CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

EN BANC G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA
and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the
Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ,
and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective
positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents'
Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other
petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay
Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of
Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as
members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of
which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have
signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the
barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents
be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain
that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which
shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to
June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has
the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986,
which provided:
 SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6)
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may
continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term
of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace
petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the
effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must
be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2,
Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982
declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local
governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for
in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay
officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no
legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as
Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N.
DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS,
as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of
Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as
Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic Development
Authority, respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

FERNAN, C.J.:

These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The
pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in
favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than
his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-
third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the
limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which provides as follows:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with
the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to
seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further
seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining
order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple
positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other
forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse
or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.

Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-
executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice
who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by
law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of
the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No.
284.6

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they
allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.
This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers –– one,
the President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general –– allegedly "abolished the clearly separate,
higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead
by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2)8 provides:

Sec. 7. . . . . .Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified
by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988,10 being the first official construction and
interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution,
involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion
No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ
Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to
positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to
the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned
(disparate positions).

In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission
applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended
to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
or assistants.

There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between
petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the
Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second
paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned.

The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

We rule in the negative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or
boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to
his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the
present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly
denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa.12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the
Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-
Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."

Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government service were the data contained
therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies,
instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco,
Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben
B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11)
each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of ten (10) each.13

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore
quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution
the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in
these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the
assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the
government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued.

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
"(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .".
Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government,including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government."

It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an
office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking
contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government."
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private
office or employment.

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also succinctly
articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the
anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on
them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of
the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents'
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate
the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch
from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below
Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This
observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to
say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7,
par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall
not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions
under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13,
Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-
vis Section 13, Article VII.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. 17 Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.19

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.20

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not,
however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that
these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd
consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under
Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of
National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason
to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council
(NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his department for policy
coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.

The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy
direction in the areas of money, banking and credit.25

Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a
continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and
unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely,
not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an
"act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority,29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority.30

The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs,
cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from
the other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already performed under their original appointments."32

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The
term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.33 The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but
must be required by the official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions
are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to
the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by
the Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official management functions
and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which
are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise
and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and
delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet
members, to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.35 Without these additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of
the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned
has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary
of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be
in the form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,
such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of
his position,"36 express reference to certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made.37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when
although not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is
necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade
and Industry.38

While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional functions
and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him without offending the constitutional
prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7,
par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986.
Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed article on General
Provisions.39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on July 22,
1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department, containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986.41 It was only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and
"styling" by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and
reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."

What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of
specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of
the qualified and delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all appointive
public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it
could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general
Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.

That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family is by reason of the legal
principles governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any
rate, we have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary
functions may be considered as not constituting "any other office."

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.1âwphi1Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face."43 The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in
the framers's understanding thereof.44

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment
in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's
manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two
(2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict application of the prohibition
mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members would be
stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier
clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the
feared impractical consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more
than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages
to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and
economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin
and taking in more than what he can handle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel
V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish
their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are
no longer occupying the positions complained of.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the
services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.47 Any per diem, allowances or
other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore
be retained by them.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO,
PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.

Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas
petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates
of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo
Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were
proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the
Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique
Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No.
4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista
Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as
member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and
over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1)
Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral
Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as
Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on
February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1)
Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of
the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private
secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of
Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner
Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have
their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the
Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon
nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista
Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral
Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged..
hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said
public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito
restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
pending this action.

"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that
they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of
the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the
appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and
private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses,
that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members
of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right
to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel,
and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact
that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective
representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy
available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action
against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their
duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the
author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to
determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach
upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same,
thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular
service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or
attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).

The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its
jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers
of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes
the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive,
there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may
not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under
the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as
incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of
an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to
do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by
respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect
that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes
cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the
latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our
resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a
quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body.
The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate
electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the
Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera
vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in
the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political
alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said
reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar
question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in
the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised,
either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
xxx xxx xxx
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper
remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is,
therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use
petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of
the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is
not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February
21, 1956, Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the
latter declined the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel
aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the
Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme
Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference
in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court."
But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my
right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the
theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the
provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned
statement of Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if
my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In
this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the
courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts,
therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the
executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the
departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to
deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is
frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182
N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-
compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is
correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual
vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view
contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In
Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90;
Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion
determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial
control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people
have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from
judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot
be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the
particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject
him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the
special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown
except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which
Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void.
This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings
in connection therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue
raised by the parties herein.

