF. — Fourth, a party or an organization must not be
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful
statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one
(1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE
AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED
OR ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. —Fifth, the party or
organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of
the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of
citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is
not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to
the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be
elected to the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. — Not only the
candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat,
under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot
be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban
poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is
to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE
TO FORMULATION AND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION
THAT WILL BENEFIT THE NATION AS A WHOLE. — As previously
discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee
proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is
not going to represent a particular district . . . ."
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION;
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SECTORAL
REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. — Perhaps the present controversy
stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list
system. At first glance, it gives the impression of being a
combination of proportional representation for non-traditional
parties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional
representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to
open up the electoral process for broader participation and
representation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes
that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress.
This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the
provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well
as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO,
NAMELY: 1) POLITICAL PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL
ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4) COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. — The party-
list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral
parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party
is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or
platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral
party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable
sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities and women and those added
by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a
group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an
aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for election purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE.
— A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same qualifications
applicable to legislative districts candidates, with the exception of
the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only,
and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective
office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately
preceding election. A nominee must actually belong to the sector
which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true
representation. A nominee of the youth sector is further required to
be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the
election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term,
he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once elected,
party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and
privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not
entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund (CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL
PARTIES, SECTORAL GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS
AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR
NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE AGENTS. — A feature of the party-
list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of
"candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if
a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated,
removed from office by the party or the organization he represents,
resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another
person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the
replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted
to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list
representative who switches party affiliations during his term
forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation
within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for
nomination in party-list representative under his new party or
organization. EcTDCI
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS
OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE ADOPTING IT. — The polestar in
the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect must be
given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this
tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to
suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of
constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import
have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable
than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly,
be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous
waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a
constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners
is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and
when better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION; MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN
DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM WHOM CONSTITUTION
EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. — "The most
important single factor in determining the intention of the people
from whom theConstitution emanated is the language in which it is
expressed." The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for
a party-list system of "registered, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and
only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list
representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art.
VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that
whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the
purpose is to provide exclusive representation for "marginalized
sectors," by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER
GUIDES FAIL AS SAID PROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY
TERMS OF CONSTITUTION WHEN MEANING IS CLEAR. — The
polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this
Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows: While
it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-
TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. — The
two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list
representation is a type of proportional representation designed to
give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of
Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have
sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these
groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.")
Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-
seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in
contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if
a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under
the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in
order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the
"winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing
candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates
a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their public
support, the party-list system enables marginalized and
underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.
Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors
seats in the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY
NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY NUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT
BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO GIVE THEM A SEAT
NATIONWIDE. — The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors referred to by
petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of
proportional representation intended to give voice to those who
may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but
are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It,
therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that
"Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their
proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents
worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the
'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined
as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the
districts.'"
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IS RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR,
PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,
WOMEN AND YOUTH. — A problem was placed before the
Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-
seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of under representation two
solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list
system or proportional representation. The Constitutional
Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that
the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners
contend without changing entirely the meaning of
the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the
reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free
and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2
THEREOF, CONSTRUED. — What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply
states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority
claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats
in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of
the law is "to promote proportional representation through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For
while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As
already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to
enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district
elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily
limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors. DHITcS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not
only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have
less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections, to have the
same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would
desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received
several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
"[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations
takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result
the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous
petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of
the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations
whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing
matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will
encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this
electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the
'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review
of the matters at bar, we must recognize the
fact that there is a need to keep the number of
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions,
down to a manageable level, keeping only those
who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the
sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on
the Motions for Reconsiderations or
Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-
Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in
the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days
from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing,
however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court
on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 147589,
assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days
from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before
this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the
two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May
15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were
received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was
conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties
were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the
parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule
65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may
participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list
system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be
remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners
under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of
the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for
cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22
of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of
Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion
for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading
under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed
before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the
elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent
events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date,
the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But
a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency,
for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties
to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list
system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA
7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registerednational, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-
list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of
a political party, organization, or coalition shall
be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in thisConstitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or
organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,
Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the
party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,
PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list
system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of
the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a
chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He
explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-
list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ."Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political
party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to
the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998
elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major
ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." (Italics supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a
distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared
that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine
power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national
history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-
executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to
Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The
State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House
of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack
[of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the
absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of
a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only
those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented"
become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-
style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be
applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section
5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized
group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary
 stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government,
list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the
Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not
limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends
that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section
6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing
the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate
in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-
list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens — specifically
those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties — to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system
is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-
rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two
sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat
them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and
with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted
during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and
sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives
of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic
clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to
arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank
accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply
to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers
the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not
been able to win in the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent
of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in
the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and
the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was
to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the
House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those
who have never gotten a foothold within it — those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical
to open the system to those who have long been within it — those
privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without
such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented
to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not
only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to
be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed
out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly
on the supposed intent of the framers of theConstitution as culled
from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision
itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort
be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such
as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention,
in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the
system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when
we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids
of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious
and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there
is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to
the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers'
deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at
best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of
the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of
Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain
parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that
the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and
the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet
of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the
party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the
law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and
quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not
to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately
pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties
— Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP — on the
ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political
parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this,
they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election
Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers . . . ." We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list
election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for
the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however,
is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for
that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the
necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges." This
Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents
should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under
the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the
party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case
to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate
to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show —
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history,
platform of government and track record — that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily,
majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-
list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must
show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon
Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted
as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am not disputing that in my question. All I am
saying is, the political party must claim
to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a
religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision
that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with
nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters,
in order to circumvent this prohibition,
decides to form its own political party
in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their
inspiration and philosophies from well-
established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
If the evidence shows that the intention is to go
around the prohibition, then certainly
the Comelec can pierce through the
legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA.
When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT
RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or
pastors who may be elected by, say,
the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS.
Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who
represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the
Catholic Church, the Protestant Church
et cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The prohibition
was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in
this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here;
it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized
for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has
registered." 59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a
party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws
and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which
states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of,
or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a
party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties,
but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9
of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
 election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 ofRA 7941, the nominees
must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the
law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental
social justice principle that those who have less in life should have
more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to
benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the
destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground,
that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of
their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions
of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system
is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only
weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it
would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the
party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions,
and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely,
this could not have been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and the makers ofRA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec,
which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the
last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings
for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this
Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing
the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the
last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec
itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join
the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria
of the 1986 People Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor
infused by civilian society in a cleansing political reform and focused
itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily governance. A
cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single
party in power — a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule.
Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2, of the 1987 Charter —
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-
HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, ASPROVIDED
BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH,
AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS
SECTOR. —
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.
Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress,
then president Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her transitory
appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the Lower
House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women and youth sector. The
assignment was made from a selected list of names submitted by
the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these
reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would
have to participate in an electoral contest to secure their
representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing,
would wait for the legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress
was to be circumscribed by the terms expressed in Article 6, Section
5(2). — First, the system should only apply to the election of 20% of
the total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it
would prescribe a mandatory proportional representation scheme,
and, third, it would allow participating parties and organizations to
be represented in voter's registration boards, board of election
inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An
Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through
the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," was
enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution
No. 2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and
Regulations Governing the Elections of the Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998
first party-list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the
first time, their political mettle in an open electoral contest with
other parties, groups and organizations under a party-list system.
While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result
of public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001
multi-party list elections, however, were different. This time, a huge
number of parties, groups and coalitions applied for registration
with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC.
Six of these groups were established political parties, namely
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO,
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and
PDP-LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major
parties on the ground that their participation does not level the
playing field for less known and less organized sectoral groups still in
dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the
system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors,
as well as other parties but only on the condition that the latter field
sectoral candidates themselves, herein petitioner sought the
disqualification of the large major political parties and groups which
do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by
the Constitution into the electoral system, would show the
pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the qualifications of a
party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to
provide for the system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the
enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A. 7941 reads —
"The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a
party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lacked well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives, by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI,
Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two
staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in Congress
to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved
to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be
represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in
the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established
political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with
the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral
representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the
party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by
allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required
number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the
proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation
of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The
only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their
electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as
possible, abhors the monopoly of representation in the Lower
House. This intent is evident in the statutory imposition of the
three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats
that may be gained by a party or organization. 1 Votes garnered in
excess of 6% of the total votes cast do not entitle the party to more
than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the
enabling law that disallows major political parties from participating
in the party-list system and, at the same time, from fielding
candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of
the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it gives
the impression of being a combination of proportional
representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral
representation. The first, proportional representation, on one end,
is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral
process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral
representation on the other, presupposes that every
underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This
impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the
provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well
as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented. In
holding that the party list system is open only to the
underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places
much reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized
group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list
of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the
petition in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice
and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen
(15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60)
days before election." EcTIDA
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section
3(d) of the statute, defining a "sectoral party," the enumeration was
intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not the other eligible
groups (e.g., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions).
Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee
representation to all sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over
only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. The real aim, if
the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be respected,
was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political
parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4)
coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A
sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section
5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those
added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral
organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system
is required to register with the COMELEC, together with a list of its
five nominees for party-list representatives, arranged according to
the group's order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives, each voter casts two votes — one for the district
representative of his choice and another for the party or
organization of his choice. The votes cast for the parties and
organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of
all other officials where the rule of plurality (i.e., the candidate with
the highest number of votes wins) is adopted, the number of seats
under the party-list system depends on the number of votes
received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide.
On the basis of the number of registered voters in the recent
elections, a group under the party-list system, should get
approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political
parties themselves. Undeniably, political parties are an important
feature in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. By
legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political
power, parties add an important element of stability to a political
system and also help organize the government and electorate by
recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging partisan
attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter
participation and providing varying degrees of policy direction to
government. The idea could also be seen as a good training and
recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend the
multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the
many interests of a complex society, including a range of ideological
differences, conflicting political values and philosophies. Section 6
of the 1987 Constitution is explicit — "A free and open party system
shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people." 2 The multi-party system of proportional representation
broadens the composition of the House of Representatives to
accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-
defined political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority
or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same
qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates, 3 with the
exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in
one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for
any elective office or has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. 4A nominee must actually belong
to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can
be no true representation. 5 A nominee of the youth sector is
further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age
on the day of the election. 6 Should he, however, attain the age of
30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration
thereof. 7 Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the
same term, rights and privileges as do district representatives,
except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development
Fund (CDF). 8
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties,
sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation
acquire the status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated to
mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes
physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the
organization he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his
term, his party can send another person to take his place for the
remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in
the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration.
Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
affiliations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also, if a person
changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months before the election,
he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative
under his new party or organization. 10
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to
have been overlooked as they precisely were the same points
subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by the members Political Parties: Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG
of the Constitutional Commission. BAYANI),
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
And, the polestar in the constructions National Federation of Sugar Planters
of constitutions always remains — "effect must be given to the Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD- (NFSP)
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting UMDP),
it."11 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or
Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC), coalition desiring to participate in the party-list system must apply
elbow-room for construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any
inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), to the COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days before the
provisions according to their plain terms and import have been election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires that any
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON), party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the
considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those
avoided, or as compensated by countervailing COMELEC should declare its intention to participate in the party-list
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
advantages. 12 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may system 90 days before the election.
Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the
dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a Liberal Party (LP),
COMELEC passed upon the applications for registration or
constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners Nacionalista Party (NP), manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations, and
is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of parties,
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14,
when better counsel prevails. aASEcH 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and coalitions
Organizations/Coalitions:
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-
(DRUG WATCH),
dismissal of the petitions. list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine society and that there is
MENDOZA, J., dissenting: no way by which other sectors not so identified, much less the
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO
major political parties, can participate in the party-list elections.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently PHILIPPINES),
Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to the fact that
explain my vote, but before I do so it seems to me necessary to The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP,
state briefly the facts and the issues. NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major
LOYALIST),
THE FACTS political parties in the country today as determined by the COMELEC
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and charges that the
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for Inc. (PLAM), rest of private respondents are "pseudo party-list organizations"
short) is the political agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big
Movement, a non-stock and non-profit organization. On the other Citizens Movement for Justice,
Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP), businesses.
hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party representing
peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized Chamber of Real Estate Builders Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is
sectors. Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections in Association (CREBA), intended to address the problem of ineffective representation
connection with the election for party-list representatives on May of underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct
14, 2001. Sports and Health Advancement people's action and participation in the decision-making process
Foundation, Inc. (SHAF), to counter-balance the territorial representation of 80% of the
Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, House of Representatives, and that to allow participation in the
for certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract party-list system of respondent political parties and
mandamus — for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the Workers (OCW), parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose because
registration of the following parties classified as "political parties" these parties do not represent "marginalized and
and "organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections: underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna
 prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the five major
political parties from participating in the party-list system only
in the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in
subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-
List System Act clearly allow, and they do not
prohibit, the participation of "registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations" to participate in the party-list
system, whether or not said parties or
organizations represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society. 2
It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that
For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to
permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In any event,
it is contended that petitioners' recourse is not to this Court but
to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or
coalition represents "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts.
The COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan
Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground,
respondents NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD,
CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the
following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be
dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for area in accordance with the number of their
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of society. respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated. as provided by law, shall be elected through a
DISCUSSION party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
I.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed
constitute twenty per centum of the total
petitions for the disqualification of respondents, the fact is that
number of representatives including those
when the petitions in these cases were filed on April 16 and 17,
under the party list. For three consecutive terms
2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was doubt
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
whether a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was
half of the seats allocated to party-list
forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on May 14,
representatives shall be filled, as provided by
2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no
law, by selection or election from the labor,
other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
law" within the meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil
communities, women, youth, and such other
Procedure and were justified in resorting to the extraordinary
sectors as may be provided by law except the
remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
religious sector.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress
to await formal resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had
enacted the Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent
already indicated in press statements its stand that parties,
provisions of which read:
organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The
the election for the party-list system — a fact confirmed by it in its State shall promote proportional representation
comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis in the election of representatives to the House
for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted administrative of Representatives through a party-list system
remedies before coming to this Court. of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
statement of the second issue above plainly shows. It is only if the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
question whether the party-list system is limited to "marginalized
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the affirmative will it
defined political constituencies but who could
be necessary to determine the status of respondents.
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
II. appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
following provision of the Constitution:
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
Art. VI, §5(1). The House of and open party system in order to attain the
Representatives shall be composed of not more broadest possible representation of party,
than two hundred fifty members, unless sectoral or group interests in the House of
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected Representatives by enhancing their chances to
from legislative districts apportioned among the compete for and win seats in the legislature,
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
 SEC. 11. Number of Party-List
Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998
elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each;Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
"The most important single factor in determining the
intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated is
the language in which it is expressed." 3 The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2)
is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral
representation. Only for three consecutive terms following the
ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of
the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral
representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for
petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral representation or
party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation
for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not
identical. Party-list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a
seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to
win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this
sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and
underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives
are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of
votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat
district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he
gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate
need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature. On the
other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes
cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or
candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that reflects their
public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and
underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives.
Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors
seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in
the Constitution as answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan
Muna argues that the constitutional intent in adopting the party-list
system must be searched for in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been
stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this
jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P.
Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even
assuming we could discover what it was, when it is not adequately
expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when
they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we
look behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying
into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find
is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason
why we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional
Commission speaks clearly against petitioners' reading of Art. VI,
§5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional Commission
rejected sectoral representation in preference to proportional
representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the
Legislative Department read:
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces and cities in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be
 elected from the sectors and party list. The
sectoral or party list representatives shall in no
case exceed twenty percent of the entire
membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory, provided, however, that each
city with a population of more than two
hundred thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
Within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.6
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for
additional representation in the House of Representatives were
submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department: one for
sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and
another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner
Monsod. The two are not the same. As Commissioner Monsod said
in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
I would like to make a distinction from
the beginning that the proposal for the party list
system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list
system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors . . . . In effect, a sectoral representation
in the Assembly would mean that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; that they will
choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited
were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students,
professionals, business, military, academic,
ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the
nine sectors that were identified here as
"sectoral representatives" to be represented in
this Commission. The problem we had in trying
to approach sectoral representation in the
Assembly was whether to stop at these nine
sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we
had the problem of who comprise the farmers. .
. . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also
be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of
the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would
be included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there
are no reserved seats for sectors. . . . This can be
a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in
Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that
he wants the farmers' party to be represented in
the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party.
At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by
each party or each organization — one does not
have to be a political party and register in order
to participate as a party — and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the
votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
We feel that this approach gets around
the mechanics of sectoral representation while
at the same time making sure that those who
really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in
the National Assembly. These sectors or these
groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not
be able to win a seat on a district basis but
surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
The purpose of this is to open the
system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts.
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party list
system. 7
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the
phrase "shall be elected from the sectors and party list" in §5 by
replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED
NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS. 8
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight
modification it later became the basis of the present Art. VI,
§5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod
amendment:
MR. DAVIDE:
Madam President, before accepting the
proposed amendment, the Committee
would like to get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS," is he referring to any
sector which the law may subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD:
. . . . The party list system that is being
advocated by this amendment is a
system that opens up the list to any
regional, national or sectoral party . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
The Committee would like to be clarified on
this.
 Do we understand the proponent correctly that
this party list system is not necessarily synonymous to
sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD:
No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does
include the right of sectoral parties or
organizations to register, but it is not
exclusive to sectoral parties or
organizations.
MS. AQUINO.
And that it does not likewise reserve any
institutional seat for any sector? In
other words, it only enables it to be a
part of the party list if it has the
capacity to do so, but it does not
reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat
system. 9
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed
by Commissioner Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo,
Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM.
Madam President, in view of the explanation, I
am objecting to this amendment
because it is possible that the labor
sector will not be represented
considering that those who will vote
are all the voters of the Philippines. In
other words, the representative of
labor will be chosen by all the electors
of the Philippines, and that is not
correct. My contention is that the
sectoral representative must be
selected by his own constituents, and
for that reason, I am objecting to this
amendment. 10
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the
ground that if allowed to participate in the party-list
system, the major political parties could gobble up the
sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO
. . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list,
papasukin ng political parties.
Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan
hanggang mawala ang sektor. 11
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo
ang UNIDO na isang political party, it
will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din iyong sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors.
Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties. 12
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system
because it would not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained
a semblance of self-government at the start of
this century, our legislators were elected based
on their promise that they would represent the
little people of our land. With the exception of a
few patriotic legislators, some of whom are in
our Commission today, members of the National
Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of
the past did not devote themselves enough to
the alleviation of the dismal condition of our
country's poor and lower classes.
xxx xxx xxx
These realities convince us that there
are no spokesmen and legislators who can best
represent the poor, the underprivileged, the
marginalized than those coming from within
their ranks. 13
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors
would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD.
My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH
A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED
NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable
Commissioner object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, because it does not guarantee that the
seats reserved for the party list
representatives will be reserved for the
sectors. 14
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25,
1986, on §5 was suspended to allow the commissioners to come to
an agreement. After one week, a compromise formula was reached
by the two groups and presented to the plenary session of the
Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall be
elected from the sectors and the party list," it was proposed that the
following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE
PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS
AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION TWENTY-FIVE OF THE
SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW
FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
 However, although an agreement had apparently been
reached, the advocates of sectoral representation were not satisfied
that it would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives.
Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment
of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF
REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS
PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. TWENTY-FIVE OF
THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE
LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was
defeated with nineteen (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22)
voting against. 15
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment
of Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was
approved by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners against
none. 16 As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH,
AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS
SECTOR.
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
show that the party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor,
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation
intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary
number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to
give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on
Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and
Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list
system, both proponents worked within the framework that the
party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in
each of the districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically
different, and they do not have the same basis. What the advocates
of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats
for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth
sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half
of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three
terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth place(rs)" in district
elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to
those who may not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be
sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House.
They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged"
sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no
need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the
party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private
respondents are the same ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta,
Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod proposal which
became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors,
like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list
system; that the big parties might gobble up the sectoral parties;
that the party-list system will not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the "underprivileged sectors." These objections,
however, did not carry the day, as the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod
proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the
Monsod proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections
now would be to overrule the Constitutional Commission and in
effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional
Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district
system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this
problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list
system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved
for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without
changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact
mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it
provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject
to the provisions of this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields
support for the view that the party-list system is designed
exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner Ople
said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the
stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For
example, we have the PDP-Laban and the
UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be
able to make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very leadership of
these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is
true of the administration parties, this will be
true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is
now being formed. There is no question that
they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to
contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be
radically transformed because this amendment
will create conditions that will challenge both
the mass organizations and the political parties
to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will
enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of
representatives of mass organizations affiliated
with them. So that we may, in time, develop this
excellent system that they have in Europe
where labor organizations and cooperatives, for
example, distribute themselves either in the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very
 presence there has a transforming effect upon
the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties. 18
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered
under the party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful
means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any
foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with
laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in
its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one
(1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two
(2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or
organizations, such as private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this provision are for the
COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They are unfit
for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in
which the constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when
the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as
the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed
light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose
of the provision being construed.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
relative to the party-list system, is couched in
clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall
be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted RA 7941 . . . . Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole . . ."
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the
meaning of §2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. — The
State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the
party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives and,
that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be
guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say
that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of
Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to
promote proportional representation through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation
of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose
of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in
the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These
groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in
§5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can
possibly include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party
system" if the election for the party list system is to be limited to the
sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law,i.e., labor, peasants,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals? After all, what is provided for is "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations"
each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is
also clear from §5 of the law:
SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized
group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list
of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if
the party-list system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases
should be dismissed.
||| (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
147589 & 147613, [June 26, 2001], 412 PHIL 308-374)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 48641. November 24, 1941.]
PEDRO GALLEGO, petitioner, vs. VICENTE
VERRA, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTIONS; CANDIDATE FOR MUNICIPAL MAYOR;
RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION; RESIDENCE DEFINED. — The term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE HOW ACQUIRED. — In order
to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must be an animus non revertendi and
an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The
acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change
of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place
chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of
residence there must be added the animus manendi.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT OF THE LAW IN FIXING
RESIDENCE. — The manifest intent of the law in fixing a
residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community; and when the evidence on the alleged
lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it
clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the
law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office,
the will of the electorate should be respected.
DECISION
OZAETA, J p:
This case is before us on petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, which declared illegal and void
the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of
Abuyog, Leyte, in the general elections of December, 1940, on
the ground that he did not have the residence qualification, and
ordered that he be ousted from said office. Respondent Vicente
Verra (petitioner below) was the unsuccessful opponent of the
petitioner Pedro Gallego, who was declared elected by the
municipal board of canvassers with a majority of nearly 800
votes.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals may be briefly stated as follows:.
Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After
studying in the Catarman Agricultural School in the province of
Samar, he was employed as a school teacher in the municipality
of Catarman, Samar, as well as in the municipalities of Burawen,
Dulag, and Abuyog, province of Leyte, and also in the province
of Agusan. In 1937 he resigned as a school teacher of Abuyog,
Leyte, and presented his candidacy for municipal mayor of his
home town, but was defeated. After his defeat in that election,
finding himself in debt and unemployed, he went to Mindanao
in search of a job. He first went to Oriental Misamis, but finding
no work there he proceeded to the sitio of Kaato-an,
municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, whereat he arrived on
June 20, 1938, and immediately found employment as
nurseryman in the chinchona plantation of the Bureau of
Forestry. On July 30 of the same year he returned to Abuyog
because he had been offered an employment as teacher in the
public school of the barrio of Union, municipality of Sogod,
Leyte; but as he did not accept the offer he returned to Kaato-
an on August 23, 1938, and resumed his employment there as
nurseryman of the Bureau of Forestry. He stayed in the
chinchona plantation until he resigned in September, 1940. But
during the period of his stay there, his wife and children
remained in Abuyog, and he visited them in the month of
August of the years 1938, 1939, and 1940. Altho the
Government offered him a free house in the chinchona
plantation, he never took his family there. Neither did he avail
himself of the offer of the Government of a parcel of ten
hectares of land within the reservation of the chinchona
plantation. He and his wife own real property in Abuyog, part of
which he acquired during his stay in Malaybalay.
Nevertheless, on October 1, 1938 he registered himself
as an elector in precinct No. 14 of Lantapan, municipality of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in the election for
assemblymen held in December, 1938. The trial court noted
that in his voter's affidavit (exhibit B) he did not fill the blank
space corresponding to the length of time he had resided in
Malaybalay. On January 20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his
residence certificate from the municipal treasurer of
Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had
resided in said municipality for one year and a half.
Based upon the facts stated in the next preceding
paragraph, namely, (1) his registration as a voter, (2) his having
actually voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for
assemblymen, and (3) his residence certificate for 1940, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals declared that the herein
petitioner Pedro Gallego had acquired a residence or domicile
of choice in the municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and had
lost his domicile of origin in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte,
at the time he was elected mayor of the latter municipality, and
that, therefore, his election was void, following the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Tanseco vs. Arteche, 57 Phil., 227, and
Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.
In this Court the petitioner assigns the following errors:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the petitioner Pedro Gallego was a
legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not
of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time of his election as
municipal mayor of the latter municipality on
December 10, 1940.
"2. The Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court holding
the election of Pedro Gallego to the office of
municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, null and void
and ordering the exclusion of Gallego from the
office to which he was elected.
"The only question presented is
whether or not Pedro Gallego had been a
resident of Abuyog for at least one year prior to
December 10, 1940. That question may be
 approached from either of two angles: Did he
lose his domicile in Abuyog by the mere fact
that he worked in Malaybalay as a government
employee, registered himself as a voter and
voted there in the election for assemblymen in
December, 1938, and secured his residence
certificate there for the year 1940; and
assuming that he did, had he reacquired his
domicile of origin at least one year prior to his
election as mayor of Abuyog on December 10,
1940?.
The term "residence" as used in the election law is
synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Nuval
vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645). In order to acquire a domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must conform
with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary;
the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be
actual; and to the fact of residence there must be added
the animus manendi. (17 Am. Jur., section 16, pages 599601.)
In the light of these principles, we are persuaded that
the facts of this case weigh heavily against the theory that the
petitioner had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog. We
believe he did not reside in Malaybalay with the intention of
remaining there indefinitely and of not returning to Abuyog. He
is a native of Abuyog. Notwithstanding his periodic absences
from there previous to 1937, when he was employed as teacher
in Samar, Agusan, and other municipalities of Leyte, he always
returned there. In the year 1937 he resigned as a school teacher
and presented his candidacy for the office of mayor of said
municipality. His departure therefrom after his defeat in that
election was temporary and only for the purpose of looking for
employment to make up for the financial drawback he had
suffered as a result of his defeat at the polls. After he had found
employment in Malaybalay, he did not take his wife and
children thereto notwithstanding the offer of a free house by
the Government. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did
not avail himself of the offer of the Government of ten hectares
of land within the chinchona reservation in Malaybalay, where
he worked as a nurseryman. During the short period of about
two years he stayed in Malaybalay as a government employee,
he visited his home town and his family no less than three times
notwithstanding the great distance between the two places.
The facts of this case are more analogous to those of
Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36), Yra vs. Abaño (52 Phil., 380), and
Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 694) than to those of Nuval vs.
Guray (52 Phil., 645) and Tanseco vs. Arteche (57 Phil., 227)
which were followed herein by the Court of Appeals. In the
Teves case this Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial
court, among other things said:
"In this case the respondent-appellant,
Pedro Teves, from the year 1904 has had his
own house in the municipality of Dumaguete,
Oriental Negros, wherein he has constantly
been living with his family and he has never had
any house in which he lived either alone or with
his family in the municipality of Bacong of said
province. All that he has done in the latter
municipality was to register as elector in 1919,
through an affidavit stating that he was a
resident of said municipality; run for
representative for the second district of the
province of Oriental Negros and vote in said
municipality in said year; run again for
reelection in the year I922; launch his candidacy
for member of the provincial board of said
province in 1925, stating under oath in all his
certificates of candidacy that he was a resident
of said municipality of Bacong.
"The affidavit made by him upon
registering as elector in the municipality of
Bacong in the year 1919, stating that he was a
resident of said municipality; his two certificates
of candidacy for the office of representative for
the second district of the Province of Oriental
Negros, which were filed, the former in the year
1919 and the latter in the year 1922, and the
certificate of candidacy for the office of member
of the provincial board filed by him in the year
1925, in every one of which he stated that he
was a resident of the municipality of Bacong, are
at most a prima facie evidence of the fact of his
residence in the municipality of Bacong, which is
required by law in order that the corresponding
officials could register him as an elector and
candidate, and not conclusive, and may be
attacked in a corresponding judicial proceeding.
If, according to the ruling laid down in the case
of Vivero vs. Murillo, cited above, mere
registration in a municipality in order to be an
elector therein does not make one a resident of
said municipality; if, according to constant
rulings the word 'residence' is synonymous with
'home' or 'domicile,' and denotes a permanent
dwelling place, to which an absent person
intends to return; if the right to vote in a
municipality requires the concurrence of two
things, the act of residing coupled with the
intention to do so; and if the herein respondent-
appellant, Pedro Teves, has always lived with his
family in the municipality of Dumaguete and
never in that of Bacong, he has never lost his
residence in Dumaguete. The fact that his
registration as elector in the municipality of
Bacong was cancelled only on April 6, 1934,
upon his petition, did not disqualify him to be a
candidate for the office of municipal president
of said municipality of Dumaguete on the
ground that, as has been stated in the case of
Yra vs. Abano, cited above, registration in the
list of voters is not one of the conditions
prescribed by section 431 of the Election Law in
order to be an elector; neither does failure to
register as such constitute one of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of
said law." (61 Phil., 36, 39-41.)
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the facts of
the present case, we find sufficient ground for the revocation of
the judgment appealed from. Petitioner also contends that
even assuming that he had lost his residence or domicile in
Abuyog, he reacquired it more than one year prior to December
 10, 1940. In support of that contention he invokes his letter or
note, exhibit 9, addressed to "Varel" (Valeriano Tupa), vice-
president of the political faction to which petitioner belongs, in
which note he announced his intention to launch his candidacy
again for municipal mayor of Abuyog as early as the month of
May, 1939. But we do not deem it necessary to pass upon said
contention in view of the conclusion we have reached that the
petitioner did not lose his domicile of origin.
We might add that the manifest intent of the law in
fixing a residence qualification is ,to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community; and when the evidence on the
alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive
and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of
the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the
office, the will of the electorate should be respected. Petitioner
is a native of Abuyog, had run for the same office of municipal
mayor of said town in the election preceding the one in
question, had only been absent therefrom for about two years
without losing contact with his townspeople and without the
intention of remaining and residing indefinitely in the place of
his employment; and he was elected with an overwhelming
majority of nearly 800 votes in a third-class municipality. These
considerations we cannot disregard without doing violence to
the will of the people of said town.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, with the costs of this instance against the respondent.
So ordered.
Diaz, Moran and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.
||| (Gallego v. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, [November 24, 1941], 73 PHIL
453-459)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991.]
MOHAMMAD ALI
DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V.
MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives,
and (HON. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.)
HON. CAMILO L. SABIO, Secretary, House of
representatives, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881; FILING OF
CANDIDACY OF ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS CONSTITUTES
RESIGNATION. — In B.P. Blg. 881 members of the legislature
included in the enumeration of elective public officials are to be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of
their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for
President and Vice-President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE BEHIND. — This statutory provision seeks
to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office and
thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all
public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their
constituents.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; TERMS OF OFFICE
DIFFERENTIATED FROM TENURE. — The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the
duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76
Phil 12).
4. ID.; ID.; TENURE; CUT SHORT BY FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY. — Under the questioned provision, when an elective
official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his
term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve
its unexpired portion.
5. ID.; ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; GROUNDS FOR
SHORTENING TENURE, NOT EXCLUSIVE. — That the ground cited in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office
of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to
present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure
of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in
the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in
the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a
vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it
preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so
enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions
the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant
not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the
events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman
cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the
grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our
fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS;
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE
ENACTMENT. — The basic principle which underlies the entire field
of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by
enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to
be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A
doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; MAXIM EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS; SERVE ONLY AS AN AID IN DISCOVERING
LEGISLATIVE INTENT WHERE SUCH INTENT IS NOT MANIFEST. — The
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with
the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only
those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly
imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as
inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of
interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim
expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in
discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise
manifest.
8. POLITICAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 180; AUTOMATIC FORFEITURE
OF PUBLIC OFFICE UPON THE FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY. — In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving
Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically
pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a
new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; CONGRESS;
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AN
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER WITH MINISTERIAL FUNCTION; DUTY TO
REMOVE NAME FROM THE ROLL UPON NOTICE OF FILING OF
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; CASE AT BAR. — The Speaker is the
administrative head of the House of Representatives and he
exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office.
As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-
General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove
petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor
of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on
Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor
of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot
refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of
the statute imposing the duty.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON BEHIND. — The reason for this
is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for
the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987
and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on
Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
election was scheduled for 17 February 1990. cdrep
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on
Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. 1 As reported by the
Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990: 2
"The Order of Business today carries a
communication from the Commission on
Elections which states that the Honorable
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District
of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy
for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao
on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat,
performing an administrative act, did not
include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo
in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which
states: 'Any elective official whether national or
local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso factoresigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and
Phrases as by the very act itself — by the mere
act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic)
filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable
Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of
the House of Representatives; and, therefore,
his name has not been carried in today's Roll
and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the
House. . . ."
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a
letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." 3 The record does not
indicate what action was taken on this communication, but it is
apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in
Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently
filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name
from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the
House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his
office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites
were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred
and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his
rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman
from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however,
maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution, Being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress. cdphil
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of
office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the
grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article
XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,1992;" while Section 7,
Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election." On the other hand, the grounds by which
such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
"a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat
by holding any other office or employment in
the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary
action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by
resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of
office."
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in
the Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to
include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as
among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be
shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it
in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the
Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously
found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted
the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents
in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present
Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents
acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-
called "administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in
terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as
an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary
renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his
seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of
candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or
employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected
member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored
on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition: 4
"A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG.
881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE
RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE
ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE
ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND
DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
AS SUCH?"
On the other hand, respondent through the Office of the Solicitor
General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
'voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7,
Article VI of theConstitution. That the ground provided in Section 67
is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the
grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition,
other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a
crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public
office. LLpr
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of
Candidacy is an act of resignation which stops him from claiming
otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They
further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere
ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial
powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
"Any elective official whether national or local
running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2
of C.A. No. 666, 5 which reads:
"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city
official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy."
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in
this wise: 6
"Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any
elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from office from the moment of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy."
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective
officials as follows: 7
"Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. —
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city,
municipal or municipal district officer running
for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office
on the day his term of office commences, or
within ten days after his proclamation if said
proclamation takes place after such day. His
failure to take his oath of office as herein
provided shall be considered forfeiture of his
right to the new office to which he has been
elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes
beyond his control."
The 1978 Election Code 8 provided a different rule, thus:
"Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. —
Governors, mayors, members of various
sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon
filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered
on forced leave of absence from office."
