1
G.R. No. 193833 November 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, P/S INSP.
LORIEMAN* L. MANRIQUE, and RODIE J.
PINEDA @ "Buboy,"Accused.
PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 193833 is an appeal1 from the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 June 2009 as well
as the Resolution3promulgated on 11 June 2010
by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-
G.R. CR.-HC. No. 03119. The appellate court
affirmed the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision4 of
Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393
for Kidnapping (for Ransom), 03-766 for
Robbery, and 04-1311 also for Robbery.
The trial court found appellant PO1 Froilan L.
Trestiza (Trestiza) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal by direct participation of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659),
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages to
Irma Navarro (Navarro) and Lawrence Yu (Yu).
P/Insp. Lorieman L. Manrique (Manrique) and
Rodie Pineda y Jimenez (Pineda) were likewise
found guilty of the same crime by the trial
court, and adjudged the same sentence as
Trestiza. The trial court acquitted Trestiza,
Manrique and Pineda in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
766 and 04-1311.
The Facts
The following charges were brought against
Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda on 20 November
2002:
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping
That on or about the 7th day of November
2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp.
Loriemar L. Manrique, both active members of
the Philippine National Police, and Rodie
Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of
them armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another with one PO2 [Reynel] Jose, a member
of the Philippine National Police, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma
Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of their
liberty by then and there kidnap without legal
grounds for the purpose of extorting money for
their safety and immediate release as in fact
said accused demanded the amount of
₱1,000,000.00 as ransom money from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunitions
That on or about the 16th day of November
2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) Pistol Glock 21 bearing SN
035481 with thirteen (13) rounds of live
ammunitions and without the corresponding
license or permit thereof, which he carried
outside of his residence.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 15 April 2004, Trestiza was acquitted of the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. 02-
3394.7 The Affidavit of Arrest stated that the
serial number of the firearm seized was
035481, while the firearm itself had a serial
number of BRG-768. The trial court rejected the
explanation that the difference between the
serial numbers was a mere typographical error.
An order8 of the trial court dated 16 April 2004
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-3393, 02-3394, 03-766
and 04-1311 recounted the circumstances
involved in the filing of the charges against
Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda.
Criminal Case No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping
against accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson
(PO1 Trestiza), PS/Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique
(PS/Insp. Manrique) and Rodie Pineda y
Jimenez (Pineda) and Criminal Case No. 02-
3394 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions against accused PO1 Trestiza
alone were filed before this Court on 20
November 2002. Surprisingly, however, SPO2
[Reynel] Jose was not included as an accused in
the Kidnapping case although in the original
Information, Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
mentions him as someone who mutually
helped all the other accused in the willful,
unlawful, felonious kidnapping of private
complainants Lawrence Yu y Lim (Yu) and Ma.
Irma Navarro (Navarro). A Motion for
Reinvestigation dated 21 November 2002 was
then filed by "all" three accused while a
separate Motion for Reinvestigation and/or
Preliminary Investigation dated 22 November
was filed by accused PS/Insp. Manrique.
Then Acting Presiding Judge Salvador S. Abad
Santos issued the Order dated 26 November
2002 granting the Motions filed by all accused.
In the said Order, he directed the Public
Prosecutor to conduct a Preliminary
Investigation of the cases filed and to furnish
the Court with his Report within sixty (60) days
from said date.
On 21 February 2003, Public Prosecutor Andres
N. Marcos filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information of Kidnapping with Ransom and to
Admit Information for Robbery with attached
Resolution dated 03 January 2008. He pointed
out therein that after he conducted a
preliminary investigation, he found no
probable cause exists to warrant the
indictment of the accused for the crime of
Kidnapping with Ransom. He added that they
should be charged instead for the crimes of
Robbery and Grave Threats. The Court set the
hearing of this Motion to 06 March 2003.
