ESTRADA VS.

ESCRITOR accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free

492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las
Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not
her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with
him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to
investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that
the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted

by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for

such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is
exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in
enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic
in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise
claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality

and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the

benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
 PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE V. LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting
collectively & anonymously.
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping
his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994,
during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly
known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false
accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was
dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said
motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense
counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance
Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the
FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of
the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises
three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is
unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental
motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.
Ratio: Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is
per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the
United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To
state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman,
categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty
itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which
the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal
sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused
who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given
the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S.
Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes
in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes
vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled
and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended
to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of
personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part
of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of
life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely
relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v.
Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to
the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death of or even the serious
injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as
it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We
have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is
unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive
penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on
two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the
death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape
through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include
rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of
Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this
could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the
context of our own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical
privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking
of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the
gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or
not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part
of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the
biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes
under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal
Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code
of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for
the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during
times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery
with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of
a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is
a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of
the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained
of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of
people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless
of their private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to
be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically
proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms
have failed to abate criminality in society what R.A. No. 7659
states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public
order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize
the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the
flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or
by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent
disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or
public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a
civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a
quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to
respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the
sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she
puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape
or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping
where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest
citizenry they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury
to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts
would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of
the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice
and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and
physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It
causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is
always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and
dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
 LITO CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 180016, APRIL 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy
pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit
the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after
the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to
Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that
he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against
Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for
being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the
jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is
different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of
document without violating the best evidence rule (only original
documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed
to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon
in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in
his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with
abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and
that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of
the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information
indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about
the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of
confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.
The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that
it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query
was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation
of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely
rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding
if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such
finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for
in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
 PEOPLE VS. FERRER
[48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge
that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill
of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity.
2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances
of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of
opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the
CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It
created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members
of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is
an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present
danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that
affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior
to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty
for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses
in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under
freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto
law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done.
The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of
1957. membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without
the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences
a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons,
groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
law.) Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an by overt acts.
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the acts.
same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the
conduct not person. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the
accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further
the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself
party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members
of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is
given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing
membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies
the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in
 PEOPLE VS. MARTIN SIMON
G.R. NO. 93028 JULY 29, 1994
SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS
FACTS: Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags,
weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the
day of question, he was picked up by the police at their house
while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed
instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to
sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the
documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the marked money came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the
blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three
days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that
the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did
not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment,
to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
ISSUE: Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING: To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the
sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. To sell means
to give, whether for money or any other material consideration.
It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant
actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the
for two twenty-peso bills. benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags the maximum range have fixed through the application of
of marijuana that was sold and there were 2 other tea bags of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to
marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months
for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only. of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional.
However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition,
that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is
less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty
where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same
error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize
such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole
law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where
the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities
stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua.
This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law
that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes
of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to
arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to
impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although
provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and
under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1
which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense.”
 MANUEL V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 165842 NOVEMBER 29, 2005
Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death, malice, good faith as a valid defense
· Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art. 349 RPC, Art. 41 FC
FACTS:
· July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaña before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again
· January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera, 21 year old
computer secretarial student, in Dagupan City while she looked
for a friend during her 2 days stay
· Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a motel together
and he proposed marriage and introduced her to his parents
who assures that he is single
· April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before Judge Antonio
C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City and they
were able to build a home after
· 1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or thrice a
year and whenever jobless Tina would ask for money, he would
slap her
· January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and left and
stopped giving financial support
· August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and was embarrassed and
humiliated to learn that Eduardo was previously married
· Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he had to go
to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina
· RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and
10 months, as minimum, to 10 years, as maximum and
P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit
o Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy
· Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent whereas under
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for · GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
one to be criminally liable for a felony defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
· CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating that Article 41 negates malice or criminal intent.
of the Family Code should apply that there should have been a · EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone
judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent is presumed to know the law.
spouse and modified minimum to 2 years and four months o Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
· burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he
ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony by dolo married he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife
(deceit). was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than
20 years since 1975
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial declaration as
proof
· Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be · Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or presumptive death on Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been which states that before the spouse present may contract a
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
proper proceedings. absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
o The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve reappearance of the absentee spouse.
and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. · moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 in
o Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code for being
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the welfare of society
presumptive death of the absent spouse
· For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
o (a) he/she has been legally married; and
o (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
§ The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage
· Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent
o Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the doing of
an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury
o When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law
presumes it to have been intentional
o For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there
must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent.
§ Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
 PEOPLE OF THE R.P. VS. DELIM
G.R. NO. 142773 28 JANUARY 2003
FACTS OF THE CASE: It is due to the automatic review of the
decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them
to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and
victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son of their
father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim
charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded
him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed
stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999.
Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence
against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that
murder can be the crime?
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no
opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously
adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars
on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does
mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be
presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he
was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto
does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their
numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was
shot and stabbed.
HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS
WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO
HOMICIDE)

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be
proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So
their acts were synchronized and executed with precision
evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
 PEOPLE V SABALONES
294 SCRA 751, AUGUST 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO,
accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.
Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were
convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in 1985 which led to
the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries
of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims
were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who also
attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with
Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep
along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to
the party after parking the car at Lim’s house. When they
reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire.
The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Sabalones and
Beronga appealed.
Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of
frustrated murder
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos
and Rogelio Presores testified about the shooting and identified
the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that is
behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones as one of the
gunmen. When the gunmen fired at the car, driver Nelson
Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan
Tiempo’s house from which they have escaped death.
Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and
Beronga denied their presence during the commission of the
crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses who stated
that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he
got tired watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga
testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was fetched
by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep.
Sabalones even escaped from place to place to flee from the
wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The
defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the
witnesses arguing that the place where the incident happened is conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise
dim and not lighted. degree of participation in the act.
RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants. Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the
circumstances that the crime was done at night time and that
Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident
credible? premeditation is also an aggravating circumstance [the accused
Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated had planned to kill the victim some days before].
testimonies of two witnesses. There was positive identification
by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in
gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s
headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because
the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding
though to the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial
evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconcistencies are
minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of
testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow],
mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity applies,
more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail over
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by
positive identification. Using the case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is
not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance
from the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?
No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred
in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of
frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for
frustrated felony is next lower in degree than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony. Because there are no
mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused.
It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show who
was between the two who actually pulled the trigger that killed
the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a