Sufficiency of Complaint or Information
All
PEOPLE vs. DIMAANO, G.R. No. 168168, September 14,
2005
Issue: Whether or not the complaint or information for attempted
rape sufficiently alleged the acts and omissions constituting the
offense.
 For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
 What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.
 No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the
crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information.
 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
 The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that
the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense
Sasot v People, 462 SCRA 138
 For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of
the respondent, it is accompanied by complainants
affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents,
and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed
before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez.
It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the
complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want
of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect
the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.
 In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an
acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of
the State of New York that the same has been
subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12,
1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate.
While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit
appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution
Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant’s
representative will present the authenticated notarized
original in court, and Prosecutor Guray manifested that
the original copy is already on hand. It is apt to state at
this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy.
LASOY VS ZENAROSA, 455 SCRA 138
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and
respondents submitted opposing views -- accused insisting on its
validity, whereas respondents asserted that the accused were
arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being
an alteration on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the
true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the
prosecution insisted that the first information under which
accused were arraigned is invalid.
 An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof.
 In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way
that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately
know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the
information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime
defined by law.
 Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is
that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was
committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to
 apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against
them, is reasonably complied with.
PEOPLE VS BATIN, GR 177223
 Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial
court that treachery was sufficiently proven during the
trial. All that Castor claims before us is that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
specifically alleged in the Information. The Information
filed against the Batins states that the accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and
with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO
REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him
with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his
stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death.[28] Castor claims that this charge
does not allege the specific treacherous acts of the
accused. According to Castor, the allegation therein that
the accused with treachery x x x, attack, assault and
employ personal violence is a mere conclusion of law
by the one who drafted the said Information. Hence, it
did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as
provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.
 Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the
Information to have sufficiently alleged treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need not be
alleged in the information because these are matters of
defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts;
the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.
 The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited
in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of
the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form
or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted.
That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the
Information differently did not impair its sufficiency.
Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from
adopting such a form or style. As long as the
requirements of the law are observed, the Information
will pass judicial scrutiny.
PEOPLE VS CACHAPERO
 Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape,
appellant argues that the Information was fatally
defective for failing to state the precise hour when the
crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added,
jeopardized his right to be properly informed of the
charge against him.
 The Information in this case alleged that the crime was
committed "sometime in March 1998" which, according
to private complainant, was more or less at the closing
of the school year. Being reasonably definite and
certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Court merely requires that the
information must state, among others, the approximate
time of the commission of the offense.
 Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or
information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
If the present appellant found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment
either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly
informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the
quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not
conform with the prescribed form. Having failed to
pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived
objection to any formal defect in the Information.
BACASMAS vs SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 189343 July
10, 2013
 It is not necessary to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, except when it is a material
ingredient thereof. Here, the date is not a material
ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on
one day alone, but rather within a period of time
ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998.
Also, the Information named all of the accused, it
correctly excluded Gonzales because her alleged acts
did not fall under the crime charged in the Information.
The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable
for their actions. The Information sufficiently specified
the offense that violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the
essential elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
 3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of the functions of the accused.
 The Information is sufficient, because it adequately
describes the nature and cause of the accusation against
petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned
law.
SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
Quintin Saludaga et al vs Sandiganbayan et al, GR No.
184537, April 23, 2010
 Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no
substituted information. The Information dated August
17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263
charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of
commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the
most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of
committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the government; or b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act
or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may
be charged under either mode or under both should both
modes concur.
 Petitioners reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,
ruling that, in substitution of information another
preliminary investigation is entailed and that the
accused has to plead anew to the new information is not
applicable to the present case because, as already stated,
there is no substitution of information there being no
change in the nature of the offense charged.
SSgt. Jose M. Pacoy vs Hon. Afable Cajigal et al, GR No.
157472, September 28, 2007
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose,
Teehankee v. Madayag is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes,
while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from
the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be
with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for
another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in
the original information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for
if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily
included in the original charge; hence the accused cannot claim
double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or
a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof,
the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an
attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the
first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information,
constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption
of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its
replacement by the word Murder. There was no change in the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in
the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as
those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide,
as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the
caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely
formal.
