G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
EXECUTION OF THE the Government Corporate
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
GSIS state —
I.
NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the
conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares
and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to
the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must
negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for
the Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must
execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE
WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary
contracts with GSIS/MHC not
later than October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995);
and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee
on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of
Counsel) are obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security
to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . .
.5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the
Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The
case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is
clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to
Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under
which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its
territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According
to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have
slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from
the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the
bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a
matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well
be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse
its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for
the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That
is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply
 refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam
President, I am asking this
question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the
wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,"
can it be understood as a
preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who
are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the
question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say
definitely "TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam
President, I think that is
understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or prospective
laws will always lay down
conditions under which business
may be done. For example,
qualifications on the setting up
of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by
respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter
of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice
and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows
that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations
must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute have to raise a question.
Constitutional Commission 34 explains — witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Suppose it is a corporation that
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own is 80-percent Filipino, do we not
The patrimony of the Nation that should be historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, give it preference?
conserved and developed refers not only to out independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
rich natural resources but also to the cultural part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo
heritage of out race. It also refers to our equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional amendment would refer to an
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that individual Filipino. What about a
we should develop not only our lands, forests, anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and corporation wholly owned by
mines and other natural resources but also the management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot Filipino citizens?
mental ability or faculty of our people. be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim MR. MONSOD. At least 60
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is percent, Madam President.
pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the stands. 38
intention?
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in
in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which
fact, we would be limiting it if we
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
say that the preference should
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel 1986 Constitutional Commission
only be 100-percent Filipino.
when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine Davide is recognized.
meaning clear because
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may
of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine MR. DAVIDE. I would like to refer only to individuals and not
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the introduce an amendment to the to juridical personalities or
Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official Nolledo amendment. And the entities.
visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36 amendment would consist in
substituting the words
MR. MONSOD. We agree,
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
Madam President. 39
Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World War II the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS
xxx xxx xxx
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote,
with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand.
SUCH CITIZENS. may I request that the
Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of
amendment be read again.
political activities, playing host to almost every political convention.
In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped xxx xxx xxx
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
MR. MONSOD. Madam
failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
President, apparently the
"proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic. CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
proponent is agreeable, but we
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." And the word
"Filipinos" here, as intended by
the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained
thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I
would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I
can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that
amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more
qualified in some aspects than
the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is
"yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of
"MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL
GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That
means that Filipinos should be given preference in
the grant of concessions, privileges and rights
covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified
by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the
"Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This
provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient,
since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common
good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified
Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the
former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is
that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution
by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and
requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself
— is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to
renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For,
even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and
can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further
enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse
of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional
duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts —
provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the
executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and
of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading
and understanding the Constitution and the laws
is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were,
the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is
at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized
the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power —
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with
the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than
the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike
were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us,
while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not
yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have
the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept
its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist
on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution
lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must
it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention
of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the
influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and
welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by
the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is
not its function to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or the executive about the
wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in
nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared
criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Court's First Division against the sale of the
Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner,
certain statements were published in a major daily
to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates
that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that
while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as
the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do
not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity.
For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
review when the Constitution is involved. 49 respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50 Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property SO ORDERED.
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and
the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation
of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has
played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In
this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a
place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has
played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand
Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien
hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which
cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by
the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a
non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's
cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand,
how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA,
JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of
the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as
OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G.
MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO
V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to
enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective
positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on
the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo
M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de
la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a
Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V.
Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the
Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of
which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such
on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the
performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I
did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement
of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality
of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was
signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all
concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that
pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It
is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority
to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which
provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from
February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the
terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished
and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that
petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may
continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the
occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has
been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of
elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether
or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on February
25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we
hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective
date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante
dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year
deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over
of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2,
1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be SO ORDERED.
deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article
III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure

specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares
it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of
the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of
which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power
to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly,
Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides
in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by

law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent

between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and
the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be
considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations

letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC

Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45859 September 28, 1938
GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
QUIRICO ABADILLA, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondents.
Claro M. Recto and DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason and Ramon Diokno for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve petitioner's application for patent for a
certain mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in relation
thereto, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of
the President of the Philippines.
The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral
claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-
province of Benguet, Mountain Province, and located on public
lands by C. L. O'Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Act of
congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of
February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission,
relative to the location of mining claims; that said claim was located
on January 1, 1929, and the original declaration of location
registered in the office of the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain
Province, on January 7, 1929; that from March 16 to 17, 1934, an
amended location on the premises was made, for which an
amended declaration of location was registered in the office of the
mining recorder on April 3, 1934; that petitioner by itself and its
predecessors in interest, has been in continuous and exclusive
possession of said claim from the date of location thereof: that prior
to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the office of the Director of
Lands an application for an order of patent survey of said claim,
which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the
former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from August 9, 1933,
to April 30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; that the return of the
surveyor, the plat and field notes of the claim and certificate that
more than P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had been
expended on said claim, were approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Science; that prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed
with the mining recorder an application for patent, together with a
certificate showing that more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or
improvements had been expended by the petitioner upon said
claim, and with the plat and field notes above mentioned; having
previously posted a copy of such plat, together with notice of said
application for patent in a conspicuous place upon said claim; and
filed a copy of such plat and of such notice in the office of said
mining recorder, as well as an affidavit of two persons that such
notice had been duly posted; that prior to November 15, 1935, the
notice of petitioner's application for patent was forwarded by the
mining recorder to the division of mines, so that the latter could
order the publication of said notice was made once a week for a
period of sixty days in the "Philippines Herald," "El Debate," and the
Official Gazette, commencing February 13, 1936; that the sum of
P113.59 was tendered to respondents, as payment for the purchase
price of said claim, the area of which is 4.5434 hectares; and that
petitioner has requested the respondents, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve its application for patent, and to prepare
the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit
such papers for the signatures of the President of the Philippines,
but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and
refuse, to do so.
Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent
applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the
issuance of such patent.
Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegations of the petition
and deny others, and, by way of special defense, allege that
"petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a
patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim because the Constitution provides
that 'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture
land, shall not be alienated'; and that the respondents are, not only
under no obligation to approve petitioner's application for a patent
to said claim and to prepare the necessary papers in relation
thereto, but, also, in duty bound to proven the issuance of said
patent and the preparation of the aforesaid papers, because they
have sworn to support and defend the Constitution."
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for
an interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of
section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining
claims. The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to
determining the status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining
claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to
the public interest to meet squarely the fundamental question
presented, disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies
found in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the
view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where
he says that "the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners
may be accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny
some of the allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our
answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or
importance as should necessitate introduction of evidence before
the cases are submitted for decision. From our view of the cases,
these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints,
leaving out the difference between the allegations in the pleadings
to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are
confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty."
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
SECTION 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agriculture land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of
public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural
resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public
domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took
effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for
this conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first
declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, etc., and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong
to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation
of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the
State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to
conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional
provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do
not come within the prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in
the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on
November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the
Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of
Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind
that a constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with
the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and
opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W.,
769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: "The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to
the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of
public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not effect the validity of the former location. By
such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from
the public domain even as against the Government . (Union Oil
Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27
Cyc., 546.)"
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim,
the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana
Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by
the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession,
with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground
as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as
limited by the extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent.
While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his
location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains
in the government until patent issues." (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In
Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the
court said:
There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not
comply with all the requirements of the law in making the location
of the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever
abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim.
They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily
traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in
compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done
all that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The
claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of
the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could
obtain at any time upon proof of what they had done in locating the
claim, and of subsequent expenditures to specified amount in
developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the title
in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not
afterwards open to sale.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was said:
The rule established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of
state and lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining
claim is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The
claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold,
transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right
or title of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the
state; and is "real property," subject to the lien of a judgment
recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court.
(Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 737, 737; 1 Mor.
Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-
534; 14. Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood,
208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263;
Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchased the claim or
secure patent from the United states; but so long as he complies
with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent. (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74
Law. ed., 445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision
in the McDaniel case in determinative of the fundamental question
involved in the instant case. But he maintains "that this decision is
based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court
relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be abandoned."
We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well
founded or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1
Article XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we were
disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect
rights already fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of
Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come
within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources;
and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in
this case. In Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that "mandamus will lie to
compel the secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for
a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so
is based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its
decision the court said: "While the decision of this court exhibit a
reluctance to direct a writ of mandamus against an executive
officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law
in some cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed.,
1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In
Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20
Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this
court said:
executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a
statute might refuse to perform it, and hen his refusal is brought
before the court he might successfully plead that the performance
of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and
therefore it as not ministerial, and the court could on that account
be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the powers of the
court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from
judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of their
duties whenever they should plead that the duty required of them
arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its
language, nor how plainly they violated their duty in refusing to
perform the act required."
In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the
pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering,
however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the
application for a patent on its merits as due to their
misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions,
following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a
writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose
of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in
section 1 of Article XII of the constitution and in Commonwealth Act
No. 137. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

"Every statute to some extent requires constructions by the public

officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read
the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in
order to form a judgment from its languages what duty he is
directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily
and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a
purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in
regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which, upon
the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is
ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in
some degree a construction of its language by the officer. Unless
this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD
CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
B.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS,
SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,
AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-
HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN
JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE
BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS,
JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO,
JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,
PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV
M. BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.
GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,
WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO
LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA,
JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR.
MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA
D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU,
INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.
POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA
L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no
matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear
to be, over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often
frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that
the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon
by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns
that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that
the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is
neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance,
guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are deemed initiated at the time of
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, the filing of such verified complaint
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by or resolution of impeachment with
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two the Secretary General.
referred to the proper Committee within three session days Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of tabulation:
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding 11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES Impeachment Proceedings. – Within
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by BAR AGAINST a period of one (1) year from the date
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. RULE II RULE V IMPEACHMENT impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall INITIATING BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF Section 14. Scope of Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles IMPEACHMENT IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS Bar. – No impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL proceedings shall be against the same official. (Italics in the
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. initiated against the same original; emphasis and underscoring
Section 2. Mode of
Initiating Section 16. – Impeachment official more than once supplied)
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is Impeachment. – Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In within the period of one
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same Impeachment shall be cases where a Member of the House (1) year.
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate initiated only by a verified files a verified complaint of
shall forthwith proceed. complaint for impeachment or a citizen files a On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
impeachment filed by any verified complaint that is endorsed by Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the Member of the House of a Member of the House through a Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
same official more than once within a period of one year. Representatives or by any resolution of endorsement against an an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
citizen upon a resolution impeachable officer, impeachment disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of endorsement by any proceedings against such official are Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall Member thereof or by a deemed initiated on the day the
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is verified complaint or Committee on Justice finds that the On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but resolution of verified complaint and/or resolution impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the impeachment filed by at against such official, as the case may Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. least one-third (1/3) of all be, is sufficient in substance, or on this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
the Members of the the date the House votes to overturn public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than House. or affirm the finding of the said Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Committee that the verified Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall complaint and/or resolution, as the Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and case may be, is not sufficient in XI of the Constitution which reads:
punishment according to law. substance.
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to In cases where a verified complaint or any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and a resolution of impeachment is filed a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
underscoring supplied) or endorsed, as the case may be, by included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
at least one-third (1/3) of the referred to the proper Committee within three session days
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Members of the thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives House, impeachment proceedings all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right
to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and
approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives
and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5,
6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court
issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3)
and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment
complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with
the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings
on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of
this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition
for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of
the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated,
pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming
that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to
protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of
the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as
all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2)
this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a
citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N.
Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin
the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in
his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation
Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which
they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents
House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this
Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House
of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and
Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they
are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the
Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging
that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null
and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the
respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and
(2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that
they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment
Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged
that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into
the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned
for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered
to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions
not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions
for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its
co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is
an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this
Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later
than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that
insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and
have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing
of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1)
its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave
to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued
by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by
this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive
issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be
as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)
the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did
not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on
what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels,for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality
to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is
not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express
grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we
have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera,
it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this
Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the
reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's
"sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try
crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it
would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power
of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled
by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas,
"[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and
the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House
of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though
vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon
this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided
for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited
by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it
held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power
of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective
of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts'
power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and
that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-
interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In
view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify
what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-
in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note .
. . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke
the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the
bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not
a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe
it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under
the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as
shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions
before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,
the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the
issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A
party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case.
He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same
issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of
the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of
the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based
on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene
for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does
will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must
be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to
meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent
in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to
allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what
was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice
in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need
for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first
be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College
of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of
their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither
would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from
either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule
with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this
Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he
became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power
of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has
nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects
the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers
without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will
proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the
Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the
benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers,
allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court
in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration
had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could
not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them
in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath
of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun
on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of
the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling
a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in
the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose
was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be
held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to
hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of
the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard
before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being
heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified
by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution.
Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate
in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the
issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to
perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with
them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I
provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given
law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject
of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there
is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for
votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only
a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section
1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the
UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away
with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions
may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that
the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are
also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question
from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on
Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking
the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively
raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence
of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims,
it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said
issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is
further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of
legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify
against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment,
the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification"
of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement
of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment
and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and
referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2),
Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed
and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such
resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to
the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations
militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for
deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render
for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262,
but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's
arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not
unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably
linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on
the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue
that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof
are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy
may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its
duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than
being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn
duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On
the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to
pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason,
they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest
had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition
of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution
of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to
decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case
with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the
Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan
cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in
a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide
such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a
friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution
are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between
the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad
if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by
alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and
erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because
their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court
refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment
has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those
political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one
way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split
and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the
petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes
that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a
precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the
land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to
file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by
a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House
of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to
act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the
term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate"
as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice
appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely
puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which
jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas,
who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on
November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution
is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne
out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution
covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate,
trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is
the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor.
If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical
about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me.
The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of
all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the
text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated
by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in
Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified
that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common
verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment
case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis,
the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case
in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other
hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3)
whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is
not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something
prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps
that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line
was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read
ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated
lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action
of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is
a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning
different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this
Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of
the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3
(8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the
power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption,
however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene
the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which
is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the
province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it
was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are
open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed
that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to
inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where
the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as
a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President
and the legislators being elected by the people. 156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust
as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure,
it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that
has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the
instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives
since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is
always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual
and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to
be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans
and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state
of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of
national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form
with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of
the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public
official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at
the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of
jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed
at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate
what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in
full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an
issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.
What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material
which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other
course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem
head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself
with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of
having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could
be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest of the Constitution.
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible
fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a SO ORDERED.
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any
member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified
instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit
at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is
simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept

in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the
law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is
no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not
above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But
just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to
have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt

been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no
other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed
immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went
through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that
it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression
upon each other.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional
boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are
taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course
to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test
respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing
to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the
Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in
intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said
petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply
thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8
December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it
involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of
government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also
occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of
relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we
follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief
Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs.
Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions,
not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what
they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers
are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone
of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But
we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief
Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing
laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions
relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in
its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A.,
762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and
offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the
rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of
The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee,
Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to
appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under
the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment
in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this
conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed
by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart
provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on
the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article
VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more
limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments
that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the
Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads,
ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau
heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were
two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission.
These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made
under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7,
Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval
captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to
put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same
page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et
cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The
first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on
line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what
would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them
to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by
deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from
merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a
plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff
directors who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn
of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz?
The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not
the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer
of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the
Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this
matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will
first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such
that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation
by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate,
and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and
bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment
on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and
on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO
APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM
IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different constitutional
commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is
not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the
words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS
CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the
Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those
officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and
the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification
made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment
of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third
groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the
President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in
said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence
is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as
the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in
addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary,
p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress
that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the
President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated
in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent
(confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings
of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence,
the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the
first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and
appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in
two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference
in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge
Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify
such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require
no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even
if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore
the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16,
Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such
power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But,
it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint,
the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third
sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis
supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the
absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed
by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it
follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the
President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the
various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the
government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the
word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the
considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone"
after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It
will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following
provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof
— stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately
after the provision which makes practically all presidential
appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general
rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by
law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11
officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear
and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was
no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress
may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article
VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government.
In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par.
3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be
redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is
evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among
those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other
hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the
Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have
one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and
Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an
annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by
existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be
appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October
1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now
reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of
Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall
each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under
which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No.
1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art.
VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as
an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the
full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the
salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as
they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO
CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO, BISHOP JESUS
VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO
LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III, ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO
MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE
PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Renato E. Tañada and Wigberto E. Tañada for
petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza & Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
This petition for prohibition, which was filed on January 21, 1975,
seeks the nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A,
calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees
Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential
Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions,
as well as other presidential decrees, orders and instructions
relative to the said referendum.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment
on January 28, 1975. After the oral argument of over 7 hours on
January 30, 1975, the Court resolved to consider the comment as
answer and the case submitted for decision.
The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor
possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or
the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the
questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the
title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and
therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the
appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be
questioned before the courts. Only the Solicitor General or the
person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo
warranto petition. The petitioners do not claim such right to the
office and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General.
Hence, they have no personality to file the suit (Castro vs. Del
Rosario, Jan. 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 197; City of Manila & Antonio
Villegas vs. Abelardo Subido, et. al., May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 231-232,
235-236; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; and
Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil. 127). It is established
jurisprudence that the legality of the appointment or election of a
public officer cannot be questioned collaterally through a petition
for prohibition which assails the validity of his official acts.
The foregoing governing legal principles on public officers are re-
stated in order to avert any misapprehension that they have been
eroded by Our resolution in the instant petition.
Because of the far-reaching implications of the herein petition, the
Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised.
II
This Court already ruled in the Ratification Cases "that there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect." As Chief Justice Makalintal stressed in the Habeas
Corpus cases, the issue as to its effectivity "has been laid to rest by
Our decision in Javellana versus Executive Secretary (L-36142,
March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of course by the existing
political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our
relation with countries" (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile and 8 companion
cases, L-35546, L-35538-40, L-35538-40, L-35547, L-35556, L-35571
and
L-35573, Sept. 17, 1971, 59 SCRA 183, 241).
III
In the aforesaid Habeas Corpus cases, We affirmed the validity of
Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972
by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the
issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution
that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been
exacerbated; that the question is to the validity of the Martial Law
proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of
the 1973 Constitution, which provides that "all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done
by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and
shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting
of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution ..."; and that
"any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation
of Martial Law, has become moot and purposeless as a consequence
of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question
propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the
President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do
you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the
reforms be initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming
majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens beyond 15
and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was
thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the
Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself.
Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the
President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its
judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign." (Aquino, Jr. vs.
Enrile, supra, 59 SCRA 183,
240-242).
Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
duly reelected by the vote of the sovereign people in the
Presidential elections of 1969 by an overwhelming vote of over
5,000,000 electors as against 3,000,000 votes for his rival, garnering
a majority of from about 896,498 to 1,436,118 (Osmeña vs. Marcos,
Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973). While his term of
office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on
December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973,
the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office
even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly
ratified on January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to
finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as
aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom
"sovereignty resides ... and all government authority emanates ...,"
it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs.
Enrile, et. al., supra, p. 242).
The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de
jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.
IV
The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the
Philippines within the purview of Section 3 of Article XVII on the
transitory provisions of the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore
stated, by virtue of his reelection in 1969, the term of President
Marcos tinder the 1935 Constitution was to terminate on December
30, 1973. The new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional
Convention on November 30, 1972, still during his incumbency.
Being the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time of
the approval of the new Constitution by the Constitutional
Convention, the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind
except President Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially convene
the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent President Marcos alone
who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22,
1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as instructions and
performed other acts as President prior to the approval on
November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the Constitutional
Convention and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the
people. Consequently, since President Marcos was the only
incumbent President at the time, because his term under the 1935
Constitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the
Constitutional Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had
in mind only him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new
Constitution it provided "that all the proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly."
The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in
Section 9 of the same Article XVII likewise could only refer to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. .
This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same
Article XVII which provides that "the incumbent members of the
Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70 years
unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section
hereof." There can be no dispute that the phrase "incumbent
members of the Judiciary" can only refer to those members of the
Judiciary who were already Justices and Judges of the various courts
of the country at the time the Constitutional Convention approved
the new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and when it was
ratified.
Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President
referred to in Article XVII of the transitory provisions of the 1973
Constitution, he can "continue to exercise the powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon
the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and
the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their legislative
powers vested by this Constitution (Sec. 3[l], Art. XVII, 1973
Constitution).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to
proclaim martial law. Under the 1973 Constitution, it is the Prime
Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973
Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer
or administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the
Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees
during the period of Martial Law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and
social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to
prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or
the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all
nations including highly developed countries (Rossiter,
Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief
Justice Stone's Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku, 327
US 304).
To dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such law-making
authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, Section
3(2) of Article XVII of the New Constitution expressly affirms that all
the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts he
promulgated, issued or did prior to the approval by the
Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 and prior to the
ratification by the people on January 17, 1973 of the new
Constitution, are "part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or
the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and specifically modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly."
The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to
legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor
of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
Dr. Jose M. Aruego, noted authority in Constitutional Law as well as
delegate to the 1935 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions, shares
this view, when he states thus:
108. ... — These Presidential Proclamations, order, decrees,
instructions, etc. had been issued by the incumbent President in the
exercise of what he consider to be his powers under martial law, in
the same manner that the lawmaking body had enacted several
thousand statutes in the exercise of what it consider to be its power
under the Organic Laws. Both these classes of rules of law — by the
President and by the lawmaking body — were, under general
principles of constitutional law, presumed to be constitutional until
declared unconstitutional by the agency charged with the power
and function to pass upon constitutional law question — the
Judiciary, at the apex of which is the Supreme Court. Hence, the
inclusion of both group of rules — President rules and legislative
rules — in the new Constitution for the people to approve or
disapprove in the scheduled plebiscite. (Aruego, The New
Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
Delegate Arturo Pacificador, a Floor Leader of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, in explaining Section 3(2) of Article XVII,
underscores this recognition of the legislative power of the
incumbent President as Commander-in-Chief during martial Law,
thus:
The second paragraph sets forth the understanding of the
Convention of the nature, extent and scope of the powers of the
incumbent President of the Philippines, under martial law. It
expressly recognizes that the commander-in-chief, under martial
law, can exercise all necessary powers to meet the perils of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. This
provision complements Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution
that "all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly."
The second paragraph is an express recognition on the part of the
framers of the new Constitution of the wisdom of the proclamations,
orders, decrees and instructions by the incumbent President in the
light of the prevailing conditions obtaining in the country. (Montejo,
New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314, emphasis supplied).
The power under the second clause of Section 3(2) is not limited
merely to modifying, revoking or superseding all his proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or
done prior to the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. But even if
the scope of his legislative authority thereunder is to be limited to
the subject matter of his previous proclamations, orders, decrees or
instructions or acts, the challenged Proclamations Nos. 1366 and
1366-A, as well as Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-
A are analogous to the referenda of January, 1973 and July 27-28,
1973.
The actions of the incumbent President are not without historical
precedents. It should be recalled that the American Federal
Constitution, unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, does not confer expressly on the American President
the power to proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. And yet President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and
President Roosevelt during the Second World War, without express
constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies and offices
and appropriated public funds therefor in connection with the
prosecution of the war. Nobody raised a finger to oppose the same.
In the case of President Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in the
United States. It was thousands of miles away, in the continents of
Europe and Africa and in the Far East. In the Philippines, military
engagements between the government forces and the rebels and
secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril
to the safety of the Republic itself. There is therefore greater reason
to affirm this law-making authority in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial Law.
Petitioners further argue that the President should call
the interim National Assembly as required of him by Section 3(1) of
Article XVII, which National Assembly alone can exercise legislative
powers during the period of transition.
It should be stressed that there is a distinction between the
existence of the interim Assembly and its organization as well as its
functioning. The interim Assembly already existed from the time the
new Constitution was ratified; because Section 1 of Article XVII
states that "there shall be an interim National Assembly which shall
exist immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall
continue until the members of the regular National Assembly shall
have been elected and shall have assumed office ..." However, it
cannot function until it is convened and thereafter duly organized
with the election of its interim speaker and other officials. This
distinction was clearly delineated in the case of Mejia, et. al. vs.
Balolong, et. al. where We held that from the phrase "the City of
Dagupan, which is hereby created, ...," Dagupan City came into
existence as a legal entity upon the approval of its Charter; but the
date of the organization of the city government was to be fixed by
the President of the Philippines, and necessarily was subsequent to
the approval of its organic law (81 Phil. 486, 490-492).
Petitioners likewise urge that the President should have convened
the interim Assembly before the expiration of his term on December
30, 1973. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. This was
revealed by no less than Delegate Jose M. Aruego himself, who
stated:
109. Convening the interim National Assembly. — The Constitutional
Convention could have fixed the date when the interim National
Assembly should convene itself as it did with respect to the regular
National Assembly. There would not have been any need for any
Presidential call as there is none, with respect to the regular
National Assembly.
But considering that the country had been already placed under
martial law rule the success of which was conditioned upon the
unity not only of planning but also in the execution of plans, many
delegates felt that the incumbent President should be given the
discretion to decide when the interim National Assembly should be
convened because he would need its counsel and help in the
administration of the affairs of the country.
And in the event that it should convene, why did
the interim National Assembly not fix its tenure, and state expressly
when the election of the members of the regular National Assembly
should be called? Many of the delegates felt that they could not be
sure even of the proximate date when the general conditions of
peace and order would make possible orderly elections, ... (The New
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
This was also disclosed by Delegate Arturo F. Pacificador, who
affirmed:
Under the first paragraph of this section, the incumbent President is
mandated to initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Note that the word used is "shall" to indicate the mandatory nature
of the desire of the Constitutional Convention that
the interim National Assembly shall be convened by the incumbent
President. The Constitutional Convention, however, did not fix any
definite time at which the incumbent President shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. This decision was deliberate
to allow the incumbent President enough latitude of discretion to
decide whether in the light of the emergency situation now
prevailing, conditions have already normalized to permit the
convening of the interim National Assembly. (Montejo, The New
Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314).
It is thus patent that the President is given the discretion as to when
he shall convene the interim National Assembly after determining
whether the conditions warrant the same.
His decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National
Assembly was supported by the sovereign people at the referendum
in January, 1973 when the people voted to postpone the convening
of the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years
from the approval of the new Constitution. And the reason why the
same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted
at the referendum on February 27, 1975, is that even some
members of the Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who are already ipso factomembers of
the interim National Assembly, are against such inclusion; because
the issue was already decided in the January, 1973 referendum by
the sovereign people indicating thereby their disenchantment with
any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize the
reforms they demanded and had wasted public funds through the
endless debates without relieving the suffering of the general mass
of citizenry.
Petitioners likewise impugn the scheduled referendum on the
ground that there can be no true expression of the people's will due
to the climate of fear generated by Martial Law and that the period
of free discussion and debate is limited to two weeks from February
7 to 21, without right of rebuttal from February 22 until the day of
the referendum.
The first objection is not tenable because during the senatorial
elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended, during which period of suspension there was
fear of arrest and detention. Yet the election was so free that a
majority of the senatorial candidates of the opposition party were
elected and there was no reprisal against or harrassment of any
voter thereafter. The same thing was true in the referendum of July
27-28, 1973, which was done also through secret ballot. There was
no Army, PC, or police truck, bus or other mode of transportation
utilized to transport the voters to the various precincts of the
country. There was no PC, Army or police personnel assigned to
each election precinct or voting booth. And such assignment would
be impossible; because the combined membership of the police, PC,
and Army was then as now very much less than the number of
precincts, let alone the number of voting booths. And no one would
be left to fight the rebels or to maintain peace and order. And as
heretofore stated, the voting was done in secrecy. Only one voter at
a time entered the voting booth. The voting was orderly. There was
no buying of votes or buying the right not to vote. And as opined by
the Solicitor General, every qualified voter who fails to register or go
to the polling place on referendum day is subject to prosecution;
but failure to fill up the ballot is not penalized.
In the Habeas Corpus cases, We declared that the result of the The period of 14 days for free discussion can compare favorably
referendum on July 27-28, 1973 was a decision by the sovereign with the period required for publication of the proposed
people which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Then again, it is too amendments under the Old Society.
late now for petitioners to challenge the validity of said referendum.
WHEREFORE, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS HEREBY
Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the previous DECLARED DE JURE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, PRESIDENTIAL
referenda of January and July, 1973, were a lot more free than the PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 1366 AND 1366-A AND PRESIDENTIAL
elections under the Old Society previous to the proclamation of DECREES NOS. 629,630, 637 AND 637-A ARE HEREBY DECLARED
Martial Law, where the will of the voter was subverted through VALID, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITHOUT COSTS.
"guns, goons and gold", as well as through fraud. All modes of
transportation were utilized by the candidates and their leaders to
transport the voters to the precinct. The voters were likewise wined
and dined and so prostituted that they refused to vote until the
required monetary persuasion was proffered, if they were not being
subjected to various forms of intimidation. In some areas, the
ballots were filled up and the election returns were accomplished
before election day. Even animals and dead persons voted. The
decisions in the electoral contests filed after every election under
the Old Society attest to this very unflattering fact in our history.
The second objection that the two-week period for free debate is
too short, is addressed to the wisdom of the President who may still
amend the proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.
At any rate, such a brief period of discussion has its counterpart in
previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Under the Old
Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on
April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to
append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski Act of
the US Federal Congress to the 1935 Constitution was published in
only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days
prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act No. 492). For the 1940
constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress,
the reelection of the President and Vice-President, and the creation
of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No.
517).And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional
amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of
the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73).
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T.
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING,
as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO
FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as
Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of
Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO
FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as
Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of
Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as
Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the
National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T.
David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated
August 9, 19881 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The
pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that
this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department
holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they
(sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate
official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more
than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third
(1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect,
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution,2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits
public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the
other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions
as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284,
petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R.
No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition
and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing
public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in
addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other
than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving
any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges
and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and
compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any
and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such
positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges
that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing"
provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73,
series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public
office, including membership in the boards of government
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in
the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8,
paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by
the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the
basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25,
1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987:
promulgated Executive Order No. 284.6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ
Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly
"lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision
in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained
linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct
and separate group of public officers –– one, the President and her
official family, and the other, public servants in general –– allegedly
"abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory
constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs
for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of
government expected to lead by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7,
par. (2)8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by
DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155,
series of 1988,10 being the first official construction and
interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII
and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving
the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive
executive official to positions other than his primary position, is
"reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive
Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series
of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ
Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of
1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not
applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not
so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of
the public official, but only to the holding of multiple positions
which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of
the public official concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission
applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and
that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section
13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the
Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement
between petitioners and public respondents lies on the
constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because
of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used
in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided
in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being
allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second
paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being
designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand,
maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned
therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe
the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of
various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent
during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled
corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board
with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances
and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have
remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In
fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly
denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. 12 This
condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the
Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report
on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-
Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No.
4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-
Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety
and morality in government service were the data contained therein
that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of
twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and
corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A.
Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus
S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C.
Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of
twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo
Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q.
Peña of ten (10) each.13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite
inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it
was after the people successfully unseated former President
Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions
under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct,
the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices
and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest
selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the
scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions
in the government and collecting unconscionably excessive
compensation therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7,
Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of
the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers
of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section
13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from
holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
"(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the
active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government,including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7
(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to
hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an
office or employment in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is
the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not
being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibition
imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence
provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-
embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members
of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President
and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter
with the President and his official family was also succinctly
articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner
Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service
prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the
anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz
Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and
the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers
and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory
and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of
the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in
the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation
that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so
carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-
ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to
Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary
downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in
the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would
render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This
observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under
Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an
elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say that
the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in
Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-
XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of
the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-
Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or fails
to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by
interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e.,
Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the
other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception
thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB
be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument.17 Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution18 and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect
to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a
positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the
language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation.21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and,
the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The
reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials.23 To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to
absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the
Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized
under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can
the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of
National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to
exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of
Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of
which are attached to his department for policy coordination and
guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries
chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary
Board.24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by
lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of
money, banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended
such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously
operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable
or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers
to an "authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law,
the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-
officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, 29 and
the Light Rail Transit Authority.30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-
officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by
the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to
be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a
previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the
act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is
true with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No
new appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the
representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in
addition to those already performed under their original
appointments."32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order
of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term
is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.33 The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the official's primary functions. Examples of
designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are
the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the
Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry
Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to
the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting
as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer
on the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary
compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or
directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-
President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are
not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and
skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized
in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its
multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting
national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to
the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President
and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.35 Without these additional duties and
functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit
in the governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or
instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be supervision,
thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or
functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no
right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General
Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his
position,"36 express reference to certain high-ranking appointive
public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made.37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople,
Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when
although not required by current law, membership of certain high-
ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is
necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The example
given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and
Industry.38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may
be used as authority for saying that additional functions and duties
flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed
upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under
consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying
that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB.
This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the
plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then
was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the
proposed article on General Provisions.39 At that time, the article on
the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on
July 22, 1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department,
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. 41 It was only
after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and
"styling" by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the
General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and
reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles
which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of
specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily
at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the
qualified and delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an
exception to the general rule covering all appointive public officials.
Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific
prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded
said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then
Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section
7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the
President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles
governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather
than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have
made it clear that only the additional functions and duties
"required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may
be considered as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail42 as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear.1âwphi1Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." 43 The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the
1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation
of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the
people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
in the government and government corporations, Executive Order
No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences
that will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated
under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government,
considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices
held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or
by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-
officio posts held by the executive official concerned without
additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of
"any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by
virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions
executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and
requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. void and is accordingly set aside.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's
ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties SO ORDERED.
and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental
offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of
attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our
national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if
any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself
too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the
court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V.
Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of
the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other
offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the
petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer
occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where
there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has
had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the
office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust
that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de
facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services.47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received
by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the
questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.
G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for respondents.
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the
Commission on elections submitted, last May, to the President and
the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections
held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting
in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will.
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the
selection of its officers. Thereafter, in the course of the session, a
resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that,
pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election,
the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Romero — who had been included among the sixteen candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.
Pertinent parts of the resolution — called Pendatun — are these:
WHEREAS the Commission on Elections, charged under the
Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest
elections in the Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
". . . Reports also reached this Commission to the effect that in the
Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy
of the ballot was actually violated; the armed bands saw to it that
their candidates were voted for; and that the great majority of the
voters, thus coerced or intimadated, suffered from a paralysis of
judgement in the matter of exercising the right of suffrage;
considering all those acts of terrorism, violence and intimidation in
connection with elections which are more or less general in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this
Commission believes that the election in the provinces aforesaid did
not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. It should
be stated, however, that the Commission is without jurisdiction, to
determine whether or not the votes cast in the said provinces
which, according to these reports have been cast under the
influence of threats or violence, are valid or invalid. . . ."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera, member
of the Commission on Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as a result of this chaotic condition, many residents of the
four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their
home towns in order not to be subjected to the prevailing
oppression and to avoid being victimized or losing their lives"; and
that after the election dead bodies had been found with notes
attached to their necks, reading, "Bomoto kami kay Roxas" (we
voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS the same Judge De Vera says in his minority report that in
the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija,
the worst terrorism reigned during and after the election, and that if
the elections held in the aforesaid provinces were annulled as
demanded by the circumstances mentioned in the report of the
Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would
not and could not have been declared elected;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements in the
four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the election of
the candidates of the Conservative wing of the Nationalist Party is of
public knowledge and that such terrorism continues to this day; that
before the elections Jose O. Vera himself declared as campaign
Manager of the Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in the Huk provinces
because his life would be endangered; and that because of the
constant murders of his candidates and leaders, Presidential
Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American High
Commissioner Paul V. McNutt for protection, which appeal
American High Commissioner personallyreferred to President Sergio
Osme_¤_a for appropriate action, and the Presidentin turn ordered
the Secretary of the existence and reign of such terrorism;
WHEREAS the Philippines, a Republic State, embracing the principles
ofdemocracy, must condem all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS it is essential, in order to maintain alive the respect
fordemocratic institutions among our people, that no man or group
of men be permitted to profit from the results of an election held
under coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the principle of
freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution;
WHEREAS protests against the election of Jose O. Vega, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose Romero, have been filed with the electoral
Tribunal of the Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the findings
of the Commission on Elections above quoted;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose
Romero, pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report
of the Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost
Marshal constitutes the ground of said protests and will therefore
be the subject of investigation and determination.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their
colleagues responsible for the resolution. They pray for an order
annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction of this
court, and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
The issues, few and clear-cut, were thoroughly discussed at the
extended oral argument and in comprehensive memoranda
submitted by both sides.
A.—NO JURISDICTION
Way back in 1924, Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a fellow-
member in the Philippine Senate. That body, after investigation,
adopted a resolution, suspending him from office for one year. He
applied here for mandamus and injunction to nullify the suspension
and to require his colleagues to reinstate him. This court believed
the suspension was legally wrong, because, as senator appointed by
the Governor-General, he could not be disciplined by the Philippine
Senate; but it denied the prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of
the separation of the three powers, Executive, Legislative and
Judicial. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 81.) Said the decision:
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts
cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement. (Code of civil Procedure, section 222,
515; 18 R.C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190;
French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass.,
468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151
Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235;
Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156;
State ex rel. Crammer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., ex rel. Bruce vs.
Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907],
187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.) (Supra, pp. 88,
89.)
. . . Under our form of government the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the constitution. (Supra, p. 93)
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold
that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the
Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a
court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of
either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular
government as we know it in democracies. (Supra, p. 94.)
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend
an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for
cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court
does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine
Senate take any particular action. . . . (Supra, p. 97.)
The same hands-off policy had been previously followed in
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros (16 Phil., 366) and Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612)
At this point we could pretend to erudition by tracing the origin,
development and various applications of theory of separation of
powers, transcribing herein whole paragraphs from adjudicated
cases to swell the pages of judicial output. Yet the temptation must
be resisted, and the parties spared a stiff dose of juris prudential
lore about a principle, which, after all, is the first fundamental
imparted to every student of Constitutional Law.
Not that a passable excuse would be lacking for such a dissertation.
The advent of the Republic, and the consequent finality of our views
on constitutional issues, may call for a definition of concepts and
attitudes. But surely, there will be time enough, as cases come up
for adjudication.
Returning to the instant litigation, it presents no more than the
questions, whether the Alejandro doctrine still obtains, and whether
the admitted facts disclose any features justifying departure
therefrom.
When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in 1935, the
existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-important branches
of the government was ratified and confirmed. That Organic Act
contained some innovations which established additional exceptions
to the well-known separation of powers; for instance, the creation
of the Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the Supreme Court
participate in the decision of congressional election protests, the
grant of rule-making power to the Supreme Court, etc.; but in the
main, the independence of one power from the other was
maintained. And the Convention — composed mostly of lawyers
(143 out of a total of 202 members), fully acquainted with the
Abueva, Alejandrino and Severino precedents — did not choose to
modify their constitutional doctrine, even as it altered some
fundamental tenets theretofore well established.1
However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral Commission
(63 Phil., 139), modified the aforesaid ruling. We do not agree.
There is no pronouncement in the latter decision, making specific
reference to the Alejandrino incident regarding our power — or lack
of it — to interfere with the functions of the Senate. And three years
later, in 1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had penned it, cited
Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding authority of the separation of
powers. (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) It must be stressed that, in the
Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant
before the court, and whatever obiter dicta, or general expressions,
may therein found can not change the ultimate circumstance that
no directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any
member thereof.2 This Court, in that case, did not require the
National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It
only found it "has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission."
(Supra, 63 Phil., 161.)
That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying
a resolution of the National Assembly, is not decisive. In proper
cases this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails to
observe the constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to
the judiciary since Chief Justice Marshall penned Marbury vs.
Madison in 1803. Its foundation is explained by Justice Sutherland in
the Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544).Said the Court:
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the
land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate
sovereignty under our form of government. A congressional statute,
on the other hand, is the act of an agency of this sovereign
authority, and if it conflicts with the Constitution, must fall; for that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is. To hold it invalid (if
it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the judicial power, — that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to
law. From the authority to ascertain and determine the law in a
given case there necessa ruly results, in case of conflict, the duty to
declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of
an inferior act of legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is
no effect, and binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a
substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for such
no substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of
the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly
before the court, to the determination of which must be brought
the test and measure of the law.
And the power is now expressly recognized by our Organic Act.
(See sections 2 and 10. Article VIII.)
But we must emphasize, the power is to be exercised in proper
cases, with the appropriate parties.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief executive performed
within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is
non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an inquiry into the
validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. . . . In the present
case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither
compelled nor restrained to actin a particular way. . . . This court,
therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will
accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy." (Planas vs. Gil., 67 Phil., 62, 73, 74, 76.) (Emphasis
ours.) (See also Lopez vs. De los Reyes, 55 Phil., 170.)
More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there was only
the Electoral Commission which was "not a separate department of
the Government" (Vol. 63,p. 160), and exercised powers "judicial in
nature." (Supra, p. 184) Hence, against our authority, there was no
objection based on the independence and separation of the three
co-equal departments of Government. Besides, this court said no
more than that, there being a conflict of jurisdiction between two
constitutional bodies, it could not decline to take cognizance of the
controversy to determine the "character, scope and extent" of their
respective constitutional spheres of action. Here, there is actually no
antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the
Senate itself, for it is not suggested has adopted a rule contradicting
the Pendatun Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our
intervention. Such conflict of jurisdiction, plus the participation of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal are essential ingredients to make the
facts of this case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine.
Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may
this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally be in the
negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of
the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office,
and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power
of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine
Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should
be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not
order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof.
To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset
the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
institutional setup.
Adherence to established principle should generally be our guiding
criterion, if we are to escape the criticism voiced once by Bryce in
American Commonwealth thus:
The Supreme Court has changed its color i. e., its temper and
tendencies, from time to time according to the political proclivities
of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally from
the habits of thought they had formed before their accession to the
bench and from the sympathy they could not feel for the doctrine
on whose behalf they had contended. (The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50.)
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should,
according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt proceedings. If
the respondents should disobey our order, can we punish them for
contempt? If we do, are we not thereby destroying the
independence, and the equal importance to which legislative bodies
are entitled under the Constitution?
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong
there is are medy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to
afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature
may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions.
Numerous decisions are quoted and summarized under this heading
in 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, section 145.
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary
is the repository of remedies for all political and social ills. We
should not forget that the Constitution had judiciously allocated the
powers of government to three distinct and separate
compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the
preservation of the dependence of the three, and a zealous regard
of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the
guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may
be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot
box.
The extreme case has been described wherein a legislative chamber,
without any reason whatsoever, decrees by resolution the
incarceration, for years, of a citizen. And the rhetorical question is
confidently formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?
Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging
the nullity of the resolution and claiming for release. But then, the
defendant shall be the officer or person, holding him in custody, and
the question therein will be the validity or invalidity of resolution.
That was done in Lopez vs. De los Reyes, supra. (See also Kilbourn
vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.) Courts will
interfere, because the question is not a political one, the "liberty of
citizen" being involved (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra) and the act
will clearly beyond the bounds of the legislative power, amounting
to usurpation of the privileges of the courts, the usurpation being
clear, palpable and oppressive and the infringement of the
Constitution truly real. (See 16 C.J.S., p. 44.)
Nevertheless, suppose for the moment that we have jurisdiction:
B.—PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition
refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section
2, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of
functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond
the scope of such special remedy.
C.—SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS
Again let us suppose the question lies within the limits of prohibition
and of our jurisdiction.
Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the
promulgation of the Constitution, each House of the Philippine
Legislature exercised the power to defer oath-taking of any member
against whom a protest had been lodged, whenever in its discretion
such suspension was necessary, before the final decision of the
contest. The cases of Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols
are known instances of such suspension. The discussions in the
constitutional Convention showed that instead of transferring to the
Electoral Commission all the powers of the House or Senate as "the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction
over "all contests" relating to the election, etc. (Aruego, The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 271.) The
proceedings in the Constitutional Convention on this subject are
illuminating:
It became gradually apparent in the course of the debates that the
Convention was evenly divided on the proposition of creating the
Electoral Commission with the membership and powers set forth in
the draft. It was growing evident, too, that the opposition to the
Electoral Commission was due to rather inclusive power of that
body to judge not only of cases contesting the election of the
members of the National Assembly, but also of their elections,
returns, and qualifications.
Many of the delegates wanted to be definitely informed of the
scope of the powers of the Electoral Commission as defined in the
draft before determining their final decision; for if the draft meant
to confer upon the Electoral Commission the inclusive power to pass
upon the elections, returns, and qualifications — contested or not
— of the members of the National Assembly, they were more
inclined to vote against the Electoral Commission. In an attempt to
seek this clarification, the following interpretations took place:
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate Labrador.—Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe
that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on
its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Delegate Roxas.—I have no doubt that the gentleman is right. If this
right is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him from that reason.
xxx xxx xxx
In the course of the heated debates, with the growing restlessness
on the part of the Convention, President Recto suspended the
session in order to find out if it was possible to arrive at a
compromise plan to meet the objection.
When the session was resumed, a compromise plan was submitted
in the form of an amendment presented by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Lim, Vinzons, Rafols, Mumar, and others, limiting the
power of the Electoral Commission to the judging of all cases
contesting elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly. Explaining the difference between the
amendment thus proposed and the provision of the draft, Delegate
Roxas, upon the request of President Recto, said:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the
objection pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the
first clause of the draft which states "The election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly" seems to give
to the Electoral commission the power to determine also the
election of the members who have not been protested. And in order
to obviate that difficulty, we believe that the amendment is right in
that sense . . . that is, if we amend the draft so that it should read as
follows: "All cases contesting the election, etc.", so that the judges
of the Electoral Commission will limit themselves only to cases in
which there has been a protest against the returns.
The limitation to the powers of the Electoral Commission proposed
in the compromise amendment did much to win in favor of the
Electoral Commission many of its opponents; so that when the
amendment presented by Delegate Labrador and others to retain in
the Constitution the power of the lawmaking body to be the sole
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members
was put to a nominal vote, it was defeated by 98 negative votes
against 56 affirmative votes.
With the defeat of the Labrador amendment, the provision of the
draft creating the Electoral Commission, as modified by the
compromise amendment, was consequently approved.
"All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an electoral
commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest
number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief, the Commission to be presided over by one
of said justices."
In the special committee on style, the provision was amended so
that the Chairman of the Commission should be the senior Justice in
the Commission, and so that the Commission was to be the sole
judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly. As it was then amended, the provision read:
"There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly."
The report of the special committee on style on the power of the
Commission was opposed on the floor of the Convention by
Delegate Confesor, who insisted that the Electoral Commission
should limit itself to judging only of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. The draft was amended accordingly by the Convention.
As it was finally adopted by the Convention, the provision read:
There shall be an Electoral Commission . . . The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol.
I, pp. 267, 269, 270, 271 and 272.).
Delegate Roxas rightly opined that "if this draft is retained" the
Assembly would have no power over election and qualifications of
its members; because all the powers are by the draft vested in the
Commission.
The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latter's
authority to "contests" relating to the election, etc. altered the
draft. The Convention did not intend to give it all the functions of
the Assembly on the subject of election and qualifications of its
members. The distinction is not without a difference. "As used in
constitutional provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory
contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder,
but also to have himself inducted into the office."(Laurel on
Elections, Second Edition, p. 250; 20 C.J., 58.)
One concrete example will serve to illustrate the remaining power in
either House of Congress: A man is elected by a congressional
district who had previously served ten years in Bilibid Prison
for estafa. As he had no opponent, no protest is filed. And the
Electoral Tribunal has no jurisdiction, because there is no election
contest. (20 C.J., 58, supra.) When informed of the fact, may not the
House, motu propio postpone his induction? May not the House
suspend, investigate and thereafter exclude him? 3 It must be
observed that when a member of the House raises a question as to
the qualifications of another, an "election contest" does not thereby
ensue, because the former does not seek to be substituted for the
latter.
So that, if not all the powers regarding the election, returns, and
qualifications of members was withdrawn by the Constitution from
the Congress; and if, as admitted by petitioners themselves at the
oral argument, the power to defer the oath-taking, until the
contests is adjudged, does not belong to the corresponding Electoral
Tribunal, then it must be held that the House or Senate still retains
such authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by,
the Electoral Tribunal. And this result flows, whether we believe that
such power (to delay induction) stemmed from the (former)
privilege of either House to be judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members thereof, or whether we hold it to be
inherent to every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
It is customary that when a number of persons come together to
form a legislative body, ". . . the first organization must be
temporary, and if the law does not designate the person who shall
preside over such temporary organization, the persons assembled
and claiming to be members may select one of their number for that
purpose. The next step is to ascertain in some convenient way the
names of the person who are, by reason of holding the proper
credentials, prima facie entitled to seats, and therefore entitled to
take part in permanent organization of the body. In the absence of
any statutory or other regulation upon this subject, a committee on
credentials is usually appointed, to whom all credentials to be
entitled to seats. . . . (Laurel on Elections, Second Edition, pp. 356,
357, quoting McCrary on Elections.)
Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the
Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into
the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in
its deliberations. As we have seen, the assignment by the
constitution of the Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that
power — provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line,
deciding an election contest against the member. Which the
respondents at bar never attempted to do. Precisely, their
resolution recognized, and did not impair, the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal to decide the contest. To test whether the
resolution trenched on the territory of the last named agency let ask
the question: May the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate order that
Body to defer the admission of any member whose election has
been contested? Obviously not. Then it must be conceded that the
passage of the disputed resolution meant no invasion of the
former's realm.
At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention that the
Senate has not this privilege "as a residuary power". Such
contention is premised on the proposition that the Houses of the
Philippine Congress possess only such powers as are expressly or
impliedly granted by the Constitution. And an American decision is
quoted on the powers of the United States Congress. The mistake is
due to the failure to differentiate between the nature of legislative
power under the Constitution of the United States, and legislative
power under the State Constitutions and the Constitution of the
Commonwealth (now the Republic). It must be observed that the
Constitution of the United States contains only a grant or delegation
of legislative powers to the Federal Government, whereas, the other
Constitutions, like the Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the
Republic), are limits upon the plenary powers of legislation of the
Government. The legislative power of the United States Congress is
confined to the subject on which it is permitted to act by the Federal
constitution. (Dorr vs. United States, 195 U. S., 140; Martin vs.
Hunter, 1 Wheat., 326; McCullock vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 405;
United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 551.) The legislative power of
the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations,
as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Organic Act has
lodged it elsewhere.
Another line of approach. The Senate, as a branch of the legislative
department, had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its
proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of the Constitution), and by
legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such
orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve
its dignity.4 We are advised by the respondents that, after weighing
the propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the exercise
of its authority and discretion and of its inherent power of self-
preservation, resolved to defer the administration of oath and the
sitting of the petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is
not clear that the measure had no reasonable connection with the
ends in view, and neither does it palpably transcend the powers of
the public deliverative body. On the contrary, there are reasons to
believe it was prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of
public policy. For, if, as reported by the corresponding constitutional
agency, concededly well-posted on the matter by reason of its
official duties, the elections held in the Provinces of Pampanga,
Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were so tainted with acts of
violence and intimidation, that the result was not the legitimate
expression of the voters' choice, the Senate made no grievous
mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of such
widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annull the
returns in that region (see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel,
Elections [2d ed.], p. 488 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not
entitled to seats in the Senate. Consequently, to avoid the
undesirable result flowing from the participation of disqualified
members in its deliberations, it was prudent for it to defer the
sitting of the respondents. True, they may have no direct connection
with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be annulled just the
same, and if that happens, petitioners would not among the sixteen
senators elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the Senate to consider
that "in order to maintain alive the respect for democratic
institutions among our people, no man or group of men (should) be
permitted to profit from the results of an election held under
coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of freedom
of choice which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution." (Exhibit A of petitioners' complaint.)
a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals
During our deliberations, it was remarked that several justices
subscribing the majority opinion, belong to the electoral tribunals
wherein protests connected with the Central Luzon polls await
investigation. Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings
about the coincidence. Their designation to the electoral tribunals
deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this
Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor
will their deliverances here at on a given question operate to
prevent them from voting in the electoral forum on identical
questions; because the Constitution, establishing no incompatibility
between the two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want,
justices opining one way here, and thereafter holding
otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral tribunals, or vice-versa.
Anyhow, these should be no diversity of thought in a democratic
country, at least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant
lawlessness, root and basis of the Pendatun Resolution.
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no definite
pronouncement that terrorism and violence actually prevailed in the
district to such extent that the result was not the expression of the
free will of the electorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants
and protestees at the hearing of the respective contests.
b. Doubt and presumption.
After all is said or written, the most that may be conceded to the
industry of petitioners' counsel is that the Senate power, or lack of
power, to approve the resolution is not entirely clear. We should,
therefore, indulge the presumption that official duty has been
performed regularly, (Rule 123, section 69, Rule of Court), and in the
right manner:
It is a general principle to presume that public officers act correctly
until the contrary is shown. United States vs. Weed, 5 Wall., 62.
It will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that a public
officer acted in accordance with the law and his instructions. Moral
y Gonzales vs. Ross (Gonzales vs. Ross), 120 U.S., 605; 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 705.
Officers charged with the performance of a public duty are
presumed to perform it correctly. Quinlan vs. Greene Country, 205
U.S., 410; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 505. (United State Supreme Court
Reports Digest, Vol. 5, p. 3188.)
It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional
powers. (See cases cited at p. 257, 16 C.J.S., note 1.)
And should there be further doubt, by all the maxims of prudence,
left alone comity, we should heed the off-limits sign at the
Congressional Hall, and check the impulse to rush in to set matters
aright — firm in the belief that if a political fraud has been
accomplished, as petitioners aver, the sovereign people, ultimately
the offended party, will render the fitting verdict — at the polling
precints.
c. Membership in the Constitutional Convention
The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that the
dissenting members of this Court who were delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of the
Constitution" "are in a better position to interpret" that same
Constitution in this particular litigation.
There is no doubt that their properly recorded utterances during the
debates and proceedings of the Convention deserve weight, like
those of any other delegate therein. Note, however, that the
proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power
construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of
the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are
endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives. (Willoughby
on the Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.)
Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or explaining that
instrument, published shortly thereafter, may, like those of
Hamilton, Madison and Jayin The Federalist — here in the
Philippines, the book of Delegate Aruego, supra, and of others —
have persuasive force. (Op. cit., p. 55.)
But their personal opinion on the matter at issue expressed during
our deliberations stand on a different footing: If based on a "fact"
known to them, but not duly established or judicially cognizable, it is
immaterial, and their brethren are not expected to take their word
for it, to the prejudice of the party adversely affected, who had no
chance of rebuttal. If on a matter of legal hermeneutics, their
conclusions may not, simply on account of membership in the
Convention, be a shade better, in the eyes of the law. There is the
word "deference" to be sure. But deference is a compliment
spontaneously to be paid — never a tribute to be demanded.
And if we should (without intending any disparagement) compare
the Constitution's enactment to a drama on the stage or in actual
life, we would realize that intelligent spectators or readres often
know as much, if not more, about the real meanings, effects or
tendency is of the event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors
themselves, who sometimes become so absorbed in fulfilling their
emotional roles that they fail to watch the other scenes or to
meditate on the larger aspects of the whole performance, or what is
worse, become so infatuated with their lines as to construe the
entire story according to their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective
and disinterestedness help certainly a lot in examining actions and
occurrences.
Come to think of it, under the theory thus proposed, Marshall and
Holmes (names venerated by those who have devoted a sizable
portion of their professionals lives to analyzing or solving
constitutional problems and developments) were not so
authoritative after all in expounding the United States Constitution
— because they were not members of the Federal Convention that
framed it!
D.—ALLEGED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS
Quoting section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, counsel for
petitioners assert that it was respondents' duty legally inescapable,
to permit petitioners to assume office and take part in the current
regular session. The section reads partly:
The candidates for Member of the House of Representatives and
those for Senators who have been proclaimed elected by the
respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission on Elections
shall assume office and shall hold regular session for the year
nineteen hundred and forty-six on May twenty-five, nineteen
hundred and forty-six. (Section 12, Commonwealth Act. No. 725.)
We have carefully considered the argument. We opine that, as
contended by the Solicitor-General, this provision is addressed to
the individual member of Congress, imposing on him the obligation
to come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session.
However, it does not imply that if, for any reason, he is disqualified,
the House is powerless to postpone his admission. Suppose that
after elections a member is finally convicted of treason. May not the
House refuse him outright admission, pending an investigation (by it
or the Electoral Tribunal as the case may be) as to his privilege to sit
there? Granting the right to admission as the counterpart of the
duty to assume office by virtue of said section 12; we must
nevertheless allow that such rights would not be peremptory
whenever it contacts other rights of equal or superior force. To
illustrate: if the law provided that all children, seven years or more
"shall go to school", it can not reasonably be inferred that school
authorities are bound to accept every seven-year boy, even if
he refuses to pay fees, or to present the certificates required by
school regulations.
Furthermore, it would not be erroneous to maintain that any right
spelled out of section 12 must logically be limited to those
candidates whose proclamation is clear, unconditional and
unclouded, and that such standard is not met by the petitioners,
because in the very document attesting to their election one
member of the Commission on Elections demurred to the non-
exclusion of the votes in Central Luzon, calling attention to the
reported reign of terror and violence in that region, and virtually
objecting to the certification of herein petitioners. To be sure, it was
the beclouded condition of petitioner's credential (certificate of
canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to enact the
precautionary measure herein complained of. And finding no phrase
or sentence in the Constitution expressly or impliedly outlawing the
step taken by that legislative body, we should be, and we are,
reluctant to intervene.
Indeed, had the Senate been officially informed that the inclusion of
petitioners' name in the Commission's certificate had been made at
the point of a gangster's automatic, none will deny the appositeness
of the postponement of their induction, pending an inquiry by the
corresponding authorities. Yet the difference between such
situation and the instant litigation is one of degree, broad and wide
perhaps, but not altering the dominant legal principle.
In answer to the suggestions as to abuse of the power it should be
stated that the mere possibility of abuse is no conclusive argument
against the existence of the power, of the power, for the simple
reason that every official authority is susceptible of misuse. And
everybody knows that when any people will discover the methods
to curb it.
Perhaps it is necessary to explain that this decision goes no further
than to recognize the existence of Congressional power. It is settled
that the point whether such power has been wisely or correctly
exercised, is usually beyond the ken of judicial determination.
E.—PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
One final consideration.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any
speech or debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not
be questioned in any other place." The Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or
the presentation of a resolution.
. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit
it towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in
its application to written reports presented in that body by its
committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must
be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs.
thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to
him by the House of Representatives of the United States Congress,
concerning the business of a real estate partnership, was
imprisoned for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to
recover damages from the sergeant at arms and the congressional
members of the committee, who had caused him to be brought
before the house, where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The
Supreme Court of the United States found that the resolution of the
House was void for want of jurisdiction in that body, but the
action was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon the
strength of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity.
The court cited with approval the following excerpts from an earlier
decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear
of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article
ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design
of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.)
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates
apparently as controlling, the following incident:
In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a
writ of mandamus in a civil action brought against them as members
of the Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a refusal of a
bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the furnishing of paper, the
Senate resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully
invaded the constitutional privileges and prerogatives of the Senate
of the United States and of three Senators; and was without
jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to make no
appearance in response thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution
of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their
votes in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to
uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional
directive. We must not question, nor permit respondents to be
questioned here in connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, supra.)
Case dismissed. No costs.
Moran, C J., Paras, Pablo, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., concurring:
I concur.
Petitioners, alleging that they have been elected Senators in the last
national elections, have filed this proceeding against respondents
who, according to the complaint, have been likewise elected
Senators in the same elections. In paragraph III of the complaint it is
alleged that respondent Hon. Jose A. Avelino is joined in this
proceeding as member and President of the Senate. Two kinds of
remedies are sought by petitioners, one ancillary and the other
principal. The ancillary they would have consist in a preliminary
injunction addressed to "respondents, their officials, employees,
agents and other persons acting under them, ordering them", until
the order is remanded by the court, "to desist and to abstain from
carrying out" the so-called Pendatun Resolution complained of.
(Exhibit A attached to complaint.) The principal remedy, if the suit is
to prosper, would be as follows: a judicial declaration that the said
resolution is entirely null and void, a definite order of this court
prohibiting respondents, and each of them, from preventing
petitioners from "continuing in their seats in the Senate of the
Philippines and freely exercising their office as Senators, and
likewise prohibiting them from adopting any other ulterior
procedure to execute the said resolution."
1. Has this court power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioners under the facts alleged in their complaint?
The power of this court to issue auxiliary writs and process is
defined in, and conferred by, section 19 of Act No. 136, as follows:
Sec. 19. Power to issue all necessary auxiliary writs.—The Supreme
Court shall have power to issue writs of certiorari and all other
auxiliary writs and process necessary to the complete exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
Under this provision, such auxiliary writ or process as the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners in the instant case,
is only issuable by this court is engaged in the exercise of its original
(or appellate) jurisdiction in a main case, and secondly, when such
writ or process is necessary to a complete exercise of that
jurisdiction. This principle is ingrained in and underlies the pertinent
provisions of the present Rules of Court (Rule 60). Indeed, it is
elementary that an independent action cannot be maintained
merely to procure a preliminary injunction as its sole objective.
(Panay Municipal Cadastre vs. Garduño and Soncuya, 55 Phil., 574.)
Besides, there are other grounds for holding that this court lacks
jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
petitioners. It is clear that the rights sought to be exercised or
protected by petitioner through this proceeding are political rights
and the questions raised are political questions, and it is well settled
that the equitable remedy of injunction is not available for such a
purpose. The principle has also been incorporated in the rule that a
court of chancery will not entertain a suit calling for a judgement
upon a political question, and of course this court has been resorted
to in the instant case as a court of equity in so far as injunctive relief
is being sought. In the case of Flethcer vs. Tuttle (151 Ill., 41; 25
L.R.A., 143,146), the definitions of a political right by Anderson
defines a political right as a "right exercisable in the administration
of government" (Anderson Law Dictionary, 905). And Bouvier says:
"Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or management of the government."
(2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 597.)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The prayer of the bill is that, upon the hearing of the cause, both
acts be declared unconstitutional and void, and held to be of no
effect; and that a writ of injunction issue to Walter C. Tuttle, county
clerk of Vermilion county, restraining him from issuing, or causing to
be posted, notices of election calling an election for the house of
representatives for the eighteenth senatorial district; and that such
injunction be made perpetual; and that the court grant to the
petitioner and to the people all such other and further relief as the
case demands.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing statement of these two bills, it seems to be
perfectly plain that the entire scope and object of both is the
assertion and protection of political, as contradistinguished from
civil, personal or property rights. In both the complainant is a legal
voter, and a candidate for a particular elective office; and by his bill
he is seeking the protection and enforcement of his right to cast his
own ballot in a legal and effective manner, and also his right to be
such candidate, to have the election called and held under the
provisions of a valid law, and to have his name printed upon the
ballots to be used at such election, so that he may be voted for in a
legal manner. The rights thus asserted are all purely political; nor, so
far as this question is concerned, is the matter aided in the least by
the attempt made by the complainant in each bill to litigate on
behalf of other voters or of the people of the state generally. The
claims thus attempted to be set up are all of the same nature, and
are none the less political.
As defined by Anderson, a civil right is "a right accorded to every
member of a district community, or nation," while a political right is
a "right exercible in the administration of government." Anderson,
Law Dictionary, 995. Says bouvier: "Political rights consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
management of the government. These political rights are fixed by
the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public
officers, and of being elected. These are the political rights which
the humblest citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which have no
relation to the establishment, support, or management of the
government. They consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying
property, or exercising the paternal or marital powers, and the like.
It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by
sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of the civil rights, which
is not the case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no
political, although in full enjoyment of the civil rights." (2 Bouvier
Law Dict., 597.)
. . . A preliminary injunction having been awarded, it was
disregarded by the city officers, who proceeded, notwithstanding, to
canvass the vote and declare the result. Various of the city officers
and their advisers were attached and fined for contempt, it was held
that the matter presented by the bill was a matter over which a
court of chancery had no jurisdiction, and that the injunction was
void, so that it violation was not an act which subjected the violators
to proceedings for contempt.
. . . In Georgia vs. Stanton (73 U. S., 6 Wall., 50; 18 Law. ed., 721), a
bill was filed by the state of Georgia against the secretary of war and
other officers representing the executive authority of the United
States, to restrain them in the execution of the acts of congress
known as the "Reconstruction Acts," on the ground that the
enforcement of those acts would annul and totally abolish the
existing state government of the state, and establish another and
different one in its place, and would, in effect, ovewrthrow and
destroy the corporate existence of the state, by depriving it of all
means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might and
otherwise would be maintained; and it was held that the bill called
for a judgement upon a political question, and that it would not
therefore be entertained by a court of chancery; and it was further
held that the character of the bill was not changed by the fact that,
in setting forth the political rights sought to be protected, it averred
that the state had real and personal property, such, for example, as
public buildings, etc., of the enjoyment of which, by the destruction
of its corporate existence, the state would be deprived, such
averment not being the substantial ground of the relief sought.
(Flethcer vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A., 143, 145-147; (emphasis
supplied.)
Section 381. 3. Political Questions.—a. in General.—It is well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred on the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions. It is not easy, however, to
define the phrase "political question," nor to determine what
matters fall within its scope of the judicial power. More properly,
however, it means those questions which, under the constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. Among the
questions that have been held to be political, and therefore beyond
the province of the judiciary to decide, are: Questions relating to the
existence or legality of the government under which the court is
acting; what persons or organizations constitute the lawful
government of a state of the Union, or of a foreign country; . . . the
canvass of an election. (12 C.J., 878, 879; emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 20. 4. Only Civil Rights Protected.—The subject matter of
equitable jurisdiction being civil property and the maintenance of
civil rights, injunction will issue only in cases where complainant's
civil rights have been invaded. Injunctions do not issue to prevent
acts merely because they are immoral, illegal, or criminal. Courts of
equity have no jurisdiction over matters or questions of a political
nature unless civil property rights are involved and will not interfere
to enforce or protect purely political rights, . . . (32 C. J., 41;
emphasis supplied.)
But petitioners seem to proceed upon the theory that there is a
main case here to which the preliminary injunction would be merely
auxiliary — one of prohibition, presumably under Rule 67, sections
2, 4, and 7. Rule 67, section 2, omitting impertinent parts, says:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial . . .
To begin with, respondents herein cannot in any rational sense be
said to constitute a "tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." To be sure, the functions
of the Senate and of its members in the premises are not judicial. It
is no less certain, in my opinion, that they are not ministerial.
Indeed, they are not only legislative but discretionary in the highest
sense, as more at length demonstrated hereafter.
It is insisted, however, that the provisions of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725 imposed upon respondents the
ministerial duty of letting petitioners assume office and participate
in the regular session for the year 1946 on May 25, 1946. But, as in
my opinion correctly contended by the Solicitor General at the
argument, this provision is addressed to the members of both
Houses of Congress who are to assume office and hold regular
session. Altho to this, some who opine differently from us, may
counter with the question: What is the use of imposing upon said
members the ministerial duty to assume office and hold the session
if either House or other members thereof could prevent them from
doing so? In the first place, I would not say that, considering
together, as we should, the report of the Commission on Elections
to the President of the Senate of May 23, 1946 (Exhibit B), and the
certificate of canvass of the same date (Exhibit C), said Commission
"proclaimed elected" those candidates whose election may be
adversely affected by the Commission's own express reservation as
to the validity or invalidity of the votes cast in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija, in the same sense that
they proclaimed elected those not so affected — it would seem that
the proclamation made in Exhibit C was based merely upon a
numerical canvass or count of the votes cast, the Commission
considering itself without authority to discount the votes cast in said
four provinces, leaving that question to the Electoral Tribunal for
the Senate; and it would seem further, that within the meaning and
intent of section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725 the phrase
"candidates . . . proclaimed elected," rationally construed, is
exclusive of those of whose valid election the Commission is the
first, in effect, to express very grave doubts. As to these, considering
the Commission's report and certificate of canvass together, the
Commission, in final effect, far from proclaiming them elected,
confesses that it does not really know whether they have been or
not. In the second place, Ido not admit that any such ministerial
duty is imposed upon the members of Congress in the sense that its
fulfillment may be compelled by mandamus issuing from the
judiciary. In the third place, if we were to concede that the intention
of the law is as petitioners contend it to be, that is, that it imposes
upon both Houses of Congress and upon the members thereof who
legitimately act for them, the ministerial duty of letting even those
members, as to whom there exist grounds for suspension, assume
office and participate in the Houses' deliberations, I am of the
considered opinion that the provisions would be null and void for
the simple reason that it would be destructive of, and repugnant to,
the inherent power of both Houses to suspend members for reasons
of self-preservation or decorum. I say null and void, because the
principle underlying said inherent power is ingrained in the very
genius of a republican and democratic government, such as ours,
which has been patterned after that of the United States, and
therefore lies at the very foundation of our constitutional system. It
was admitted at the argument that when both legislative chambers
were the sole judges of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, each chamber possessed such inherent power of
suspension, particularly as against members whose election was the
subject of contest. When the Commonwealth Constitution
transferred to the Electoral Tribunal for each chamber the
jurisdiction as sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members, without any provision as
to said power of suspension, the clear inference is that the same
was left intact, to remain where it was inherent. And certainly the
framers should not be presumed to have silently intended to
abrogate and take away a power so vital and so essential.
Coming now more fundamentally to the alleged main case
presented by the complaint. As stated at the outset, the principle
remedy pursued by petitioners, if this suit is to prosper, and
therefore the main case which they seem to allege as justifying the
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, would be concerned with
a judicial declaration by this court that the so-called Pendatun
Resolution is entirely null and void, with a definite order of this
court prohibiting respondents, and each of them, from preventing
petitioners "from continuing in their seats in the Senate of the
Philippines and freely exercising their functions as Senators, and
likewise prohibiting them form adopting any other ulterior
procedure to execute the said resolution."
This immediately brings to the fore the vital and serious question of
whether this court has jurisdiction to grant the remedy thus prayed
for by giving final judgment making the said judicial declaration of
nullity and granting the writ prohibition definitely prohibiting the
respondent President of the Senate and respondent senators from
executing the above specified acts. Such fundamental principle as
the separation of powers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal for the Senate of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its members, are involved.
Our Constitution and laws will be scanned and searched in vain for
the slightest hint of an intention to confer upon the courts, including
the Supreme Court, the power to issue coercive process addressed
to, or calculated to control the action of, either of the other two
coordinate departments of the government — the legislative whose
power is vested in the Congress, consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives (Constitution, Article VII, section 1),
concerning matters within the sphere of their respective functions.
Besides, if we had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction, it must be upon the ground that prima facie the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to justify the writ. In that
case, we must have the power to make said injunction final if upon a
trial on the merits we find those facts proven. (Rule 60, section
10.)But since such a permanent or perpetual writ would have to be
premised upon the determination that petitioners have been legally
and validly elected, which question is beyond our power to decide,
it is clear that we lack jurisdiction to issue even the preliminary
process. And be it not contended that our preliminary writ is simply
to serve while the contest has not been decided by the Electoral
Tribunal, because under Act No. 136, section 19, and Rule 60,
sections 2 and 3, this court can issue such a process in aid only of its
own jurisdiction of another tribunal — and it is unthinkable that the
Supreme Court should be made to serve as a sort of auxiliary court
to the Electoral tribunal.
2. Has this court jurisdiction of the subject matter of the alleged
main case and, consequently, to grant the alleged principal remedy?
The judicial declaration of nullity sought by petitioners, severed
from the writ of prohibition prayed for by them, would become, if at
all, nothing more nor less than a declaratory relief. Thus divorced
from a remedy of prohibition, it will be a mere abstract
pronouncement of an opinion of this court regarding the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the Pendatun Resolution,
giving rise to no substantial relief or positive remedy of any kind. It
will order nothing and will prohibit nothing to be done by one party
or the other. But not even as such declaratory relief can said judicial
declaration be considered under Rule 66, nor its antecedents, Act
No. 3736 Commonwealth Act No. 55, since the Pendatun Resolution
is neither a "deed, will, contract or other written instrument . or a
statue or ordinance," within the plain and natural meaning of said
rule and said acts, aside from the reason that pursuant to the same
acts the action for a declaratory judgment should be brought in a
Court of First Instance, without any express provision conferring
original jurisdiction upon this court in such cases, which provision is
necessary before this court can possess such original jurisdiction
(Act No. 136, section 17), and the final consideration that alike
under said Act No. 3736 and Rule 66, section 6, the court has a
discretion to refuse to exercise the power to construe instruments,
among other cases, where the construction is not necessary and
proper at the time under all circumstances. In the case of
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83,95), this court, referring to a
case of mandamus, said:
. . . On the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience
should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to
it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience
should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court
where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not
be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not
be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to follow.
Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead
to unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity.
This court offer no means by a decision for any possible collision
between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine
Senate as a branch of coordinate department, or between the court
and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive Legislature.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that the Alejandrino case was one of mandamus. But under
the principle of separation of powers, the rule is equally applicable
to cases of injunction--in fact, to all cases where it is desired to have
the judiciary directly control the action of either the executive or
legislative department, or either branch of the latter, concerning
matters within their respective province. Moreover, not much
scrutiny is required to see that what is here pursued is, in practical
effect, an order of this tribunal commanding the Senate or
respondents, who represent it, to allow the petitioners to remain
seated in the Senate and freely exercise their alleged functions and
rights as Senators: for no other is the effect of an
order prohibiting the Senate or said respondents from
preventing petitioner's from remaining thus seated and exercising
said functions and rights. Looking thru the form to the substance,
the petition is really one of mandamus.
As the writ of prohibition, the complaint asks this court, after trial
on the merits, to enjoin respondents and each of them from
preventing petitioners from continuing seated in the Senate and
freely exercising the functions of Senators, and likewise, from
adopting any other ulterior proceeding in execution of the
resolution in question. The writ thus sought would, if granted, be
definite and final in its effects. (Rule 67, sections 2, 8, and 9.) Such a
writ of prohibition would necessarily be perpetual or permanent in
character and operation, in the same way that a final injunction
under Rule 60, section 10, would permanently enjoin the act
complained of and perpetually restrain the defendant from the
commission or continuance of such act. It would enjoin respondents
from preventing petitioners from acting as members of the Senate
in exactly the same way and with exactly the same rights and
privileges as the other members whose election is unchallenged and
uncontested, not only temporarily but for the entire term of the
office. But for this court to so order, it would necessarily have to
base its judgment and decree upon the premise that petitioners
have been duly and validly elected as members of the Senate. This
would inevitably involve a determination of precisely the question,
presently contested before the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate, as
sole judge under the Constitution, of whether or not said petitioners
have been duly and validly elected as Senators. This clearly would be
an unconstitutional invasion of the sphere allotted by the
fundamental law to said Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Senate. All of which means that this court cannot
constitutionally possess jurisdiction over the alleged main case of
prohibition. This is another way of saying that petitioners are not
entitled to the principal remedy thus sought by them from this
Court.
Sec. 17 (2). Prima Facie Case.—While it is not a ground for refusing a
preliminary injunction that is not absolutely certain that
complainant has the right to relief, yet to authorize a temporary
injunction, complain must make out at least a prima facie showing
the right to the final relief. (32 C. J.,38 ; emphasis supplied.)
Reason for rule.—The injunction pendente lite can be justified only
upon theory that it is necessary incident to the granting of
such final relief as complainants appear to be entitled to. The right
to such final relief must appear; if not, the allowance of an
injunction is erroneous. Amelia Milling Co. vs. Tennessee Coal, etc.,
R. Co. (123 Fed., 811, and other cases cited.) (32 C. J., 39 under note
76 beginning on p. 38; emphasis supplied.)
Finally, we come to the great principle of separation of powers. In
the case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, this court said (pp. 88,
89):
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students
of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our
system of government, each of the three departments is distinct
and not directly subject to the control of another department. The
power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the perfromance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions And over which they have exclusive control. The courts
cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
If mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of purely
legislative duties by the legislature, its members, or its officers, how
can, under the same principle, injunction or prohibition lie to enjoin
or prohibit action of the Legislature, its members, or its officers, in
regard to matters pertaining to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control? And if the courts are powerless interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance
to compel reinstatement of an expelled member of the legislative with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the
body, it seems inconceivable that under the same system of United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the
government the courts should possess jurisdiction to prohibit the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by
expulsion in the first instance. And if the courts cannot interfere to this court to arrest proceedings in that court?
prevent such expulsion, a fortiori they should lack authority to
intervene to prevent a mere suspension, which is a less drastic These questions answer themselves.
measure against the member. If the expulsion of a member of the
Senate is purely a legislative question, as clearly decided in the xxx xxx xxx
Alejandrino case, the supension of a member of the same body
must equally be of the same nature.
. . . we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and
In the same case this court, in remarking that some of the cases that such bill ought to be received by us.
cited therein related to the chief executive rather than to the
legislature, said that the rules which govern the relations of the
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief
courts to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the
sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as President, as
courts to the legislature.
President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson as a citizen of
Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an
In Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475), a bill was filed act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, if relief against its execution by
praying the United States Supreme Court to enjoin Andrew Johnson, the President. . .
President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississipi and Arkansas from
In the case of Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan (29 Mich., 320),
executing certain acts of Congress. The court, per chief Chief Justice
Justice Cooley, speaking for the Supreme Court of Michigan, had the
Chase, said that the single point for consideration was: Can the
following to say:
President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an
Act of Congress alleged to the be unconstitutional? It continued:
. . . Our government is one whose powers have been carefully
apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the government; the
alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined
President is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in
by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective
its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when
spheres of action equally independent.
performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
xxx xxx xxx
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon
consideration of its possible consequences.
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects
independently of the others, and that what are called the checks
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the
and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the
President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is
rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the department
without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the
which controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of
President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute
another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason
the acts of the Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
gives no occassion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the
Legislative in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its
Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the
proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to
President for such refusal? And in that case could this court
enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within
their proper province, because they are only applying that which is
law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give
judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that
the officers of the several departments are kept within their
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is
usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by
another department of the government attempting to correct the
wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the
constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot
dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or
alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature
could in like manner override executive action also, the government
would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the other
hand it would be readily conceded that no court can compel the
Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or
adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though
the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the
laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the
control of the other is not only implied in the framework of
government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful
apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that
any other course than that which leaves the head of the executive
department to act independently in the discharge of his duties
might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not something worse,
should the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the
executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if
jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our
judgment would be no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce it,
especially against an officer who would be presumed ready and
anxious in all cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a case
where jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the
dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be
disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to place
him in position where, in a matter within his own province, he must
act contrary to his judgment, or stand convicted of a disregard of
the laws.
In the same case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra), we find the
following quotation from French vs. Senate of the State of California
(146 Cal., 604):
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of
the pleader, they do not make a case justifying the interposition of
the court. Under our form of government the judicial department
has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the constitution. . . .
From the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (262 U.S., 447; 67 Law.
ed., 1078, 1084), we quote the following passage:
. . . If an alleged attempt by congressional action to annul and
abolish an existing state government, "with all its constitutional
powers and privileges," presents no justifiable issue, as was ruled in
Geogia vs. Stanton, supra, no reason can be suggested why it should
be otherwise where the attempt goes farther, as it is here alleged,
than to propose to share with the state the field of state power.
In our case the Senate action through the Pendatun Resolution and
the acts alleged to have been performed thereunder, are still less
transcendental in comparison to those involved in Georgia vs.
Stanton (supra), and Massachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), as should be
obvious to every one.
In the case of Barry vs. United States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S.,
597; 73 Law ed., 867, 872), the Federal Supreme Court was
concerned with a case where the United States Senate, pending the
adjudication of the validity or nullity of the election of William S.
Vare as Senator, refused acceptance of his credentials consisting of
the returns, upon the face of which he had been elected, and a
certificate form the Governor of the State to that effect, and refused
to administer the oath of office to him, and to accord the full right
to participate in the business of the Senate. It was held that all this
"was a matter within the discretion of the Senate." This is strikingly
similar to the instant case where the Senate of the Philippines,
which I maintain retained it inherent power of suspension after the
transfer to the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate for its exclusive
jurisdiction to judge contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members, deemed it to be necessary or
convenient to suspend the administration of oath to petitioners,
their seating in the Senate and their participation in its
deliberations, pending final decision by said Electoral Tribunal of the
contest concerning their election, which matters were in my opinion
within the discretion of said Senate.
In the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), the Supreme Court
of the United States concluded its decision in these words:
. . . Looking through forms of words to the substance of their
complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive department of
the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress
asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent.
To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co-equal department — an authority which plainly we
do not possess.
Strikingly similar, our case is one wherein the substance of the
complaint is merely that respondents President and Members of the
Philippine Senate have executed and will execute a resolution of the
body asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to
prevent, to paraphrase the Federal Supreme Court. I could not do
better than make mine the conclusion of that High Tribunal that
rather than a judicial controversy which we are asked to decide, it is
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and
co-equal department which we are asked to assume — an authority
which plainly we do not possess.
In the adjudicated cases, it has often been said that in actual and
appropriate controversies submitted to the courts the judiciary has