On 03 March 2003, private complainants
appearing through Private Prosecutor Teresita
G. Oledan filed an "Urgent Motion to Hold
Withdrawal of Information for Kidnapping
Charge with Entry of Appearance as Private
Prosecutor." They alleged in said Motion that
they were not furnished clear and certified true
copies of the Resolution dated 03 January 2003
to enable them to file their
Opposition/Comment to the Motion to
Withdraw.
On 05 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of
RTC Makati Branch 135 sent a letter dated 26
February 2003 addressed to the Branch Clerk of
this Court ostensibly transmitting the Release
Order of PO1 Trestiza dated 22 February 2003
together with other pertinent documents in
connection with Criminal Case No. 02-3394,
which was duly approved by the Hon. Francisco
B. Ibay, Presiding Judge of said Court.1âwphi1
The Order of Release dated 22 February 2003
signed by Judge Ibay directed the Jail Warden
of Makati Police Station, Makati City to
discharge from his custody the person of said
accused as the latter was able to file the
corresponding bail bond in the amount of two
hundred thousand pesos (PHP200,000.00) thru
the Plaridel Surety and Insurance
Company provided "there exists no order in
any other case to the effect that he shall
remain confined under your custody." He set
the arraignment of the accused on 14 March
2003 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
Before the scheduled hearing of the Motion to
Withdraw at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 06
March 2003, the Private Prosecutor filed her
Opposition thereto at 1:30 o’clock in the
afternoon of said date. She alleged therein that
while the Motion to Withdraw filed by Public
Prosecutor Marcos prays for the withdrawal of
the Information for Kidnapping with Ransom
and the substitution thereof with an
Information for Robbery, the latter Information
was filed immediately with the Criminal Cases
Unit of the Office of the Clerk of Court on the
same date that the Motion to Withdraw was
filed with this Court on 21 February 2003.
Subsequently, said "Information for Robbery"
was raffled to RTC Branch 57 on 03 March 2003
yet there was a scheduled hearing of the
Motion to Withdraw on 06 March 2003. She
added that the complainants were in a

quandary why the alleged "substituted"
Information for Robbery was raffled to another
Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
766, when this Court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the original cases filed. The
same case was thereafter consolidated with
this Court on 26 March 2003 as per Order dated
24 March 2003 rendered by the Honorable
Reinato G. Quilala, Presiding Judge thereat.
Accused PS/Insp. Manrique, PO1 Trestiza, and
Pineda posted bail in this case, which was duly
approved by Judge Ibay, while accused SPO2
Jose’s bail was approved by Judge Napoleon E.
Inoturan, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 133.
At the hearing to the Motion to Withdraw, then
Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos gave
counsel for the accused time within which to
file his comment/objection to the Urgent
Motion to Hold Withdrawal of Information for
Kidnapping filed by the private complainants,
furnishing the Private Prosecutor a copy
thereof, who was given the same number of
days to file her Reply, if necessary. The Court
likewise ordered the "re-commitment" of all
three (3) accused, who were then present at
that hearing, to the custody of the Makati City
Jail despite the fact that they have already
posted bail, considering that the Motion to
Withdraw was still pending resolution.
Counsel for the accused filed his Comment to
the Opposition dated 10 March 2003 alleging
that the same did not bear the conformity of
the Public Prosecutor who has direct control
and supervision over the Private Prosecutor as
provided for under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Said Comment, to his mind, is thus
a mere scrap of paper which did not deserve
any consideration by the Court.
On 13 March 2003, the Court was furnished by
the private complainants a copy of their
"Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated January 03, 2003 but Released on
February 20, 2003" which they filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
xxx
On 29 May 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza and
PS/Insp. Manrique filed an Urgent Motion to
Resolve Motion for Withdrawal of Original
Information claiming that said Original
Informations have subsequently been
amended by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and
just "needs the court/judge[‘s] approval of the
Motion to Withdraw Complaint and for
Admission of the Amended Information."
