Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMPETITION, 2014
STATE OF BAMBI
(PROSECUTION)
V/S
(DEFENCE)
UNDER SECTION 120 B READ WITH 34, 501, 502, 227 AND 385 OF BARAT PENAL CODE, 1860
Cases ........................................................................................................................................... v
Statutes ....................................................................................................................................... ix
Statement Of Jurisdiction................................................................................................................ x
Arguments Advanced...................................................................................................................... 1
Issue-1 Respondents are not guilty for the offence of Criminal Conspiracy with common
intention. ..................................................................................................................................... 1
[2.1] Respondents are not guilty for publishing film posters in the newspapers .................... 8
newspapers/magazines. ......................................................................................................... 11
Issue-3 Saba and Jaimil are not guilty for putting Ms.Naika under fear of injury to extort ..... 12
[3.1.1] Saba and Jaimil did not put or attempted to put Ms.Naika in any fear of injury ...... 13
DW Defence Witness
Ed. Edition
IC Indian Cases
p. Page No.
PW Prosecution Witness
SC Supreme Court
Sec. Section
v. Versus
Cases
Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2000) Cr.LJ 2978 (SC) 3
Sanjay Dutt v. State of Maharashtra, Through CBI (STF), Bombay, AIR 2013 SC 11
3687.
Books
1. ADRIANE KEANE, JAMES GRIFFITH AND PAUL MCKEOWN, The Modern Law of Evidence,
3. B.R.SHARMA, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation & Trials, 4th Ed., 2005,
4. BATUK LAL, The Law of Evidence, 18th Ed. 2010, Allahabad Law Agency.
5. COLLIN TAPPER, Cross & Tapper on Evidence, 11th Ed., 2005, Oxford University Press.
6. DR. SARALA GUPTA AND BENI PRASAD AGRAWAL, Forensic Science in Criminal
7. DR.ASIS MALLICK, Law of Evidence, 1st Ed., 2011, Eastern Law House.
8. M.MONIR, Law of Evidence, Vol.I,II, 15th Ed., 2010, Universal Publishing Co.
9. P.M. BAKSHI, Basu‟s Law of Evidence, 7th Ed., 2003, India Law House.
10. PETER MURPHY, Murphy on Evidence, 11th Ed., 2009, Oxford University Press.
11. PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE, 16th Ed., 2005,(Indian Rep.2007), Sweet & Maxwell.
12. Princep‟s Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 18th Ed., 2005, Lexis
Nexis.
Butterworth‟s Wadhwa.
14. R.V.KELKAR, Criminal Procedure, 5th Ed. 2011, Eastern Book Co.
15. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, Criminal Procedure Code,1973, 2010, Lexis Nexis.
16. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, Indian Penal Code, 33rd Ed. 2010, Lexis Nexis.
17. S.K. SARVARIA, R.A.Nelson‟s Indian Penal Code, Vol.I,IV, 10th Ed., 2008, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa.
18. SHAMSUL HUDA, Principles of Law of Crimes, 3rd Ed., 1993, Easter Book Co.
19. STEPHEN MASON, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility, 1st Ed.,
20. SUDIPTO SARKAR AND VR MANHOHAR, LAW OF EVIDENCE, 17th Ed., 2010, Lexis Nexis
Butterworth Wadhwa.
21. THOMAS A. MAUET AND WARREN D. WOLFSON, Trial Evidence, 4th Ed., 2009, Aspen
22. VEPA P.SARATHI, Law of Evidence, 6th Ed., 2006, (Rep.2010), Eastern Book Company.
23. VINAYAK KAKDE, Criminal Trials, 2nd Ed., 2011, Universal Law Publishing Co.
Lexicon
1. BRYAN A.GARNER, Black‟s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed., 2010, West Publications, Thomson,
Reuters.
2. DANIEL GREENBERG, Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary, 7th Ed., 2008, Sweet & Maxwell.
3. J.E. PENNER,Mozley & Whitley‟s Law Dictionary, 12th Ed., 1984, (Rep.2010), Oxford
University Press.