the constitutional power to declare unconstitutional any legislative
or executive act which violates the Constitution; thus, in the case of
Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139, 182), the fourth
conclusion established by this court was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(Emphasis supplied.)
But I am of the considered opinion that, aside from such writs, as
that of habeas corpus, as may be guaranteed in the Constitution, all
others of a purely statutory origin and coersive in their operation
are not issuable by the judiciary against either of the other
coordinate and co-equal departments. In the latter cases, I think the
function of the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
does not go beyond the declaration of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the legislative or executive act assailed. But
some would ask how such a judgment could be enforced as against
the other two departments or either of them. I believe that in a
democratic system of government, built as it is upon the principle of
separation of powers, with the consequent freedom of each
department from direct control by the others, the effectiveness of
the adjudications of the courts, in cases properly coming under their
jurisdiction, has perforce to depend upon the conscience of those at
the head of, or representing, the other two departments, and their
loyalty to the Constitution. I for one am persuaded that when the
officers in whom at the time are vested the executive and legislative
power should see that the highest court of the land, at the head of
the judicial power, as, in a case properly brought before it and
within its legitimate jurisdiction, decided that an act of the executive
or legislative department is unconstitutional, their conscience and
loyalty to the Constitution can safely be relied upon to make them,
with good grace, respect such final adjudication. As was said in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra), our Constitution is, of
course, lacking perfection and perfectibility; but it has been deemed
by the framers of this and similar antecedent organic laws
preferable to leave the three coordinate departments without
power of coercion, one against the other, with the exceptions which
may have been therein established, to open the door to mutual
invasion of jurisdiction, with the consequent usurpation of powers
of the invaded department. And it is here where appeal will have to
be made to the conscience of the department concerned. If the
executive or legislative department, in such cases, should abuse its
powers against good conscience, or in a manner disloyal to the
Constitution, ignoring the judgment of the courts, the aggrieved
party will have to seek his remedy through the ordinary processes of
democracy.
During our consideration of this case reference has been made to
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barry vs.
United States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S. 597; 73 Law. ed. 867).
But an examination of the facts of that case will readily reveal that
the question of whether or not Cunningham should have been
released on habeas corpus arose from his arrest by order of the
United States Senate in the course of certain proceedings before
that body, sitting as a tribunal to judge of the election, returns and
qualifications of William S. Vare for Senator. It was held that:
In exercising the power to judge the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, the Senate acts as a judicial tribunal,
and the authority to require the attendance of witnesses is a
necessary incident of the power to adjudge, in no wise inferior
under like circumstances to that exercised by a court of justice. (P.
873.)
In the last sentence of the same paragraph the court speaks of the
power of the Senate "to compel a witness to appear to give
testimony necessary to enable that body efficiently to exercise a
legislative function; "and the court proceeds: "but the principle is
equally, if not a fortiori applicable where the Senate is exercising
a judicial function." (Emphasis supplied.)It will thus appear that the
powers of the Senate there involved were not legislative but judicial
in character which fact differentiates the case from those here cited,
wherein purely legislative powers or functions of the Legislature or
any branch thereof were in question. There is no wonder, therefore,
that the Federal Supreme Court, in the Barry case, by what really
amounts to an obiter, made the remark at the conclusion of its
opinion that "if judicial interference can be successfully invoked it
can only be upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law,"
the power referred to being thejudicial power to which the court
refers in the paragraph which I have quoted above. In such a case,
the Senate being permitted by the Constitution to exercise, for a
special purpose, a portion of the powers which primarily belong to
the judiciary, it is but proper that any abuse of such limited and
special power, constituting a denial of the due process of law,
should have its redress in the judicial department, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter; not so in cases where any branch of the
legislative department is exercising powers or functions purely
legislative in nature and, therefore, within its alloted province under
the Constitution, as in the case at the bar. The Federal Supreme
Court speaks of "judicial interference" without specifying its kind or
nature. Much less does it say that such interference will necessarily
be coercive in character. But even if it had in mind the writ of
habeas corpus there applied for, this being a high prerogative writ
(29 C. J., 6, 7) the privilege of which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights in our Constitution (Article III, section 1, paragraph [14]), it is
in a class apart from the coercive writs or process spoken of
elsewhere in this opinion — it is not merely a statutory remedy,
such as injunction, prohibition, etc., but a constitutional remedy
which by its very nature should be binding, in proper cases, upon
any department or agency of the Government to which it may be
lawfully addressed.
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. On the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46
Phil., 83), "the writ prayed for cannot issue for the whole simple
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action."
With regret I have to dissent from the majority opinion upholding
the constitutionality of the Pendatum Resolution.
That the National Assembly, now Congress, retains the power it
possessed prior to the approval of the Constitution over the
uncontested election, returns and qualifications of its members,
cannot successfully be disputed. This power remains intact,
unaffected by section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, which limits
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress that are the subject of
protest.
But within this limited sphere of its jurisdiction, the authority of the
Electoral Tribunal is supreme, absolute, exclusive. In the language of
section 11, Article VI of the Constitution (supra), "the Electoral
Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of their respective members."
In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), it was held, in the
light of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, that the
purpose of the creation of the Electoral Commission "was to
transfer in its totality all the power previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal," which, though
constituted by majority members of the legislature, "is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature." It was said that
"the grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature";
that "the express lodging of that power by the National Assembly,"
and that "this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power
as an express prohibition in the Constitution." In other parts of the
decision, this court characterized as exclusive the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission over protests against the election of members
of the National Assembly and "determination thereof."
No stronger language than this can be found to emphasize the
completeness of the inhibition of the National Assembly from
interference in any matter pertaining to an election protest filed
with the Electoral Commission.
The resolution in question destroys the exclusive character of the
Electoral Tribunal's power. It encroaches upon the Electoral
Tribunal's prerogative as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress.
In seeking the suspension of the petitioners on the strenght of the
reported election irregularities in Central Luzon, irregularities which
constitute the sole basis of the main protest, to that extent the
resolution passed judgment on the truth or probabilities of the
charges, although the judgment may not have been intended as
final. At the very least, the resolution touches directly on a matter
which involves a senatorial election contest. From whatever stand
pointone may look at the Pendatun Resolution, it is hard to escape
the conclusion that it oversteps the bounds of the Senate's authority
and trespasses on a territory entirely reserved for the Electoral
Tribunal.
Viewed from another angle, the legality of petitioners' suspension is
open to attack. This suspension was resorted to as an auxiliary and
interlocutory step subordinated to the final outcome of the election
protest filed against them. Only a few will disagree with the
proposition that the power of the Senate or the House of
Representatives to suspend its members as a subsidiary measure for
causes connected with their election, returns and qualifications, is, if
such power exists, an implied power derived from the power to
remove or exclude, or what is the same thing in this connection, the
power to invalidate an election. It follows that where the political
power has been taken away, as in the case of protested elections,
the accessory power to suspend vanishes. The fact that the power
to suspend may not have been transferred, as is contended, to the
Electoral Commission does not argue in favor of the contention that Within the remaining span of our life, never shall we be more
it still resides in the Congress. conscious of the great privilege of performing our duties as the
ultimate guardians of the fundamental source of vitality of our
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: nation as an organic whole, whether normality prevails or the
people boil in the cauldron of ex surging partisan passions. The very
essence of constitutional government is under our trust and the
I.—TO MEET OR NOT TO MEET THE CHALLENGE momentous question is whether we shall betray that trust and keep
unblemished our judicial escutcheon. The blinding grandeur of the
unprecedented opportunity challenging us cannot fail to move our
The challenge has been flung. Shall we evade it by an unmanly and
whole being, from ender on to the inner recesses of heart and
shameful retreat?
brains, in the effort to be equal to the high duty.
By this case the highest tribunal of the land in undergoing a crucial
II.—CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHIES
test. Shall it do honor to its constitutional role as the last bastion of
the "regime of justice" proclaimed by the Constitution in its
preamble, as one of the fundamental goals of the government Under the admitted lack of perfection and perfectability of our
established? Constitution, it being the work of men, still we can not subscribe to
the nihilistic theory that there are flagrant violations of its
provisions, committed in utter oppression of a minority, to whom
The Constitution itself is on the balance. Fundamental principles of
our government is incapable of giving redress, and when a judicial
good government, basic human rights, prime rules for the existence
controversy arising from them is submitted for our decision we must
of an orderly society have been trampled upon. The victims come to
allow ourselves to be petrified in buddhistic nirvana and declare
the Supreme Court where the last line of democracy lies. Shall we
ourselves impotent, like the bystander who can not lift a finger to
allow that line to give under the onslaught? Shall we betray the faith
save people crying for help inside a burning house or a little child
of our people?
inclosed in a cage full of hungry tigers.
Shall we refuse to do our part, our duty, our mission, to maintain in
Here, three senators of the Philippines are wantonly deprived of
our country a government of laws, only because we have to face a
their seats in the Senate as constitutional representatives of the
powerful group of senators?
people. Here, chosen, spokesmen of many hundreds of thousands of
qualified voters, are silenced and muzzled, and their constitutional
Three senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected by
rights trampled upon. The transgression of the fundamental law is
1,736,407 combined votes cast by qualified Filipino electors,
evident. But it is alleged that the Supreme Court is powerless to
immediately after assuming their respective positions, were
protect the victims, to revindicate their constitutional rights and
deprived of their seats in the Senate through the unscrupulous,
those of the qualified voters who elevated them to office, and to
irresponsible, and subversive action of a tyrannical and ruthless
restore law. It is alleged that within our system of government there
majority who would not stop even to a downright trampling of the is absolutely no remedy for such an oppression. The theory is an
fundamental law. The victims come to us clamoring for relief and
unmistakable upshot of a philosophy of frustration, defeatism, and
justice. Shall we meet the clamor with deaf ears? Shall we remain
despair. We can not subscribe to such an effete philosophy, afflicted
aloof with callous indifference to a flagrant violation of the
with moral asthenia, unable to see but an horizon of failure. We
Constitution? Shall we leave the victims at the mercy of a despotic
refuse to adopt the despairing and fatalistic attitude of decrepit and
oligarchy and allow the latter to supplant democracy? Shall we leave
impotent senility. Philosophical eunuchry is incompatible with
them instead to pin their hopes on popular justice, if they be patient
enemy. Gelded intellectual virility or a dynamic moral effeminacy
enough not to seek justice by their hands or by the people who
has no place within the system of Philippine constitutional
exalted them by suffrage to be their spokesmen in the Senate and in
democracy.
Congress?
The framing of our Constitution is based on a philosophy of faith and
hope, the philosophy of healthy, vigorous and courageous youth,
full of the zest of life, brimming with sturdy and exalted ideas, drunk
with the wine of inspired ambition and filled with enthusiasm for all
good and beautiful things, always dreaming of a nobler and more
glorious future. Within that strenuous philosophy there is no place
for the theory of impotency of our system of government in
redressing constitutional transgressions and of the incapability of
the courts of justice in giving protection and redress to the victims.
III.—QUALITIES REQUIRED IN JUDICIAL FUNCTION
We cannot accept the invitation to bury our heads in ostrich-like
fashion in the sands of indifference and inaction because, in having
to exercise the constitutional function of administering justice, we
will be constrained to face and take action against powerful, defiant
or arrogant parties. It is precisely in cases like this where we should
never show the least hesitancy in the performance of our official
duties and in the exercise of the loftiest function of humanity: the
administration of justice.
The judicial function calls for those qualities which, for lack of better
words, are described as manliness, moral courage, intellectual
decision, firmness of character, and steadfastness of convictions.
We accepted our position in this court fully cognizant of the grave
responsibilities it entails and aware that it will exact from us all the
best that nature has bestowed on us. We must not give less. We
must not betray popular trust. We should not disappoint the people.
IV.—FACTS IN THE CASE
The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the provisions of section
11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, made the canvass of the votes
cast for senators in the election held on April 23, 1946, and on May
23, 1946, proclaimed petitioners as elected. (See accompanying
Appendix A.)
Of the 16 senators proclaimed elected, 9 belong to the Liberal Party,
respondents Jose A. Avelino, Vicente Francisco, Vicente Sotto,
Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Mariano J. Cuenco, Olegario Clarin,
Enrique Magalona, and Salipada Pendatun; and 7 to the Nacionalista
Party, the 3 petitioners and Tomas Confesor, Carlos P. Garcia, Tomas
Cabili, and Alejo Mabanag.
Of the senators elected in 1941, 8 remain in office, 4 belonging to
the Liberal Party, Domingo Imperial, Proceso Sebastian, Sa Ramain
Alonto, and Emiliano Tria Tirona; and 4 to the Nacionalista Party,
Eulogio Rodriguez, Nicolas Buendia, Pedro Hernaez, and Vicente
Rama.
The Senate therefore, is actually composed of 13 Liberals, with a
precarious majority of 2, and a minority of 11 Nacionalistas.
On May 25, 1946, in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No.
725, the Senate convened to inaugurate the regular legislative
session for this year.
The session, with all senators present, except Senators Sa Ramain
Alonto and Vicente Rama, began by the reading of the proclamation
made by the Commission on Elections, as copied in the
accompanying Appendix A. No objection having been raised against
the proclamation, there being no question as to its legality and
regularity, with all the 22 members present, including petitioners,
recognized and accepted as full-fledged senators of the Philippines,
the Senate proceeded to elect its President, a vacant position
previously held by President Manuel A. Roxas. The result was: 3
absent; 2 abstained; for respondent Senator Jose A. Avelino, 10
votes, including his own; for petitioner Senator Jose O. Vera, 8
votes; and for Senator Carlos P. Garcia, 1 vote.
After respondent Senator Avelino assumed his office as President of
the Senate, it was moved that he receive the collective oath of office
of the newly elected senators, and, at that juncture, Senator
Salipada Pendatun proposed the adoption of a resolution herein
attached as Appendix B, as a historical exhibit of the scurviest
dealing a minority has ever endured, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of JOSE O. VERA, RAMON DIOKNO, and JOSE
ROMERO, pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report
of the Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost
Marshall constitute the ground of said protests and will therefore be
the subject of investigation and determination.
Debate began upon the adoption of the proposed resolution.
Afterwards it was unanimously agreed upon to postpone further
debate on the question for Monday, May 27, 1946.
The Senate proceeded thereafter to consider another matter during
which, in protest against the action taken by the majority on the
said matter, all the minority senators walked out from the session
hall, leaving therein only 12 majority senators, including the
President of the Senate. Taking advantage of the absence of all the
minority senators, the 12 majority senators remaining in the session
hall approved and adopted the Pendatun Resolution,
notwithstanding the fact that the Senate had already postponed the
further consideration of said resolution to May 27, 1946, and the 12
majority senators, for lack of quorum, could not, under the
Constitution, proceed with the business of the same and, therefore,
had not the authority either to reconsider the resolution taken by
the Senate, postponing the continuation of the debate on the
Pendatun Resolution to May 27, 1946, or to consider and approve
said resolution.
At the time the petition has been filed, May 27, 1946, respondent
Senator Jose Avelino, President of the Senate, had already begun to
put into effect the Pendatun Resolution by ordering the Secretary of
the Senate to erase from the roll of the same the names of the three
petitioners.
Among the three petitioners who are complaining of being deprived
of their constitutional and legal right to continue sitting in the
Senate of the Philippines is the minority Floor Leader Jose O. Vera,
who lost the election for President of the Senate by the bare
difference of two votes. All the three petitioners, by the high
positions they formerly occupied in the Government of which we
may take judicial notice, are recognized as political leaders of
national stature, whose presence will do honor to any legislative
chamber of any country in the world.
V.—PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Upon the facts above related and the allegations made in the
petition under oath, including the one to the effect that the
respondents of the majority party are determined to put into effect
immediately the Pendatun resolution, to deprive the petitioners of
their right to sit in the Senate, the "sinister purpose" of which was
the approval, without the intervention and participation of
petitioners, of important measures, including an alleged terroristic
one for judicial reorganization and the highly controversial Bell Bill,
as soon as the petition was submitted in the night of May 27, 1946,
the undersigned issued the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition upon petitioners' filing a cash bond in the amount of
P1,000. (Copy of the order is attached as Appendix D.)
On May 29, 1946, the Supreme Court in banc was specially called to
session with the specific purpose of considering the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. As the court functioning is a special
division of six, and the Supreme Court in banc was then in vacation,
the session had to be called upon the initiative of the Chief Justice.
In the meantime, the service of the writ was suspended.
The Supreme Court in banc adopted then the following resolution:
The court in banc, having been informed that a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued in G.R. No. L-543, Jose O. Vera vs. Jose
Avelino by Justice Perfecto under sections 2 and 5 of Rule 60,
Resolved to set for hearing the petition for preliminary injunction on
Saturday, June 1st, 1946, at 10 o'clock a.m., for the purpose of
determining whether or not the issuance of said writ was justified.
Let notice be given to all the parties.
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices Paras, Hilado and Bengzon
voted to dissolve the preliminary injunction in the meantime.
Upon the adoption of the above resolution, the undersigned
instructed the Clerk to proceed with the service of the writ of
preliminary injunction, which was immediately served to
respondents.
On June 3, 1946, a majority adopted the following resolution,
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the case of
Jose O. Vera, petitioners, vs. Jose A. Avelino, respondents, G.R. No.
L-543, to preserve the status quo and thus prevent the execution of
the acts alleged under oath in the last part of paragraph X of the
petition, without the intervention of the petitioners; and taking into
consideration that this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate
believes and trusts that the respondents will not carry out said acts
during the pendency of this proceeding, this court, without deciding
whether or not the said injunction was justified, hereby resolves to
dissolve it in the meantime, without prejudice to whatever action or
decision this court may take or render on the question involved in
this case including that of jurisdiction.
Justice Paras concurs in the result.
Justice Jaranilla absent.
Justice Perfecto dissents as follows:
The facts alleged in the petition show that petitioners' fundamental
rights have been trampled upon in open defiance of the law and the
Constitution; that respondents, in adopting the Pendatun Resolution
and trying to enforce it, usurped constitutional functions exclusively
entrusted by the people to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate, as
an independent and separate department of the government; that
the people at large, who voted for and of whom petitioners are legal
representatives, are intended to be deprived of their voice and vote
on matters of transcendental importance to the welfare and future
of this nation, that are and to be under consideration of the Senate.
Respondents did not deny these facts. They reduced themselves to
impugn the inherent and undisputable jurisdiction of this Supreme
Court to pass upon the above mentioned flagrant violations of the
Constitution and to afford coercive relief to the victims thereof. We
cannot agree with an action which history may give a damaging
interpretation. We must have proper respect to the judgement of
posterity. We have a plain duty to uphold the Constitution. We must
not shirk that sacred duty. We are called upon to protect the
constitutional prerogatives of the representatives of the people. Our
loyalty to the people does not permit any alternative action to that
of extending the cloak of our authority so that the representatives
of the people may continue performing unhampered their
fundamental prerogatives and functions. We cannot agree with any
suspension of their exercise in utter violation of the fundamental
law of land. The sovereignty of the people itself is involved in this
case. We cannot suffer the idea that in one of the crucial moments
in the performance of our functions and in the compliance of our
duty as is pointed out by our conscience, we have faltered. The
preliminary injunction must not be dissolved.
Although the belief expressed in the majority resolution is, in effect,
a moral injunction, addressed solely to the sense of responsibility,
fairness, decency, and patriotism of respondents, without any
enforceable legal sanction, the majority being sure that respondents
will not betray the trust reposed on them, yet we felt it our duty to
dissent because in questions so important as those raised in this
case we do not agree with indirect and diplomatic procedures, with
wavering, innocious and hesitating action, with laodicean measures
and resolutions, with equivocal, furtive, and not forth putting
attitude. In judicial matters, the best policy is forthrightness, not
ambiguity. The way of Themis is always rectilinear. Her path is never
tortuous, labyrinthine, or misleading.
Without any attempt at prophecy, not long after the resolution
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, events have shown the
moral, indirect, or admonitory injunctions by courts of justice are
mere sounds transcribed on scraps of paper, not worthier than the
sheets on which they are written. Hocking at the credulity,
ingenuousness, and compliance of the majority of this court, with
the exclusion of petitioners, respondents proceeded to carryout the
acts alleged in the last part of paragraph X of the petition, such as
the approval of the Bell bill, the revamping of the judiciary system of
the Philippines, including the unconstitutional reduction of the
membership of the Supreme Court from the eleven to seven, and
the measure which would wipe out the time-honored principle of
stability in the Philippine civil service system, by placing many
thousands of public officers and employees in iniquitous insecurity
in the positions in which they have invested the be stenergies in
years of public service.
For the nonce, it will be hard to gauge and appraise the full
consequences of the resolution of June 5, 1946, dissolving the writ
of preliminary injunction based on the majority's belief and trust
that events have shown to be completely hazy and groundless. It is
only our fervent hope that the consequences, whatever they may
be, may not dampen the enthusiasm of those who have reposed so
much faith in the success of our sovereign Republic as the
pursuivant heralding a new era to all subjected peoples.
On June 8, 1946, petitioners filed a motion praying that the above
majority's resolution of June 3, 1946, be reconsidered and that the
writ of preliminary injunction be restored. It remained deplorably
unacted upon for weeks until respondents were able to
consummate the acts above mentioned.
That action continues now to be pending before us for decision, the
same as respondents' motion to dismiss.
VI.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The constitution of the Electoral Tribunals is provided in section 13
of Article VI of the Constitution, wherein it is required that they shall
be constituted "within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of their
President and Speaker, respectively."
From the foregoing, it is evident that the power to judge "all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of
senators and representatives, is exclusively lodged in the respective
Electoral Tribunal, the exclusivity being emphasized by the use of
the word "sole" by the drafters of the Constitution.
By the Pedatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in effect, the
power to judge "the election, returns, and qualifications" of
petitioners as senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected
on April 23, 1946.
From the very words of respondents themselves there can be no
possible mistakes as to the fact that, in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution, they exercised the judicial power to judge a controversy
concerning the election of petitioners as senators of the Philippines.
From their motion to dismiss dated June 6, 1946, through Solicitor
General Lorenzo Tañada and Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, himself one
of the Senate, referring to the reasons behind the adoption of the
Pendatun Resolution, we read:
The Senate considers it against its dignity and inimical to its welfare
and integrity to allow petitioners to sit as members pending the final
determination of the question whether or not they were duly
elected . . . it was an expression of the legislative (?) policy, a desire
on the part of the Senate to recognize only members whom it
believes were legally elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents do not constitute the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise said power. The fact
that latter three among the respondent Senators were chosen to be
members of said Tribunal does not change the situation, nor cures
the constitution inroad. They, therefore, in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution, usurped a power, a jurisdiction, and an authority
exclusively belonging to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
usurpation has been perpetrated in flagrant violation of the
Constitution. The Pendatun Resolution, being unconstitutional, is
null and void per se.
Among the Justices who voted to declare it invalid, because it
wimbles the fundamental law, are two former members of the
constitutional convention and of its committee on style, who took
active part in the creation of the Electoral Commission, and a former
member of the Second National Assembly which, by constitutional
amendment, created the present Senate and the two Electoral
Tribunals. Justice Hontiveros, one of the present three Justices who
took part in the framing of the original Constitution, did not
participate in the voting.
We have to bring out these facts because it is only logical that the
co-authors of the Constitution and of its amendments must be in a
better position to interpret their own will, intention, and purposes
as they expressed them in their own words in the fundamental law.
VI.-A.—THE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CONSTITUTION IS
IDENTICAL WITH THE INTENT OF THEIR DELEGATES
Even the majority themselves admit that, in construing the
Constitution of the United States, the writings in "The Federalist" of
the delegates of the constitutional convention, such as Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, have persuasive force, the same as the book of
Delegate Aruego and of other members of our own constitutional
convention concerning the Constitution of the Philippines. It is only
logical that the authors themselves should be in the advantageous
situation of construing more exactly the product of their own minds.
But, as if repenting for making the admission, foreseeing the
damaging consequences thereof for the majority's position, they
tried to neutralize it or subtract its validity by seconding the
sophistic distinction made by Willoughby as to the conclusiveness of
the parliamentary proceedings as means by proper construction of
the Constitution, on one side, and of the statutes, on the other,
since in the legislative proceedings "it is the intent of the legislature
we seek, " while in the preceedings of the constitution convention
"we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
the discussions and the liberations of their representative." The
distinction is absolutely groundless. In either the constitutional
convention are in the legislature, it is the people who speak through
their delegates and representatives, and the intent of the people
may only be gathered from the utterances of said delegates and
representatives. The "intent of the legislature" in ordinary laws is
the "intent of the people," both and being undistinguishable for all
practical purposes. And the "intent of the people" in a constitutional
convention is identified with the "intent" of their delegates thereof.
It is absurd, in practical, and against the realities of all experience to
mention "intent of the people" as something different from and in
opposition to the intent of their own representatives. The delegates
and representatives are the mouthpiece of the people. In the
system of the representative democracy prevailing in the United
States of America and in the Philippines, the people never speak by
themselves, but by their chosen mouthpieces — the voters in the
matter of selection of government officers, and the officers in the
matter of expressing the people's will in government or state
matters.
There is no essential difference between the parliamentary role of
the delegates to a constitutional convention and that of the
members of a legislature. The fact that the former are charged with
the drafting of the fundamental law and the latter with the
enactment of ordinary laws does not change their common
character as representatives and mouthpieces of the people. In
either the Constitution or in the ordinary statutes, it is the thought
and the will of the people which are expressed. What that thought
and that will are can only be gathered from the way they are
expressed by the representatives. The thought and the will of the
people are interpreted and expressed by the representatives and
crystallized in the words uttered and written by them. No one may
pretend to know the meaning of the expressions uttered of the
provisions written better than the very persons who poured on
them their own thoughts and decisions. The thought and the will of
the people remain in the abstract, are incapable of caption, are
more ideological entities, and do not form and cannot be pointed
out or determined until and unless their representatives in the
constitutional convention are in the legislature express them in
concrete and specific words of their own. The collective entity of the
people is, by its very in being, inarticulate. It becomes articulate only
through its chosen representatives. Its will is an aphlogistic amber
that becomes aflame only in the parliamentary actuations of its
delegates.
And if we are not dreaming, we must accept the fact that what the
representatives of the people stereotype either in a constitution or
in ordinary laws are their own personal opinions and convictions,
their own individual and personal thoughts and wills, although in
doing so they act in their representative capacity. We, the members
of the Supreme Court, are also representatives of the people and
are performing our official functions in are presentative capacity,
but the opinions we express and write flow, not from any extrinsic
or indwelling reservoir of justice, reserved to us by the sovereign
people, but from the spiritual fountain of our own personal
consciousness.
We will not dare to dispute any one's claim to wield, in interpreting
the fundamental law, the same authority of such judicial giants as
Marshall and Holmes, but we consider it completely out of place to
conclude that, because in the present constitutional controversy we
maintain that the co-authors of our fundamental law are in better
position to construe the very document in which they have infused
the ideas which boiled in their minds, and gave a definite form to
their own convictions and decisions, said great justices shall not be
so authoritative in expounding the United States Constitution,
because they were not members of the federal convention that
framed it, eventhough, it should be recalled, Chief Justice Marshall
was one of the outstanding figures in the Virginia convention that
ratified said Constitution. The mention is out of place, because it has
not been, and can not be, shown that the constitutional opinions of
Marshall and Holmes, for which they were hailed as authorities, are
in conflict with what Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and other delegates to
the federal convention had said or written as to the intent
expressed in said fundamental law; while in the present
controversy, there is an actual conflict of interpretation between
former delegates and those who never have been, and it happens
that the former members of the constitutional convention taking
part in the disposal of this case, are unanimous in construing the
document in the drafting of which they took personal and active
part.
Of course, in our atmosphere of freedom of opinion, outsiders may
perfectly claim and pretend to know what the delegates to our
constitutional convention intended to express in the Constitution
better than the delegates themselves, as it is possible for some
anthropologists to claim that they are in a position to recognize the
children of some parents better than the parents themselves. But
everybody must also agree that such feats of clairvoyance are not
within the range of normal experience and, therefore, must not
ordinarily be accepted at their face value.
VII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE
The Pendatun Resolution has been adopted when there was no
quorum in the Senate. Those present were only 12, all respondent
senators.
When respondents adopted the resolution, they purportedly
adopted it as a resolution of the Senate.
Section 10 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide."
It is evident, therefore, that, to do business, the Senate, being
composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at least 13
senators. "A smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent members," but not in exercising
any other power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution.
The procedure used by respondents in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution is, therefore, conclusively unconstitutional.
VIII.—CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Petitioners are among the senators who, having been proclaimed
elected by the Commission on Elections, are duty bound to assume
office from May 23, 1946, under the following mandatory provision
of section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725:
SEC. 12. The candidates for member of the House of
Representatives and those for Senator who have been proclaimed
elected by the respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission
on Elections shall assume office and shall hold regular session for
the year nineteen hundred and forty-six on May twenty-five,
nineteen hundred and forty-six. Within thirty-five days after the
election has been held, both Houses of Congress shall meet in
session and shall publicly count the votes cast for the offices of
President and Vice-President, in accordance with Article VII, section
two of the Constitution. The persons respectively having the largest
number of votes for President and Vice-President shall be declared
elected; but in case two or more candidates shall have an equal and
largest number of votes for either office, one of them shall be
chosen President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by a
majority vote of the members of Congress in joint session
assembled.
If petitioners should fail to discharge the duties of their respective
offices, they will incur criminal responsibility and may be punished,
according to the Penal Code, with arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both.
Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office.—The penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular
election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be
sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
No one may prevent them from performing the duties of their
office, such as attending the meetings of the Senate or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, or from expressing their opinions or
casting their votes, without being criminally guilty of a violation of
parliamentary immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal
Code with prision mayor.
ART. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity.—The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use
force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the
National Assembly (Congress)from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special
session, arrest or search any member thereof, except this Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor. (Words in parenthesis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents have the
inexcusable duty of recognizing petitioners as legal members of the
Senate, otherwise they may be liable to criminal prosecution for an
offense defined and punished by the Penal Code with imprisonment
ranging from 6 years to 12 years.
IX.—PETITIONERS' CREDENTIALS CONCLUSIVE AS TO THEIR RIGHT
TO THEIR SEATS IN THE SENATE
It is a duty from which respondents can not legally escape.
Otherwise they will invite the sword of Damocles of criminal
prosecution to be hanging on their heads. As the Supreme Court of
Kansas said in Re Gunn. 19 L.R.A., 519:
But, again we have what is known as a "standard work" on
parliamentary or legislative practice. It is found in almost every
public library, is examined and referred to by every legislative
assembly and every congressional body, and its title is "Cushing's
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies." . . . In section 240 it is
said: "the principle of parliamentary law applicable to the question
are perfectly simple and plain, founded in the very nature of things,
established by the uniform practice and authority of parliament,
confirmed by reason and analogy. These principles are as follows:
First, that every person duly returned is a member, whether legally
elected or not, until his election is set aside; second, that no person
who is not duly returned, is a member, although legally elected,
until his election is established; third, that conflicting claimants,
both in form legally returned (that would be where two persons had
certificates), are neither of them entitled to be considered as
members until the question between them has been settled; fourth,
that those members who are duly returned, and they alone — the
members whose rights are to determined being excluded —
constitute the judicial tribunal for the decision of all questions of
this nature." Upon this question of certificates, we also cite the
contest in the United States Senate from Montana, which is the
latest utterance of the highest legislative body in this land. In the
report of the majority of the committee it is said: "The majority of
the committee are of the opinion that, if this body of persons had
lawful and constitutional certificates of their election, that title is a
good title against all the world, governing their associates in that
body, governing the senate, governing everybody who had a lawful
duty to determine who are lawfully elected representatives, until
there can be an adjudication by the House itself to the contrary; and
that nobody can be heard to say, and that no authority can be
permitted to inquire into or determine, the actual facts of the
election as against the title." (51st Congress, 1st Session [21 Cong.
Record, pt. 3, pp. 2906-2810], p. 521.)
The court also quoted from the American and English Encyclopedia,
saying:
The American and English Encyclopedia summarizes the law of the
worth of a certificate of election as follows: "It is settled that when it
is made the duty of certain officers to canvass the votes, and issue a
certificate of election in favor of the successful candidate, a
certificate of such officers, regular upon its face, is sufficient to
entitle the person holding it to the possession of the office during an
action to contest the right." Volume 6, p. 373; 33 Law. ed., 948;
State vs. Buckland (23 Kan., 369).
The court might well have added that Ruling Case Law wholly
confirms its stand:
. . . The certificate entitles the recipient to exercise the office until
the regular constitutional authority shall determine who is legally
elected officer, and it is duty of the incumbent of an office at the
expiration of his term to surrender it to one who has received a
certificate of election and has qualified thereunder. If it is desired to
contest the election or qualification of such person, this may be
done in the manner prescribed by law for determining claims to an
office. Disbursing officers, charges with the payment of salaries,
have a right to rely on the apparent title, and treat the officer who is
clothed with it as the officer de jure, without inquiring whether
another has the better right. While a certificate of election may be
superseded by a decree in proceedings to contest the election, it
cannot be subjected to attack in a collateral proceeding in which the
title may be in question; and if the time should pass within which
such proceeding may be instituted the title may become absolute
and indefeasible in default of any contest. Hence it has been said
that the holder of a certificate of election who has duly qualified
is prima facie entitled to the office when his term begins, as against
everyone except a de facto officer in possession under color of
authority. He is entitled to retain possession and to perform the
duties of the office without interference until such certificate is set
aside by some appropriate proceeding." (22 R. C. L., 436, 437.)
This Supreme Court laid down the same doctrine by stating the
following:
. . . As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board
of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935)
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons
and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The
return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-
elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695;U. S. C. A., Title
2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of
the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in
controverted election is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate
or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the
Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying
into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31
& 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the
order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed.,
sec. 166). (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 180, 181.)
As a matter of fact, in the Gunn case, the Supreme Court of Kansas
had occasion to comment on the exclusion of ten duly proclaimed
members from the roll of the House, and unhesitatingly condemned
it in these words:
It seems that while 10 contestants are marked in the Dunsmore
Journal as present, but not voting, 10 names on the certified roll are
wholly omitted. Any rightful reason for such omission does not
appear. We cannot perceive any valid reason for such omission,
even if 10 certified members had their seats contested. Every
person duly returned too a house of representatives, and having a
certificate, is a member thereof, whether elected or not, whether
eligible or not, until his election is set aside. And this must be set
aside by the House, not by the individual members before
organization, not by anyone member, not by any contestant, not by
any mob. Before organization, a few members properly elected,
meeting in causus or otherwise, cannot pass upon the "elections,
returns, and qualification of a members of the House to be
thereafter organized." If one member, before organization can
object to any other member duly returned and having a certificate,
then all members can be objected to, and there could be no one left
to organize any house. In McCraryon Election (2d ed., s. 204) the
practice is thus stated; "Where two or more persons claim the same
office, and where a judicial investigation is required to settle the
contest upon the merits, it is often necessary to determine which of
the claimants shall be permitted to qualify and to exercise the
functions of the office pending such investigation. If the office were
to remain vacant pending the contest, it might frequently happen
that the greater part of the term would expire before it could be
filled; and thus the interests of the people might suffer for the want
of a public officer. Besides, if the mere institution of a contest were
deemed sufficient to prevent the swearing in of the person holding
the usual credentials, it is easy to see that every great and serious
injustice might be done. If this were the rule, it would only be
necessary for an evil-disposed person to contest the right of his
successful rival, and to protract the contest as long as possible, in
order to deprive the latter of his office for at least a part of the
term; and this might be done by a contest having little or no merit
on his side for it would be impossible to discover in advance of an
investigation the absence of merit. And, again, if the party holding
the ordinary credentials to an office could be kept out of the office
by the mere institution of a contest, the organization of a legislative
body-such, for example, as the House of Representatives of the
United States-might be altogether prevented by instituting contest
against a majority of the members; or what is more to be
apprehended, the relative strength of political parties against
members of one or the other of such parties. These considerations
have made it necessary to adopt and to adhere to the rule that the
person holding the ordinary credential shall be qualified and
allowed to act pending a contest and until a decision can be had on
the merits.
Now, why should not this principle be followed? Why should not
this rule, which is universal throughout the states of this Union, and
which is accepted and adopted by Congress, be followed in the state
of Kansas? It has history to sustain it. It has reason to sustain it. And
let us here remark that in every state of this Union where, through
political excitement or personal contests, a different rule has been
adopted, disturbance, violence, and almost bloodshed have always
occurred. (Pp. 522-523.)
X.—ELECTORAL CONTESTS ON LEGISLATIVE POSITIONS
Much reliance has been placed by respondents on the Rafols case in
support of their authority to suspend the seatings of petitioners
through the Pendatun Resolution.
We agree that not enough emphasis may be placed on said case,
although not as an isolated one but as the initial link of a chain of
historical events handing with the leading and epoch-making,
although not enough of the publicized case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, decided on July 15, 1936, which reversed the
pusillanimous, vacillating, and self-contradictory majority position
taken in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, decided on September 11, 1924.
A little piece of history will be helping.
In 1925, Nicolas A. Rafols was reelected as representative from one
district of Cebu. The House of Representatives of the 7th Philippine
Legislature suspended his seating. The resolution for suspension
was passed after a bitter parliamentary debate between members
of the majority belonging to the Nacionalista Party and the
members of the minority belonging to the Democrata Party. The
House was then presided over by Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, now
President of the Philippines, and among those who with us opposed
the resolution for suspension were Representative Jose Avelino
from Samar, now President of the Senate, and the minority floor
leader, Claro M. Recto, who later became President of the House of
Representatives. The arbitrariness and injustice committed against
Representative Rafols were bitterly resented and rankled deep in
the hearts of the minority who felt they were despotically trampled
upon by a bulldozing majority.
The Pro-Anti political struggle in 1934 resulted in new alignments.
Former Democratas Avelino and Recto happened to align with the
Anti majority, the same as Justice Hontiveros, who also became a
Delegate to the constitutional convention; and former Nacionalistas
Manuel A. Roxas and Manuel C. Briones happened to align with the
Pro minority.
In 1934, the constitutional convention was presided over by Claro
M. Recto, as President, Ruperto Montinola, as First Vice President,
and Teodoro Sandico, as Second Vice President. All of them
belonged to the Democrata Party when in 1925 injustice was
committed against Representative Rafols. Recto and Sandico were
aligned with the Anti majority and Montinola with the Pro minority.
Although the Pro delegates of the convention were only about one-
fifth of all the members, some of them were elected to preside over
important committees--Rafael Palma, on principles; Jose P. Laurel,
on the bill of rights; Manuel C. Briones, on legislative power; and
ourselves on citizenship. By his leading and influential role in the
drafting of the Constitution, Manuel A. Roxas was pointed out as the
Hamilton of our convention.
With such men and with their background, the convention
introduced the innovation of creating the Electoral Commission of
the National Assembly, to which the power to judge upon the
election, returns, and qualifications of legislators, formerly exercised
by legislative bodies, was transferred. The innovation was
introduced precisely with the purpose of avoiding the repetition of
such abuses and injustices as those committed against Rafols, by
lodging the judicial power of deciding electoral contests for
legislative positions to where it should logically belong--to a judicial
body, which is expected to do justice and not to serve partisan
political interests without compunctions and scruples.
Although the initiative came from the minority, Pros, it was whole
heartedly supported by the majority Anti leaders. The members of
the constitutional convention, with the most prominent leaders
thereof, were fully aware of how changeable the political fortunes
of men are, and it was in the interest of everybody that the rights of
the minority be equally protected as those of the majority.
Through Justice Laurel, a former member of the constitutional
convention, this Supreme Court said:
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as
a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Nothwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of
the people." (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)
From the deliberations of our constitutional convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matter pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an indefendent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt
need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in
which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in
its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral commission is a constitutional creation, invested with
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis,
45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A.,
1917B, 1). (Angara vs. Electoral commission, 63 Phil., 139, 174-176.)
XI.—SEPARATION OF POWERS
There is much misunderstanding as to the real import meaning, and
scope of the much vaunted principle of separation of power due to
the confusion in many minds between two conceptions: one, naive
and vulgar; and the other, constitutional and strictly juridical. The
trouble lies in the fact that, for lack of more appropriate term, the
word separation has been used to convey a group of concepts and
ideas, when the word only expresses just one of partial aspect of
one of said concepts and ideas. Thus a misconception results by
confounding a part with the whole or the whole with the part.
The vulgar notion of separation of powers appears to be simple,
rudimentary, and clear-cut. As a consequence, the principle of
separation of powers creates in the mind of the ignorant or
uninitiated the images of the different departments of government
as individual units, each one existing independently, all alone by
itself, completely disconnected from the remaining all others. The
picture in their mental panorama offers, in effect, the appearance of
each department as a complete government by itself. Each
governmental department appears to be a veritable state in the
general set up of the Philippine state, like the autonomous
kingdoms and princedoms of them a harajahs of India. Such
undiscerning and rudimentary notion can not fit in the pattern
framed by the Filipino people through their representatives in the
constitutional convention. The true concept of the principle of
separation of powers may not be obtained but in conjunction with
the political structure set up by the Constitution and only in
accordance with the specific provisions thereof.
The drafters of the constitution were fully acquainted with the then
prevailing confusions and misconceptions as to the meaning of the
principle of separation of powers. One outstanding instance is
shown in the self-contradicting, courageless decision in Alejandrino
vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), where the majority deflected from the
natural and logical consequences of the premises unanimously
agreed upon by all the members of the court using as a subterfuge
an erroneous, disrupting, and subversive interpretation and
application of the principle of separation of powers, becoming since
a fetish of a class of unanalytical constitutional doctrinaires,
distressingly unmindful of its dangerous implications, eager to
emulate, in proclaiming it as a legal dogma, the plangent exertions
of housetop bawlers preaching the virtues of a new panacea.
Fully knowing the prevailing misconceptions regarding said
principle, although there was an implicit agreement that it is one of
those underlying principles of government ordered by the
Constitution to be established, the delegates to the constitutional
convention purposely avoided its inclusion in the Declaration of
Principles inserted as Article II of the fundamental law. They even
went to the extent of avoiding to mention it by the phrase it is
designated.
XII.—CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION—THE ONLY ONE ACCEPTABLE
The only acceptable conception of the principle of separation of
powers within our democracy in the constitutional one. We must
reject any idea of it as something existing by itself, independent of
the Constitution and, as some misguided jurist would have it, even
superior to the fundamental law of the land.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. . . . The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote
of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 156, 157.)
The framers of the Constitution had never intended to create or
allow the existence of governmental departments as autonomous
states within the republican state of the Philippines. The three
departments mentioned in the Constitution were created, not as
complete independent units, but as limbs and organs of the organic
unit of the department is independent and separate from the others
in the sense that it is an organ specifically entrusted with the
performance of specific functions, not only for the sake of efficiency
resulting from division of labor, but to avoid tyranny, despotism,
and dictatorship which, as experience and history have taught,
result from the concentration of government powers in one person
or in an oligarchical group.
XIII.—FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF UNITY
The idea of unity is fundamental in our Constitution.
The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the Constitution "in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy" (Preamble of the Constitution). "The Philippines is a
republic state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article 11, Constitution).
Under this principle we must view the whole government as a unit,
and all departments and other government organs, agencies and
instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same was as the head,
the hands, and the heart are parts of a human body.
By examining the provisions of the Constitution, the vulgar notion of
the principle of separation of powers can be shown to be wrong, as
there is neither an office nor a department, created or allowed to be
created under the Constitution, that may be considered as
effectively separate from the others, as the misinformed people
would have it. As a matter of fact, there is no government power
vested exclusively in any authority, office, or government agency.
Section 1 of Article VI vests the legislative power in a Congress of
the Philippines, but this provision does not preclude the President of
the Philippines and the Supreme Court from partaking in the
exercise of legislative power. The President has the initiative in the
making of appropriations which may not be increased by Congress
except those pertaining to Congress itself and the judicial
department, and the President may veto any bill enacted by
Congress (sections 19 and 20, Article VI, of the Constitution). The
Supreme Court may declare unconstitutional and, therefore, nullify
a law enacted by Congress and approved by the President of the
Philippines (sections 2 and 10, Article VIII, of the Constitution). The
Supreme Court exercises, besides, legislative power in promulgating
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
(section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution)
The executive power is vested in a President of the Philippines
(section 1, Article VII, Constitution of the Philippines), but the
Senate and House of Representatives, through the Commission on
Appointments, take part in the exercise of the executive power of
appointment (section 12, Article VI, and section 10 [3], Article VII, of
the Constitution), and in the granting of amnesty and in making
treaties (section 10 [6] and 10 [7], Article VII, of theConstitution).
The Supreme Court exercises executive power regarding the
transfer of judges from their districts to another. (Section 7, Article
VIII, of the Constitution.) Tribunals' power to order the execution of
their decisions and mandates is of executive character.
The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior court as may be established by law (section 1, Article VIII, of
the Constitution).But there are many instances wherein the
President of the Philippines must administer justice, so it is required
from him by the Constitution to swear to "do justice to every man"
(section 7, Article VII, of the Constitution). And by impeachment
proceedings, the House of Representatives and the Senate exercise
judicial function (Article IX, of the Constitution). Their power to
construe and apply their own rules and their disciplinary power to
punish their own members for disorderly conduct are of judicial
nature.
Furthermore, there are specific functions of government entrusted
to agencies other than the three great departments of government,
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The judicial function
of judging contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of
senators in entrusted to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate; and
that of judging contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of
representatives, to the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution).The
executive function of auditing the government accounts is entrusted
to a constitutional officer, the Auditor General (Article XI, of the
Constitution), and the administrative function of supervising
elections is entrusted to the Commission on Elections (Article X, of
the Constitution).
To understand well the true meaning of the principle of separation
of powers, it is necessary to remember and pay special attention to
the fact that the idea of separation refers, not to departments,
organs, or other government agencies, but to powers exercised. The
things separated are not the subject of the powers, but the
functions to be performed. It means division of functions, but not of
officials or organs which will perform them. It is analogous to the
economic principle of division of labor practiced in a factory where
multiple manufacturing processes are performed to produce a
finished article.
XIV.—APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the discussion of the question how the principle of separation of
powers must be applied, misunderstood ideas have been asserted
as springboard to jump to rash and unfounded conclusions. Among
such assertions is the one which would have three great
departments of government, not only co-equal in dignity, but,
notwithstanding their admitted coordination, as actual sovereigns
— as if within the sphere of the sovereigns can be admitted — each
one with full powers to destroy and trample upon the Constitution,
with the victims absolutely incapable and powerless to obtain
redress against the offense. Such an assertion would make of said
departments as states within a state. The fundamental error of the