Moreover, they averred that the City
Prosecutor’s Office has approved the findings
of the reinvestigating Assistant City Prosecutor
on the downgrading of the original complaint.
Both accused prayed that said motion be heard
on 28 May 2003.
On 9 June 2003, the Private Prosecutor filed an
Ex-Parte Opposition to Accused’s Motion for
Withdrawal of Original Information with
Motion for Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest
against accused SPO2 Jose. She alleged therein
that "it is true that one of the accused’s right is
the right to speedy trial. However, where, as in
this case, the stench of "something fishy"
already was evident when suddenly the
robbery case as amended by Prosecutor
Marcos and more recently "affirmed" by
Prosecutor Sibucao, there should be further in-
depth investigation as the circumstances on
how the three accused were able to post bail
without the knowledge and approval of this
Honorable Court, which had already acquired
jurisdiction over the case. In fact, a Petition for
Review from the Resolution of Prosecutor
Sibucao denying the Private Complainants’
Motion for Reconsideration of the 03 January
2003 Resolution of Prosecutor Marcos duly
approved by the City Prosecutor has been
seasonably filed." She further alleged that, the
Urgent Motion allegedly filed by accused PO1
Trestiza and PS/Insp. Manrique does not
include accused SPO2 Jose, also a member of
the Police Force. However, the records show
that the latter also "post bail" for the Robbery
case and was in fact "outside" the Chamber of
this Honorable Court when the hearing was
being conducted. "However, when she went
out to look for him, SPO2 Jose was able to do a
‘Houdini’ and disappeared from view." Private
Prosecutor Oledan prayed for the deferment of
the proceedings herein until the final resolution
of the Petition for Review.
Referring back to the Urgent Motion to Resolve
by accused PO1 Trestiza and PS/Insp.
Manrique, considering that the latter prayed
for it to be heard on 28 May 2003, but filed said
Motion the following day only, the same was
then set for hearing on 10 June 2003. On the
same date, the Private Prosecutor furnished
the Court a copy of their Petition for Review
which they filed with the Department of
Justice. In the meantime, the Branch Clerk of
this Court issued a Certification to the effect
that Acting Presiding Judge Abad Santos was on
official leave until 15 July 2003 and that there is
an Urgent Motion to be resolved. Pairing Judge
Manuel D. Victorio, acting on the Urgent
Motion, issued the Order of even date directing
the City Prosecution Office to submit to the
Court the complete records of its Preliminary
Investigation within five (5) days from notice,
thereafter the same shall be considered for
resolution.
On 23 June 2003, accused PO1 Trestiza filed an
Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution of the
Pending Motion to Resolve, reiterating the
grounds stated in his previous Motion.
Before the issue could be resolved by the
Pairing Judge, however, the Honorable Estela
Perlas Bernabe, took over this Court as
Assisting Presiding Judge, after the Honorable
Salvador S. Abad Santos requested the
Supreme Court to be relieved of his assignment
herein. Judge Bernabe issued the Order dated
27 June 2003 holding in abeyance the
Resolution of the Prosecution’s Motion to
Withdraw Information for a period of sixty (60)
days from the filing of the Petition for Review
by private complainants with the Reviewing
Office. On 08 July 2003, she denied the Motion
to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 02-3394 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms filed against accused
PO1 Trestiza on the grounds that the
allegations raised by said accused are defenses
proper for determination in a full-blown trial
and set the pre-trial of the same to 24 July
2003. Trial on the merits for this particular
Criminal Case ensued until the Prosecution
rested its case and said accused filed his
Demurrer to Evidence on 05 March 2004.
2
In the meantime, without any word yet as to
the outcome of the Petition for Review filed
with the DOJ relative to Criminal Case No. 02-
3393, Judge Bernabe issued the Order dated 28
August 2003, directing the City Prosecution
Office to conduct a re-assessment and re-
evaluation of the evidence presented and to
submit its report and recommendation within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of said
Order. The Resolution of the subject Motion
was again held in abeyance.