Online Resources
1. AIR Online.
2. WestLaw India.
3. Manupatra.
4. SCC Online.
5. AdvocateKhoj.
Statutes
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon‟ble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Section 177 and 209 of Code
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 3rd February,2014, Panna Boy was again granted parole citing the same reason to take care of
his ailing wife. There were following chain of events that transpired the controversy;
a) Panna Boy visited Star Hospital where his ailing wife was undergoing treatment for some
serious illness.
b) Mr. Jaimil was also admitted in the same hospital as he was asked to take complete bed rest
for 2 weeks. At the same time cameras and other equipment were also installed for shooting
c) After one hour he was found in another room which was being ready for the shoot, Hero
Panna was sitting next to an old lady, Mrs. Mashaal, in the role of mother. On the other side of
the bed, Ms. Poonam, who is a look alike of Ms. Naika and usually acts for stunts and intimate
d) In the evening Hero Panna was found in the central mall along with his daughter in a colorful
outfit. Later it was found that there were some hidden cameras and other equipment being ready
for shoot and Ms. Poonam entered the Mall with some other people.
e) On 14th February,2014, the posters of the film “ The Hit Factory- An explosive love story”
with tags of being released shortly were released in the newspapers and magazines.
On account of following events, on 16th February,2014, Ms. Poonam filed a suit of permanent
injunction of the movie, in the High Court Of Bambi citing that she had disassociated herself
with the movie and even had returned the advance payment regarding the same. By allowing
screening of the movie the directors are trying to tarnish her reputation. Secondly in the evening
STATEMENT OF CHARGES
Panna Boy has been charged with Section 120 B read with Sections 34, 227, 501& 502 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 for the crime of criminal conspiracy along with Saba and Jaimil,
respectively.
Saba and Jaimil has been charged with Section 120 B read with Sections 34, 385, 501&
502 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for the crime of criminal conspiracy along with Panna
Boy, for putting person in fear of injury to commit extortion and defamation,
respectively.
Issue-1 Respondents are not guilty for the offence of Criminal Conspiracy with common
It is most humbly submitted that the respondents are not guilty for the crime of criminal intention
with common intention to defame Ms.Naika as there has been no agreement to do such illegal act
and also there has been no establishment of mens rea to prove the respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is most humbly submitted that the respondents have not made any imputation in order to harm
the reputation of Ms.Naika by portraying her along with Mr.Panna Boy as the very act has been
Issue-3 Saba and Jaimil are not guilty for putting Ms.Naika under fear of injury to extort
It is most humbly submitted that Saba and Jaimil are not guilty of putting any kind of fear of
injury to Ms. Naika contrary to the allegations made by her. The prosecution has not dwelled into
the realms of reality to prove the respondents guilty and hence their accusation is seen with the
benefit of doubt.
Issue-4 Panna Boy is not guilty to violate any condition of remission of punishment
It is humbly submitted that Panna Boy has not violated any condition of remission of punishment
as at the threshold there has been no proof to show the same and secondly, parole cannot be
equated with remission as there lies a scope of distinction between the two
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Issue-1 Respondents are not guilty for the offence of Criminal Conspiracy with common
intention.
It is most humbly contended that the respondents are not guilty for committing the crime of
criminal conspiracy with a common intention to defame the complainant, Ms. Naika (herein after
as “PW4”). It is pertinent to note that the punishment for committing criminal conspiracy is
mentioned in Section120 B, Indian Penal Code (herein after referred as “IPC”) and has to fulfill
essentials of Sec.120A,IPC .Thus this will be shown by looking at the actus reus[1.1] and no
on the part of complainant, until and unless the guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Sec.120A, IPC, Criminal conspiracy is defined as when two or more persons agree to do
or cause to do;
a) There must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire[1.1.1];
and
An illegal act, or
An act which is not illegal by illegal means [1.1.2], then such an agreement is
1
Section 120A, Indian Penal Code,1860 (herein after referred as “IPC”).
be a nexus to acts to show intention to commit an offence. The next part will be dealing with the
criminal conspiracy in order to show that there were transactions which infer the conduct of
[1.1.1] There is no agreement between two or more persons who are alleged to conspire
The very essential ingredient of proving criminal conspiracy is to show agreement between two
or more persons who were alleged to conspire, and this is irrespective of further consideration
whether or not the offence is actually committed as the very fact of conspiracy constitutes the
offence.3 “Agreement” is the rock bottom of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Sec.120A,
Saba (herein after referred as “A2”) and Jaimil (herein after referred as “A3”) decided to
complete the movie as there was a lot of financial burden on them5, but nowhere it could be
asserted that the acts of the respondents were to plot a conspiracy in order to defame
Ms.Naika(herein after referred as “PW4”), as there has been no agreement to do any act
illegally.