II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members
of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said
party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of
the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be
nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally to this
motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the
Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having
the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of
said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the
Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said
Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the
Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would
nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators
Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956
(Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator
Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he
being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was
raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which
Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do.,
do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and
afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40
p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp.
377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator
Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that
is Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am
now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I
nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators
Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my
sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only
permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my
objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la
nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser
miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after
the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said
Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and
which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of
nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be",
is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby
"waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these
respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate
merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the
appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of
Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the
privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word
"privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was
not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the
end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the
Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the
Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.

"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in
the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I
don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a
matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege
to nominate," adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there
is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that
when Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between
the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens
Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere
coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party
separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis
supplied.).

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.

"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And
whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the
representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation ..
approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the
Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral
Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the
"privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this
Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the
Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Tañada, as the party
having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the
constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used,
is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts
of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the
solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been
uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of
contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional
provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed
to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous
construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory
provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department,
contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount
considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so
essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to
change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest
doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is
demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the
word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with
respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered,
therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot
conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be
considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for
the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr.
Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the
determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many
complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and
dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that
characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great
number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic
laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a
camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in
some countries, like England and Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by
Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong
declared:.

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority
party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a
minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the
majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so
main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been
made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became
a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was
saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and
they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the
majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many
abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members:
Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest
number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral
tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along
party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.

"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the
legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was
entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was
some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that
provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of
the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained.
But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been
observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because
of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of
some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same,
would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would
be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of
the Electoral Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the
minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from
experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of
party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these
questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that
with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if
there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members
of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said
parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is
really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of
Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case,
there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall
have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party
interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be
applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best
guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral
Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the
justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three
justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in
electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the
majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the
Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139),
he asserted:.

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world.
When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice
of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a
composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme
Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft.,
dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale
pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos,
sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la
minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
emphasis supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of
an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of
judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest
number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the
Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said
cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number
of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had
moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number
of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral
Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties
and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of
power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is
hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they
will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being
learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we
should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our
party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should
result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the
guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices
who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the
majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the
Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial
offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the
framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and
secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or
motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis
supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the
Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator
Tañada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said
party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to
the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the
party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of
said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said
Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the
Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp.
330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to
discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is
within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within
the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished
from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory
construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the
surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to
the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and
the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be
made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as
mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may
be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does
not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and
never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or
directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form,
and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision
of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than
substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as
directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating
to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute,
which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such
provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must
exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be
regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article
VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral
Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein,
with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The
procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called
upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at
bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen
by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375).
Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution,
for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3)
members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second
largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12
has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said
member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal.
Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already
disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority
thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The
equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices
of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of
political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers
of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter
of fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon
their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made
dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the
method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of
experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of
endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of
action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the
demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the
party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-
28, 33, 34, supra.).

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented
in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein
are worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the
legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate,
the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8
candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-
elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no
senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority
parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme
Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this
Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt
and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of
the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral
protests are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest,
and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully
exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6
members of the majority party in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party
candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to
court." (Emphasis supplied.).

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive
constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes,
even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are
involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the
organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that
where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S.,
874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged
waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested
exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not
lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said
petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth
of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature
of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la
Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the
legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators
who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as
members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or
party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal,
are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold,
however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not
lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the
majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and
there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A.
Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and
that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal
and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the
petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without
special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
EN BANC G.R. No. 122156

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic
partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the
Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other
Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.[3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to
this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
 On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6]Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus,
for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done. [9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which
only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited
in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not
make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State,
not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid
is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise
its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for
mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty
to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to
the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is
founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature
to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. [12] A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have
often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.[15]

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote
from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the
wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as
against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over
aliens ?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws
or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For example,
qualifications on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring
supplied by respondents).