On 02 March 2004, the Prosecution filed a
"Motion to Resolve (Motion to Withdraw
Information of Kidnapping) with attached
Order dated 19 February 2004. It alleged
therein that it conducted a thorough re-
assessment and re-evaluation of the evidence
obtaining in this case in compliance with the
Order of this Court dated 28 August 2003 and
maintains that the correct and appropriate
charges to be filed against accused should be
for ROBBERY and GRAVE THREATS but for two
(2) counts each, and NOT for KIDNAPPING as
initially filed. Thus, it prayed for this Court to be
allowed to withdraw the present Information
for Kidnapping "considering that the
appropriate charges of two (2) counts of
Robbery and two (2) counts of Grave Threats in
lieu of the charge of KIDNAPPING have already
been filed with the proper Courts."
To justify the Prosecution’s withdrawal of the
Information for KIDNAPPING, Public Prosecutor
Edgardo G. Hirang states, in the Order attached
to the said Motion, that, to wit:
"A careful re-evaluation of the pieces of
evidence adduced by both parties shows that
the offense of Kidnapping shall not prosper
against all the accused. As correctly stated in
the Resolution issued on February 20, 2003,
one of the essential elements for the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized
under [Article] 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is that [the] offender must be a
private individual which does not obtain in the
case at bar as respondents Trestiza, Manrique,
and Jose are public officers being police officers
who at the time the complainants were
allegedly divested of their cash money and
personal belongings by herein respondents,

were conducting a police operation to enforce
the provision of the Dangerous Drug Law (R.A.
9165).
All accused were in the place of the incident to
conduct such operation is shown not only by
the existence of coordination between them
and the police authorities but also by the
declaration of the complainants that they were
able to verify the plate number of the vehicle of
the accused from the Makati Police Station.
Hence, they should be charged with the offense
of Robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code and Grave Threats as
recommended by this Office in its Resolution
issued on February 20, 2003. Considering that
there are two (2) complainants, the
respondents should be charged with two (2)
counts of Robbery and Grave Threats."
The Prosecution filed on the same date a
Motion to Amend Information and to Admit
Attached Amended Information in Criminal
Case No. 02-766 alleging that the Criminal
Information therein for Robbery should only be
limited to private complainant Yu’s complaint
and not to Navarro’s. Counsel for the accused,
Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria, filed an Urgent
Motion to calendar the hearing of the Motion
to Amend Information and to Admit Amended
Information which the Court granted in its
Order dated 25 March 2004.
In the meantime, Criminal Case No. 04-1311 for
Robbery which was filed on the strength of the
Complaint of Navarro was consolidated with
similar cases pending before this Court, upon
the Order dated 12 March 2004 by the
Honorable Ma. Cristina J. Cornejo, Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 147.
After study, the Court resolves to:
1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information
for Kidnapping under Criminal Case No. 02-
3393;
2. To [sic] GRANT the Motion to Amend
Information for Robbery; [and]
3. To [sic] Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against SPO2 Jose in Criminal
Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information
relative thereto shall have been duly amended
by the Prosecution.
In its Motion to Withdraw Information for
Kidnapping, the Public Prosecutor argues in
essence that the crime of Kidnapping could not
be possibly committed by the accused as they,
except for one, are police officers, who at the
time the complainants were divested of cash
and other personal belongings were conducting
a police operation to enforce the provisions of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. This to the mind of
the movant runs counter to the provisions of
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have committed simulating public
authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have
been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be
a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The Court finds this unmeritorious. Even a
public officer can commit the said crime within
the context of the aforesaid legal provision.