The prosecution did not show direct evidence against the conspiracy but merely circumstantial6
and the word of caution lies in the matter is that too much of reliance could not be put on the
circumstantial evidence.7
2
Madanlal vs State Of Punjab, 1967 SCR (3) 439.
3
K.S. Narayan v. S. Gopinathan, 1982 CrLJ 1611 (Mad.)
4
Jagannath Mishra v State of Orissa, 1974 Cut LT 1253; Tejichand v. State of UP, 1977 U.P. Cr C (All) 281 (283).
5
Para 5, p.1, Moot Proposition.
6
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, 2005 Cr LJ 3950 SC.
7
Mohanlal v. State of U.P., AIR1974 SC 1144.
An act is said to be illegal which amounts to an offence, prohibited by law.8 The charge of
conspiracy cannot be merely made on the basis of inferences and has to be backed by the cogent
evidence to show that there was meeting of minds for commission of illegal act 9 or to achieve a
particular object.10
The act done by A2 and A3 to complete the movie by using technological camera effects by
using the scenes of the movie which were previously acted by the complainant11 was not to be
confused to be done with an intent to conspire against her, in order to defame her.
Common intention under Sec.34 refers to the ultimate criminal act with which the accused is
charged.12 There must be a link which needs to be shown that the acts were done in furtherance
Mere presence without proof of any act or omission done to facilitate the offence or at least
without proof of the existence of common intention will not be sufficient to convict under
Sec.34.14 The respondents had no common intention to act in order to defame the complainant as
the prosecution has merely relied on circumstantial evidence and have not corroborated for the
8
Sec.43, IPC.
9
Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2000) Cr.LJ 2978 (SC).
10
State v. Siddhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma, (2001) Cr.LJ 2404 (Del.).
11
Annexure 3, Para 11,p.12, Moot Proposition
12
Halim Mian v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1836.
13
Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1999(8) SCC 555.
14
Mahadeo Nath Khetri v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat. 550; Basharat v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah. 813.
Statements made by Ms. Mashaal (herein after referred as “DW5”) and Ms. Poonam (herein after
referred as “DW4”) shows that there had been mere presence of A1 at the Star Hospital as he
came out on parole to take care of his wife who had been suffering from serious illness.16
[1.2.2] Common intention not to be inferred from separate acts that does not lead to
ultimate act.
There must be a pre mediation or previous meeting of minds for the acts to be done with a
common intention to defame the complainant.17 The following statements which have been made
by prosecution witness does not show that the acts were done in any furtherance of common
Presence of A1 at the gate of Star Hospital and Central Mall does not show that he had
The prosecution has alleged that A1 came out on parole as he knew the plot to shoot for
A1 met DW4 and DW5 in due course of hospital visit and took some photographs as
well.
These acts were considered to be done in furtherance of common intention but none of these acts
were corroborated by the prosecution. Hence, these acts do not form any part as a matter of
The prosecution did not prove the charges against the respondents and are hence under the
burden of proving it, beyond reasonable doubt. There are various discrepancies that if admitted
When the prosecution relies on the circumstantial evidence then all the links in the chain of
circumstances must be complete and should be proved through cogent evidence. 19 When a link
breaks away the chain of circumstances get snapped and then other circumstances fail to prove
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.20 The evidence which has been relied upon must fulfill
following essentials;
incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and
such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be
The following statements by prosecution witness show that there has been no establishment of
19
State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohte, AIR 2009 SC 1066.
20
Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 2140.
21
Mahmood v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 69.