AMENDED INFORMATION/AMENDMENT
Cabo vs Sandiganbayan, GR 169509
The Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set
forth the conditions for petitioner’s arraignment pending
reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel abroad. Among
the conditions specified in said order is if it should be found that
there is a need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the
accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule
110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her
constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy.
Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional
arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal
consequences of such conditions. In fact, she signed the minutes
of the proceedings which could only signify her informed
acceptance of and conformity with the terms of the conditional
arraignment.
Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such
conditions on the pretext that she affirmed her conditional
arraignment by means of a written manifestation. To begin with,
there is no showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled on her written
manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm
her previous plea on the original information. It is likewise
doubtful that petitioner may legally confirm her conditional
arraignment by means of a mere written motion or manifestation.
Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires
that (t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea.
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot
rely upon the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment
on the amended information. It is elementary that for double
jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information
sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the
charge.[25] In the instant case, the original information to which
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty was neither valid nor
sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also
neither dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not,
therefore, attach even if petitioner is assumed to have been
unconditionally arraigned on the original charge.
It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case
No. 27959 failed to allege all the essential elements of violation
of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any
offense and was, to all intents and purposes, void and defective.
A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such
information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of
being convicted when she entered her plea of not guilty to the
insufficient indictment.
Kummer vs. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
The change of the date of commission of the crime is a formal
amendment.
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the
disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial.
Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the
accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the
nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information, as amended.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended
information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify,
pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal
amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense
different from that charged in the original complaint or
information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an
amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS PENDING
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.172476-99
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001,[22]
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper
court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of
the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of
the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case
may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the
information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court
on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution
subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
PRESCRIPTION
Panaguiton vs DOJ, GR 167571
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is
instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in
Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of
the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause,
with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer
any impediment to the filing of the information against
petitioner.
PEOPLE vs ROMUALDEZ, G.R. No. 166510 July 23, 2008
That we can single out for special treatment cases involving
grave abuse of discretion is supported by no less than the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversy involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Under this provision, action on grave abuse of discretion is not
only a power we can exercise; more than this, it is a duty we
must discharge.
In the spirit embodied in this constitutional provision and in the
interest of substantial justice, we will not hesitate to deviate from
the strict application of our procedural rules when grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is properly
and substantially alleged in a petition filed after the lapse of the
period for appeal under Rule 45 but prior to the lapse of the
period for filing a Rule 65 petition. Conceptually, no major
deviation from the rules in fact transpires in doing this. Under
established jurisprudence, decisions and rulings rendered without
or with lack or excess of jurisdiction are null and void, subject
only to the procedural limits on the right to question them
provided under Rule 65. It is for this reason that a decision that
lapses to finality fifteen (15) days after its receipt can still be
questioned, within sixty (60) days therefrom, on jurisdictional
grounds, although the decision has technically lapsed to finality.
The only deviation in terms of strict application of the Rules is
from what we have discussed above regarding the basic nature of
a petition for certiorari as expressly laid down by Rule 65; it is
available only when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and
thus is not allowed as a substitute when a party fails to appeal a
judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy.
Disini vs. Sandiganbayan and People , GR 169823 September
11, 2013
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be
considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense
charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also
enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the
day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled
to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts
out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the
prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless
ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support
a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to
apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know
or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause
of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the
question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v.
Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the
violation of the special law was not known at the time of its
commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for
the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date
of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five
years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the
1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries
of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the
legality of these transactions.
CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
Pinote vs Ayco, 477 SCRA 409
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under
the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit,
however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the
case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the
Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this
account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of
criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests,
foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.
Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et. al., GR No. 190487,
April 13, 2011
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the
executive department of the government whose principal power
and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed.
Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are
prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors.
In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public
service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors
from different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the
public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.
Flores vs Gonzalez, GR No. 188197
As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this
jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of
Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case,
notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the arraignment
of the accused and further proceedings, and not even if the
Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher courts.
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being
affirmed by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it
may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial
court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the
case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents,
or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the
public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce
before it; or any evidence already adduced before the court by
the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public
prosecutor. The trial court should make its assessment separately
and independently of the evaluation of the prosecution or of the
Secretary of Justice. This assessment should be embodied in the
written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or the motion to
withdraw the information.