assertion lies in the failure to consider the following principle of the
Constitution:
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. (Section 1, Article II.)
Each department of government is nothing but a mere agency by
which the people exercise its supreme sovereignty. Within the
framework of the Constitution, our government may be compared
to a human being: the legislative department is the brain that
formulates policies and rule through the laws it enacts; the
executive department is the hand that executes such policies and
rules; the judicial department is the conscience that declares what is
wrong and what is right, and determines what acts are in
consonance with or inimical to the constitutional unity as the very
condition of life and survival.
The brain that defines policies and the hand that executes them
may go astray and disregard, by their physical power, the infallible
pronouncements and admonitions of conscience; but nothing can
and should stop conscience in its great ethical mission as a condition
indespensable to existence itself. By the same token, nothing can
and should silence tribunals as the organs, in the government set up
by the Constitution, of the collective conscience of the people. In
the long trip of destiny, that collective conscience shall ever be the
guiding star, unerring even in the gloomiest confusions.
Applying to the case at bar the principle of separation of powers in
its true meaning, the logical result will be precisely the opposite of
the position taken by respondents who, unwittingly, are insistently
invoking it to challenge the power, authority, and jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court to entertain the petition and to grant petitioners
coercive relief.
From the facts of the case, it is evident that respondents
encroached upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary powers to
suspend petitioners in relation to the power to judge electoral
contests concerning senators, a power which the Constitution
specifically assigns to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all
other departments, agencies or organs of government. That power
of suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and ancillary
to the substantial power to judge said electoral contests. The
accessory must follow the principal; the adjective, the substantive;
the complementary, the complemented.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 177.)
That power of suspension may, in the interest of reason and justice,
be exercised by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in relation too an
electoral contest, among other possible cases that can be surmissed,
where two or more allegedly elected senators are in possession of
apparently valid credentials of having been proclaimed as duly
elected. In such a case, as the Constitution does not allow more
than twenty-four senators to sit in the Senate and there is, in the
meantime, no possibility of determining who among the contestants
have been duly elected — all the claimants being in possession of
incompatible, self-denying and self-destroying credentials — reason
counsels that all of them be suspended by the Electoral Tribunal
pending the presentation of the necessary evidence to allow one of
them to take his seat in the Senate until the contest is finally
decided.
The usurpation perpetrated by respondents is a flagrant violation of
the principle of separation of powers, they having invaded a ground
belonging exclusively to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
XV.—THE SENATE WITHOUT POWER TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS
Respondents lack the power of suspension, not only as ancillary
remedy in senatorial election contests, but even in the exercise of
the Senate judicial power to punish its members for disorderly
conduct. The majority and the minority of the Supreme Court in the
case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), agreed unanimously
with respect to said Senate Malcolm, speaking for the Court in said
case, stated:
As to whether the power to "suspend" is included in the power to
"punish," a power granted to the Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove" a power granted to the
Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither
is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld
from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General
alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all
its long history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without depriving the construency of
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the
honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an
opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without the district being afforded any
means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains
filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. (P. 96.)
And Justice Johnson, who dissented on another ground, explained
the ruling in greater detail as follows:
The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a
disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is removed
either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a vacancy
exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the right to appoint,
and the people of the district the right to fill the vacancy by election,
so that the people may again, under either case, be represented. A
"suspension" of a member, however, does not create a vacancy, and
the people of the district are without a representative and the
Governor-General cannot appoint one and the people cannot elect
one during the period of suspension. They are without
representation during that period. They are, for the period of
suspension, taxed without representation. If a member, under the
power to punish, can be suspended for ten or more years, thus
depriving the Governor-General of his right under the law, and the
people of the district, of a representative, and without a remedy in
the premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the power
to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and if the
suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed member many
be removed, under the power to punish, by a mere majority, while
the law requires a two-thirds majority to remove an elective
member. In other words, if under the power to "punish," any
member of the legislature, including an appointive member, may be
in effect removed, then an elective member may be removed by a
majority vote only, thus encroaching upon the power of the
executive department of the government, as well as violating the
powers conferred upon the Legislature, because the Legislature
cannot remove an elective member except by two-thirds majority.
It is strenuously argued by the respondents that the resolution
depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from his
office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use the word
"suspend" but does not use the word "deprive." It provides that the
petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, etc., for a period of
one year. If that word means anything it means that all of the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner and the
citizens whom he represents have been taken from him and them.
His prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments constitute his right to
represent the people of his district, and his right to exercise all the
duties and to assume all the responsibilities pertaining to his office.
His emoluments constitute his right to receive his salary and the
benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be placed
upon his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments, and if he has
been deprived of them, then it must follow that they have been
removed from him, or that he has been removed from them. At any
rate, the resolution has separated the petitioner and the people
whom he represents and deprived them of all of one year; and, for
all intents and purposes, he and the people whom he represents,
have been deprived of their prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, and in effect, has been removed from any
participation in the legislative affairs of the government.
A great many cases have been studied on the question of removal
and suspension, and we are confindent in the assertion that the
power to punish does not include the power to remove or suspend.
A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the rights of an
officer of all his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, is in
effect a deprivation or a removal from office for the time mentioned
in the order of suspension. It has been held that a suspension from
office for an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months,
lost its temporary character, ceased to be a suspension, and in
effect became a removal from such office. It was held, in the case of
the State vs. Chamber of Commerce, that the suspension of a
member was a qualified expulsion, and that whether it was called a
suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect disfrachised the
person suspended. In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that
a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite period is in effect
a removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the
power to remove an officer or punish him does not include the
power to suspend him temporarily from his office. A mere
suspension would not create a vacancy, and the anomalous and
unfortunate condition would exist of an office, — an officer, — but
no vacancy, and of no one whose right and duty it was to execute
the office. (Pp. 100-102.)
XVI.—POWER OF JUDICIAL NATURE
The principle of separation of powers can not be invoked to deny
the Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the
question of validity or nullity of the Pendatun Resolution, of
whether petitioners are illegally deprived of their constitutional
rights and privileges as senators of the Philippines, of whether
respondents must or must not be enjoined by injunction or
prohibition from illegally and unconstitutionally trampling upon the
constitutional and legal rights of petitioners, is a function judicial in
nature and, not having been assigned by the Constitutional to other
department of government, is logically within the province of courts
of justice, including the Supreme Court.
The power, authority, and jurisdiction to decide any question as to
the allocation of powers by the Constitution are of judicial nature
and belong to court of justice. In denying that power to the
Supreme Court, respondents only add insult to injury by maintaining
that there is no remedy for any usurpation being committed in
adopting the Pendatun Resolution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping
and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of power between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescense for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
this, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon the questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. (Angara vs. Election Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 157-
159.)
XVII.—SENATORIAL TERRORISM
There is much loose talk as to the inherent power of the Senate to
adopt the unsconstitutional Pendatun Resolution for the self-
preservation of the Senate, for its dignity and decorum. We are
afraid that, by the facts publicly known to everybody, such talks
serve only to reveal sheer hypocrisy. There is absolutely no showing
that they are guilty of any disorderly conduct or of any action by
which they may be subject to criminal prosecution, or that by their
conduct they have become unworthy to have a seat in Congress. On
the other hand, there are three senators who are under indictment
for the heinous crime of treason before the People's Court, not for
acts committed before their election, but for acts committed while
they were already holding office as such senators. Respondents
have not taken any action looking toward the suspension of said
three senators. Although we do not propose to criticize respondents
for this inaction, as the three senators undicted for treason must be
presumed innocent unless and until they are finally convicted by the
proper court, such inaction serves to emphasize the iniquitous
discrimination committed against petitioners, who have not even
been indicted before any court of justice for the slightest violation
of law.
The Pendatun Resolution invokes the report of the Commission on
Elections as to alleged electoral irregularities in four Central Luzon
provinces; but there is absolutely nothing in the resolution to show
that petitioners had anything to do with said irregularities, and
respondents themselves, in the canvass of votes for President and
Vice President, had counted as valid all the votes cast in said Central
Luzon provinces and had accepted as good ones the votes they
themselves obtained therein. In fact, one of them occupied the first
place in one of said provinces. This self-contradicting attitude has
absolutely no defense in the judgement of any decent person. To
this we must add that the Pendatun Resolution, in fact, misquotes
the report of the Commission on elections in the sense that it tries
to convey an impression contrary to said report by quoting parts
thereof based on unverified and uncorroborated hearsay evidence,
and ignoring its main conclusion in which it is stated that the alleged
irregularities did not affect the orderly election in said provinces.
There is much talk as to the alleged terrorism prevailing in the
provinces in question during election, but there is absolutely no
reliable evidence as to such terrorism that can be found either in the
report of the Commission on Elections or in the Pendatun
Resolution. Even in the case that such terrorism really happened,
there is no reason to make any pronouncement based on it without
proper investigation by proper authorities, and in the present case
the proper authority that must determine, if such terrorism did
really take place and affect the election on April 23, 1946,
concerning senators, is the Senate Electoral Tribunal. And until then
there is no reason why respondents must themselves resort to
senatorial terrorism in order to oppress, muzzle, and crush minority
senators, such as petitioners. Congressional terrorism is no better
than lawless terrorism. Because it is practised by despotice
government officials does not make it holy and sacrosanct.
XVIII.—NOBODY IS ABOVE THE LAW
There are assertions to the effect that we may exercise jurisdiction
against individual officers of the Senate, but not against the Senate
or against respondents. We do not agree with such an unmanly
attitude. We do not agree with the theory that the Supreme Court
must exercise its judicial power to give redress to the victims of a
usurpation only when its decision is addressed to minor officers of
government, but not when it is addressed to minor officers of
government, but not when it is addressed to powerful ones. We will
incur a grave dereliction of duty if we should refuse to grant the
redress that justice demands only and because we have to reverse
an illegal and unconstitutional act committed by a legislative
chamber, or a group of its members, specially if the group forms the
majority, or by Congress itself. To show that under the Constitution
nobody is above the law, we have only to refer to its provision
which recognizes in the Supreme Court the power to nullify the
declare unconstitutional an act enacted by Congress and approved
by the President of the Philippines. A law passed by Congress is
enacted with the direct participation of the two great departments
of our government, the legislative and the executive. Nevertheless,
if the law enacted is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has the
power to declare it so and deny effect to the same.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can
become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the
United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its
interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles,
supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most conduce
to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very
great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.
The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental.
And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may
either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by
those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between
a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed,
and if act prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the Constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is On a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then
written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the
people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and, is
consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the
fundamental principles of our society.
xxx xxx xxx
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and
the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the
law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the
principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in
practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if the
legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It
would be given to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence,
with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within
narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits
may be passed at pleasure. Manbury vs. Madison (1 Cr., 137; 2 Law.
ed., pp. 60, 73, 74)
But we have found no better expression of the true principle on this
subject than the language of Justice Hoar, in the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts reported in 14 Gray, 226, in the case of Burnham vs.
Morrissey. That was a case in which the plaintiff was imprisoned
under an order of the House of Representatives of the
Massachusetts Legislature for refusing to answer certain questions
as a witness and to produce certain books and papers. The opinion,
or statement rather, was concurred in by all the court, including the
venerable Chief Justice Shaw;
"The House of Representatives (says the court) is not the final judge
of its own power and privileges in cases in which the rights and
liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action
may be examined and determined by this court. That House is not
the Legislature, but only a part of it, and is therefore subject in its
action to the law in common with all other bodies, officers and
tribunals within the Commonwealth. Especially is it competent and
proper for this court to consider whether its proceedings are in
conformity with the Constitution and laws, because living under a
written Constitution, no branch or department of the government is
supreme, and it is the province and duty of the judicial department
to determine in cases regularly brought before them, whether the
powers of any branch of the government, and even those of the
Legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in
conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their
acts as null and void. . . ."
In this statement of the law, and in the principles there laid down,
we fully concur. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 Law. ed., 377, 390.)
Professor Edward S. Corwin, in this book "The Twilight of the
Supreme Court," says:
The pivotal proposition was set up that between the making of law
and its construction was an intrinsic difference of the most vital
nature; and that since the latter function was demonstrably a daily
concern of courts, it followed necessarily that the legislature might
not perform it in a way to produce finally binding results.
Applied to the Constitution, this reasoning automatically produces
judicial review. As Marshall insists in Marbury vs. Madison, the
Constitution, a solemn act of the people themselves, was made to
be preserved, and no organ of government may alter its terms. But
interpretation, which belongs to the courts exclusively and is "their
peculiar and proper province," does not change the law,
it conserves it. By the same token, judicial interpretation of the
Constitution is vested with the authority of the Constitution itself.
(P. 110.)
A passage in Cicero's De Legibus, the substance of which was later
recalled by Coke, describes the law as "the silent magistrate" and
the magistrate as "the law speaking." Despite the apparent
implication of these words, the Roman Law would seem to have
regarded interpretation as primarily an extension and condition of
the process of law making, as the maxim "curius est cendere est
interpretari" appears to bear witness. Reciprocally, the official
attitude of the common law has not always escaped skeptical
comment. A yearbook of the fourteenth century records a dispute
among the judges over whether they were enforcing reason or only
their own will, and two hundred years later we find an Elizabethan
bishop asserting flatly: "Whoever that an absolute authority to
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-
giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote
or spoke them." Suppose the good bishop had known of the
Constitution of the United States, a law first spoken in 1789 and
subject 150 years later to the "absolute authority" of the Supreme
Court to interpret it! (Pp. 112-113.)
What gives the coup de grace to the idea that — in the words of
Chief Justice Marshall — "courts are the mere instruments of the
law and can will nothing," is the simple fact that most so-called
"doubtful cases" could very evidently have been decided just the
opposite way to which they were decided without the least
infraction of the rules of logical discourse or the least attenuation of
the principle of stare decisis. (P. 114.)
In short, decision is choice; the very circumstance which produces
doubtful cases guarantees the Court what Justice Holmes has
termed "the sovereign prerogative of choice" in deciding them. This
circumstance may be described as a factual situation which
forthwith divides, as it were, the acknowleged body of established
law as far as it bears upon the said facts into two opposed — two
antinomous — camps. (P. 115.)
Should the Constitution be construed "strictly" or "liberally"? That
depends logically on whether it came from the people at large or
from state sovereignties. Then there is the antimony of "inclusive"
versus "exclusive" construction — in Marbury vs. Madison Chief
Justice Marshall invoked the latter principle, in McCulloch vs.
Maryland he invoked the former. Again there is the issue whether
the Court's mandate to interpret the Constitution embraces the
power and duty of adopting it to change circumstances. Marshall
thought that it did, while Taney repudiated any such mission for the
Court; and in the recent Minnesota Moratorium Case the Chief
Justice takes as his point of departure Marshall's doctrine, while
Justice Sutherland, dissenting, builds upon Taney's doctrine.
Furthermore, there are those diverse attitudes of a shifting majority
of the Bench which, though they may never have found clear-cut
expression in antithetical principles of constitutional construction,
have given rise none the less to conflicting courses of decision, the
potential bases of future opposed arguments which either counsel
or the Court may adopt without incurring professional reproach. In
brief, alternative principles of construction and alternative lines of
precedent constantly vest the Court with a freedom virtually
legislative in scope in choosing the values which it shall promote
through its reading of the Constitution. (P. 117.)
The concept of a "government of laws" simmers down, therefore,
under the Constitution to a power in the Supreme Court which is
without statable limits to set the metes and bounds of political
authority in both the nation and the states. But the dominating
characteristic of judicial review, wide-ranging though it be, is that it
is ordinarily or negative power only — a power of refusal. The Court
can forbid somebody else to act but cannot, usually, act itself; in the
words of Professor Powell, it "can unmake the laws of Congress, but
cannot fill the gap." (P.122.)
To summarize: From legal history emerge two conceptions of law —
that of a code of intrinsic justice, not of human creation but
discoverable by human reason, and that of a body of ordinances
assertive of human will and owing its binding force thereto. The idea
of a "government of laws and not of men" originally predicated the
sway of the former kind of law and a "legislative power" which was
merely a power to declare such law, and hence was
indistinguishable in principle from "judicial power." But as we saw in
the previous chapter, the very essence of the American conception
of the separation of power is its insistence upon the inherent
distinction between law-making and law-interpreting, and its
assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when
brought to bear upon the constitution, yields judicial review. For all
that, the idea that legislative power embraces an element of law-
declaring power has never been entirely expelled from our inherited
legal traditions, while, conversely, modern analysis of the
interpretative function exercised by courts plainly discloses that it
involves unavoidably an exercise of choice substantially legislative in
character; and especially is this so as the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the national Constitution, on account of the
wealth of alternative doctrines from which the Court may at any
time approach its task of interpretation. In short, the meaning of "a
government of laws" in our constitutional law and theory is
government subject to judicial disallowance. (Pp. 146, 147.)
XIX.—PARALLELISM WITH THE ANGARA CASE
No better precedent may be invoked to decide several important
questions raised in this case than the decision rendered by this very
Supreme Court in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, which
may be considered as an outstanding milestone in Philippine
jurisprudence.
The facts and legal issues in said case are in exact parallel with the
ones in the present controversy. Then, there was a conflict between
two independent departments or organs of government, the
National Assembly and the Electoral Tribunal. Now the conflict is
between two equally independent departments or organs of
government, the Senate and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
differences between the contending parties consist in: (a) that while
the former National Assembly constituted the whole legislative
department, the present Senate is but a part of the legislative
department; (b) that the National Assembly that adopted the
resolution then in question and, finally, declared by this Supreme
Court as unconstitutional, null, and void, acted as a body, with
undisputable quorum and regularity; while the Pendatun Resolution
was adopted by but 12 senators or the majority Liberal Party, when
there was no quorum present in the Senate. There is also an
accidental difference in the fact that, in the Angara case, the
Electoral Commission was the respondent and the National
Assembly was not a party, although 6 members thereof were also
parties in the case, they constituting a majority of two-thirds of the
Electoral Commission membership; while the present case, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is not a party, and the respondents are the
majority members of the Senate, which is but a branch of Congress.
In both cases the legislative department upon which the legislative
power was vested by the Constitution — the National Assembly in
1936 or Congress in 1946 — is definitely not a party.
Another difference between the two cases is the fact that in the
Angara case, petitioner sought to nullify a resolution of the Electoral
commission because it was in conflict with one previously adopted
by the National Assembly. The Supreme Court, is denying the
petition, nullified instead the resolution of the National Assembly as
adopted without the powers vested in it by the Constituiton. In the
present case, petitioners pray for the annulment of the Pendatun
Resolution which the respondents or the Senate could not and
cannot adopt without transgressing the Constitution.
Many of the conclusions and pronouncements of the Supreme Court
in the Angara case may appear as if written expressly to decide
several of the very legal issues raised in the present case. This will
readily appear if we should read "Senate" and "Senate Electoral
Tribunal," respectively, in lieu of "National Assembly" and "Electoral
Commission," in the following summarized conclusion in said case:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.
(c) That in case of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any
other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to
the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necessitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules
and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission
was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and
expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties
and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
Without the slightest ambiguity, in perspicuous and clear-cut
language, the Supreme Court stated the real conflict, grave and
transcendental, in said case as follows:
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
The Supreme Court then, in the full consciousness of the far-
reaching importance of the pronouncement it had to make, with
manly courage stated:
From the very nature of the republican government established in
our country in the light of American experience and of our own,
upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. . . . Conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of
the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary
injusticiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and
other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. . . . The nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive
of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
Where the Supreme Court wrote "Electoral Commission" in the last
preceding lines, we may also write as well "Senate," "House of
Representatives," "Congress," "Senate Electoral Tribunal," "House
Electoral Tribunal," or any other constitutional body.
The above pronouncements of the Supreme Court made in the
ringing words penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel who, with President
Roxas, Justice Briones, Justice Hontiveros, former Justices
Romualdez and Recto, and several others, was among the leaders
and most prominent figures in the constitutional convention, we
believe will sound through the ages as the expression of permanent
truth and undisputable wisdom. Since the words have been written,
the question as to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to take
cognizance and decide controversies such as the present one and to
grant redress for or against parties like those included in this
litigation, has been unmistakably definitely and definitely settled in
this jurisdiction.
XX.—THREE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF A SENTENCE
Regret can not be repressed when, upon reading the majority
opinion, one notices that, in the very first paragraph heading it,
truth is unwittingly immolated by, as a counterpart of the Pendatun
Resolution and without the benefit of any ritual, attributing to the
Commission on Elections an assertion which in fact it did not make.
The Commission is represented to have fathered the statement that
in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac,
voting "did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular
will."
This assertion is the third revised edition of a 3-line sentence
appearing in the report of the Commission on Elections. For
clearness, we will reproduce the three editions, the original one and
the amended two:.
First edition.—In the report of the Commission on Elections, the
sentence reads as follows:
It is believed that the election in the provinces aforesaid did not
reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
Second edition—The drafter of the Pendatun Resolution, who
appears to be ready to sacrifice truth if it is necessary to serve or
bolster his interests and purposes, in reproducing said statement,
without any compunction or scruple, changed the words "it is
believed" to the words "This Commission believes" as follows:
This commission believes that the election in the provinces aforesaid
did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
Third edition.—In the majority opinion the idea of belief by third
persons, contained in the report of the Commission, and the idea of
belief by the Commission, attributed in the Pendatun Resolution are
eliminated and substituted by a positive statement by the
Commission on Elections of a categorical and conclusive nature as
follows:
The Commission on Elections . . . stated that . . . the voting in said
region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular
will.
The discrepancy is emphasized by reading the following paragraph
of the report of the report of the Commission on Elections:
Except for alleged suppression of the popular will in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and certain municipalities of Nueva Ecija
wherein the voters were allegedly intimidated or coerced by the
Hukbalahaps and other lawless elements to such an extent that the
election in said provinces is considered a farce, not being the free
expression of the popular will, the elections throughout the country
were carried on peacefully, honestly and in an orderly manner, as a
result of which the respective representatives-elect for all the
provinces throughout the country have been duly proclaimed by the
various boards of provincial canvassers, and the Commission on
Elections on May 23, 1946, also proclaimed those elected senators in
accordance with section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident: (1) that the alleged suppression of
the popular will in Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan, and certain
municipalities of Nueva Ecija is mentioned by the Commission only
as a hearsay information that the Commission itself, contrary to the
idea which the Pendatun Resolution or the majority opinion
conveys, does not accept; (2) that to emphasize the Commission's
refusal to accept the unverified information, it explicitly and
conclusively manifested that "the elections throughout the country
were carried on peacefully, honestly and in an orderly manner, as a
result of which the respective representatives-elect for all the
provinces throughout the country have been duly proclaimed
elected by the various boards of provincial canvassers, and the
Commission on Elections on May 23, 1946, also proclaimed those
elected senators in accordance with section 11 of Commonwealth
Act No. 725."
An abiding respect for truth compels us to point out the above
glaring error of fact, which is just a fitting prelude and milieu to a
long chain of errors of law spread over the opinion of the majority,
resulting in conclusions that we are sure will fail to withstand the
test of posterity.
XX-A.—UNJUSTIFIED AND RECKLESS PRONOUNCEMENTS
The error of reading the report of the Commission on Elections
assertions contrary to the ones appearing therein, induces the
majority to make pronouncements which are necessarily groundless
and unjustified, because premised on assertions not borne out by
the truth.
Thus, in justifying the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution, the
majority assert that "there are reasons to believe it was prompted
by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of public policy" for "if, as
reported by the corresponding constitutional agency" (the
Commission on Elections), the elections held in the provinces of
Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija" were so tainted with
acts of violence and intimidation, that the result was not the
legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate made no
grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of
such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annul the
returns in that region (see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel,
Elections[2d Ed.], p. 448 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not
entitled to seats in the Senate."
Taking as point or departure the false assumption, that of
attributing to the Commission on Elections a statement that, upon
the very face of its report, is contrary to what it made, the majority,
not only attribute to the respondent majority of the Senate
preternatural prophetic foresight, taking for granted what the
Senate Electoral Tribunal will do, but by making the pronouncement
pretend to assume an improper role, the one by which, in effect,
they pretend to direct and dictate to the Senate Electoral Tribunal
what it should do in the pending electoral protests against
petitioners, thus recklessly prejudicing the decision and disposal of a
litigation pending in an independent tribunal with exclusive and final
constitution jurisdiction over said litigation.
On second thought, it seems that the majority try, with an
apologetic attitude, to recede from the bold position of practically
announcing what the Senate Electoral Tribunal, three members of
which are Justices of the Supreme Court, will do, by beginning to
state that "there should be no diversity of thought in a democratic
country, at least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant
lawlessness, root and basis of the Pendatun Resolution," and ending
with the following paragraph:
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no definte
pronouncement that terrorism and violence actually prevailed in a
district to such extent that the result was not the expression of the
free will of theelectorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants
and protestees at the hearing of the respective contests.
We can not but regret that the endeavor is futile, because it can not
subtract a scintilla from the boldness of the pronouncement
emphasized with the following reiteration: "True, they may have no
direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be
annulled just the same, and if that happens, petitioners would not
be among the sixteen senators elected."
Furthermore, the recession seems only to be apparent, used as a
breathing respite, preparatory to another onslaught, on less
unjustified, reckless, and out of reason.
Commenting on section 12 of Commonwealth Act no. 725, the
majority restrict the provision to those candidates whose
proclamation "is clear, unconditional, unclouded," adding — and
here comes the aggressive thrust, prejudging petitioners on the
basis of an unfounded surmise — "that such standard is not only
met by the petitioners, because is the very document attesting to
their election one member of the Commission on Elections
demurred to the non-exclusion of the votes in Central Luzon, calling
attention to the reported reign of terror and violence in that region,
and virtually objecting to the certification of herein petitioners. To
be sure, it was the be clouded condition of petitioners' credential
(certificate of canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to enact the
precautionary measure herein complained of."
The attack does not stop here. It goes even further when, adducing
as argument by analogy, an uncharitable example is used by
comparing the situation imagined without any evidentiary
foundation on fact by the dissenting minority of one in the
Commission on Elections with the case if "the inclusion of
petitioners" name in the Commission's certificate had been made at
the point of a gangster's automatic," although adding that " the
difference between such situation and the instant litigation is one of
degree, broad and wide perhaps, . . . .
XXI.—FUTILE EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE SWEEPING EFFECT OF
DECISION IN ANGARA CASE
In a futile effort to neutralize the sweeping effect of the decision of
this court in the Angara case, the majority assume unfoundedly that
in said case "no legislative body or person was a litigant before the
court," and that "no directive was issued against a branch of the
Legislature or any member there of" the statements being premised
on the error of fact and law that two-thirds of the members of the
Electoral Commission were assemblymen.
The fact that this court, in the Angara case, made declarations
nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly is, according to the
majority, "not decisive," when a better precedent can hardly be
cited to show the practical exercise by the Supreme Court of its
power to declare null and void any legislative resolution violative of
the fundamental law. The majority recognize the power of this court
to annul any unconstitutional legislative enactment, citing as
authorities the epoch-making decision of Chief Justice Marshall in
Marburry vs. Madison, and the following pronouncement of Justice
Sutherland in the Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544):
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the
land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate
sovereignty under our form of government. A congressional statute,
on the other hand, is the act of an agency of this sovereign
authority, and if it conflicts with theConstitution, must fall; for that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is. To hold it invalid (if
it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the judicial power — that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to
law. From the authority to ascertain and determine the law in a
given case there necessarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to
declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of
an inferior act of legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is
of no effect, and binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a
substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for no
such substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant
of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly
before the court, to the determination of which must be brought
the test and measure of the law.
If the above reasoning is accepted by the majority with respect to a
law enacted by two Houses of Congress and approved by the Chief
Executive, there is absolutely no logic in denying its applicability to
mere resolutions adopted by just a legislative branch, by the Senate
alone, or by a group of senators acting collectively when the Senate
is without quorum. The Supreme Court has the power to declare
null and void such resolutions when they are in conflict with the
Constitution, the same as the acts of the President as, according to
the decision rendered by this court in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62, 73,
74), cited with approval by the majority, the Supreme Court has the
power of "making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of
his(the Chief Executive's) acts when these are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding."
The majority, accepting the pronouncement in the Angara case that
this court could not decline to take cognizance of the controversy to
determine the "character, scope and extent" of the respective
constitutional spheres of action of the National Assembly and the
Electoral Commission, maintain that in the present case, there is
actually no antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
and the Senate itself, "for it is not suggested that the former has
adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun Resolution." This
assertion is based on the wrong idea that in order that antagonism
may exist between two independent bodies, the attacks should be
reciprocal and bilateral, and it is not enough that one should rashly
invade the province of the other. The theory is parallel with the
Japanese insistence in calling what they term "China Incident"
because China was not able to invade in her turn the Japanese
mainland of Honshu.
XXII.—FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT
It is argued by the majority that conceding that petitioners'
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, the petition
should be denied, because for this court to order the reinstatement
of petitioners "would be to establish judicial predominance, and to
upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into
our constitutional setup." The argument is utterly fallacious. There
can be no more judicial predominance because the Supreme Court,
without shirking its responsibility, should order that petitioners be
reinstated in the full exercise of their constitutional rights, functions
and prerogatives, of which they were deprived, in flagrant violation
of the fundamental law, than there will be legislative predominance
because Congress should refuse to be cowed into prevarication in
the exercise of its legislative powers, or executive predominance
because the President would not allow denial of his executive
functions. And the pattern of checks and balances is not disrupted
because the Supreme Court should proceed to perform its judicial
duty by granting petitioners the legal redress to which they are
entitled.
The indictment of volubility flung by Lord Bryce against the Supreme
Court of the United States, resulting from "the political proclivities
of the man who composed it," is quoted by the majority in order to
support the rule of conduct that "adherence to established principle
should generally be our guiding criterion." We
underline generally because we prefer it to the word invariably, as,
otherwise, we will expose ourselves to the English author's
indictment, and with more reason if we should reverse the doctrines
and principles enunciated in the Angara case in order not to
displease a controlling majority in the Senate.
XXIII.—NOT DEMIGODS OUTSIDE THE REACH OF LAW
Should respondents disobey any order we may issue in this case, the
majority ask, can we punish them for contempt? Of course. They are
not demigods, duces, fuehrers, or nippon emperor divinities, who
are outside the reach of law. They do not pretend that they are like
the king of France who said L'etat c'est moi.
But, why should we render respondents the disservice of
entertaining the false hypothesis that they may disobey any order
we may legally issue? Our people were not crazy enough to elect
anarchists to our Senate.
XXIV.—BUILT ON PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
The majority insist, notwithstanding, in arguing that if we should
punish respondents for contempt because they should have
disobeyed an order of ours, we would be destroying the
independence and equal importance of legislative bodies, under the
Constitution. We would never imagine that the independence and
equal importance of legislative bodies, under the Constitution,
should be precariously built upon the unstable and shifting
quagmire of immoral immunity to punishment for contempt, an
offense punishable under all modern systems of criminal law.
Dogmatizing ex cathedra, the majority preached that we must
"disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the
repository of remedies for all political and social ills." Shooting in the
dark of fantastic hobglobins, insufflated with extraterrestrial life by
supercreative imagination, might be an amusing sport, but is
misleading in juridical controversy. No one has ever entertained the
false and laughable notion that the judiciary may afford remedies
"for all political and social ills." No one, unless he be a paranoiac
mogalomaniac, may pretend to be the happy possessor of any
political or social panacea. The argument is irrelevant because, in
the case, we are dealing with a constitutional wrong which, under
the fundamental law, can and must be redressed by the judiciary.
XXV.—FLAGRANT INCONSISTENCY
A citizen, deprived of liberty by a resolution to incarcerate him for
years, illegally and unconstitutionally adopted by a legislative
chamber, according to the majority, may not be denied relief by the
courts and "may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging the
nullity of the resolution and claiming for release," invoking as
authorities Lopez vs. De los Reyes (55 Phil., 170) Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U. S., 168; 26 Law ed., 377). The reason is because
the resolution is beyond the bounds of the legislative power, is a
usurpation of functions belonging to courts, is an infringement of
the Constitution, which is precisely the case of the Pendatun
Resolution. But the majority would then have only as defendant the
officer or person holding the victimized citizen in custody, which
officer or person might be a senator or a group of senators.
The majority's inconsistency can not be hidden.
XXVI.—ELECTION CONTESTS—WRONG DEFINITION
The majority maintain that not all the powers of the House or
Senate as "the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications
of the members" thereof were transferred to the Electoral
Commission, but only "all contests" relating to said election, returns
and qualifications. But the use of the words "all contests" in the
Constitution does not affect or limit the transfer of all powers as
"the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications" of the
legislative members, because these all powers have always been,
from the very beginning, circumscribed by the word "contests." The
very words "the sole judge" imply necessarily contests, because if
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
The majority adhere to the following quotation: "As used in the
constitutional provisions, `election contest' relates only to statutory
contests in which the contestants seek not only to oust the intruder,
but also to have himself inducted into office." (Laurel on Elections,
2d ed., p. 250; 20 C. J.,58.)The assertion is wrong because there are
election contests in which the contestants do not seek to be
inducted into office, as when the contestants do not pretend to
have won in the election and, admitting that the protestee obtained
the majority votes, should, however, be ousted because he is
unqualified.
The example of a man, disqualified for having served a long term of
imprisonment, elected to either House of Congress, is a good one
not in support of the majority's theory that the House may, upon its
authority, investigate and exclude the disqualified person, but to
show that the election may be contested before the corresponding
Electoral Tribunal in a proper contest, without the protestant
seeking to be himself seated.
XXVII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The majority's theory that an election contest does not ensue when
a member of the House raises a question as to the qualification of
another because the former does not seek to be substituted for the
latter, is based on the wrong definition of an election contest, the
one limiting it to cases wherein protestants seek also to have
themselves inducted into the contested office. Having for its basis a
wrong premise, the theory can not be correct. The election contests
mentioned in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution include
contests "relating to qualifications" of the respective members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives. To maintain that
either House may investigate and thereafter exclude a disqualified
member, is to maintain a constitutional heresy. An insistent effort to
justify and approve an action that violates elemental standards of
law and justice, such as the Pendatun Resolution, may often lead
one to advancing unwittingly the most expected theories.
Invoking as authority the erroneous statement made by one of the
attorneys for petitioners during the oral argument to the effect that
the power to defer the oath taking until the contest is adjudicated
does not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunals, the
majority gleefully jumps to the conclusion that "then it must be held
that the House or Senate still retains such authority, whether we
believe that such power (to delay induction) stemmed from the
privilege of either House to be the judge of the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members thereof, or whether we hold it to
be inherent to every legislative body as a measure of self-
preservation.
Thus we see that the majority seem reluctant to accept the new
constitutional setup by the creation of the Electoral Commission,
later substituted by the Electoral Tribunals. They would rather stick
to the old order of things when the majority of the Senate and the
House of Representatives before the Commonwealth were the
absolute dictators of the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the respective legislative chambers, when they boldly
assert that either House has "the privilege to be the judge of the
election, returns and qualifications of the members thereof."
XXVIII—THE CHARACTER AND PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE
CONSTITUTION
The discussions as to the character of the legislative power vested in
Congress gives way to a confusion of ideas due mainly to lack of
discrimination between preconceived constitutional ideas, ingrained
in the mind during university training, and the actual provisions of
the Constitution of the Philippines, which enjoy outstanding and
substantial advantages over older ones, because the delegates to
our constitutional convention embodied in it new precepts and
principles based on the lessons of one century and a half experience
of American and European countries in constitutional government
and four decades of Philippine constitutional history and last
juridical and idealogical discoveries.
Whether the Constitution of the United States is only a grant or
delegation of legislative powers to the federal government and the
American state constitutions are mere limitations of plenary powers
of legislation, having nothing to do with the true character and
physiognomy of our own Constitution which we must examine, not
on the mirror of other constitutions, but on the face of its own
concepts, precepts and provisions, and there we will see at once
that our Constitution is both a grant and a limitation of powers of
government decreed by our people, on whom sovereignty resides
and from whom all government authority emanates. (Section 1,
Article II of the Constitution.) The sovereign people is the repository
of all powers of government, in fact, also political and social powers.
From them emanate, not only all government authority, but the
plenary and unlimited power of society which is the foundation of
government. Social order is established and maintained by the will
of the people. The people is the absolute master of his own destiny.
The people is the holder of the universality and residuum of all
human powers. This being a natural conviction of humanity since
time immemorial although not always articulate and vocal, to justify
the absolutism of kings and emperors, it had been necessary to
create the fiction of the divine genesis of their authority, imposed
on the ignorance and religious credulity of superstitious masses, so
much so that in certain epochs of history the position of high priest
and king were merged in the same individual. And those who would
attach to a high officers of government, no matter in what
department, any kind of monarchial or oligarchical absolutism,
unlimited because placed above the law and not controllable by the
provisions of the Constitution or any agency existing under its
authority, are only trying to perpetuate the worn-out tradition of
the divine origin of the despotic rulers of the past.
To our mind, no power of government may be exercised by any
branch, agency or officer thereof unless expressly or implicitly
granted by the people through the Constitution. Subject to the
limitations provided therein and in accordance with express
provisions, the residuum of legislative, executive and judicial
powers, respectively, are vested in Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court. It is wrong to maintain that any legislative power is
vested exclusively in the Senate. The legislative power is vested in
Congress, composed of the Senate and the House for
Representatives, and not in any of its branches alone.
XXIX.—RIZALIAN ADMONITION ON TOLERANCE
Although there is absolutely nothing in the report of the
Commission on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution itself which
imputes upon petitioners any act of disorderly behavior, it not
appearing that they have anything todo with alleged irregularities
and terrorism in the four provinces of Central Luzon, yet had the
Senate elected to deprive petitioners of their seat in the Senate
under the power to punish and expel a member for disorderly
behaviour provided in section 10 (3) of Article VI of the Constitution,
and the Senate adopted the Pendatun Resolution in pursuance
thereof, the majority of this court would still dismiss the petition. It
appearing that not two-thirds of all members of the Senate
concurred or could concur in the adoption of the Pendatun
Resolution and, therefore, under the constitutional provision
invoked, the deprivation of petitioners of their seat in the Senate
would appear as a flagrant transgression of the fundamental law,
the majority of this court would still shield respondents with the
palladium of judicial noli me tangere. Respondents must be very
extraordinary beings to enjoy such an immunity from even the most
shocking and tyranical violation of theConstitution.
The majority would counsel prudence and comity and admonish to
heed the off-limits sign at the Congressional hall, firm in the belief
that "if apolitical fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners aver,
the sovereign people, ultimately the offended party, will render the
fitting verdict — at the polling precint."
We are reluctant to wash our hands so easily. We can not remain
comfortably seated in the highest tribunal of the land nor reconcile
with our conscience by abstaining to give the relief we are duty
bound to give the victims of a political fraud which constitutes a
wanton trampling down of the rights and privileges guaranteed by
the Constitution. Let us not so easily forget the Rizalian admonition:
"Sufferance is not always a virtue; it is a crime when it encourages
tyrannies." Let us not disguise such kind of resignation under the
inoffensive name of judicial prudence. Burke said: "There is also a
false, reptile prudence, the result not of caution, but of fear." Fear,
as favor, should not have place in judicial vocabulary.
XXX.—CONSTITUTIONALISM
The present nuclear physics of a far cry from the more than twenty-
five centuries old theory enunciated by Democritus in the following
words: "By convention sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter,
by convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention
color is color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the
objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to
regard them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and
the void are real."
The heated controversy between Ptolemy and Copernicus, the
discoveries of Galileo and Newton, are just small incidents in the
perennial struggle in which man is engaged to be, through science,
fully acquainted with the truth about our universe. It takes 1,600
years for one-half of a gram of radium to disintegrate, and it takes
one second for light to travel 186,300 miles; formerly matter and
energy were essentially different things, but now solid matter is but
concentrated energy, and energy has weight; it is not yet answered
whether light is wave of a shower of photons, but it is known that it
can be weighed. The theory of relativity, opened new vistas in the
panorama of science, but new riddles meet man in the great
adventure to the unknown. Albert Einstein said:
Yet new, still more difficult problems arise which have not been
definitely settled as yet. We shall mention only some of these
unsolved problems. Science is not and will never be a closed book.
Every important advance brings new questions. Every development
reveals, in the long run, new and deeper difficulties." (The Evolution
of Physics, p. 308.)
All theories which, in their day, served useful scientific purposes,
had to give way to others giving better explanations of physical
phenomena. The prevailing theories may not resist the onslaught of
new intellectual discoveries, but because they may eventually be
discarded themselves is no reason to dispense with them when, in
the meantime, they are only ones that can satisfy reason.
Otherwise, science will be crippled. Paralysis will keep her from new
advances.
By the same token, in the history of law, man had to stick in each
epoch to the known as the best of legal institutions. In the millenia
of human life no more wonderful legal institution was devised by
man than constitutionalism, the evolution of which is one of the
most inspiring chapters of history. A mere religious concept, giving
voice to moral law, in Israel, a philosophical concept, merely
normative, in Greece, it was in republican Rome where it took a
definite legal and political force as the basis of jurisdiction as
distinguished from gobernaculum, the reason of the law as opposed
to the power of government. In England for the common law to
prevail over the prerogative of the crown it took several hundred
years of bitter struggle. But fate had it that in America is where the
evolution of constitutionalism had to reach its highest
accomplishment. It became the basis of the government of the
United States from its very inception. Now constitutionalism for the
world is envisaged as the only hope of humanity to attain the goal
that will insure juridical order for the world, so that men's
inventions, including those ominous on nuclear energy, may be
placed under adequate social control.
The hope of the Republic of the Philippines lies also on
constitutionalism. Not the one that would merely offer lip service to
the Constitution, but that would make of that document as one of
the living tissues of our body politic, absolutely indispensable to its
own existence.
XXXI.—THE MOST VITAL ISSUE
The validity of the Constitution of the most vital issue involved in
this case. If no one must be allowed to be above the law, with
greater reason no one should be allowed to ignore or to trample
upon the provisions and mandates sacred by all persons living under
the pale of the Republic of the Philippines, and not rocked of as an
insignificant pushpin to toy with.
Burning with the thirst of immortality, shepherd Erostratus burned
the temple of Ephesus to gain a berth in history. Let us not make of
the Constitution of the Philippines another temple of Ephesus. It is
much better to be buried in the dust of eternal oblivion than to
permanently live in the memory of future generations as guilty of
arson, as rivals of the barbaric hordes who destroyed the great
works of art of Greece and Rome, or the contemporary vandals who
destroyed without any compunction churches and schools,
treasures of noble human institutions, or other works wherein the
loftiest ideals and aspirations of man have blossomed with
imperishable grandeur and beauty. Letus spare the Constitution
from the deleterious effects of our prejudices and from the ravages
of blind passions. Let us keep it as an underlying beacon of hope,
the indestructible foundation of our national existence, the
inexpugnable citadel of the rights and liberties of our people, the
eternal rock upon which the Republic of the Philippines shall forever
subsist with dignity.
The pamphlet in which it is printed may wizen and shrivel, its paper
rived into shreds, the shreds pulverized into dust and ashes, and
these reduced into infinitesimal atoms which will finally scatter in
the wide universe, to form new substances. But the juridical sense
of our people, crystallized in that pamphlet and permeating that
paper, embodied in the great document, like the mythological
phoenix of Arabia, undergoing the five hundred years cycle of
resurrection, shall again and again rise in youthful freshness from
the scattered ashes and atoms, the undying symbol of the spirit of
law, the flaming banner of justice, the magnificent expression of the
undaunted will-power to live.
The petition must be granted, and the preliminary injunction of May
29, 1946, must be reissued and made perpetual.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
Despues de las elecciones generales de 23 abril, 1946, en que
fueron elegidos el Presidente y Vice Presidente de Filipinas y los
miembros del Congreso, el senado y la Camara de Representantes
inauguraron se periodo de sesiones reuniendose por primera vez el
25 mayo. Uno de los primeros documentos que seleyeron en el
Senado fue la roclama expedida por la Comision sobre
Eleccionescuyo texto integro se transcribe a continuacion:
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF
RETURNS OF VOTES FOR THE OFFICE OF SENATOR AND
PROCLAMATION OF THE CANDIDATES ELECTED IN THE ELECTIONS
HELD ON APRIL 23, 1946.
We, the undersigned, constituting the Commission on Elections, do
hereby certify that, pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725, we have made the canvass of the votes
cast in the Philippines for the office of Senator in accordance with
the statements submitted by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
the different provinces and the City Board of Canvassers of Manila,
and that the result thereof shows the following sixteen (16)
registered candidates to have received the highest number of votes:
Name of candidates
1. Vicente J. Francisco
 Romero and Salipada Pendatun received the next eight (8) highest "On election day, altho no acts of violence were officially reported
2. Vicente Sotto 717,225
number of votes. to this Commission in connection with the elections, we were
advised by our representative in Nueva Ecija that ballot boxes were
3. Jose Avelino 708,420 stolen by armed bands in the barrios of the municipalities of
We further certify that the attached statement of votes shows the