22
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 79.
booked for shooting from 5th to 7th February,2014 but he did not knew full details
This statement is not admissible as it being merely an hearsay evidence24 and does not
form part of „res gestae‟, thus being barred by Sec.60, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (herein
Ms. Khushboo (herein after referred as “PW3”, admitted that she has seen A1 at the gate
of Star Hospital on 8th Febrauary,2014 and later in the evening she saw him at Central
This statement is not admissible as PW3 being a „chance witness‟, who happened to be at
the alleged sites by chance26, but she does not make any statement with regard to the
participation of the respondents in any kind of shoot. Thus such statement is not found to
Thus these statements mark that the prosecution have been trying to falsely implicate against the
respondents.
PW3 has stated that she had been suffering from a small bout of Anomalous trichromacy (of
nature of Protanomaly and Deuteranomaly) in 2003, but has been cured now. 28 In cases of
23
Annexure 1, Para 1,p.5, Moot Proposition.
24
Kashmira Singh v. State, AIR 1965 J&K 37.
25
Annexure 1, Para2, p.5, Moot Proposition.
26
Bahal Singh v.State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 2032.
27
Sec.6, IEA.
28
Annexure 1, Para 2, p.5, Moot Proposition.
make distinction between colors.29 Thus the statement given by her must be used with utmost
care and caution and must be corroborated with a fitness statement by a medical expert in order
to be deemed to be accepted.
The investigation report given by the inspector, Mr.Sundar(herein after referred as “PW2”) has
been biased on the part that it gives prosecution as it has not been examined and this will be
prejudicial to the respondents.30 The police officer needs to bring the unvarnished truth of the
case and not merely base his repot on gamut of witness statements without dwelling into the
credibility of the same.31 There have been following inconsistencies in the investigation report;
CCTV footage discloses mere presence of A1 at Star Hospital and Central Mall 32, but
there is no disclosure about the alleged scenes by way of any corroborative evidence for
the same.
The report says that there is a chance of A2 and A3 to influence A1 in order to take
parole from the Jail33, but on the contrary his wife was ailing with serious illness and this
The report says that there may be threat to be induced by A2 and A3 to PW434, but there
has been no corroboration for the same and hence they have been falsely charged for the
same.
29
MARTIN NIXON, Oxford Dictionary, 5th Ed., 2000, Oxford University Press.
30
Raj Kumar Rajwar v. State of Bihar, 1993 (3) PLJR 831.
31
Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, 1974 (3) SCC 774.
32
Annexure 3, Para 3, p.10, Moot Proposition.
33
Annexure 3, Para 12, p.11, Moot Proposition.
benefit of doubt to the respondents.35 When a piece of evidence introduced and relied upon by
the prosecution itself creates a reasonable doubt as regards to the complicity of the accused, even
if there are no infirmities in other evidence then the doctrine of benefit of doubt must be invoked
by the court in the favour of the accused.36 Secondly, such reasonable doubt creates a gap
between the fact that the respondents “may have committed the crime” and not give a conclusive
proof regarding the crime to be “must to be committed”. 37Hence it is humbly submitted that the
It is most humbly submitted that the accused are not liable for defamation of Ms. Naika by the
act of shooting some intimate scenes and releasing the advertisement by way of film posters of
“Hit Factory”, by using a look alike. The very act of completing the movie by A2 and A3 was a
[2.1] Respondents are not guilty for publishing film posters in the newspapers
The complainant has accused the respondents to be defaming her by publishing her along with
34
Annexure 3, Para 12, p.12, Moot Proposition.
35
State v. Rakesh Kumar, (1998) Cr.LJ 3604 (SC).
36
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 957.
37
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2004) Cr.LJ 36 (SC).
that he should have the mens rea defined in this section, i.e. knowledge or reason to believe that
the matter printed or engraved is defamatory of some person apart from the person who has been
defamed.38
[2.1.1] There was no knowledge or reason to believe that the matter is defamatory
In order to prove the charges of defamation under Sec.501, IPC, it is pertinent to note that the
Such imputation must be made by way of words, either spoken or intended to be read or
Such imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with knowledge or
The complainant has not proved either of the facts that there has been imputation nor such
It refers to the accusation of fact made against such person in order to lower her image amongst
the public.40 It has been alleged that releasing poster alongside A1 there has been serious
imputation against reputation of PW4. There has been no imputation made against PW4 as the
act of printing poster was done in good faith [2.1.3], A1 was a person with previously good
38
Nemichand v. Khemraj, AIR 1973 Raj 240; Sankaran Chettiar v. K. Ramakrishna Pillai, AIR 1960 Ker.141.