This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the
Motion to Withdraw Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution,
and it correctly did so.
RULE 111: Prosecution of Civil Action, Sections 1 to 7
A. Rule in Civil Liability Arising from Delict
Bun Tiong v. Balboa, GR No. 158177
Under the foregoing rule (Section 1 of Rule 111 of RoC), an
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense
charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings,
unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2)
there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil
action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.[14] Since
respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action,
then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of
Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum
shopping to speak of.
B. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
SIMON VS. CHAN, GR 157547
The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately without a reservation.
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This
is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December
1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action… xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet
in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on
August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from,
procedural laws.
C. Death of the Accused
Aliso vs People G.R. Nos. 159017-18
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case
could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose
directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the
civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on
human relations.49 The pertinent articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states: When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states: Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages: (6) The right against deprivation of
property without due process of law;
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the
applicability of the law on human relations. First, the complaint
for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on
the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages specifically
invoked defendant Mayor Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s
right to due process.
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on
due process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case,
is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff
Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner
Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted
him as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule
III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in
Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan
was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the
civil and criminal cases before it.
PEOPLE VS BAYOT, GR 200030
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v.
Bayotas, which was cited in a catena of cases, had laid down the
following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale,
therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
D. Acquittal
PEOPLE VS TIRSO VELASCO, GR 127444
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the
laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen,
when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" Thus
Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that
is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice,
an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals
is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact
extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the
innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This
interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence
determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled
to try him, for societys awareness of the heavy personal strain
which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of
government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of
the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "the
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that
the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be
unfair.
Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions
are available as guides to the court in determining the standing of
the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court
decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In
most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of
certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the
state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some
indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in
itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate
remedy available,[ and it is not uncommon to find language in
cases to the effect that the state should not be permitted to
accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal. Thus, if a
judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an
acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits
by the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by
certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an
order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the
indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a
verdict of guilt.
CHING vs. NICDAO, G.R. No. 141181
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the
consequences of an acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability of
the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the
delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within
the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as
the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case
notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The
civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action
since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did
he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period
accorded to the accused should also be available to the offended
party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision," the
period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that
granted to the accused.40 With petitioner Ching’s timely filing
of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CA’s
decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to
determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao
notwithstanding her acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish
that the judgment of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls
under any of the three categories enumerated in Salazar and
Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the act or omission imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that
respondent Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner
Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively
extinguished her civil liability
COSCOLUETA VS SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 191411
The Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of
their criminal case had been violated.
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent
with due process.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course,
result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not necessarily
follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil
liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case
which the Province may opt to pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an
acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended
party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict,
unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People, citing Banal v.
Tadeo, Jr.:
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the
person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered."
E. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION VS JANIOLA, GR
184861
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a
"change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had." In the instant case, the
phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to
the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by
the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments
except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal
actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that
would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously
instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded
and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
"before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be
interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the
public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during
the trial with the court hearing the case.
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case.
PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL, GR 172060
The requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.The issue in the
civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In
this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which
would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime
that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
he was still married to respondent.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES VS PEREZ, GR 192253
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and
a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak
of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose
was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in
nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and
original.
That the action for specific performance was an administrative
case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law, was of
no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for
specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought
only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of
administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in
favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial
adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their
resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the
proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a
uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.
RULE 112- PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V TALAVERA, 45 SCRA 34
A motion for reinvestigation on the ground of newly discovered
evidence must be filed before the justice secretary rules on an
appeal from a resolution in a preliminary investigation.
In the present case, the accused filed their Motion for
Reinvestigation on November 29, 2000, about three months after
the August 15, 2000 Resolution of the secretary denying with
finality their Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of their
Petition for Review. Clearly, therefore, it was grossly erroneous
for respondent judge to order the reinvestigation of the case by
the prosecutor. This action enabled the latter to reprobate and
reverse the secretarys Resolution. In granting the Motion for
Reinvestigation, respondent effectively demolished the DOJs
power of control and supervision over prosecutors.
Considering that a prima facie case had been found to exist
against the accused during the preliminary investigation -- a fact
affirmed by the justice secretary -- respondent judge should have
exercised great restraint in granting a reinvestigation.