number of votes polled by each candidate for the Office of Senator Bongabon, Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba. These incidents are still
4. Melencio Arranz in the Philippines by provinces. 666,700 under investigation by the Military Police Command. After the
election we cannot fail to notice the reports published in the
5. Ramon Torres In witness whereof, we have signed these presents640,477
in the City of newspapers on the attacks that have been made by armed bands
Manila, this 23rd day of May, 1946. upon persons or group of persons who were known to have voted
6. Tomas Confessor 627,354 for candidates other than the candidates of those armed elements.
Even the report submitted to this Commission by the Provost
7. Mariano Jesus Cuenco (Sgd.) JOSE LOPEZ 623,650 VITO Marshal General on May 20, 1946, . . . contains a recital of incidents
Chairman of terrorism that occured in the four provinces of Central Luzon
herein above mentioned which disturbed or affected the national
8. Carlos P. Garcia 617,542
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO ENAGE election in an undesirable manner. Reports also reached this
Member Commission to the effect that in the provinces of Bulacan,
9. Olegario Clarin 611,227 Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of the ballot was
actually violated; that armed bands saw to it that their candidates
10. Alejo Mabanag I concur in toto, except as regards the proclamation 608,902
of the 16 were voted for; and that the great majority of the voters, thus
Senators-elect, on the basis of the canvassing of all the votes cast in coerced or intimidated, suffered from a paralysis of judgment in the
11. Enrique B. Magalona their favor, without excluding those of Central Luzon. (Separate
591,796 matter of exercising the right of suffrage. Considering all those facts
opinion prepared.) of terrorism, violence and intimidation in connection with elections
12. Tomas Cabili 589,762 which are more or less general in the provinces of Pampanga,
Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this Commission believes that the
(Sgd.) VICENTE DE VERA election in the provinces aforesaid did not reflect the true and free
13. Jose O. Vera 588,993
Member expression of the popular will. It should be stated, however, that the
14. Ramon Diokno 583,598 Commission is without jurisdiction, to determine whether or not the
Acto seguido procediose a la eleccion del Presidente del Senado votes cast in the said provinces which, according to these reports
saliendo elegido como tal el candidato de la mayoria Hon. Jose A. have been cast under the influence of threats or violence, are valid
15. Jose O. Vera 563,816
Avelino que obtuvo 10 votos contra el candidato del partido de la or invalid. Suffice to state that in accordance with the provision of
minoria Hon. Jose O. Vera que obtuvo 8. Tanto el Sr. 557,156
Vera como sus Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution, "The Commission on
16. Salipada E. Romero Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
correcurrentes Sres. Diokno y Romero tomaron parte en la votacion.
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and
In view of the above result, we hereby proclaim that the above- shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by
Elegido el Presidente se iba a proceder a la toma del juramento
named sixteen(16) registered candidates are the duly elected law. It shall decide — save those involving the right to vote — all
colectivo de los Senadores electos, pero en esto el Senador Hon.
Senators in the election held on April 23, 1946. administrative questions, affecting elections, including the
Salipada Pendatun presento para su aprobacion un proyecto de
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
resolucion cuyo texto tambien se transcribe integro a continuacion:
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials . .
We further certify that Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Sotto, Jose
." and that the question of whether or not a vote has been cast
Avelino, Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Tomas, Confesor, Mariano Whereas, the Commission on Elections, charged under the legally or illegally is not for this Commission to determine. The
Jesus Cuenco and Carlos P. Garcia received the first eight (8) highest Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest matter is therefore being brought to the attention of the President
number of votes, and that Olegario Clarin, Alejo Mabanag, Enrique elections, in the Philippines, reported to the President of the and Congress of the Philippines for such action as may be deemed
B. Magalona, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, Jose E. Philippines on May 23, 1946, that proper pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution that this
Commission submit after every election a report to the said offices
on the manner the election was conducted."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera, member
of the Commission on Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as result of this chaotic condition, many residents of the
four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their
home towns in order not to be subjected to the prevailing
oppression and to avoid being victimized or losing their lives;" and
that after the election dead bodies had been found with notes
attached to their necks, reading: "Bumoto kami kay Roxas" (We
voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS, the same Judge De Vera says in his minority report that
in the four provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija,
the worst terrorism reigned during and after the election, and that if
the elections held in the aforesaid provinces were annulled as
demanded by circumstances mentioned in the report of the
Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would
not and could not have been declared elected;
WHEREAS, in his report to the Provost Marshal, col. Amando
Dumlao, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, attached to the report of the
Commission on Elections, states among other things, that "all the
members of the Church of Christ(Iglesia ni Cristo) were intimidated
and coerced, some kidnapped and murdered" by the HUKBALAHAPS
"because they had expressed their opinion that they were going to
vote for President-elect Manuel A. Roxas"; that because of terrorism
and coercion "a great many barrio people have evacuated their
respective places and signified their attention not to vote"; and that
ballot boxes were taken away from barrios San Miguel, Pasong Isip,
Pakap, Guimba and Galvan, and that in some instances election
inspectors were kidnapped;
WHEREAS, the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements in the
four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the election of
the candidates of the Conservative Wing of the Nacionalista Party is
of public knowledge and that such terrorism continues to this day;
that before the elections Jose O. Vera himself declared as campaign
manager of the Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in Huk provinces
because his life would be in endangered; and that because of the
constant murders of his candidates and leaders, Presidential
Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American High
Commissioner Paul V. Mcnutt for protection, which appeal
American High Commissioner personally referred to President
Sergio Osmeña for appropriate action, and the President in turn
ordered the Secretary of the Interior to afford the necessary
protection, thus impliedly admitting the existence and reign of such
terrorism;
WHEREAS, the Philippines, a Republic state, embracing the
principles of democracy, must condemn all acts that seek to defeat
the popular will;
WHEREAS, it is essential in order to maintain alive the respect for
democratic institutions among our people, that no man or group of
men be permitted to profit from the results of election held under
coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the principle of
freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution;
WHEREAS, protest against the election of Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose Romero, have been filed with the Electoral Tribunal
of the Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the findings of the
Commission on Elections above quoted;
NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero, pending the hearing and decision of reports lodged against
their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of the
Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost Marshal
constitute the ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Parece que cuando se puso a debate la resolucion arriba transcrita,
el Senado acordo unanimemente transferir la discusion para la
sesion del lunes siguiente, 27 de mayo. Ya se estaba discutiendo
otro asunto cuando surgio unacalorado incidente en virtud del cual
los Senadores de la minoria salierontodos del salon de sesiones,
quedandose alli solamente el Presidente Avelinocon sus once (11)
compañeros de la mayoria. Se alega en esta ocasion, ausenteslos
Senadores minoritarios y sin el necesario quorum legal para poder
seguir despachando asuntos, los Senadores de la mayoria,
revocando el acuerdo anterior de transferencia, decidieron
considerar y aprobar la resolucion sinmas debate.
Tales son, a grandes rasgos, los hechos que han dado lugar a la
demanda quedirecta y originariamente plantean ante este Tribunal
Supremo los recurrentes Jose O. Vera, Ramon diokno y Jose
Romero, y cuya parte petitoria es como sigue:
POR LO TANTO, los recurrentes respetuosamente piden a este
Honorable Tribunal y a cualquier Magistrado del mismo, tenga a
bien expedir un interdicto prohibitorio preliminar dirigido a los
recurridos, sus funcionarios, empleados, agentes y demas personas
que obran en su ayuda, ordenandoles que hasta nueva orden del
Tribunal, desistan y se abstengan de poner en ejecucion la
resolucion arriba mencionada, y impedir a los recurrentes continuen
en sus asientos en el Senado y ejerzan libremente sus funciones y
derechos como senadores de Filipinas, deshaciendo todo lo hecho
en contrario hasta esta fecha; que acorte los terminos de
contestacion; que una vez contestada esta demanda, designe un
Comisionado para recibir las pruebas, con instrucciones de que la
haga sin dilaciones, y que, previa la vista correspondiente, dicte
sentencia declarando enteramente nula y de ningun valor la citada
resolucion, y prohibiendo consecuentemente a los recurridos y a
cada uno de ellos a impedir a los recurrentes a continuar en sus
cargos como senadores, y prohibiendoles igualmente a realizar
cualquier otro procediemiento ulterior para ejecutar la resolucion
citada, con las costas. Los recurrentes piden tambien cualquier otro
remedio justo y equitativo.
El magistrado Perfecto concedio el interdicto preliminar pedido
principalmenteen virtud de la alegacion expuesta en el parrafo 10
de la demanda, en el sentido de que la resolucion cuestionada tenia
por objecto, entre otras cosas, "la realizacion de fines siniestros,
tales como la aprobacion, sin la fiscalizacion e intervencion de los
recurrentes, del Bill Bell, de una medidade reorganizacion judicial
terrorista para el personal de la judicatura y deotras semejantes, y
para doblegar a los recurrentes, por tal hitlerico procedimiento a los
manejos de tal mayoria." Sometido el interdicto preliminar a la corte
en pleno, esta lo aprobo en una votacion de seis (6) contra cuatro
(4), y al propio tiempo lo señalo a vista para la determinacion de la
cuestion de si su expedicion estaba o no justificada. En dicha vista
que duro 6 horas seguidas, desde la mañana hasta la tarde (una de
las mas largas si no la mas larga que se haya celebrado jamas en los
anales de esta Corte), arguyeron extensamente tanto la
representacion de los recurrentes como la de los recurridos. El
Procurador General Tañada comparecio y arguyo en nombre de
estos ultimos, pero limitandose en su informe a cuestionar e
impugnar la jurisdiccion de este Supremo Tribunal para conocer y
enjuiciar el asunto bajo el principio de la separacion de poderes que
informa nuestra Constitucion. Puede decirse sin exageracion que el
tema se agoto discutiendose con minuciosidad los puntos
constitucionales y juridicos planteados en el asunto. Despues de la
vista esta Corte en pleno, con la solañausencia del Magistrado
Jaranilla, y con la disidencia del Magistrado Perfecto, acordo
disolver el interdicto prohibitorio preliminar mediante lasiguente
orden:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the case of
Jose O. Vera et al., petitioners, vs. Jose Avelino, respondents, ( G. R.
No. L-543), to preserve the status quo and thus prevent the
execution of the acts alleged under oath in the last part of
paragraph X of the petition, without the intervention of the
petitioners; and taking into consideration that this court, after
hearing both parties, at any rate believes and trusts that the
respondents will not carry out said acts during the pendency of this
proceeding, this court, without deciding whether or not the said
injunction was justified, hereby resolves to dissolve it in the
meantime, without prejudice to whatever action or decision this
court may take or render on the questions involved in this case
including that of jurisdiction.
Resulta evidente de autos que las cuestiones que tenemos que
considerar yresolver son las siguientes: (1) a la luz de nuestra
Constitucion y de nuestras ¿es legal y sostenible la resolucion
objecto de controversia, en cuanto por ella se priva a los recurrentes
de sus asientos en el Senado de Filipinas, y de los derechos,
privilegios y prerrogativas anejos a dichos asientos?; (2) a la luz de
nuestra constitucion y de nuestrs leyes ¿tiene este Tribunal
Supremo jurisdiccion y competencia para conocer, enjuiciar y
decidir el asunto?
Primera cuestion.—A la luz de nuestre Constitucion y de nuestre
leyes ¿eslegal sostenible la resolucion objecto de controversia, en
cuanto por ella sepriva a los recurrentes de sus asientos en el
Senado de Filipinas, y de losderechos, privilegios y prerrogativas
anejos a dichos asientos?
Antes de la aprobacion de la primera Constitucion del
Commonwealth de Filipinas (1935), la Legistura era el juez de las
elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus propios miembros. La
disposicion original relativa a esta materia era la contenida en la Ley
Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1.º de julio de 1902 (Ley
Organica, articulo 7, parrafo 5), la cual preceptuaba que "La
Asamblea (Filipina) decidira de las elecciones, su resultado y las
calificaciones de los representantes. . . ." Cuando se aprobo la Ley
del Congreso de 1916 (Ley Jones, de amplia automania, seccion 18,
parrafo 1), la citada disposicion se reincorporo, con una
modificacion que la hacia mas enfatica insertandose la palabra
"unicos," a saber: "Que el Senado y la Camara de Representantes,
respectivamente, seran los unicos jueces de las elecciones, del
resultado, escrutinio y condiciones de sus miembros electivos. . . ."
Esta disposicion no era de ningun modo original: no hacia mas que
transplantar a este pais la tradicion y el sistema americano provisto
en la clausula 1.ª de la seccion 5 del Articulo I de la constitucion de
los Estados Unidos, que dispone que "cada Camara sera juez de las
Elecciones, Actas y Condicciones de sus propios miembros. . ."
La Asamblea Constituyente convocada en 1934 para redactar la
Constitucionde nuestro Commonwealth pudo haber seguido sobre
esta materia diferents cursos de accion: reafirmar la tradicion
americana vigente en este pais desde1902; o seguir el ejemplo de
algunos paises — verbigracia, Canada, Australia,Hungria y Polonia —
que habian transladado esta facultad de las Camaras Legislativas al
departamento judicial, hablando mas concretamente, al
TribunalSupremo; o bien instituir un sistema mixto, creando un
cuerpo constitucional separado e independiente, con jurisdiccion
exclusiva sobre la materia. La Asemblea Constituyente opto por este
ultimo creando "una Comision Electoralque se compondra de tres
Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo que seran designadospor su
Presidente, y de seis diputados escogidos por la Asamblea Nacional,
tres de los cuales el mayor numero de votos, y tres por el partido
que lesiga en el mayor numero de votos. Esta Commision Electoral
sera presidida porel Magistrado mas antiguo y conocera
exclusivamente de todas las controversiasrelativas al resultado de la
eleccion y a las calificaciones de los miembrosde la Asamblea
Nacional" (Articulo IV, Constitucion de Filipinas, 1935). Cuando la
Constitucion se reformo en 1940 restaurandose le legislatura
bicameral, la filosofia de la comision electoral se respecto y
conservo en la Constitucion reformada y en lugar de una comision
se crearon dos, una para cada camara, y ya no se llamaba Comision
electoral sino Tribunal Electoral, como para recalcar y subrayar el
caracter judicial del nuevo organismo. El precepto constitucional
pertinente es como sigue:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine members, three of whom shall be Justice of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que una importante fa cultad
judicial que tenian las camaras legislativas anteriormente — la
facultad de actuar como jueces sobre las elecciones, actas y
calificaciones de sus miembros — ha quedado eliminada
completamente bajo la actual Constitucion y traspasada tambien
completa y plenamente al nuevo organismo constitucional — el
Tribunal Electoral. La pregunta ahora en orden es si la resolucion
cuestionada que para mayor claridad llamaremos Resolucion
Pendatun representa o constituye,por parte de los Senadores
recurridos, el ejercicio de una facultad constitucional que no les
pertenece sino al Tribunal Electoral, y nuestra contestacion es
decididamente afirmativa. Con esa resolucion en la mano es como si
los recurridos hubieran dicho a los recurrentes lo siguiete:"Señores,
aqui tenemos un informe de la Comision sobre Elecciones en donde
se dice que en cuatro provincias del centro de Luzon no ha habido
sufragio libre, sincero y or denado, por los actos de intimadacion y
violencia de vuestros partidarios. Sin los votos de esas provincias,
vosotros no hubierais triunfado. Por tanto, hasta que se decida en
vuestro favor las protestas formuladas contra vuestras actas ante el
Tribunal Electoral, os negamos el derecho de jurar, de sentarse en
estos escaños, de participar en las deliberaciones del Senado y de
gozar de los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al cargo de
Senador." ¿Que es esto sino una innegabale susurpacion de la
facultad exclusiva que tiene el Tribunal Electoral de ser el unico juez
de las controversias relativas a la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de
los miembros de la camara a qu corresponde dicho tribunal?
Se arguye que independientemente de la cuestion electoral cada
camara, para proteger su existencia, su buen nombre y su decoro,
tiene el poder inherente de suspender a cualquier miembro suyo;
que la Resolucion Pendatun se inspiro en estos motivos; que la
suspension de los recurrentes es un acto politico que nada tiene que
ever con la determinacion de sus actas por el Tribunal Electoral y no
se halla sujeto a revision de parte del departamento judicial por
cuestionable que fuera el mismo desde el punto de vista del
derecho o de la moral publica; y que, por tanto, no hay tal
usurpacion de poderes constitucionales, no habiendose los
recurridos entrometido en la esfera de accion del Tribunal Electoral.
Sin embargo, no hay mas que leer la resolucion en cuestion para
convencerse de que su entera motivacion se deriva de las elecciones
de 23 de April, dandose en ella por establecido, en virtud del
informe de la Comision sobre Elecciones, que el triunfo de los
recurrentes se debio a un estado de terror y violencia en las
Provincias de Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija y Bulacan. Los "por
cuantos" de la resolucion hacen referencia a las supuestas
anomalias e irregularidades que viciaron el sufragio en dichas
provincias; hacen ciertas afirmaciones de caracter general como la
de que Filipinas, a fuer de nacion y estado democratico, debe
condenar todo acto tendente a derrotar la voluntad popular, y la de
que "para mantener vivo entre nosotros el respeto a las
instituciones democraticas, a ningun hombre o grupo de hombres se
debe permitir que reporten beneficio de los resultados de una
eleccion llev ada a cabo bajo coercion"; y al final se dice "por
cuanto, sobre la base de los informes arriba citados de la Comision
sobre Elecciones se han formulado protestas ante el Tribunal
Electoral de Senado contra la eleccion de Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno y Jose E. Romero"; y luego la parte dispositiva en virtud de la
cual se priva a los recurrentes del juramento y de sus asientos en el
Senado entre tanto no se resuelvan las protestas formuladas contra
sus actos, interregno que puede durar meses y hasta años. De todo
esto resulta bien claro que los considerandos de la resolucion versan
precisamente sobre los mismos hechos electorales cuya
determinacion incumbe exclusivamente al Tribunal Electoral, y que
la interdiccion, o mejor dicho, la suspension de los derechos,
prerrogativas y privilegios de los recurrentes se basa
indudablemente en tales considerandos. No hay en la resolucion ni
la mas minima insinuacion de que se haya aprobado por altos
motivos de dignidad y decoro senatorial — eso que algun tratadista
lllama graficamente medida de profilaxis — como para evitar el roce
deshonroso con miembros que fuerean algo aso com de la casta
despreciable de lost intocables, aquejados de lepra moral en sus
personas. No hay ni el menor cargo de torpeza moral contra los
recurrentes, ni siquiera se insinua que estos fuereon directa o
indirectamente responsables del alegado estado de terror y
violencia. La conclusion indeclinable, pues, es que la Resolucion
Pendatun enjuicia y resuelve cuestiones o "issues" puramente
electorales, aceptando prima facie un informe incompetente sobre
terrorismo, violencias y fraudes, y como tal constituye una
intromision en la facultad que bajo la Constitucion tiene el Tribunal
Electoral del Senado de ser el unico juez de las controversias
relativas a la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de los miembros de
dicho alto cuerpo colegislador.
Pero admitamos por un momento que la Resolucion Pendatun tiene
ese caracter profilactico que le atribuyen a ultima hora; que, contra
lo que es evidente y claro con claridad meridiana, esa resolucion
nada tiene que ver con la determinacion judicial de las actas de los
recurrentes por el Tribunal electoral. La pregunta otra vez en orden
s la siguiente: sometida la Resolucion Pendatum a la piedra de toque
de nuestra Constitucion ¿puede resistir con exito la prueba? Nuestra
contestacion es terminantemente negativa. La Constitucion filipina
es el producto de la sabiduria, experiencia y genio politico de
nuestro pueblo. No es un documento enteramente original: en
ciencia politica las concepciones originales no abundan. Hemos
volcado en ella no solo el resultado de nuestra experiencia
necessariamentelimitada, sino lo que hemos aprendido de la
sabiduria y experiencia de otros pueblos mas avanzados que
nosotros, particularmente del pueblo Americano, con el cual nos ha
ligado una convivencia de cerca de medio sigolo. Despues de largas
y laboriosas deliberaciones nuestra Asamablea Constituyente,
elegida por el pueblo (1934-1935), adopto el sistema presidencial de
gobierno dividido en tres altospoderes, independendientes entre si
pero coordinandos en un mecanismo cuidadosamente elaborado de
frenos y contrapesos. Esos poderes son: legislativo, ejecutivo y
judicial.Sus altas facultades y funciones se hallan especificadas en la
Constitucion, en capitulos separados. En el uso del lenguaje se ha
evitado la municiosidad, el pormenorismo caractereistico de las
leyesordinarias, a fin de hacer del instrumento suficientemente
amplio y flexible para acomodarse y para subvenir a las necesidades
y condiciones cambiantes de los tiempos; pero, con todo, los trazos,
los lineamientos son suficientemente claros, firmes y seguros, y
creemos puededecirse sin inmodestia que en concision, en claridad
y en buen ordenamiento nuestra Constitucion no cede a ninguna de
las constituciones escritas que se conocen.
Examinemos ahora el departamento o poder legislative que es lo
que nos concierne e interesa en el presente asunto. Es un principio
constitucional bien establecido que el poder de legislar es ilimitado
en tanto en cuanto no pugna con la Constitucion, la cual opera
como una limitacion. Todos los demas poderes y facultades que no
tengan caracter legislativo deben ser conferidos expresa o
implicitamente. Nuestro Congreso, actuando concurrentemente por
medio de sus dos camaras, tiene el poder de legislar. "El poder
legislativo queda investido en un Congreso de Filipinas, compuesto
de un Senado y de una Camara de Representates (Articulo VI,
seccion 1, Constitucion de Filipinas, 1940). Pero ademas de este
poder de conjunto, cada camara tiene ciertas facultades, entre ellas
algunas de caracter disciplinario, a saber: (a) la de compeler la
asistencia de miembros ausentes en la forma y bajo las penas que
dicha camara prescriba; (b) la de castigar a sus miembros por
conducta desordenada, y, con la concurrencia de dos terceras partes
de sus miembros, expulsar a un miembro por tal motivo (Articulo VI,
seccion 10, ap. 2 y 3). Fuera de estas facultades no hay en nuestra
Constitucion ninguna otra que autorice la imposicion de un castigo o
pena, o envuelva una privacion de derechos, prerrogativas y
privilegios, siguiera sea temporal, tal como la que se provee en la
Resolucion Pendatun. ¿Encaja esta resolucion en cualquiera de las
facultades arriba enumeradas? Evidentemente que no. No encaja en
el inciso (a)—la facultad de compeler disciplinariamente la
asistencia de miembros ausentes — porque es superfluo decir que
no se trata ni remotamente de tal caso. Tampoco encaja en el inciso
"b" porque se ha admitido desde el comienzo que el caso que nos
ocupa no es el de conducta desordenada de un miembro. Tampoco
encaja en la facultad de determinar y resolver la legalidad y
solvencia de las actas y credenciales de los recurrentes porque ya
hemos demostrado hasta la saciedad que habiendose
retirado totalmente de las camaras la substancia, la esencia de esa
facultad trasladandola al Tribunal Electoral, quedo tambien ipso
facto retirada y eliminada la facultad de suspender que es nada mas
que un incidenteun aledaño de la substancia.
Pero se dice: el Tribunal Electoral no tiene la facultad de suspender,
esto se halla admitido por todo el mundo; luego esa facultad ha
quedado, por lo menos, en las camaras como residuo no afectado
por el traspaso de jurisdiccionsobre las credenciales y actas
electorales. Sin embargo,esto no es mass que una habil sustileza. En
la Constitucion no hay mas que dos categorias de poderes: el
expreso o el implicito (either by express grant or by fair
implication from what is granted). Como quiera que esa reserva,
ese residuo (la facultad de suspender) no esta conferido
expresamente en la Constitucion, luego hay que suponerlo implicito.
Pero ¿implicito de que? Tiene que ser de algo de un poder mas
general y mas amplio expresamente conferido (parte de un
todo) que en este caseo tendria que ser el poder de conocer y
resolver las controversias electorales sobre las actas de los
miembros del Congreso. Es asi que este poder ya no lo tienen las
camaras bajo la Constitucion; luego tampoco queda
nada implicito en elias, so pena de sostener que lo implicito, que es
nada mas que un incidente, puede subsistir por si solo sin
la substancia — el vaso esencial que lo envuelve y entraña. El
corolario forzoso de todo esto es que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina eliminaron por completo la facultad de
suspender no solo del Congreso sino del Tribunal Electroral; que la
voluntad soberana del pueblo expresada en el codigo fundamental,
es que ningun protestado seria privado de sus asiento ni por un solo
minuto; que ninguna presuncion se estableceria en contra de la
legitimidad y solvencia de su acta; que solamente una sentencia
final podira cerrarle las puertas del Congreso. No tenemos porque
averiguar si con esta decision la Asamblea Constituyente quiso erigir
un firme valladar a los excesos y demasias de la pasion politica
creando un clima propicio para el desarrollo de las minorias en un
pais en que, como el nuestro, ciertas causas y circunstancias han
retardado el turno periodico y saludable de los partidos; todo lo que
nos incumbe hacer es señalar y destacar el hecho inexorable, la
volicion constitucional.
Se han citado dos casos de nuestra jurisprudencia parlamentaria
para justificar la Resolucion Pendatun: el caso de Jose Fuentebella
en el Senado de Filipinas, en 1916, y el caso de Nicolas Rafols en la
Camara de Representantes, en 1925. Bajo la alegacion de haberse
cometido graves irregularidades y fraudes en las primeras
elecciones senatoriales celebradas en el 6. o distrito (provincias
bicolanas)al candidato electo Jose Fuentebella se le negoprima
facie el juramento y el asiento pendiente la resolucion de la protesta
formulada contra su acta. Lo mismo se hizo en el caso de Nicolas
Rafols, por alegados fraudes electorales cometidos en el 6.º distrito
diputacional de Cebu. Pero la endeblez e inaplicabilidad de estos
precedentes salta inmediatamente a la vista si se tiene en cuenta
que cuando se establecieron las camaras legislativas eran
constitucionalmente los unicos jueces de la eleccion, actas y
calificaciones de sus miembros; asi que la suspension prima facie del
juramento y del asiento no fue mas que un incidente en el ejercicio
de esa facultad; y, prescindiendo de si esto era justo o injusto,
prudente o arbitrario, parecia incuestionable que estaba dentro los
poderes y facultades de las camaras el hacerlo.
Pero, en realidad, los casos de Fuentebella y Rafols pueden citarse
para un efecto completamente opuesto al perseguido por los
abogados dee los recurridos cuando se analizan y discuten amplia y
objetivamente los motivos, circunstancias y designios que indujeron
a nuestra Asamblea Constituyente a abandonar la bien arraigada
tradicion americana de hacer de las camaras legislativas los unicos
jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros,
trasladanddo la jurisdiccion a un organismo constitucional
completamente separado e independiente. Un analisis de este
genero viene a ser altamente revelador y expresivo. Lo primero que
embarga la atencion del observador es que cuando se adopto esta
reforma fundamental y original por la Asamblea Constituyente
dominaba en Filipinas un partido politico fuerte, denso, acaudillado
por una personalidad genial, brillante, dinamica y poderosa. Ese
partido acababa de ganar en unas elecciones apasionadisimas y muy
reidas una victoria espectacular, abrumadora, que le daba el
dominio y control de todos los resortes de la vida politica no solo en
la nacion sino hasta en las provincias y municipios.Ese partido
dominaba naturalmente tambien la Convencion Constitucional, la
Asamblea Constituyente. ¿Que hizo ese partido en medio de su
omnipotencia? ¿Le emborracho ese peligroso licor de los dioses —
el licor de la victoria, el licor del poder? No. Ese partido, sus
caudillos, resolvieron ser generosos, ser justos, ser prudentes, ser
democraticos, y lo fueron; determinaron pensar en terminos de
humanidad, en terminos de nacion, en terminos de justica pero
justicia de verad, en terminos de libertad y democracia, y lo hicieron
tal como lo pensaron. Podian haber escrito una constitucion a su
talante — una constitucion que sirviese sus propios fines, que
asegurase su perpetuidad en el poder. No lo hicieron. Y no
solamente no lo hicieron, sino que hicieronalgo mas; algo
extraordinario, inconcebible, juzgado a la luz y segun la norma usual
del egoismo de los partidos. Teniendo en sus manos un poder
enorme, formidable, sumamente tentador, el poder de resolver las
controversias electorales sobre las actas de los miembros de la
Legislatura, renunciaron a ese poder para alojarlo en un cuerpo
constitucional separado e independiente, el cual es practicamente
un tribunal de justicia: la Comision Electoral, hoy Tribunal Electoral.
La determinacion de hacer este cuerpo lo mas apolitico posible se
denota en el hecho de que sus miembros legislativos estan
distribuidos en igual numero, 3-3, de suerte que los 3 Magistrados
componen el factor decisivo.
¿Por que los redactores de la Constitucion, y, sobre todo, por que el
partido politico mayoritario pudo hacer estarenuncia de la que
pocos ejemplos hay en la historia politica del mundo? No parece
dificil imaginarse los motivos, las causas, sobre todo para uno que
como el autor de esta opinion tuvo algo que ver, siguera muy
modestamente, con las tareas de la Asamblea Constituyente. El
pueblo filipino estab empeñado en una suprema, altisima tarea — la
de estructurar el Estado, la de escribir el codigo fundamental de la
nacion no solo para los 10 años del Commonwealth sino para la
Republica que se proclamaria despues de dicho periodo de tiempo.
Todo el mundo sabia que la suerte de la democracia en filipinas
dependia principalmente de la Constitucion que se escribiera, no
solo en su letra sino en su espiritu, y, sobre todo, de la forma y
manera como ella moldearia, penetraria e influiria en la vida
cotidiana del pueblo y del individuo. Desde luego no eramos unos
ilusos, utopistas, perfeccionistas; no aspirabamos ni mucho menos a
crear un trasunto de la republica ideal de Platon; pero deseabamos
hacer lo mejor posible dadas nuestras circunstancias y limitaciones,
dada nuestra historia y tradiciones, y dado el temperamento y genio
politico y social de nuestro pueblo. Se habia acuñado y popularizado
por aquel tiempo la frase "justicia politica" para denotar la clase de
justicia convencional que cabia esperar en relacion con las protestas
electorales planteadas ante las camaras legislativas. No solo se
aceleraba o demoraba el despacho de las mismas a ritmo con los
dictados de ciertas conveniencias de taifa o grupo, sino que no
pocas veces el complejo politico o personal era el factor
determinante en las resoluciones y decisiones que se tomaban.
Todo esto lo sabian los delegados a la asamblea constituyente, lo
sabian los liders de los partidos, lo sabian los escritores y
pensadores dedicados al estudio de las ciencias politicas y sociales.
En la Convencion habi delegados que eran miembros actuales y
pasados de la Legislatura, hombres que sabian por propia
experiencia como se resolvian las protestas electorales en las
camaras legislativas y que, ademas, sabian por sus lecturas lo que
sobre el particular ocurria en otros paises. Alli estaba, como
delegado, Nicolas Rafols — actor del drama politico que determino
uno de los procedentes parlamentarios que se citan — acaso
rumiando todavia en su fuero interno el agravio contra lo que
reputara arbitrariedad cometida por la mayoria en su caso. ¿Que de
extraño habia que en medio de tal "background", en medio de tal
ambiente ideologico se formara una fuerte opinionen favor de un
cambio de sistema, en favor de unarbitrio constitucional que
sustituyera la llamada "justicia politica" con una justicia de verdad,
una "justicia judicial?"Asi se creo la Comision Electoral. Nada mejor
que las siguientes palabras del malogrado Magistrado Abad Santos
en su luminosa opinion concurrente en el celebrado asunto de
Angara contra Comision Electoral, para definir el caracter del
sistema: "El objeto que se trataba de obtener con la creacion del a
Comision Electoral no era crear un cuerpo que estuviera por encima
de la ley, sino el elevar las elecciones legislativas de la categoria de
cuestiones politicas a la de justiciables." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151, 200.) Y el ponente en dicho asunto el
Magistrado Laurel se explaya mas todavia con los siguientes
pronunciamientos que no tienen desperdicio:
Los miembros de la Convencion Constitucional que planearon
nuestra ley fundamental eran, en su mayor parte, hombres de edad
madura y de experiencia. A buen seguro muchos de ellos estaban
familiarizados con la historia y desarrollo politico de otros paises del
mundo. Por tanto, cuando creyeron conveniente crear una Comision
Electoral como un organismo constitucional y lo invistieron con la
exclusiva funcion de conocer y fallar las controversias electorales,
actas y condiciones de los miembros de la Asamblea
Nacional,debieronde haberlo hecho asi, no solamente a la luz de su
propia experiencia, sino tambien teniendo en cuente la experiencia
de otros pueblos ilustrados del mundo. La creacion de la Comision
Electoral fue planeada para remediar ciertos males que conocian los
autores de nuestra Constitucion. No obstante la tenaz oposicion de
algunos miembros de la Convencion a su creacion, el proyecto como
antes se ha dicho, fue aprobado por ese cuerpo mediante una
votacion de 98 contra 58. Todo cuanto se puede decir ahora sobre la
aprobacion de la Constitucion, la creacion de la Comision Electoral
es la expresion de la sabiduria y "la justicia esencial al pueblo".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, marzo 4, 1861.)
De las deliberaciones de nuestra Convencion Constitucional resulta
evidente que el objeto era traspasar en su totalidad toda la facultad
previamente ejercitada por la Legislatura en asuntos pertenecientes
a protestas electorales de sus miembros, a un tribunal
independiente e imparcial. Sin embargo, no fue tanto el
conocimientoy apreciacion de precedentes constitucionales
contemporaneos comola ha tiempo sentida necesidad de fallar
protestas legislativas, libres de prejuicios partidistas lo que impulso
al pueblo, obrando por medio de sus delegados a la Convencion, a
establecer este Cuerpo que se conoce por Comision Electoral. Con
estas miras, se creo un cuerpo en el que tanto el partido de la
mayoria como el de la minoria estanigualmente representados para
contrarrestar la influencia partidista en sus deliberaciones, y dotado,
ademas, de caracter judicial mediantela inclusion entre sus
miembros de tres magistrados del Tribunal Supremo.
La Comision Electoral es una creacion constitucional, investida de las
facultades necesarias para el cumplimiento y ejecucion de las
funciones limitadas y especificas que la ha asignado la Comision.
Aunque no es un Poder en nuestro Gobierno tripartito, es, para
todos los fines, cuando obra dentro de los limites de su autoridad,
un organismo independiente. Se aproxima mas, ciertamente, al
Departamento Legislativo que a cualquiera otro. El lugar que ocupa
la disposicion legal (articulo 4) que crea la Comision Electoral en el
Titulo VI, titulado "Departamento Legislativo" de nuestra
Constitucion,es muy significativo. Su composicion es tambien
significativa por cuanto etsa constituida por una mayoria de
miembros de la Legislatura. Pero es un cuerpo separado e
independiente de la Legislatura.
La concesion de facultades a la Comision Electoral para conocer de
todas las controversias relativas a las elecciones, actas y condiciones
de los miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, tiene por objeto hacer
que esas facultades sean tan completas y queden tan incolumes
como si hubieran continuado originalmente en la Legislatura. El
haber expresamente investido de esas facultades a la Comision
Electoral, es una negativa tacita del ejercicio de esas facultades por
la Asamblea Nacional. Y esto es una restriccion tan eficaz a las
facultades legislativas como una prohibicion expresa contenida en la
Constitucion (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman,36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). . . ."
(Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151-, 188-190.)
Acaso se pueda decir algo mas todavia acerca de los motivos que
indujeron la creacion de la Comision Electoral; acaso se pueda
aventurar la afirmacion de que con este cuerpo los redactores de la
Constitucion, los caudillos de los partidos se propusieron asegurar
por todos los medios y garantias la vida y crecimiento de la
democracia en Filipinas. Democracia es esencialmente libre
discusion de los asuntos publicos, de los problemas de la
comunidad; libreexpresion del pensamiento y de la opinion. De esto
se sigue necesariamente un regimen basado en la existencia de una
mayoria que gobierna y de una minoria que aspira a gobernar
entretanto que vigila los actos del gobierno en su doble papel de
censor y de aspirante al poder. La mejor piedra de toque para
apreciar y juzgar la calidad de un regimen politico es la manera y
forma como trata a las minorias y oposiciones. Un gobierno
totalitario, despotico, las liquida, las ahoga; un gobierno
democratico no solo las respeta, sino que crea para ellas un clima
vital propicio. Mirado en esta sentido el Tribunal electoral es un
instrumento de minorias por antonomasia: la idea basica de su
creacion es el desposeer a las mayhorias del poder de destruir, de
aniquilar a las minorias mediante lo que cinicamente se ha
denominado "justicia politica," e impartir a las minorias las maximas
garantias de una justicia de verdad — una "justicia judicial" de la
mayoria en el Senado, pronunciando su discurso a favor de la
reforma en la Asamblea Constituyente, dijo entre otros conceptos
las siguientes significativas palabras: "Many have criticized, many
have complained against the tyranny of the majority in electoral
cases. . . ." (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution,Tomo I, pag. 263). Por eso es un absurdo sostener que
la facultad de suspender utilizada mediante la Resolucion Pendatun
haya quedado en el Congreso como residuo, independientemente
de la jurisdiccion exclusiva del Tribunal Electoral para resolver
protestas electorales legislativas. Ello equivaldria a sostener que los
redactores de la Constitucion pusieron un remedio paraderrotarlo al
propio tiempo mediante una puerta reservada y trasera por la que
podria escurrirse el pequeño monstruo de la "justicia politica". Este
juego infantil no podian haberlo hecho los redactores de la
Constitucion, los liders de los partidos que tuvieron alguna
responsabilidad en la redaccion de dicho documento. ¿Que mas?
Esa facultada para suspender equivale practicamentea una carta
blanca para intervenir y estorbar las actuaciones y procedimientos
del Tribunal Electoral, provocando suspicacias, creando
anticipadamente prejuicios no solo en la mente del publico sino de
los miembros mismos, empequeñeciendo, en una palabra, el
prestigio del tribunal. ¿Como se puede pensar que la Asamblea
Constituyente permitiera y posibitara ese resultado antijudicial,
reservandoalgo al Congreso en un traspaso de facultades que se
consideraba total, absoluto e incondicional? Los
tribunalesordinarios de justicia estan por ley protegidos contra todo
estorbo y obstruccion a sus funciones. El Tribunal Electoral —
criatura de la misma Constitucion — tiene, por lo menos, iguales si
no mejores titulos a esa impermeabilidad, mejor todavia, a esa
inmunidad contra toda obstruccion y entorpecimiento. El hecho de
que la intromision venga del Congreso o de una de sus camaras no
puede ser una justificacion.
Las deliberaciones de la Asamblea Constituyente arrojan buena luz
sobre el espiritu del precepto que nos ocupa. Queel traspaso de
facultades fue total, absoluto; que al Congreso no se reservo
ninguna facultad, mucho menos la de suspender, en toda cuestion
relativa a la eleccion de sus miembros, lo denotan bien claro ciertas
observaciones, que a estas alturas resultan profeticas, del Delegado
ManuelRoxas, uno de los liders mas autorizados de la Asamblea
Constituyente, hoy primer Magistrado de la nacion. El Sr. Roxas
estaba contestando varias interpelaciones sobre el alcance del
nuevo sistema propuesto. Replicando al Delegado Ventura no
parece sino que el Sr. Roxas presintiera la Resolucion Pendatun o
actos semejantes a ella cuando dijo lo siguiente: ". . . Ademas, si la
Asamblea desea anular el poder de la Comision (Electoral), puede
hacerlo asi mediante ciertas maniobras en su primera sesion cuando
se someten las actas a la Asamblea. El objeto es dar a la Comision
Electoral todo el poder ejercitado por la Asamblea referente a las
elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus miembros"
(vease Angara contra Comision Electoral, supra, pag. 179).
Ese todo de que habla el Sr. Roxas excluye la idea de cualquier
reserva o residuo dejado a las camaras del Congreso.
Se dice, sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria que los debates en
la Asamblea Constituyente sobre el precepto constitucional de que
se trata demuestran que la intencion de los redactores de la
Constitucion no fue el entregar todo a la Comision Electoral (ahora
Tribunal Electoral), sino que se le confirio solamente la facultad de
ser "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."Es
decir — se arguye — que cuando no hay "contest" o contencion las
camaras tienen la facultad de entender y juzgar de "la eleccion,
actas y cualificaciones de sus miembros".Esto se desprende, segun
la ponencia, del hecho de que mientras el "draft" o proyecto original
decia lo siguiente:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission.
la redaccion final del proyecto quedo como sigue:
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly.
Se asevera enfaticamente en la opinion de la mayoria que la
supresion de la primera parte de la clausula es harto significativa.
Ello demuestra, se dice, que la clausula tenia dos partes con
significados distintos: la primera parte, relativa a casos no
contenciosos, y la segunda referente a casos contenciosos. La
eliminacion de la primera parte venia a reducir consiguientemente
la jurisdiccion de la ComisionElectoral a los casos contenciosos,
reservandose los no contenciosos a las camaras. Y para probar esta
tesis a primera vista deslumbrante se transcribe en la ponencia una
larga tirada del diario de sesiones de la Asamblea Constituyente —
tirada que, en verdad, ofrece ciertos equivocos y ambiguedades.
Pero esto no es mas que un aspecto del cuadro.
Estos nos obliga a revisar y examinar toda la parte del diario de
sesiones que abarca los debates sobre el
particular.Afortunadamente, las discusiones fueron amplias, plenas
de informacion y detalle, y sobre todo llevadas
muyinteligentemente. El Delegado Manuel Roxas, ahora Presidente
de Filipinas, era quien sostenia el lado afirmativo, esto es, el
precepto original tal como lo habia sometido el llamando Comite de
Siete y tal como queda transcritoen el parrafo anterior. Un grupo de
Delegados, encabezado por el Hon. Alejo Labrador, de Zambales,
estaba fundamental y decididamente opuesto a la formula. Estos
Delegados no aceptaban la reforma propuesta, querian que se
conservase el antiguo sistema por virtud del cual las camaras eran
los jueces exclusivos de la elecccion, actas ycualificaciones de sus
miembros. Acaso sea pertinente consignar el hecho de que si bien
es verdad que los partidos (anti y pro) habian declarado una tregua
patriotica y saludable en sus luchas dentro de la Convencion, el Sr.
Roxas pertenecia al partido minoritario — el de los pros — mientras
que el Sr. Labrador era de la mayoria, el partido fuerte y poderoso
de los antis cuyo indiscutible lider era el entonces Presidente del
Senado Sr. Quezon. La oposicion del Sr. Labrador y compa_¤_eros se
fundaba principalmente en la teoria de la separacion de poderes:
ellos creian que la reforma era demasiado radical, que la misma
venia a mermar grandemente el poder y prestigio del departamento
legislativo,reduciendolo a un estado de inferioridad y vasallaje,
particularmente al poder judicial, en virtud de la intervencion de
miembros de la Corte Suprema en la composicion de la Comision o
Tribunal Electoral. Acaso sea pertinente decir tambien que entre los
ardientes patrocinadores de la reforma figuraban distinguidos
Delegados de la mayoria entre ellos el Hon. Vicente J. Francisco, de
Cavite, en la actualidad Senador de Filipinas.
Veamos ahora el proceso de como se enmendo el "draft"original del
precepto. Las siguientes interpelaciones arrojan copiosa luz sobre la
cuestion.
Delegate VENTURA. We have a doubt here as to the scope of the
meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft
reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of
anyof its members shall be judged by an electoral Commission ."I
should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the
election and qualification of the members whose election is not
contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
member, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge"is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no qustion about
the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the
Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Delegate VENTURA. But that does carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?
Delegate ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, theaction of the House of Representatives in
confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules
of the Assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a
man (adviertase bien esto) fileshis credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless the election is contested."
(Arruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,pp. 267, 268.)
Como se ve, lo que preocupada al Delegado Ventura era que con la
fraseologiaindicada la Comision Electoral tuviera jurisdiccion y
competencia hasta sobrelas credenciales no protestadas; parece
que se temia esta ambiguedad. Peroni el Delegado Ventura ni nadie
en la Convencion tuvo jamas en la mente la idea de que la
fraseologia envolvia una dual jurisdiccion: una, de parte de la
Asamblea Nacional, sobre las credenciales no protestadas; y otra, de
parte de la Comision Electoral, sobre las credenciales protestadas. Y
elDelegado Roxas, con su contestaciones, establecio bien
claramente que se empleaba la palabra "judge"; y el "contest," el
litigio tenia que ser enjuiciado naturalmente por la Comision
Electoral.
De la ultima contestacion del Delegado Roxas transcrita arriba se
deduceincuestionablemente que el no admitia la posibilidad de que
la Asemblea Nacional rehusase su confirmacion a una credencial no
protestada o contendida. El sostenia que esta confirmacion no era
constitucional, no era necesaria. Poreso el dijo categoricamente:
"After a man files his credential, that issufficient, unless the election
is contested." Aplicado este criterio al casoque nos ocupa, equivale
a lo siguiente: Despues de haberse presentado alSenado las
credenciales de los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero (a ello
monta el certificado de proclamacion expedido por la Comision
sobre Elecciones), ello era bastante, a menos que su eleccion fuese
cuestionada, ycuestionada legalmente, esto es, protestada
debidamente ante el Tribunal Electoral.
El pensamiento del Delegado Roxas se aclaro mas contestado otras
interpelaciones. El dijo positiva y terminantemente, replicando al
DelegadoCinco, que no habia ninguna diferencia entre la primera y
segunda parte de laclausula; que, en realidad, los casos de elections,
returns and qualifications," y que la frase "and contested elections"
se inserto meramente para los efectos de mayor claridad.
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte (Mr. Ventura)
when I arose a while ago.However, I want to ask more questions
from the Delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the
draft cites cases contesting the election asseparated from the first
part of the section which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Delegate ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the
cases ofcontested elections are already included in the phrase "the
elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested
elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Delegate CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the election of
the members?
Delegate ROXAS. I do not think so unless there is a protest.
(Arruego, id.,p. 269.)
Pero hay todavia cosa mas importante. En realidad, esta misma
custion que nos ocupa ya se planteo en aquellos debates y la
solucion que entonces se le diocuadra perfectamente con el criterio
que sostenemos en esta disidencia. ElDelegado Labrador, lider,
como ya se ha dicho, de los opositores a la reforma,hizo al Delegado
Roxas algunas interpelaciones que parecian hechas enanticipacion a
los presentes acontecimientos. He aqui el dialogo Roxas-Labrador:
Delegate LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe
that unless this power is granted to the Assembly, the Assembly on
its own motion does nothave the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. I have no doubt that the gentleman is right. If this
draft is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the Assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. By the Assembly for misconduct.
Delegate LABRADOR. I mean with the respect to the qualifications of
the members.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
Assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he
must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question heard
before the Electoral Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
whether the election is not contested.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes sir; that is the purpose. (Aruego, idem, pp. 269,
270.)
Este dialogo Roxas-Labrador nos da la mejor clave para interpretar
el perfecto. Labrador pregunto si bajo el mismo la Asamblea tenia
derecho acuestionar, de su propia iniciativa (on its motion).
la eleccion y cualificacion de sus miembros; Roxas contesto que NO,
que "aunque dos terceras partes de la Asamblea creyeran que un
miembro no tenia las cualificaciones provistas por la ley, ellos no
podrian removerle por tal razon".
Labrador volvio a preguntar inquiriendo sobre quien tenia el
derecho de remover. Roxas contesto: la Asamblea Nacional
por mala conducta (for misconduct); y la Comision Electoral, con
respeto a las cualificaciones de losmiembros de la Asamblea.
Y cuando Labrador volvio a remachar preguntando si un miembro
de la AsambleaNacional podria, bajo el precepto que se discutia,
cuestionar la elegibilidadde sus miembros, Roxas contesto
categoricamente que "antes de que un miembro pudiera cuestionar
la eligibilidad (de otro) debia ir a la Comision Electoral y hacer que la
cuestion se oyera ante la Comision Electoral." Es decir que,aplicado
este criterio al caso nos ocupa, ni el Senador Pendatun, ni ningun
otro Senador, ni nadie tenia derecho a cuestionar la elegibilidad de
los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero ante el Senado, sino
que el asunto debia llevarse directamente al Tribunal Electoral y
hacer que este lo enjuiciara.
Pero se preguntara: ¿entonces por que se reformo el "draft" o
proyecto original eliminando la primera clausula y dejando solo la
segunda, o sea la frase "all cases contesting the elections, returns
and qualifications," etc. etc? Es verdad, se hizo la enmienda, pero la
misma no es sustancial,no afecta al fondo del precepto, no involucra
el espiritu del sistema tal como lo definio y explico el Delegado
Roxas en sus luminosas respuestas a las diversas interpelaciones,
particularmente las dadas al Delegado Labrador. Se acepto la
enmienda mas bien por razones puramente psicologicas, esas que
conoce bien todo aquel que este familiarzado con la mecanica de los
parlamentos y asambleas deliberativas.Por un lado, el Delegado
Roxas veia que habia ciertas dudascon respecto al alcance del
proyecto tal como estaba fraseado;pero, por otro lado, el decia que
esas dudas carecian de fundamento, que las dos clausulas del
precepto tenian un mismo significado, que la segunda ya estaba
contenida en la primera y se insertaba tan solo para fines de
claridad.Asi que, habil estrategia parlamentario, creyo que podia
aceptar perfectamente la enmienda, entre cuyos proponentes (esto
es muy significativo, como se vera mas adelante) figuraba por cierto
el Delegado Rafols, pues con ello no perdia nada, no comprometia ni
un apice de su posicion, y en cambio ganaba mucho, atraia el apoyo
de los indecisos,aseguraba la aprobacion del precepto en la votacion
final, derrotando a los que estaban fundamentalmente opuestos al
mismo como, en efecto, los derroto por 98 votos contra 56. Que la
enmienda no era sustancial y de ningun modoafectaba al sistema,
asi lo declaro categoricamente el Sr. Roxas cuando, defiriendo a una
sugestion del Presidente Recto de la Convencion, definio el alcance
del cambio diciendo que era "tan solo para obviar la objecion
apuntadapor varios delegados en el sentido de que la primera
clausula del 'draft' que dice 'The election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly' parece dar a la Comision
Electoral el poder de determinar hasta la eleccion de los miembros
que no han sido protestados."Es decir, que o unico que se quiso
aclarar y establecer fuera de toda duda con la enmienda es que el
poder de la Comision Electoral no podia extenderse a las
credenciales no protestadas, pero jamas se penso que el efecto de
la enmienda era el desgajar este poder de la Comision Electoral para
dejarlo como un residuo en la Legislatura; en otros terminos, jamas
se imagino que con la enmienda la Asamblea Nacional todavia
podria ser juez de las credenciales no protestadas de sus miembros.
He aqui las palabras textuales del Sr. Roxas:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the
objection pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the
first clause which states "The election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly" seems to give to the
Electoral Commission the power to determine also the election of
the members who have not been elected. And in order to obviate,
we believe that the amendment is right in that sense . that is, if we
amend the draft so that it should read as follows: "All cases
contesting the election, etc.," so that the judges of the Electoral
Commission will limit themselves only to cases in which there has
been a protest against the returns.
No pudo haberse concebido jamas la peregrina, fantastica idea de
que el "draft" enmendado dejaba a la Asamblea Nacional la facultad
de enjuiciar la "eleccion, actas y cualificaciones de los miembros"
contra los cuales no existiera ninguna protesta ante la Comision
Electoral, por al sencilla razon de que ello engendraria las siguientes
anomalias: (a) la creacion de dos jueces: uno, para credenciales no
protestadas — la Asamblea Nacional o Congreso; y otro, para
credenciales protestadas — la Comision o Tribunal Electoral; (b) en
un momento dado, una mayoria sin escrupulos,viendo peligrar el
poder en sus manos despues de unas elecciones reñidisimas, podria
dar un golpe de mano mediante la estratagema de hacer que sus
candidatos derrotados se inhiban de protestar ante el Tribunal
Elctoral a fin de dar lugar a que el Congreso actue directamente
sobre el caso, con la mira de ajusticiar a los candidatos minoritarios
triunfantes bajo la guillotina de lo que el cinismo de los descreidos
ha llamado justicia politica de las mayorias; (c) occurriria la paradoja
de que las credenciales no protestadas estarian en peor situacion
que las protestada, porque mientras estas ultimas tendrian el
beneficio de una justicia de verdad, la justicia judicial del Tribunal
Electoral, aquellas caerian bajo la justicia politica de las mayorias,
sedientas de sangre adversaria. Es indudable que, como hemos
dicho en otra parte de esta disidencia, la Asamblea Constituyente no
podia ser parte en un juego infantil como este; y el Delgado Roxas,
con su seriedad, con su bien conocida madurezpolitica, con su
devocion a la causa de la libertad y democracia, de ningun modo
podia ser corresponsable de un precepto constitucional que pudiera
dar lugar a tan tremendas anomalias. Y ¿que decir del Delgado
Rafols? ¿Como se puede concebir que, con sus tristes reminiscencias
de la justicia politica de las mayorias, diera su patrocinio a una
enmienda que pudiera producir tales consecuencias?
Para remachar la tesis de que cada camara de nuestro Congreso
todavia retiene la facultad de determinar "la eleccion, las actas y las
cualificaciones de sus miembros" en casos en que no hay protesta,
la mayoria propone en su opinion el siguiente ejemplo: "Es elegido
por un distrito congresil un hombre que habia servido previamente
10 años en las Prisiones de Bilibid, por estafa. Como no tuvo
contrincante(¡este hombre debia de ser muy popular!), ninguna
protesta se formula contra su eleccion. Y naturalmente el Tribunal
Electoral no adquiere jurisdiccion sobre el caso, pues no hay
'contest' o controversia. Una vez informada del hecho ¡no puede la
Camara, motu propio, suspender la toma de su juramento? ¿No
puede la Camara investigarle y despues exclurle? Se observara que
cuando un miembro de la Camara suscita una cuestion respecto a
las cualificaciones de otro, de ello no se sigue un pleito electoral,
pues ninguno pretende sustituir a este ultimo."
Pareceria que estabamos excusados de replicar a este argumento
por dos razones: primera, porque evidentemente el ejemplo
propone un caso que es completamente distintodel que nos ocupa,
pues los recurrentes no estan acusados de estafa ni de nada que
afecta a su caracter, y su caso,como ya hemos dicho, es de
motivacion enteramente electoral, es decir, relacionada con la
forma como fueron elegidos que se dice viciada por actos de
violencia y terrorismo de sus partidarios; y segunda, porque si bien
es verdad que el ejemplo es meramente hipotetico, plantea, sin
embargo, un caso que puede perfectamente occurrir y pareceria
que ni esta Corte ni ningun miembro suyo deberia adelantar su
opinion sobre semejante hipotesis susceptible de realizarse. Pero
como del ejemplo se pretende hacer argumento aquiles, no
tenemos mas remedio que comentarlo y discutirlo.
Ante todo se deben deslindar bien los conceptos. El derecho o
facultad de expulsar a un miembro de una camara legislativa
(Articulo VI, seccion 10, ap. 3, Constitucion de Filipinas) es una cosa
bien diferente del derecho de rehusar la admision de uno para ser
miembro de dicha camara. En esto ultimo las cuestiones envueltas
se refieren principalmente, tal vez exclusivamente, a las
cualificaciones constitucionales de aquiellos que se presentan para
ser admitidos como miembros, o bien a la regularidad y legalidad de
las elecciones en que fueron elegidos; mientras que en lo primero,
esto es, en lo que toca a la expulsion, lo que de lugar a la accion es
el caracter personal o conducta de la parte afectada (Willoughby,
On the Constitution of the United States, tomo 1.º, pag. 611).
En el ejemplo que propone la mayoria, la condena por estafa no es
cosa que guarda relacion con las cualificaciones constitucionales del
congresista o Representante electo ni con la regularidad y legalidad
de las elecciones en que salio victorioso, por cierto sin ningun
contrincante. Es cosa que afecta a su caracter personal o conducta.
Por tanto, no cabe discutir su derecho a ser admitido como
miembro de la camara; el reune las cualificaciones constitucionales
(ciudadania, edad, etc.) para ser Representante y la limpieza de su
eleccion esta admitida. Asi que, parafraseando al Delegado Roxas, la
"presentacion de su credencial de que ha sido eligido, es bastante
para que sea admitido como miembro." Pero ¿la condena por
estafa? ¿No puede la camara por este motivo investigarle y excluirle
como elemento no deseable? — pregunta la mayoria. Esta es otra
cuestion. Ya hemos visto que el derecho de admision es una cosa, y
el derecho de expulsion, otra. El derecho de expulsion, por mala
conducta, lo tienen las camaras independientemente del Tribunal
Electroral. Ya lo dijo el Delegado Roxas, contestando al Delegado
Labrador: la facultad de remover, en tratandose de la "eleccion,
actas y cualificaciones de los miembros," la tiene la Comision o
Tribunal Electoral, previa protesta; la facultad de remover, por mala
conducta, la tiene la Asamblea (Congreso)
Pero examinemos el ejemplo de la estafa que plantea la mayoria
hast sus ultimas consecuencias. Willoughby dice que sobre este
respecto el punto principal de controversia es si los actos de mala
conducta objeto de queja debenser solo los subsiguientes a la
eleccion y que afecten a la dignidad del Congreso y al debido
desempeño de sus funciones, o deben ser tambien los anteriores.
"Respecto de los actos de los miembros electos cometidos con
anterioridad a su eleccion se ha argumentado fuertemente que las
Camaras no deben tenerlos cuenta, pues se debe conceder que los
electores tienen el derecho de elegir a quienes quieran para
representarles en el Congreso, y se debe presumir que han tenido
en cuenta el caracter y la conducta de aquellos a quienes elegen."
A disregard of the foregoing doctrine, it has been urged, operates as
a denial to the States of a right or privilege constitutionally provided
for them. Thus, we find James M. Beck, former Solicitor General of
the United States, declaring : "It seems too clear for argument, that
each States has the right to select from its people any
representative in the Senate (or the House) that it sees fit,
irrespective of his intellectual or moral qualifications (provided he
possesses the qualifications specified in the Constitution), . . ." A
state may have selected a member of the Senate or secured his
nomination by unworthy means. He may be intelectually unfitted
for the high office, and his moral character may, in other respects,
leave much to be desired. The People of the United States may
justifiably think that the States has sent to Congress an unfit man,
who could add nothing to its deliberations, and whose influence
might well be pernicious. None the less, the States has the right to
send him. It is its sole concern, and to nullify its choice is to destroy
the basic right of a sovereign State, and amounts to a revolution"
(Willoughby, idem, pp. 611, 612).
El primer precedente — añade el autor citado — de que, como base
para expulsion, los actos cometidos antes de la eleccion no deben
ser considerados, fue en el caso del Senador Humphrey Marshall, en
1796, quien fue acusado de que habia cometido perjurio. El Senado
en este caso se nego a tomar jurisdiccion para determinar si, de
hecho, Marshall habia sido reo de un delito, a pesar del hecho de
que el pidio que el Senato investigase y determinase el caso" (supra,