39
Prem Pal Singh v. Mohan Lal, (1981) Cr.LJ 1208.
40
NCERT v. P.D. Bhatnagar, (1981) Cr.LJ (NOC) 57 (Raj.).
hearted person and lastly, the fact that A1 and PW4 were acting together, there was no harm to
Good faith must be interpreted in reference to Sec.54 I.P.C which means that there must be no
act be done or believed in good faith without due care and attention.41 So the due care and
attention
has been taken in order to establish the statement as a reasonable man to be of true
construction.42
PW4 knew about the ongoing case filed against A1 in 1993 under the charges of TADA Act for
illegal possession of arms, way before she decided to do movie with him.43 Later after conviction
under the Arms act, PW4 refused to act for some incomplete scenes, which was decided to be
Secondly, A1 and A3 were rightful owners over the movie by virtue of copyright act as they
being cinematographer.45 The rights of the movie was about to be assigned by way of assignment
to Mr.Shaikh, upon completion of the movie and due to financial burden upon them.46 Exception
8 of S.499 clearly mentions that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation
41
Sec.54, IPC.
42
Samanta Biswanath Roy v. Jhari Bewa, (1997) Cut LR (Cr) 53.
43
Para1, p.1, Moot Proposition.
44
Annexure 3, Para 9, p.6, Moot proposition.
45
Sec.2(f), Copyright Act,1957.
46
Para 7, p.2, Moot Proposition.
subject matter of accusation.47Hence, they acted in good faith to complete the movie.
[2.1.4] No harm to reputation of Ms. Naika was done by portraying along Panna Boy
A1 was even though convicted under the Arms Act,1959 but in the society he had good character
as he transformed in the prison and was follower of Bapu Ji, who was father of the nation.48 So
the relevancy in the character of A1 is an important factor to show that there was no harm done
by acting along with him.49 The evidence can be given of general reputation and general
disposition only and not of particular facts, since isolated incidents afford no presumption of a
man‟s general character.50 Reputation must be distinguished from rumour.51 Evidence of rumour
is mere hearsay and evidence of general repute does not offend against the rule of hearsay, but is
direct evidence of a man‟s character.52 Hence A1 was transformed to be a person with good
character and was rumoured to be of that of involved with anti-social element but was proved not
knowing that it contains such matters is punishable.54 There must be something more than mere
47
Rajendra Kumar SItaram Pande v. Uttam, AIR 1999 SC 1028.
48
Para 2, p.1, Moot Proposition.
49
Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, (1954) Cr.LJ 338 SC.
50
Queen v. Rowton, (1865) 34 LJ (MC) 57.
51
M.MONIR, Textbook on the Law of Evidence, p.227,8 th Ed., 2010, Universal Law Publishing Co.
52
Raghubir Dayal v. Emperor, 1936 Cr.LJ 33.
53
Sanjay Dutt v. State of Maharashtra, Through CBI (STF), Bombay, AIR 2013 SC 3687.
54
Sec.502, IPC.
intention of defaming directly or indirectly the person complaining of, such as to constitute an
The evidence adduced in the case does not show that the respondent has the required mens rea, in
the absence of evidence proving the mens rea on the part of the respondent, the respondent
Issue-3 Saba and Jaimil are not guilty for putting Ms.Naika under fear of injury to extort
It is humbly contended that A2 and A3 are have been falsely charged under Sec.385 as the
prosecution has failed to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict an
the accused put or attempted to put any person in fear of any injury[3.1.1]; and that
such act of the accused was in order to commit extortion[3.1.2].
The offence under this section is an aggravated form of offence defined under Sec.383 and must
be read in conjunction with it.57 Extortion has been defined as intentionally putting a person in
55
L.S. Jayappa v. N.S. Shamegowda, (1986) 1 Cr LC 24 (Karn.).
56
S.D. Premchand v. M.C. Balu, 1986 Mad LW (Cr) 179 (Mad.).
57
Tanumal Udhasingh v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Sind 203.
58
Sec.383,IPC.