It must be stressed here that a preliminary investigation is
essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a
crime has been committed, and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display
of the parties evidence, which needs to be presented only to
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
SORIANO VS PEOPLE, GR 162336
In Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, the Court held that the affidavits
attached to the BSP transmittal letter complied with the
mandatory requirements under the Rules of Court.
To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova
are not the same as the BSP letter involved in the instant case.
However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and the
BSP letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they
are all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP, they were not
sworn to by the said officers, they all contained summaries of
their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a
preliminary investigation and the filing of corresponding
criminal charges against petitioner Soriano. Thus, the principle
of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon.
Casanova be applied in the instant case once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.
We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of
the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not
intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules.
They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the
events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters
merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of
people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We
ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them,
initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits
were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them
before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance
with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Samuel U. Lee vs. KBC Bank N.V., GR NO. 164673
Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and
whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are
matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the
preliminary investigation. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,
the Court held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence
or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.
In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation,
as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
IN THE PRESENT CASE, JUDGE DUMAYAS, IN HIS 26 MARCH
2003 ORDER, DID NOT (1) POSITIVELY STATE THAT THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST LEE AND LIM IS INSUFFICIENT, (2)
INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE, (3)
ASSESS WHETHER SECRETARY PEREZS CONCLUSION IS
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, (4) LOOK AT THE BASIS OF
SECRETARY PEREZS RECOMMENDATION, (5) EMBODY HIS
ASSESSMENT IN THE ORDER, AND (6) STATE HIS REASONS
FOR GRANTING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE
INFORMATIONS.
JUDGE DUMAYAS FAILURE TO MAKE HIS OWN EVALUATION
OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE VIOLATES KBC BANKS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. JUDGE DUMAYAS 26 MARCH 2003 ORDER
GRANTING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE
INFORMATIONS IS VOID.
PEOPLE VS QUINTOS, GR 199402
The information charging accused of this crime lacked the
allegation of any mental disability on the part of AAA. This is
not necessary to convict accused of the crime of rape provided
that sexual congress and mental incapacity and, therefore, the
incapacity to give consent, are proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
However, to qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of
accused from reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B in
relation to Article 266-(A)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, an
allegation of the victim's intellectual disability must be alleged in
the information. If not alleged in the information, such mental
incapacity may prove lack of consent but it cannot increase the
penalty to death. Neither can it be the basis of conviction for
statutory rape.
In this case, the elements of sexual congress and lack of consent
were sufficiently alleged in the information. They were also
clearly and conveniently determined during trial. The fact of
being mentally incapacitated was only shown to prove AAA's
incapacity to give consent, not to qualify the crime of rape.
SENATOR ESTRADA VS BERSAMIN
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter
affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right
to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or
rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from
Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the
complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the
investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy
of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously,
the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the
issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent "shall have
access to the evidence on record," this provision should be
construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as
well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a)
states that "theinvestigating officer shall require the complainant
or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the
complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall
issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all
other supporting documents, directing the respondent" tosubmit
his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b)
are the affidavits mentioned in Section
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are
the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses.
The provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the
same Rule II that a respondent shall have "access to the evidence
on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to
the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring
the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the
"affidavits and other supporting documents" submitted by "the
complainant or supporting witnesses." Thus, a respondent’s
"access to evidence on record" in Section 4(c), Rule II of the
Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and
supporting documents of "the complainant or supporting
witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent shall have the right to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense."
A respondent’s right to examine refers only to "the evidence
submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of
Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a
respondent. Justice Velasco’s dissent relies on the ruling in
Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), an
administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure
and standards apply. Sen. Estrada’s Petition, in contrast, involves
the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case. Rule III on
the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while
Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen.
Estrada’s Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a
suppletory character or by analogy.
RULE 113- ARREST
JUANITO GERONIMO v. THE HEIRS OF CARLITO
GERONIMO, G.R. NO. 169858
- Not a crim pro case 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON.
PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., G.R. No. 128587 March 16,
2007
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to
Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were
lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by
the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace
officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another. None of these
circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The
accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment
and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his
arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to
commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The
unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that
the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right
front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim
in size that it would not give an outward indication of a
concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done
by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and
knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun,
nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to
his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo
Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from
the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.
