1
1. Marbury v Madison:
The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was
illegal, but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via
writ of mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme
Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.
Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek
a remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress
did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation
because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.
In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the
power to declare a law unconstitutional.
2. Angara v Electoral Tribunal:
The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
3. PACU v Secretary of Education:
Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental
to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between litigants.
4. Tan v Macapagal:
As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made
concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate
case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is
the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and
until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent
being announced it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law.
5. People v Vera:
There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized
representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also
not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.
6. Macasiano v NHA:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality
of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be very lis mota presented.8 To reiterate, the
essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality
of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision
of the case.9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of.
7. Kilosbayan v Guingona:
The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners which was
raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court
finds this petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even
higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos
it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.
Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that
he is a taxpayer, it does not mean, however, that in each and every
instance where such a ground is invoked, this Court is left with no
alternative except to hear the parties. In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 we

clarified that "as far as a taxpayer's suit s concerned, this Court is not
devoid of the discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."
8. Senate v Ermita:
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in
G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to
the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in
the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were
brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different
committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its
oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al.
have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the
House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O.
464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the
implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the
marginalized and underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner
groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and
defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls
short of that required to confer standing on them as parties injured-in-
fact.[40]
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may
not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464
does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.[41]
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in
the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of
E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties
to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association
v. Ongpin[42] and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[43]
respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[44]
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not
only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but
more especially for sound legislation[45] is not disputed. E.O. 464,
however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to
access information that is crucial to law-making.[46] Verily, the Senate,
including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over
2
the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.[47]
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna),
Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin
Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza
(Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464,
the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the
implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a
claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing
requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in
the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the
legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the
party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-
defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.[48]
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing
to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners
COURAGE and CODAL is rendered unnecessary.[49]
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an
organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,[50] invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting
that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is
essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights[51] and to
the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of
the government through the principle of checks and balances.[52]
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and
other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,[53] this Court held that when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal
standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which
this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to
be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public)
or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.[54] The first and last determinants not being
present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution
of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its
petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is
vague and uncertain, and at best is only a generalized interest which it
shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether
actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which
serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution.[55] In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party
does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
8. Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo:
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court
the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
9. Tatad v Garcia:
For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public funds
— which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs.
Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) — has greater application in the Philippines than
that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the
expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers
thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the price
being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in
3
Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and
employee of the Government was not permitted to question the
constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of
Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and
Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain
appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the
reason that impelled this Court to take such position in said two (2) cases
— the importance of the issues therein raised — is present in the case at
bar. Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases,
petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he
represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated
political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
10. Tanada v Cuenco:
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,
in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
11. Francisco v House of Representatives:
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now
apply this standard to the present controversy.
12. League of Cities v COMELEC:
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as
unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and
fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an
admission that the law is unconstitutional.
However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact
doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning
of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and

employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood
Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a
gravely dangerous precedent.
Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already
implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court,
can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued
despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the
wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their
immediate implementation before the Court can declare them
unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate the
Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the
Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied
as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces
no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act
13. Lopez v Roxas:
Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.1
This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely
some specified or limited judicial power, but "the" judicial power under
our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other
agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications" of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives which is vested by the fundamental law solely
in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.2
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts
of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.3 The proper
exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such
enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on
appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts," subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.4
Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for
president or vice-president, who believe that he was the candidate who
obtained the largest number of votes for either office, despite the
4
proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the president-elect
or vice-president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest
a recount of the votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right
thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on this matter were
not justiciable.
14. In re Cunanan:
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes
the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress
by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment
and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on
the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
15. Fabian v Desierto:
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in
spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we
shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and
other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard
its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a
statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty
of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs
in a case before them for judgement.[12]

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions
which are not raised in the pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized
to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring
into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in
the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.[14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in
the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at
any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The Court ex mero motu may
take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the
fact is developed.[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
16. Macalintal v PET:
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has
merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact
that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts
of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate
courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also,
comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited
number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of
courts of first instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal
court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even,
separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct
and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land
registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic
relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial
capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited
than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases
which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other
words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions
pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics
different from those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first
instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate
5
jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and,
appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one
Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance,
clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of first
instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of
land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although
with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing
ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to
itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar
to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of
Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the
power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It
merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of
the Supreme Court.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is
obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully
defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as
well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
20. In re: COA Opinion:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law
for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme
Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10
typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even
informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.
 6

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must

have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the
petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless
provision.