This is settled in our jurisprudence in the case
of People vs. ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE
SANDIGAN, et al. (GR No. 123979[,] December
3, 1998) which provides in part:
"The fact alone that appellant Pillneta is an
organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a member of the PNP would not
exempt them from the criminal liability of
kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting
and taking away the victim, appellants did so
neither in furtherance of official functions nor
in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is
not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in
purely private capacity that they have acted in
concert with their co-appellant Santiano and
Chanco."
Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B.
Regalado elucidates on this point clearly:
"This article provides that the crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention are
committed by private individuals obviously
because if the offender is a public officer the
crime is arbitrary detention under Art. 124, but
passing sub silentio on the matter of
kidnapping. It should be understood however,
that the public officer who unlawfully detains
another and is punishable by Art. 124 is one
who has the duty to apprehend a person with a
correlative power to detain him. If he is only an
employee with clerical or postal functions,
although the Code considers him as a public
officer, his detention of the victim is illegal
detention under this article since he is acting in
a private, and not an official, capacity. If a
policeman kidnaps the victim, except when
legally authorized as part of police operations,
he cannot also be said to be acting in an official
capacity, hence he is to be treated as a private
individual liable under this article.
(underscoring ours)
From the purpose and the formulation of R.A.
18 and R.A. 1084, it can be deduced that the
legislative intendment was to put all forms of
kidnapping under Art. 267 when Congress
amended it together with Art. 270. There
appears to have been some oversight,
however, in the related articles and these will
be discussed at the proper juncture." (Florenz
B. Regalado, Pages 488 and 489, Criminal Law
Conspectus, First Edition, March 2000)
As to whether or not the accused were indeed
engaged in the performance of a legitimate
police operation at the time the private
complainants were allegedly deprived of their
liberty and personal belongings is a matter
which at this stage can only be considered as
a defense that calls for further factual support
in the course of judicial proceedings. Was there
a Mission Order? Are there documents to show
that police-to-police coordinations were
indeed made? Are there corroborations to
3
these claims whether documentary or
testimonial? The need for further evidence
supportive of this claim gains significance in the
light of the emphatic assertions to the contrary
by the private complainants and their
witnesses.
As there appears to be probable cause for the
inclusion of accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal Case
No. 02-3393 for Kidnapping considering that
the latter was specifically mentioned in the
body of the Information as someone who
conspired, confederated and mutually helped
the other accused in this case, the Court
resolves to await for the Prosecution to amend
the same before issuing a Warrant of Arrest
against said accused.
Lastly, the Court finds the sought amendment
of the Information for Robbery to be well-
taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to:
1. DENY the Motion to Withdraw Information
for Kidnapping [under Criminal Case No. 02-
3393];
2. GRANT the Motion to Amend Information for
Robbery;
3. Hold in abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest against accused SPO2 Jose in Criminal
Case No. 02-3393 until after the Information
relative thereto shall have been duly amended
by the Prosecution.
Set these cases for arraignment on 27 April
2004 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.1âwphi1 The Amended Information
for Robbery duly attached in the Motion is
hereby ADMITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Atty. Jose Ma. Q. Austria (Atty. Austria)
withdrew as counsel for Manrique and Pineda.
Atty. Austria also manifested that he would file
an Omnibus Motion relative to the 16 April
2004 Order of the trial court. The arraignment
was reset to 25 May 2004,9 which was further

reset to 28 June 2004,10 19 July 2004,11 23
August 2004,12 and finally on 31 August 2004.13
Atty. Austria filed his Omnibus Motion for
Trestiza: motion for reconsideration of the 16
April 2004 Order, motion to quash the
informations, and motion to allow Trestiza to
post bail.14 Complainants opposed the
Omnibus Motion.15The corresponding
reply16 and rejoinder17 were also filed. In its 19
August 2004 Order,18 the trial court denied the
Omnibus Motion. It ruled that the trial court
has the authority to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information relative to a criminal case filed
before it. Moreover, the quashal of the
informations against the accused goes into the
determination of the nature of the arrest,
which, in turn, goes into the merits of the case.