The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of the car.
The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the
banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had
placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein.
PEOPLE VS DIAZ, GR No. 110829
Finally, accused-appellants assert that the trial court gravely
erred when it admitted in evidence the gun, five bullets and
magazine taken from them by the police at the time of their
arrest. Allegedly, they were obtained during a warrantless arrest.
Their objection is too late. The records show that they failed to
object to the admissibility of said evidence during their formal
offer. Thus, they waived their right against their admissibility.
Amidst a waiver, the trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence.
RULE 114- BAIL
Mabutas vs. Perello
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817. June 8, 2005 &
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820. June 8, 2005
The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent
Judge may be administratively held liable for the grant of bail
in the particular criminal cases subject of the complaints. As
earlier stated, the criminal cases subject of the present
administrative complaints all involve violations of R.A. No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Under the Section 11 of RA No 9165, possession of 50 grams or
more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable
by life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense.[12] As
such, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule
114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
This provision is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing
duties. A hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution was
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of its
stance; respondent Judge based her findings on the prosecutions
evidence, namely, the testimonies of P02 Saturnino Mayonte and
Arturo Villarin; respondent Judges Order dated May 9, 2003
granting the accuseds petition for bail contained a summary of
the prosecutions evidence; and since it was her conclusion that
the evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not strong, the petition
for bail was granted. Respondent Judge did not violate
procedural requirements. Records show that respondent Judge
afforded the prosecution ample opportunity to present all the
evidence it had and there was no protest from the prosecution
that it had been deprived of its right to present against the
accused. Thus, the Court does not find any irregularity in the
grant of bail in Criminal Case No. 03-265 that would render
respondent Judge administratively liable.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely
different picture.
In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 without the requisite hearing.
In so doing, it was respondent Judges defense that under R.A.
No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled
precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable
only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as such, bail
is a matter of right and a hearing is not required.
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165, as
she asserted, to determine the nature of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law would immediately
show that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug
and not a controlled precursor.
LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 189122,
March 17, 2010
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for
bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court
to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending
appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be
discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by
the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial
court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail
and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination
that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the
deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane
to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice
system and court processes.
DOMINGO v. Judge PAGAYATAN, A.M. No. RTJ-03-
1751.June 10, 2003
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A hearing is
indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the
lack of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to
indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judges evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect
of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peaflorida
without conducting a hearing despite his earlier pronouncement
in the Order dated November 19, 2001 denying bail as he
considered the crime the accused Peaflorida was charged with to
be a non-bailable offense. The manifestation of the prosecutor
that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that the
prosecution’s evidence against the accused is strong, is never a
basis for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary hearing
on the matter. A hearing is required even when the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to
the motion for bail.
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge
and the duty to exercise discretion cannot be reposed upon the
will or whim of the prosecution or the defense. Respondent
should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt
is strong and endeavored to determine the propriety of the
amount of bail recommended. To do away with the requisite bail
hearing is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against
arbitrariness. It must always be remembered that imperative
justice requires the proper observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper
dispensation.
SERAPIO VS SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 148468
The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed
to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not
wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times
precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before
a complaint or information is filed against him. The Courts
pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the
fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well
as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence,
we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned
before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For
when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides
also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court
finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a
situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In
fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of
his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a
motion to quash during the pendency of his petition for bail,
petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail
are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each
other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to
quash may in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein,
thus rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines
that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention
cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to
quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for bail or to
withdraw one that has been filed. He also insists that the grant of
a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge
of an accused from detention nor render moot an application for
bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN, GR 213847
He may be granted bail under humanitarian reasons. By its
decision, the Court has recognized his right to bail by
emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if the risks
of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. In our view,
however, the records demonstrated that the risks of flight were
low, or even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other
circumstances, such as his advanced age and poor health, his past
and present disposition of respect for the legal processes, the
length of his public service, and his individual public and private
reputation. There was really no reasonable way to deny bail to
him simply because his situation of being 92 years of age when
he was first charged for the very serious crime in court was quite
unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and unstable
health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the basis
alone of the judicial discretion to deny bail would be probably
unjust.