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. [17] Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of
the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first
and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.[19]

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation [20] speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the
promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights [27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of
total human liberation and development.[33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality.[36]

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During
World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the American
forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for
their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost
every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
 For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.[38]

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least
60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist
in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED
BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it
is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned
by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.

MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not
to juridical personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I
can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.

MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
 MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino First policy.That means that
Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified
by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO
FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x

The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to
the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and
a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference
here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate
the Manila Hotel.[44]

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory
and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by the
government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical
life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of
the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on
constitutional government is apt -

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts -
provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or
perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates.[45]

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of
the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC
a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state
action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. [46]

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the
State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent
GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in
the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land.Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest,
bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws
of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any
of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was
well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners
alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino
fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it
had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter
have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To
insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to
insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would
rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS
is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine,
the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.The position of the Court on this
matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the
executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism
for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction
issued by the Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a
major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to
or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate
the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective
should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there
is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. [49]

Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing
in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the
people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the
demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a
historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking
about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of
a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark -
this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino
psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a
nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national
pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be
preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This
is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group),
with other groups[1] and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
(RA 6735).

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions.[6] These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of theirinitiative.[7]

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Courts ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections[8] declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.[9]

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their
petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties
to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the will of the sovereign people.
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (Binay Group) pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show
cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELECs verification of signatures and for entertaining the Lambino
Groups petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Groups petition as an opposition-in-
intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Groups petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court
to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its
implementing rules as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Groups petition. The
supporting intervenors[10] uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying
on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors[11] hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Groups standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the
signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Groups compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of
the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Groups compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving
the parties memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments
to the Constitution through a peoples initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to implement the initiativeclause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a peoples
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Courts ruling
in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition, thus:
 MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready
and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed[14] the concept of peoples initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States[15] which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement
is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and
that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.[16]

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v.
State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead
the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might
not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the
requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.[17] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,[18] the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

 The purposes of full text provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms.
x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters
can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition.); x x x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to
be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.) (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.[19]

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people
must sign the petition x x x as signatories.

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and
do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that
the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet[20] after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral
arguments was the signature sheet attached[21] to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty.
Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadras opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Groups
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Verified
Legislative District: Barangay: Signatures:

PROPOSITION: DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition
for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
 Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification
Number Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

_________________ _________________ __________________

Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Groups proposed changes in the signature
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the petition that
the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino
Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Groups draft petition which they later filed
on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30
August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his
answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost
seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentados
Verification/Certification of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the Official
Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines[22] has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the
approach to support the proposals of the Peoples Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
 WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members
of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the Peoples Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend
amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the
expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution
as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through Peoples
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE
UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE
PEOPLES CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through peoples initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the
1987 Constitution. The proposals of the Consultative Commission[24] are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the
Preamble to the Transitory Provisions.The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Groups proposed changes do not touch. The
Lambino Groups proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the
introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August
2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six
months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Groups claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Groups proposed changes.

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were
inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had
shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the
petition of 25 August 2006 inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group
did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with,
the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC, thus:
 [T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that (w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act. [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Groups statement that they circulated to the people the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC appears
an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters)
and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their
Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated the petition for initiative but failed to mention
the amended petition.This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was
the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that a signer who did not read the measure attached to
a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act. The
Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed changes were not incorporated
with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Groups citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their
feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-
gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less
than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition
or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition
they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print
additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters
printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the
printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Groups Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits
that petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x
x.[25] This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to
show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition,
assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for
ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum
number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Groups signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the
signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a
mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition. The signature sheet is not the petition envisioned in
the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament
can be re-elected indefinitely;[26]

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all
the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members
of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; [27]

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.[28]

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Groups signature sheets. The people who
signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the
contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-
gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed
changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changesbelies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the
word next before the phrase election of all local government officials. This would have insured that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of
the word next allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even
beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group
deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes
would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.