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the
legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials
who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of
the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except
for President and Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2
(now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the
rationale of this inclusion, thus: 9
"MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your
Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the
provision seems to be different — I
think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-
provincial, city, municipal or municipal
district officer running for an office
other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. LLjur
May I know, Your Honor, what
is the reason of the Committee in
departing or changing these provisions
of Section 24 of the old Election
Code and just adopting it en toto? Why
do we have to change it? What could
 possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the
rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I
don't mind repeating it. The purpose is
that the people must be given the right
to choose any official who belongs to,
let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to
run for another office. However,
because of the practice in the past
where members of the legislature ran
for local offices, but did not assume the
office, because of that spectacle the
impression is that these officials were
just trifling with the mandate of the
people. They have already obtained a
mandate to be a member of the
legislature, and they want to run for
mayor or for governor and yet when
the people give them that mandate,
they do not comply with that latter
mandate, but still preferred (sic) to
remain in the earlier mandate. So we
believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's
latest mandate must be the one that
will be given due course. . . ."
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of
Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet
Bill No. 2, said: 10
"MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the
Committee, we made this proposal
based on constitutional grounds. We
did not propose this amendment
mainly on the rationale as stated by the
Gentlemen from Manila that the
officials running for office other than
the ones they are holding will be
considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of
office facilities but primarily because
under our Constitution, we have this
new chapter on accountability of public
officers. Now, this was not in the1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article
XIII, Section 1 — 'Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people.'
Now, what is this significance
of this new provision on accountability
of public officers? This only means that
all elective public officials should honor
the mandate they have gotten from the
people. Thus, under our Constitution, it
says that: 'Members of the Batasan
shall serve for the term of 6 years, in
the case of local officials and 6 years in
the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr.
Speaker, we have precisely included
this as part of the Omnibus Election
Code because a Batasan Member who
hold (sic) himself out with the people
and seek (sic) their support and
mandate should not be allowed to
deviate or allow himself to run for any
other position unless he relinquishes or
abandons his office. Because his
mandate to the people is to serve for 6
years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a
governor or a mayor who was
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for
an office other than the one he was
elected to, then, that clearly shows that
he has not (sic) intention to service the
mandate of the people which was
placed upon him and therefore he
should be considered ipso facto
resigned. I think more than anything
that is the accountability that
the Constitution requires of elective
public officials. It is not because of the
use or abuse of powers or facilities of
his office, but it is because of
the Constitution itself which I said
under the 1973 Constitutioncalled and
inserted this new chapter on
accountability.
Now, argument was said that
the mere filing is not the intention to
run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan
Member files the certificate of
candidacy, that means that he does not
want to serve, otherwise, why should
he file for an office other than the one
he was elected to? The mere fact
therefore of filing a certificate should
be considered the overt act of
abandoning or relinquishing his
mandate to the people and that he
should therefore resign if he wants to
seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service. LexLib
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I
disagree with the statements of the
Gentleman from Manila because the
basis of this Section 62 is the
constitutional provision not only of the
fact that Members of the Batasan and
local officials should serve the entire 6-
year term for which we were elected,
but because of this new chapter on the
accountability of public officers not
only to the community which voted
him to office, but primarily because
under this commentary on
accountability of public officers, the
elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own
personal ambition. And that is the
reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to
 propose Section 62 where candidates
or elective public officers holding
offices other than the one to which
they were elected, should be
considered ipso facto resigned from
their office upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987
Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of
Public Officers" is more emphatic 11 in stating:
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned
statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He
failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging
them from running for another public office and thereby cutting
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must
serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the
mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the
term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse
"term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the
Solicitor General: 12
"The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure), may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of
said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of
office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. The maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius is not to be
12)." applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute
and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be
thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is considered as inhibiting the power of "legislature. 19 The maxim is
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional
term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its command. 20 This maxim expresses a rule of construction and
unexpired portion. serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such
intent is not otherwise manifest. 21
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under
tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include
application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As
provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners: 22
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on "MR. MAAMBONG:
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
theConstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high Could I address the
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and clarificatory question to the
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not Committee? The term 'voluntary
by impeachment. 13 Such constitutional expression clearly renunciation' does not only appear in
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
MR. DAVIDE:
shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex
rel. Berge vs. Lansing, 14 the expression in the constitution of the Yes.
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
MR. MAAMBONG:
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds. 15 Events so It is also a recurring phrase all
enumerated in theconstitution or statutes are merely conditions the over the constitution. Could the
occurrence of any one of which the office shall become Committee please enlighten us exactly
vacant 16 not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one what 'voluntary renunciation' means?
of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a Is this akin to abandonment?
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one
of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our MR. DAVIDE:
fundamental law never intended such absurdity. LLphil Abandonment is voluntary. In
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts other words, he cannot circumvent the
pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of restriction by merely resigning at any
legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be given time on the second term.
created. 17 This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of MR. MAAMBONG:
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of Is the Committee saying that
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A the term voluntary renunciation is
doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. 18 more general than abandonment and
resignation?
 MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more
embracing."
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of 8.P. Blg. 881,
of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an
overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office
presently being held is evident from this exchange between the
Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Roño: 23
"MR. ROÑO:
My reasonable ground is this:
if you will make the person . . . my,
shall we say, basis is that in one case
the person is intending to run for an
office which is different from his own,
and therefore it should be considered,
at least from the legal significance, an
intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes.
MR. ROÑO:
And in the other, because he is
running for the same position, it is
otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is
why are you going to compel a person
to quit an office which he is only
intending to leave? A relinquishment of
office must be clear, must be definite.
MR. ROÑO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr.
Speaker, what I am saying that while I
do not disagree with the conclusion
that the intention cannot be
enough, but I am saying that the filing
of the certificate of candidacy is an
overt act of such intention. It's not just
an intention: it's already there."
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, 24 a case involving Section 27
of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced
that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the
moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had
occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs.
Gatuslao:25
". . . 'The wording of the law plainly indicates
that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law
does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly
made as of the moment of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. . . .'" llcd
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another
office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the
elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as
petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The
ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of
the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office
having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself,
no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the
administrative head of the House of Representatives and he
exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his
office. 26 As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to
remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal
tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission
on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor
of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot
refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of
the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. 27 Officers of the government from the highest to
the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. 28
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a
public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people.
As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office. 29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part — related to one of the parties.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an
invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent
them in Congress. cdasia
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo
to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically
palatable, and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in
cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in
preventing the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution.
We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in
political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial
and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental principle in Constitutional Law that Congress
cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for
disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can
Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining
constitutional officers other than those provided in the Constitution.
This is as true for the President and the members of this Court as it
is for members of Congress itself The causes and procedures for
removal found in the Constitution are not mere disciplinary
measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the
unhampered and independent discharge of their functions. It is for
this reason that the court should insure that what
theConstitution provides must be followed.
The Constitution provides how the tenure of members of Congress
may be shortened:
"A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other
office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution
of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest
(Art. VI, Sec. 17); LexLib
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI. Sec.
7, par. 2)." (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an
enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long
before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX,
Section 67 provides:
"Any elective official whether national or local
running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy." (Petition, p.
8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for
removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are
exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being
permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the
sinking of a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress
expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in
the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is
voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime
carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against
running for public office. Whether or not the conviction for such a
crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel
him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We
must await the proper case and controversy. My point is —
Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes
for disqualification or removal of its members. Only
theConstitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No.
180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code — does
not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case
of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials
being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of
candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only
the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of
provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has no such power when it
comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature
during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law
period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a
certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from
one's current position. It was also a recognition that such a provision
could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in
the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary
renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker
and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of
"voluntary renunciation as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985
when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was
not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason
why the passage of a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should
suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing
and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a
state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements
should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be
deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty
years of our constitutional history, running for a local government
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman
Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been
engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in
Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can
state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he
decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not
deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary
renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by
the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court
should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should
be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
"We should not lose sight of the fact that what
we are dealing with here is not the mere right of
the petitioner to sit in the House of
Representatives, but more important, we are
dealing with the political right of the people of
the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
to representation in Congress, as against their
disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be
strictly in favor of representation and strictly
against disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the
same should only be by due process of law, both
substantive and procedural, and not by mere
 arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires,
'administrative act' of the respondents." (Reply
to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI
of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the
grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo
ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of
his people. He wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous,
more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim
according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court)
that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional
officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see how
the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be
applied to this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition. LexLib
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
||| (Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, [October 15, 1991], 279
PHIL 843-866)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 15905. August 3, 1966.]
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. BARTOLOME
CABANGBANG, defendant-appellee.
Liwag & Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs-
appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for
defendant-appellee.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J p:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of
several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication
of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having been granted by
the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from
the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in
question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether
it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of
said publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:.
"The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place." (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on
whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to
say in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. 1
The publication involved in this case does not belong
to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an
open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November
14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or
about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His
Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are
concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication
began with the following paragraphs:.
"In the light of recent developments
which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the unfair attacks against the duly elected
Members of Congress of engaging in intriguing
and rumormongering, allow me. Your
Excellency, to address this open letter to focus
public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, feel it
my solemn duty to our people to expose.
"It has come to my attention that there
have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists."
Then it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational
plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said
to be "an insidious plan for a massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing
and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the
"planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds of the Department of National
Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter
says — are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign", It further adds:
"It is reported that the 'Planners' have
under their control the following: (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban
of NBI. (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2
AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS, (5) Lt. Col. Jose
Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
Information Office, DND. To insure this control,
the 'Planners' purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job
Mayo, Chief of MIS. to Europe to study and
while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by
Col. Fidel Llamas. They also seat Lt. Col.
Deogracias Caballero, chief of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col.
Jose Regala. The 'Planners' wanted to relieve Lt.
Col. Ramon Gelvezon. Chief of CIS (PC) but
failed. Hence, Gelvezon, is considered a missing
 link in the intelligence Network. It is, of course,
possible that the officers mentioned above are
unwittingly tools of the Plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge." (Emphasis
ours.).
Among the means said to be used to carry out the
plan, the letter lists, under the heading "other operational
technique", the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the
Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and
"Apologetics" on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds
of letters — "type in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of
magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the
"hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and
criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the
Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several
branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a
way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the
people of the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'état", in connection
with which the "planners" had gone no further than the
planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan
No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a
loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano
delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of
Congress, and in an effort to rally the officers and men of the
AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended: (1) that
Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces
be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of
National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man;
(4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that
Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the
chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces, alleged plan to stage a coup d'état or that they were knowingly
including chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in
agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas were not among the "planners" of said coup d'état, for,
and Gen. Arellano"; and that, "most probably, they belong to otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on
the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now their part, of said "planners".
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular
Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby
by battalion strength to the various stand-by or training affirmed. It is so ordered.
divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and
J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P.
Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
undertaking an investigation of the planned "coup d'état".
||| (Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. 15905, [August 3, 1966], 124
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not
PHIL 296-302)
sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons
unnamed therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having
been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano,
plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of
course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other
words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be
merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that
this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs to the point of
entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law,
under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest
that the group therein described as "planners" include these
two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter
in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is
false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule,
and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with
the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the same, it
being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-17144. October 28, 1960.]
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA
K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L.
PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G.
TEVES, JOSE J. ROY, FAUSTO DUGENIO,
ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT,
PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S.
ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B.
FERNANDEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No.
59, respondents.
A. Padilla, F. A. Rodrigo and T. T. Quiazon, Jr., for
petitioner.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. B. Fernandez, E. S. Baltao and Tecla
San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS;
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS, NOT ABSOLUTE. —
While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall, however, it does
not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For
unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be
censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by
the votes of their colleagues.
2. ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; FAILURE TO
CONFORM TO RULES, EFFECT OF. — Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a
deliberate body when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE
the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR OF MEMBERS; SEPARATION OF
POWERS. — The House of Representatives is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not resume a
jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by
the judicial department with the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF
EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR. — The
House of Representatives of the United States has taken the
position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive
constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in
several instances, it took action against offenders, even after
other business had been considered.
5. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS
MEMBERS. — While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no
power to suspend appointive member (Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair.
DECISION
BENGZON, J p:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of
his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said
members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to
do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish
him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59,
"WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June,
1960, the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives from
the Second District of the province of Cebu, took
the floor of this Chamber on the one hour
privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;'
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech,
the Congressman from the Second District of
Cebu stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"The people, Mr. President, have been
hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they
used to get from the government are now for
sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the
gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the
culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail
as long as he can come across with a handsome
dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that
your administration is dispensing. . . ."
WHEREAS, the charges of the
gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if
made maliciously or recklessly and without basic
in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the
Office of the President, which is the one visible
symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people,
and would expose said office to contempt and
disrepute; . . .
 Resolved by the House of
Representatives, that a special committee of
fifteen Members to be appointed by the
Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to
investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privileges speech of
June 23, 1960, and for such purpose it is
authorized to summon Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., to appear before it to substantiate
his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to
require him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee
shall submit to the House a report of its findings
and recommendations before the adjournment
of the present special session of the Congress of
the Philippines."
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged:
first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third,
after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House
provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority
decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware
of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in
view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its
report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behavior; and acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day — before closing its session — House Resolution
No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him
from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the
exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga,
Fernandez and Baltao) 1 filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the
fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
Committee — whose members are the sole respondents — had
thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a
privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in
Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to produce before the House
Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the
imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,
he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a
period of fifteen months, for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
"WHEREAS, the Special Committee
created under and by virtue of Resolution No.
59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour for making without
basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the
President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile
in character that they affronted and degraded
the dignity of the House of Representatives:
Now, Therefore, be it.
RESOLVED by the House of
Representatives, That Representative Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty
of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . ."
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition
that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to
be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly
behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he
could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost the
power to do so because it had taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional
position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for
any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1
of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner
himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power
to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which
is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
"is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of
every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense." 2 Such immunity has come to this country
from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no
longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States
Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured
for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A
monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous
acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-
799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing
insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In
one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a
statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary
privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents
123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, 3 suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
The appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of
informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power
of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It
mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign
country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in
April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may
no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my
speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up
other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was
unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted
to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may
suspend the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past
acts or renew its right to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending
the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to
actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired
vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views.
At any rate, courts have declared that "the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has been said
that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure." 6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The rule here invoked is one of
parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly
held that it is within the power of all
deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive
their own rules of procedure, adopted for the
orderly conduct of business, and as security
against hasty action." (Bennet vs. New Bedford,
110 Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass.
408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App.
595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of
Albany, 23 Wend. [N.Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs.
City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. E. 977,
124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of
Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W.
632; Tuell vs. Meacham contracting Co. 145 Ky.
181, 186, 140 S. W. 159, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.)
[Taken from the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 South Western Reporter, p. 534.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of
Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which
Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the
resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened
after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the
Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña
may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been
advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if
this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have
assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
"SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with
Legislature. — The principle is well established
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference
by the judicial department with the legislature
since each department is equally independent
within the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution. . . ."
"The general rule has been applied in
other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the state Senate is given
the power to expel a member, the courts will
not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const.
Law, sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]
The above statement of American law merely abridged the
landmark case of Clifford vs. French. 7 In 1905, several senators who
had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken
a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement,
alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The
Supreme Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in
orthodox juristic language:
"Under our form of government, the
judicial department has no power to revise even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It had been held by high
authority that, even in the absence of an
express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied
 power to expel a member for any cause which it
may deem sufficient. In Hiss vs. Barlett. 3 Gray
473. 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of
Mass. says, in substance, that this power is
inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the
state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and
that the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision
authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise,
or forbid the exercise by either house of the
power to expel a member. These powers are
functions of the legislative department and
therefore, in the exercise of the power thus
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the
legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to
exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do."
We have underscored in the above quotation these lines
which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this
litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be
applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case
at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no
jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as
subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of
action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely
refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it
is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we
feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing
principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position on at least
two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief
Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
order. 8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered. 9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power
to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator
Alejandrino was, by resolution of the Senate, suspended from office
for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that
Body for certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a
debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held
that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to
compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on
to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones
Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the
Senate no power to remove on appointive member, like Senator
Alejandrino. The Jones Lawspecifically provided that "each house
may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18).
Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the
Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and
without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his
opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter
dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means by
which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to
refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the
affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with
the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the views of
the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General,
who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the
Legislature had only those powers which were granted to it by
the Jones Law; 10 whereas now the Congress has the full legislative
powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted
by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the
Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the
Senate the power it then exercised — the power of suspension for
one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent
legislative prerogative of suspension 11 which the Constitution did
not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
"The Legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations as are found in the
Republic's Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of
the district's representation can not be more weighty in the matter
of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one
of their members to jail. 12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The
petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting in
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task,
reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension
order. The House has closed its session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be
dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of course, there
is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include
all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and
thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of
such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino 14 and Alejandrino vs. Quezon.
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the
important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to
express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed
relevant and decisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby
dismissed. So ordered.
Parás, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
 I concur with the majority that the petition filed by
Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either for
declaratory judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no
original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings, and
certiorari is available only against bodies exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely
fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled
to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of
prohibition against the committee, in so far as House Resolution No.
59 (and its sequel, Resolution No. 175) constituted an unlawful
attempt to divest him of an immunity from censure or punishment,
an immunity vested under the very Rules of the House of
Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V,
provides as follows:
"If it is requested that a Member be
called to order for words spoken in debate, the
Member making such request shall indicate the
words excepted to, and they shall be taken
down in writing by the Secretary and read aloud
to the House; but the Member who uttered
them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject
to the censure of the House therefor, if further
debate or other business has intervened."
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña
had delivered his speech and before the House adopted, fifteen
days later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent
Committee and empowering it to investigate and recommend
proper action in the case, the House had acted on other matters and
debated them. That being the case, the Congressman, even before
the resolution was adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the
words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the express wording
of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or disciplinary
action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it attempts
to divest him of the immunity so acquired and subject him to
discipline and punishment, when he was previously not so subject,
violates the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation,
and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 are legally obnoxious and invalid
on that score. The rule is well established that a law which deprives
an accused person of any substantial right or immunity possessed by
him before its passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur.
Vol. 16-A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. McDonnell, 11 Fed. Supp.
1015; People vs. Talkington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs. Garfinkel, 69 F.
Supp., 849).
The foregoing also answers the contention that since the
immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the
House could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules, and
Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment by
implication. The right of the House to amend its Rules does not carry
with it the right to retroactively divest the petitioner of an immunity
he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached
when the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the
House only affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But
whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred
was extinguished when the House thereafter considered other
business; and this extinction is a substantive right that can not be
subsequently torn away to his disadvantage. On an analogous issue,
this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44 Phil., 437, has ruled:
"In regard to the point that the subject
of prescription of penalties and of penal actions
pertains to remedial and not substantive law, it
is to be observed that in the Spanish legal
system, provisions for limitation or prescription
of actions are invariably classified as substantive
and not as remedial law; we thus find the
provisions for the prescription of criminal
actions in the Penal Code and not in the 'Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in reality a more
logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not,
strictly speaking, a matter of procedure; it bars
or cuts off the right to punish the crime and
consequently, goes directly to the substance of
the action. . . (Italics supplied.)
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the
objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and not
statutes. In so far as the position of petitioner Osmeña is concerned,
the essential point is that he is being subjected to a punishment to
which he was formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted
out a suspension of privileges, that suspension is as much a penalty
as imprisonment or a fine, which the House could have inflicted
upon him had it been so minded. Such punitive action is violative of
the spirit, if not of the letter, of the constitutional provision
against ex post facto legislation. Nor is it material that the
punishment was inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power.
"The ex post facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has
ruled, "can not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is
essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U.S.] 1104, 1106;
Cummings vs. Missouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House
rules is to protect the freedom of action of its members and to
relieve them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second
thought, as a result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or
pressures. It is unrealistic to overlook that, without the immunity so
provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the hunting
fear that his most innocuous expressions may at any time
afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever a
majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting sands of
political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure that
members of the House may freely act as their conscience and sense
of duty should dictate complements the parliamentary immunity
from outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly
deserving of liberal interpretation and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as
instances of disciplinary action taken notwithstanding intervening
business, are not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by
Deschler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of
Congressman Watson of Georgia involved also printed disparaging
remarks by the respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so that
the debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of Congressmen
Weaver and Sparks was one of censure for actual disorderly conduct
(II Hinds, sec. 1657); while the cases of Congressmen Stanbery of
Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II
Hinds, secs. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of
the U. S. House of Representatives as it stood before the 1880
amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the Rousseau
case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the following effect (II
Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):
"This sixty-second rule is divided in the
middle by a semicolon, and the Chair asks the
attention of the gentlemen from Iowa (Mr.
 Wilson) to the language of that rule, as it settles
the whole question:
"62. If a Member be called to order for
words spoken in debate, the person calling him
to older shall repeat the words excepted to" —
That is, the "calling to order" is
"excepting" to words spoken in debate "and
they shall be taken down in writing at the Clerk's
table; and no Member shall be held to answer,
or be subject to the censure of the House, for
words spoken in debate, if any other Member
has spoken, or other business has intervened,
after the words spoken, and before exception to
them shall have been taken."
The first part of this rule declares that
"calling to order" is "excepting to words spoken
in debate." The second part of the rule declares
that a Member shall not be held subject to
censure for words spoken in debate if other
business has intervened after the words have
been spoken and before "exception" to them
has been taken. Exception to the words of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Grinnell) was taken
by the gentlemen from Illinois (Mr. Harding), the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rousseau), and
also by the Speaker of the House, as the records
of the Congressional Globe will show. The
distinction is obvious between the two parts of
the rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member
excepting to language of another and having the
words taken down. In the last part of the rule it
says he shall not be censured thereafter unless
exception to his words were taken; but it omits
to add as an essential condition that the words
must also have been taken down. The
substantial point, indeed the only point,
required in the latter part of the rule is, that
exception to the objectionable words must have
been taken."
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases
and the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily apparent. As
Rule 62 of the United States House of Representatives stood before
1880, all that was required to preserve the disciplinary power of the
House was that exception should have been taken to the remarks on
the floor before further debate or other business intervened. Under
the rules of the Philippine House of Representatives, however, the
immunity becomes absolute if other debate or business has taken
place before the motion for censure is made, whether or not
exceptions or point of order have been made to the remarks
complained of at the time they were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity
established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar
the members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself for
remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I
have noted, include the right to retroactively amend the rules so as
to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts
can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post
facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress should
be deprived of the same protection. Surely membership in the
Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the
individual citizen.
"The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraint or violate fundamental rights and there
should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better, more
accurate or even more just." (U. S. vs. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-325.)
"Courts will not Interfere with the
action of the state senate in reconsidering its
vote on a resolution submitting an amendment
to the Constitution, where its action was in
compliance with its own rules, and there was no
constitutional provision to the contrary."
(Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963)
(Italics supplied.)
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or
compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not
deter it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and
nullity of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has been
taken up in pursuance thereof. Although the respondent committee
has been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain
so important as to require adjudication by this Court.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent of Mr. Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which
purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even the Congress
in the exercise of the power conferred upon it to discipline its
members, must follow the rules and regulations that it had itself
promulgated for its guidance and for that of its members. The rules
in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech
declared by the House to constitute a disorderly conduct provides:
". . . but the Member who uttered
them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject
to the censure of the House therefor, if further
debate or other business has intervened." (Rule
XVII, Sec. 7, Rules, House of Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on
June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23, 1960
when the House created the committee that would investigate him.
For fully 15 days the House took up other matters. All that was
done, while the speech was being delivered, was to have certain
portions thereof deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own Rules the
House may no longer punish Congressman Osmeña for the speech
delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish
Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except to have
some parts of the speech deleted, shows that the members of the
House did not then consider Osmeña's speech a disorderly conduct.
The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña, which came 15 days after,
was, therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that
Congressman Osmeña is being made to answer for an act, after the
time during which he could be punished therefor had lapsed.
 The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its
rules any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that
the House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental
principle of law that an amendment takes place only after its
approval, or, as in this case, to the extent of punishing an offense
after the time to punish had elapsed. Since the rule, that a member
can be punished only before other proceedings have intervened,
was in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech,
the House may not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority opinion
that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a
speech to the day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With
due respect to the opinion of the majority, we do not think that it is
merely a rule of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of
the time in which the House may take punitive action against an
offending member; it is a limitation (in reference to time) on the
liability to punishment. As Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes points out, the
rule is substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not
be ignored when invoked.
If this Government is a Government of laws and not of-
men, then the House should observe its own rule and not violate it
by punishing a member after the period for indictment and
punishment had already passed. Not because the subject of the
Philippic is no less than the Chief Magistrate of the nation should
the rule of the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our
Government is based on the principle of separation of powers
between the three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary
proposition that this Court should not interfere with the legislature
in the manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the
Court cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the law is when
any of its (the House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the
law.
Congressman Osmeña has invoked the protection of a rule
of the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the rule
being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being
violated in meting out punishment for his speech; we should not
shirk our responsibility to declare his rights under the rule simply on
the broad excuse of separation of powers. Even the legislature may
not ignore the rule it has promulgated for the government of the
conduct of its members, and the fact that a coordinate branch of
the Government is involved, should not deter us from performing
our duty. We may not possess the power to enforce our opinion if
the House chooses to disregard the same. In such case the members
thereof stand before the bar of public opinion to answer for their
act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm
of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent
personally believes that vituperous attacks against the Chief
Executive, or any official or citizen for that matter, should be
condemned. But where the Rules, promulgated by the House itself,
fix the period during which punishment may be meted out, said
Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be prejudiced
thereby. Only in that way may the supremacy of the law be
maintained.
APPENDIX — SUSPENSION OF MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE
BODY.
I. Whatever is spoken in the house is subject to the censure
of the house; and offenses of this kind have been severely punished
by calling the person to the bar to make submission, committing him
to prison, expelling him from the house or inflicting other
punishment. (Mason, Manual of Legislative Procedure, pp. 402-403.)
II. 171. — (1) If a Member is named by the Speaker, or by
the chairman of a committee of the whole House, immediately after
the commission of the offense of disregarding the authority of the
chair, or of persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of the
House, by abusing the rules of the House, then —
(i) If the offense has been committed by a Member in the
House, the Speaker forthwith puts the question, on a motion being
made, no amendment, adjournment or debate being allowed, that
the Member (naming him) be suspended from the service of the
House; and . . .
(2) The suspension of a Member on the first occasion
continues until the fifth day, and on the second occasion until
the twentieth day on which the House sits after the day on which he
was suspended, but on and subsequent occasion it continues until
the House resolves that such suspension be terminated. A Member
suspended under this rule must forthwith quit the precincts of the
House. (House of Commons, Manual of Procedure in the Public
Business, p. 114.)
III. In the course of the debate, Mr. Nelson W. Aldrich, of
Rhode Island, read the following from Cushing:
"The power to expel also includes in it a
power to discharge a Member, for good cause,
without inflicting upon him the censure and
disgrace implied in the term "expulsion", and
this has accordingly been done, in some
instances by the House of Commons.
Analogous to the right of expulsion
is that of suspending a Member from the
exercise of his functions as such, for a longer or
shorter period; which is a sentence of milder
character than the former, though attended
with somewhat different effects; for during the
suspension the electors are deprived of the
services of their representative, without power
to supply his place; but the rights of the electors
are no more infringed by this proceeding than
by an exercise of the power to expression."
(Hinds Precedents II, Sec. 1665.
IV. The suspension of members from the service of the
House is another form of punishment. (May's Parliamentary
Practice, p. 53, cited by Hinds, p. 1141, Vol. II.)
V. The Leader of the House then moves that the
Member be suspended from the service of the House, and the
motion must be put to the question 'without amendment,
adjournment or debate.'
If the member is named in Committee of the whose House
by the Chairman, the latter immediately suspends the proceedings
and reports the circumstances to the House when the Speaker has
resumed the Chair. From this point matters proceed as described
above.
If the House agrees to the suspension, the Speaker again
directs the member to withdraw and, if he still persists in refusing to
do so, even when summoned under the Speaker's orders by the
Sergeant-at-Arms, force is resorted to. If this is necessary, the
Speaker calls the attention of the House to the fact, and in such a
case the suspension of the member is for the remainder of the
session. The normal period of suspension is now fixed at five sitting
days for the first offense and twenty for the second, the
uncompleted portion of the sitting during which the offense was
committed counting as one day. The first offense is taken to mean
the first during that session.
 A member who is suspended is not exempt from serving on
a Private Bill Committee but, apart from this exception, suspension
from the service of the House of Commons means exclusion from
the precincts of the Palace of Westminster.
A member guilty of a breach of privilege or contempt may
be suspended without being named, but in such a case the motion
for his suspension would be subject to debate. The practice of
'naming' a member was first introduced by Speaker Lenthal (q.v.) in
1941. (An Encyclopedia of Parliament by Wilding and Laundy, p.
366.)
VI. Offenses which are not sufficiently grave to warrant
imprisonment are punished by admonition to reprimand, the latter
being the more serious punishment of the two. . . . Members of
Parliament who commit offenses are liable to two further
penalties: suspension from the service of the House and expulsion.
(An Encyclopedia of Parliament by Wilding and Laundy, p. 456.)VII. A
portion of the majority, Messrs. L. E. McComas of Maryland, Albert
J. Beverridge of Indiana, and J. C. Pritchard of North Carolina,
submitted views in favor of suspension of the two senators. After
discussing the power to punish generally, they submitted:
". . . Like Parliament, it may imprison or
expel a member for offenses. The suspension of
members from the service of the House is
another form of punishment. (May's
Parliamentary Practice 53). This author
gives instances of suspension in the seventeenth
century and shows the frequent suspension of
members under a standing order of the House
of Commons, passed February 23, 1880."
Says Cushing, section 280: "Members may also be
suspended by way of punishment from their functions as such,
either in whole or in part or for a limited time. This is a sentence of a
milder character than expulsion."
During the suspension, says Cushing, section 627, the
electors are deprived of the services of their representatives
without power to supply his place, but the rights of the electors are
no more infringed by this proceeding than by an exercise of the
power to imprison. (Vol. II, Hinds' Precedents of the House of
Representatives, p. 1141.)
VIII. Suspension from the service of the House was a operating beyond the sitting during which the resolution was
punishment employed by the House of Commons under its power of passed. — Burton vs. Taylor (1886), 11 App. Cas. 197, P. C. — AUS
enforcing discipline among its Members, long before it was (Copied from English and Empire Digest (1927) Vol. 36, p. 295.)
prescribed by standing order for particular offenses, such as
disregard of authority of the Chair, or obstruction, and it can still be ||| (Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, [October 28, 1960],
imposed at the discretion of the House, although, of course, not 109 PHIL 863-888)
under the summary procedure authorized by that standing order
(see p. 471).
In 1641, Mr. Gervaise Hollis was suspended by the House
during the session.
In 1643, Sir Norton Knatchbull was suspended by the House
during the pleasure of the House.
For nearly two centuries this form of punishment had been
in abeyance, no cause of suspension having occurred since 1692.
But at the discretion of the House on 25 of July 1877, as a result of
persistent obstruction by Members who supported Parnell, Mr.
Speaker Brand gave the following ruling:
"The House is perfectly well aware that
any Member persistently and wilfully
obstructing public business without just and
reasonable cause is guilty of a contempt of this
House, and is liable to punishment whether by
censure, suspension from the service of the
House, or commitment, according to the
judgment of the House" (Parl. Deb. [1877]235, c.
1814).
On 20 February 1911, Mr. Ginnell, a Member was
suspended for one week as a punishment for a breach of privilege in
publishing a letter reflecting on the Speaker's conduct in the Chair.
C. J. (1911) 37.
In February 1880, the procedure for suspending a Member
for particular offenses was laid down by Standing Order No. 22 (see
p. 471), and suspension under this Standing Order not infrequent.
(The Law, Privileges Proceedings Usage of Parliament, 6th Ed. pp.
48-53, Fellows and Cocks.)
IX. Resp. having entered the Chamber of the New South
Wales Assembly, of which he was a member, within a week after it
had passed a resolution that he be "suspended from the service of
the House," he was removed therefrom and prevented from re-
entering it: — Held: the resolution must not be construed as
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46267. November 28, 1938.]
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner, vs. SIXTO DE
LA COSTA, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta, for
petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno, for
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGES; ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT FOR A
NEW JUDICIAL DISTRICT; PETITIONER ESTOPPED TO QUESTION
LEGALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 145UNDER WHICH
NEW APPOINTMENT WAS MADE. — When a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of
a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment,
accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch
of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court
of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial
district formed by the addition of another Court of First
Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the
functions of his new office and receives the corresponding
salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be
entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the
law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued;
and, said new appointment having been disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither
can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon
him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the
discharge of the functions thereof.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J p:
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la
Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the
respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth
Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that
the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in
question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said
respondent.
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.
145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial
District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city,
by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President
of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on
September 8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on
which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received
from the President of the Commonwealth and new ad
interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in
accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned
on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on
Appointments' having acted on said ad interim appointment,
another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued
in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new
oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties
thereof. After his appointment and qualification as judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as
executive judge, performed several executive acts, some of
which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as
administrative officer, under the orders of the petitioner, as
executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters
pertaining to the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are
handled by said executive judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the
appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for
the Province of Palawan, said appointment to expire on
December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having authorized justice of
the peace Iñigo R. Peña to defend a criminal case the hearing of
which had begun during the past sessions in Coron, Palawan
(Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days to
justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan
(Exhíbit 8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen
days to the justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of
the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim
appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the
Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines
appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa,
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifty Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
and his appointment was approved by the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said
appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and
assumed office. On the same date, August 1, 1938, the
President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after
confirmation thereof, issued the corresponding final
appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la
Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits
some of the facts alleged therein and denies the rest, and
alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is
estopped from attacking the constitutionality
of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new
appointment as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of
First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the
necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the functions of
his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall
discuss it first to determine whether or not the petitioner may
proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance
of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Court of First
Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
 As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable
Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by
virtue of an appointment issued to him on June 2, 1936, and
confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the
same year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad
interim appointment, issued in accordance with the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took effect on the same
date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth
Judicial District, with authority of preside over the Fifth Branch
of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, upon which he immediately took the
corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office.
Under his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the petitioner
had authority to preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new appointment
of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over
said Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of Manila but
also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be
noted that the territory over which the petitioner could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last
appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise
and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is
wider than that over which he could exercise and did exercise
jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is
incompatibility between the two appointments and,
consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each
of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter.
In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of
the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the
necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of
First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner
abandoned his appointment of June 22, 1936, and ceased in the
exercised of the functions of the office occupied by him by
virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that
when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an
office newly created or reorganized by a law, — which new
office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him —,
qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the
necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties
by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by
virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55),
and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by
virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American
Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted
from said rule only when his nonacceptance of the new
appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled
to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was
free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the
President of the Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or
nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of
first instance is of public interest, being one of the means
employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes,
which is the administration of justice, considering the
organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and the
creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the
temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied
without detriment to the smooth running of the judicial
machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to
believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he
should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or,
at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he
believed that this duty of obedience to the laws compelled him
to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order
of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to
preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered
into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after
taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge
that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was
appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the
validity of said appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He
likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim
appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were disapprove the same, it would become
ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner
having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936,
and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of
Manila, Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was being
presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad
interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of
judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila together with the Court of First Instance of
Palawan, and entering into the discharge of the functions of
said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the
office occupied by him under his said appointment of June 2,
1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of
which he has been appointed judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is
estopped by his own act from proceeding to question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of
which he was appointed, by accepting said appointment and
entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the
office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled
doctrine established by both American and Philippine
jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional
questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the
questions on constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs.
Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 34 Phil., 518; Mc Girr vs.
Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section
40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion
and so hold that when a judge of first instance, presiding over a
branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue
of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment
to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First
Instance, in addition of another Court of First Instance to the
 old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new
office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his
old office and cannot claim to be entitled to repossess it or
question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his
new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment
having been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new
appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the
functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is
denied and the same is dismissed, with costs to the petitioner.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
I do not subscribe to the application of the doctrine of
estoppel in this case. The ratio decidendi of the majority is
found in the following paragraph of their opinion:
"The rule of equity, sanctioned by
jurisprudence, is that when a public official
voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office
newly created or reorganized by law, — which
new office is incompatible with the one formerly
occupied by him —, qualifies for the discharge
of the functions thereof by taking the necessary
oath, and enters into the performance of his
duties by executing acts inherent in said newly
created or reorganized office an receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be considered to
have abandoned the office he was occupying by
virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus
Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he
was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence,
166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted
from said rule only when his nonacceptance of
the new appointment may affect public interest
or when he is compelled to accept it by reason
of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence,
770, par. 124)."
To arrive at the conclusion reached, three important
legal principles are invoked and applied: (a) Incompatibility of
public offices; (b) abandonment of public office; and (c)
estoppel. As necessary predicates for the application of the
principle of estoppel references for the application of the
principle of estoppel references has to be made to the doctrines
of incompatibility and abandonment of public offices: "Hence,
there is incompatibility between the two appointments and,
consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each
of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter.
In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of
the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the
necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of
First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the
petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and
ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office occupied by
him by exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him
by virtue thereof." (Emphasis mine.) Thus runs the decision of
the majority of my brethren. Frankly, I do not see how the
doctrine of incompatibility of public offices could have any
application here. If a judge of the Court of First Instance may be
a judge of one or more provinces, there can be no objection in
principle to his being judge of one or more districts, if the
constitution or the law authorizes it. It should be observed that
incompatibility in law is not physical impossibility but
inconsistency in the functions of the two public offices
concerned. In the language of Judge Folger, "where one office is
not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the
other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that
incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance
of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in
its application to this matter is, that from the nature and
relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be
held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism
which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully
and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the
incumbent of the other." (People vs. Green, 58 N. Y., 295, 304.)
If the law as an expression of public policy prohibits are
acceptance by a public officer of any office other than that
which he holds, it is not a case of incompatibility but of legal
prohibition. Acceptance of an incompatible office should be
distinguished from acceptance of a forbidden office. (Cf. sec.
18, Jones Law; sec. 8, Art. VI, Philippine Constitution.) As to
abandonment, in order that official relations may be terminated
thereby, the circumstances must be such as clearly indicate an
absolute relinquishment. I find nothing in the conduct of the
petitioner indicative of clear intention to abandon the particular
office involved and its duties and emoluments. On the contrary,
he appears to have clung to the office, until forced to vacate it.
A fortiori, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable. The
petitioner, before the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 145,
was judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, fifth sala,
Ninth Judicial District. On the same day that the Act was
approved he received his ad interim appointment for the new
Fourth Judicial District established byCommonwealth Act No.
145, which district comprises not only Manila but also the
Provinces of Rizal and Palawan. The appointment was made as
well in the case of the petitioner as in other cases to avoid a
break of continuity in the performance of judicial functions. The
petitioner accepted the appointment and proceeded to
discharge his duties as judge of the reorganized district in the
honest belief that enlargement was all that was done to his old
district. I express the opinion that the conduct of the petitioner
does not warrant the application of the principle of estoppel or
the invocation of the maxim that "He who hath committed
iniquity shall not have equity." I am not prepared to say of the
petitioner that he has performed what Lord Coke would call "an
act which stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead
the truth." The doctrine of estoppel is inherently founded on
equity and its application should not be predicated on strictly
legal principles.
I do not see much utility in referring to adjudicated
cases on this point as hardly any one of them tallies with the
facts of the present case. I should observe, however, that in
applying the doctrine of estoppel we should not overlook the
significant fact that the principle originally arose almost entirely
in relation to transfers of property although it has now come to
be applied to a variety of legal situations. From the point of
view of legal and somewhat arbitrary classification of the Anglo-
American law, the principle invoked and applied is the equitable
estoppel, otherwise known as estoppel in pais. As such, it is,
according to Bigelow, estoppel by conduct, which is said to have
its foundation in fraud, considered in its general sense.
(Bigelow, Estop., secs. 437-439.) Upon the other hand, I have a
very serious doubt as to whether the petitioner, — on the
hypothesis that the question involved is his security of tenure
under the Constitution — could by acquiescence or consent be
precluded from raising a question of public interest. Security of
tenure is certainly not a personal privilege of any particular
judge. From this point of view it cannot be said that his
remaining silent when he ought to have spoken debars the
petitioner from speaking when conscience requires him to be
silent (10 R. C. L., par. 21).
The petitioner in his vigorous and impassioned plea
asks us to vindicate the independence of the judiciary and
uphold the constitutional mandate relative to the security of
tenure of judges, embodied in section 9 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. He claims that "Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional because the regrouping of the provinces into
nine judicial districts as therein provided for was effected by the
National Assembly without constitutional authority." Upon the
other hand, the Solicitor-General directs our attention to the
power of the legislature over courts inferior to the Supreme
Court, conferred by section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution. I
think the constitutional issue thus squarely presented should be
met courageously by the court, instead of applying to the
petitioner the doctrine of estoppel which, in my humble
opinion, is entirely inapplicable. The life and welfare of this
government depends upon close and careful observance of
constitutional mandates. For this reason, in clear cases, this
court should not hesitate to strike down legislative acts in
conflict with the fundamental law. This court is perhaps the last
bulwark of constitutional government. I shall not obstruct the
popular will as manifested through proper organs. It will adapt
itself to the needs of an ever-expanding present and face the
future with a clear insight into economic and social values. It
will keep itself alive to the dictates of national policy. But, in the
same way that it cannot renounce the life breathed into it by
the Constitution, so may it not forego its obligation, in proper
cases, to apply the necessary corrective so that, in the very
language of this court, "the course of Government may be
directed along constitutional channels" (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 23), or its return to them
may be accelerated.
I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine
so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there
Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district was an express provision providing for the vacation by the
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth
valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the
inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize legislative power.
them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
I, therefore, concur in the result.
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to ||| (Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No. 46267, [November 28, 1938],
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various 66 PHIL 615-627)
courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme
Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the
judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the
same article of the Constitution must be coördinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide
actual cases and controversies of every sort (Justice Holmes in
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S., 45; 49 Law. ed., 937).
I am not insensible to the argument that the National
Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat
the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to
all judges. But, is this the case? One need not share the view of
Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of
Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the
application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily
factual and circumstantial and the fixity of principle is the
rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and
emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation
of the constitutional provision regarding security of judicial
tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of
reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and
evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time
to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am
satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the
purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great
public need by the legislative department and
that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to
affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge.
Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the
legislature department under the Constitution. To be sure,
there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon
the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 51122. March 25, 1982.]
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN,
EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME
R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO, and REYNALDO
L. LARDIZABAL,petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T. J.
DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of
the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R.G. VILDZIUS,
ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO,
SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO, and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
In an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI), the Puyat Group won six seats to gain
control of the Board and of the management of the company. The
Acero Group which won only five seats, questioned the said election
in a quo warranto proceeding filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) wherein they claimed that the stockholders' votes
were not properly counted. In the said case, Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on constitutional grounds,
thus discouraging Assemblyman Fernandez from further appearing
therein as counsel. Subsequently, however, Assemblyman
Fernandez acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company
representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares, on
the basis of which he filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
SEC Case alleging legal interest therein. The respondent Associate
Commissioner of the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Atty. Fernandez ownership of the said ten shares. Hence, this
petition.
The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances,
there had been an indirect "appearance as counsel before any
administrative body" which is a circumvention of the prohibition
under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, held that the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities and
Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said
constitutional prohibition.
Petition granted. Questioned order, reversed and set aside.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 11, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1973
CONSTITUTION; ASSEMBLYMEN PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING AS
COUNSEL BEFORE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE BODY; CIRCUMSTANCES IN
CASE AT BAR WARRANTING A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
ASSEMBLYMAN'S INTERVENTION IN CASE BEFORE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION CONSTITUTE INDIRECT APPEARANCE AS
COUNSEL BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. — Certain salient
circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez in the quo warranto case filed before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company, representing ten
(10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them
"after the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit
had been filed on May 25, 1979 before the SEC on May 31, 1979.
And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified
his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing perhaps,
the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it
may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior,
co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and
circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body"
and in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the prohibition
contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to
accomplish the objects specifically or implied prohibited. (Am.
Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108
P1046.)
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is
poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC
Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the
following dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14, 1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation,
was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as
Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongban R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those
on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as
Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14,
1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were
not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of
the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before . . .
any administrative body," and SEC was an administrative body.
Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition, being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A.
Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for
 P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to
qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized
only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of
ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the
matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order
allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde
Buinzefabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T.C.
Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior. In L-51928,
we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel
in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such
situation the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings
in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent
Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing
intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to
consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII ofthe Constitution,
which, as amended, now reads:
"SEC 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall
appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction,
before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall be, directly or indirectly be
interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation,
during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in
any cause or matter where he may be called to
act on account of his office. (Emphasis and
paragraphs supplied).
What really has to be resolved is whether or not in intervening in
the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitution provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he
is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is not joining the
cause of private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be
for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had
acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after
the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of
Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been
filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is
more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention
to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but
which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity
of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted
that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-
51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-
defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find
that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . .
any administrative body and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in
some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the
event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure
naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in
the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may
not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly
prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the
question of the constitutional prohibition against members of the
Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders,
in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC
relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is
not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is
hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No costs.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN,respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; IT IS WELL WITHIN
THE POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
INQUIRE WHETHER INDEED THE SENATE OR ITS OFFICIALS
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS
AND PREROGATIVES. — In the instant controversy, the
petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondent. Dissenting in
part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine,
however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to
the relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed
a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE NO PROVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OR EVEN THE RULES OF THE
SENATE HAS BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED,
DISREGARDED OR OVERLOOKED, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO SENATE OFFICIALS FOR ACTS DONE defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
WITHIN THEIR COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY. — We hold that leader.
Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
PROVISION PRESCRIBED WHICH OF THE MANY MINORITY
minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of
GROUPS OR THE INDEPENDENTS OR A COMBINATION THEREOF
the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
HAS THE RIGHT TO SELECT THE MINORITY LEADER. — Let us go
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be
back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority."
the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came
larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half.
only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
number of votes or adherents than the majority.
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority,
by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
authority. CSEHIa
there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
3. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; WHILE identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
SENATE MUST BE ELECTED BY A NUMBER CONSTITUTING MORE of the present Senate, members either belong to different
THAN ONE HALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS THEREOF, IT DOES NOT political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
PROVIDE THAT THE MEMBERS WHO WILL NOT VOTE FOR HIM statutory provision prescribed which of the many minority
SHALL IPSO FACTO CONSTITUTE THE "MINORITY," WHO COULD groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the
THEREBY ELECT THE MINORITY LEADER. — The term "majority" right to select the minority leader.
has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL THAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS IS
to a certain number out of a total aggregate, it simply "means
THAT "EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS
the number greater than half or more than half of any total."
IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY"; THE METHOD OF CHOOSING SUCH
The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional
OTHER OFFICERS IS MERELY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF
clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
PROVISION; SUCH METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE COURT. — While the Constitution is
"majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And
explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect,
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
that the Charter says is the "[e]ach House shall choose such
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind,
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court. The Rules of Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are
actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT WILL NEITHER BE
A TYRANT NOR A WIMP; RATHER, IT WILL REMAIN STEADFAST
AND JUDICIOUS IN UPHOLDING THE RULE AND MAJESTY OF THE
LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL RESPECT AND A BECOMING REGARD
FOR THE SOVEREIGN ACTS OF A CO-EQUAL BRANCH PREVENTS
THIS COURT FROM PRYING INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
SENATE. — Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly
within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has
no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold — the very
duty that justified the Court's being. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of
the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding
the rule and majesty of the law. To accede, then, to the
interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition
would easily fall. DIESaC
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO
WARRANTO; USURPATION OF OFFICE; THE PERSON SUING
MUST SHOW THAT HE OR SHE HAS A CLEAR RIGHT TO THE
OFFICE; IN CASE AT BAR, PETITIONERS PRESENT NO SUFFICIENT
PROOF OF A CLEAR AND INDUBITABLE FRANCHISE TO THE
OFFICE OF THE SENATE MINORITY LEADER. — DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; WHATEVER
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo
warrantoproceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the
solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming
to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be
brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded
into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office. In order
for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person
suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this
case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader.
MENDOZA, J.: concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part:
POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; COURTS HAVE NO
POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND
BUSINESS OF A HOUSE OF CONGRESS EXCEPT AS THE QUESTION
AFFECTS THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES OR A SPECIFIC
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION IS INVOLVED. — The Court has
no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the
minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of
that chamber is political. It respects the internal affairs of a
coequal department of the government and is thus addressed
solely to that august body. Courts have no power to inquire into
the internal organization and business of a house of Congress
except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved. For this reason this
Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the
discipline of members of the legislature and the application and
interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house. For indeed,
these matters pertain to the internal government of Congress
and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J.: separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL
DIFFERENCES THE PARTIES MAY HAVE AGAINST EACH OTHER
MUST BE SETTLED IN THEIR OWN TURF AND THE COURT,
CONSCIOUS AS IT IS OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY-DELINEATED
POWERS, WILL NOT TAKE A STEP TO OVERSTEP THE SAME. —
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful
occupant of a Senate "office" and does not deal with the
passage of a bill or the observance of internal rules for the
Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the
procedures of the Senate. There is to me no constitutional
breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this
Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners on
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the1987 Constitution clearly does
not find support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
The majority vote required for the election of a Senate
President and a speaker of the House of Representatives speaks
only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be
lawfully as such. There is here no declaration that by so
electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided
into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the
"offices" of Majority Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are
not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As pointed
out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory
that under paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of
the Constitution, each House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will
be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed
upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties may have
against each other must be settled in their own turf and the
Court, conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated
powers, will not take a perilous move to overstep the
same. ITADaE
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each
of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of
the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws
of even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant
nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law. LLphil
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago
and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the
ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful
minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the
Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor general "to
file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both
respondents and the solicitor general submitted their
respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the
Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their
Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said
pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and
deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need
of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this
Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide
petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts
impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present
case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In
fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the
Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been
recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R.
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
Osmeña as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the
"minority."
first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in
terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as During the discussion on who should constitute the
follows: 6 Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party —
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian
matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on
the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the
delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP) Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the
1 member Liberal Party (LP) body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP) minority leader of the Senate.
1 member Gabay Bayan The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging
2 members Independent in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
––––—— minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members Issues
are all classified by petitioners as "independent".) From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the
following issues for resolution:
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over
Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate the petition?
President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad
2. Was there an actual violation of
was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
the Constitution?
Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate. 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as
Senate minority leader?
president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority
leader. 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
 The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful
deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court finds
that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of
discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in
arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who
is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the
definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16(1),
Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their
separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of who
is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter
pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over
which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly,
no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does
not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The
legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such
office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of
selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply,
because there exists no question involving an interpretation or
application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling
the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor
general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to
support the petitioner's theory that a senator who votes for the
winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the
minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully
reviewed and deliberated on the various important cases
involving this very important and basic question, which it has
ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the
scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions
involving an interpretation or application of a provision of
the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house
of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court
over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts
that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined
to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate
President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling
exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed
jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue
hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect
a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I]
concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over
cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the
judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political
questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
"Indeed there is no denying that the
situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in
the House of Representatives. It has already
involved the President of the Philippines. The
situation has created a veritable national crisis,
and it is apparent that solution cannot be
expected from any quarter other than this
Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the
people for an effective settlement are
pinned." 15
". . . This case raises vital constitutional
questions which no one can settle or decide if
this Court should refuse to decide them." 16
". . . The constitutional question of
quorum should not be left unanswered." 17
In Tañada v. Cuenco, 18 this Court endeavored to
define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to bedecided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a
particular measure." 19
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was
not a political question. The choice of these members did not
depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the
Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was
also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority
to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of
the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v.
Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castañeda 23 that "the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is
final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other
persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the
Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary. 24
"The reason why the issue under
consideration and other issues of similar
character are justiciable, not political, is plain
and simple. One of the principal bases of the
non-justiciability of so-called political questions
is the principle of separation of powers —
characteristic of the presidential system of
government — the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature,
into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those
involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2) those
concerning mainly with the enforcement of such
laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or
interpreting the same, which belong to the
executive department; and 3) those dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives
that are legally demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere — but only within such
sphere — each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers
or filed of action assigned to any of the other
departments, but also to inquire into or pass
upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts
performed, measures taken or decisions made
by the other departments — provided that such
acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution."
"Accordingly, when the grant of power
is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or
the limitations respected is justiciable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one
of legality of validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations — particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution — would be set
at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into
such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of the courts of justice under
the presidential form of government adopted in
our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks
and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, we have neither the authority nor
the discretion to decline passing upon said issue,
but are under the ineluctable obligation — made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by
our oath, as members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend
the Constitution — to settle it. This explains
why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW
522, 523], it was held that courts have a 'duty,
rather than a power,' to determine whether
another branch of the government has
'kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike or previous constitutions, the 1987
Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power.
The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the
court of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more
resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza v.
Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona. Jr. v.
Gonzales28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the
leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among
political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in
the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue
was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature,"
since it involve "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by
[Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada
v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the
Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en
banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of
government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety
of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse
of discretion.
Earlier in Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a
decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said
tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of
their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and
exclusive. 3 1 The Court may inquire into a decision or
resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion." 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was
asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to look
beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted
as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative
body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the
House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They
averred further that a violation of the constitutionally
mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitutionitself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because
the matter complained of concerned the internal procedures of
the House, with which the Court had no concern. It
enucleated: 34
"It would be an unwarranted invasion
of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action
as void because the Court things the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire
 into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse
of discretion were it to do so. . . In the absence
of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body."
In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of
whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist — try
to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim
that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been
observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition.
Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the
aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now
go to the next crucial question: In recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate
the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the
affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision
requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote
of all its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine
the concepts of "majority" and "minority", as well as who may
elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the
aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2)
accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who
voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to
determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners
assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate
President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted
committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed
by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the
laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the
Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a
number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply
mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more
than one half of allthe senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms. cdtai
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes
some relevant precedents, which were not contested in
petitioner's Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the
first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President
was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E.
Estrada 38 . During the ninth regular session, when Sen.
Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to
all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This
practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History
would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress
has referred to the political party to which the most number of
lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to
a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms
"majority" and "minority". Majority may also refer to "the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 41 not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with
a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines
(as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be
several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by
the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of
the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the
present Senate, members either belong to different political
parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and
adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45 Pertinent
to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
"Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
"SEC. 1. The Senate shall elect, in the
manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a
Sergeant-at-Arms.
"These officers shall take their oath of
office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.
RULE II
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
"SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall
be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one
candidate for the same office, a nominal vote
shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be
by viva voce or by resolution."
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof . At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court
is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of
the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for
the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within
the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific,
operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before
the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory
laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body 49 at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power
and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem.
And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold — the very duty that justifies the Court's
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the
law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners
would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or
the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and
while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an
act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse
of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the
judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief
Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
". . . the powers of government are
generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because
of that supremacy[, the] power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
"Briefly stated, courts of justice
determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those
of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
"This is the background of paragraph 2
of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question."
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other
issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona
and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power 52 by one without color of
title or who is not entitled by law thereto 53. A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment 54. The action may be brought by
the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be
successful, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present not
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office
of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards
that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the
disputed position has not been laid down by theConstitution,
the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said
that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's
assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has
been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the
Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of
the term "grave abuse of discretion."
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility." 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent
Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President
in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let
us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of
the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo,
JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J ., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part:
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree
that "[it] has jurisdiction over the petition [in this case] to
determine whether the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives." 1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The
question who constitute the minority in the Senate entitled to
elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. It respects
the internal affairs of a coequal department of the government
and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal
organization and business of a house of Congress except as the
question affects the rights of third parties or a specific
constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take
cognizance of cases involving the discipline of members 2 of the
legislature and the application and interpretation of therules of
procedure of a house. 3 For indeed, these matters pertain to
the internal government of Congress and are within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate are
not state officers. They do not attain these positions by popular
vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from
their peers in the house. While their offices are a constitutional
creation, nevertheless they are only legislative officers. It is
their position as members of Congress which gives them the
status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective
chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by
the vote of the majority of the members of the house to which
they belong. 4Thus, Art. VI, §16(1) of the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and
the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose
election and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the
members and is no concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took
cognizance of matters pertaining to the internal government of
each house, infringements of specific constitutional limitations
were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with
only 12 senators present there was a quorum for the election of
the Senate President, considering that, of the 24 members, one
was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case
called for an interpretation of Art. VI, §10(2) of the 1935
Constitution which provided that "A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business. . ." While initially
declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took
cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate
opinion in support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of
the reasons which persuaded the Court to intervene in the
Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a quorum or not
in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that calls for
the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express
and specific provision of the Constitution." 6 In his view, "The
word quorum is a mathematical word. it has, as such, a precise
and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than
one-half (½)." 7
In Tañada v. Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the
majority could fill the seats intended for the minority party in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not enough
minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was
governed by a specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of
the 1935 charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of
each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . and the
remaining six shall be members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each House, three upon the nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore,
a specific constitutional provision to be applied.
The cases 9 concerning the composition of the
Commission on Appointments likewise involved the mere
application of a constitutional provision, specifically Art. VI, §18
of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission
shall be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of
the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional
representation of political parties and organizations is observed
the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction over the
choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the
recomposition of the Senate representation in the Commission
and to reinstate a particular senator after satisfying itself that
such recomposition of the Senate representation was not a
"departure from the constitutionmandate requiring
proportional representative of the political organizations in the
Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took
cognizance of the case which involved the reorganization of the
Commission as a result of the realignment of political forces in
the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case
actually involved the right of a third party whose nomination by
the President had been rejected by the reorganized
Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, 12 where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations
involved in the foregoing cases, beyond providing that the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall elect a president
and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each
house shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their]
respective Members." the Constitution leaves everything else to
each house of Congress. Such matters are political and are left
solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific
constitutional limitations nor a violation of the rights of a party
not a member of Congress. This Court has jurisdiction over this
case only in the sense that determining whether the question
involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of
jurisdiction in the same way that a court which dismisses a case
for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow sense have jurisdiction
since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The
determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or
not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is
the great lesson of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S.
Supreme Court, while affirming its power of review, in the end
held itself to be without jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of
1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was
unconstitutional. In other words, a court doing a Marbury
v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without
jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of
jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J .:
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet
broke a chain or freed a human soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark
Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame veritably speaks about the
creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize our
perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that
we may not be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust
thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to
certain fundamental precepts and I believe that this occasion
presents an opportunity to do so. Thus, as I join the majority
and case my vote today for the denial of the instant petition,
may I just be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential postulates
which I have long embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to
petrified opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine in the
hope that all future disputes of this nature may be similarly
resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has
been invited to resolve a matter originating from the internal
processes undertaken by a co-equal branch of government,
more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the
landmark case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al., 1 we
were confronted, among other things, by the issue of whether a
significant tax measure namely, Republic Act. No. 7716
(Expanded Value-Added Tax Law), went through the legislative
mill in keeping with the constitutionally-mandated procedure
for the passage of bills. Speaking through Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax measure's validity,
relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court is
not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules
supposedly violated when the bill was being passed by
Congress. I took a different view, however, from the majority
because of what I felt was sweeping reliance on said doctrines
without giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I
underscored that these principles may not be applied where
the internal legislative rules would breach
the Constitution which this Court has a solemn duty to uphold.
It was my position then that the introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Committee Report violated the
constitutional proscription against any amendment to a bill
upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the
exercise of its judicial power, can properly inquire into without
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
Last year, 2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et
al. 3 presented an opportunity for me to clarify my position
further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a petition
before the Court complaining that during a session by the
House of Representatives, he was effectively prevented from
raising the question of quorum which to him tainted the validity
of Republic Act No. 8240 or the so-called "sin taxes" law. The
Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr.
Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to
explain my position then because of possible misinterpretation.
I was very emphatic that I did not abandon my position
in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being radically
different from the former. In keeping with my view that judicial
review is permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I pointed
out that the legislative rules allegedly violated were purely
internal and had no direct or reasonable nexus to the
requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the
passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's
intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I
again take a similar stand as the ones I made in the two cited
cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the
rightful occupant of a Senate "office" and does not deal with
the passage of a bill or the observance of internal rules for the
Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the
procedures of the Senate. There is to me no constitutional
breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this
Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners on
Section 16(1), Article VI of the1987 Constitution clearly does not
find support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
The majority voted required for the election of a Senate
President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks
only of such number of quantity of votes for an aspirant to be
lawfully elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so
electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided
into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the
"offices" of Majority Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are
not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As pointed
out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory
that under paragraph 2, Section 16(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution, each House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will
be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed
upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties may have
against each other must be settled in their own turf and the
Court, conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated
powers, will not take a perilous move to overstep the
same. LLjur
VITUG, J .:
The 1987 Constitution, like the
counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has continued to be
implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary
— proper acknowledgment and respect for each other. The
Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by
Congress) nor the "sword" (held by Congress) nor the "sword"
(held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the
State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort
and as the Constitutional Court of the nation. 1 Peculiar,
however, to the present Constitution, specifically under Article
VIII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended jurisdiction of judicial
power that now explicitly allows the determination of "whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." 2 This expanded concept of
judicial power seems to have been dictated by the martial law
experience and to be an immediate reaction to the abuse in the
frequent recourse to the political question doctrine that in no
small measure has emasculated the Court. The term "political
question," in this context, refers to matters which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be
thought of as having been tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I find it here
opportune to reiterate what I have stated in Tolentino vs.
Secretary of Finance, 3 viz:
"I cannot yet concede to the novel
theory, so challengingly provocative as it might
be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court
may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of
the people's imprimatur, into every affair of
government. What significance can still then
remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely
acclaimed principle of separation of powers if,
at every turn, the Court allows itself to pass
upon at will the disposition of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch in our
system of government. I dread to think of the so
varied uncertainties that such an undue
interference can lead to. The respect for long
standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not
timidity, of stability rather than quiescence."
Pervasive and limitless, such as it may seem to be, judicial
power still succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation
of powers. Congress is the branch of government, composed of
the representatives of the people, that lays down the policies of
government and provides the direction that the nation must
take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the
Court will not negate that which is done by these co-equal and
coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of
grave abuse of discretion on their part, clearly too relative a
phrase to be its own sentinel against misuse, even as it will not
hesitate to wield the power if that abuse becomes all too clear.
The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial tyranny, is
 what has been envisioned by an institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution.
There is no hornbook rule by which grave abuse of
discretion may be determined. The provision was evidently
couched in general terms to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging
millieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or
personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an
affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would
subscribe to the dictum, somewhat made implicit in my
understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 4 that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby
inheres the Court will not deign substitute its own judgment
over that of any of the other two branches of government.
Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear disregard
of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention. cda
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to
have the case hew to the above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
||| (Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577,
[November 18, 1998], 359 PHIL 276-315)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108251. January 31, 1996.]
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J.
HONRADA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second
Division; HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, in his
official capacity as Special Prosecutor;
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his
official capacity as Ombudsman; and TEOFILO
GELACIO, respondents.
Rolando A. Suarez & Associates, for petitioners.
Esmeraldo U. Guloy, for private respondent. cdta
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; MAY BE INITIATED AND
CONCLUDED BY DIFFERENT INVESTIGATORS. — Petitioners
contend that the filing of charges against them was not
recommended by the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation, but by another one who, it is alleged,
had no part at all in the investigation. There is no basis for
petitioners' claim that the resolution was prepared by one who
did not take any part in the investigation. What happened here
is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being
able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason or
another and by necessity the decision is rendered by another
judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an
arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of
due process. For what is important is that the judge who
decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does
not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case
from the beginning.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY;
CERTIFICATE; VALUE NOT DIMINISHED BY FAILURE TO
ANTICIPATE THAT HIS CERTIFICATE WOULD BE USED IN
EVIDENCE. — That Violan gave credence to the Certification of
Judge Ariño in concluding that no arraignment had been held in
Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that Violan was biased
against petitioners. Although Judge Ariño subsequently gave an
Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit repudiated what he had
earlier stated. Judge Ariño never denied his earlier Certification
that Criminal Case No. 1393 "never reached the arraignment
stage," because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned
the Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscal's resolution,
Judge Ariño suspended action until March 17, 1986 and in fact
the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case. The fact that
Judge Ariño did not anticipate that his certificate might be used
in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now pending in
the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is
that Judge Ariño did not retract his previous Certification that
there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If
that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not
anticipate that his certificate would be used in evidence in any
case would not diminish a whit the value of the
certificate. cdasia
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; RETRACTION OF
AFFIDAVIT MADE IN VIOLATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE, INADMISSIBLE. — There is nothing in the resolution
of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that
petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public
documents) on Atty. Sansaet's retraction. In her resolution, all
that she stated is that "the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
important bearing in this case." Otherwise she did not cite the
confession as proof of the falsification of public documents. To
the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in
violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be
inadmissible in evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have
relied on the affidavit of retraction.
4. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; DIVERGENCE OF
OPINIONS BETWEEN A JUDGE AND A PARTY'S COUNSEL, NOT A
GROUND. — Mere divergence of opinions between a judge and
a party's counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not
sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the
case on the ground of bias and partiality.
5. ID.; ACTIONS; MERE FILING OF SEVERAL CASES
BASED ON THE SAME INCIDENT, NOT FORUM-SHOPPING; TEST.
— The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident
does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is
whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions,
essential facts, and circumstances.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT TRANSACTIONS, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT
FORUM SHOPPING; CASE AT BAR. — Here, although several
cases were filed by the same complainant against the same
defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the
cases was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent
of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is that the several
cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and
causes of action. Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed
in the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, was for perjury,
based on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by
petitionerParedes, Jr. in connection with his free patent
application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed in
the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same
application for free patent, was for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as
Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land
Inspector to secure the approval of his free patent application.
On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases
(Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for
falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No.
1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against
petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that
are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are
incidents of these cases, being the petition for review and
motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P.
Case No. P-90-396. Thus the present cases involve substantially
different transactions, facts and circumstances from those
involved in the other, though related, cases. Although they
arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioner's public land
application, they involve different issues. It is well settled that a
single act may offend against two or more distinct and related
provisions of law or that the same act may give rise to criminal
as well as administrative liability. As such, they may be
prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they
do not place the accused in double jeopardy of being punished
for the same offense.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISMISSAL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DOES NOT NECESSARILY BAR
FILING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — Petitioners call attention
to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner
Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling
in Maceda v. Vasquez that only this Court has the power to
oversee court personnel's compliance with laws and take the
appropriate administrative action against them for their failure
to do so and that no other branch of the government may
exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of
separation of powers. But one thing is administrative liability.
Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our
determination of the administrative liability for falsification of
public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal
liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were
the subject of the administrative complaint.
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FILING OF
CRIMINAL CHARGE CANNOT JUSTIFY PROHIBITION OF
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IF THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
— That the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot
justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary
investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held
during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as
that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great
detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violan's resolution was
reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his
own detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violan. We
cannot say that, in approving the resolutions of two
investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor committed an abuse of their discretion.
9. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; PURPOSE. —
A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the
government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause.
10. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL HARASSMENT; REQUISITES;
CASE AT BAR. — To warrant a finding of political harassment so
as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses
the power and the influence to control the prosecution of
cases. Here, the prosecution is handled by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that petitioner Ceferino
S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution by his political
enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged, much less
shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the
national prosecution service. To show political harassment
petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the
private complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the
case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other
purpose than to place the accused in contempt and disrepute.
For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the
preliminary investigation, be said to have deserted the
performance of his office to determine objectively and
impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify
judicial intervention in what is essentially his province.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution dated December
9, 1992 of the Office of the Ombudsman, denying petitioner's
motion for the reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of
public documents which had been filed against petitioners and
to restrain the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from
hearing the cases.
The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23,
1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. Charged with petitioner Paredes, Jr., who was
then the provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J.
Honrada, clerk of court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso Sansaet,
counsel of petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal Case No. 1393 of
the MCTC. cdta
In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of
court Honrada, in conspiracy with petitioner Paredes, Jr. and
the latter's counsel Atty. Sansaet, certified as true a copy of a
Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes on July 9, 1985, showing that an
arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and
issued a certification dated March 24, 1986 to that effect when
in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. In support
of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by
Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño of the MCTC to the effect that Criminal
Case No. 1393 had "never reached the arraignment stage"
before it was dismissed on motion of the prosecution. 1
A preliminary investigation of the complaint was
conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been
deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao.
Petitioners and Atty. Sansaet, as respondents in the case, filed
their respective counter-affidavits. Paredes, Jr. denied the
charges. He alleged that their filing was politically motivated
and that the complainant, Teofilo Gelacio, was being used by
his political enemies to harass him. For his part, Honrada
maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held in
Criminal Case No. 1393 as certified by him. His claim was
corroborated by Atty. Generoso Sansaet, who stated in an
affidavit that he was present during the arraignment, being the
counsel of Paredes, Jr. Sansaet called Judge Ariño's
Certification, denying that there was an arraignment, the
product "of a faltering mind." 2
Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, but before it could be acted
upon, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents, retracted his
earlier statement to the effect that Paredes, Jr. had been
arraigned before the case against him was dismissed. In an
Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991,
Sansaet claimed that there was really no arraignment held in
Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada made false
certifications which were used to support the dismissal (on the
ground of double jeopardy) of Criminal Case No. 13800 which
was then pending against Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan.
3 cdta
As a result of this development, Paredes, Jr. and
Honrada, were required to comment. Paredes, Jr. claimed that
the Sansaet's aboutface was the result of their political
estrangement. 4 For his part Honrada insisted that an
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1393 had indeed been held
and that in making the certifications in question he stated the
truth.
On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie
Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman, recommended on February 24, 1992 that
petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of
Public Documents. Her recommendation was indorsed by
Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, who, upon the recommendation of Erdulfo Querubin
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, approved the filing of
three informations for falsification of public documents
against Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet with
the Sandiganbayan. 5 The cases were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
On July 9, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the
informations. Their motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in
its resolution of August 25, 1992, as was the motion for
reconsideration they subsequently filed. cdta
Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the
cases. They complained (1) that the resolution, recommending
the filing of the cases, was not prepared by Public Prosecutor
Axalan, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but
by GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, who allegedly had no
hand in the investigation; (2) that Violan relied solely on the
retraction of Atty. Generoso Sansaet and the Certification of
Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño and disregarded evidence in favor of
petitioners; and (3) that Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin, who
reviewed Violan's recommendation, could not be expected to
act fairly because he was the prosecutor in Criminal Case No.