Finally, the charge of kidnapping is a non-
bailable offense.
When the case was called for arraignment,
Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda all pleaded not
guilty to the following charges:
Criminal Case No. 02-3393:
That on or about the 7th day of November
2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S Insp.
Loriemar L. Manrique, both active members of
the Philippine National Police, and Rodie
Pineda y Jimenez, a private individual[,] all of
them armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another with one PO2 Reynel Jose, a member
of the Philippine National Police, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma
Navarro, or otherwise deprive them of their
liberty by then and there kidnap without legal
grounds for the purpose of extorting money for
their safety and immediate release as in fact
said accused demanded the amount of
₱1,000,000.00 as ransom money from them.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 03-766:
That on or about the 7th day of November
2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, PO1 Froilan Trestiza y Lacson and P/S
Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, PO2 Reynel Jose, all
active members of the Philippine National
Police, and Rodie Pineda y Jimenez, a private
individual[,] all of them armed with firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another with intent to gain by means of
force and violence or intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
and divest Lawrence Yu y Lim and Maria Irma
Navarro of the following items to wit:
a. One (1) piece of necklace (gold) with pendant
amounting to ₱50,000.00;
b. Two (2) pieces bracelet (gold) worth more or
less ₱70,000.00;
c. One (1) Rolex watch worth ₱270,000.00;
d. One (1) men’s ring worth ₱15,000.00;
e. Two (2) cellphone[s] described as Nokia 9210
& 3310;
f. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] watch worth
₱150,000.00;
g. One (1) Philip Chariole [sic] bracelet worth
₱75,000.00;
h. One (1) solo diamond studded [sic] (3K)
worth ₱500,000.00;
i. One (1) women’s ring gold worth ₱12,000.00;
j. One (1) necklace gold [sic] worth ₱20,000.00;
k. One (1) [sic] cellphone[s] described as Nokia
7650 & 8855; and,
l. Cash money amounting to more or less
₱300,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainants.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. 04-1311:
That on or about the 7th day of November
2002, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent of gain and by means of force and
violence or intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob and
divest Irma Maria A. Navarro of the following
items to wit:
a. One (1) Chariol (sic) watch
b. One (1) Gold ring
c. One (1) Chariol (sic) bracelet
d. One (1) pair diamond earring (sic)
e. One (1) gold necklace
f. One (1) cellphone 7650 Nokia
g. One (1) cellphone 8855 Nokia
h. Cash money amounting to ₱120,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
The trial court set the case for pre-trial
conference on 14 September 2004,20 which was
reset to 20 September 2004.21 The parties
stipulated on the following:
1. That on November 7, 2002, the three (3)
accused, Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda were
using an Adventure van with plate no. XAU-298;
2. That Loriemar Manrique was the team leader
of the group comprising [sic] of Rodie Pineda
and Reynel Jose on November 7, 2002;
3. That the incident started at the Hotel
Intercon located in Makati City;
4. That Loriemar Manrique is a member of the
PNP Drug Enforcement Agency;
5. That accused Froilan Trestiza was the driver
of the Adventure van bearing plate no. XAU-
298 on November 17, 2002;
4
6. That after the operation was conducted,
there was never any occasion that the accused
Froilan Trestiza communicated with any of the
complainants;
7. None of the items allegedly lost by the
complainants were recovered from accused
Froilan Trestiza.22
The trial court summarized the testimonies
during trial as follows:
The prosecution sought to establish its case by
presenting the following witnesses: Ma. Irma A.
Navarro, Lawrence Yu y Lim, PO2 Rodolfo
Santiago, PO3 Rosauro P. Almonte, John Paul
Joseph P. Suguitan, Angelo Gonzales, PO3
Edward C. Ramos, Schneider R. Vivas, PSInsp.
Salvador V. Caro, and Chief Insp. Roseller
Fabian.