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that
one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before
the proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules."
The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose. Thus, in
Villasenor v. Abano, the Court has pronounced that "the
principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the determination
of which most factors are directed, is the probability of the
appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."
The Court has given due regard to the primary but limited
purpose of granting bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner
would appear during his trial and would continue to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges
levelled against him.
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused
answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his
or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be
presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of
preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion
that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is,
therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of
admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon
mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial.
The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of
jail until a trial with all the safeguards has found and adjudged
them guilty.
RULE 115-RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PETER ANDRADA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005
Records show that counsel for petitioner actively participated in
the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution to test
their credibility. At any rate, the fact that he did not choose to
present other witnesses did not affect any of petitioner’s
substantial rights. Besides, said counsel might have valid reasons
why he did not call to the witness stand those witnesses.
We note that petitioner was present during the hearing. If he
believed that his counsel de parte was not competent, he could
have secured the services of a new counsel. He did not. Having
decided to retain the services of his counsel during the entire
proceedings, petitioner must be deemed bound by any mistake
committed by him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is
inept, he should take action by discharging him earlier, instead of
waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and thereupon
blame his counsel for incompetence.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is bound
by the mistakes of his lawyer. Mistakes of attorneys as to the
competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden
of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses,
and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the client and
prevent him from properly presenting his case, do not constitute
gross incompetence or negligence.
Having found that petitioners counsel was not so inept or
motivated by bad faith, or so careless and negligent of his duties
as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of petitioner or
prevent him from putting up a proper defense, we hold that he is
bound by the decisions of his counsel regarding the conduct of
the case.
OLIVAREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS, 465 SCRA 465
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
A complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information merely states that petitioner was being charged
for the crime of violation of R.A. 7610 without citing the
specific sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner.
Nonetheless, we do not find this omission sufficient to invalidate
the information. The character of the crime is not determined by
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an
incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or
other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently
apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
True, the information herein may not refer to specific section/s
of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, but
it is all to evident that the body of the information contains an
averment of the acts alleged to have been performed by
petitioner which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under
Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A. 7610 is
being violated by petitioner is inconsequential. What is
determinative of the offense is the recital of the ultimate facts
and circumstances in the complaint or information.
LIBUIT VS PEOPLE, 469 SCRA 510
Petitioner contends that the trial court should have appointed a
counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear
for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the
services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No
such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment
and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. Worth noting,
when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense
arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the
absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by
counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could
not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after his initial
cross-examination, the trial court granted the petitioners motion
to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of
another counsel. The failure of Atty. Jose Dimayuga, his newly
hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason
was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking
from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render
judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the
repeated failure to appear of defendants counsel at the trial may
even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the courts
proceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation
like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court,
which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of
grave abuse.
MAGTOLIS VS SALUD, 469 SCRA 439
The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as
evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to
privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
ephemeral electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. Any question as to the admissibility
of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent
himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the
sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
HERRERA v, ALBA, GR. No. 148220
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA
testing violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner
ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is
applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote
relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with
approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or
from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of
respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test
to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received
as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of
pants for size was allowed; and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on testimonial compulsion.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the
putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the
evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the
facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence
should be considered subject to the limits established by the law,
rules, and jurisprudence.
PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF
THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOV. AMPATUAN
Public Trial / Publicized Trial / Impartial Court
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and
witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like
Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained
conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the
conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American
attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the
particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain
that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a
fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in
People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof
of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may
challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a
proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed
out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a
change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from
publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for
closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court
may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag
orders.
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has a
right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that
the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who
shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings.
pro hac vice = for this time only
RULE 116-ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
ENRILE VS PEOPLE – arraignment / bill of particulars
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires
that the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as
to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to
be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him. During arraignment, the accused is granted the
opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him
and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information
and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It
is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused
enters his plea, or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that
the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of
the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make
an intelligent plea and prepare a defense. Moreover, the
Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime
for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which
he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon
by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence.
Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an accused
is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry
him for the same crime or crimes. In other words, the
Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense,
ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented,
enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the
sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the
material elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails
to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense. Of course, an
Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash,
and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details
of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court
allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and to prepare for trial.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused
to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications
that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments
to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is
lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting
and order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating
on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting
the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position
of disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and
withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it
intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of
particulars is designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the
observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair
verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where
the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital
punishment and entails the commission of several predicate
criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread
over a considerable period of time. Notably, conviction for
plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this
reason, more process is due, not less. When a person’s life
interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language
recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the
proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection
of those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion
for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due
process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of
particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of
their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position
that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of
substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and
lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead and
prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information
for its failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation
against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion
for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient
detail because the allegations in the Information are vague,
indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile
to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are
made.That every element constituting the offense had been
alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from
requesting for more specific details of the various acts or
omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for
details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars. Hence,
while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating
the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations
may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
PEOPLE vs Documento, GR No. 188706
Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed
because the trial court did not properly conduct a searching
inquiry on the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea
of guilt.
We disagree. It is true that the appellate court noted the trial
courts failure to conduct the prescribed searching inquiry into the
matter of whether or not Documentos plea of guilt was
improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of
appellant proper. Its disquisition on Documentos plea of guilt is
in point.
Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial
court complied with the guidelines [set forth by the Supreme
Court in a number of cases] after appellant’s re-arraignment and
guilty plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the
direct and cross-examination likewise fall short of these
requirements. x x x x x x x
The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the
guidelines set forth by the High Court. The appellant was not
fully apprised of the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as
argued by appellant, the trial court should have informed him
that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the imposable
penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed
that under Article 63, the death penalty, being a single indivisible
penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any
mitigating circumstances that might have attended the
commission of the deed. Moreover, the trial court judge failed to
inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the
guilty plea.
With the trial courts failure to comply with the guidelines,
appellants guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus
rendered inefficacious.
This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded
to the trial court. This course of action is appropriate only when
the appellant’s guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction.
As held in People v. Mira, -
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant’s
guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial
court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient
and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling convicting
Documento.
Virata v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 114331 May 27, 1997
The rule is that a complaint must contain the ultimate facts
constituting plaintiffs cause of action. A cause of action has the
following elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
of damages. As long as the complaint contains these three
elements, a cause of action exists even though the allegations
therein are vague, and dismissal of the action is not the proper
remedy when the pleading is ambiguous because the defendant
may ask for more particulars. As such, Section 1, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court, provides, inter alia, that a party may move for
more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity
to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired. Under this Rule, the
remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue
or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to
file a motion, either for a more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars. An order directing the submission of such statement
or bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant
intelligently to prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to
prepare for trial.
A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document
consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a
pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific allegation of
the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of
particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the
precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense
which the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide
his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to
protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of
the specific proposition for which the pleader contends, in
respect to any material and issuable fact in the case, and it
becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It has been
held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of
the nature of the pleaders cause of action or defense, and it must
furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable fullness
and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and
substantially gives the opposite party the information to which
he is entitled, as required by the terms of the application and of
the order therefor. It should be definite and specific and not
contain general allegations and conclusions. It should be
reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will
allow.
Guided by the foregoing rules and principles, we are convinced
that both the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 and the
Limited Bill of Particulars of October 22, 1992 are couched in
such general and uncertain terms as would make it difficult for
petitioner to submit an intelligent responsive pleading to the
complaint and to adequately prepare for trial.
Furthermore, as correctly asserted by petitioner Virata, the
Limited Bill of Particulars contains new matters which are not
covered by the charge that Virata acted as agent of his co-
defendants in the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
Apparently, as may be examined from the three paragraphs of
the Limited Bill of Particulars, Virata, in so doing the acts, can
not be considered as an agent of any of his co-defendants, on the
contrary, the factual circumstances stated in the said bill of
particulars indicate that Virata acted on behalf of the
government, in his official capacity as a government officer.
This observation is established by the allegations that Virata
acted as a member of the Central Bank Monetary Board, as
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, and, when he executed the
Agreement with Meralco on July 7, 1978 concerning the sale of
certain properties, he acted as the Finance Minister of the
government and as a representative of the Republic in the
contract. In performing the said acts, he, therefore, acted as an
agent of the government, not as an agent of his co-defendants,
which is the charge against him in the expanded Second
Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the allegations in the Limited
Bill of Particulars are irrelevant and immaterial to the charge that
Virata acted as an agent of his co-defendants.