The Lambino Groups initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed
changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section
4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
 Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitutionconsistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a surplusage and the Court and the people should simply
ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Groups initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject
matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,[29] the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes logrolling, which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts
to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendments proponents simplistic explanation
reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment
being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes
it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only
one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,[30] the Supreme Court
of Alaska warned against inadvertence, stealth and fraud in logrolling:

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to
increase the likelihood of an initiatives passage, and there is a greater opportunity for inadvertence, stealth and
fraud in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other
(more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process
for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish
the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the
interim Parliament as a constituent assembly.The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise
again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the
absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately
amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the
interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not directly proposed by the
people because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Groups amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed
Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
 Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not
schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present
members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of
half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30
June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister
will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They
could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliaments choice of
Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of
attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.

In short, the Lambino Groups initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon
three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
peoples initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to [A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to [A]mendments to this
Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
 MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us
last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission
of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution
and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and
(b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between amendment
and revision of the Constitution. The framersintended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a peoples initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,[32] the
Supreme Court of California ruled:

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the
proposing and the adopting or rejecting of laws and amendments to the Constitution and does not purport
to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter
termed the measure) now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our
 present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until
and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:[33]

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it
can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision;
and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on
the revision of the constitution drafted by the Commission for Constitutional Revision authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the
two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it
can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:[34]

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the
one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x
x While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and
to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by
which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed
restrictions, is unconstitutional. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to
insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a peoples initiative may only amend, never revise, the
Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino
Groups initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases
that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well
as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term amendment implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.[35](Emphasis supplied)
 Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation
of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution,
courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion
or alteration of numerous existing provisions.[36] The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.[37] Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches.[38] A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.[39]

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and
Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.[40] Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging
the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-
and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Groups proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,[42] an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution. The Supreme Court of Florida, striking
down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of
the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the
 states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary
change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people
should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain
from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and
there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the
State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were
to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.[43] (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Groups initiative not
only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments.
The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the
shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Groups present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. [44] There is no doubt that the
Lambino Groups present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because
the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such
endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both amendment
and revision when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide
only for amendment when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual
experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the
matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other
hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter
because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words revision and
amendment pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
interpreting the constitutional provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between amendment and revision cannot reasonably be in the
substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that
the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the
Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter
of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where
the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language.[45] Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes
the flimsiness of the Lambino Groups position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural
change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance
without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,[46]the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His
theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose
a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be
enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinctionbetween amendment and revision is determined
by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to a formal
overhauling of the constitution. They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of
the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure
will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law, the trial court correctly held that it violated Article
XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted
by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1,
relating to proposed amendments, the court said:

From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending
the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution. x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: It is the only section of the constitution which
provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may
place such a measure before the electorate. x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply
to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Groups theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for
revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment
or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present
initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government,
requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article,
the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age
from 18 years to 15 years[47] is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.[48] Also, a change requiring a college degree as
an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.[49]

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red
end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with
monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II [50] of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and
the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system
of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but
also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and
24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2,
ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case,
they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Groups draft of Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier
provision shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government. The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one shall be amended, which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments
that the requirement of a future amendment is a surplusage. In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory
construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency.However, it is not as simple
as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the Parliamentary system of government, and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of
a unicameral parliamentary form of government.
Now, what unicameral parliamentary form of government do the Lambino Groups proposed changes refer to ― the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealandmodels, which are among the few countries
with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary
forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the peoples initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in
many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a peoples initiative will only result in gross absurdities in
the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a peoples
initiative to [A]mendments to this Constitution.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present
petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on
some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.[51]

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the
Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even
before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories. Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the petition x x x as signatories.

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners. In the COMELEC, the Lambino
Group, claiming to act together with the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, No petition embracing more than one
(1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the
interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the
shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Groups initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Groups Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Groups initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Courts ruling
in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.[52] For following this Courts
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of
June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this
nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified
modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned
by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in
the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this
country.

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast[53] − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the
full expression of the peoples sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising
the Constitution.
 No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the peoples sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or let the people decide cannot override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the peoples fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political
groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nations stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the peoples voice. However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified
support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms. The Lambino Group
thus admits that their peoples initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of peoples voice or sovereign will in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the
peoples sovereign will, is the bible of this Court.This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Courts raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.