13800 in connection with which the allegedly falsified records
were used and in fact appealed the dismissal of the case to this
Court. 6
Although these grounds were the same ones invoked
by petitioners in their motion to quash, which
the Sandiganbayan had denied, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless
directed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the
cases. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman required
complainant, the herein respondent Teofilo Gelacio, to
comment on petitioners' Motion for Reinvestigation.
In a resolution dated December 9, 1992, Special
Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor recommended
denial of petitioners' motion. He noted that the matters raised
in the motion were the same ones contained in petitioners'
motion to quash which had already been denied and that in fact
"a cursory examination of the resolution of GIO II Gay Maggie
Balajadia-Violan shows that the existence of a prima facie case
has been duly established and the same was reviewed by SPO III
Erdulfo Querubin and also the approval of Honorable Conrado
M. Vasquez." He held that as no newly-discovered evidence or
denial of due process had been shown, there was no basis for
petitioners' request for a reinvestigation. cdta
Montemayor's recommendation was approved by
Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez. Accordingly the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial.
The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction was then filed to enjoin the trial of the criminal
cases. Petitioners pray that:
(1) Upon the filing of this petition and
before its final resolution, to issue a temporary
restraining order immediately ordering
the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, to cease
and desist from proceeding with the scheduled
hearing of this case; cdta
(2) After due hearing, to adjudge that
respondents Honorable Special Prosecutor
Aniano A. Desierto and Honorable Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez have committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in issuing and approving the
questioned resolution dated December 9, 1992
and ordering said resolution denying petitioners'
motion for reinvestigation be annulled and set
aside;
(3) To adjudge that the Sandiganbayan,
Second Division, is without jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 all
of which are apparently intended as political
harassments against the herein petitioners,
particularly as against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.,
and prohibiting the said court from proceeding
(with) the hearing of the said cases on January
15, 1993, and likewise ordering the said court to
dismiss the said cases, with costs against
respondents and Teofilo Gelacio; and
(4) To issue a writ of injunction,
thereby making the restraining order
permanent, and prohibiting the respondents
and complainant Teofilo Gelacio from
committing any act or acts tending to harass and
to inflict further damage and injury to
petitioners, such as but not limited to the
continuation and further prosecution of said
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792, and
17793. cdta
Petitioners contend (1) that their constitutional right to
due process was violated at various stages of the preliminary
investigation; (2) that the prosecutors closed their eyes to the
fact that in filing the cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio
engaged in forum-shopping; and (3) that the cases were filed
for political harassment and there is in fact no prima
facie evidence to hold them answerable for falsification of
public documents. 7
I.
Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that the
filing of charges against them was not recommended by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by
another one who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the
investigation.
Petitioners' contention has no basis in fact. It appears
that the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by
Teofilo Gelacio was initially conducted by Public Prosecutor
Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao in the investigation of graft cases.
Axalan prepared a resolution. The records do not show what his
recommendation was. What is clear, however, is that no action
had been taken on his recommendation in view of the fact that
Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases,
retracted an earlier statement he had given to the effect that
petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 1393 before the case was dismissed. Atty.
Sansaet now claimed that no arraignment had been held after
all. This new development required the reopening of the
investigation (in fact Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to
comment on the retraction), the reevaluation of the evidence,
and the preparation of a new resolution. Gay Maggie Balajadia-
Violan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, was designated to conduct the
investigation and prepare a report, which she did. cdta
Violan's recommendation was indorsed by Deputy
Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez,
who then referred the matter to Special Prosecution Officer III
Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred in the
recommendation of Violan but suggested that, instead of one,
three separate informations for falsification of public
documents be filed against respondents (Paredes, Jr., Honrada
and Sansaet), considering that three documents were involved.
On June 26, 1992, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez
approved the recommendations of Violan and Querubin.
Accordingly three cases were filed against petitioners with
the Sandiganbayan, where they were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
There is thus no basis for petitioners' claim that the
resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in
the investigation. What happened here is similar to the trial of a
case by one judge who, without being able to finish the hearing,
ceases from office for one reason or another and by necessity
the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over
the conduct of the case. Such an arrangement has never been
thought to raise any question of due process. For what is
important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of
the evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not
conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning. cdta
Petitioners nonetheless charge that GIO II Violan and
Prosecutor Querubin did not have such cold neutrality of an
impartial judge to be trusted to conduct a fair investigation.
According to petitioners, Violan gave credence to the
Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño when the fact is
that Judge Ariño subsequently executed an affidavit, dated
November 5, 1990, in which he explained that "he issued the
said certificate without expectation that the same would be
used as evidence in any case" and that the "use of said
certificate . . . is against [his] conscience." Worse, it is
contended, Violan considered the Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications executed by Atty. Sansaet, which she should have
disregarded because it was made in violation of the
confidentiality of attorney-client communication under Rule
130, § 24(b) of the Rules of Court. As for Prosecutor Querubin,
they claim that he is the same prosecutor who had handled the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800 against
petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan and after its
dismissal, sought review in this Court and, therefore, he was
biased against petitioners.
That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge
Ariño in concluding that no arraignment had been held in
Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof that Violan was biased
against petitioners. Although Judge Ariño subsequently gave an
Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit repudiated what he had
earlier stated. In his Affidavit he merely stated:
1. That I am the incumbent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge in the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-
Rosario-Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; cdta
2. That I am the same Ciriaco C. Ariño who
issued a certificate in Criminal Case No.
1393 entitled Pp. vs. Ceferino
S. Paredes, Jr. which certificate was
used as evidence in administrative
complaint against Mansueto J.
Honrada, in the Administrative
Complaint No. A.M. P-90-396 and
Criminal Complaint against Mansueto J.
Honrada, incumbent Governor Ceferino
S. Paredes, Jr. and Atty. Generoso S.
Sansaet before the Ombudsman under
Criminal Case No. OBM-MIN-90-0053
(sic) entitled Teofilo Gelacio vs.
Mansueto J. Honrada, et al.;
3. That honestly, the said certificate was issued
without my expectation that the same
be used as evidence in any case and I
be a witness;
4. That the use of said certificate as evidence in
the above-mentioned cases is against
my conscience, more so upon discovery
that the cases aforesaid are known to
me to be politically motivated and
involves [sic] big time politicians in
Agusan del Sur about whom I am not at
liberty to name names for security
reason; cdta
5. That in view of all the foregoing, I am not
interested to testify in any investigation
to be conducted in connection thereof,
either in the administrative or criminal
proceedings.
Thus, Judge Ariño never denied his earlier Certification
that Criminal Case No. 1393 "never reached the arraignment
stage," because having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned
the Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscal's resolution,
Judge Ariño suspended action until March 17, 1986 and in fact
the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case.
The fact that Judge Ariño did not anticipate that his
certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal
cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to
disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ariño did not retract his
previous Certification that there was no arraignment held in
Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he
now says he did not anticipate that his certificate would be
used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the
value of the certificate. cdta
Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty.
Sansaet proof that GIO II Violan was biased against petitioners.
Petitioners contend that Sansaet's confession was privileged
and that Violan herself acknowledged that the affidavit of
retraction might be inadmissible in court.
In the first place, there is nothing in the resolution of
Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that
petitioners were probably guilty of falsification of public
documents) on Atty. Sansaet's retraction. In her resolution, all
that she stated is that "the confession of Atty. Sansaet has
important bearing in this case." Otherwise she did not cite the
confession as proof of the falsification of public documents. To
the contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in
violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be
inadmissible in evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have
relied on the affidavit of retraction.
Moreover, the admissibility of this piece of evidence is
a question for the Sandiganbayan to determine in the event it is
used by the prosecution. It is untenable to ascribe bias and
partiality to the investigator because she considered this
retraction in her resolution of the case. Even if she relied on it
mere "divergence of opinions between a judge and a party's
counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient
ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case on the
ground of bias and partiality. " 8 dta
As for Prosecutor Querubin, simply because he was the
one who handled the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800,
in connection with which the documents allegedly falsified were
used by petitioners, is not a reason for supposing he could not
act fairly. As any other counsel in a case, it was his duty to act
with "full devotion to [his client's] genuine interests, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability." 9 It cannot be casually
assumed that because of his engagement in that case he had
lost his objectivity to such an extent that he forsook his duty to
see to it that justice was done and not to act out of
vindictiveness.
Indeed, Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private
attorney. In the familiar terminology, he is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that
justice shall be done. 10 It may therefore be assumed that he
was merely performing an official duty and that nothing
personal was involved in his recommendation to prosecute the
cases.
Above all, it should be stressed that the decision to
charge petitioners in the Sandiganbayan was the decision not
only of one person but of all those who in one way or another
were called upon to act in the cases, namely: Graft Investigation
Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Deputy Ombudsman Cesar
Nitorreda, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and Special
Prosecutor Aniano Desierto. Indeed, Querubin's only
contribution to the process was to suggest the filing of three
separate informations of falsification of public documents
against petitioners. cdta
II.
The second ground for the petition is that the Office of
the Ombudsman closed its eyes to the fact that in filing these
cases, complainant Teofilo Gelacio is guilty of forum-shopping
and that his purpose for the filing of the cases is simply political
harassment. To buttress their contention, petitioners call
attention to the factual background of the cases. 11
According to petitioners, way back in 1984 private
respondent Teofilo Gelacio charged petitioner Paredes, Jr. with
perjury on the ground that in 1975 Paredes, Jr. made false
statements in an affidavit which he used in support of his
application for a free patent. As already noted, the case which
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, and docketed there as Criminal Case No. 1393,
was dismissed on March 24, 1986 upon motion of the
prosecution.
On October 28, 1986, Teofilo Gelacio filed another
complaint against petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the acting
governor of the province. The complaint was for violation of
§3(a) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1976 petitioner Paredes, Jr.,
then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, unduly
"persuaded, induced and influenced" the Public Land Inspector
to approve his (Paredes, Jr.'s) application for a free patent.
According to petitioners, this case involved the same
application for a free patent of petitioner Paredes, Jr., which
was the subject of Criminal Case No. 1393. cdta
The information was filed by Special Prosecutor
Erdulfo Querubin in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 13800. Petitioner Paredes, Jr. moved to
quash the information, but the court denied his motion. He
then filed a motion for reconsideration. It was in connection
with this motion that the procurement of allegedly falsified
documents, now the subject of prosecution, was made by
petitioner Paredes, Jr. The documents were used to support his
motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
previous resolution and dismissed Criminal Case No. 13800,
although on the ground of prescription. The Office of the
Ombudsman sought a review of the action of
the Sandiganbayan, but its petition was dismissed by this Court
on July 3, 1992 in G.R. No. 101724. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution was likewise denied.
As an offshoot of the execution of these documents,
two cases were filed by Teofilo Gelacio: (1) an administrative
complaint (A.P. Case No. P-90-396) for falsification of public
documents which was filed with this Court against Mansueto
Honrada, the clerk of the MCTC who made certifications and (2)
a complaint for falsification of public documents, initially filed
as OMB-MIN-90-0053 with the Office of the Ombudsman and
eventually as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 in
the Sandiganbayan, against the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
Sansaet. cdta
The first case was dismissed for insufficiency of the
evidence. But with respect to the second complaint, Graft
Investigation Officer Violan found probable cause to proceed
against petitioners and against Atty. Sansaet and so
recommended the filing of a case against them. Her
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June 26,
1992, although upon the recommendation of Special Prosecutor
Querubin three separate informations were filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Earlier on July 29, 1991, Atty. Sansaet, one
of the respondents, executed an Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications in which he stated that, contrary to his previous
affidavit, there was no arraignment held in Criminal Case No.
1393.
A. Petitioners contend that these cases should be
dismissed, being merely the latest in a series of cases which
"arose out of the same alleged incident — i.e. that of allegedly
having induced the land inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jr.'s)
land application," 12 for having been filed in violation of the
rules on forum-shopping. Petitioners cite the following
statement in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission: 13
There is forum-shopping whenever as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the
courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of
an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. . . . A violation of this rule
shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a
cause for summary dismissal of both petitions,
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel or the party
concerned. cdta
The mere filing of several cases based on the same
incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The
test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions, essential facts, and circumstances. 14 Here,
although several cases were filed by the same complainant
against the same defendant and the subject matter of the
actions of two of the cases was the same incident (i.e., the
application for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.),
the fact is that the several cases involve essentially different
facts, circumstances and causes of action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the
MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, was for perjury, based
on false statements allegedly made in 1975 by
petitioner Paredes, Jr. in connection with his free patent
application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which was filed in
the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same
application for free patent, was for violation of the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as
Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land
Inspector to secure the approval of his free patent application.
On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases
(Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for
falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No.
1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against
petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that
are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are
incidents of these cases, being the petition for review and
motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P.
Case No. P-90-396.
Thus the present cases involve substantially different
transactions, facts and circumstances from those involved in
the other, though related, cases. Although they arose from the
same incident, i.e., petitioner's public land application, they
involve different issues. It is well settled that a single act may
offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of
law 15 or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability. 16 As such, they may be prosecuted
simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not
place the accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the
same offense. cdta
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the
administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada was
dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez 17 that
only this Court has the power to oversee court personnel's
compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative evidence and that the use of the certificate in the cases below
action against them for their failure to do so and that no other was "against his conscience," because the cases were politically
branch of the government may exercise this power without motivated and he was not going to testify in any investigation
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers. concerning such certificate. 21 At the same time petitioners
seek to minimize the retraction of Atty. Sansaet by ascribing
But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another
political motivation for its execution. Petitioner
thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. claims that Sansaet's obsession has been
determination of the administrative liability for falsification of
to win in an election and that his loss to petitioner Paredes, Jr.
public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal
in the May 11, 1992 congressional elections was Sansaet's sixth
liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, 18 the dismissal of
defeat. As for private respondent Teofilo Gelacio, petitioners
an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
say he is a political leader of Democrito Plaza. They claim that in
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were
1991 Atty. Sansaet changed political affiliation and allied
the subject of the administrative complaint.
himself with Democrito Plaza and Teofilo Gelacio.
Petitioner's assertion that private respondent Alterado
Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the
has resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The
clerk of court with respect to an arraignment allegedly held on
investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the
July 9, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 1393 is conclusive and cannot
criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and
be altered by Atty. Sansaet's claim to the contrary. They cite
Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the
what is now Rule 132, §23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are
which provides that "public instruments are evidence, even
entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
one conclude the other. Thus an absolution from a criminal
execution and of the date of the latter." cdta
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of
the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa. We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive.
19 cdta First of all, that the filing of the charges is politically motivated
cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there
B. As final argument, petitioners allege that the
is otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary
complaint in Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793 was
investigation of the complaint against petitioners was held
filed by political enemies of petitioner Paredes, Jr. merely to
during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as
harass him and that there is in fact no probable cause to
that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great
support the prosecution of these cases. Petitioners cite the
detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violan's resolution was
following which allegedly indicate that the charges below have
reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his
merely been trumped up:
own detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violan. We
(1) The affidavit of Agusan del Sur District Citizen's cannot say that, in approving the resolutions of two
Attorney Lou Nueva, stating that then Congressman Democrito investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special
O. Plaza instructed Atty. Leonardo Cadiz to secure a certification Prosecutor committed an abuse of their discretion.
from Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño that no arraignment had been held
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the
in Criminal Case No. 1393, threatening that if the judge refused
discretion of the Ombudsman unless such discretion is clearly
to give the certification, he (Congressman Plaza) would do
shown to have been abused. As explained in Young v. Office of
"everything against Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño," including "reviving
the Ombudsman: 22
certain cases against Judge Ariño;" 20 and
The rule is based not only upon respect
(2) The affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, of Judge
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
Ariño in which he stated that he did not expect that the
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
certificate which he had previously issued would be used in
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
 Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant. cdta
There are instances, constituting exceptions to the
general rule, when this Court will intervene in the prosecution
of cases. Some of these instances were enumerated inBrocka v.
Enrile, 23 as follows:
a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity
to afford protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95)
b. When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil.
304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et
al. L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA
607)
c. When there is a prejudicial question which
is sub judice; (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202) cdta
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62)
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil 556; Yu Co Eng vs.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389)
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140) cdta
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-
G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L. J. (1953), cited
in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No.
30720-R, October 8, 1962; cf Guingona,
et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4,
1984, 128 SCRA 577) cdta
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and motion to
quash on that ground has been denied;
(Salonga vs. Paño n, et al. L-59524,
February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners. (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-
6374, August 1, 1953) (cited in
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed.). cdta
But none of these instances is present here.
What petitioners raise are questions which go to the
weight to be given to the affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge
Ariño. These are matters for the trial court's appreciation. A
preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the
government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause. 24 As we
explained in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, 25 this function involves
only the following:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground
of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
(Words and Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p.
12) The term does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge. cdta
Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment
so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant
possesses the power and the influence to control the
prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is handled by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that
petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution
by his political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been
alleged, much less shown, that his enemies have influence and
power over the national prosecution service.
To show political harassment petitioners must prove
that public prosecutor, and not just the private complainant, is
acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case 26 or has lent himself
to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the
accused in contempt and disrepute. 27 For it is only if he does
so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary
investigation, be said to have deserted the performance of his
office to determine objectively and impartially the existence of
probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in what is
essentially his province.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
is DISMISSED. cdta
SO ORDERED.
||| (Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, [January 31,
1996], 322 PHIL 709-736)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86647. February 5, 1990.]
REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner, vs. HON.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND ROMEO L.
SANTOS, respondents.
Virgilio P. Robles for and in his own behalf.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private
respondent.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19,
1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent Motion to Recall
and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated January 26, 1989,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos
were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district
of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections.
Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23,
1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent
HRET. He alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District
of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the
commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms,
on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the
canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the
recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts
(pp. 16-20, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to
the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack
of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest. cdrep
On August 15, 1988, respondent HRET issued an order setting the
commencement of the revision of contested ballots on September
1, 1988 and directed protestant Santos to identify 25% of the total
contested precincts which he desires to be revised first in
accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (pp. 76-77, Rollo).
On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts,
representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was
terminated.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos filed a Motion to
Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts (pp. 78-80, Rollo).
No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion
to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts were yet taken by
respondent HRET when on September 14, 1988, Santos filed an
Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest (pp.
81-85, Rollo). On September 19, 1988, Robles opposed Santos'
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest in an Urgent
Motion to Cancel Continuation of Revision with Opposition to
Motion to Recall Withdrawal (pp. 86-91, Rollo). On the same day,
respondent HRET issued a resolution which, among others, granted
Santos' Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest. The said resolution states:
"House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Case No. 43 (Romeo L. Santos vs. Virgilio P.
Robles). Three pleadings are submitted for
consideration by the Tribunal: (a) Protestee's
'Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision,' dated
September 8, 1988; (b) Protestant's 'Motion to
Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and
Motion to Set Case for Hearing,' dated
September 12, 1988; and (c) Protestant's
'Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard
Withdrawal of Protest,' dated September 14,
1988.
"Upon the filing of Protestant's Motion to
Withdraw Protest, the revision of ballots was
stopped and such revision remains suspended
until now. In view of such suspension, there is
no need to act on Protestee's Motion.
"The 'Motion to Withdraw Protest,' has been
withdrawn by Protestant's later motion, and
therefore need not be acted upon.
"WHEREFORE, Protestee's 'Urgent Motion to
Suspend Revision' and Protestant's 'Motion to
Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest' is GRANTED.
"The Secretary of the Tribunal is directed to
schedule the resumption of the revision on
September 26, 1988 and to send out the
necessary notices for this purpose." (p.
84, Rollo)
On September 20, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion and
Manifestation praying that his Urgent Motion to Cancel Revision
with Opposition to Motion to Recall dated September 19, 1988 be
treated as a Motion for Reconsideration of the HRET resolution of
September 19, 1988 (pp. 92-94, Rollo). LexLib
On September 22, 1988, respondent HRET directed Santos to
comment on Robles' "Urgent Motion to Cancel Continuation of
Revision with Opposition to Motion to Recall Withdrawal" and
ordered the suspension of the resumption of revision scheduled for
September 26, 1988.
On January 26, 1989, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal denied Robles' Motion for Reconsideration (pp. 109-
111, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition was filed on February 1, 1989
(pp. 1-14, Rollo).
On February 2, 1989, We required the respondent to comment
within ten (10) days from notice of the petition (p. 118, Rollo). On
February 9, 1989, petitioner Robles filed an Urgent Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Injunction or Restraining Order (pp. 119-
120, Rollo) which We Noted on February 16, 1989. Petitioner's
Motion for Leave to File Reply to Comment was granted in the same
resolution of February 16, 1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition (p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning
respondent HRET's February 16, 1989 resolution denying
petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision until this Court has
finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a partial
determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal Rules was had with private
respondent Santos making a recovery of 267 votes (see Annex "C" of
Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo).
It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private
respondent Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated
September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the
case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the
revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the
withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
We do not agree with petitioner.
It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest
on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon
was taken by respondent HRET. Contrary to petitioner's claim that
the motion to withdraw was favorably acted upon, the records show
that it was only on September 19, 1988 when respondent HRET
resolved said motion together with two other motions. The
questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3)
motions, namely: a) Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision
dated September 8, 1988; b) Protestant's Motion to Withdraw
Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing
dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestant's 'Urgent Motion to
Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest,' dated September 14,
1988. The resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, Protestee's 'Urgent Motion to
Suspend Revision' and Protestant's 'Motion to
Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of
Protest' is GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx"
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated (Jimenez v.
Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal when it held:
"We cannot agree with Protestee's contention
that Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest
on Unrevised Precincts' effectively with drew
the precincts referred to therein from the
protest even before the Tribunal has acted
thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the
authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal becomes effective only when the
Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would
permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction already acquired.
"We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the
power and the authority to grant or deny
Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to
insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient
authority to see to it that the will of the
electorate is ascertained.
"Since Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest
on the Unrevised Precincts' had not been acted
upon by this Tribunal before it was recalled by
the Protestant, it did not have the effect of
removing the precincts covered thereby from
the protest. If these precincts were not
withdrawn from the protest, then the granting
of Protestant's 'Urgent Motion to Recall and
Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' did not
amount to allowing the refiling of protest
beyond the reglementary period."
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its
jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614,
July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna,
G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564). This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many
cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297,
December 8, 1988, thus:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162].
The exercise of the Power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
been described as `intended to be complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature' [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'
[Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818
(1948)] and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission
[Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25,
1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
'judicial review of decisions or final resolutions
of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible
only in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of
a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly
constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for
such abuse."
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing
a writ of certiorari will not issue. LibLex the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by SO ORDERED.
respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e.,
that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of ||| (Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from 86647, [February 5, 1990], 260 PHIL 831-839)
being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public
office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted
on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to the office. This
is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that
any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully
resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important
that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a
constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural
play of words.
The case of Dimaporo v. Estipona (G.R. No. L-17358, May 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 282) relied upon by petitioner does not help to bolster his case
because the facts attendant therein are different from the case at
bar. In the said case, the motion to withdraw was favorably acted
upon before the resolution thereon was questioned.
As regards petitioner's Supplemental Petition questioning
respondent tribunal's resolution denying his motion to defer or
reset revision of the remaining seventy-five (75) per cent of the
contested precincts, the same has become academic in view of the
fact that the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and was
terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's Memorandum,
p. 208, Rollo). This fact was not rebutted by petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process
when respondent tribunal rendered a partial determination
pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos
made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first twenty-
five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The
partial determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the
votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of which both parties
were properly represented. cdll
It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest
is impressed with public interest in the sense that the public is
interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v.
Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private interests must yield to
what is for the common good.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84297. December 8, 1988.]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE
HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G.
TIMBOL, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTION CONTEST; JURISDICTION OF
THE COMELEC AND THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. — That Sec. 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang
Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has
already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a
bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec.
17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to elective
regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to
those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
2. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; POWERS. — The power of
the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by
the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; HISTORICAL BACKGROUND REGARDING THE GRANT OF
POWER TO A BODY TO JUDGE ELECTION PROTESTS. — A short
review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under
the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the
legislative body itself or to an independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature. Except under the 1973
Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislative body. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions,
which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three
branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular
purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals)
[see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818]. It was
only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between
the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by
constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election
contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the
COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of
elections for all elective national and local officials.
4. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF COMELEC TO HEAR AND DECIDE
ELECTION CONTESTS TRIMMED DOWN UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS POWER TO
PRESCRIBE PERIOD TO FILE PROTESTS. — With regard to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests.
This has been trimmed down underthe 1987 Constitution. Whereas
the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987
Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of
municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly
makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members
[Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is
that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period
within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not
only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more
importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
5. ID.;ID.;HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; HAS DISCRETIONARY
POWER TO ISSUE RESTRAINING ORDER OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION. — The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a
protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the
determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to
support the prayer for the aforementioned ancillary remedies also
lies within the HRET's sound judgment.
6. ID.; SUPREME COURT; CANNOT GENERALLY REVIEW FINAL
ACTION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ON MATTERS WITHIN ITS
JURISDICTION. — So long as the Constitutiongrants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court.
As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on
the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or
even affect the same."
7. ID.; ID.; MAY INTERFERE WITH THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL'S
JUDGMENT WHICH WAS RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the
Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court
includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment.
DECISION
CORTES,J p:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the elections
of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private
respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But
since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his
objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On
May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate
for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the
COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed
with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May
27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private
respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare
petitioner's proclamation void ab initio.Later, private respondent
also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The
COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able
to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab
initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this
Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission
on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol,"
docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January
25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of
petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent
filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter
referred to as "HRET") an election protest, docketed as Case No.
46. LLjur
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the
ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET ruled that the
protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET
Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction
of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.
A. The Main Case
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of
the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the
protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time, and (2)
its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition. The Solicitor General filed
a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed
his comment with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the
petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments
filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case
submitted for decision.
Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision
governs the period for filing protests in the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's
election protest would have been filed out of time. On the other
hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the
protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is
whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably
filed. cdphil
To support his contention that private respondent's protest had
been filed out of time and, therefore, the HRET did not acquire
jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides:
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
offices.— A sworn petition contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city
official shall be filed with the Commission by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same
office,within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election.[Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an
election protest was suspended by the pendency of the petition to
annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time,
considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore
private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that
private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on
May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again
on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a
copy of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 80007; that private
respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6,
1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent
filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was filed on time, the
HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987
Congressional elections shall be filed with the
Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed
at the post office as registered matter
addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal,
together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof
plus one (1) copy for each protestee, within
fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these
Rules on November 22, 1987 where the
proclamation has been made prior to the
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same
may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the
date of the proclamation.Election contests
arising from the 1987 Congressional elections
filed with the Secretary of the House of
Representatives and transmitted by him to the
Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed
with the Tribunal as of the date of effectivity of
these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as
prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Thus, ruled the HRET:
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest
should have been filed within fifteen (15) days
from November 22, 1987, or not later than
December 7, 1987. However, on September 15,
1987, the COMELEC, acting upon a petition filed
by the Protestant (private respondent
herein),promulgated a Resolution declaring the
proclamation void ab initio.This resolution had
the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and
such proclamation was not reinstated until
Protestant received a copy of the Supreme
Court's decision annulling the COMELEC
Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents
and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner
herein) proclamation became effective only on
January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for
Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned
from that date.
 Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988,
or eleven (11) days after January 28. The
protest, therefore, was filed well within the
reglementary period provided by the Rules of
this Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.].
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and,
hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is
misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs no
interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the
COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore,
Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code
which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial
and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the1973
Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the
jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the
Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. cdrep
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests
regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective
under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang
Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is
now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art.
VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to
elective regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate
jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art.
IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election were
generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11,
1987. It must be emphasized, however, that such does not
necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to
each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as
petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election
Code was only one of several laws governing said elections. **
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive
orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within
which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals.
Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing
the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be
prescribed by statute.
The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for
filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making
power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by
the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)],where
the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain
terms:
...[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission
carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is
conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth
ed.,vol. I, pp. 138, 139).In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before
the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177;
emphasis supplied.]
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except
under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the
legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of
Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or
to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the
legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935
and the 1987 Constitutions]. Cdpr
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of
being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character
of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175].Earlier,
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as " full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board
 of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained
as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R.
No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may
be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly
apportion the powers of the three branches of government, lodge
the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent,
impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral
Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973
Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the
Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional
experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests
involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC,
an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for
all elective national and local officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully
to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members,
consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three
branches of government under the presidential system, is too
evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially
retained the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the
exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law
enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for
election purposes; to register political parties and accredit citizens'
arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters
and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art.
IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this
sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where
specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide
election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987
Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC
with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec.
2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city
officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)],
expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House
of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members
[Art. VI, Sec. 17]. LLpr
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well
within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which
protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical
precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear
language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been
filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be
charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
B. Private Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition
Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as
the Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the
pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET
resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the
grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the
HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have
the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on
the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be
doubted.
The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition
is not forthcoming.
The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within
the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of
whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer
for the aforementioned ancillary remedies also lies within the
HRET's sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court
declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral
protest, this Court said:
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation
(which had been previously ordered by the
COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency
of the protests of the rival candidates, is a
matter that is also addressed, considering the
premises, to the sound judgment of the
Electoral Tribunal.
Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside
the HRET's resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional
relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not
yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is
actually nothing to review or annul and set aside. But then again, so
long as theConstitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as
a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power
granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
"excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same."
[Lachica v. Yap,supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v.
Bocar [66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)], the Court declared that "[t]he
judgment rendered by the Electoral] Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference,
except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due
process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the
Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court
includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. llcd
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private
respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
84297, [December 8, 1988], 250 PHIL 390-403)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83767. October 27, 1988.]
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A.
ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL
KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE
G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S.
GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, EVA R. ESTRADA-
KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE
P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR,
BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO
JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT,
EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES,
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R.
VELOSO, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE ELECTORA
L TRIBUNAL, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO ITS RULES (SEC. 24), NOT FEASIBLE. — The
proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) —
requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature — is a proviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought. We do not agree with petitioners'
thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant
to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental
objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPIRIT BEHIND THE PROPORTION OF SENATORS TO
JUSTICES AS MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL. — It seems quite clear to
us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices
of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. Said
intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion
of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable indication
that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPOSED MASS DISQUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS
SHOULD NOT BE COUNTENANCED; REASONS. — The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal
no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body
can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators. To our mind, this
is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law. Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of
its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI DOES NOT
LIE; TRIBUNAL DID NOT ACT WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The
charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in
its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the
circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing
the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein
petitioners.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring:
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY. — Should any three (3) Senator-Members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify
themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No.
002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the
three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and
still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both
the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners
and the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed
"judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals
would appear to be substantially met and served.
This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not
compelled by certiorari.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12,
1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners'
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for
Reconsideration thereafter filed. LLphil
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed
senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the
Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and
Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of
Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had
been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada,
the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the
Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the
respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of
SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator
Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had
filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to
Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially
the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in
the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the
petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition.
Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were
heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing
the Resolutions now complained of. Cdpr
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited
himself from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the
respondent Tribunal in both SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No.
001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto S. Sanchez
against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative
respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two
cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public
policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of the
questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable
and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of
the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the
contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) —
requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature — is a provisothat where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is
neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that
in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the
plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article
VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be
staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and
"legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated
one part of this proposition when it held that said provision ". . . is a
clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests . . . shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in
that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course, is that
the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 — an unmistakable indication
that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. prcd
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in
the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last
time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or
for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and
sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively. LexLib
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member
of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that
his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its
discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must
therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition
filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinion

FELICIANO, J ., concurring:

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his
opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward however
slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of his
opinion.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal
would result that would be balanced between the three (3) Justice-
Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute
more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the
considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and
the constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed
"judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals
would appear to be substantially met and served.
This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not
compelled by certiorari. LLjur

||| (Firdausi Smail Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

83767 (Resolution), [October 27, 1988], 248 PHIL 879-886)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]
DR. EMIGDIO A.
BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES
MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M.
PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.,or
any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr.,and THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL,respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C . Felixmera and Horacio
S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R.Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION";DEFINED. — The
accepted meaning of "political question" is that "where the matter
involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign
capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the
legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party
proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of
its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act."
(Aquino vs.Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL; DEFINES "JUDICIAL POWER." — Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines judicial
power as both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
3. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT UNDER THE 1935
CONSTITUTION. — Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman." Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of
the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and
second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTISAN. — The use of the
word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section
11 of the 1935 Constitutionunderscores the exclusive jurisdiction of
the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs.House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990).The tribunal was created
to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate
and House of Representatives: "The purpose of the constitutional
convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and
to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members. "The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the
National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained in the legislature." "The Electoral Tribunals of the
Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special
tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and,
as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select
their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without
any legislative interference." (Suanes vs.Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.) To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction,
the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent.Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared
by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. "The Electoral
Commission is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature. "The Electoral Commission, a
constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assemblymay not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of
the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly." (Angara vs.Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139.)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
REMOVE A MEMBER FROM THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The independence of the House Electoral
Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of
our Constitution,would, however, be a myth and its proceedings a
farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein,
may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests
of the party in power. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote
in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be thesole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the House of
Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the
party in power. The expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not
for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of
the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the
House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional
mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND "BREACH OF PARTY
DISCIPLINE" NOT VALID GROUND FOR TERMINATION OF
MEMBERSHIP THEREIN. — As judges, the members of the House
Electoral Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence — even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on
the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERS THEREIN ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE;
REMOVAL MUST BE FOR A VALID CAUSE. — The resolution of the
House of Representatives expelling Congressman Camasura violates
his right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge"
of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.
PADILLA, J.,dissenting:
1. POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF "SEPARATION OF
POWERS";EXPLAINED. — A fundamental principle in our
constitutional system is that the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) great departments: legislative,
executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate from,
yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its
authority directly from the fundamental law. As Mr. Justice
Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not only
coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While
interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its
functions fully and adequately without the other, they are
nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to
say, one department may not control or even interfere with another
in the exercise of its particular functions." The completeness of their
separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to
the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and
treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to
the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every
other department. In other words, one department must not
encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the constitutional
competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department.That department
alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to
exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of
whomsoever.
2. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE POWER TO APPOINT OR
DESIGNATE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO BE
A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NECESSARILY
INCLUDE THE POWER TO REMOVE SAID MEMBER. — The power to
appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to
be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, necessarily
include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the
nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will
maintain the proportional representation of the political parties,
mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected,
no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law,
it is said, is concerned with power not
with policy,wisdom or expediency.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW
ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR ACTION OF LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
TAKEN IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER COMMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO IT
BY THE CONSTITUTION; CASE AT BAR. — The judicial department, in
my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of
power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. It is not within
the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee
legislative acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety,
fairness and common sense. Such acts, are exclusively of legislative
concern. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of
separation of powers. Even assuming that the act of the House of
Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal is politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the
knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral
protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done
within the limits of its constitutional power.