p. 612). Parece que en estos casos el criteriogeneral y predominante
es que el sufragio popular es como un especie de Jordan que lava
con sus aguas purificadoras todos los pecados cometidos antes de la
eleccion. Es como si al pueblo se le supusiera investido de la
facultad suprema de indultar totalmente a sus favoritos por medio
de la balota electoral.
Se insinua que los recurridos tenian la facultad de adoptar la
Resolucion Pendum en virtud del principio de que todo
cuerpolegislativo tiene el poder inherente de adoptar reglas para su
organizacion, funcionamiento y preservacion. Se cita la practica
legislativa de que al inaugurarse un cuerpo deliberativo se forma un
comite de credienciales que examia los certificados o titulos que
presentan los miembros para su admision. Dicho comite rinde su
informe recomendando la aprobacion o desaprobacion de las
credenciales. No puede sostenerse una tesis mas peligrosa que esta.
Las camaras legislativas son mas, muchisimo mas que una camara
de comercio, por ejemplo. Los legisladores son funcionarios
constitucionales. Sus cualificaciones, la invenstidura y el ejercicio de
su cargo, el termino del mismo,estan definidos y amparados por la
Constitucion mediante preceptos y disposiciones que operan como
limitaciones constitucionales sobre el poder legislativo en general.
Esos preceptos y disposiciones no se pueden enmendar o derogar
mediante una ley ordinaria, mucho menos mediante una resolucion
simple como la del Senador Pendatun: para enmendarlos o
derogarlos hace falta que se reforme la Constitucion por los
procesos que ella preceptua. Hacer depender la admision del
legislador o la tenencia de sus cargo de una resolucion o acuerdo
reglamentario es de los mas subversivo, pues le reduciria a un a
situacion tan precaria y tan endeble que un mero empleado del
servicio civil tendria mas prestancia y mas seguridad que el.
Se nos cita, sin embargo, el caso de Barry vs. United States ex rel.
Cunningham (279 U.S., 867, 874; 73 Law, ed. 597), para demostrar
que la Resolucion Pendatun es valida y legal por entrar y recaer
dentro del poder inherente del Senado para suspender a cualquier
miembro, independientemente de la cuestion electoral. Hemos
revisado cuidadosamente la sentencia citada y la hemos hallado
inaplicable el presente caso. Es verdad que ella tiene cierta relacion
con el caso de Vare, candidatoa Senador en Pennsylvania en las
elecciones de 1926, a quien se lenegroprima facie el asiento
mientras se efectuaba una investigacion dealegadas irregularidades
y practicas corruptas cometidas para promover sunominacion y su
eleccion, entre ellas el haber hecho promesas impropiase ilegales,
etc. Pero, aparte de que la suspension del juramento y asientode
Vare caia del Senado American como "unico juez de la eleccion,
actas y calificaciones de sus miembros," solo muy incidental y
colateralmentese habla de esto en el caso de Barry. La unica y
verdadera cuestion planteadaen esta caso era la de si a un tal
Cunningham se le podia arrestrar, mediante orden del Senado, y
traerle a la barra para contestar a ciertas preguntassobre la
procedencia de ciertos fondos gastados en la nominacion y
eleccionde Vare. La Corte Suprema Federal dijo que si, que esto caia
dentro de los poderes judiciales del Senado. "Generally" — dice la
Corte — "the Senate is alegislative body, exercising in connection
with the House only the power to make laws. But it has had
conferred upon it by the Constitution certain powers which are not
legislative but judicial in character. Among these is the power to
judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members.
That power carries with it authority to take such steps as may
beappropriate and necessary to secure information upon which to
decide concerning elections" (Barry, supra, 871). Y al final de la
sentencia la Corte sienta la siguiente afirmacion que es
muysignificativa para el presente caso: "Here the question under
consideration concerns the exercise by the Senate of an indubitable
power; and if judicial interference can be successfullyinvoked it can
only be upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the power as will constitute a denial of the due process of law.
That condition we are unable to find in the present case"
(Barry, supra, 874). De suerte que, bien mirado, el asunto de Barry
hasta es un argumento en favor de la jurisdiccion de esta Corte
Suprema para conocer y enjuiciar la Resolucion Pendatun,para
determinar si con ella se ha infringido o no la Constitucion.
Se arguye que los recurridos no hicieron mas que actuar sobre un
informe rendido por la Comisioon sobre Elecciones en obediencia a
un mandato constitucional. En el informe se recitaban ciertos
hechos y se sentaban conclusiones sobre alegados actos de
terrorismo y violencia que posian afectar a la eleccion de los
recurrentes. Se dice que la Resolucion Pendatun no es sino la
reaccion, la respuesta de los recurridos adicho informe; que estos
tenian absoluta discrecion sobre el particular; que ello entraba
dentro de sus poderes politicos y no era revisable por el
departamento judicial. Para contestar esto nos bastara repetir que
la Resolucion Pendatun es algo mas que el ejercicio de un poder
politico y discrecional: es una usurpacion de poderes
constitucionales pertenecientes a otro organismo constitucional; y
para demostrarlo no necesitamos reproducir los argumentos ya
extensamente expuestos.
Por lo demas, el discutido informe de la Comission sobre Elecciones
no tiene el valor ni alcane que le atribuye. Ese informe no podia
autorizar ni justifica ninguna accion que como la Resolucion
Pendatun tuviese el efecto de privar a los recurrentes de sus
asientos en el Senado, siguera temporalmente. El documento
sometido por la Comision sobre Elecciones que tiene verdadero
valor constitucional y legal, que tiene fuerza obligatoria, es su
proclama declaranda electos a los recurrentes. Esa proclama
impone a los recurridos el deber ministerial de recibir y aceptar a los
recurrentes como miembros del Senado hasta que el Tribunal
Electoral diga otra cosa. ¿Como un informe, que ni siquiera es al
resultado de una investigacion propia, sino que esta basado en otros
informes de fuerea, podia tener la trascendencia que se le ha dado,
tomando pie del mismo para una sacudida seismica de tales
proporciones como es la suspension de los derechos de tres
miembros electos del Senado y siete miembros electos de la Camara
de Representantes? Ni la imaginacion mas libre y erratica en la
Asamblea Nacional pudo haberse figurado jamas este efecto a
cuenta de esa clausula inofensiva de la Constitucion que manda a la
Comision sobre Elecciones presentar un informe despues de cada
eleccion al Jefe Ejecutivo y al Congreso.
La accion sobre ese informe no puede ir mas alla de los limites que
confinan cada poder. El Ejecutivo, por ejemplo, investigaria los
abusos e irregularidades los funcionarios encargados de ejecutar y
hacer cumplir la Ley Electoral en cumplimiento de su mandato
constitucional de ejecutar las leyes y de hacer que estas se ejecuten
fielmente (Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VII, secciones 7 y 10); y
el Congreso estudiaria y consideraria reformas a la ley con vista de
dicho informe, o bien crearia inmediatamente el Tribunal Electoral
para despachar sin demora las protestas sobre elecciones
legislativas. El Ejecutivo no podria, por ejemplo, so pretexto de
tremendas irregularidades y anomalias expuestas en el informe
sobre elecciones locales y provinciales, mandar suspender el
juramento de algun concejal, alcalde o gobernador provincial electo,
puesto que esto seria una usurpacion y una invasion de la
jurisdiccion de los tribunales de justicia.
De todo lo antedicho resulta evidente que, resolviendo la promera
cuestion propuesta, la Resolucion Pendatun objeto de controversia
es ilegal, es anticonstitucional y es, por tanto, insostenible.
Segunda cuestion. — A la luz de nuestra Constitucion y de nuestras
leyes ? tiene este Tribunal Supremo jurisdiccion y competencia para
conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto?
Los recurrentes invocan nuestra jurisdiccion pidiendo un remedio a
que, segun ellos, tienen derecho bajo la Constitucion y la ley. Alegan
que son Senadores electos y, por tanto, funcionarios
constitucionales de Filipinas, pues el Senado es cuerpo
constitucional; que han sido debidamente proclamados por la
Comission sobre Elecciones bajo las dispposiciones de la Ley No. 725
y, por tanto, tienen derecho por ministerio de la Constitucion y de la
ley a ocupar sus asientos en el Senado con todos los derechos,
prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al cargo; que, sin embargo, los
recurridos, o mas bien una mayoria de ellos, han aprobado una
resolucion — la Resolucion Pendatun — por la cual se les priva de
sud asientos; que dicha resolucion infringe la Constitucion y la ley;
por tanto, piden dictemos sentencia "declarrando entramente nula
y de ningun valor la citada resolucion, y prohibiendo
consecuentemente a los recurridos y a cada uno de ellos a impedir a
los recurrentes a continuar en sus asientos en el Senado de Filipinas
y a ejercer libremente sus cargos como Senadores, y prohibiendoles
igualmente a realizer cualquier otro procedimiento ulterior para
ejeccutar la resolucion citada." ¿Podemos negarnos a asumir la
jurisdiccion que se invoca? ¿Hay alguna manera de evadir la
cuestion, inhibiendose este Tribunal de declarar si es o no verdad
que se han infringido la Constitucion y la ley, y de conceder el
remedio pedido si ha habido tal infraccion? La comodidad, la linea
de menor resistencia hubiera sido por el lado de la inaccion, de la
inhibicion. Nos damos perfecta cuenta de la tremenda
responsabilidad que supone el mantener la armonia entre los
poderes del Estado. Es parte de la prudencia y sabiduria de los
gobernantes el evitar en todo lo posible cualquier ocasion de
conflicto entre dichos poderes, recordando siempre que si las
instituciones son entidades abstractas, por ende anestesicas,
insensibles, los hombres estan hechos de arcilla animada y ya no son
tan impasibles como las instituciones. Pero hemos hallado que en el
presente caso nuestro deber de actuar, y de actuar positivamente,
tiene la fuerza de un imperativo categorico. Nuestra jurisdiccion
esta escrita en la Constitutcion, se halla reafirmada en la ley. En el
Titulo VIII de la Constitucion (sobre la judicatura) esta declarada
tanto implicita como expresamente la facultad judicialde resolver y
decidir casos constitucionales; y en la regla 67 del Reglamento de los
Tribunales hallamos la implementacion procesal de esa jurisdiccion
y competencia.
Puede decirse que en este respecto nuestra Constitucion es una
edicion mejorada de la Constitucion federal de los Estados Unidos.
Como se sabe, la llamada facultad judicial de revisar la Constitucion
en controversias propiamente planteadas no se halla concedida
expresamente en la magna carta americana. Ha diso el genio audaz
de sus juristas, particularmente del gran Marshall, el que arrnaco
esa facultad de las penumbras de la Constitucion (Marbury vs.
Madison [1803], 1 Cranch, 137) contribuyendo ello grandemente,
segun opinion general de los criticos tanto nacionales como
exranjeros, a fortalecer y estabilizar las instituciones politicas de
America. Aprovechando la experiencia americana hemos escrito
expresamente en nuestra Constitucion lo que en Americ no era mas
que doctrina judicial o jurisprudencia.
Se dice, sin embargo, con todo enfasis, con todo vigor, que aun
admitiendo que los recurridos, actuando como mayoria del Senado,
hayan infringido la Constitucion al aprobar la Resolucion Pendatun y
hacerla efectiva, con todo la judicatura, la judicatura filipina no tiene
jurisdiccion para intervenir en el caso, bajo el principio de la
separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion. Se arguye
que los tres poderes del Estado son igueles; que ninguno de ellos es
superior al otro; que cada poder puede interpretar la Constitucion a
su modo y cuando asi lo hace ningun otro poder puede ni debe
entrometerse yu revisar su interpretacion; que el Senado es el unico
juez de sus actos y si algun ciudadano sale agraviado por algun
alegado atropello a sus derechos constitucionales, su recurso no
esta en acudir al poder judicial o al poder ejecutivo, sino en apelar
directamente al pueblo en la epoca de elecciones, en los comicios,
empleando el arma civil por excelencia del ciudadano — la balota; y,
finalmente, que el poder judicial no es un "curalo todo," una especie
de Don Quijote que con la lanza en ristre pretenda endereezar todos
los entuertos.
Como se ve, nos llaman a decidir custiones de tremenda
importancia para el desenvolvimiento constitutcional en este pais;
lo que resolvamos puede trascender mucho mas alla del promedio
de tiempoo en que puede durar nuestra existencia. Puede dicirse sin
inmodestia que grandes diciones del futuro — empleamos la
palabra no en su sentido exclusivamente judicial — dependeran de
como resolvamos esas cuestiones formidables que se nos plantean
hoy.
En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No se
puede discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son iguales e
independientes entre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro,
mucho menos el poder judicial que entre los tres es el menos fuerte
y el mas precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se
pude discutir que bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona,
una esfera de accion propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera un
cumulo de facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente;
que dentro de esa esfera y en el suso de esas facultades cada poder
tiene absoluta discrecion y ningun otro poder puede controlar o
revisar sus actos so pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tach de
arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la insularidad,
la separacion llega solo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo
proclamo cientificamente hasta nuestros dias, el principio de la
separacion de poderes ha sufrido tremendas modificaciones y
limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo
relativa y que la separacion de poderes queda condicionada
mecanica constitucional — la mecanica de los frenos y cortapisas.
(Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States, tomo 3, pags.
1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es
absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna la Constitucion; alli el
juego de sus facultades y funciones no se puede coartar. Pero
cuando se sale y extravasa de esa esfera invadiendo otros esferas
constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades que no le pertenecen, la
teoria de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es
superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica dentro de
sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anticonstitucionales. La
cuestion ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno
hay un mecanismo que permite restablecer el juego normal de la
Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos
que podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es
cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un
ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun
remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las leyes, y
quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la
cuestion basica, cardinal en este asunto.
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son
los tribunales de justicia. "They very essence of the American
conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the
inherent distinction between lawmaking and law-interpreting,
and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which,
when brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review"
(Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p. 146). En Angara
contra Comision Electoral (supra) dijimos que "prescindiendo del
tipo ingles y otros tipos europeos de gobierno constitucional, los
redactores de nuestra Constitucion han adoptado el tipo americano,
en donde el departamento judicial interpreta y da efecto a la
Constitucion escrita. En algunos paises, que han rehusado seguir el
ejemplo americano, se han insertado disposiciones en sus
constituciones prohibiendo a los tribunales que ejerciten su facultad
de interpretar la ley fundamental. Esto se toma como un
reconocimiento de lo que, de otro modo, seria la regla de que a falta
de prohibicion expresa los tribunales estan obligados a asumir lo
que logicamente es deber suyo" (Angara contra Comision Electoral,
63, Jur. Fil., 173, 174).
En el famoso asunto de Marbuyr vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal
Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de su gran Chief
Justice John Marshall, en tarminos inequivocos definio y explico las
facultades de la judicatura para poner en vigor la Constitucion como
la suprem ley del pais, y declaro que "es terminantemente de la
competencia y deber del departamento judicial el decider cual es la
ley que rige.
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same.
Webster says: "The Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of
course, that every act of the legislature constrary to the law must be
void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself
decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal and
becomes only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they
only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to the
Constitution, then the Constitution is advisory and accessory only,
not legally binding; because, if the construction of it rest wholly with
them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very
erroneous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when
the case arises, must decide upon the validityof particular acts."
Webster, Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. 1, 2d edition pp. 4,5.)
En realidad, esta cuestion no es nueva en esta jurisdicion. El
precedente mas inmediato que tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia
es el asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral ya tantas veces
citado (1936). Por primera vez se planteaban y discutian ante esta
Corte cuestiones importantisimas resultantes de la Constitucion del
Commonwealth que acababa de promulgarse. Se trataba
precisamente de deslindar las zonas constitucionales ocupadas por
la Asamblea Nacional y la Comision electoral; es decir que,
fundamentalmente, casi, casi las mismas cuestiones que ahora se
plantea ante nosotros. La teoria de la separacion de poderes —
el leit motif de la presente controversia — se analizo y discutio alli
hasta en sus ultimas implicaciones los siguientes; Jose Angara habia
sido proclamado Representante electo por uno de los distritos de
Tayabas. Al inaugurarse la Asamblea Nacional su acta fue
confirmada por este cuerpo juntamente con las de otros
Representantes contra quienes no se habian formulado protestas. el
acta de Angara no estaba protestada entonces. Algunos dias
despues Pedro Insua, su contrincante, presento una protesta ante la
Comision electoral que acababa solamente de constituirse.
Escuadado tras el hecho de que su acta ya habia sido confirmada
por la Asamblea Nacional, Angara vino a esta Corte planteando una
accion orginaria para que se expidiera un mandamiento de
inhibicion prohibiendole a la Comision Electoral que siguera
conociendo de la protesta. Esta Corte acepto el reto asumiendo
jurisdiccion sobre el caso, procediendo a desempenar su alta
funcion de interllamo deslinde de facultades constitucionales.
Reconociendo y estableciendo firmemente la jurisdiccion exclusiva
de la novisima Comision Electoral sobre controversias relativas a la
eleccion de miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, esta Corte denego
el recurso de prohibicion. Llevaando las cosas por la tremenda, la
Asamblea Nacional, bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes, pudo
haber ignorado la decision de esta Corte, pudo haber pasado por
encima de la Comision Electoral conservandole el asiento a Angara,
ya que el acta de este habia sido confirmada por ella cuando jjaun
no habia portesta. No lo hizo. La Constitucion, casi entre los pañales
aun de su cuna, se salvo gracias a la compostura de todo el mundo,
saliendo ilesa de la prueba, rodeada de grandes prestigios. Las
conclusiones y pronunciamientos de la Corte por boca del ponente
el Magistrado Laure, parecen estereotipados para el case que nos
ocupa y para el presente momento historico con todas sus crisis; asi
que los vamos a reproducir en toda su integridad a continuacion:
La separacion de poderes es un principio fundamental de nuestro
sistema de gobierno. Se establece, no por disposicion expresa, sino
por division real trazada en nuestra Constitucion. Cada
departamento del Gobeierno tiene conocimiento exclusivo de las
materias que caen dentro de su jurisdiccion, y es supremo dentro de
su propia esfera. Pero del hecho de que los tres poderes han de
conservarse separados yu distintos no se sigue que la Constitucion
se propuso que fuerean absolutamente irrestringidos e
independientes unos de otros. La Constitucion ha dispuesto un
sistema elaborado de frenos y cortapisas para asegurar
coordinacion en los trabajos de los varios departamentos del
Gobierno. Por ejemplo, el Jefe Ejecutivo, bajo nuestra Constitucion,
es hasta tal punto erigido en un freno para el poder legislativo que
se requiere su asentimiento en la aprobacion de las leyes. Sin
embargo, esto esta sujeto al ulterior freno de que un proyecto de
ley puede convertirse en ley no obstante la negativa del Presidente
de aprobarlo, por medio de una votacion de dos tercios tiene el
Presidente facultad de convocar a la Asamblea cuando lo crea
conveniente. Por otra parte, la Asamblea Nacional funciona como
un freno sobre el Ejecutivo, en el sentido de que es necesario su
consentimiento, por medio de la Comision de Nombramientos, en el
nombramiento de ciertos funcionarlos; y es esencial la conformidad
de todos sus miembros para la conclusien de tratados. Ademas, en
su facultad de determinar que tribunales, que no sea el Tribunal
Supremo, se habran de establecer, para definir su competencia, y de
destinar fondos para su sostenimiento, la Asamblea Nacional rigte al
departamento judicial en cierto grado y medida. La Asamblea
ejercita, tambien, la facultad judicial de conocer de recusaciones. Y
la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final,
frena con efectividad a los demas departamentos en el ejercicio de
su facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos
los actos ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.
Pero, en esencia, la Constitucion ha delineado con mano firme y en
terminos energicos la sasignacion de facultade as los departamentos
ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial de Gobierno. La superposicion y el
entralazamiento de funciones y deberees de los varios
departamentos, sin embargo, a veces hace dificil decir precisamente
donde termina uno y empieza otro. En tiempos de intraquilidad
social o excitacion politica, las grandes piedras angulares de la
Constitucion son susceptibles de ser olvidadas o anubladas, si no
desatendidas enteramente. En casos de conflicto, el departamento
judicial es el unico organismo constitucional que puede ser llamado
para deteminar el proprio deslinde de facultades entre los varios
departamentos y entre las unidades integrales o constituyentes de
los mismos.
Como cualquier producto humano, nuestra Constitucion carece,
desde luego, de perfeccion y perfectibilidad; pero, en tanto en
cuanto estaba en manos de nuestro pueblo disponerlo asi, obrando
por medio de sus delegados, ese instrumento, que es expresion de
su soberania, por limitada que se, ha establecido un gobierno
republicano destinado a obrar y funcionar como un conjunto
armonico, bajo un sistema de frenos y cortapisas, y con sujecion a
las limitaciones y restricciones que se disponen en dicho
instrumento. La Constitucion señala, en un lenguaje nada incierto,
las restricciones y limitaciones de los poderes y organismos
gubernamentales. Si estas restrcciones y limitaciones fueran
traspuestas, seria inconcebible que la Constitucion no hubiera
dispuesto un mecanismo por el cual pudiera encauzarse el curso del
Gobierno por los canales constitucionales, pues entoneces la
distribucion de poderes seria merea palabreria, el bill de derechos
meras expresiones sentimentales, y los principios de buen gobierno
meros apotegmas politicos. Ciertamente, las limitaciones y
restricciones que comprende nuestra Constitucion son reales, como
debe serlo en cualquier Constitucion. En loos Estados Unidos en
donde no se encuentra ninguna concesion constitucional expresa en
su Constitucion, la posesion de este poder moderador de los
tribunales, por no diceir ya nada de su origen historico y
desenvolvimiento aqui, ha sido dejado en reposo por la
aquiescencia popular por un periodo de mas de un siglo y medio. En
nuestro caso, este poder moderador esta concedido, si no
expresamente, por decuccion tacita del articulo 2, Titulo VIII, de
nuestra Constitucion.
La Constitucion es una defnicion de las facultades del Gobierno.
¿Quien es el llamado a determinar la naturaleza, proposito y alcance
de esas facultades? La Constitucion misma ha dispuesto el
organismo de la judicatura como el medio racional. Y, cuando la
judicatura media para determinar los linderos constitucionales, no
mantiene ninguna superioridad sobre los otros departamentos; en
realida no anula ni invalida un acto de la Legislatura, sino que
solamente asevera la solemne y sagrada obligacion a ella asignada
por la Constitucion de determinar pretensiones incompatibles de
autoridad dimanada de la Constitucion, y de establecer para las
partes en una contraversia actual los derechos que ese intrumento
asegura y garantiza a las mismas. Esto, a la verdad, es todo lo que va
implicito en la expresion "supremacia judicial", que propiamente es
la facultad de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion. Aun entonces,
este poder de revision judicial esta limitado a casos y controversias
reales, que se ha de ejercitar despues de que las partes han tenido
plena libertad de hacerse oir, y esta, ademas, limitado a la cuestion
constitucional suscitada, o a la misma lis mota planteada. Cualquier
tentativa de abstraccion , solo conduciria a la dialectica, y
obstaculizaria las cuestiones legales, y a conclusiones esteriles que
nada tendrian que ver con los hechos reales. Circunsrita de este
modo a sus funciones, la judicatura no se ocupa de resolver
cuestiones sobre la cordura, justicia o convenciencia de la
legislacion. Aun mas, los tribunales conceden la presucnion de
constitucionalidad a las leyes aprobadas por la Legisltura, no
solamente porque se presume que esta acata la Constitucion, sino,
tambien, porque la judicatura, en el fallo de actuales casos y
controversias, debe reflejar la sabiduria y la justicia del pueblo, tal y
como se han expresado por medio de sus representantes y por los
departamentos ejecutivo y legislativo del Gobierno.
Pero por mucho que pudieramos postular sobre los frenos internos
de poderes que dispone nuestra Constitucion, debe, con todo,
recordarse que, segun las palabras de James Madison, el sistema
mismo no es el principal paladin de la libertad constitucional . . . el
pueblo, que es el autor de esta bendicion, debe, tambien, ser su
guardian . . . sus ojos deben siempre estar alertos para señalar, su
voz para delatar . . . agresiones a la autoridad de su constitucion. En
ultimo analisis, pues, el trinof de nuestro Gobierno en los años
venideros debera ser puesto a prueba en el crisol de las mentes y en
los corazones de los filipinos, mas bien que en las salas de consultas
y camaras de audiencia de los tribunales." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 169-172.)
Algo mas se puede añadir sobre el caso de Angara. Alli la Corte
descarto sin vacilaciones la posibilidad de un vacio, de un estado
juridico de inerme impotencia frente a conflictos constitucionales,
sentando la siguiente conclusion: "En nuestro caso, la indole de la
actual contrversia revela la necesidad de un arbitro constitucional
ultimo que determine la incompatibilidad de facultades entre dos
organismos creados por la Constitucion. Si fueramos a rehusar el
conocer de la contrversia ?quien determinaria el conflicto? Y si se
dejara sin decidir ni determinar el conflicto ¿no se crearia en si un
vacio en nuestro sistema constitucional que la larga daria por
resultado echar a perder toda la labor? El hacer estas preguntas es
contestarlas. Natura vacuum abhorret, por lo que debemos evitar
toda postracion en nuestro sistema constitucional." No solamente
esto — añadimos — sino que a toda costa debemos evitar que fuera
de la legalidad sse forme un "territorio de nadie" donde puedan
germinar situaciones peligrosas y explosivas.
Pero ademas del caos de Angara tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia
otro precedente mas inmediato todavia en apoyo de la tesis de la
supremacia judicial en tratandose de interpretar la Constitucion y de
dirimir conflictos constitucionales; nos referimos al asunto de
Carmen Planas, recurrente, contra Jose Gil, Comisionado del Servicio
Civil, recurrido, decidido por este Tribunal Supremo el 18 de enero
de 1939 bajo la ponencia del mismo Magistrado Laurel (67 Phil., 62).
Carmen Planas, siendo miembro de la Junta Municipal de Manila,
publico un articulo en La Vanguardia criticando duramente a ciertos
funcionarios del Gobierno, entre ellos el Presidente de Filipinas Sr.
Quezon, en relacion con las elecciones de Diputados a la Asamblea
Nacional celebradas el 8 de noviembre de 1938. Entre los fuertes
cargos formulados por la articulista contra los dioses del Olimpo
oficial , figuraban los siguientes: que, no obstante el tacito interdicto
impuesto por la Constitucion al disponer que el Presidente de
Filipinas ejerciese su cargo por un solo periodo — años — sin
reeleccion, situandosele de esta manera en las serenas alturas del
Poder como un supremo arbitro, moderador y neutral, el Sr. Quezon
intervino activamente en aquellas elecciones a favor de los
nacionalistas poniendo en juego toda la enorme influencia de su
cargo y apalstando asi a los condidatos de la oposicion; que toda la
maquinaria del Gobierno se movilizo favor de los candidatos
nacionalistas, colocandose en la vanguardia de dicha movlizaccion
los miembros del Gabinete; y que no se escatimaron medios para
asegurar el trifunfo de los coandidatos de la adminstracion, el
fraude y la corrupcion inclusive. Al dia si guiente de haberse
publicado este articulo sensacional, la Srta. Planasa recibio una carta
firmada de la siguiente manera: "By authority of the President: Jorge
B. Vargas, Secretary to the President," en donde se le decia: "Por la
presente se le instruye que comparezca ante el Comisionado del
Servicio Civil, sola o acompañada por un abogado, a las 9 de la
mañana, Noviembre 22, para porbar las declaraciones hechas por
usted. El que tales cargo no se puedan sostener o no se pruebe que
se han hecho de buena fe, sera considerado como razon suficiente
para su suspension o destitucion del cargo."
La Srta. Planas objeto a la investigacion rescusando al Comissionaldo
del Servicio Civil. Este, sin embargo, insistio en proseguir la
investigacion y fue entonces cuando ella vino ante este Tribunal
Supremo pidiendo un mandamiento de prohibicion contra el
Comisionado, por los siguientes fundamentos, entre otros: que bajo
la Constitucion y las leyes que protegen la libertad de palabra y de
expresion, ella tenia derecho o formular la censura de que se trata
como libre ciudadana de un pais democretico; que, en efecto, ella
escribio el articulo no como concejal sino como persona particular;
que como funcionario ella solamente podia ser investigada y
exigirsele responsabilidad por motivo de prevaricacion, mala
conducta o infraccion relacionada con su cargo, y este no era el
caso; que suponiendo que el articulo en cuestion fuera libeloso o
contuviera algo por lo cual la articulista pudiera ser cirminalmente
responsable, el Codigo Penal y el Procedimiento Criminal Señalan el
modo de hacerefectiva esa responsabilidad ante los tribunales de
justicia. El Procurador General, al impugnar el recurso, aleego entre
otros fundamentos que este Tribunal, bajo "el principio de la
separacion de poderes establecido por la Constitucion, no tenia
jurisdiccion para revisar las ordenes del jefe Ejecutivo de que se
trata, las cuales son de caracter puramente administrativo,"
citandose en apoyo de la impugnacion las sentencias de este
Tribunal en los asunto de Severino contra El Gobernador General y
Junta Provincial de Negros Occidental, Abueva contra Wood y
Alejandrion contra Quezon, citados en otra parte de esta
disiddencia. Esta Corte desestimo la objecion y resolvio que tenia
jurisdiccion y competencia sobre el caso, diciendo que si bien "los
actos del Ejecutivo ejecutados dentro de los limites de su jurisdiccion
son sus actos oficialies y los tribunales no dirigiran ni controlaran la
accion ejecutiva en tales casos" (la regla es la de no-intervencion),
sin embargo, "de esta premisa legal no se sigue necesariamente que
no podemo inquirir la validez o constitucionalidad de sus actos
cuando estos se cuestionan y atacan en un procedimiento legal
apropiado." "Por lo que respecta a la judicatura" — añadio esta
Corte — "si bien es verdad que ella no agara `ni la estpada ni la
bolsa," es por arreglo constitucional el organo llmado para deslindar
las fronteras constitucionales, y al Tribunal Supremo esta
encomendada expresamente o por necesari aimplicacion la
oblligacion de determinar en procedimientos appropieados la
validea o constitucionalidad de cualquier tratado, ley, ordenanaza,
orden ejecutiva o regulacion."
Es verdad que esta Corte denego el recurso interpuesto por la Srta.
Planas, pero no por el fundamento de la falta de jurisdiccion alegado
poor el Procurador General, sino porque llego a la conclusion de que
la orden de investigacion cuestionada caia dentro de los limites
constitucionales de la jurisdiccion del Presidente, y, por tanto, era
valida, constitucional y legalmente. He aqui los prononciamientos
pertinentes de la Corte, los cuales no tienen desperdicio y reafirman
con todo vigor la doctrina de la supremacia judicial en materia de
deslindes constitucionales, establecida en el asunto de Angara, a
saber:
The Solicitor General, under the last paragraph (par. 10) of his
amended answer, raises the question of jurisdiction of this court
over the acts of the Chief Executive. He contends that "under the
separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no
jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive, evidenced
by Annex A and Annex C of the petition, which are of purely
administrative character." Reliance is had on the prrvious decisions
of this court: Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil.,
366);Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 Phil., 612); and Alejandrino vs.
Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83). Although this is the last point raised by
the Government in its answer, it should, for reasons that are
apparent, be first to be considered. If this court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, then, the same should
be dismissed as a matter of course; otherwise the merits of the
controversy should be passed upon and determined.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive performed
within the limits of his jurisidction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is
noninterference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an inquirey into the
validity or constitutionality of his acts when those are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers, whether viewed in the light of
the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers,
for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine orgin, we
cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments" not only because "the
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of blacks and white" but also because "even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually
from one extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government [1928],
277 U.S. 189; 72 Law ed., 845, 852.) As far as the judiciary is
concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by
constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate
constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted
expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determinig in
appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Article VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the
judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and
this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of
checks and balances" of the government established.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding.
He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. the
Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the theory
is advanced by the Government that because an investigation
undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas. The
argument is ferafetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of
the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may
be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive
upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in
the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate officials
and employees of the Executive Department to the extent that at
the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction
of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive
order is necessarily abated or suspended. The facts in Severino vs.
Governor-General (supra), Abueva vs. Wood (supra), and
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (supra), are different, and the doctrines laid
down therein must be confined to the facts and legal environment
involved and whatever general observations might have been made
in elaboratioon of the views therein expressed but which are not
essential to the determination of the issues presented are
mere obiter dicta.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ willnot
issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or
quasi-judicial functions (50 C.J., 658), its issuance and enforcement
are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction it may issue to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or in excess
of jurisidction. (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions"
in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged investigation by the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service, which investigation if unauthorized and is violative of the
Constitution as contended is a fortiori without or in excess or
jurisdiction. The statutory rule in this jurisdiction is that the writ of
prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them
from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will
issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are
without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is
granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307;
Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1264.) This court, therefore, has
jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will accordingly
proceed to determine the merits of the present controversy.
Se arguye, sin embargo, que de permitirse la interventcionjudicial
para deslinde constitucional o para dirimir conflictos
constitucionales, ello tiene que ser en casos o procedimientos
apropiados. Se dice que en el asunto de Angara la intromision
judicial era procedente y justificada porque en el la parte litigante
era solo la Comision (Tribunal) Electoral, como recurrida, y la
Asamblea Nacional, como uno de los tres poderes del Estado, no era
ni recurrente ni recurrida. Por analogia se insinua tambien que en el
asunto de Planas contra Gil Presidente de Filipinas no era parte
directa sino tan solo el Comisionado del Servicio Civil.
El argumento es de esos que, por su sutileza, provocan una batalla
de argucxias hasta sobre el filo de una navaja, como se suele dicir.
Es verdad que en el caso de Angara la Asamblea Nacional no era
parte directa porque de su inclusion no habi necesidad; pero
¿cambia ello el aspecto de la cuestion? ¿Se puede negar que alli
habia conflicto de jurisdicciones contituciones constitucionales
entre la Asamablea y la Comision electoral y que cuando, a instancia
de parte, se invoco y pidio la intervencioon de esta Corte, la misma
intermvino y se declaro competente para hacer el deslinde
constituticonal y finalmente adjudico la zona disputada a la
Comision (Tribunal) Electoral? Supongase que una mayoria de los
miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, pasando por encima de la
sentencia de esta Corte, hubieran insistido en hacer efectiva la
confirmacion del acta de Angara y le hubieran dado un asiento en
los escanos de dicha Asamblea, despojando a la Comision Electoral
de su derecho de conocer y enjuiciar la protesta de Insua ?hubiera
ello modificado la fase fundamental del caso, haciendo
constitucional lo que era anticonstitucional, y hubiera perdido este
Tribunal Supremo la jurisdiccion para entender del asunto?
Indudablemente que no: la infraccion de la Constitucion seria
misma, tal vez mayor y mas grave; y la jurisdiccion de este Tribunal
para interveneir en el conflicto, mas obligada y mas forzosa, a fin de
mantener inviolada la suprema Ley de la nacion. En otras palabras,
la inhibicion judicial no seria una actitud mas correcta, mas sana y
mas prudente tan solo porque la infraccion de la Constitucion fuera
mas audaz y mas agresiva. Aqui no habria medias tintas: to be or not
to be, que dijo Hamlet.
Y lo propio se puede decir del asunto de Planas contra Gil. Es verdad
que el Presidente no estaba nombrado como parte directa en el
litigio. Pero ?que mas da? ?No se trataba de una orden ejecutiva
expedida por directa autorizacion del Presidente? Y asi como se
pudo dictar una sentencia a favor del recurrido por el fundamento
de que con la expedicion de la orden cuestionada el Presidente ne
se habia extralimitado de sus facultades constitucionales y
estatutorias, a sensu contrario tambien se hubiera podido dictar una
sentencia adversa, es decir, si se hubiese tratado de un acto
ejecutivo que cae fuera de las facultades conferidas al Presidente
por la Constitucion; y en este ultimo caso la sentencia no hubiera
sido menos derogatoria tan solo porque hubiese estado dirigida
contra el Comisionado del Servicio Civil que actuaba por mandato
directo del Presidente. El que esta a las maduras, tambien debe
estar a las duras. . . .
Se nos dice, sin embargo, que el caso de Angara no es la cita
pertinente aplicable, sino el de Alejandrino contra Quezon (46 Jur.
Fil., 87, 151), decidido en 1924. El Senador Alejandrino agredio a
otro miembro del Senado fuera de la sala de sesiones de resultas de
un debate acalorado. Con motivo del incidente la mayoria aprobo
una resulucion. suspendiendo a Alejandrino por un año y
privandole, ademas, de todas sus prerrogativas, privilegios y
emolumentos durante dicho periodo de tiempo. Alejandrino planteo
ante esta Corte una accion originaria pidiendo la expedicion de una
orden de mandamus o interdicto para que se le repusiera en su
cargo on todos los drechos y privilegios anexos. Se denego el
recurso por el fundamento de que esta Corte carecia de jurisdiccion
para conocer del asunto.
Un somero examen del caso Alejandrino demuestra, sin embargo,
que no tiene ninguna paridad con el que nos ocupa. Es evidente que
el Senado tenia el derecho de castigar a Alejandrino dentro de sus
facultades disciplinarias provistas por la ley organica — la Ley Jones.
Esta era una facultad discrecional y constitucional cuyo ejercicio no
podia ser regido ni revisado por ningun otro poder. Como hemos
dicho mas arriba, cada poder es arbitro unico y exclusivo dentro de
su esfera constitucional. (Planas contra Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) Ninguno
tiene derecho a entrometerse en la forma como se las arregla alli.
Pero nuestro caso es completamente diferente. Aqui los recurridos
o la mayoria de los Senadores han ejercido una facultad que
constitucionalmente no les pertenece. Por tanto, han traspasado los
confined de su predio constitucional, invadiendo otro; por tanto, la
Resolucion Pendatun es completamente ultra vires. Y no es
necesario que repitamos los argumentos ya extensamente
desarrollados acercade este punto.
Todas las autoridades que se citan en la decision de la mayoria en el
asunto de Alejandrino tienen la misma ratio decidendi, el mismo leit
motif. Se trata de casos en que los actos discutidos recaian dentro
de las facultades constitucionales del poder envuelto en el litigio; de
ahi la negativa del departamento judicial a intervenir, a
entrometerse.
Y si examinamos los precedentes locales sobre la materia, vemos
que la veta de la jurisprudencia tiene el mismo tipo, la misma
naturaleza. En el asunto de Barcelon contra Baker y Thompson (5
Jur. Fil., 89) se declaro legal lo hecho por el Gobernador General por
la razon de que caia dentro de sus poderes politicos o ejecutivos
bajo la constitucion.
Lo propio se hizo en los siguientes asuntos:
Forbes contra Chuoco Tiaco y Crossfield, 16 Jur. Fil., 535; Asunto
de McCulloch Dick, 38 Jur. Fil., 43, 225, 240;
Severino contra gobernador General y Junta Provincial de Negros
Occidental, 16 Jur. Fil., 369; Abueva contra Wood, 45 Jur. Fil., 643.
Al negarse esta Corte a revisar lo actuado por el Jefe Ejecutivo en los
casos citados, ha tenido indudablemente en cuenta el siguiente
pronunciamiento del Chief Justice Marshall en el citado asunto de
Marburry vs. Madison: "The Constitution itself endows the
President with certain important political powers in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable onlyu to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience." De
modo que, en ultimo resultado, en tales casos se ha reconocido que
el ejecutivo ha ejercido solamente sus poderes constitucionales;
nada hay en ellos que sugiera la idea de la inmunidad e
irresponsabilidad por una infraccion de la Constitucion.
Contra la pretension de que el departamento judicial no puede
revisar los procedimientos de una Camara legislativa en casos de
extralimitacion constitucional y dictar la orden correspondiente,
militan varios precedentes en la jurisprudencia americana. El mas
conocido y celebrado entre ellos es el asunto de Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377). En 1876 la Camara de
Representantes de los Estados Unidos aprobo una resolucion
disponiendo que se investigara cierta compania en la que el
gobierno federal, por medio del Secretario de la Marina, habia
hecho depositos improvidentes de dinero publico. Se decia que la
compania estaba en quiebra y el gobierno federal era uno de los
mayores acreedores. Se alegaba, ademas, en la resolucion que los
tribunales eran impotentes para hacer algo en el caso y proteger el
interes publico. Se nombraba en la resolucion un comite de cinco
Representates para efectuar la investigacion.
En el curso de la investigacion se le cito al recurrente Hallet
Kilbourn subpoena duces tecum para que produjera ante el comite
ciertos documentos y contestase ciertas preguntas. Killbourn se
nego a hacer lo uno y lo otro. Kilbourn fue entonces arrestado por
orden del Speaker y como quiera que siguio rehusando contestar las
mismas preguntas formulada ahora por el Speaker y producir los
documentos requeridos por el comite, la Camara aprobo otra
resolucion disponiendo que Kilbourn fuese otra vez arrestado y
detenido en la carcel de Distrito de Columbia hasta que se aviniese a
cumplir la orden contenida en las resoluciones de la Camara de
representantes. Kilbourn no solo inistio en su negativa, sino que
formulo una queja contra el sargento de armas de la Camara y los
cinco miembros del Comite por "trespass for false imprisonment,"
acusandoles de haberle arrancado de su casa mediante fuerza y
detnido por 45 dias en la carcel. Elevado el asunto al Tribunal
Supremo Federal, este declaro que la resolucion de investigacion era
anticonstitucional; que la investigacion no tenia por objeto una
accion legislativa sino que era mas bien para una inquisicion de
caracter judicial; asi que la Corte declaro lo siguiente:
In looking to the Preamble and Resolution under which the
committee acted, before which Mr. Kilbourn refused to testify, we
are of opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded
the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only
be properly exercised by another branch of the government,
because the power was in its nature clearly judicial.
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain. If what we
have said of the division of the powers of the government among
the three departments be sound, this is equivalent to a declaration
that no judicial power is vested in the Congress or either branch of it,
save in the cases specifically enumerated to which we have referred .
..
We are of opinion, for these reasons, that the Resolution of the
House of Representatives authorizing the investigation, was in
excess of the power conferred on that body by the Constitution; that
the committee, therefore, had no lawful authority to require Mr.
Kilbourn to testify as a witness beyond what he voluntarily chose to
tell; that the orders and resolutions of the House, and the warrant
of the Speaker, under which Mr. Kilbourn was improsined, are, in
like manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that body, and that his
imprisonment was without any lawful authority. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377.)
Finalmente, la Corte dispuso que la causa contra Thompson, el
sargento de armas, se devolviera al tribunal de origen para
ulteriores procedimientos. Se estimo el sobreseimiento con
respecto a los miembros del comite bajo el principio de la libertad
parlamentaria de debate qu les hacia imunes. A proposito de esto
ultimo son muy significativas las siguientes palabras de la Corte:
It is not necessary to decided here that there may not be things
done, in the one House or other, of an extraordinary character, for
which the members who take part in the act may be held legally
responsible. If we could suppose the members of these bodies so far
to forget their high functions and the noble instrument under which
they act as to imitate the Long Pariliament in the execution of the
Chief Magistrate of the Nation, or to follow the example of the
French Assembly in assuming the functions of a court for capital
punishment, we are not prepared to say that such an utter
perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose would be screened
from punishment by the constitutional provision for freedom of
debate. (Idem. p. 392.)
Ademas de la precedente cita, varias decisiones de los mas altos
tribunales pueden ictarse en apoyo de la doctrina de que "todos los
funcionarios, departamentos o agencias gubernamentales estan
sujetos a restriccion judicial cuando obran fuereaa de sus facultades,
legales o constitucionales, y por virtud de dicha extralimitacion
privan a un ciudadano de sus derechos" (Osborn vs. United States
Bank, 9 Wheaton [U.S.], 739; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92
[U.S.], 531; United States vs. Lee, 106 U.S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114
U.S., 311; Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U.S., 362; Smith vs. Ames,
169 U.S. 466; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Philadelphia Co. vs.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605.)
Respecto de la facultad judicial para expedir, en casos apropiados,
ordenes coercitivas dirigidas a funcionarios de la Legislatura, hay en
la jurisprudencia americana una buena copia de autoridades. He
aqui algunas de ellas:
. . . En el asunto Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91) se libro el
mandamiento contra el Presidente de la Camara de representantes
para obligarle a que certificara al Interventor de Cuentas Publicas la
cantidad a que tenia derecho el recurrente como miembro de lal
Camara como compensacion por millaje y dietas. En el asunto de
State vs. Elder (31 Neb., 169), se libro el mandamiento para obligar
al Presidente de la Camara de Representantes para que abriera y
publicara los resultados de la eleccion general. En el asunto de State
vs. Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350) se declaro que procedia expedir
un mandamus contra el Presidente de la Camara de Representantes
para obligarle que certificara la eleccion y nombramiento de
funcionarios. En el asunto de Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87) se
expidio el mandmiento para obligar al Archivero de las Nominas de
la Camara de Representantes a que imprimiera y publicara un
proyecto de ley aprobado por la Legislatura y, a solicitud, que
facilitara copia del mismo propiamente certificada. (Veanse
tambien los asuntos de Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S., 168;
Statee vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41People vs. Marton, 156 N.Y., 136.)
(Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil, 87, 149.)
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que esta Corte tiene facultad para
dictar la sentencia y expedir el interdicto que se solicita. La orden ira
dirigida no contra el Senado de Filipinas, entidad abastracta que
nada ha hecho contra la Constitucion. La orden resitringente ira
dirigida contra los recurridos en cuanto ellos intentan hacer efectiva
una resolucion que es ilegal, que es anticonstitucional, lo mismo que
se hizo en el asunto de Kilbourn. Se les restringe y cohibe como se
les restringiria y cohibiria si, por ejemplo, en vez de la Resolucion
Pendatun, hubieran aporbado otra resolucion mandando a la carcel
a los recurrentes hasta que el Tribunal Electoral resuelva la cuestion
de sus actas. ¿Habria alguien que sostuviera que si en tal caso
vinieran a esta Corte los afectados para pedir el adecuado remedio
contra el atropello, esta Corte no podria concederlo bajo la teoria de
la sepracion de poderes? Luego la cuestion se reduce a una de
grado, de tamaño de la transgresion constitucional; pero es obvio
que nuestra jurisdiccion y competencia no queda condicionada por
el volumen de la transgresion. ¿Y quien diria en tal caso que el
Senado de Filipinas ha sido el sujeto de la orden de interdicto, con
grave desdoro de sus altos prestigios como uno de los tres poderes
del Estado?
Puesto que la accion en el presente caso va dirigida no contra el
Senado como corporacion o institucion, sino contra una mayoria de
sus miembros como personas, como individuos, si bien en su
concepto de Senadores, dicho se esta que tenemos competencia
para conceder el recurso, no solo por las razones constitucionales ya
expuestas, sino porque esta claramente reconocida y definida dicha
competencia en nuestros estatutos: anteriormente en los articulos
226 y 516 de la Ley No. 190 (Cod. de Proc. Civ.), y ahora en la regla
67, secciones 2 y 4, Reglamento de los Tribunales. Estas
disposiciones legales prescriben que el mandamiento de inhibicion
(prohibition) puede expedirse a "una corporacion, junta, o persona,
en ejercicio de sus funciones judicales o ministeriales, siempre que
se demuestre que carecian de competencia o se han extralimitado
de ella en las actuaciones que hayan practicado" (Planas contra Gil
ut supra). Sin embargo, se arguye que los recurridos como
Senadores no ejercen funciones judiciales ni ministeriales, sino
legislativas; luego la regla no es aplicable a ellos. Pero es evidente
que en el presente caso la funcion de que se trata no es de caracter
legislativo sino ministerial; apenas es necesario decir que la
Resolucion Pendatun no es un acto legislativo. Bajo la Constitucion y
los estatutos el derecho de un miembro electo del Congreso a ser
admitido y a ocupar su asiento es de naturaleza ministerial,
imperativa. La Ley No. 725 del Commonwealth, aprobada por el
pasado Congreso para implimentar la Ley Electoral con vista a Las
elecciones nacionales del pasado 23 de Abril, dice en parte lo
siguiente:
ART. 11. La Comision de Elecciones hara el escrutinio de los
resultados para Senadores tan pronto como se hayan recibido las
actas decada provincia y ciaudad, pero no depues del viente de
mayo de milnovecientos cuarenta y seis. Sera proclamados elegidos
los dieciseis candidatos inscritos que obtuvieren el mayor numero
de votos para el cargo de Seandor. En caso de que apareciere de los
resultados del escrutinio de los votos para Senadores que dos os
mas candidatos han obtenido el mismo numero de votos para el
decimosexto puesto, la Comision de Elecciones, despues de hacer
constar este hecho en el acta correspondiente, celebrara otra sesion
publica, previa notificacion con tres dias de antelacion a todos los
candidatos empatados, para que ellos os sus representantes
debidamente autorizados puedan estar presentes si asi lo desearen,
en la cual procedera al sorteo de los candidatos empatados y
proclamara el candidato que saliere favorecido por la suerte. El
condidato asi proclamado tendra derecho a tomar posesion del
cargo del mismo modo que si hubiere sido elegido por pluralidad de
votos. Acto seguido, la Comision de Elecciones levantara acta del
procedimiento seguido en el sorteo, de su resultado y de la
proclamacion subsiquiente. Se enviaran copias cerfificadas de dicha
acta por correo certificado al Secretario del Senado y a cada uno de
os candidatos empatados.
Art. 12. . . . The candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives and those for Senator who have been proclaimed
elected by the respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission
on Elections shall assume office and shall hold regular session for
the year 1946 on May 25, 1946 (las bastardillas son nuestras).
Si bajo estas disposisciones legales los recurrentes tienen el derecho
de asumir el cargo, es obvio que los demas Senadores, entre ellos
los recurridos, tienen el correlativo deber ministerial de no
impedirles el ejercicio de ese derecho, o dicho de otro modo, el
correlativo deber ministerial de admitirles para que tomen posesion
de sus cargos a la sola presentacion de sus credenciales que en este
caso viene a ser la proclama expedidda por la Comision sobre
Elecciones declarandolos electos (Delegado Roxas, debates en la
Asamblea Constituyente, ut supra). Se dice que la frase shall assume
office, con ser imperative, no impone una obligacion especifica de
admitir a cualquier miembro electo, sino que es tan solo un
mandamiento, un directive al legislador electo para que tome
posesion de su cargo inmediatamente, como si un candidato
triunfante que, es de presumir, se presento voluntariamente
candidato y a lo mejor gasto una fortuna para promover su eleccion,
necesitara de ese ukase legislativo para asumir su oficio. Pero
concedamos por un momento, arguendo, que esa disposicion legal
no tiene mas que el significado de una especie de conscripcion civil,
todavia cabe preguntar: ¿como prodri el legislador electoasumir
forzosamente (shall) su cargo, si, por otro lado, un mayoria de sus
compañeros en conclave tuvieran la facultad discrecional — que
puede degenerar en arbitraria — de negarle el asiento, siquiera sea
con caracter temporal? ¿No seria ello claramente un absurdo, un
contrasentido? Luego la conclusion logica y natural es que esa frase
imperativa es de doble via, esto es, tanto para admitir al miembro
electo como para que este asuma el cargo.
Se apunta el temor de que la intervencion judicial en el caso que nos
ocupa puede dar lugar a una grave consecuencia — la de que una
orden adversa sea desobedecida por los recurridos, suscitandose
por tal motivo un conflicto de poderes. Pero, aparte de que el deber
— maxime si esta impuesto por la Constitucion y las leyes — se
tiene que cumplir rigurosamdnete por penoso que fuese sin
consideraciona las consecuencias, parece impropio e injusto
presumir que los recurridos sean capaces, en un momento dado, de
desplazar las cuestiones que entraña la presente controversia del
elevado nivel en que deben discutirse y resolverse, en medio de un
atmosfera de absouta impersonalidad y objetividad, libre de los
miasmas de la pasion y suspicacia Y no se diga, fulanizando
ostensiblemente la cuestion que cuando la judicatura, en el
apropiado ejercicio de su facultad de interpretar la Constitucion y
los estatutos, dicta un fallo adverso a ciertos intereses y a ciertos
hombres pertenecientes a otro poder del Estado, humilla y
empequeñece con ello a ese poder, colocandolo en condicion
inferior y subalterna. en los grandes conflictos y disputas sobre la
cosa publica lo que, en verdad, empequeñece y deslustra no es el
contrateimpo y reves que se sufre — incidente inevitable en toda
noble lid por la razon, la verdad y la justicia — sino la falta de esa
serena dignidad, de ese sentido sobrio de propia inhibicion y propio
dominio paa aceptar y sufrir el reves, de todo eso que es la mejor
piedra de toque de la madurez politica y de las virtudes publicas en
un regimen de caracter popular y democratico. Los hombres van y
vienen, pasan con sus miserias y sus disputas en la interminable
caravana del tiempo; las instituciones quedan, y eso es lo que
importa salvar a toda costa por encima de las pasiones y caprichos
transeuntes del momento.
Se esta corte tiene, segun la Constitucion, facultad para conceder el
remedio solictado, es de suponer que los recurridos acataran el fallo
que se dicte, pues son hombres de orden y de ley, y seran los
primeros en dar el ejemplo de cumplir los mandatos de la
Constitucion, interpretados y aplicados por la judicatura; pero si —
lo que para nosotros es imposible que ocurra — escudandose tras
sus privilegios, llegaren al extremo de cometer desacato, que cada
cual asuma su responsabilidad ante su conciencia, ante el pais y
ante la historia. Esta Corte habra cumplido solamente consu deber,
sin miedo y sin favor, y en la forma mejor que le haya sido dable
hacerlo en la medida de sus luces y alcances.
En esta jurisdiccion tenemos un precedente tipico, claro y
terminante de orden coercitiva dirigida por el departamento judicial
al departamento ejecutivo del gobierno. Nos referimos al asunto de
Concepcion contra Paredes (42 Jur. Fil., 630) en el cual se trataba de
una solicitud de mandamiento de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido
Secretario de Justicia de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido
Secretario de Justicia que desistiera de poner en vigor las
disposiciones de la Ley No. 2941 que exigia a los jueces de primera
instancia que echasen suertes cada cinco años para el cambio de
distritos. Esta Corte declaro que la ley popularmente conocida por
ley de la "loteria judicial" era anticonstitucional. Se concedio, por
tanto, el mandamiento de prohibicion, haciendose definitivo el
interdicto preliminar expedido.
Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente,
desalentador de que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo
la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se les
dice que no tienen mas que un recurso: esperar las elecciones y
plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eleigiendoles o
elevando a su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridos o a su partido. algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de
este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es
expedito ni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir
ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir
tambien que en una eleccion politica entra muchos factores, y es
posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan
palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros
"issues" mas presionantes y decisvos. Tambien se podria decir que,
independientemente de la justicia de su causa, un partido
minoritario siempre lucha con desventaja contra el partido
mayoritario.
Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento es que no
cabe concebir que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan
dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio
en donde quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constitucion y de la
ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, importente frente a lo que el
considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactores de
la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de gobierno —
sistema presidenecial. Sabian mauy bien que este no tiene la
flexibilidad del tipo ingles — el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los
paises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad
politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacuden los
cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se disuelve y se convocan
elecciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues"
del dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin
violencia. El sistema presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El periodo que
media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, por
ejemplo, el periodo es de seis años para el Senado, y de cuatro años
para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para
cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones generales y otras.
Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi es harto
peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones donde el
individuo y el pueblo no pueden buscar el amparo de la Constitucion
y de las leyes, bajo procesos ordenandos y expeditos, para proteger
sus derechos.
En resumen, direcmos lo siguiente:
Tenemos una Constitucion escrita que representa el genio politico y
socio de nuestro pueblo, que encarna nuestra historia, nuestras
tradiciones, nuestra civilizacion y cultura influida por las mas
grandes civilizaciones y culturas conocidas en el mundo. Esa
Constitucion se escribio no solo para el Commonwealth, sino para la
Republica: esta hecha para perdurar y sobrevivir a todas las crisis y
vicisitudes. Sobrevivio casi milagrosamente a la peor de estas — la
ocupacion japonesa. Es un formidable instrumento de libertad y
democracia. Su modelo mas cercano es la Constitucion americana,
pero en ciertos respectos es una superacion del modelo. Uno de sus
aspectos mas originales y progresivos es indudablemente la
creacion del Tribunal Electoral. Esta reforma constituye el valiente
reconocimiento de una dura realidad, al propio tiempo que un
energico remedio.