The fear of injury must be in such a way that it unsettle the mind of the person upon whom it is
exercised is not voluntary.59 The injury need to be physical injury and may be to malign one‟s
character.60 The statement of PW4 shows that her personal mobile number was known to few
and A2 and A3 were amongst them.61 But this statement does not prove that the voice was that of
them. Secondly despite of repeated refusal by PW4 to co-operate for incomplete shoot there has
been no effort to ask her again which shows that the only resort was to complete the movie by
The charge of extortion is established when the accused put the complainant or to any other
person in fear of an injury and then dishonestly induced her to deliver any valuable security.62
Prosecution has failed to show that there has been any act by A2 and A3 that has resulted in
inducement of PW4 in order to dishonestly make her act in the movie. The evidence provided as
a voice recording with transcript does not prove the accused guilty. Evidence should not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused but should in addition be inconsistent with his
innocence.63 The standard of proof required is that the Court must be satisfied that the
59
R v. George Walton & Joseph Ogden, (1863) 169 All ER 1399.
60
K.D. GAUR, Textbook on The Indian Penal Code, 4th Ed.,2012, Universal Law Publishing Co.
61
Annexure 1, Para 3, p.6, Moot Proposition.
62
Sec.383, IPC.
63
State v Mohd.Afzal and Ors., 2003 (3) JCC 1669.
64
Hira Pearelal Kirar v. The State, AIR 1960 M.P. 11.
The identification of the taped voices is a crucial matter and proper identification is the sine qua
non. The time and place and accuracy of the recording must be proved by a competent witness
and the voices must be properly identified.65 Tape recorded conversation is admissible in
evidence provided;
There lies a higher standard of proof to show that the voice recording is accurate and authentic.67
Since there has been no certificate of authenticating the use of such audio records as an evidence,
then such admission should be prima facie discredited to be admissible in the Hon‟ble Court.
Hence it is humbly submitted that A2 and A3 are deemed to be innocent and not guilty for
accusation of threat.
The complainant has alleged the charge under Sec.227, IPC by questioning the propriety of A1
to act in movies at the time of parole.68 In order to make out an offence under this section, it must
be proved not only that the accused was granted a conditional remission of punishment, that he
65
Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147.
66
R.M. Malkhani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157.
67
Tukaram S. Dikhole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, AIR 2010 SC 965.
68
Para 19, p.3, Moot Proposition.
knowingly.69 There has been no proof with regard to the misuse of condition of parole as it has
been established that A1 came out on parole citing his wife‟s illness.
Parole is “a conditional release of a prisoner, generally under the supervision of a Parole Officer,
who has served part of the term for which he was sentenced to prison.” 70 During parole period
there is no suspension of sentence but the sentence is actually continuing to run during that
sentence without changing its character.73 Secondly, parole being an administrative action is
decided by the executive as a matter of discretion and is given in condition of illness of near
relative, spouse etc.74 Hence it has been rightly granted for citing his wife‟s illness.75
There is a distinction between remission and parole but if it has to be construed that parole is
supposed to be conditional remission, still there has been no violation of condition as citing
illness of wife, as he used to visit Star Hospital to meet his wife which has been corroborated
with CCTV footage of the same and had not been indulged in alleged shoot. Hence, A1 is not to
be convicted guilty for violating any condition per se and prosecution has failed to prove him
guilty.
69
S.K.SARVARIA, R.A. Nelson‟s Indian Penal Code, Vol.2, 10th Ed., 2008, Lexis Nexis.
70
BRYAN D.GARNER, Black‟s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed., 2009, Thomson Reuters Publishers.
71
State of Haryana v. Nauratta Singh, 2000 Cri.LJ 1710.
72
Rule 20, Prison (Bombay Parole & Furlough) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred as “Prison Rules”).
73
State (Govt.of NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121, para 10.
74
Rule 19, Prison Rules
.
75
Rule 10, Prison Rules.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this
a) Acquit Panna Boy, Saba and Jaimil for offence of criminal conspiracy coupled with
common intention and defamation vis-à-vis Sections 120B, 34, 501 and 502, respectively.
b) Acquit Panna Boy for offence of violation of condition of remission under Section 227 of
IPC,1860.
c) Acquit Saba and Jaimil for offence of putting fear in Ms. Naika in order to extort her
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
Sd/-
Public Prosecutor