SARMIENTO, J.,dissenting:
POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION";BEYOND JUDICIAL
INTERFERENCE. — I believe that the question, can the Court annul
an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a
political question and a question in which the Court can not
intervene. It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this
Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of
separation of powers. Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster
from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers within the
lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices
should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of
politics. If they do, they risk their independence.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO,J p:
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the
Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House? LLphil
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803),had hesitated to embark the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the
upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the Associate Justice
the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the Supreme Court
into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when
prerogatives. a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone
who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest It is — ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political
confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head "a plain exercise of the judicial power, that Associate Justice
ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the power vested in courts to enable them to
accepted meaning of which is that "where the matter involved is left administer justice according to law. ...It is simply Supreme Court
to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to a necessary concomitant of the power to hear
the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive and dispose of a case or controversy properly
branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it before the court, to the determination of which
was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the must be brought the test and measure of the FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the law." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile,59 SCRA 183, 196.). Associate Justice
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987,
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
Supreme Court
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District
As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in
plenary power is granted either department of government may not the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the Pampanga:
abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a Congressman
constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is 1st Dist.,Benguet
Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes
to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility
of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches LDP
Difference 3,300 votes
have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile,59 SCRA 183, 196). On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is Congressman
of the Philippines which defines judicial power as composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the
Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of 1st Dist.,Palawan
both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered LDP
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art.
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." VI,1987 Constitution) as follows:
 SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the
least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case. Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Congressman 2nd Dist.,Nueva Ecija Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991,
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
LDP in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The
Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman letter reads as follows:
Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. LLpr
"13 March 1991
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member March 4, 1991, to his "Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., "Honorable Justice Ameurfina
LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case Melencio-Herrera
Congressman but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice Chairman
and self-respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among House of Representatives
1st Dist.,Davao del Sur the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of Electoral Tribunal
the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's Constitution Hills Quezon City
LDP
revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry "Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority
in the Tribunal. "I have the honor to notify the House of
Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of of Representatives during its plenary session on
Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and
Congressman copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito
1991. G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
4th Dist.,Batangas Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc which is self-explanatory and copies of which
LDP decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura are hereto attached.
by letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91, had "Thank you.
already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the
LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "For the Secretary-General
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP "(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
Congressman members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as
those acts are "not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical and "Officer-in-charge
2nd Dist.,Zamboanga del Sur immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and Operations Department"
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the
(formerly GAD, now NP). LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3 (p. 10, Rollo.)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and
submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for
decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point,
the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a re appreciation and
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon
V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP,
and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to
take note of it "especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite." 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the
Tribunal, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of
this "distressing development" and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because —
"By the above action (of the House) the
promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in
the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v.
Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25),previously
scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73777-78, promulgated 12
September 1990).Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision
which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be
confidently expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant
which would have been defeated.
"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as
early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes
in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some
members of the Tribunal requested re-
appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of
the decision had to be deferred by at least 4
months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the
decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in
favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by
Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani
A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and
Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio
H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March
1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino,
David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr.
and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
"Congressman Camasura's vote in the Bondoc v.
Pined case was, in our view, a conscience vote,
for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal
but also the loss of the confidence of the
leadership of his party.
"Under the above circumstances, an untenable
situation has come about. It is extremely
difficult to continue with membership in the
Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its
integrity and credibility as a constitutional body
charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that
the unseating of an incumbent member of
Congress is being prevented at all costs. We
believe that the Tribunal should not be
hampered in the performance of its
constitutional function by factors which have
nothing to do with the merits of the cases
before it.
"In this connection, our own experience teaches
that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article
VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should
be amended to provide instead for a return to
the composition mandated in the 1935
Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen
by the House or Senate upon nomination of the
party having the largest number of votes and
three (3) of the party having the second largest
number of votes: and a judicial component
consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of
parties can dominate the legislative component
in the Tribunal.
"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as
the sole judge of all such contests involving
members of the Senate. In this way, there
should be lesser chances of non-judicial
elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
"We suggest that there should also be a
provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral
Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence
and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal
deliberations.
"There are only three (3) remaining cases for
decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have
been promulgated today, 14 March
1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is
scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991
and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No.
45),after the Holy Week recess.
"But political factors are blocking the
accomplishment of the constitutionally
mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the
completion of the present congressional term.
"Under these circumstances, we are compelled
to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
"xxx xxx xxx".
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day,
the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution
reads:
"In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has
received at 9:45 this morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held
on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal
Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its
Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No.
25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is
because, without Congressman Camasura's
vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five
members as required by Section 24 of the Rules
of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
"The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-
members of the Supreme Court, being of the
opinion that this development undermines the
independence of the Tribunal and derails the
orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they
have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even
date, for their relief from membership in the
Tribunal.
 "The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman
Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign
as a member of the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen
Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr.,and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention."
(p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for
relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them
to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed
that: LibLex
". . . in view of the sensitive constitutional
functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole
judge' of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of
Congress, all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases
before them and that in the contemplation of
the Constitution the members-legislators,
thereof, upon assumption of their duties
therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political
parties but as impartial judges. The view was
also submitted that, to further bolster the
independence of the Tribunals, the term of
office of every member thereof should be
considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally
terminated except only by death, resignation,
permanent disability, or removal for valid cause,
not including political disloyalty.
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to
DECLINE the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz,
and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them
to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its
concern over the intrusion of non-judicial
factors in the proceedings of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which
performs functions purely judicial in character
despite the inclusion of legislators in its
membership; and c) to NOTE the new that the
term of all the members of the Electoral
Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is
co-extensive with the corresponding legislative
term and cannot be terminated at will but only
for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the
Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the
issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
"Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I
concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura
should be allowed to cast his original vote in
favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political
and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-
Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave."
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito
G. Camasura, Jr.,or any other representative who may be appointed
Vice Representative Juanito G. Camasura Jr.,and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of
Representatives of March 13, 1991, "to
withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
nomination of Representative Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining
respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be
designated in place of respondent Camasura
from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Camasura to immediately reassume
and discharge his functions as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and
equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course,
required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten
days from notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M.
Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanito G.
Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until
the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the
election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by
the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the
petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by
the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on
Appointments as well),hence, it allegedly has the sole power to
remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive
with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of
the LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House of
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the
reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol
alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him
because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership
in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House
of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House,
not the HRET, that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar
vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is
erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the
HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the
House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a
member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner
argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the
assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged
that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET
Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the
Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to
the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner
for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give
recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the
Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner
explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the
respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives
had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HRET, several newspapers of general circulation
reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and
elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in
the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by
the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of
an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse
of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer
to that question. It provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be members
of the Senate or House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,
except the provision on the representation of the main political
parties in the tribunal which is now based
onproportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and
second largest political aggravations in the Legislature. The 1935
constitutional provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (1935 Constitution of the
Philippines.).
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and
it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the
tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the
Batasang Pambansa. LLpr
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990).The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-
political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said
about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
"The purpose of the constitutional convention
creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all
the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
"The power granted to the electoral
Commission to judge contests relating to the
election and qualification of members of the
National Assembly is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature."
"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the
House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own
employees, and to supervise and control them,
without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.
"The Electoral Commission is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of
government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an
 independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a
body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
xxx xxx xxx.
"The Electoral Commission, a constitutional
organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits
of its authority, but the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for
the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating
to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved
undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges
on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
"My questions will be very basic so we can go as
fast as we can. In the case of the electoral
tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is
it correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these
with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate
of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good
distinction?.
"MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say
that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional
body?
"MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body,
is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
"MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to
constitutional restrictions intended for that
body.
"MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out
if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present
bodies we are creating since it ruled that the
electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the government. Would that
ruling still be valid?
"MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate
departments because the separate departments
are the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not
separate departments of government, I would
like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding
on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from
Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress has no
power to regulate proceedings of these electoral
tribunals.
"MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are
independent although they are not a separate
branch of government.
"MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in
all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule
is to leave unto themselves the determination of
controversies with respect to the election and
qualifications of their members, and precisely
they have this Committee on Privileges which
takes care of this particular controversy.
"Would the Gentleman say that the creation of
electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule
because apparently we have an independent
electoral tribunal?
"MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral
tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman
will notice that the wordings say: `The Senate
and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal.' It is still the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the
House and tribunal of the Senate although they
are independent.
"MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we
have agreed on, are independent from both
bodies?
"MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
"MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my
question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians
sitting in both tribunals?
"MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent,
Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we
discussed a portion of this in the Committee on
the Executive, there was a comment by Chief
Justice Concepcion — Commissioner
Concepcion — that there seems to be some
incongruity in these electoral tribunals,
considering that politicians still sit in the
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in
the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral
Tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete
detachment from all political considerations.
That is why I am asking now for the record how
 we could achieve such detachment when there
are six politicians sitting there.
"MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the
Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence,
shown independence in the proceedings of this
Commission. I think we can also trust that the
members of the tribunals will be independent."
(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986,
Emphasis ours.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET.—
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution,would, however, be a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or
the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political
(as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral
tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in
the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal
to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP
member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate
may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not
a valid cause for
termination of membership
in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence — even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and
"breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura
from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of theConstitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore,
null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman
Camasura violates his
right to security of tenure.—
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's
right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure. LLjur
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that
members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security
of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices
in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional
term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his
elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced
by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of
absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed,
however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET
had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to
remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to
go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid
reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a
pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled
from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he
had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in
the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the
HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could
be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House
of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET
in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the
protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party
in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his
plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of
Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to
exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights
as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be
the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring
opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile,59 SCRA
183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a
lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits
of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void
the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to
the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abinitio for being
violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura,
Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-
0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A.
Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay
incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies
thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.
Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr.,JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.,dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of
Representatives, assuming that said act were politically motivated,
but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so
on the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government."
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House
of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to
the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura,
Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I
cannot join the majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the
almost sacramental doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the
others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental
law. 1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments
are not only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While
interdependent, in the sense that each is unable to perform its
functions fully and adequately without the other, they are
nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to
say, one department may not control or even interfere with another
in the exercise of its particular functions." ' 2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence
does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in
one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority
in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as
nugatory and not binding in every other department. 3 In other
words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with
acts done within the constitutional competence of the other where
full discretionary authority has been delegated by the Constitutionto
said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any
encroachment or interference of whomsoever. 4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the
judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial review and
prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political
questions. 5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the
House of Representatives withdrew and rescinded the nomination
of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J.
Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly
having invited other LDP members to join the said political party. As
a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House
Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House
of Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed
of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a ploy to thwart the
promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him
(petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M, Pineda, a member of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),and which decision would be
favorable to him (Bontoc).Petitioner contends that not only does
the action of the House of Representatives violate the
independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also
violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said
electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that
the House of Representatives has the sole authority to nominate
and select from among its members who are to sit in the House
Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties
therein, hence, it also has the sole power to remove any of them
from the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation
of the political parties in the House is materially changed on account
of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House member from
a political party. A Tribunal member's term of office in said electoral
tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his
legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision
mandating representation in the electoral tribunal based on political
affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of
the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of
the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of the
tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members
come from the members of the House chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party list system. 6 The
House of Representatives has the power to nominate the members
of the House Electoral Tribunal (representing the House) provided,
of course, that the proportional representation of parties is
maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination
extended to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing the
House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has
expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint
or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind,
necessarily include the power to remove said member. A
withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where
such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of
the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be
recognized and respected, no matter how politically motivated it
might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not
with policy, wisdom or expediency. 7 The question that must be
asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House
of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not
whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has
done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act
done within the constitutional authority to the legislature? I believe
not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot question
the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the
Justices who sit as members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Matters such as — who will be designated or nominated as
members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote — surely
are matters that not merely concern political action as far as
members of the House are concerned, but are the very essence of
political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open
courts of justice to such political controversies would have courts sit
in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
maneuvers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the
political arena which in the long run could undermine and destroy
their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to
it by the Constitution. 8 It is not within the province of this Court to
supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them
within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such
acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern. 9 To ballots.The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the power to institute
hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on
powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find which all else depend, the vitality of a political system would be
among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary for any and all political
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result. It is the
that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be understood that the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant
three (3) 'Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as about their government to the end that they can continue to live
it were, a Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task
Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be to the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of
better evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity democratic government itself.
of the decision of one 'Department' as to its authority on a given
occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
supreme the 'Department' that has the last word." 10 (Emphasis
supplied). SARMIENTO, J ., dissenting:
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am
division of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its own unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the question, as
ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress,
because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and
would be and so temporarily accepts the existing one, or because a question in which the Court can not intervene.
the society has vacated its decision making function and special
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court
interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case,
includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
the Court can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution,
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of
and thereby subject its role as guardian to claims offered, nor
separation of powers.
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a
which is the Court's primary source of power." 11 result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This Court,
however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in
get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman
independence.
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how ||| (Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, [September 26, 1991], 278
Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests before said PHIL 784-817)
Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of
the House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its
constitutional power.Besides, what other act of the House (or
Senate) is there that is not politically motivated? After all, that
branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or
pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be politically
motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered
opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike down the
legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this
court — who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their
 EN BANC Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng committees, including the House representation in the
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna
[G.R. No. 86649. July 12, 1990.] On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter
Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under
to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
the banner of KAIBA.'
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her
KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG
upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon.
BAYAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON V.
Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of
of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N.
Representatives of the Congress of the
Commission on Appointments. They were: Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.
Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as
Majority Floor Leader of the House of 1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party) On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives,
Representatives of the Congress of the on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection
Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex- 2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority
Officio Chairman of the Appointments; HON. membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform
ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR, HON. LORNA L. VERANO- 3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan) with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A.
YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows:
V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, 4. Hon. Raul Daza LP
1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP
HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR, HON. JOSE L.
CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. IMPERIAL, HON. 5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. PDP-Laban
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP
MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M.
BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & 6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban
3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP
HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the
Commission on Appointments for the House of 7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP
Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. 8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND
5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LD
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND
6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP
Perfecto V . Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal
P. Fernandez for petitioners. 10. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP
7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law 11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB
Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap. 8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP

(pp. 115-116, Rollo.) 9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP

DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted
in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban,
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the
10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP
Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque
Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the
House.
(p. 122, Rollo.)
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of member representing the House minority.
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House
 On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and
her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal
Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto
and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the
election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran,
Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin
also the other respondents from recognizing them as members
of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their
election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members
out of the 202 members of the
House) is entitled to only nine
(9) seats out of the twelve to be
filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political
parties, or coalitions thereof,
must be nominated by their
respective political parties or
coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of
respondent Verano-Yap by the
respondents as representative
of the minority was clearly
invalid p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention
of respondent Ablan as Minority
member in the Commission
because he was neither
nominated nor elected as such
by the minority party or parties
in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified
to sit in the Commission on Appointments as a representative
of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other
congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo)
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of
Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the
members of the Commission on Appointments including provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman reads:
Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1)
"Sec. 18. There shall be a
that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on
Commission on Appointments consisting of
Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the
the President of the Senate, as ex officio
jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18,
Members of the House of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of
Representatives elected by each House on the
proportional representation of the political parties, considering
basis of proportional representation from the
the majority coalition "as a form of a political party (pp. 115,
political parties and parties or organizations
118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160
registered under the party-list system
members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had
represented therein. The chairman of the
expressly renounced in writing their respective political party
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15
tie. The Commission shall act on all
Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo). After its petition for
appointments submitted to it within thirty
registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989
session days of the Congress from their
by the First Division of the COMELEC and affirmed on November
submission. The commission shall rule by a
23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP become the new
majority vote of all the Members. (Art.
Majority in the House. They finally argued that as KAIBA is part
VI, 1987 Constitution.).
of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of
President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is After deliberating on the petition and the comments of
bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of the members the respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed,
who would sit in the Commission on Appointments. not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but
because the revision of the House representation in the
Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment
Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
alleged that the petitioner has no better right than those
representation of the political parties therein as provided in
already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
on Appointments because: (1) the Constitution was not violated
in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs.
Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court
incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by
(pp. 217-218, Rollo). the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
on the petition as the issues involved may touch on the validity
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
or the LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp.
by any branch or instrumentality of the government."
195-198, Rollo)
The composition of the House membership in the
The issue here is whether the members of the House in
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
representation of the political parties in the House. There are
proportional representation from the political parties therein as
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of
the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on ||| (Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 86649, [July 12, 1990], 265 PHIL
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be 398-405)
rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna
Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this
apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such
as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of
the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its
lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less
than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to
one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments.
To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should
have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and
congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the
Commission are inconsequential because they are not members
of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of
her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that
the House members in the Commission on Appointments
should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. The petition itself shows that they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They
were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their
election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is
unassailable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 106971. October 20, 1992.]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-
NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(LAKAS-NUCD) petitioners, vs. NEPTALI A.
GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO AND WIGBERTO
E. TAÑADA, respondents. NATIONALIST
PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
Ricardo C. Nepomuceno for petitioners.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Intervenor NPC.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; PROHIBITION; EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, A CASE OF. — The instant petition may be regarded
as one of prohibition wherein the Senate is claimed to have acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it designated
respondent Senator Romulo as eighth member of the Commission
on Appointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and respondent
Senator Tañada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that in both
instances, LDP and LP are each entitled only to "half a member".
2. ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS; UNLAWFUL EXCLUSION FROM THE
ENJOYMENT OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE, A CASE OF. — In the
alternative, the petition may be regarded as one for mandamus, in
which it is claimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
each is entitled.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 18 OF ARTICLE VI THEREOF;
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS; RULE ON PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES; CASE AT BAR A VIOLATION
OF. — It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the
mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate is as follows: LDP — 7.5 LP-PDP-LABAN —
.5 NPC — 2.5 LAKAS-NUCD — 1.5 It is also a fact accepted by all such
parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the
political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI
of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as
above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of
one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than
their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of
Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party — either the LAKAS —
NUCD or the NPC.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLIANCE THEREWITH IS MANDATORY;
REASON. — The provision of Section 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any
discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard
the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a
majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on
the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in
the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the
balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled
to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional
share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in
the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more
power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token,
suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF AT LEAST TWO SENATORS IN THE
SENATE FOR A POLITICAL PARTY TO HAVE A SEAT IN THE
COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — Section 18 also assures
representation in the Commission on Appointments of any political
party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided
that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a
representative in the Commission on Appointments. Drawing from
the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., a political party must
have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent
Senator Tañada.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF A QUORUM FOR THE COMMISSION TO
PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS. — Under Section 18, the Commission
shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 10, the
Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call
of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such
powers and functions herein conferred upon it". It is quite evident
that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Other
instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which
perform their functions even if not fully constituted and even if their
composition is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among these
are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their functions so long
as there is the required quorum, usually a majority of its
membership. The Commission on Appointments may perform its
functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) senators are
elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; PROHIBITION; GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; PRESENT WHERE POWER IS KNOWINGLY
EXERCISED IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION; CASE AT
BAR. — Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be
always twelve (12) senators in the Commission on Appointments,
the instant situation cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard
of the rule on proportional representation. The election of Senator
Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their
nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer force of
superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of
August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where
power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command
of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly
and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.
 DECISION NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
CAMPOS, JR., J p: LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members.
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senators
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting and assuming the
position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27, 1992,
prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of said Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated,
Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senators for and in behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators for membership in
to sit as members thereof. the Commission on Appointments, namely, Senators Angara,
Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo. The
As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the nomination of the eighth senator 2 was objected to by Petitioner,
Senate is composed of the following members or Senators Senator Guingona, as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John
representing the respective political affiliations: Osmeña, in representation of the NPC. To resolve the impasse,
LDP — 15 senators Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that
the Senate elect 3
NPC — 5 senators ". . . 12 members to the Commission on
Appointments, eight coming from LDP, two
LAKAS-NUCD — 3 senators coming from NPC, one coming from the Liberal
Party, with the understanding that there are
LP-PDP-LABAN — 1 senator 1 strong reservations against this proportion or
these numbers so that if later on in an action in
the Supreme Court, if any party is found to have
an excess in representation, that the party will
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as
necessarily reduce its representation, and if any
follows:
party is found to have a deficiency in
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats representation, that party will be entitled to
nominate and have elected by this body its
___________________________
additional representative."
Total No. of senators elected.
The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary
the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of arrangement and, inspite of the objections of Senators
proportional representation of each political party with elected Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the Commission on
representatives in the Senate, is as follows: Appointments to be organized by the election of its members, it
was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP,
Political Party/ Proportional
one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Political Coalition Membership Representatives On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., in his behalf
and in behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
(LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali
LDP 15 7.5 members Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators
Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the LDP, and
Wigberto L. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-
LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the
proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule
of proportional representation, and that it is the right of the
minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the
Constitution, 4 to combine their fractional representation in the
Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to
decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally
nominated and elected thereto.
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides for the
creation of a Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its
membership, as follows: LLpr
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission of
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve senators
and twelve members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each house on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties or organizations registered
under the party list system represented therein.
The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act
on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority of all the members. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional
representation of the various political parties with elected senator
in the Senate, each of these political parties is entitled to a
fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments as
stated in the first paragraph of this decision. 5 Each political party
has a claim to an extra half seat, and the election of respondents
Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP majority is precisely questioned by the
petitioners because, according to them, it unduly increased the
membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the Commission and
reduced the membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC
correspondingly. In view of the conflicting claims of each of the
political parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a
fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments, the
election of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada has
become controversial and its validity questionable. Hence, this
petition. It has been established that the legality of filling up the
membership of the Commission on Appointments is a justiceable
issue and not a political question. 6
We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as to
the nature of the instant petition. There is no doubt that the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature and are of vital
importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a Commission on
Appointments. Where constitutional issues are properly raised in
the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a
relatively minor significance, 7 and the "transcendental importance
to the public of the case demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely brushing aside . . . technicalities of procedure". 8
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant petition
may be regarded as one of prohibition 9 wherein the Senate is
claimed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it
designated respondent Senator Romulo as eighth member of the
Commission on Appointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and
respondent Senator Tañada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that in
both instances, LDP and LP are each entitled only to "half a
member". In the alternative, the petition may be regarded as one
for mandamus, 1 0 in which it is claimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and
NPC were unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which each is entitled. Considering the importance
of the case at bar and in keeping with the Court's duty under the
Constitution to keep the other branches of the government within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws of the land, this Court has
decided to brush aside legal technicalities of procedure and take
cognizance of this case.
The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as follows:
1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members of
the Commission on Appointments is in
accordance with the provision of Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2) If said membership of the respondent
senators in the Commission is violative of the
Constitutional provision, did the respondent
Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in
electing the respondent Senators?
3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining,
prohibiting and restraining the respondent
Senators from sitting as members of and
participating in the proceedings of the
Commission on Appointments be issued?
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the
mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP — 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN — .5
NPC — 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD — 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is
entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on
proportional representation of each of the political parties. A
literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as
above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2
to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the
Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to
less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
one political party — either the LAKAS — NUCD or the NPC. cdll
On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the case of
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, 11 and the case of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments because of: (a) the physical impossibility of
dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must be
rounded up into one senator, (b) being the sole elected senator of
his party, his party is entitled to be represented in the Commission
on Appointments; (c) having been elected senator, rounding up into
one full senator his fractional membership is consistent with the
provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full accord,
with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked
as a precedent in support of incumbent Senator Tañada's claim to a
membership in the present Commission on Appointments. In the
time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected senators in the upper
chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party, while
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, who belonged to the Citizens' Party, was
the lone opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member
of the Commission on Appointments because he alone represented
the minority party. Had there been another senator belonging to a
party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of who should sit
as the sole representative of the opposition party would have
arisen. In the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators
elected from the opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada.
Applying the rule of proportional representation mentioned earlier
(see formula), the opposition was entitled to one full member (not a
fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated
and elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the
present case, if there were a political party other than the present
four political parties in the Senate, and We follow Senator Tañada's
claim that he is entitled to full membership as lone representative of
his party, We would have the anomaly of having 13 senators,
where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the Commission
on Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission
on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in
the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it
is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall
be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on
Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a
breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will
give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who is
deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by
sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By
requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority
party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To
allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on
the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.
Section 18 also assures representation in the Commission on
Appointments of any political party who succeeds in electing
members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission on
Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs.
Mitra, Jr., 12 a political party must have at least two senators in the
Senate to be able to have a representative in the Commission on
Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a
party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. This
applies to the respondent Senator Tañada. LLphil
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition
must have at least two duly elected senators for
every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political
parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in
the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to
elect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The
Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on
Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and
in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is
in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
members "to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the
Constitution, Section 10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, provides as follows:
SECTION 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum:
The Commission shall meet at either the session
hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as
the Commission may designate. The presence of
at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to
constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at
least four (4) of the members constituting the
quorum should come from either house . . ."
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election
and presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of
the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may
function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional
collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified
by the Constitution. Among these are the Supreme Court, 1 3 Civil
Service Commission, 14 Commission on Election, 15 Commission on
Audit. 16They perform their functions so long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The
Commission on Appointments may perform its functions and
transact its business even if only ten (10) senators are elected
thereto as long as a quorum exists.
It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for
equal membership from the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments, the senators
on the one hand, and the representatives, on the other, do not vote
separately but jointly, and usually along party lines. Even if Senator
Tañada would not be able to sit in the Commission on
Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be represented in the
Commission by Congressman Ponce Enrile who has become a
member of the LP. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any
of the political parties from forming a coalition with another political
party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this
decision.
Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always
twelve (12) senators in the Commission on Appointments, the
instant situation cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard of
the rule on proportional representation. The election of Senator
Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on
Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their
nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer force of
superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of
August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where
power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command
of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly
and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules
and jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, We declare the
election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as
members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for
being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said
respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from
assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of
the Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from
recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and from
allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said Commission.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, [October 20, 1992])
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,
EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as
National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 113174. August 19, 1994.]
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine
Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES, as Chairman of
the Committee on Finance of the Philippine
Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President
and Chief Executive of the Philippine Senate, all
of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own
behalf and in representation of Senators
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H.
OSMEÑA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
VICENTE SOTTO III, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA
and FREDDIE WEBB,petitioners, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE
NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling co-
petitioner, respondents.
[G.R. No. 113766. August 19, 1994.]
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, as Members of the Philippine Senate
and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION,petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in
his capacity as as Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD
BALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT,respondents.
[G.R. No. 113888. August 19, 1994.]
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, as Members of the Philippine Senate
and as taxpayers, petitioners, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management,
HON. CARIDAD BALDEHUESA, in her capacity as
National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 112105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos 113766 &
113888.
Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for
petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo
Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for intervenor Lawyers
against Monopy and Poverty (LAMP).
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
Once again this Court is called upon the rule on the
conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative and the
Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and the sword.
Providing the focus for the contest between the President and
the Congress over control of the national budget are the four
cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group
of concerned taxpayers on the claim that Congress and the
President have impermissibly exceed their respective
authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the
President has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted
without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power. prLL
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses
of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in
the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It
also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign
their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. cdasia
No step was taken in either House of Congress to
override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine
Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A.
Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to
declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the
Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article
I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses,
and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the
P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special
Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90,
104-105).
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led
by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A.
Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and
Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of the writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers,
petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a)
for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f)
State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and
Wigberto Tañada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No. 113174), together
with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic
corporation, sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, the National
Treasurer, and the COA. cdll
Petitioners Tañada and Romulo sued as members of
the Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom
from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the
constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision
in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Tañada and Romulo
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of
1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of
certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary
restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary of Budget
and Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing
the questioned provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the Court
declined to grant said provisional reliefs on the time-honored
principle of according the presumption of validity to statutes
and the presumption of regularity to official acts. LLpr
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the
issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice
Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as Amicus
Curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51
[1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392
[1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus
standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the
remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to
override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the
requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was
recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In
said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of
the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the
presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of
the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted
on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows: cdll
"Authorizing and Directing the Committee on
Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of
the Philippines the Proper Suit with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of
Special and General Provisions, particularly
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of
Congress to sue has been recognized (United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes:Congressional
Access To The Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632
[1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16
Senators, including the Senate President and the Chairman of
the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the
Senate itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and
113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the
purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of
petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issues
before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential
veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items
in the GAA of 1994. LibLex
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the
House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing
to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without
or in excess of the authority vested on the President by
the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the
Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises
(Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive
Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366
[1974]). LLjur
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v.
Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus
Curiae, noted;
"This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as
a whole or individual Senators as such having
substantial interest in the question at issue. It
could likewise be said that there was requisite
injury to their rights as Senators. It would then
be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any
intrusion into the domain appertaining to the
Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation
were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch
that could allege a transgression, its officials
could likewise file the corresponding action.
What cannot be denied is that a Senator has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in his office" (Memorandum, p.
14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism
for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,
however, is available only when the presidential veto is based
on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is
claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty
of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of
 executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction 1.Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein Under the Constitution, the spending power called by
begin. LLphil appropriated shall be used for infrastructure, James Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to
III purchase of ambulances and computers and Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The
G.R. No. 113105 other priority projects and activities, and credit President may propose the budget, but still the final say on the
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
1.Countrywide Development Fund.
and identified by officials concerned according The power of appropriation carries with it the power
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide to the following allocations: Representatives, to specify the project or activity to be funded under the
Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, Congress wants it to be.
other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a
qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides: The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it
revolving fund to be administered by a shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
"COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND government financial institution (GFI) as a trust computers and other priority projects and activities and credit
uirements of countrywide development projects fund for lending operations. Prior years releases
P2,977,000,000 facilities to qualified beneficiaries. . . ." It was Congress itself
to local government units and national that determined the purposes for the appropriation. llcd
New Appropriations, government
by Purpose agencies for this purpose shall be
Executive function under the Countrywide
turned over to the government financial
Current Operating Expenditures Development Fund involves implementation of the priority
institution which shall be the sole administrator
of credit facilities released from this fund. cdasia projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only
Maintenance The fund shall be automatically released
to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the
quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and
President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President
Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the
assigned implementing agency not later than must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the
and Other members of Congress fall within the specific items of
five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter
expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he
upon submission of the list of projects and
activities by the officials concerned. next determines whether they are in line with other projects
Operating Capital
planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects
2.Submission of Quarterly Reports. The qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall
Department of Budget and Management shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications
Expenses Outlays Total submit within thirty (30) days after the end of
made by the members of Congress are merely
each quarter a report to the Senate Committee recommendatory.
on Finance and the House Committee on
The procedure of proposing and identifying by
Appropriations on the releases made from this
Fund. The report shall includes the listing of the members of Congress of particular projects or activities under
t Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
projects, locations, implementing agencies and
P250,000,000 P2,727,000.000 P2,977,000,000
the endorsing officials" (GAA of 1994, p. 1245). The Constitution is a framework of a workable
government and its interpretation must take into account the
—————— —————— Petitioners
—————— claim that the power given to the members
of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of
the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991,
to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an
there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said
constituents of the members of Congress, with the members
power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law.
P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 They argueP,977,000,000
that the proposal and identification of the projects close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for
"horse-trading," getting more than their less favored
—————— —————— do not involve
—————— the making of laws or the repeal and
colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon with
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by
Special Provisions the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78-86). cdrep an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power
 to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Others 57,173 ———
Representative or Senator.
——— (GAA OF 1994, pp. 3-4)
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make
equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual Total Other Compensation 103,815 The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of
members of Congress, far more than the President and their Representatives are as follows:
congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about ———
Personal Services Salaries, Permanent 261,557
the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be 01 Total Personal Services 264,032
given each project. LibLex Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643
———
2.Realignment of Operating Expenses ———
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
Total Salaries and Wages 405, 200
Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is 02 Travelling Expenses 32,841
appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the ———
appropriation for the House of Representatives is 03 Communication Services 7,666
Other Compensation
P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated 04 Repair and Maintenance of Government 1,220
for current operating expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9,
Facilities
12). Step Increments 4,312
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as 05 Repair and Maintenance of Government 318
follows: Vehicles Honoraria and Commutable

"Personal Services 06 Transportation Services 128

Allowances 4,764
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
Salaries, Permanent 153,347 Compensation Insurance
08 Rents 24,584
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 6,870 14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
——— Premiums 1,159
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
Total Salaries and Wages 160,217 Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
——— Medicare Premiums 2,281
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
Other Compensation Step Increments 1,073 Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
23 Advertising and Publication
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731 Terminal Leave Benefits 29

Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579 Personnel Economic Relief

24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184 29 Other Services 89,778
Allowance 21,510
Medicare Premiums 888 ———
Additional Compensation
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791 Total Maintenance and Other Operating 200,415
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000 Expenditures
of P500 under A.O. 53 21,768
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266 ———
Others 106,140
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130 Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
 ——— ——— The special provision on realignment of the operating
expenses of members of Congress is authorized by Section 16 of
Total Other Compensation 202,863 (GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12) the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
01 Total Personal Services 608,063 The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the "Expenditure Components. Except by act of the
Philippines provides: Congress of the Philippines, no change or
——— "4.Realignment of Allocation for Operating modification shall be made in the expenditure
Expenses. A member of Congress may realign items authorized in this Act and other
his allocation for operational expenses to any appropriation laws unless in cases of
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
other expense category provided the total of augmentations from savings in appropriations as
02 Travelling Expenses 139,611 said allocation is not exceeded." (GAA of 1994, authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of
03 Communication Services 22,514 p. 14). the Constitution." (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government 5,116 House is further divided into expenditures for salaries, personal Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not the individual
Facilities services, other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government 1,863 and other operating expenses. In turn, each member of savings as appropriated.
Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a Under the Special Provisions applicable to the
Vehicles
proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress only
06 Transportation Services 178 which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of expense, determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248 said item to another item of expense. position to do so because they are the ones who know whether
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940 Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses
member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325 claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their
VI of the Constitution. Said section provides: Cdpr stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer that: LibLex
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474 of appropriations: however, the President, the (1)The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to
———
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of be taken; and
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency 9,400 the Supreme Court, and the heads of (2)The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of
Expenses Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or
authorized to augment any item in the general realignment is to be made.
23 Advertising and Publication Expenses 242 appropriations law for their respective offices
3.Highest Priority for Debt Service
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420 from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations." While Congress appropriated P86,323,428,000.00 for
29 Other Services 284,209 debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants
only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education,
——— the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give
Representatives the power to augment items in an
Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses 557,234 debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp.
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in
93-94) because under theConstitution it should be education
——— other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law
that is entitled to the highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5),
authorizing such augmentation.
Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297 Article XIV thereof, which provides:
 "(5)The State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the
best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment." cdtai
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196
SCRA 221 (1991), where this court held that Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
"While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to
'assign the highest budgetary priority to
education' in order to 'insure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment,' it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond
to the imperatives of the national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985,
the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school
system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations
Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is
a clear compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress
is certainly not without any power, guided only
by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which
was inherited from the previous administration.
It is not only a matter of honor and to protect
the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger
than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional."
G.R. NO. 113105
G.R. NO. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII
(Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 which
provides:
"Special Provisions.
1.Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized
herein shall be used for payment of principal
and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in
excess of the amount herein appropriated shall
be subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines with the concurrence of the
congress of the Philippines; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used
to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators.
2.Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas and the Department of Finance shall
submit a quarterly report of actual foreign and
domestic debt service payments to the House
Committee on Appropriations and Senate
Finance Committee within one (1) month after
each quarter" (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision,
without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt
service in said Article. According to the President's Veto
Message: cdrep
"IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with
the desire of Congress to reduce the debt
burden by decreasing the appropriation for debt
service as well as the inclusion of the Special
Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe
that this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA. This must
be addressed by revising our debt policy by way
of innovative and comprehensive debt
reduction programs conceptualized within the
ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt,
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing
Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177as reiterated
under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to
emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been
upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of
'Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, et al.,' G.R. No. 94571, dated April
22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special
provision for the reason that the GAA is not the
appropriate legislative measure to amend the
provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D.
No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
'Use of the Fund. The
appropriation authorized herein shall
be used for payment of principal and
interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to
the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the
Congress of the Philippines; PROVIDED
FURTHER, That in no case shall this
fund be used to pay for the liabilities of
the Central Bank Board of Liquidators'"
(GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the
Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service without
vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. NO. 113174, pp.