As clearly established by the foregoing discussion, the two bills
of particulars filed by the Republic failed to properly amplify the
charges leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere
reiteration or repetition of the allegations set forth in the
expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent,
they contain vague, immaterial and generalized assertions which
are inadmissible under our procedural rules.
RULE 117- MOTION TO QUASH
LOS BAÑOS VS PEOPLE, GR 173588
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not
exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The modifier
provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8
essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character
(i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of
the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those
that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and
jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the
principle of double jeopardy, by the previous extinction of
criminal liability, by the rule on speedy trial, and the dismissals
after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8,
by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because they are
not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that
lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a
motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3.
The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash
suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific
and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A
necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those
listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a
motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a
ground does not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash
is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may
then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This feature also
answers the question of whether the quashal of an information
can be treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7
of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a
meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment
of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to
a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of
sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information
may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under
Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the
limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done
where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or
double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and
complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the
exception stated in Section 6.
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint or information filed
against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a
case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the
prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions
enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated
under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements do not apply to
a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information for defects or defenses
apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may
be grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the
information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment
(Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional dismissal of
the case even when the trial proper of the case is already
underway provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent
until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes a permanent
dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not
per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so
only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case,
what is important is the question of whether the action can still
be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the
offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-
filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate
consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different
concepts whose respective rules refer to different situations that
should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates
to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or
information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to
quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons
for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before
arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8,
fall under provisional dismissal.
In this case, The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are
that the Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117],
and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section
3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records
that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides
the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited
Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not
see on the face or from the averments of the Information any
legal excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedros
motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September
24, 2001, issued by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law
Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of
the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a
permit to carry firearms during the election period) that Pedro
attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is
a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and
cannot support, a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or
justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly,
no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuineness of the COMELEC certification.
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR. vs SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 180122
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the
essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and
Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager,
Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the
NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to the office and while in the performance of their
official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped
each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate
intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The
felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz
Construction public funds in the amount of P232,628.35
supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the
fact that no such works were undertaken by said construction
company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
On the contention that the Information did not detail the
individual participation of the accused in the allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that
under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two
levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it
may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is
not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only
when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in
conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and
all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint
or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case
at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally
responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of
all.
In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information
should not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may
be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of
actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common
purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of
sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A
statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in
the Information.
The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any
damage or injury caused to any party or the government,
likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.
PEOPLE vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.
n the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses
may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior
to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17,
1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days
from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was
served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that
notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims
or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including
those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or
Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the records that
the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said
motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although
Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor, he did
so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely,
Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino
Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora
who (except for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective
affidavits of desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of
Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda.
There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were
served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on
the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents
motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus
deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent’s motion
and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the
appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new
rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution,
the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations
for multiple murder against the respondent.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of
giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed
cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-
bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed
under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1,
2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.
This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in
fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and
avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful
results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be
excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the
rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State
could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot
even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the
criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not
reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of
both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar
therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so
would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely
affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal
laws in particular.
comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal. Also, the contention that both the filing of the
motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be
made prior to the expiration of the one year period is not found
in the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to
revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider that
2004 is a leap year and that the one year period to revive the case
should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal by Uy.

To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition RULE 118- PRE-TRIAL
sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with
the express consent of the accused before the effective date of OCA vs ESPANOL
the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with
the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would
be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of
one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000
to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a
valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective
date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is
entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.

William Co vs New Prosperity Plastic Products, GR No.

183994, June 30, 2014

Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first

paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the
express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order
granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, it is apparent from
the records that there is no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was
served on the private complainant at least three days before said
hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact
is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional
dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not
shown any interest to pursue her complaint." The importance of
a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional
dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:

In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional

dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private
complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as mandated by
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second
paragraph of the new rule should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service
of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been
revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel,
notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to
the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13
of the Rules. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to