Pero en las constituciones la letra no es el todo, ni siquiera lo

principal. Lo imporatante, lo fundamental es el espiritu, el caracter
del pueblo; son las practicas, las costumbres, los habitos politicos
que vivifican e implementan la letra esrita que es inorganica e
inerte. Exceptuando el parentesis tragico de la guerraa, nuestra
Constitucion lleva unos ocho años de vigencia. En ese breve periodo
de tiempo se ha formado en su derredor una limitada
jurisprudencia, encaminada a robustecerla y expandirla como
intrumento de libertad y democracia. Los casos de Angara y Planas,
tan copiosamente comentados en esta modesta disidencia, son
tipicamente representativos de esa magnifica tendencia. La custion
ahoraa es si esta ha de poder continuar sin estorbos, sin trabas, o ha
de sufrir un serio reves en su marcha ascendente. Nuestro sentir es
que se debe permitir el ordenado desenvolvimiento de la
Constitucion en toda su anchura, bajo los amplisimos auspicios de la
libertad, en terminos y perspectivas que hagan de ella la formidable
herramienta de democracia y justicia que debe ser.

¡ Ojala el resultado del presente asunto no sea parte para estorbar

ese desenvolvimiento!
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor
General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio T. Quianzon, Jr., for
respondents.
FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao seeking the reversal of a
resolution by the Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta
No. 14. The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of
the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located
in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as
actual incumbent. When the deed of sale was presented to Register
of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of
Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per
cent of the members of their corporation were Filipino citizens
when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed
of donation of a parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring
that 60 per cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness
to submit an affidavit, both not in the same tenor as that made the
Progress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not
similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five
incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to
their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite
Nuns became the owner of properties donated to it, whereas the
case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would
become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the
registerability if the document, the matter was referred to the Land
Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance
with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the
matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after the petitioner
corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered
on September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of
Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the
vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines
in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital,
property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens,
there being no question that the present incumbent of the
corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the opinion of
the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159 of the
corporation Law relied upon by the vendee was rendered operative
by the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution with respect
to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein — that at
least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens — be
present, and, therefore, ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to
deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of
compliance with such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action
for mandamus was instituted with this Court by said corporation
sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled
jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L.
Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in favor of the
Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural
lands for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship,
and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside
the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In
its resolution of November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to
this petition providing that the procedure prescribed for appeals
from the Public Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange
Commissions (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as
follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to cititzens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO
ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF
THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER
CONSTITUTION. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
other than the development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are
considered "qualified" to acquire and hold agricultural lands in the
Philippines? What is the effect of these constitutional prohibition of
the right of a religious corporation recognized by our Corporation
Law and registered as a corporation sole, to possess, acquire and
register real estates in its name when the Head, Manager,
Administrator or actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole,
irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or
disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The Corporation
Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a
corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the of the
properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator
thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities are
owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or by the diocess
as minor "moral persons" with the ordinary or bishop as
administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, petitioner explained that as a religious society or
organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions — the clergy or
religious members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures
of the Bureau of Census showed that there were 277,551 Catholics
in Davao and aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting
that all these foreigners are Catholics, petitioner contends that
Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics
population of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition,
counsel for petitioner presented the Catholic Directory of the
Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year,
Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of
the group. It was, therefore, allowed that the constitutional
requirement was fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be
true that petitioner is not the owner of the land purchased, yet he
has control over the same, with full power to administer, take
possession of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or
all lands and their improvements registered in the name of the
corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or sue for all
money or values of any kind that may be kind that may become due
or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into
agreements with any persons, concerns or entities in connection
with said real properties, or in other words, actually exercising all
rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the
theory that properties registered in the name of the corporation
sole are held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a
place, as of Davao in the case at bar should be sustained because a
conglomeration of persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui
que trust or recipient of the benefits from the property allegedly
administered in their behalf. Neither can it be said that the mass of
people referred to as such beneficiary exercise ant right of
ownership over the same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls
short of a trust. The respondents instead tried to prove that in
reality, the beneficiary of ecclesiastical properties are not members
or faithful of the church but someone else, by quoting a portion a
portion of the ought of fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon his
elevation to the episcopacy wherein he promises to render to the
Pontificial Father or his successors an account of his pastoral office
and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the
constitutional provision calling for 60 per cent of Filipino citizenship,
the criterion of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can
say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation
usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into
the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was
referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was designed to
facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by
the clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as
the property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors
(who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who
are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities
and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their
natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a
sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several
chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are
illuminating and sustain the stand of petitioner. Section 154 thereof
provides:
SEC. 154. — For the administration of the temporalities of any
religious denomination, society or church and the management of
the estates and the properties thereof, it shall be lawful for the
bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such religious
denomination, society or church to become a corporation sole,
unless inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or discipline of his
religious denomination, society or church or forbidden by
competent authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the
same Corporation Law copied hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief
priest, or presiding elder of any religious denomination, society or
church must file with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged
with the administration of the temporalities and the management of
the estates and properties of his religious denomination, society, or
church within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner of the said articles of incorporation, which verified by
affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and accompanied by the copy of
the commission, certificate of election, or letters of appointment of
the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as
prescribed in the section immediately preceding such the bishop,
chief priest, or presiding elder, as the case may be, shall become a
corporation sole and all temporalities, estates, and properties the
religious denomination, society, or church therefore administered or
managed by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, shall
be held in trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use, purpose,
behalf, and sole benefit of his religious denomination, society, or
church, including hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan, asylums,
parsonages, and cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such articles of
incorporation, the Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall
collect twenty-five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No.
287); and.
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property
held or owned by a religious order or society, or by the diocese,
synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or
church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall
be held in trust for the use, purpose behalf, and benefit of the
religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church of which
the diocese, or district organization is an organized and constituent
part.
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of
the corporation sole or ordinary as administrator of the church
properties, as follows:
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre
la administracion de todos los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en
su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdiccion, salvs las
prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios derechos.
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y
circunstancias, procuraran los Ordinarios regular todo lo
concerniente a la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos, dando
las oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco del
derecho comun. (Title XXVIII, Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III,
Canon 1519).1
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as
the case may be, as corporation's sole are merely administrators of
the church properties that come to their possession, in which they
hold in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true
that church properties could be administered by a natural persons,
problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided
to rise upon his death. Through this legal fiction, however, church
properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his
successor in office. It could be seen, therefore, that a corporation
sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of the
church or religious society where he belongs but also to hold and
transmit the same to his successor in said office. If the ownership or
title to the properties do not pass to the administrators, who are the
owners of church properties?.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise
comment:
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and
to the Apostolic See, the Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of
supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters
regarding other church property, through the administrators of the
individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid
down in the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however, that
the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church property; but merely
that he is the supreme guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A
Text and Commentary, p. 764).
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia
Canonica, ruled in the case of Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the
properties constituting the endowment of the ecclesiastical or
collative chaplaincies is vested.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom
the ownership of the ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect
to which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with
Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it
resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is
more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in
the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by
the churches, institutions and canonically established private
corporations to which said properties have been donated.
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring
ownership of church properties on the Pope although he appears to
be the supreme administrator or guardian of his flock, nor on the
corporation sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly
mere administrators of said properties, ownership of these
temporalities logically fall and develop upon the church, diocese or
congregation acquiring the same. Although this question of
ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been
mentioned in several decisions of the Court yet in no instance was
the subject of citizenship of this religious society been passed upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice
Perfecto in his dissent in the case of Agustines vs. Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church
by the Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There is no
question that the Roman Catholic Church existing in the Philippines
is a tributary and part of the international religious organization, for
the word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes
the authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty
in drawing conclusions, We have to analyze and take note of the
nature of the government established in the Vatican City, of which it
was said:
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority
and jurisdiction over clergy and laity alike as held by the pope who
(since the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals assembled in
conclave, and holds office until his death or legitimate abdication. . .
While the pope is obviously independent of the laws made, and the
officials appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually
exercises his administrative authority according to the code of
canon law and through the congregations, tribunals and offices of
the Curia Romana. In their respective territories (called generally
dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the patriarchs,
metropolitans or archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction
which is called ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to a
person. . . (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of
their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the
religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic
congregation of the faithful throughout the world seeks the
guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant
therein. Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the
faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are
affected by that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman
Catholic Church in almost every country springs from that society
that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this
faith derive their authorities and receive orders from the Holy See
do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these
branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by
a sort of "radiation". We have to realize that although there is a
fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein
all over the globe, the universality that the word "catholic" implies,
merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the
interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but
certainly they are separate and independent from one another in
jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are
incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in the
management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory
that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the
citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead
to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace
the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society,
likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We
consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any
other country of the world. The same thing be said with regard to
the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under
the laws of the Philippines, which is not altered by the change of
citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation
sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in
different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is
located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and
privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that
country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman
Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations
with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules
and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We
may draw on this matter will have a far reaching influence, nor can
We overlook the pages of history that arouse indignation and
criticisms against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that
snowbailed into a strong nationalistic sentiment manifested itself
when the provisions on natural to be embodied in the Philippine
Constitution were framed, but all that has been said on this regard
referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations
known as "Friar Estates" which have already bee acquired by our
government, and not to properties held by corporations sole which,
We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the faithful
residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling
probably precipitated and influenced to a large extent the doctrine
laid down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We have to take this
matter in the light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually
obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the
Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or
better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private
agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of
Article XIII of the Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that
only persons or corporations qualified to acquire hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and
hold private agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in
the present controversy hinges on the proposition or whether or not
the petitioner in this case can acquire agricultural lands of the public
domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange
Commission, We find that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga
was incorporated (as a corporation sole) in September, 1912,
principally to administer its temporalities and manage its properties.
Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of
incorporation were reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange
Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, this corporation sole
administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located
in the island of Mindanao. Later on, however, new dioceses were
formed and new corporations sole were created to correspond with
the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being
petitioner herein, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the
administrative for all the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic
Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved
April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any
religious society or church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the
temporalities of such society or church. By "temporalities" is meant
estate and properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The
successor in office of such religious head or chief priest incorporated
as a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on
ascension to office, and shall be permitted to transact business as
such on filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy
of his commission, certificate of election or letter of appointment
duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record
(Guevara's The Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real
estate and personal; property for its church, charitable, benevolent,
or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held
by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but
before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of
the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell
has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for
such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have directed, and
that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or
sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief
priest, or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be
opposed by any member of the religious denomination, society or
church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however,
That in cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the
religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by
such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding,
selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the
Courts shall not be necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to
purchase real property, like the power exercised in the case at bar, it
is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes
is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the
church concerned represented by said corporation sole. If
corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate for its church,
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register
said real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for
specific purposes me be subject of registration (section 69, Act 496),
and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to
register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may
be issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular
Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is absurd that while the
corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the
erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and
cemeteries which they are expressly authorized by law to acquire in
connection with the propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not
register said properties in their name. As professor Javier J.
Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the immortal and
imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded history,
erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no doubt that he
will continue to do so for all time to come, as long as he continues
'imploring the aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's
Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41, September,
1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state
that even before the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every
corporation sole then organized and registered had by express
provision of law the necessary power and qualification to purchase
in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised
its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently
of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and
head, the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without
fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in
the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind
the religious corporations sole when they provided that 60 per
centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered
corporation sole is an artificial being having the right of succession
and the power, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by
law or incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In
outlining the general powers of a corporation. Public Act. No. 1459
provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber,
and otherwise deal with such real and personal property as the
purpose for which the corporation was formed may permit, and the
transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may
reasonably and necessarily require, unless otherwise prescribed in
this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a
form of corporation recognized by the same law, Section 159
aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and
hold real as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion
of the objects for which said corporation sole is created.
Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained
that since the Philippine Constitution is a later enactment than
public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of
Section 13 thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered
repealed by the former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the
Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or
overlooked this particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that
the naturalization and conservation of our national resources was
one of the dominating objectives of the Convention and in drafting
the present Article XII of the Constitution, the delegates were
goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino
posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence (See The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the
same book Delegate Aruego, explaining the reason behind the first
consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital
had been to be rather shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to
invest a considerable sum of their capital for the development,
exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the country.
They had not as yet been so used to corporate as the peoples of the
west. This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the
retardation of the development of the natural resources, unless
foreign capital would be encouraged to come and help in that
development. They knew that the naturalization of the natural
resources would certainly not encourage the INVESTMENT OF
FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in the
Convention that it was better to have such a development retarded
or even postpone together until such time when the Filipinos would
be ready and willing to undertake it rather than permit the natural
resources to be placed under the ownership or control of foreigners
in order that they might be immediately be developed, with the
Filipinos of the future serving not as owners but utmost as tenants
or workers under foreign masters. By all means, the delegates
believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino
posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the
Constitution intended said provisions as barrier for foreigners or
corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and
develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for
our people to clear and enrich when they are already prepared and
capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in
the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of the
"temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit
of the members of their respective religion composed of an
overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No mention nor allusion
whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against
or the liability of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to
acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there were some
discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the
inclusion of the provision allowing the Government to break big
landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above
referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of Article XIII of the
constitution does have bearing on the petitioner's case; even so the
clause requiring that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the
corporation be owned by Filipinos is subordinated to the
petitioner's aforesaid right already existing at the time of the
inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the
Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel (a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention), in his concurring opinion of the
case of Gold Creek mining Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was
originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on
Naturalization and Preservation of Land and Other Natural
Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1954.
It was later inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section
13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now.
Slight have been the changes undergone by the proviso from the
time when it comes out of the committee until it was finally
adopted. When first submitted and as inserted to the first draft of
the Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease, or
concession existing in respect thereto on the date of the adoption of
the Constitution'. As finally adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution'. This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs
form the just character of the government established. The framers
of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy
or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well
knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean
destruction or annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they
erected a government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh
conservative in the protection of property rights. This
notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic traits discoverable upon
even a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the
instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that
during the deliberation of this case he submitted to the
consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the
"vested right saving clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution, but some of the members of this Court either did not
agree with the theory of the writer, or were not ready to take a
definite stand on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring
our ruling on such debatable question for a better occasion,
inasmuch as the determination thereof is not absolutely necessary
for the solution of the problem involved in this case. In his desire to
face the issues squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a
disgression, to explain and develop his theory, not as a lucubration
of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it better and convenient
to go over the cycle of reasons that are linked to one another and
that step by step lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive
part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
provides, among other things, that "all agricultural lands of the
public domain and their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT
AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of
Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259,
"this recognition (in the clause already quoted), is not mere
graciousness but springs from the just character of the government
established. The farmers of the Constitution were not obscured by
the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit
of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our natural
resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED
PROPERTY RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of
acquisition of public or private lands by a corporation which does
not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to purchases of the
Constitution and not to later transactions. This argument would
imply that even assuming that petitioner had at the time of the
enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property or
right could not be exercised after the effectivity of our Constitution,
because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein
petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the
Corporation Law, could no longer be exercised in view of the
requisite therein prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the
capital of the corporation had to be Filipino. It has been shown
before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary
corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is
composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is
only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities
located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such
temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful
residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4)
the latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the
incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation,
management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects
the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem
obvious that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked
by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or
overlooked this particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the
facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so,
then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of
at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We
might say that a reading of said Section 1 will show that it does not
refer to any actual acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or
power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of
the Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In
the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be
in need of more temples where to pray, more schools where the
children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of
their religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated,
more hallow or consecrated grounds or cemeteries where Catholics
could be buried, many more than those actually existing at the time
of the enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it
be logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by
express provision of law, has the power to hold and acquire real
estate and personal property of its churches, charitable benevolent,
or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to
stop its growth and restrain its necessities just because the
corporation sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one
person who in his unity does not admit of any percentage, especially
when that person is not the owner but merely an administrator of
the temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the
answer to whoever may read and consider this portion of the
decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in
disposing the case, for even if We were to disregard such saving
clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right,
grant, etc., at the same time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution, yet We would have, under the
evidence on record, sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's
contention on this matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si
Temple, 2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May 21, 1955, wherein this
question was considered from a different angle, this Court through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital
stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since
it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The
purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure
that corporation or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land
or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and
the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital
stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a
corporation sole but a corporation aggregate, i.e., an unregistered
organization operating through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality,
and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With
regard to petitioner, which likewise is a non-stock corporation, the
case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole,
evidently of no nationality and registered mainly to administer the
temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of
said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the
record to inquire into the composing membership to determine
whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would
find undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly
Filipino citizens. As indicated before, petitioner has presented
evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this
religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by
the Constitution. These facts are not controverted by respondents
and our conclusion in this point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed. — After having developed our
theory in the case and arrived at the findings and conclusions
already expressed in this decision. We now deem it proper to
analyze and delve into the basic foundation on which the dissenting
opinion stands up. Being aware of the transcendental and far-
reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter might have, this case
was thoroughly considered from all points of view, the Court sparing
no effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a
prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the reversal of the doctrine We laid
down in the celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and
properties from the group of the term "private agricultural lands"
use in this section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution; and (2) by
driving Our reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the
appointment of Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head the
corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the
Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. With regard to the first
way, a great majority of the members of this Court were not yet
prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are
obvious. As to the second way, it seems to be misleading because
the nationality of the head of a diocese constituted as a corporation
sole has no material bearing on the functions of the latter, which are
limited to the administration of the temporalities of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is
based, it may be noticed that its author lingered on the outskirts of
the issues, thus throwing the main points in controversy out of
focus. Of course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that
the framers of our Constitution had at heart to insure the
conservation of the natural resources of Our motherland of Filipino
posterity; to serve them as an instrument of national defense,
helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign
control through peaceful economic penetration; and to prevent
making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all
these precautions adopted by the Delegates to Our Constitutional
Assembly could have not been intended for or directed against
cases like the one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on the
statement that once the capacity of a corporation sole to acquire
private agricultural lands is admitted there will be no limit to the
areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the "revival
or revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so
troublesome in our past", cannot even furnish the "penumbra" of a
threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place, the right
of Filipino citizens, including those of foreign extraction, and
Philippine corporations, to acquire private lands is not subject to
any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We certainly do
not see any wrong in that. The right of Filipino citizens and
corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is already limited by
law. In the second place, corporations sole cannot be considered as
aliens because they have no nationality at all. Corporations sole are,
under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the
Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the third place, every
corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only entitled to purchase,
convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with
real properties when it is pursuant to or in consonance with the
purposes for which the corporation was formed, and when the
transactions of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably
and necessarily require such dealing — section 13-(5) of the
Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459 — and considering these
provisions in conjunction with Section 159 of the same law which
provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real
estate and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent
or educational purposes", the above mentioned fear of revitalization
of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely dispelled.
The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole
to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main
source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the
Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests
or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient
and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious
landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that
when the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention drafted and
approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind
the corporation sole. We come to this finding because the
Constitutional Assembly, composed as it was by a great number of
eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any other legislative body
empowered to enact either the Constitution of the country or any
public statute, presumed to know the conditions existing as to
particular subject matter when it enacted a statute (Board of
Commerce of Orange Country vs. Bain, 92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind
of the Legislature in enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121
A. 109; 277 P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the
law on the subjects upon which it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and
Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature
acted with full knowledge of the prior legislation on the subject and
its construction by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89 N. E.
899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject
with which it was dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E.
778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory
construction. (People vs. Lowell, 230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349,
followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.).
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a
constitution or statute without reason, or that a result was intended
inconsistent with the judgment of men of common sense guided by
reason" (Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of
Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other
authorities that can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single
individual, the head of any religious society or church operating
within the zone, area or jurisdiction covered by said corporation sole
(Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the
temporalities which he merely administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any
administrator has absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the
person desiring to acquire real property in the Philippines by
purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary
succession, who according to the Constitution must be a Filipino
(sections 1 and 5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the
corporation sole to purchase and holdreal estate for its church,
charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and to receive
bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, almost all of whom were Roman
Catholics, could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the
Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their
church, knowing pretty well that with the growth of our population
more places of worship, more schools where our youth could be
taught and trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our dead
would be needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized
the corporations sole even to receive bequests or gifts of real
estates and this Court could not, without any clear and specific
provision of the Constitution, declare that any real property
donated, let as say this year, could no longer be registered in the
name of the corporation sole to which it was conveyed. That would
be an absurdity that should not receive our sanction on the pretext
that corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock
corporations composed of only one person in the capacity of
administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty per centum of
their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even
provides:
ART. 10. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of
the properties of a Filipino can acquire, in the name of the latter,
private lands without any limitation whatsoever, and that is so
because the properties thus acquired are not for and would not
belong to the administrator but to the Filipino whom he represents.
But the dissenting Justice inquires: If the Ordinary is only the
administrator, for whom does he administer? And who can alter or
overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to answer these
questions. The corporations sole by reason of their peculiar
constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of its
temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely
implied that the Ordinary holds them in trust for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic faithful to their respective locality or diocese.
Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say that the
temporalities of every corporation sole are held in trust for the use,
purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious society, or order so
incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district
organization is an organized and constituent part (section 163 of the
Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the
temporalities of the corporation sole, let us see now what is the
meaning and scope of the word "control". According to the
Merriam-Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580,
on of the acceptations of the word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate;
regulate; hence, to hold from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. —
to overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the
intervention of the courts is not necessary, to mortgageor sell real
property held by the corporation sole where the rules, regulations
and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church
concerned presented by such corporation sole regulates the
methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate,
and that the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of
the corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or
of selling real property. It may be also admitted that the faithful of
the diocese cannot govern or overrule the acts of the Ordinary, but
all this does not mean that the latter can administer the
temporalities of the corporation sole without check or restraint. We
must not forget that when a corporation sole is incorporated under
Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself
to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these
tribunals can thus entertain grievances arising out of or with respect
to the temporalities of the church which came into the possession
of the corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that the
courts cannot intervene as to the matters of doctrine or teachings of
the Roman Catholic Church. That is correct, but the courts may step
in, at the instance of the faithful for whom the temporalities are
being held in trust, to check undue exercise by the corporation sole
of its power as administrator to insure that they are used for the
purpose or purposes for which the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action
brought by persons claiming to be members of a church, who allege
a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the church property to uses
foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical
question is involved and equity will protect from wrongful diversion
of the property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4
L.R.A. — n.s. — 1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over
the officers of such corporations in respect to the performance of
their official duties; but as in respect to the property which they hold
for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the
courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of
trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30
L.R.A. — n.s. — 665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, supra.).
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of
church rules or discipline unless civil rights become involved and
which must be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart, 67 S.C.
338, 45 S.E. 753, and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, p. 960-964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above
enumerated and of the provisions of law relative to existing
conditions as to management and operation of corporations sole in
the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the
Delegates thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be
imagined even for an instant that when Article XIII of the
Constitution was approved the framers thereof intended to prevent
or curtail from then on the acquisition sole, either by purchase or
donation, of real properties that they might need for the
propagation of the faith and for there religious and Christian
activities such as the moral education of the youth, the care,
attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of the dead of the
Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective
corporations sole? The mere indulgence in said thought would
impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that
is precisely the leit motiv that permeates the whole fabric of the
dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are
confronted with in this appeal, hinges around the necessity of a
proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of
statutory construction laid down by the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the
people from whom the constitution emanated is the language in
which it is expressed. The words employed are to be taken in their
natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given
their technical meaning. The imperfections of language as a vehicle
for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved
by result to extraneous aids for discovering the intent of the
framers. Among the more important of these are a consideration of
the history of the times when the provision was adopted and of the
purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional
convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical
construction by the legislative and executive departments,
especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to
create, ambiguities. . . . Consideration of the consequences flowing
from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an
important interpretative device. . . . The purposes of many of the
broadly phrased constitutional limitations were the promotion of
policies that do not lend themselves to definite and specific
formulation. The courts have had to define those policies and have
often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing so.
The interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing
conceptions of political and social values. The extent to which these
extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of constitutions
cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence cannot be
ignored in describing the essentials of the process (Rottschaeffer on
Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation
may be inconsistent with the general objectives of policy behind it,
and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statute the courts
rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted
interpretation is usually applied where the effect of literal
interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the words
of one court, the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock
general common sense'. (Vol. 3, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development
of a country nor an obstruction to its progress and foreign relations
(Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York and
Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed
and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be
construed as if intended to stand for a great length of time, and it is
progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too
narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the meaning given it
should be applied in such manner as to meet new or changed
conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed.,
1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair
interpretation of the language used and that construction which
effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or
purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be
adopted (State ex rel. Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d
979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose
the construction should be broad or liberal or equitable, as the
better method of ascertaining that intent, rather than technical
(Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the
Constitution had not in mind the corporations sole, nor intended to
apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when
they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it
is, herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by
purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and
educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its
name with the Register of Deeds of Davao, an indispensable
requisite prescribed by the Land Registration Act for lands covered
by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated
question above referred to as "the vested right saving clause"
contained in section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The dissenting
Justice hurls upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by
the writer of the decision the most pointed darts of his severe
criticism. We think, however, that this strong dissent should have
been spared, because as clearly indicated before, some members of
this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer or were
not ready to take a definite stand on that particular point, so that
there being no majority opinion thereon there was no need of any
dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the writer
deems it necessary to say a few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a
capacity to acquire (property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or
existing property right that the Constitution protects from
impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there
must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual,
and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must
have become 'fixed and established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil.
498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the
rule because among the rights granted by section 159 of the
Corporation Law was the right to receive bequests or gifts of real
properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And
this right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations
in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be impaired without
any specific provision in the Constitution to that effect, especially
when the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of
the religious faith of the immense majority of the Filipino people
and the curtailment of the activities of their Church. That is why the
writer gave us a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego said
in his book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the
enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, another Delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring opinion in the
case of Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil.
259. Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to
pass upon said "vested right saving clause" for the final
determination of this case.

JUDGMENT

Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration

Commission of September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the
provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands
in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per
centum of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the
deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such
requisite, is hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent Register
of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale
executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present
litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO
CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES,
and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer,respondents.
Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio
T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of
the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal
Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November,
1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin
Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao
Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected.
Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually
assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by
petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima
Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and
William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of
Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party,
chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon
nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens
Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of
said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf
of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of
Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members
of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the
latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator
Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary,
respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said
Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman
Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in
his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at
present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the
Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo
M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or
color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of
appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the
appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes,
as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco
and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void;
and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are
about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the
rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging
to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an
Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators
chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3)
Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest
number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an
Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to
which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in
Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators
having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged..
hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be
determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco,
Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to
usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from
paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent
Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and
that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the
Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the
respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the
petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of
the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment
of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said
respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without
power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the
Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b)
that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner
Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated
himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because
said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not
the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon
the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the
Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective
political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in
the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of
the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners
herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the
bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from
the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon
by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it
does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to
allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said
House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the
exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a
very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom
certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to
determine whether the powers possessed have been validly
exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach
upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since
the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as
the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to
ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In
the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the
Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by
either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-
Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent
refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over
said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the
fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its
President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel
thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested
exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power
includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive,
there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said
Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not
be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-
called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of
the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the
powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original
Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and
annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the
fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation
cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an
act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so,
which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and
paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and
Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents,
in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not
review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members
thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be
considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor
of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution,
sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question
being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has
been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco
(83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the
number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the
case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a
particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the
Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party,
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which
party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators
for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two
(2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of
the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to
act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a
resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative,
upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs.
Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force
upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the
Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of
which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue
depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of
the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of
the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is
a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to
pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded,
impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the
second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore,
is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party
may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said
Citizens Party.
xxx xxx xxx
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the
jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the
proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but
an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is,
therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question,
not one justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the
remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use
petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of
public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the
impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the
Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the
petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a
fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the
organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956,
Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he
nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined
the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr.
Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved
and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to
public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court.
Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one
day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose,
because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any
action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody
pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be
upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator
Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to
the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose,
Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may
lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that
does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is
pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional
Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator
Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and
election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of
Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he
might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not
respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on
the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this
connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established
principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts
to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action.
Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit
the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive
to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by,
statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists
or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together
with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in
the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States,
Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum,
from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor
to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used
to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also
Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio
St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108;
emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain
amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance
with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may
be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of
political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the
questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the
court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing
board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the
amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it
has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by
the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it
has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to
act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re
Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills,
69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151
Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the
Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law
or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The
courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely
because they involve political question, but because they are
matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to
him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and
acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts
cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the
particular matter under his control. But every officer under a
constitutional government must act according to law and subject
him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the
special duty of determining the limitations which the law places
upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown
except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that
the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which
Webster said were the greatest contained in any written
constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the
present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of
the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate,
and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance
with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given
situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether
such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the
constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis
supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but,
also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised
by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the
Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of
the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party,
namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In
the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido
moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be
given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-
quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second
largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected
formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to
nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs,
not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other
Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having
the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being
devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of
said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens
Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the
Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel
Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal,
although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he
has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral
Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that he
reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate,
after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his
motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea,
Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate
adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp.
329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator
Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada,
but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only
one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only
Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do.,
pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not
one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its
spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez,
Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned,
expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364,
375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole
morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution
of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at
7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel,
with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377).
When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew
his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on
behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected,
Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I
nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House.
Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the
Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now
making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two
other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal:
Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations
from the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the
nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado
and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to
be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm
conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by
the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista
Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate
three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few
moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my
objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two
additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios
Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha
por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los
Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal
Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan,
no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and
have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the
nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of
Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal,
the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily
be nominated by the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party,
to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to
the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9)
members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory;
that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the
majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only,
on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no
two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen
by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said
Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the
aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the
number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that,
accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of
said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo
Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid
and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the
organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of
Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from
Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias
inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator
Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had
created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the
framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed
part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he
subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada
"is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which
"approximates the situation desired by the framers of the
Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-
330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only
minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in
the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be
given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't
believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator
Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right."
(Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as
Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to
nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second
largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such
a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from
Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator
Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was
by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and
the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when
Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition
with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a
Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When
the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not
lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the,
Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the
certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election
was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id.,
id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring
to Senator Tañada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the
first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And
whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-
that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the
representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground
and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation ..
approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that
Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the
Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to
Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral
Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator
Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege"
to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on
behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only
without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of
the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room
for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party,
represented by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second
largest number of votes in said House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main
argument in support of the mandatory character of the
constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is
imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which
are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen
and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the
solution of the question before this Court, for the practical
construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been
uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of
substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of
contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As
a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is
clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation
thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or
in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the
application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that,
"except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical
construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a
doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made
imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may
he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed
up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so
essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on
contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to
change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest
doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do
not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is
demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent
herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the
word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral
Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect
to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part
of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral
portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have
not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be
deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each
Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards
the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the
Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory
of petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for
the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M.
Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the
organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not
altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the
lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number
of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The
undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats,
the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of
them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the
determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a
great number of the people as well as by the organs of public
opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in
the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws
was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political
justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of
thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the
determination of election contests, following the practice in some
countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of
the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by
Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in
its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests
involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority
party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases,
because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority,
and when you make each House the judge of every election protest
involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a
position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result
was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices:
committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of
the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that
justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving
Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority
when he had an election case, and it was only through the
intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming
the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old
system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they
were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election
protests decided under the old system was that the majority being
then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest,
was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and
injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361;
emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to
create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three
of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes,
and three from the party having the second largest number votes so
that these members may represent the party, and the members of
said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees.
For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe
that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our
Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the
election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time
when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative
department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the
members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that
body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns
and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also
expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the
greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was
the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the
United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States,
and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the
legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that
would make the determination of this contest, of this election
protest, purely political as has been observed in the past."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis
supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate
contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the
constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon
the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the
equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority
parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some
members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would
insure greater political justice in the determination of election
contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if
the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate
Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the
Electoral Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the
hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the
minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would
make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from
experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House
or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party
from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only
the majority but also the minority should intervene in these
questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be
no tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me
most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this
intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to
the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be
any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but
questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as
well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest
because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in
this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the
three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the
determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of
justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well,
it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme
Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application
of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters
having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in
these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the
fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party
interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration
of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied
rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of
the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee
which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three
justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say
again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain
tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they
really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of
the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we
shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in
power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not
given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained
against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that
the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not
only by three members of the majority but also by three members
of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial
judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis
supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this
Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he
asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When,
therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as
a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove
stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All
that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution,
the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the
wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however,
as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as
the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body
in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in
its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.)
7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention,
Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir
informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho
gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres
miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte
Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a
dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta
cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los
de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema
consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers
of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an
Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for
each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting
members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of
votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were
given the same number of representatives in the Electoral
Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and
thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the
Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of
representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the
influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional
provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had
moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the
nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the
Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so
as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant
majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its
composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so
to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That
is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III,
p. 349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the
three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is
hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to
protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will
act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function.
But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were
men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not
angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go
to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free
from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope
that the three from the majority and the three from the minority
who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they
do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner,
still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the
result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the
three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the
protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to
prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of
the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded
by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but
will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices,
will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or
protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers
of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral
Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in
creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never
allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by
seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the
hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor
either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political
parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the
Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as
representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators
Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the
Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral
Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the
nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine
whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral
Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the
party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital
feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said
parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by
the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In
the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature
reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution",
pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized
(Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351,
355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims
as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the
true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of
a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the
spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the
letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit
of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and
clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the
pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory
provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished
from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of
this question, as of every other question of statutory construction,
the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative
intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances,
and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its
object, and the consequences which would result from construing it
one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in
connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive
character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect
the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that
they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of
them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as
mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand,
the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be
deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried
out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require
a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words
as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would
in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. ..
Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether
the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required,
or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can
often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly,
when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial
matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of
convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a
statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and
prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory,
unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is
regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no
injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative
can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with
substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision
relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of
substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute,
which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows
that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be
essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same
antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the
exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other
powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory.
(Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-
467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to,
and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the
Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the
resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is
vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the
essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is
mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and
void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit
the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar,
to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that
the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the
framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of
the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted
maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations
can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority
party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents'
contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12
has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he
should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said
member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically
handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal.
Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators,
because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous
position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the
aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would
have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against
one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the
Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the
majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same
would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political
parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive
moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be
wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide
open for the predominance of political considerations in the
determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal,
which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly
strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of
fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he
explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon
their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election
of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made
dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above
referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the
method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual
qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of
experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great
note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of
endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the
Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of
action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the
Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning
individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice
created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of
political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in
proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which
it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished
members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice
to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in
the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority
disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are
worthy of notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very
frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal
basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at
least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16
senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the
senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates
of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or
terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the
elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election
frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only
one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment
on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the
contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral
Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6
members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most
respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an
interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the
very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could
entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy
in the Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party,
or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the
majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there
might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are
filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a
need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to
the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is
a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of
the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they
could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in
the Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered
in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates
who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis
supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner
Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those
meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even
those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive
does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved.
(11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371).
The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of
the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of
the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is
founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be
permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there
can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator
Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his
rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party,
other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration,
act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of
Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the
Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators
Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly
asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination.
He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to
questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other
party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that
confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate.
Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by
respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by
virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed.
In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and
independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have
not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof
to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate
the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the
Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of
them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate
has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias,
and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of
said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however,
that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended
by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman,
presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure
members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any
rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of
its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and
control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will,
hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4)
respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the
Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that,
respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A.
Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that
they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the
powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from
acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No.
4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is
dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes,
J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949
WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs,
JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port
of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as General
Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents:
PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, intervenor.
Tañada, Pelaez & Teehankee, Pandatun, Arches & Sayo, and De
Santos, Herrera & Delfino for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor
Lucas Lacson for respondents.
Roxas, Picazo & Mejia for intervenor.
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Miguel Cuenco and Nicolas Belmonte as
amici curiae.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent
Customs Officials from cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping
Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to
petitioner. The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts
is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore
not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine
registry. The Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that
petitioner violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed
between them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner
having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen. The Philippine Shipowners' Association was later
allowed to intervene and it filed its answer against the petitioner.
The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William
Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen, and this Court holds that he is one.
Article IV of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission
manner provided by law. of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the stated.
herein petitioner William Chiongbian, was elected to and held the The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The
office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental mere deletion of the phrase — "and their descendants," — is not
Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because
submitted to this Court; by the findings of the National Bureau of the learned framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous,
Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately
Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also covered by subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the
shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over
Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor. the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.
it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of
Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein petitioner, having been sale with the Philippine Shipping Administration on the ground of
elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his
the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a
section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the deliberate misrepresentation but an error. which any person not
herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner
citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his merely meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of
father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said law and not by birth.
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ
jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of of prohibition is hereby granted and respondent Customs officials
his father. are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted petitioner's vessels and respondent Philippine Administration is
by subsection 2 (Article IV, Constitution) is strictly personal and does hereby enjoined from rescinding the sale of the three vessels made
not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this to petitioner. No costs. It is ordered.
contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this
subsection was adopted by the Constitutional Convention merely to
grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the
possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its
framers. Secondly, it is argued that the original draft of said
subsection 2 contained the phrase — "and their descendants," —
which was deleted from the final draft, thus showing that this
privilege of citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to the
one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his
descendants.
With regard to the first argument, it may be said that the members
of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision fully
cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA
CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR
GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN
(OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN.
PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
CUEVAS, JR., J.:
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and
ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila
International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country
after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The
assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country
which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic.
The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to
all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing
and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad
hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known
as the Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D.
1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various
witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary
and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses
who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board
were the herein private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major
General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas
Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero
Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were
submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by
its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely:
Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and
Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and
turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After
conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the
TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2)
Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S.
Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and
another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman,
who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the
prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both
criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories,
along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate
Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases,
the Prosecution represented by the Office of the petition
TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its
evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before
the Agrava Board. 6 Private respondents, through their respective
counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private
respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies
of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence
against him in the above-entitled cases" 7 contending that its
admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D.
1886. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as
evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the
other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to
exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same
ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions
contending that the immunity relied upon by the private
respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to
invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact
Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the
TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their
respective memorandum on the issue after which said motions will
be considered submitted for resolution. 10
On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present
and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing,
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for
exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by
agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the
opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support
thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are
to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the
prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary
evidences.11 On June 3, 1985, the prosecution made a written
"Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the
testimonies of private respondents and other evidences produced
by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked
in the course of the trial.12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal
offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their
respective motion for exclusion.
On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a
Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the
evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or
other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution
having been DENIED, they now come before Us by way of
certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the
challenged Resolution on the ground that it was issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother
of deceased Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for
certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from the same
factual beginnings and raising practically Identical issues, the two (2)
petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt
with and resolved in this Decision.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of
the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did
not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava
Board.
It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the
petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible
against the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's
failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by
P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not invoke said privilege,
the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending
that such failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a
waiver thereof. 16 The private respondents, on the other hand, claim
that notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be
used against them as mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886.
They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second
clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the
first clause of the same Section would suffer from constitutional
infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self-
incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in horns on the
effect and legal significance of failure to set up the privilege against
self-incrimination.
The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this
Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving
immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question coupled with
the extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did
nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon which
this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore
unexplored area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental
task, however, We shall be guided, as always, by the constitution
and existing laws.
The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular
public clamor that an impartial and independent body, instead of
any ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting
the investigation. The then early distortions and exaggerations, both
in foreign and local media, relative to the probable motive behind
the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or
involved in the assassination hastened its creation and heavily
contributed to its early formation. 19
Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board,
the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and
purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of
determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but
more importantly, the determination of the person or persons
criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before
the bar of justice. For indeed, what good will it be to the entire
nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts and
circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless
not be dealt with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12
of the said Presidential Decree, the pertinent portion of which
provides —
SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should
the findings warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may
initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate got
government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar
investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination
of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and
ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees
"any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at
any stage of the proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing
environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of
receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not
merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-
participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned
and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one
where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in
order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of
the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character
and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents,
suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver
and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they
were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava
Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or
be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them
no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce
evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do
so. 21 The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before
conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot
invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of
which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental
law. 21-a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away
totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and
produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available
only to a person undergoing custodial interrogation? We find no
categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter
which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass
of jurisprudence 23 on this specific portion of the subject provision.
In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person
detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation
has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel,
and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him
may be used against him. Significantly however, there has been no
pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person
similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense,
if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition
mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use
the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words
"under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the
phrase "any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto
the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither are we
impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word
"confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4
connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation, for
although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not
only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this
section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession
or admission and against third person. 25
It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under
a more formidable ordeal and graver trying conditions than one who
is at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator
in both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from
the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him. This is the lamentable
situation we have at hand.
All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are
members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while
disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on
that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were
among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General
Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-
petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General
Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom
others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the case. The
papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging
tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another
participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that
brought about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt then
that their being asked to testify, was to determine whether they
were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in
the said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe
that private respondents' being called to the witness stand was
merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the
tragedy, which was already so abundantly supplied by other
ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records
show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses
called by the Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the
line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies
before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than
merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and
circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination
reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they
were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in
the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at
the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that
particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent
and that any statement given by them may be used against them. If
the investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other
police agency, all the herein private respondents could not have
been compelled to give any statement whether incriminatory or
exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be admonished
of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be
informed that any and all statements given by them may be used
against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights
simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not
by any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued
testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their rights to
remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But
in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the
awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to
testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they
testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be
compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right
to remain silent.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion 'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant. 26
Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley"
citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where certain police officers
summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General
involving the fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following
a warning that if they did not answer they would be removed from
office and that anything they said might be used against them in any
criminal proceeding, and the questions were answered, the answers
given cannot over their objection be later used in their prosecutions
for conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court went further in
holding that:
the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment
against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent proceedings
of statements obtained under threat or removal from office, and
that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members
of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562. The Court also held
that in the context of threats of removal from office the act of
responding to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an
effective waiver of the privilege against self- incrimination.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly
hopeless cause, petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio
Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal
case. Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private
respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs.
Kapunan 28 doctrine militates very heavily against this theory. Said
case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates. It is
not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And
yet, when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify
upon being called as a witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a
forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's
plea that for him to be compelled to testify will be in violation of his
right against self- incrimination. We did not therein state that since
he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal
cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can
invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question
which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
profounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to
be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29 If in a mere
forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in
favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied
to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where
his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him,
hang on the balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be
found in the historical background of this constitutional provision
against self- incrimination. The privilege against self- incrimination is
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In
the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of
American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws were
similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows:
That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself. 30
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other
import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other
than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to
testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is
not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case
No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the
afore-discussed sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to
"due process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-
respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court, the
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due process —
... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to
any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has
been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting Idea of fair play (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and
the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political
thought."(Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It
is not a narrow or '"echnical conception with fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
1961, 367 US 1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a
'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to
form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw, 1939, 308 US 313).
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the
oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel,
failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The
manner in which the testimonies were taken from private
respondents fall short of the constitutional standards both under
the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in
Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional
infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot
be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. This is true
regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the
presence of a grant of immunity by law. Nevertheless, We shall rule
on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private
respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886
which issue was squarely raised and extensively discussed in the
pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which
grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known
as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as
follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled
testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the
criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand,
"transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates." 32 Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically
Section 5 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
(Emphasis supplied)
it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of
immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any
statement given before the Board, but not immunity from
prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying
and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against
self- incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of
such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs
the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due
process, demands that private respondents should have been
informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements to be given by them may be used against them. This,
they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it
and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted
and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self-
incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent
use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned
upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution,
which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession
obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this
exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, 33 whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by
an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Any interpretation
of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the
Constitution must be avoided. So much so that if two or more
constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then
that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even
though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the more
usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To save the
statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a
reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental
law. 35Apparent conflict between two clauses should be
harmonized. 36
But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege
against self- incrimination as a condition sine qua non to the grant
of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has
the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make
such claim. P.D. 1886, however, forecloses such option of refusal by
imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and impose appropriate penalties therefor. A person
guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by
the Board. ...
Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves
the witness no choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the
immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such
application is apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however,
forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings against anyone
who makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion
imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the
sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the witness' right
against self-incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the
constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,
meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-
extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence,
under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in
fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer,
so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case,
the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private
respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure
the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner
as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in
view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to
answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies
compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the
same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886
cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the
temper of the times, we run the risk of being consigned to
unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the
frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly
adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding
solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil
libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr.
Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs. Manalang 38 and
we quote:
I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the
interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I
have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in an situations
which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of
consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would
blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity
of any human being. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this
disposition passing upon the guilt or innocence of the herein private
respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are
merely resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein
made applies to all similarly situated, irrespective of one's rank and
status in society.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the
instant petitions without merit, same are DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.