16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special
Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt
service and could therefore be the subject of an item veto
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp.
72-82). cdrep
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest
in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In that case,
the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
"The fundamental issue raised is whether or not
the veto by the President of Section 55 of the
1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY '89, and
subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of
the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90),
is unconstitutional and without effect."
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not
be any misunderstanding about it, thus:
"The focal issue for resolution is whether or not
the President exceeded the item-veto power
accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,
has the President the power to veto `provisions'
of an Appropriations Bill?"
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar
to those invoked in the present case, are stated as follows:
"In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on
the following grounds: (1) the President's line-
veto power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provision; (2)
when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-
veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3)
the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the
power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25
[5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided
for by law and, therefore, Congress is also
vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power. cdlex
The restrictive interpretation urged by
petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that any provision n the
general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI,
Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense
of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill
is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not
relate to the entire bill."
The Court went one step further and rules that even
assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the executive
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90)
were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they
are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items"
for the purpose of the President's veto power. prcd
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153
(1977), said that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
"item," which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it
refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,
is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations
Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act)
and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As
held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should
be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume the
constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P.
1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is
actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of
Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is
found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in
Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption
of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of
the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to
veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution,
Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is
the power given to the President to veto any particular item or
items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27 [2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire
item. prLL
A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit
(Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple
Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act
of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on August 29,
1916. The concept was adopted from some StateConstitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting
provisions, including conditions, restrictions and limitations, to
items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention
added the following sentence to Section 20 (2), Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution:
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill
affects one or more items of the same, the
President cannot veto the provision without at
the same time vetoing the particular item or
items to which it relates. . . ."
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President
was empowered to veto separately not only items in an
appropriations bill but also "provisions."
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the
aforementioned sentence added to Section 11 (2) of Article VI
of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision:
 "No provision or enactment shall be embraced
in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates" (Art. VI,
Sec. 25 [2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that
sentence of Section 16 (2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987
Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the
disallowance of the power of the President to veto a
"provision."
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which
Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,"
it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an
item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to
be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended
to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have
no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general
legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate
enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus
Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish
conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the
President given by the Constitution for that would be an
unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative. cdll
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well
elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
"Just as the President may not use his item-veto
to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive
the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of
the state by including in a general appropriation
bill matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power
to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be
abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill,
thereby forcing the Governor to choose
between approving unacceptable substantive
legislation or vetoing `items' of expenditures
essential to the operation of government. The
legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Nor can it
circumvent the Governor's veto power over
substantive legislation by artfully drafting
general law measures so that they appear to be
true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would
be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its
appropriation power to infringe on the
Governor's constitutional right to veto matters
of substantive legislation than we are to allow
the Governor to encroach on the constitutional
powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this
result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's
item veto power over general appropriation
bills.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in
such a manner as to encumber the general
appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling
measures,' special interest provisions which
could not succeed if separately enacted, or
'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation
incorporated in a bill to insure passage without
veto. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the
veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is
valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for
debt payment without complying with the conditions for
automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860
as amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177
as amended by the Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No.
1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will
not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not
issue on the fear that official actions will be done in
contravention of the laws. cdtai
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the
provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be
used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators." These provisos are germane to and have a direct
connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power
of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be
spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said
provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed
separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any
misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service only with respect
to the proviso therein requiring that "any payment in excess of
the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. No. 113174
G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
1.Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize
the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the
following: cdrep
"(H.7)West Visayas State University
'Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the
University subject to Section 13 of the special
provisions applicable to all State Universities
and Colleges shall be equally shared by the
University and the University hospital' (GAA of
1994, p. 395).
xxx xxx xxx
 (J.3)Leyte State College
'Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House
and Human Resources Development Center
(HRDC). The income of Leyte State College
derived from the operation of its LSC House and
HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving Fund
to be deposited in an authorized government
depository bank for the operational expenses of
these projects/services. The net income of the
Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall be
remitted to the National Treasury and shall
accrue to the General Fund. The implementing
guidelines shall be issued by the Department of
Budget and Management" (GAA of 1994, p.
415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's
are the following:
"12.Use of Income from Extension Services.
State Universities and Colleges are authorized to
use their income from their extension services.
Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents
and the approval of a special budget pursuant to
Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, such
income shall be utilized solely for faculty
development, instructional materials and work
study program" (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
"13.'Income of State Universities and Colleges.
The income of State Universities and Colleges
derived from tuition fees and other sources as
may be imposed by governing boards other than
those accruing to revolving funds created under
LOI Nos. 872 and 1026 and those authorized to
be recorded as trust receipts pursuant to
Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No.
292 shall be deposited with the National
Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in
the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and
P.D. No. 1437 for the use of the institution,
subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292: PROVIDED, That disbursements from
the Special Account shall not exceed the amount
actually earned and deposited: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That a cash advance on such income
may be allowed State Universities and Colleges
representing up to one-half of income actually
realized during the preceding year and this cash
advance shall be charged against income
actually earned during the budget year: AND
PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall such
funds be used to create positions, nor for
payment of salaries, wages or allowances,
except as may be specifically approved by the
Department of Budget and Management for
income-producing activities, or to purchase
equipment or books, without the prior approval
of the President of the Philippines pursuant to
Letter of Implementation No. 29. LLjur
All collections of the State Universities and
Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended
for private recipient units, including private
foundations affiliated with these institutions
shall be dully acknowledged with official
receipts and deposited as a trust receipt before
said income shall be subject to Section 35,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of
1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reasons for the veto thus:
"Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, Section 44,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all
income earned by all Government offices and
agencies shall accrue to the General Fund of the
Government in line with the One Fund Policy
enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution.
Likewise, the creation and establishment of
revolving funds shall be authorized by
substantive law pursuant to Section 66 of the
Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5, Book VI
of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions
of the Constitution and existing law, I have
noted the proliferation of special provisions
authorizing the use of agency income as well as
the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the fact that such
income were already considered as integral part
of the revenue and financing sources of the
National Expenditure Program which I
previously submitted to Congress. Hence, the
grant of new special provisions authorizing the
use of agency income and the establishment of
revolving funds over and above the agency
appropriations authorized in this Act shall
effectively reduce the financing sources of
the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase
the level of expenditures of some agencies
beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized levels
for such agencies. This corresponding increases
the overall deficit of the National Government"
(Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his veto the "use of
income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western
Visayas State University and Leyte State Colleges when he
allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm,
to use their income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No.
113174, pp. 15-16). prcd
There was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions
in other government agencies. If some government agencies
were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund
for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund
policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No.
902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No.
359 for the Department of Budget and Management's
Procurement Service).
2.Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the President vetoed the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30%
maximum ratio of works to be contracted for the maintenance
of national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as
follows:
"2.Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds.
Funds allotted for the maintenance and repair
of roads which are provided in this Act for the
Department of Public Works and Highways shall
be released to the respective Engineering
District, subject to such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Department of Budget
and Management. Maintenance funds for roads
and bridges shall be exempt from budgetary
reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the
maintenance of national roads and bridges, a
maximum of thirty percent (30%) shall be
contracted out in accordance with guidelines to
be issued by the Department of Public Works
and Highways. The balance shall be used for
maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance
fund appropriated herein to be applied across
the board to the allocation of each region shall
be set aside for the maintenance of roads which
may be converted to or taken over as national
roads during the current year and the same shall
be released to the central office of the said
department for eventual sub-allotment to the
concern region and district: PROVIDED, That any
balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be
restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for
the maintenance of existing national
roads. LibLex
No retention or deduction as reserves or
overhead expenses shall be made, except as
authorized by law or upon direction of the
President" (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis
supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the
veto:
"While I am cognizant of the well-intended
desire of Congress to impose certain restrictions
contained in some special provisions, I am
equally aware that many programs, projects and
activities of agencies would require some
degree of flexibility to ensure their successful
implementation and therefore risk their
completion. Furthermore, not only could there
restrictions and limitations derail and impede
program implementation but they may also
result in a breach of contractual obligations.
D.1.a.A study conducted by the Infrastructure
Agencies show that for practical intent and
purposes, maintenance by contract could be
undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent
(70%) and the remaining thirty percent (30%) by
force account. Moreover, the policy of
maximizing implementation through contract
maintenance is a covenant of the Road and
Road Transport Program Loan from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-
1990) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a
covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for
the Highway Management Project (IBRD Loan
No. PH - 3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the
policy of the government to encourage and
maximize private sector participation in the
regular repair and maintenance of infrastructure
facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of
the Department of Public Works and Highways"
(Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings
to fore the divergence in policy of Congress and the President.
While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30%
of the total appropriation for road maintenance should be
contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive
study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects
at an option of 70% would be more efficient, economical and
practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended —
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. LLpr
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress
of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which
they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetary
sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the
veto of this special provision. He merely argued that the
provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice
of the government to maximize contract maintenance (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to veto a
provision separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision
No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
3.Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special provision on
the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675). The vetoed provision
reads: LLpr
"12.Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of
medicines by all Armed Forces of the Philippines
units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National
Drug Policy of the Department of Health" (GAA
of 1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to
subject the purchase of medicines to a standard formulary, "it is
believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for its
adoption and smooth implementation in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases
of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. It is a mere
advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law,
the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of
drugs with generic names through a rational system of
procurement and distribution." The President believes that it is
more prudent to provide for a transition period for the smooth
implementation of the law in the case of purchases by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11
(Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot
justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by
the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the
special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without
also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v.
Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]). cdrep
4.Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for
purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP,
the President vetoed the underlined proviso of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior
approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No.
3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
"2.Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein
appropriated, priority shall be given for the
acquisition of AFP assets necessary for
protecting marine, mineral, forest and other
resources within Philippine territorial borders
and its economic zone, detection, prevention or
deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to
support diplomatic moves aimed at preserving
national dignity, sovereignty and
patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said
modernization fund shall not be released until a
Table of Organization and Equipment for FY
1994-2000 is submitted to and approved by
Congress.
3.Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization
Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6)
additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel
carriers" (GAA of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the
said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if
allowed, "shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines"
(Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the
"Use of Fund" and Special Provision NO. 3 are conditions or
limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "use
of Fund" for the AFP modernization program that the President
must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for
its approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or legislative
veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means
whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative
action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in
the implementation of particular executive actions. The form
may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the
executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the
executive action. This device represents a significant attempt by
Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared
administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation
of Powers: The Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina Law
Review, 423 [1978]). LexLib
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions
involving the principle of separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion
to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues
at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Any provision
blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and
3 were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her
memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress cannot do
directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to
the exercise of that power (of the President as Commander-in-
Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the
use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer
planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of
contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by
the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5.Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP
pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Fund, the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the
Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds. The vetoed provision reads: prcd
"2.Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is
authorized, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in
the appropriations provided herein to augment
the pension fund being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System as
provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No.
361" (GAA of 1994, p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1)
of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the
authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of theConstitution (Veto Message, pp.
7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP
Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation which is
so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not
be separated therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to
use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI
of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5) no law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an
exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the
general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right
must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a
specific law. Cdpr
6.Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
 Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's
including the payment of separation benefits but it added the
following Special Provision:
"1.CAFGU Compensation and Separation
Benefit. The appropriation authorized herein
shall be sued for the compensation of CAFGU's
including the payment of their separation
benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence
allowance for the 11,000 members who will be
deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP,
shall subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense, promulgate policies and
procedures for the payment of separation
benefit" (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the
CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant
to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. He gave the following
reasons for imposing the condition: prLL
"I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of
Congress in proposing the amendment of
Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However,
it is premature at this point in time of our peace
process to earmark and declare through special
provision the actual number of CAFGU members
to be deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that
the number to be deactivated would largely
depend on the result or degree of success of the
on-going peace initiatives which are not yet
precisely determinable today. I have desisted,
therefore, to directly veto said provisions
because this would mean the loss of the entire
special provision to the prejudice of its
beneficent provisions. I therefore declare that
the actual implementation of this special
provision shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No.
1597 and R.A. No. 6758" (Veto Message, P. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the
deactivation of the CAFGU's when it appropriated the money
for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof.
The President, however, directed that the deactivation should
be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into
consideration the peace and order situation in the affected
localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President
was tantamount to an administrative embargo of the
congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to
dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, p. 14; G.R. No.
113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot
impair or withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated
by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
who should determine when the services of the CAFCU's are no
longer needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 92-95).
This is the first case before this Court where the power
of the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to
spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type
(Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505
[1973]). LibLex
Those who deny to the President the power to
impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a
specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes
mandatory on the part of the President to implement the
project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. the
President has no discretion on the matter, for
theConstitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute
the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an
appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a veto
power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a
matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything about
impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be
found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least
three principal sources of the authority of the President.
Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive
power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the
same provisions invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the
laws requires that the President desist from implementing the
law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example
given is when through efficient and prudent management of a
project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer
folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount
budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential Impoundment
Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown
Law Journal 1295 [1973]; NotesProtecting the Fisc: Executive
Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal
1686 [1973]).
We do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress
intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce
the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members
all at one in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose.
Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another
law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-
in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other
laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597and R.A. No. 6758.
7.Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, etc.
(a)In the appropriations for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added the following
provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
"1.Augmentation of any Item in the Court's
Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any
item of the Court's appropriations for (a)
printing of decisions and publication of
`Philippine Reports'; (b) commutable terminal
leaves of Justices and other personnel of the
Supreme Court and payment of adjusted
pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto
pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-
225-C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement
and other operating expenses of the courts'
libraries, including purchase of books and
periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and
improvement of printing equipment; (e)
necessary expenses for the employment of
temporary employees, contractual and casual
employees, for judicial administration; (f)
maintenance and improvement of the Court's
Electronic Data Processing System; (g)
extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice,
attendance in international conferences and
conduct of training programs; (h) commutable
transportation and representation allowances
and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court,
Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other
Court personnel in accordance with the rates
prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of
attorney-de-officio; PROVIDED, That as
mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary
and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws" (GAA of
1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
"5.Use of Savings. The Chairman of the
Commission on Audit is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, to use savings for the
payment of fringe benefits as may be authorized
by law for officials and personnel of the
Commission" (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
"6.Augmentation of Items in the Appropriation
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to
appropriate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations to augment items of appropriation
in the Office of the Ombudsman from savings in
other items of appropriation actually released,
for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions,
resolutions, training and information materials;
(b) repair, maintenance and improvement of
OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and
equipment; (d) payment of commutable
representation and transportation allowances of
officials and employees who by reason of their
positions are entitled thereto and fringe
benefits as may be authorized specifically by
law for officials and personnel of OMB pursuant
to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution;
and (e) for other official purposes subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations"
(GAA of 1994, p. 1178, Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
"1.Use of Savings. The Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is hereby
authorized, subject to appropriate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations, to augment
any item of appropriation in the office of the
CHR from savings in other items of
appropriations from savings in other items of
appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing
and/or publication of decisions, resolutions,
training materials and educational publications;
(b) repair, maintenance and improvement of
Commission's central and regional facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and
equipment, (d) payment of commutable
representation and transportation allowances of
officials and employees who by reason of their
positions are entitled thereto and fringe
benefits, as may be authorized by law for
officials and personnel of CHR, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations"
(GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his
approval of the conditions included in the GAA of 1994. He
noted that:
"The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional
which states that 'no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law.' I am,
therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and
faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization
(Veto Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the
President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by
petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by
the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. LLphil
In the second place, such statements are mere
reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be
made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse,
be treated as superfluities.
(b)In the appropriation for the COA, the President
imposed the condition that the implementation of the budget
of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the
President." LibLex
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
"3.Revolving Fund. The income of the
Commission on Audit derived from sources
authorized by the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be
constituted into a revolving fund which shall be
used for maintenance, operating and other
incidental expenses to enhance audit services
and audit-related activities. The fund shall be
 deposited in an authorized government
depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom
shall be made in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and implementing rules and
regulations: PROVIDED, That any interests
earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the
end of each quarter to the National Treasury
and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED
FURTHER, That the Commission on Audit shall
submit to the Department of Budget and
Management a quarterly report of income and
expenditures of said revolving fund" (GAA of
1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to
rationalize" the implementation, applicability and operation of
use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:
". . . I have observed that there are old and long
existing special provisions authorizing the use of
income and the creation of revolving funds. As a
rule, such authorizations should be discouraged.
However, I take it that these authorizations
have legal/statutory basis aside from being
already a vested right to the agencies concerned
which should not be jeopardized through the
Veto Message. There is, however, imperative
need to rationalize their implementation,
applicability and operation. thus, in order to
substantive the purpose and intention of said
provisions, I hereby declare that the
operationalization of the following provisions
during budget implementation shall be subject
to the guidelines to be issued by the
President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66
of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3
of the General Provisions of this Act" (Veto
Message, p. 6; Emphasis supplied).
(c)In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President
imposed the condition that in the implementation of DPWH
projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5%
and 3% "shall be subject to the necessary administrative
guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to
existing laws." The condition was imposed because the
provision "needs further study" according to the
President. LibLex
The following provision was made subject to said
condition:
"9.Engineering and Administrative Overhead.
Not more than five percent (5%) of the amount
for infrastructure project released by the
Department of Budget and Management shall
be deducted by DPWH for administrative
overhead, detailed engineering and construction
supervision, testing and quality control, and the
like, thus insuring that at least ninety-five
percent (95%) of the released fund is available
for direct implementation of the project.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings,
health centers, daycare centers and barangay
halls, the deductible amount shall not exceed
three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this
provision shall subject the government official
or employee concerned to administrative, civil
and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and
80, Book VI of E.O. No. 292" (GAA of 1994, p.
786).
(d)In the appropriation for the National Housing
Authority (NHA), the President imposed the condition that
allocations for specific projects shall be released and disbursed
"in accordance with the housing program of the government,
subject to prior Executive approval." prcd
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
"3.Allocations for Specific Projects. The
following allocations for the specified projects
shall be set aside for corollary works and used
exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and
construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks,
drainage, waterworks systems, facilities and
amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That any road
to be constructed or rehabilitated shall conform
with the specifications and standards set by the
Department of Public Works and Highways for
such kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
savings that may be available in the future shall
be used for road repair, rehabilitation and
construction:
(1)Maharlika Village Road — Not less
than P5,000,000
(2)Tenement Housing Project (Taguig)
— Not less than P3,000,000
(3)Bagong Lipunan Condominium
Project (Taguig) — Not less
than P2,000,000.
4.Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount
appropriated for the implementation of various
projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million
Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P7,500,000) shall
be allocated to the Dasmariñas Bagong Bayan
resettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos
(P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation Center
Area (Gen. Marinao Alvarez) and Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and
Services, all of which will be for the cementing
of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
5.Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of
Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set
aside for the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer
main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan" (GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the
"operationalization" of the special provision on revolving fund
of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the
President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to
Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo,
G.R. NO. 113174, pp. 5, 7-8); (b) that the implementation of
Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the mandatory
retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said
Department "be subject to the necessary administrative
guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to
existing law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; p. 10, 14-16); and (c) that
the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released only
"in accordance with the housing program of the government
subject to prior Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp.
10-11; 14-16). prLL
 The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere
reminders that the implementation of the items on which the
said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance
with existing laws, regulations or policies. They did not add
anything to what was already in place at the time of the
approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said
that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will
issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of
administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized
by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his
constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed
(1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62
[1939]). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147
[1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but
those remedies can be used only when respondents have acted
"without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of
discretion," (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2). How
can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision
on the appropriation for debt payment when he merely
followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that
Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a
bigger sum for debt payment than the amount appropriated for
education, when it merely followed our dictum
in Guingona? cdrep
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines."
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law
as of the date of its enactment since the court's interpretation
merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65
SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the
same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona, and Gonzales are considered hard
cases that make bad laws and should be reversed, such reversal
cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with
respect with respect to (1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only
insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein
appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the
use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central
Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar
as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of
appropriation for the Department of Public Works and
Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision
No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED. prcd
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D.
Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision
in Gonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
"The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not
object." cdasia
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
"The majority opinion positions the veto
questioned in this case within the scope of
Section 27 (2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I
do not see how this can be done without doing
violence to the constitutional design. The
distinction between an item-veto and
a provision-veto has been traditionally
recognized in constitutional litigation and
budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 229 U.S. 410-
416:
'. . . An item of an
appropriation bill obviously means an
item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some
general provisions of law which
happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. . . '
When the Constitution in Section 27 (2)
empowers the President to veto any particular
item or items in the appropriation act, it does
not confer — in fact, it excludes — the power to
veto any particular provision or provisions in
said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al. 156
SCRA 549, this court referred to its duty to
construe the Constitution, not in accordance
with how the executive or the legislative would
want it construed, but in accordance with what
it says and provides. When
the Constitution states that the President has
the power to veto any particular item or items
in the appropriation act, this must be taken as a
component of that delicate balance of power
between the executive and legislative, so that,
for this Court to construe Sec. 27 (2) of
the Constitution as also empowering the
President to veto any particular provision or
provisions in the appropriations act, is to load
the scale in favor of the executive, at the
expense of that delicate balance of power."
I therefore disagree with the majority's
pronouncements which would validate the veto by the
President of specific provisions in the appropriations act based
on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions."
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential
standpoint, it is still a provision, not an item, in an
appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of
the Executive. LibLex
VITUG, J ., concurring:
 I concur on the points so well expounded by a most
respected colleague, Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I should like
to highlight a bit, however, that part of theponencia dealing on
the Countrywide Development Fund or, so commonly referred
to as, the infamous "pork barrel." LexLib
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an
appropriation act the activities and the projects that are
desirable and may thus be funded. Once, however, such
identification and the corresponding appropriation therefor is
done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there.
Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with exclusive
responsibility and authority, to see to it that the legislative will
is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another theory
invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the
Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither
may delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the
powers of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as
the individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision that
can bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under its
constitutional authority. Even assuming that overseeing the
laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one that I
find difficult to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its
members, that must exercise that function. prcd
I cannot debate the fact that the members of
Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would
have the best feel on the needs of their own respective
constituents. I see no legal obstacle, however, in their making,
just like anyone else, the proper recommendations
to, albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the President for the
purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by
law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible.
||| (Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105,
113174, 113766, 113888, [August 19, 1994])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81311. June 30, 1988.]
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA
PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC.,
HERMINIGILDO C. DUMLAO, GERONIMO Q.
QUADRA, and MARIO C.
VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO TAN, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondent.
[G.R. No. 81820. June 30, 1988]
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER (KMU),
its officers and affiliated labor federations and
alliances, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and
SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondents.
[G.R. No. 81921. June 30, 1988]
INTEGRATED CUSTOMS BROKERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES and JESUS B.
BANAL, petitioners, vs. The HON.
COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
[G.R. No. 82152. June 30, 1988]
RICARDO C. VALMONTE, petitioner, vs. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and SECRETARY OF
BUDGET, respondents.
Franklin S. Farolan for petitioner Kapatiran in G.R. No. 81311.
Jaime C. Opinion for individual petitioner in G.R. No. 81311.
Banzuela Flores, Miralles, Rañeses, Sy, Taquio and Associates for
petitioners in G.R. No. 81820.
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Right collaborating
counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 81820.
Jose C. Leabres and Joselito R. Enriquez for petitioners in G.R. No.
81921.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
These four (4) petitions which have been consolidated
because of the similarity of the main issues involved therein,
seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 (EO 273, for short),
issued by the President of the Philippines on 25 July 1987, to
take effect on 1 January 1988, and which amended certain
sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted
the value-added tax (VAT, for short), for being unconstitutional
in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the
President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory,
regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection
clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the
petitions on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show
justification for the exercise of its judicial powers, viz. (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest, personal and
substantial, of the party raising the constitutional questions; (3)
the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the question of constitutionality is directly
and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and its
resolution is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties. According to the Solicitor General, only the third
requisite — that the constitutional question should be raised at
the earliest opportunity — has been complied with. He also
questions the legal standing of the petitioners who, he
contends, are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the
Court, there being no justiciable controversy for resolution.
Objections to taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient
personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of
the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits
of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these
petitions. prLL
But, before resolving the issues raised, a brief look into
the tax law in question is in order.
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and
services. It is a tax on the value, added by every seller, with
aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services,
exceeding P200,000.00, to his purchase of goods and services,
unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the
gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized from the
sale of services.
The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes,
multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers,
advance sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The
framers of EO 273 claim that it is principally aimed to rationalize
the system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax
administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to
enable the country to attain economic recovery.
The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a
modified form, before EO 273 was issued. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the
issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single stage value added
tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or
"cost deduction method" and was imposed only on original
sale, barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers,
producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of such articles were
not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD
1991 on 31 October 1985, a 3% tax was imposed on a second
sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD
2006 on 31 December 1985, to take effect 1 January 1986.
Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale,
but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely increased
the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.
Petitioners first contend that EO 273 is
unconstitutional on the ground that the President had no
authority to issue EO 273 on 25 July 1987.
The contention is without merit.
It should be recalled that under Proclamation No. 3,
which decreed a Provisional Constitution, sole legislative
authority was vested upon the President. Art. II, sec. 1 of
the Provisional Constitution states:
"Sec. 1. Until a legislature is elected and
convened under a new Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative
powers."
On 15 October 1986, the Constitutional Commission of
1986 adopted a new Constitution for the Republic of the
Philippines which was ratified in a plebiscite conducted on 2
February 1987. Article XVIII, sec. 6 of said Constitution,hereafter
referred to as the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue
to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened."
 It should be noted that, under both the Provisional and
the 1987 Constitutions, the President is vested with legislative
powers until a legislature under a new Constitution is convened.
The first Congress, created and elected under the 1987
Constitution, was convened on 27 July 1987. Hence, the
enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two (2) days before
Congress convened on 27 July 1987, was within the President's
constitutional power and authority to legislate.
Petitioner Valmonte claims, additionally, that Congress
was really convened on 30 June 1987 (not 27 July 1987). He
contends that the word "convene" is synonymous with "the
date when the elected members of Congress assumed office."
The contention is without merit. The word "convene"
which has been interpreted to mean "to call together, cause to
assemble, or convoke," 1 is clearly different from assumption of
office by the individual members of Congress or their taking the
oath of office. As an example, we call to mind the interim
National Assembly created under the1973 Constitution, which
had not been "convened" but some members of the body,
more particularly the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention who had opted to serve therein by voting
affirmatively for the approval of said Constitution,had taken
their oath of office. prLL
To uphold the submission of petitioner Valmonte
would stretch the definition of the word "convene" a bit too far.
It would also defeat the purpose of the framers of the1987
Constitution and render meaningless some other provisions of
said Constitution. For example, the provisions of Art. VI, sec. 15,
requiring Congress to convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session would be a contrariety,
since Congress would already be deemed to be in session after
the individual members have taken their oath of office. A
portion of the provisions of Art. VII, sec. 10, requiring Congress
to convene for the purpose of enacting a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and Vice-President in case a
vacancy occurs in said offices, would also be a surplusage. The
portion of Art. VII, sec. 11, third paragraph, requiring Congress
toconvene, if not in session, to decide a conflict between the
President and the Cabinet as to whether or not the President
can re-assume the powers and duties of his office, would also
be redundant. The same is true with that portion of Art. VII, sec.
18, which requires Congress to convene within twenty-four (24)
hours following the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The 1987 Constitution mentions a specific date when
the President loses her power to legislate. If the framers of said
Constitution had intended to terminate the exercise of
legislative powers by the President at the beginning of the term
of office of the members of Congress, they should have so
stated (but did not) in clear and unequivocal terms. The Court
has no power to re-write the Constitution and give it a meaning
different from that intended.
The Court also finds no merit in the petitioners' claim
that EO 273 was issued by the President in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "Grave
abuse of discretion" has been defined, as follows:
"'Grave abuse of discretion' implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad
Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off Gaz. 834),
or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs.
Nable, 38 Off. Gaz. 62)." 2
Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued
capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears
that a comprehensive study of the VAT was made before EO
273 was issued. In fact, the merits of the VAT had been
extensively discussed by its framers and other government
agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past
administration. As the Solicitor General correctly stated. "The
signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the exercise of
her legislative powers. The legislative process started long
before the signing when the data were gathered, proposals
were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were
drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it cannot be said that
the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two
days before it convened." 3
Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive,
discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in violation of the
provisions of Art. VI, sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
"Sec. 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The petitioners' assertions in this regard are not
supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their
conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT
is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely
upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have
no evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative implication. 4
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the
requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. The Court, in City of
Baguio vs. De Leon, 5 said:
". . . In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69
Phil. 420), Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court,
stated: 'A tax is considered uniform when it
operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject may be found.'
"There was no occasion in that case to consider
the possible effect on such a constitutional
requirement where there is a classification. The
opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v.
Alfonso (83 Phil. 852, 862). Thus: 'Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class
shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable
and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation; . . .' About two years later, Justice
Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race
Horses Trainers Assn. v. de la Fuente (88 Phil.
60, 65) incorporated the above excerpt in his
opinion and continued; 'Taking everything into
account, the differentiation against which the
plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution.'
 "To satisfy this requirement then, all that is
needed as held in another case decided two
years later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil.
300) is that the statute or ordinance in question
'applies equally to all persons, firms and
corporations placed in similar situation.' This
Court is on record as accepting the view in a
leading American case (Carmichael v. Southern
Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495) that 'inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.' (Lutz v. Araneta, 98
Phil. 148, 153)."
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on
all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt,
at the constant rate of 0% or 10%. Cdpr
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed
only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business
with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00.
Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its
application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and
marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other
necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT,
are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the
general public. 6
The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of
the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers Association of the
Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103(r) of
the National Internal Revenue Code, unduly discriminates
against customs brokers. The contested provision states:
"Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. — The following
shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
"(r) Service performed in the exercise of
profession or calling (except customs brokers)
subject to the occupation tax under the Local
Tax Code, and professional services performed
by registered general professional
partnerships;"
The phrase "except customs brokers" is not meant to
discriminate against customs brokers. It was inserted in Sec.
103(r) to complement the provisions of Sec. 102 of the Code
which makes the services of customs brokers subject to the should by now be evident. The fact that nothing of the sort has
payment of the VAT and to distinguish customs brokers from happened shows that the fears and apprehensions of the
other professionals who are subject to the payment of an petitioners appear to be more imagined than real. It would
occupation tax under the Local Tax Code. Pertinent provisions seem that the VAT is not as bad as we are made to
of Sec. 102 read: believe. LibLex
"Sec. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the
— There shall be levied, assessed and collected, adoption and continued application of the VAT are prejudicial
a value-added tax equivalent to 10% percent of to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the
gross receipts derived by any person engaged in people, they should seek recourse and relief from the political
the sale of services. The phrase sale of services' branches of the government. The Court, following the time-
means the performance of all kinds of services honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its
for others for a fee, remuneration or judgment for that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and
consideration, including those performed or advisability of the adoption of the VAT. The Court can only look
rendered by construction and service into and determine whether or not EO 273 was enacted and
contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, made effective as law, in the manner required by, and
customs and immigration brokers; lessors of consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was
personal property; lessors or distributors of not issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
cinematographic films; persons engaged in excess of jurisdiction; and, in this regard, the Court finds no
milling, processing, manufacturing or repacking reason to impede its application or continued implementation.
goods for others; and similar services regardless WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Without
of whether or not the performance thereof calls pronouncement as to costs.
for the exercise or use of the physical or mental SO ORDERED.
faculties: . . ."
||| (KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD, ETC.,, ET AL. vs.
With the insertion of the clarificatory phrase "except BIENVENIDO TAN, G.R. Nos. 81311, 81820, 81921 & 82152, [June 30,
customs brokers" in Sec. 103(r), a potential conflict between 1988], 246 PHIL 380-392)
the two sections, (Secs. 102 and 103), insofar as customs
brokers are concerned, is averted.
At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers
from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax
under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in
that the activities of customs brokers (like those of stock, real
estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a business,
rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the
percentage tax under Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue
Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the
percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the petitioner
Association did not protest the classification of customs brokers
then, the Court sees no reason why it should protest now.
The Court takes note that EO 273 has been in effect for
more than five (5) months now, so that the fears expressed by
the petitioners that the adoption of the VAT will trigger
skyrocketing of prices of basic commodities and services, as
well as mass actions and demonstrations against the VAT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-49336. August 31, 1981.]
THE PROVINCE OF ABRA, represented by
LADISLAO ANCHETA, Provincial
Assessor, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HAROLD
M. HERNANDO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance Abra;
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BANGUED,
INC., represented by Bishop Odilo Etspueler
and Reverend Felipe Flores, respondents.
Sergio V . Paredes for petitioner.
Felix B. Claustro for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The Provincial Assessor of Abra levied a tax assessment on the
properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The
latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on the ground that it is
exempted from payment of real estate taxes, its properties being
actually, directly and exclusively used for religious or charitable
purposes as sources of support for the bishop, the parish priest and
his helpers. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the same was
denied. After conducting a summary hearing, respondent Judge
granted the exemption without hearing the side of petitioner.
Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging
denial of procedural due process.
The Supreme Court held that petitioner was right in seeking
necessary proof as the law frowns on exemptions from taxation. The
failure of respondent judge to accord a hearing therefor was in
violation of the constitutional command of procedural due process.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; TAX EXEMPTION
OF CHURCH PROPERTIES; PRESENT REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL
EXCLUSIVE AND DIRECT USE OF PROPERTY FOR CHARITABLE AND
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. — Under Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3
of the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, building, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present
Constitution (Article VIII, Section 17, paragraph 3) added "charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that
for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they
should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly"
used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded
differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken
into consideration.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TAX EXEMPTIONS, STRICTLY CONSTRUED. —
There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands,
buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to
be exempt from taxation. According to Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Guerrero, L-20812, September 22, 1967, "From 1906,
in Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern Inc.
v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and
uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is
never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be
construed strictissimi jurs." cdasia
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE EXEMPTION; ABSENCE OF
HEARING, VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. — Where
respondent judge accepted at its face the allegation of private
respondent that certain parcels of land owned by it are used
"actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support of the
parish priest and his helpers and also of the Bishop; denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and rendered a summary judgment
granting such exemption without even hearing the side of
petitioner, it clearly appears that respondent judge failed to abide
by the constitutional command of procedural due process.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C .J p:
On the face of this certiorari and mandamus petition filed by the
Province of Abra, 1 it clearly appears that the actuation of
respondent Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of First Instance
of Abra left much to be desired. First, there was a denial of a motion
to dismiss 2 an action for declaratory relief by private respondent
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted
from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment 3 granting
such exemption, without even hearing the side of petitioner. In the
rather vigorous language of the Acting Provincial Fiscal, as counsel
for petitioner, respondent Judge "virtually ignored the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court; . . . wantonly violated the rights of
petitioner to due process, by giving due course to the petition of
private respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without
allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged
the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic
provisions of due process in the constitution, thereby indicating a
failure to grasp and understand the law, which goes into the
competence of the Honorable Presiding Judge." 4
It was the submission of counsel that an action for declaratory relief
would be proper only before a breach or violation of any statute,
executive order or regulation. 5 Moreover, there being a tax
assessment made by the Provincial Assessor on the properties of
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available under Presidential Decree No.
