INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE NIMFA SIAM, REPRESENTED BY CHARITO J. SIAN-PARRENO v.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

513 SCRA 662 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Petitioners Nimfa Sian, et al. filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Negros Occidental for
cancellation of mortgage liens annotated on three titled properties against Bacolod branch

of the Petitioner Philippine National Bank-Republic Bank (PNB-RB), now Maybank Philippines, Inc.
(Maybank), and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Sian, et al. died and was substituted by her
sister. PNB filed a Motion for Substitution and Motion to Dismiss alleging that Maybank referred the case
to PNB for it acquired legal interest over the properties subject of the petition. Sian, et al. opposed the
said motion as there was no evidence to support the claim. The contention was well taken by the trial
court as such favored Sian, et al. PNB consequently applied for annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals. The same was affirmed since it was of the opinion that PNB was denied due process.

Sian, et al. contend that the petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available to PNB since it
failed to avail of the remedy of appeal through its own fault and negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PNB was denied of due process and hence, if it can be a ground for an annulment of
judgment

HELD:

The Court said that although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the annulment of a
final judgment or order of an RTC may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground therefore denial of due process.

Sian, et al.‟s argument that PNB could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment due to its
failure to appeal to the Trial Court‘s order dated August 15, 2002 fails. The court said that since the Motion
for Substitution of PNB was denied, PNB had no personality to assail the said order.

It was not PNB‘s fault if it was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story. The court said
that whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioner‘s motion to include PNB as defendant is not for
the court to reason why. The undeniable fact remains that PNB in not a party in this case and any portion
of the trial‘s court‘s judgment cannot be binding on it.
 LLAMAS vs. CA
G.R. No. 149588
September 29, 2009

FACTS:

The petitioners were charged with the crime of “other forms of swindling” penalized under Article 316 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code. They were subsequently found guilty beyond reasonable ground, which was
affirmed by the CA. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration that was also denied. Later on, they
questioned for the first time the jurisdiction of the Court. There being no action taken by the trial court
on the said motion, the petitioners instituted the respective decisions of the trial and appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC and CA since the Courts did not take any
action when the petitioners raise the issue of jurisdiction

HELD: The Court answered in the negative.

The Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules. It explained that the
remedy of annulment of judgement cannot be availed in criminal cases. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgement. It cannot be resorted to when the RTC
judgement being questioned was rendered in a criminal case.

CAMILO SIBAL v. PEDRO BUQUEL

FACTS:

(this case has a lot of confusing facts, just read the original if this digest fails to compress everything)
The Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane
planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Included also in those attached
were real properties wherein 8mout of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin which was first
acquired by Macondray & Co and then later on bought by Valdez in an auction. First Cause for
petitioner: That Within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to
redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the
price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid
thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept
the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Second Cause for petitioner: That Valdez
was trying to harvest palay from four out of seven parcels of land. Petitioner filed for preliminary
injunction to stop defendant from 1) distributing the lands 2) harvesting and selling the sugar canes,
and 3) harvesting and selling the palay. The writ was issued which prevented defendant from
planting and harvesting the lands. Defendant later appealed claiming that he was the owner of many
of the alleged land thus he also owns the crops of it. The court awarded the defendant 9,439.08
because the petitioner unduly denied the defendant to plant in his land thus preventing him to profit
thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane is personal o real property? (The relevance of the issue is with regards to
the sugar cane of the Petitioner which came from the land that now belongs to the defendant)

RULING:
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates
as real property the following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the
land or form an integral part of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in
recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de España, which holds that, under certain
conditions, growing crops may be considered as personal property.

In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as personal property. In the case
of Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court said: "True, by article
465 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees
before they are cut down . . . are considered as part of the land to which they are attached, but the
immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the crop
acquired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop is attached. . . . The existence
of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance,
rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the
possible mobilization of the growing crop."
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. SC lowered the award for damages to
the defendant to 8,900.80 by acknowledging the fact that some of the sugar canes were owned by
the petitioner and by reducing the calculated expected yield or profit that defendant would have
made if petitioner did not judicially prevent him from planting and harvesting his lands.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS-FORMER THIRTEENTH DIVISION, HON. UNDERSECRETARY JOSE
M. ESPAÑOL, JR., Hon. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, and HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR ALLAN M.
MACARAYA, respondents.

Facts:

The Department of Labor and Employment conducted a routine inspection in San Miguel Corporation,
Iligan City and it was discovered that there was underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday pay to
its employees. DOLE sent a copy of inspection result to SMC which the latter contested the findings.
SMC failed to submit proof and hence the Director of DOLE of Iligan District Office issued a compliance
 order to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees the Muslim Holidays. SMC appealed to DOLE
main office but dismissed for having been filed late but later on reconsidered because it is within
reglementary period but still dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, this present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not non-Muslim employees working in Muslim areas is entitled to Muslim Holiday Pay.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to pay its non-Muslim employees.
The basis for this decision were Articles 169 and 170 of P.D. No. 1083 “Code of Muslim Personal Laws”
which listed all official Muslim holidays and provincies and cities where officially observed. In this case,
SMC is located in Iligan which is covered in the those provisions. Also Article 169 and 170 of PD No. 1083
should be read in conjunction with Article 94 of Labor Code which provides for the right of every worker
to be paid of holiday pay.

Petitioner asserts Art.3(3) of PD No. 1083 provides that it shall be applicable only to Muslims. However,
the Court said that said article declares that nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the
prejudice of a non-Muslim. There should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays.

It was said also that the The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining Undersecretary Español who
stated: “Assuming arguendo that the respondent’s position is correct, then by the same token, Muslims
throughout the Philippines are also not entitled to holiday pays on Christian holidays declared by law as
regular holidays. We must remind the respondent-appellant that wages and other emoluments granted
by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the criteria laid down by laws and certainly
not on the basis of the worker’s faith or religion.”

Sarmiento v. Zaratan
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner. ( MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate the
premises.)

Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.

In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance
with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply
memorandum within 15 days from receipt.

Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which
to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five
days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of
filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the
grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.

On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal as
follows:

Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on May
19, 2003 (Registry Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298). Thus, under Section 7(b),
Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or until June 3, 2003 within which
to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further appears on record, however, the required
Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days
beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted the
petition of respondent. The appellate court nullified and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent’s appeal. Consequently, respondent’s appeal memorandum was admitted
and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper.

Held: In this case, the answer is NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to
include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the
RTC, the latter’s motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of
Appeal and payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the
Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days within
which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule
15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such
a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory.
As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to
be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to
avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of
the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without
giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of
the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with.

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The
required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm
and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion
was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration
of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended
period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to
resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where notice
to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex
parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence
and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural
justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that
"ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under
circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where
notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.