464 before filing such court action. Further, it was pointed out to
respondent Judge that he failed to abide by the pertinent provision
of such Presidential Decree which provides as follows: "No court
shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under
this Code until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax
assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by
reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the
officers charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of
failure to perform their duties within this time herein specified for
their performance unless such irregularities, informalities or failure
shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayers; nor shall
any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the
provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the
taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by the
court in the pending proceeding." 6
When asked to comment, respondent Judge began with the
allegation that there "is no question that the real properties sought
to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc." 7 The very
next sentence assumed the very point it asked when he
categorically stated: "Likewise, there is no dispute that the
properties including their produce are actually, directly and
exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for
religious or charitable purposes." 8 For him then: "The proper
remedy of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil
action." 9 A more exhaustive comment was submitted by private
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. It was,
however, unable to lessen the force of the objection raised by
petitioner Province of Abra, especially the due process aspect. It is
to be admitted that his opposition to the petition, pressed with
vigor, ostensibly finds a semblance of support from the authorities
cited. It is thus impressed with a scholarly aspect. It suffers,
however, from the grave infirmity of stating that only a pure
question of law is presented when a claim for exemption is
made. cdrep
The petition must be granted.
1. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he
merely compared the provisions of the present Constitution with
that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of "lands,
buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under
the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 10 The
present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and
non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of
"lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be
"exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or
charitable purposes. 11 The Constitution is worded differently. The
change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into
consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were
the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be
proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt
from taxation. According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Guerrero: 12 "From 1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966,
in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it
has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put,
the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris." 13 In Manila Electric
Company v. Vera, 14 a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated,
reference being made to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue; 15 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. & CTA;16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Customs. 17
2. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking
the protection of procedural due process. If there is any case where
proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead,
respondent Judge accepted at its face the allegation of private
respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief
filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of
land owned by it, are that they are used "actually, directly and
exclusively" as sources of support of the parish priest and his
helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. 18 In the motion to
dismiss filed on behalf of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection
was based primarily on the lack of jurisdiction, as the validity of a
tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention
of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view,
declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or
violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on
such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord
a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case
immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed
to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due
process. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the resolution of June 19,
1978 is set aside. Respondent Judge, or who ever is acting on his
behalf, is ordered to hear the case on the merit. No costs.
||| (Province of Abra v. Hernando, G.R. No. L-49336, [August 31,
1981], 194 PHIL 97-103)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39086. June 15, 1988.]
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by
PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner, vs. HON.
JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial
Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE,
Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS CF
PATERNO MILLARE, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** of the
defunct Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, dated June 14,
1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656, entitled "Abra Valley Junior
College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff vs. Armin
M. Cariaga as Provincial Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. Bosque as
Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Paterno Millare,
defendants," the decretal portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
hereby declares:
"That the distraint seizure and sale by the
Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra, the
Provincial Treasurer of said province against the
lot and building of the Abra Valley Junior
College, Inc., represented by Director Pedro
Borgonia located at Bangued, Abra, is valid;
"That since the school is not exempt from
paying taxes, it should therefore pay all back
taxes in the amount of P5,140.31 and back taxes
and penalties from the promulgation of this
decision;
"That the amount deposited by the plaintiff in
the sum of P6,000.00 before the trial, be
confiscated to apply for the payment of the back
taxes and for the redemption of the property in
question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00,
the remainder must be returned to the Director
of Pedro Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff
herein;
"That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in
the amount of P6,000.00 also before the trial
must be returned to said Municipal Treasurer of
Bangued, Abra;
"And finally the case is hereby ordered
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by the
respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on July 10,
1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of
Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building located at
Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties
amounting to P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of the college lot
and building covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly
registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff below, on July 6, 1972,
by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer,
defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the
petitioner by the respondent treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale
at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held
on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of
Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly
accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now
deceased) filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and
Municipal Treasurer, through then Provincial Fiscal Loreto C. Roldan,
filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the respondents Heirs of
Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the complaint this was
followed by an amended answer (Annex "3," ibid; Rollo, pp. 101-
103) on August 31, 1972.
On September 1, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare filed his
answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo, pp. 106-108).
On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school premises
at public auction, the respondent Judge, Hon. Juan P. Aquino of the
Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered (Annex
"6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial and
municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of
the auction sale. Hence, on December 14, 1972, petitioner, through
Director Borgonia, deposited with the trial court the sum of
P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369. LLpr
On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision.
Said Stipulations reads:
"STIPULATION OF FACTS
"COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels,
and to this Honorable Court respectfully enter
into the following agreed stipulation of facts:
"1. That the personal circumstances of the
parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the complaint
is admitted; but the particular person of Mr.
Armin M. Cariaga is to be substituted, however,
by anyone who is actually holding the position
of Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Abra;
"2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings
thereon located in Bangued, Abra under Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-83;
"3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as
Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra caused to
be served upon the Abra Valley Junior College,
Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the property of said
school under Original Certificate of title No. 0-83
for the satisfaction of real property taxes
thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of
Seizure being the one attached to the complaint
as Exhibit A;
 "4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of
the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at
public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid
real property taxes thereon and the same was
sold to defendant Paterno Millare who offered
the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of
Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant
Municipal Treasurer.
students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town II
of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters
from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
the high school and college students are housed in the main PETITIONER ARE NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR
building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES MERELY BECAUSE THE
the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the school COLLEGE PRESIDENT RESIDES IN ONE ROOM OF
reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. LLphil THE COLLEGE BUILDING.

"5. That all other matters not particularly and From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to determine
specially covered by this stipulation of facts will and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot and building
be the subject of evidence by the parties. in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. (Rollo, p.
20)
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the
Honorable Court to consider and admit this The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his
stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the
the parties. Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Memorandum
on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence,
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973. the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school
Sgd. Agripino Brillantes building and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra
Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes."
Typ. AGRIPINO BRILLANTES
(Annexes "B," "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Attorney for Plaintiff Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the
second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential
Sgd. Loreto Roldan
purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the
Typ. LORETO ROLDAN assailed decision.
Provincial Fiscal
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from
Counsel for Defendants
August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal (Per Order dated
Provincial Treasurer of
August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57) petitioner
Abra and the Municipal instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition
Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre was filed on August 17, 1974 (Rollo, p. 2).
Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give
Attorney for Defendant DUE COURSE to the petition (Rollo, p. 58). Respondents were
Paterno Millare" required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
(Rollo, Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
pp. 17-
18) I purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS
found the following: (a) that the school is recognized by the VALID THE SEIZURE AND SALE OF THE COLLEGE
government and is offering Primary, High School and College LOT AND BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand PURPOSES OF THE PETITIONER.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY
TAXES AND IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY
P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00 DEPOSIT
MADE IN THE COURT BY PETITIONER AS
PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31 REALTY TAXES. (See
Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)
The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase
"used exclusively for educational purposes."
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for
educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof,
determines the exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3),
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of
subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well
as to the provision ofCommonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known
as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore
void. cdrep
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college
lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and
sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational
President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his
family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for
commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college
building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment,
the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as
Annex "8" [Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds
application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of
the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes . . . ."
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No.
470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as
the Assessment Law, provides:
"The following are exempted from real property
tax under the Assessment Law:
(c) churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school
lot and building is the basic and controlling guide, norm and
standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental
use thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court ruled that while it may be
true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and
maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute
business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution
used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes,
and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation. LLpr
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos
Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court included in the exemption a
vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot formerly used as
a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used exclusively"
considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from payment of
land tax in favor of the convent includes, not only the land actually
occupied by the building but also the adjacent garden devoted to
the incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is not used for
commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort of lodging place,
also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use
in religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further
clarified by this Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board
of Assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991
[1965], thus —
"Moreover, the exemption in favor of property
used exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol.
2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the
case of hospitals, 'a school for training nurses, a
nurses' home, property used to provide housing
facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the
hospital staff, and recreational facilities for
student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS
6621), such as 'athletic fields' including 'a farm
used for the inmates of the institution.'" (Cooley
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil. 547 [1941]). prcd
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively
used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section
22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable
emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of
the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of
the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for
residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find
justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purpose — educational, the
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purpose of education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to
have been raised for the first time in this Court. That the matter was
not taken up in the trial court is really apparent in the decision of
respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the stipulation
of facts, not even in the description of the school building by the
trial judge, both embodied in the decision nor as one of the issues to
resolve in order to determine whether or not said property may be
exempted from payment of real estate taxes (Rollo, pp. 17-23). On
the other hand, it is noteworthy that such fact was not disputed
even after it was raised in this Court.
Indeed it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot
be taken up for the first time on appeal. Nonetheless, as an
exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a factual
issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual
matter. "The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to
review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision." (Perez vs.
Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]). cdrep
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is
built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes,
but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to
the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that
half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. ||| (Abra
Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-39086, [June 15, 1988], 245
PHIL 83-93)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10405. December 29, 1960.]
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as
Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner and
appellant, vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET
AL., respondents and appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for
appellant.
Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor
A.A. Torres for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE POWERS;
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUES ONLY FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSES; WHAT DETERMINES VALIDITY OF A PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE. — "It is a general rule that the legislature is
without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but
a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct
object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax and not the magnitude of the interests to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the
public or to the state, which results from the promotion of
private interests, and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money."
(23 R. L. C. pp. 398-450).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNDERLYING REASON FOR THE RULE. —
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of
the constitution, public funds may be used only for a public
purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate public funds
is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the
devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriate of state
funds can be made for other than a public purpose. (81 C.J.S. p.
1147).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. — The
test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of
public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the
public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although such advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81 C.J.S. p.
1147).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF CONGRESS AT THE TIME
OF PASSAGE OF A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. — The
validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at
the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring,
or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter
consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed
by said statute.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION FOR A PRIVATE
PURPOSE NULL AND VOID; SUBSEQUENT DONATION TO
GOVERNMENT NOT CURATIVE OF DEFECT. — Where the land
on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs
to a private person, an appropriation made by Congress for that
purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government,
made over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of
the Act for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality" to
the appropriation, does not cure the basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not
precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said
appropriation.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF TAXPAYERS TO CONTEST
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATION. — The relation
between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the
one hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is
not identical to that obtaining between the people and
taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer,
from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people
and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof,
except that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over
the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of
the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type
of our national government is not subject to limitations
analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon
the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the states of the Union. For this
reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assailed
the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state
public funds - which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme
Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) - has greater
application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to
acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal
funds.
7. CONTRACTS; DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY; EXCEPTIONS
TO ARTICLE 1421 OF THE CIVIL CODE.— Article 1421 of the Civil
Code is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a
party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth
in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of
the latter, except only those which are inherent in his person,
including his right to the annulment of said contract, even
though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the
above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction therein issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction upon the ground thatRepublic
Act No. 920, entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public
Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C
(a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00, "for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig
feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas — Gen. Araneta — Gen.
Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen. Segundo — Gen. Delgado —
Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and
approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were
"nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at .
. . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the tracings attached to the
petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, nor far away
from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54),
which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway"; that
the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands
on which said feeder roads were to be constructed) were
private respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the
passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate
of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta,
addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal,
offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the
municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the
donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to
change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in
favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that
on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to
said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act
No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for
the construction of the projected feeder reads in question; that
the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of
respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to
the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that
inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were
private property at the time of the passage and approval of
Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein
made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal
and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of
P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were
made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question
were "public roads and not private streets of a private
subdivision"; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality,
when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12,
1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines,
an alleged deed of donation — copy of which is annexed to the
petition — of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said
project feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation
was on the same date, accepted by the ten Executive Secretary;
that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation
partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation
violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibition
members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and,
hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for
the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with
public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from
relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision
streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of
said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the
Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the
court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply
with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal
provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and
prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item
of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the
alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be
"declared unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a writ of
injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works,
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Highways and Jose C.
Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the
above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned
item of Republic Act No. 926 and the disbursing officers of the
Department of Public Works and Communications, the Bureau
of Public Works and the Bureau of Public Highways from making
any further payments out of said funds provided for inRepublic
Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
aforementioned parties respondent from making and securing
any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic
Act No. 920 and from making any further payments out of said
illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the
ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that
the petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this
motion, respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the Province
Administrative Code; that said respondent "not aware of any
law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for
the improvement of . . . private proper"; and that, the
constitutional provision invoked by petitioner inapplicable to
the donation in question, the same being a pure act of
liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn,
maintained that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in
question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . . in which
the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved and
petitioner "has not shown that he has a personal and
substantial interest" in said Act "and that its enforcement has
caused or will cause him a direct injury".
Acting upon said motion to dismiss, the lower court
rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October 29,
1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case,
the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof
who represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities"
to question the constitutionality of the disputed item
of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature is without power
to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose", that the construction and improvement of the feeder
roads in question, if such roads were private property, would
not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the following
condition:
"The within donation is hereby made upon the
condition that the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines will use the parcels of land
hereby donated for street purposes only and for
no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly
understood that should the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines violate the condition
hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso
facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA."
(Italics supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that
said donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden by
the Constitution" and consequently illegal", for Article 1409 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in existent and void
from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the
legality of said donation may not be contested, however, by
petitioner herein, because his "interests are not directly
affected" thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in
question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed.
 At the outset, it should be noted that we are
concerned with a decision granting the aforementioned
motions to dismiss, which as such, are deemed to have
admitted hypothetically the allegations of fact made in the
petition of appellant herein. According to said petition,
respondent Zulueta is the owner of several parcels of
residential land, situated in Pasig Rizal, and known as the
Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been
reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned, which,
admittedly, were private property of said respondent
when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as
when it was approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The
petition further alleges that the construction of said feeder
roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation
of P85,000.00, would have the effect of relieving respondent
Zulueta of the burden of constructing its subdivision streets or
roads at his own expenses, 1 and would greatly enhance or
increase the value of the subdivision" of said respondent. The
lower court held that under these circumstances, the
appropriation in question was "clearly for a private, not a public
purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this
conclusion, which is self-evident. 2 However, respondent
Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
"A law passed by Congress and approved by the
President can never be illegal because Congress
is the source of all laws . . .. Aside from the fact
that the movant is not aware of any law which
makes illegal the appropriation of public funds
for the improvement of what we, in the
meantime, may assume as private property . . .."
(Record on Appeal, pp. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most
emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature of the
Government established under the Constitution of the
Philippinesand the system of checks and balances underlying
our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions
of this Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed
violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public
funds for a private purpose the principle according to Ruling
Case Law, is this:
"It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the
essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interests to be affected nor the degree to which
the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or
to the state, which results from the promotion
of private interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid
by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-
400; Italics supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the
following language:
"In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes
only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals." (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics
supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris
Secundum states:
"Generally, under the express or implied
provisions of the constitution, public funds may
be used for a public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds iscorrelative
with its right to tax, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax
for one purpose and the devotion thereof to
another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public
interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve
the public. . . ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics
supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the
foregoing views which, apart from being patently sound, are a
necessary corollary to our democratic system of government,
which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established
jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional
system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence
are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained
to uphold the appropriation in question, upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above
referred to because the same does not affect him directly. This
conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises
namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional
infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the
latter may not be annulled without a previous declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule
set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits
of no exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of
Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon
events occupying, or acts performed, subsequentlythereto,
unless the latter consist of an amendment of the organic law,
removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00
appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the
legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public
or private property when the bill, which, later on,
became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or when
said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of
said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13
of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought
a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. 4 The
donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the
approval and effectivity of said Act, made according to the
petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or
legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration
of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other
statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the
creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the
conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the
rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are
inherent in his person, including, therefore, his right to the
annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not
affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated
in said legal provision.
Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute
may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5 upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes an
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are some decisions to
the contrary, 7 the prevailing view in the United States is stated
in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
"In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute the general rule
is that only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys." (11 Am. Jur. 761;
italics supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme
Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447),
insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government
is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation
to its government. Indeed, under thecomposite system of
government existing in the U.S., states of the Union are integral
part of the Federation from an international viewpoint, but,
each state enjoys internally a substantial measure of
sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the
Federal Constitution. In fact, the same was made by
representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people of
the U.S., except insofar as the former represented the people of
the respective States, and the people of each State has,
independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution.
In other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal
statutes have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in
consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the
respective states of the Union of which they are citizens. The
peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the
Federal Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its
President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the U.S.,
but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the
Federal Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and
its taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic of the
Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining
between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal
Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that
existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and
the government thereof, except that the authority of the
Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines
is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar
as the simple and unitary type of our national government is
not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the
Federal Constitutionupon the states of the Union, and those
imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of the
states of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the
right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds — which has been
upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie,
101 U.S. 601) — has greater application in the Philippines than
that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United
States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil.,
257), involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of
Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene
for the purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner
thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs.
President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and
employee of the Government was not permitted to question
the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of
members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of
the Philippines and Barredo vs. Commission on Election (84
Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the action of
taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of
public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason
that impelled this Court to take such position in said two (2)
cases — the importance of the issues therein raised — is
present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the
Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a
taxpayer. The province of Rizal, which he represents officially as
it Provincial Governor, is our most populated political
subdivision, 7 and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the
circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify
petitioner's action in contesting the appropriation and donation
in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by
the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction
should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the
costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so
ordered.
||| (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R.
No. L-10405, [December 29, 1960], 110 PHIL 331-346)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937.]
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN
RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS
PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION. — While, generally,
prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or
quasi-judicial function (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction
may issue to ". . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or
persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial,
which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and
226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2. ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS. — The term "judicial"
and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenge act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present
case, which act because alleged to be violative of
the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . .
jurisdiction."
3. ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO
COURTS OR TRIBUNALS. — The statutory rule, therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits
of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are
without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ
is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration
of justice, or the prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
4. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM. — What is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious
freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition
of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated.
5. ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No.
4052. — The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provision of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty
thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto,
and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of
the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
6. ID.; ID.; ID. — Act No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
LAUREL, J p:
Government." Of course, the phrase ""advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of
the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or church. In the present case,
however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. — The only purpose in issuing and selling
the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance
"to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps
as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing
a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map
of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress.
8. ID.; ID.; ID. — While the issuance and sale of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. The Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20
Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
DECISION
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head
of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from
this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent
Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of
the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment
of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing as follows:
"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of
wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown,
cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The
denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36, and 50 centavos." the
said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater
part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the
stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of
prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain
ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions
(50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . . inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess
of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or
person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226,Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and
include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts
in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of
the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . .
jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is
that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts
or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own
jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted,
where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions," (Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the
alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary
as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium."
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of
the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this
principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history,
not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions
might arise when the state will use the church, and the church
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective
ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this
principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of
our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of
Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10,
1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of
1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme
expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to say now
that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.
All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the
lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the
Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that
what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not
mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and
is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in
the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall
embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from
taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
(sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and
sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law,
sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited
when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art.
VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate
allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in
relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea
that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and
certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and
133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent
Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under
the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. this
Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING
THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY
FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF
PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS
 WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Philippines in
legislature assembled and by the authority of
the same:
"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand
pesos is hereby appropriated and made
immediately available out of any funds in the
Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for
the cost of plates, and printing of postage
stamps with new designs, and other expenses
incident thereto.
"SECTION 2. The Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, is hereby authorized to
dispose of the whole or any portion of the
amount herein appropriated in the manner
indicated and as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government.
"SECTION 3. This amount or any
portion thereof not otherwise expended shall
not revert to the Treasury.
"SECTION 4. This act shall take effect on
its approval.
"Approved, February 21, 1933."
It will be seen that the Act appropriate the sum of sixty
thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto,
and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of
the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The
printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question
appears to have been approved by authority of the President of
the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part
of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent
alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer
losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the
revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in
question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to
be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in
view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize
the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold
for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts
of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's
complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance
"to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications in the
President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's
complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while
the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We
are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20
Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of
counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe
by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the
Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
persecution, care should be taken that at this stage of our
political development nothing is done by the Government or its
officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is
taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution.
But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052,
and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to
the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction
in the case at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government. "Even if we were to assume that these officials
made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to
take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and
the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is
yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied,
without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial
Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
||| (Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 45459, [March 13, 1937], 64 PHIL 201-
210)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991.]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM, in her capacity as
National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROPER PARTIES; SENATORS MAY
BRING SUIT QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATION FOR DEBT SERVICE IN THE 1990
BUDGET. — There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of
the Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a
constitutional issue is raised. Indeed, even a taxpayer has
personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; APPROPRIATION ACT OF 1990; HIGHEST
BUDGETARY PRIORITY TO EDUCATION; ALLOCATION OF P86 BILLION
TO EDUCATION, NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN IF CONGRESS
APPROPRIATED AN AMOUNT FOR DEBT SERVICE BIGGER THAN THE
SHARE ALLOCATED TO EDUCATION. — Since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance
with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority
to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is
certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment,
to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the
previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
3. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 81, 1177 AND 1967 REGARDING
AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATIONS REMAIN OPERATIVE UNTIL
AMENDED, REPEALED OR REVOKED. — Section 3, Article XVIII of
the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." The Court,
therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81,
Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely
complying with the duty to implement the same.
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEAL OR AMENDMENT BY
IMPLICATION IS FROWNED UPON. — Repeal or amendment by
implication is frowned upon.
5. ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW IS
GENERALLY APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY.— Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitutionand law is generally
applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly
stated.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; UNDUE
DELEGATION OF POWER; CONSTRUED.— In Edu vs. Ericta, this Court
had this to say — "What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test
is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether
or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what
is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which legislative process can go forward .
. . To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy .
. . The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as whole . . ."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO MAKE THE LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM
POWER AND DISCRETION AS TO ITS EXECUTION. — In People vs.
Vera, this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as
to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made."
8. POLITICAL LAW; ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE COUNTRY SHOULD
HONOR ITS INTERNATIONAL DEBT, A POLITICAL QUESTION. — As to
whether or not the country should honor its international debt,
more especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by
the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective
of the petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be
addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for
Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their
wisdom and sound discretion.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
1. POLITICAL LAW; APPROPRIATION; AMOUNT APPROPRIATED
MUST BE DETERMINATE OR AT LEAST DETERMINABLE. — One of the
essential requirements of a valid appropriation is that the amount
appropriated must be certain, which means that the sum authorized
to be released should either be determinate or at least
determinable. It is essential to the validity of an appropriation law
that it should state the exact amount appropriated or the maximum
sum from which the authorized expenses shall be paid, otherwise it
would be void for uncertainty, since the legislative power over
appropriation in effect could have been delegated in such case to
the recipient of the funds appropriated or to the official authorized
to spend them. (State v. Eggers, 16 L.R.A., N.S. 630; State v. La
Grave, 41 Pac. 1071)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH IN CASE AT BAR. — It
is easy to see that in none of these decrees (Section 7 of P.D. 81,
Section 31 of the P.D. 1717 and Section 1 of P.D. 1967) is the
amount appropriated fixed, either by an exact figure or by an
indication at least of its maximum. The ponencia says that "the
amounts are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in
the decree." I am afraid I do not see those parameters. I see only
the appropriation of "All the revenue derived from the projects
financed by such loans" and "such amounts as may be necessary to
effect payment on foreign or domestic loans" or "the principal and
interest on public debt, as and when they shall become due." All
these are uncertain. We surely cannot defend an appropriation, say,
of "such amounts as may be necessary for the construction of a
bridge across the Pasig River" even if the exact cost may be shown
later by the books of the Treasury. This would be no different from
the uncertain appropriations the Court is here sustaining.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation
(with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, 1 while the
appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
amount to P27,017,8l3,000.00. 2
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases. cdll
'SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; APPROPRIATION; MUST BE MADE BY LAW;
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, NOT EMBRACED THEREIN. — Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionprovides: "Sec. 29(1). No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." It is quite obvious from this provision
that there mustfirst be a law enacted by Congress (and approved by
the President) appropriating a particular sum or sums before
payment thereof from the Treasury can be made. If the above
constitutional provision is to be meaningful and effective at all, I
believe that the law appropriating a particular sum or sums for debt
service, whether involving domestic or foreign loans of the
Government, should be enacted by the Congress, composed of the
most recently elected representatives of the people. To construe
the term "law" in the above provision to mean the decrees issued by
then President Marcos would, in effect, be supporting a continuing
governance of the large segment of the Philippine economy by a
past regime which, as every one knows, centralized for a good
number of years legislative and executive powers in only one
person. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the
proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy
that, in my opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the
policy-determining body of the Government.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in
the 1990 budget.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized 'Judicial power includes the duty of the
by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic courts of justice to settle actual
Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: controversies involving rights which are
Foreign Borrowing Act), "by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the legally demandable and enforceable,
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary and to determine whether or not there
Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An has been a grave abuse of discretion
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the amounting to lack or excess of
Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The or instrumentality of the Government.'
Purpose."
"With the Senate maintaining that the
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the President's veto is unconstitutional, and that
Republic of the Philippines may bring this suit where a constitutional charge being controverted, there is an actual
issue is raised. 3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain case or justiciable controversy between the
unlawful expenditure of public funds. 4 Upper House of Congress and the executive
department that may be taken cognizance of by
this Court."
The petition seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. The questions raised in the instant petition are —
No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition
also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the "I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN
1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political OF THE CONSTITUTION?
question which is the repeal or amendment of said laws addressed
to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No.
not this Court. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION?
In Gonzales, 5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the
presidential veto of certain provisions, particularly Section 16 of III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(1),
the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?" 6
disposing of the issue, stated —
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which
"The political question doctrine neither this Court may properly take cognizance of.
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
On the first issue, the petitioners aver —
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this "According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation the Constitution:
 '(5) The State shall assign the
highest budgetary priority to education
and ensure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.'
"The reason behind the said provision is stated,
thus:
'In explaining his proposed
amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all
the great and sincere piety professed
by every President and every Congress
of the Philippines since the end of
World War II for the economic welfare
of the public schoolteachers always
ended up in failure and this failure, he
stated, had caused mass defection of
the best and brightest teachers to
other careers, including menial jobs in
overseas employment and concerted
actions by them to project their
grievances, mainly over low pay and
abject working conditions.
'He pointed to the high
expectations generated by the
February Revolution, especially keen
among public schoolteachers, which at
present exacerbate these long
frustrated hopes. Cdpr
'Mr. Ople stated that despite
the sincerity of all administrations that
tried vainly to respond to the needs of
the teachers, the central problem that
always defeated their pious intentions
was really the one budgetary priority in
the sense that any proposed increase
for public schoolteachers had to be
multiplied many times by the number
of government employees in general
and their equitable claims to any pay
standardization such that the pay rate
of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the
rate of government workers in general.
This, he stated, foredoomed the
prospect of a significant pay increase
for teachers.
'Mr. Ople pointed out that the
recognition by the Constitution of the
highest priority for public
schoolteachers, and by implication, for
all teachers, would ensure that the
President and Congress would be
strongly urged by a constitutional
mandate to grant to them such a level
of remuneration and other incentives
that would make teaching competitive
again and attractive to the best
available talents in the nation.
'Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that
before World War II, teaching
competed most successfully against all
other career choices for the best and
the brightest of the younger
generation. It is for this reason, he
stated, that his proposed amendment if
approved, would ensure that teaching
would be restored to its lost glory as
the career of choice for the most
talented and most public-spirited of the
"younger generation in the sense that it
would become the countervailing
measure against the continued decline
of teaching and the wholesale
desertion of this noble profession
presently taking place. He further
stated that this would ensure that the
future and the quality of the population
would be asserted as a top priority
against many clamorous and
importunate but less important claims
of the present.' (Journal of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p.
1172).
"However, as against this constitutional
intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for
the Department of Education in the 1990
budget. It is plain, therefore, that the said
appropriation for debt service is inconsistent
with the Constitution, hence, void (Art. 7, New
Civil Code)." 7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of
the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction
and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 8 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance
with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority
to education. Cdpr
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following
observations:
"To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled 'AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS
AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN
INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE,
IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR
BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR
PURPOSES OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,'
provides:
'SEC. 2. The total amount of
loans, credits and indebtedness,
excluding interests, which the
President of the Philippines is
authorized to incur under this Act shall
not exceed one billion United States
dollars or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time the loan's, credits
and indebtedness are incurred:
Provided, however, That the total
loans, credits and indebtedness
incurred under this Act shall not
exceed two hundred fifty million in the
fiscal year of the approval of this Act,
and two hundred fifty million every
fiscal year thereafter, all in United
States dollars or its equivalent in other
currencies.
'SEC. 5. It shall be the duty of
the President, within thirty days after
the opening of every regular session, to
report to the Congress the amount of
loans, credits and indebtedness
contracted, as well as the guarantees
extended, and the purposes and
projects for which the loans, credits
and indebtedness were incurred, and
the guarantees extended, as well as
such loans which may be reloaned to for the operation and
Filipino-owned or controlled maintenance of said projects,
corporations and similar purposes. to the National Treasury by
the government office, agency
'SEC. 6. The Congress shall or instrumentality, or
appropriate the necessary amount out government-owned or
of any funds in the National Treasury controlled corporation
not otherwise appropriated, to cover concerned, which is hereby
the payment of the principal and appropriated for the purpose
interest on such loans, credits or as and when they shall
indebtedness as and when they shall become due. In case the
become due.' revenue realized is insufficient
"However, after the declaration of martial law, to cover the principal, interest
President Marcos issued PD 81 amending and other charges, such
Section 6, thus: portion of the budgetary
savings as may be necessary to
'SEC. 7. Section six of the same cover the balance or
Act is hereby further amended to read deficiency shall be set aside
as follows: exclusively for the purpose by
the government office, agency
'SEC. 6. Any provision of law to
or instrumentality, or
the contrary notwithstanding,
government-owned or
and in order to enable the
controlled corporation
Republic of the Philippines to
concerned: Provided, That, if
pay the principal, interest,
there still remains a
taxes and other normal
deficiency, such amount
banking charges on the loans,
necessary to cover the
credits or indebtedness, or on
payment of the principal and
the bonds, debentures,
interest on such loans, credit
securities or other evidences of
or indebtedness as and when
indebtedness sold in
they shall become due is
international markets incurred
hereby appropriated out of
under the authority of this Act,
any funds in the national
the proceeds of which are
treasury not otherwise
deemed appropriated for the
appropriated: . . .'
projects, all the revenue
realized from the projects
financed by such loans, credits
or indebtedness, or on the "President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which
bonds, debentures, securities provides:
or other evidences of
'SEC. 31. Automatic
indebtedness, shall be turned appropriations. — All expenditures for
over in full, after deducting
(a) personnel retirement premiums,
actual and necessary expenses government service insurance, and
 other similar fixed expenditures, (b)
principal and interest on public debt, (c)
national government guarantees of
obligations which are drawn upon,
are automatically
appropriated; Provided, that no
obligations shall be incurred or
payments made from funds thus
automatically appropriated except as
issued in the form of regular budgetary
allotments.'
and PD 1967, which provides:
'Section 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of
any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may
be necessary to effect payments on foreign or
domestic loans, or foreign or domestic loans
whereon creditors make a call on the direct and
indirect guarantee of the Republic of the
Philippines, obtained by:
'a. The Republic of the
Philippines the proceeds of which were
relent to government-owned or
controlled corporations and or
government financial
institutions;LibLex
'b. government-owned or
controlled corporations and/or
government financial institutions the
proceeds of which were relent to public
or private institutions;
'c. government owned or
controlled corporations and/or
financial institutions and guaranteed by
the Republic of the Philippines;
'd. other public or private
institutions and guaranteed by
government-owned or controlled
corporations and/or government
financial institutions.
'Section 2. All repayments made by borrower
institutions on the loans for whose account
advances were made by the National Treasury
will revert to the General Fund.
'Section 3. In the event that any borrower
institution is unable to settle the advances made
out of the appropriation provided therein, the
Treasurer of the Philippines shall make the
proper recommendation to the Minister of
Finance on whether such advances shall be
treated as equity or subsidy of the National
Government to the institution concerned, which
shall be considered in the budgetary program of
the Government.'
"In the 'Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing Fiscal Year 1990,' which accompanied
her budget message to Congress, the President
of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
'Sources Appropriation
'The P233.5 billion budget
proposed for fiscal year 1990 will
require P132.1 billion of new
programmed appropriations out of a
total P155.3 billion in new legislative
authorization from Congress. The rest
of the budget, totalling P101.4 billion,
will be sourced from existing
appropriations: P98.4 billion from
Automatic Appropriations and P3.0
billion from Continuing Appropriations
(Fig 4).'
"And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out
of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt
service. In other words, the President had, on
her own, determined and set aside the said
amount of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the
appropriations of P155.3 Billion to be
determined and fixed by Congress, which is
now Rep. Act 6831." 9
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the
aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus
oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President
Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February
2, 1987 when the Constitutionwas ratified by the people; that there
is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic
appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved
any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic
appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests
on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D.
No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the
ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3,
Article XVIII which provides —
"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remainoperative until
amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis
supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent
with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments." (Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a
law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees
violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides as follows —
'Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness
in an appropriation, 11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President who determines in advance the
amount appropriated for the debt service. 12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that
"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been
adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that
legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such
laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked. LibLex
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the
clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the
principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available
when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of
periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor,
since both the periods and necessities are incapable of
determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective
execution of debt management policies. Its political wisdom has
been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues —
". . . First, for example, it enables the
Government to take advantage of a favorable
turn of market conditions by redeeming high
interest securities and borrowing at lower rates,
or to shift from short-term to long-term
instruments, or to enter into arrangements that
could lighten our outstanding debt burden —
debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or
other such schemes. Second, the automatic
appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in
debt servicing arising from any deviation from
what has been previously programmed. The
annual debt service estimates, which are usually
made one year in advance, are based on a
mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's
parlance, 'basket' of foreign exchange and
interest rate assumption's which may
significantly differ from actual rates not even in
proportion to changes on the basis of the
assumptions. Absent an automatic
appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon
Congressional action, which by the time this
comes, may no longer be responsive to the
intended conditions which in the meantime may
have already drastically changed. In the
meantime, also, delayed payments and
arrearages may have supervened, only to
worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure
ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before
due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and
indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos
and his legislative power goes against the intent
and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen
to subsist with or without the person of
Marcos." 13
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did
not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent with
Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of theConstitution which requires,
among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase
of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the
President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did
not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including
existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are
reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative
mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of
the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean
appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the
intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have
expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is
frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that
construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative
power, in Edu vs. Ericta, 14 this Court had this to say —
"What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its terms and provisions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, the inequity
must be directed to the scope and definiteness
of the measure enacted. The legislature does
not abdicate its function when it describes what
job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which legislative process can go forward . . .
'To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there
must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy .
'The standard may be either express or implied .
. . from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as whole . . ."
In People vs. Vera, 15 this Court said "the true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be
nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its
enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have
been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the
omissions. This is invalid delegation. 16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in
all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are
indicated therein. LibLex
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31
of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of
the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as
guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to
enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need
arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to
make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem
being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No
uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be
the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described
to consist of four major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor
General:
"The Government budgeting process consists of
four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is
essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch
and covers the estimation of government
revenues, the determination of budgetary
priorities and activities within the constraints
imposed by available revenues and
by borrowing limits, and the translation of
desired priorities and activities into expenditure
levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call
issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit
agency budget estimates in line with the
requirements consistent with the general
ceilings set by the Development Budget
Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff,
based on the macroeconomic projections of
interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated
sources of domestic and foreign financing,
estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of
budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes
for the interest and principal payments for the
year for all direct national government
borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the
same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage,
Congress enters the picture and deliberates or
acts on the budget proposals of the President,
and Congress in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation
made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General
Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor
already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as
amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the light of
this subsisting authorization as embodied in said
Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress
does not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive, but largely
with annual levels and approval thereof upon
due deliberations as part of the whole obligation
program for the year. Upon such approval,
Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on
whose part lies the implementation or
execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive,
the third phase of the budget process covers the
various operational aspects of budgeting. The
establishment of obligation authority ceilings,
the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities, the continuing review of
government fiscal position, the regulation of
funds releases, the implementation of cash
payment schedules, and other related activities
comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fund is triggered
by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury for
allotments from the Department of Budget and
Management, one quarter in advance of
payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments.
The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official
billings from the creditors, remits payments to
creditors through the Central Bank or to the
Sinking Fund established for government
security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase
refers to the evaluation of actual performance
and initially approved work targets, obligations
incurred, personnel hired and work
accomplished are compared with the targets set
at the time the agency budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative
power as clearly above shown, petitioners insist
nevertheless that subject presidential decrees
constitute undue delegation of legislative power
to the executive on the alleged ground that the
appropriations therein are not exact, certain or
definite, invoking in support therefor
the Constitution of Nebraska,
the constitution under which the case of State v.
Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was
decided. Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska,
however, our Constitution does not require
a definite, certain, exact or
'specific appropriation made by law.' Section 29,
Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of
these words and simply states: prcd
 'Section 29(1). No money shall
be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.'
More significantly, there is no provision in
our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made
by law,' such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made
impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as
by enactment of laws by the present Congress),
just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public
funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure
is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly
and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32
P. 272), whether in the past or in the
present." 17
Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, President Corazon C. Aquino submitted to Congress
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal
Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the
estimated obligation that will be incurred by the national
government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the
proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as follows:
"National Government Debt
Service Expenditures, 1990
(in million pesos)
Domestic Foreign Total
RA 245, as RA 4860
amended as amended,
PD 1967
Interest Payments P36,861 P18,570 P55,431
Principal Amortization 16,310 15,077 31,387
——— ——— ———
Total P53,171 P33,647 P86,818" 18
====== ===== ======
as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as
amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D.
No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely
complying with the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of
petitioners in filing this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must
fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or
not the country should honor its international debt, more especially
the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past
administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the
petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be
addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for
Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their
wisdom and sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED
Fernan, C. J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I must dissent.
One of the essential requirements of a valid appropriation is that
the amount appropriated must be certain, which means that the
sum authorized to be released should either be determinate or at
least determinable. As has been uniformly held:
It is essential to the validity of an appropriation
law that it should state the exact amount
appropriated or the maximum sum from which
the authorized expenses shall be paid,
otherwise it would be void for uncertainty, since
the legislative power over appropriation in
effect could have been delegated in such case to
the recipient of the funds appropriated or to the
official authorized to spend them. (State v.
Eggers, 16 L.R.A., N.S. 630; State v. La Grave, 41
Pac. 1075).
Thus, a law which provided that there should be
paid out of the State Treasury to any person,
firm or corporation engaged in the manufacture
of sugar in that State the sum of five-eights of
one per cent per pound upon each pound
manufactured under the conditions and
restrictions of the Act was held as invalid
appropriation for lack of certainty in the amount
to be paid out of the Treasury, the legislature
having failed to fix the amount to be
appropriated. (State of Nebraska v. Moore, 50
Neb. 88, cited in Gonzales, Phil. Political Law, p.
213).
The presidential decrees on which the respondents rely do not
satisfy this requirement.
Section 7 of P.D. 81 provides that "all the revenue realized from the
projects financed by such loans," after deducting the actual and
necessary operating and maintenance expenses, is appropriated for
servicing the foreign debts.
The same sections says that in case of deficiency, "such amount
necessary to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such
loans, credit or indebtedness as and when they shall become due is
hereby appropriated."
Section 31 of P.D. 1717 provides that "all expenditures for the
payment of the principal and interest on public debt" are
automatically appropriated.
Section 1 of P.D. 1967 appropriates "such amounts as may be
necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic loans."
It is easy to see that in none of these decrees is the amount
appropriated fixed, either by an exact figure or by an indication at
least of its maximum.
The ponencia says that "the amounts are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the degree." I am afraid I do not
see those parameters. I see only the appropriation of "all the
revenue derived from the projects financed by such loans" and "such
amounts as may be necessary to effect payment on foreign or
domestic loans" or "the principal and interest on public debt, as and
when they shall become due." All these are uncertain.
Even President Marcos, as legislator, did not know how much he
was appropriating.
The ponencia assures us that "no uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by
the books of the Treasury." That is cold comfort, indeed, if we
consider that it is the Treasury itself that is sought to be limited by
the requirement for certainty. The intention precisely is to prevent
the disbursement of public funds by the Treasury itself from
"running riot."
We surely cannot defend an appropriation, say, of "such amounts as
may be necessary for the construction of a bridge across the Pasig
River" even if the exact cost may be shown later by the books of the
Treasury. This would be no different from the uncertain
appropriations the Court is here sustaining.
I think it is a mistake for this government to justify its acts on the
basis of the decrees of President Marcos. These are on the whole
tainted with authoritarianism and enfeebled by lack of proper study
and draftmanship, let alone suspect motives. I suggest that these
decrees must be reviewed carefully and whenever proper, set aright
by necessary modification or outright revocation. Instead, the
respondents are invoking them blindly.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Cruz in his dissent. I only wish to add the following:.
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
It is quite obvious from this provision that there must first be a law
enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating
a particular sum or sums before payment thereof from the Treasury
can be made.
If the above constitutional provision is to be meaningful and
effective at all, I believe that the law appropriating a particular
sum or sums for debt service, whether involving domestic or foreign
loans of the Government, should be enacted by the Congress,
composed of the most recently elected representatives of the
people. To construe the term "law" in the above provision to mean
the decrees issued by then President Marcos would, in effect, be
supporting a continuing governance of a large segment of the
Philippine economy by a past regime which, as every one knows,
centralized for a good number of years legislative and executive
powers in only one person.
Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt
service were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees. Today
it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper
appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in
my opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-
determining body of the Government.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our
security is per se unconstitutional.
||| (Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, [April 22, 1991], 273
PHIL 443-466)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 99886. March 31, 1993.]
JOHN H. OSMEÑA, petitioner, vs. OSCAR
ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
JESUS ESTANISLAO, in his capacity as Secretary
of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his
capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs;
REX V. TANTIONGCO, and the ENERGY
REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
Nachura & Sarmiento for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J., p:
The petitioner seeks the corrective, 1 prohibitive and coercive
remedies provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, 2 upon the
following posited grounds, viz.: 3
1) the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of
the Ministry of Energy (now the Office of Energy Affairs) created
pursuant to § 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said
creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3) Article VI of
the Constitution;" 4
2) the unconstitutionality of § 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956 as
amended by Executive Order No. 137 for "being an undue and
invalid delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory
Board;" 5
3) the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund, 6 because it contravenes § 8
paragraph 2(2) of P.D. 1956 as amended; and
4) the consequent nullity of the Order dated December 10, 1990
and the necessity of a rollback of the pump prices and petroleum
products to the levels prevailing prior to the said Order.
It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984 President Ferdinand
Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General
Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The
OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in
crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange
rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of
crude oil. Cdpr
Subsequently the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability
account," in virtue of E.O 1024, 7 and ordered released from the
National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive
Order also authorized the investment of the fund in government
securities, with the earnings from such placements accruing to the
fund. LLjur
President Corazon C. Aquino amended P.D. 1956. She
promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987
expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for
possible cost under recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products the amount of the under
recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Now, the petition alleges that the status of the OPSF as of March 31
1991 showed a "Terminal Fund Balance deficit" of some P12.877
billion; 8 that to abate the worsening deficit, "the Energy Regulatory
Board issued an Order on December 10, 1990, approving the
increase in pump prices of petroleum products," and at the rate of
recoupment the OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a
span of six (6) months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents —
Oscar Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao,
in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his
capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V.
Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory Board —"are poised to
accept process and pay claims not authorized under P.D 1956." 9
The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
§ 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
"(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created
has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of
the Government."
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D.
1956 as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a
'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected
for a specific purpose the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be
treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated,
and not channeled to another government objective." 10 Petitioner
further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies
collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong
to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created." 11
He also contends that the "delegation of "legislative authority" to
the ERB violates § 28 (2) Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix, within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the
Government";
and inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the
power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must
be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to
tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also
impose a specific limit on how much to tax." 12
The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust account" is illegal per
se, but maintains that the monies collected, which form part of the
OPSF should be maintained in a special account of the general fund
for the reason that the Constitution so provides, and because they
are, supposedly, taxes levied for a special purpose. He assumes that
the Fund is formed from a tax undoubtedly because a portion
thereof is taken from collections of ad valorem taxes and the
increases thereon. cdphil
It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is
premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB
under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation
power of the State. The Solicitor General observes that the
"argument rests on the assumption that the OPSF is a form of
revenue measure drawing from a special tax to be expended for a
special purpose." 13 The petitioner's perceptions are, in the Court's
view, not quite correct.
To address this critical misgiving in the position of the petitioner on
these issues, the Court recalls its holding in Valmonte v. Energy
Regulatory Board, et al." 14 —
'The foregoing arguments suggest the presence
of misconceptions about the nature and
functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a 'Trust
Account' which was established 'for the purpose
of minimizing the frequent price changes
brought about by exchange rate adjustment
and/or changes in world market prices of crude
oil and imported petroleum
products." 15 Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended
by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 February
1987, this Trust Account may be funded from
any of the following sources:
"a) Any increase in the tax
collection from ad valorem tax or
customs duty imposed on petroleum
products subject to tax under this
Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by
the Minister of Finance in consultation
with the Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax
collection as a result of the lifting of tax
exemptions of government
corporations, as may be determined by
the Minister of Finance in consultation
with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be
imposed on petroleum products to
augment the resources of the Fund
through an appropriate Order that may
be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment of persons or
companies engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing and/or
marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost
differentials in case the actual peso
costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum
products is less than the peso costs
computed using the reference foreign
exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy."
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the world market prices of oil,
measured by the spot market in Rotterdam,
vary from day to day is of judicial notice. Freight
rates for hauling crude oil and petroleum
products from sources of supply to the
Philippines may also vary from time to time. The
exchange rate of the peso vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar and other convertible foreign currencies
also changes from day to day. These fluctuations
in world market prices and in tanker rates and
foreign exchange rates would in a completely
free market translate into corresponding
adjustments in domestic prices of oil and
petroleum products with sympathetic
frequency. But domestic prices which vary from
day to day or even only from week to week
would result in a chaotic market with
unpredictable effects upon the country's
economy in general. The OPSF was established
precisely to protect local consumers from the
adverse consequences that such frequent oil
price adjustments may have upon the
economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as
it were, into which a portion of the purchase
price of oil and petroleum products paid by
consumers as well as some tax revenues are
inputted and from which amounts are drawn
from time to time to reimburse oil companies,
when appropriate situations arise, for increases
in, as well as under recovery of, costs of crude
importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer
mechanism through which the domestic
consumer prices of oil and petroleum products
are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so
often, and oil companies are allowed to recover
those portions of their costs which they would
not otherwise recover given the level of
domestic prices existing at any given time. To
the extent that some tax revenues are also put
into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through
which the domestic prices of petroleum products
are subsidized in part. It appears to the Court
that the establishment and maintenance of the
OPSF is well within that pervasive and non-
waivable power and responsibility of the
government to secure, the physical and
economic survival and well-being of the
community, that comprehensive sovereign
authority we designate as the police power of
the State. The stabilization, and subsidy of
domestic prices of petroleum products and fuel
oil — clearly critical in importance considering,
among other things, the continuing high level of
dependence of the country on imported crude
oil — are appropriately regarded as public
purposes." dctai
Also of relevance is this Court's ruling in relation to the sugar
stabilization fund the nature of which is not far different from the
OPSF. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 16 this Court upheld the
legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and
character, viz.:
"The stabilization fees collected are in the
nature of a tax, which is within the power of the
State to impose for the promotion of the sugar
industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148).The tax
collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing
power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide a means for the stabilization of the
sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz v.
Araneta, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
 "The stabilization fees in question are levied by
the State upon sugar millers, planters and
producers for a special purpose — that of
'financing the growth and development of the
sugar industry and all its components,
stabilization of the domestic market including
the foreign market.' The fact that the State has
taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is
sufficient to constitute them state funds, even
though they are held for a special purpose
(Lawrence v. American Surety Co. 263 Mich.
586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p.
718). Having been levied for a special purpose,
the revenues collected are to be treated as a
special fund, to be, in the language of the
statute, 'administered in trust' for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the
Government. That is the essence of the trust
intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec.
29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article
VI, Sec. 23(1). 17
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a
special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact
that the funds are deposited in the Philippine
National Bank and not in the Philippine
Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out
only in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3),
lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec.
23(1)." (emphasis supplied.)
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred
to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the
special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a
"trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides
a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In
addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, § 8(c)
of P.D. 1956 18 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite,
quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax." 19
The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the
premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as
already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not
so much the power of taxation its police power. Although the
provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could
be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be
overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the
law which are embraced by the police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors
involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum
products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or
exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or
rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so
would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to
mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As
such, the standard as it is expressed, suffices to guide the delegate
in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the
circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law
delegating the power must he (1) complete in itself, that is it must
set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix
a standard — limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform. 20
". . . As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: To avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected.
It is the criterion by which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may either be express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have
to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole.' " 21
It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for
prohibition should fail.
The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied.
In that light, there can be no ground upon which to sustain the
petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable
standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB.
By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may
be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended
was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a
need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry from
the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the
standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and
the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of such officer, so
that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders
in the judgment of such officer conform to the legislative standard,
there is no failure in the performance of the legislative
functions." 22
This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the
validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which the imposts
are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund
are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard
upon which the delegation of power may be justified.
In relation to the third question — respecting the illegality of the
reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund, because allegedly in contravention of § 8,
paragraph 2 (2) of P.D. 1956, as amended 23 — the Court finds for
the petitioner. cda
The petition assails the payment of certain items or accounts in
favor of the petroleum companies (i.e., inventory losses, financing
charges, fuel oil sales to the National Power Corporation, etc.)
because not authorized by law. Petitioner contends that "these
claims are not embraced in the enumeration in § 8 of P.D.
1956 since none of them was incurred 'as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products,'" 24 and since these items
are reimbursements for which the OPSF should not have responded,
the amount of the P12.877 billion deficit "should be reduced by
P5,277.2 million." 25 It is argued "that under the principle
of ejusdem generis the term 'other factors' (as used in § 8 of P.D.
1956) can only include such 'other factors' which necessarily result
in the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products." 26
The Solicitor General, for his part, contends that "(t)o place said
(term) within the restrictive confines of the rule of ejusdem
generis would reduce (E.O. 137) to a meaningless provision."
This Court, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. The Honorable Commissioner
on Audit, et al., 27 passed upon the application of ejusdem
generis to paragraph 2 of § 8 of P.D. 1956, viz.:
"The rule of ejusdem generis states that 'where
words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are held to
be as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.' 28 A reading of subparagraphs (i)
and (ii) easily discloses that they do not have a
common characteristic. The first relates to price
reduction as directed by the Board of Energy
while the second refers to reduction in
internal ad valorem taxes. Therefore,
subparagraph (iii) cannot be limited by the
enumeration in these subparagraphs. What
should be considered for purposes of
determining the 'other factors' in subparagraph
(iii) is the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the
Section which explicitly allows the cost under
recovery only if such were incurred as a result of
the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
products." Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Campos, Jr. and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
The Court thus holds, that the reimbursement of financing charges
is not authorized by paragraph 2 of § 5 of P.D. 1956, for the reason Gutierrez, Jr., J, is on leave.
that they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic
prices of petroleum products. Under the same provision, however, ||| (Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, [March 31, 1993])
the payment of inventory losses is upheld as valid, being clearly a
result of domestic price reduction, when oil companies incur a cost
under recovery for yet unsold stocks of oil in inventory acquired at a
higher price.
Reimbursement for cost under recovery from the sales of oil to the
National Power Corporation is equally permissible, not as coming
within the provisions of P.D. 1956, but in virtue of other laws and
regulations as held in Caltex 29 and which have been pointed to by
the Solicitor General. At any rate, doubts about the propriety of
such reimbursements have been dispelled by the enactment of R.A.
6952, establishing the Petroleum Price Standby Fund, § 2 of which
specifically authorizes the reimbursement of "cost under recovery
incurred as a result of fuel oil sales to the National Power
Corporation."
Anent the overpayment refunds mentioned by the petitioner, no
substantive discussion has been presented to show how this is
prohibited by P.D. 1956. Nor has the Solicitor General taken any
effort to defend the propriety of this refund. In fine, neither of the
parties, beyond the mere mention of overpayment refunds, has at
all bothered to discuss the arguments for or against the legality of
the so-called overpayment refunds. To be sure, the absence of any
argument for or against the validity of the refund cannot result in its
disallowance by the Court. Unless the impropriety or illegality of the
overpayment refund has been clearly and specifically shown, there
can be no basis upon which to nullify the same.
Finally, the Court finds no necessity to rule on the remaining issue,
the same having been rendered moot and academic. As of date
hereof, the pump rates of gasoline have been reduced to levels
below even those prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the
nullification of the reimbursement of financing charges, paid
pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109698. December 5, 1994.]
ANTONIO DIAZ and KOSUMO
DABAW, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD AND DAVAO
LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC.,respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company,
Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an
application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its
property in service. llcd
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and
equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One
Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four
Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of
DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment
which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court assailing the decision of ERB on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, we referred the
case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which
subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the
filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a
wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did
not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the
ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently
alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received
the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8 September
1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
above circular. cdrep
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant recourse.
We deny the petition. The predecessor of the Energy
Regulatory Board was the Board of Energy created under P.D.
No. 1206. Thereunder, appeals from the decisions of the Board
of Energy were appealable to the Office of the President.
However, under the Interim Rules Implementing the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or
resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to the
Intermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9).
On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took
effect. Sec. 30, Art. VI, thereof provides: "No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence."
On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No.
172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board
of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party adversely affected
by a decision, order or ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition
to be known as petition for review with the Supreme Court."
On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court
promulgated Circular No. 1-91, par. (1) of which specifically
provides that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial
agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals.
It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was
enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this
provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot
be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to
decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf.
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110571, 7 October 1994).
If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court
or Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only course of
action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any
justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from
one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
93869, 12 November 1990).
Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4
of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed".
Paragraph (d) of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides
that "[n]o transfer of appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals
has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed;
continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals
will not be tolerated."
Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when
it held —
Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme
Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992,
referring 'this case to the Court of Appeals for
further disposition' was not a directive for this
court to disregard the above circulars and
precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could
mean only that this court should dispose of the
subject petition in conformity with, and not in
violation of, those circulars and precedents
(Rollo, p. 26).
Both Circulars Nos. 1-88 and 2-90 were duly published
in newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Hence,
lawyers are expected to keep themselves abreast with the
decisions of this Court and with its Circulars and other issuances
relating to procedure or affecting their duties and
responsibilities as officers of the court (Teehankee, Jr. v. Hon.
Madayag, G.R. No. 102717, 12 December 1992). cdrep
SC Circular No. 1-88, which took effect on 1 January
1989, was not adopted and approved by this Court for childish,
flimsy or petty reasons, nor for pure love of technicalities, but
to compel the strict observance of the Revised Rules of Court in
order that proceedings before this Court may not be needlessly
delayed (Gallardo v. Quintus, A.M. No. RTJ-90-577, 18 April
1991).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
||| (Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109698, [December 5, 1994],
308 PHIL 793-797)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996.]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO
A. CALIMBAS,respondents.
Rodolfo O. Reyes for petitioner SBMA.
Brillantes [Nachura] Navarro Jumamil Arcilla & Bello Law
Offices for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM; MAY BE EXERCISED BY THE PEOPLE TO PROPOSE
AND ENACT LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR LAW OR
ANY PART THEREOF PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR LOCAL
LEGISLATIVE BODY. — The Constitution clearly includes not only
ordinances but resolution as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language:
"The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local
legislative body . . ..' An act includes a resolution. Black defines an
act as 'an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something
done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edits, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and
determinations . . ..' It is basic that a law should be construed in
harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with
this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that 'if there is doubt or
uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or
provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it
may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used.''' DSATCI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED. — There are statutory and
conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative.
In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act", Congress
differentiated one term from the other. Along these statutory
definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of
the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at
the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other
hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed
by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action
on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing definitions,
which are based on Black's and other leading American authorities,
are echoed in the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). Prescinding
from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or
initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body
fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that
they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already
existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is
given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to
do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect
the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said
statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the
initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned . . .." On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-
making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial
jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution
which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority.
Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections. In other words, while
initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun
and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of
law-making by the people themselves without the participation and
against the wishes of their elected representatives, while
referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting
what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence,
the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more
complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will
simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND
SUPERVISION ON THE CONDUCT THEREOF. — From the above
differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending
not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing
to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper
form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon
by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed
legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken
down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted
upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted
in an initiative." It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A.
6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition." In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the
exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the
orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our
Constitution.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A
PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE VOTED FOR IT AND
IT HAS BECOME AN APPROVED ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. —
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent
Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then
there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal
and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. We also note
that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that "(n)othing
in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act . . .." So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It
passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of
mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as
determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
"branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is
quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of
discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard
to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or
lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by
the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal
in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in
the exercise of its review powers. cCDAHE
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MAY PASS UPON SUCH
PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE
CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY AND CLEARLY
OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY TO
ENACT. — Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the
Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an
initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in
fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission — to which
then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and
by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In
other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over
"approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may
adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and
language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added,
even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof
arepatently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative
body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of
this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of
Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand
and after hearing the parties thereon.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO
DISMISS; RES JUDICATA; DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ISSUE RAISED IN
THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE
EARLIER CASE. — Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No.
111230 and we found that the sole issue presented by the pleadings
was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum." In
the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of a
municipal resolution as the form by which these two new
constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly exercised.
What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for
submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the
Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS REGARDING
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ARE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO
EFFECTUATE ITS PURPOSES. — In deciding this case, the Court
realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and processes,
are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to the
Comelec so that proper corrective measures, as above discussed,
may be undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our people's
aspirations for the actualization of effective direct sovereignity.
Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum
are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and
not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby." In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be
used should the legislative show itself indifferent to the needs of the
people." Impelled by a sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the constitutional mandate.
Congress also interphased initiative and referendum into the
workings of local governments by including a chapter on this subject
in the Local Government Code of 1991. And the Commissionon
Elections can do no less by seasonably and judiciously promulgating
guidelines and rules, for both national and local use, in
implemention of these laws. For its part, this Court early on
expressly recognized the revolutionary import of reserving people
power in the process of law-making. HTSAEa
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one
thing, it institutionalized people power in law-making. Learning from
the bitter lesson of completely surrendering to Congress the sole
authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present
Constitution concurrently vested such prerogatives in the electorate
by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to
ordain legislation directly through the concepts and processes of
initiative and of referendum.
In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from
initiative and discusses the practical and legal implications of such
differences. It also sets down some guidelines in the conduct and
implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular
democracy, as well as settles some relevant questions on
jurisdiction — all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and
promoting the people's exercise of direct democracy.
In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks
to nullify the respondent Commission on Elections' Ruling dated
April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27,
1996 1 denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local
initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan.
The Facts
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
among others, provided for the creation of theSubic Special
Economic Zone, thus:
"Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone.
— Subject to the concurrence by resolution of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa,
there is hereby created a Special Economic and
Free-port Zone consisting of the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality ofSubic, Province
of Zambales, the lands occupied by
the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous
extensions as embraced, covered and defined
by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States of America
as amended, and within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and
Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter
 referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan
whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEFZ
a proclamation to be issued by the President of kung ang mga sumusunod na
the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob,
approval of this Act, each local government unit ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa
shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join kapakanan at interes ng Morong at
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of Bataan:
the President. Thereafter, the President of the
Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining (A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests'
the metes and bounds of the zone as provided — isang bundok na hindi
herein." (Italics supplied) nagagalaw at punong-puno ng
malalaking punong-kahoy at
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the iba't-ibang halaman.
declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation
into alternative productive uses. 2 Petitioner was organized with an (B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ
authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among (K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na
other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section nakapaloob sa SBMA sa
12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon pagkukuenta ng salaping
proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang
to another government agency." 3 national o 'Internal Revenue
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over Allotment' (IRA) sa Morong,
the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.
Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
(D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling
particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports buildings, 'special economic zones' ang
houses and other installations left by the American navy. bawat bayan ng Morong,
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan Hermosa at Dinalupihan.
passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing
(E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa
therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of R.A. ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng
No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, SBMA.
1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. (G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng
pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their ng nasabing mga lupa.
companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition (H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng
prayed for the following: SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24
na oras at bukod dito sa
"I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang magbukas pa ng pinto sa
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye hangganan naman ng Morong
1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa at Hermosa upang magkaroon
pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na ng pagkakataong umunlad rin
walang kundisyon. ang mga nasabing bayan, pati
na rin ng iba pang bayan ng
Bataan.
(I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga
daang Morong-Tala-Orani at
Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan
para sa kabutihan ng mga
taga-Bataan at tuloy
makatulong sa pangangalaga
ng mga kabundukan.
(J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na
representasyon sa pamunuan
ng SBMA ang Morong,
Hermosa at Bataan."
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition
of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227, particularly
those concerning the matters cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E) and (G)
of private respondents' petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been
referred to and favorably acted upon by the government agencies
concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development Authority
and the Office of the President.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their
petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative
under the Local Government Code of 1991, 4Sec. 122 paragraph (b)
of which provides as follows:
"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative.
—
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If no favorable action thereon is
taken by the sanggunian concerned, the
proponents, through their duly authorized and
registered representatives, may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof of the
sanggunian concerned.
xxx xxx xxx."
 On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in
Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition for local
initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan)
and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent
Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676) further
directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the
authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents.
On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a
petition for certiorari and mandamus 5 before this Court against
the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623
insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to
annual Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec
Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the
authentication of the required number of signatures in support of
the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227,
the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation
included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval
Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval
base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution
No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local
referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan," and which indicated,
among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996,
Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed
Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan."
On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law. . .."
The Issues
The petition 6 presents the following "argument":
"Respondent Commission on Elections
committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in scheduling a
local initiative which seeks the amendment of a
national law."
In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1)
petitioner has failed to show the existence of an actual case or
controversy; (2) . . . petitioner seeks to overturn a
decision/judgment which has long become final and executory; (3) .
. . public respondent has not abused its discretion and has in fact
acted within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) . . . the concurrence of local
government units is required for the establishment of
the Subic Special Economic Zone."
Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of
Morong, in his Reply (should be Comment) joined petitioner's cause
because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's Chairman and
staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas
discovered that the demands in the petition for a local
initiative/referendum were not legally feasible." 7
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent,
identified two issues, as follows:
"1. Whether or not the Comelec can be
enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local
initiative proposing to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
2. Whether or not the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the request of petitioner SBMA to stop the local
initiative."
On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the
parties, after which, it issued the following Resolution:
"The Court Resolved to: (1) GRANT the
Motion to Admit the Attached Comment filed by
counsel for private respondent Enrique T.
Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the: (a)
Reply (should be comment) to the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, filed by counsel for
respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated July 22,
1996; (b) Separate Comments on the petition,
filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor General for
respondent Commission on Elections dated July
19, 1996 and (b-2) counsel for private
respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22,
1996, all filed in compliance with the resolution
of July 16, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by
counsel for petitioner, dated July 22, 1996.
At the hearing of this case this morning,
Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for
petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for private
respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L.
Karaan for respondent Catalino Calimbas.
Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor
General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Zenaida
Hernandez-Perez appeared for
respondent Commission on Elections with
Solicitor General Goco arguing.
Before the Court adjourned, the Court
directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM
this Court by Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or
not Commission on Elections would push
through with the initiative/referendum this
Saturday, July 27, 1996.
Thereafter, the case shall be
considered SUBMITTED for resolution.
At 2:50 p.m., July 23, 1996, the Court
received by facsimile transmission an Order
dated also on July 23, 1996 from the
respondent Commission on Elections En
Banc inter alia 'to hold in abeyance the
scheduled referendum (initiative) on July 27,
1996 pending resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In
view of this Order, the petitioner's application
for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic and will thus not be passed upon by
 this Court at this time. Puno J., no part due to
relationship. Bellosillo, J., is on leave."
After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the
submissions and arguments of the parties, the Court believes that
the issues may be restated as follows:
(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a
decision/judgment which has long
become final and executory"; namely,
G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et
al. vs.Commission on Elections, et al.;
(2) Whether the respondent Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing its
Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s)
the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or
repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan"; and
(3) Whether the questioned local initiative
covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e.,
whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."
First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment
Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already
ruled with finality in Enrique T. Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al. 8 on "the very issued raised in (the) petition:
whether or not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong,
Bataan on the subject proposition — the very same proposition, it
bears emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of
Morong, Bataan is now sought to be enjoined by petitioner . . .."
We disagree. The only issue resolved in the
earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contra-
distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an
initiative and/or referendum. We quote from our said Decision: 9
"In light of this legal backdrop, the
essential issue to be resolved in the case at
bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an
initiative. Respondents take the negative stance
as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance
can be the subject of initiative. They rely on
Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of
the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides: 'Local Initiative Defined. — Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.'
We reject respondents' narrow and
literal reading of the above provision for it will
collide with the Constitution and will subvert the
intent of the lawmakers in enacting the
provisions of the Local Government of 1991 on
initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not
only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article
VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress, or local legislative body . . .'
An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act
as 'an expression of will or purpose . . . it may
denote something done. . . as a legislature,
including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves,
awards, and determinations . . ..' It is basic that
a law should be construed in harmony with and
not in violation of the Constitution. In line with
this postulate, we held in Re Guarina that 'if
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning
of the legislative, if the words or provisions are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible
of two or more constructions, that
interpretation will be adopted which will avoid
the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it
may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard
the more usual or apparent import of the
language use.'"
Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230
and we found that the sole issue presented by the pleadings was the
question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be
the subject of a valid initiative or referendum." 10
In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the
propriety of a municipal resolution as the form by which these two
new constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly
exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and
substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine,
whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating
and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848
The main issue in this case may be re-stated thus: Did
respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?
We answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private respondents
was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as
reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of
votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum." To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between
a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and
Referendum Act", 12 Congress differentiated one term from the
other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the
people to propose amendments to
the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the
purpose.
There are three (3) systems of
initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on
the Constitution which
refers to a petition
proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which
refers to a petition
proposing to enact a
national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation
which refers to a
petition proposing to
enact a regional,
provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay
law, resolution or
ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of
initiative by the people through a proposition
sent to Congress or the local legislative body for
action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the
electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes, namely:
c.1 Referendum on statutes
which refers to a
petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or
part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
c.2 Referendum on local law
which refers to a
petition to approve or
reject a law, resolution
or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and
local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A.
Cruz 13 defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose
bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent
of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that
referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors
become a law." The foregoing definitions, which are based on
Black's 14and other leading American authorities, are echoed in
the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. —
Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.
"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined.
— Local referendum is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject
any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held
under the control and direction of the Comelec
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and
cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim
the results of the said referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative
is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the
law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or
modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local
legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it
refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and
registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative,
giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should
the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities
with the period granted by said statute, the Commission Elections
"shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which
the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned . . ."
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making
body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction,
for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority.
Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections. 15
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-
making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their
elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in
an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum
where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in
the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to
initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal processes," these
can also be "rights," as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts," or
"the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in
this Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need
for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority
thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes
but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the
people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true
where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and
should upon thus be broken down into several autonomous parts,
each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be
exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall
be submitted to the electorate," 16 although "two or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative." 17
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the
"Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative
shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the
exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the
orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our
Constitution.
Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and
Imposition of Conditionalities — Ultra Vires?
Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be
submitted in the plebiscite, namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan to enact, 18 stressing that under Sec. 124 (b)
of R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall
cover only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of
the sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may
enact only such ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council
itself could, if it decide to so enact. 19 After the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong and the other municipalities concerned
(Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of
concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created,
whose metes and bounds had already been delineated
by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance
with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such
concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence
is no longer within the authority and competence of the Municipal
Council of Morong to legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the
specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal
resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. Hence,
such withdrawal can no longer be enacted or conditionalities
imposed by initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the creation
of SSEZ is now afait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation.
Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or
impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would
effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law of the
SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be
derived therefrom. Once created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local
concern. It has become a national project.
On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that
such argument is premature and conjectural because at this point,
the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during
the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private
respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate.
It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases. 20
We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself
provides 21 that "(n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act . . . ."
So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. 22 It
passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of
mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as
determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
"branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is
quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of
discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard
to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or
lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has
made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by
the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal
in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in
the exercise of its review powers.
Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the
Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an
initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in
fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission — to which
then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and
by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In
other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over
"approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may
adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and
language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added,
even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof
are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative
body to enact." 23Accordingly, the question of whether the subject
of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of
Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand
and after hearing the parties thereon.
While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking
body, it would be fruitful for the parties and the Comelec to plead
and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether Grande Island
and the "virgin forests" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong
to the national government and thus cannot be segregated from the
Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of passing a
municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of
the full subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized
capital stock of the Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from
cash and other assets, the ". . . lands embraced, covered and
defined in Section 12 hereof, . . ." which includes said island and
forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that may be
taken up in the proper forum — the Commission on Elections.
Another question which the parties may wish to submit to
the Comelec upon remand of the initiative is whether the proposal,
assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to enact,
may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is a
proposal to recall, nullify and render without effect (bawiin,
nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of
1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace
(palitan) said resolution with another municipal resolution of
concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder
would be granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob,
ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong and
Bataan. A voter may favor Item I — i.e., he may want
a total dismemberment of Morong from the Authority — but may
not agree with any of the conditions set forth in Item II. Should the a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
proposal then be divided and be voted upon separately and protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound
independently? public policy to enable the electorate to express their free and
untrammeled will, not only in the election of their annointed
All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very
vires on the ground of prematurity. rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and managed.
Epilogue WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang
earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present controversy as the Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to theCommission on
issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions Elections for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing
involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an discussion. No costs.
opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing — if necessary — for the
plebiscite; and (iii) that the said Commission has administrative and ||| (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections,
initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question of G.R. No. 125416, [September 26, 1996], 330 PHIL 1082-1113)
whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language and
whether such proposal or part or parts thereof
are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council
of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of law.
In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and
referendum, as concepts and processes, are new in our country. We
are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper corrective
measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to
helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the actualization of
effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions
for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate
their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the
voters of the rights granted thereby." 24 In his authoritative treatise
on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these
"instruments which can be used should the legislature show itself
indifferent to the needs of the people." 25 Impelled by a sense of
urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and
form to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased
initiative and referendum into the workings of local governments by
including a chapter on this subject in the Local Government Code of
1991. 26 And the Commission on Elections can do no less by
seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for
both national and local use, in implementation of these laws. For its
part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary
import of reserving people power in the process of law-making. 27
Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and
valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court as