The Prosecution’s main evidence relies heavily
upon the accounts of Irma and Lawrence who
testified respectively as follows:
On November 7, 2002 at about one o’clock in
the morning, Irma and her boyfriend Lawrence,
both twenty-two (22) years old at the time of
the incident, were at the "Where Else Disco" in
Makati attending a party. They stayed thereat
for around thirty (30) minutes only. Irma
however, went out ahead of Lawrence. When
she was about to proceed to where Lawrence’s
Honda ESI car was parked, she noticed that the
said car was blocked by another vehicle which
was a Mitsubishi Adventure van. Three (3)
armed men later on emerged from the said van.
As she was about to open the door of the
Honda ESI, somebody hit her in [sic] the nape.
When she turned her back, she saw the three
(3) men in the company of Rodie Pineda alias
"Buboy" ("Pineda"). She knew Pineda because
the latter was her sister Cynthia’s "kumpare,"
Pineda being the godfather of Cynthia’s child.
Furthermore, she saw Pineda in their residence
the night of November 6, 2002 as he visited his
[sic] sister. She asked Pineda what was
happening but the latter replied "pasensya na,
mare, trabaho lang" ("Bear with me, mare, this
is just a job").

She was told that the three (3) whose identities
she later on learned as Capt. Lorieman
Manrique, PO2 Reynel Jose and PO1 Froilan
Trestiza, were policemen. She asked why she
was being accosted but she was handcuffed by
Manrique. She was ushered inside the Honda
ESI. Pineda asked her where Lawrence was but
she was left inside the car with Jose while
Pineda, Trestiza and Manrique on the other
hand went away apparently to look for
Lawrence. Pineda and Manrique later on went
back inside the Honda ESI. They drove later
with Jose behind the wheels [sic] while Pineda
occupied the passenger seat. They followed the
Mitsubishi Adventure van which was then
driven by Trestiza. Unknown to Irma, Lawrence
was already inside the van at the time. They just
drove and drove around ("umiikot"), passing
through small alleys as they avoided major
routes. She was asked later by Pineda to
remove her jewelry. She was able to remove
only her earrings as she was in handcuffs.
Pineda himself removed her Philip Chariolle
[sic] watch and bracelet. Her necklace and ring
followed. All these were later on turned over by
Pineda to Manrique. Her bag where her wallet
containing the amount of ₱120,000.00 was
likewise taken.
Her two (2) cellphones, a 7650 and an 8855,
were likewise taken by Pineda. They stopped
several times at the side streets and the
accused would talk to each other. Pineda would
stay with her inside the vehicle while Jose
would go out and talk to the occupants of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. Later on, she and
Lawrence were brought together inside the
Mitsubishi Adventure van. It was there that
they were told that they will not be released if
they will not be able to produce one million
pesos. These were all uttered by Jose and
Manrique. It was somewhere in Blumentritt,
San Juan where all the accused stopped for the
last time. She was crying all the while.
She later on felt the call of nature, prompting
her to ask permission if she could possibly
relieve herself. She was accompanied by Pineda
to a nearby Shell gas station in San Juan. When
they returned to where they stopped, she was
asked as to whom she could possibly call so that
the money that the accused were asking will be
produced. The accused later on asked
Lawrence to make a call using his cellphone
with speaker phone. Lawrence was able to get
in touch with his friends John Paul Suguitan and
Angelo Gonzales. The latter was told that
Lawrence figured in an accident and that he
needs money badly. Lawrence and his friends
agreed that the money the two will produce will
be brought to the Caltex gas station along
Ortigas corner Wilson Street in Greenhills. They
proceeded to the said place later where they
waited for the friends of Lawrence. She was
told later by Manrique that she better pray that
the transaction pushes through. Manrique
further warned her against reporting the
incident to anyone lest her whole family will be
held liable. She was even shown by the accused
the picture of her child. She was cursed by Jose.
Trestiza on the other hand told her that
Lawrence’s transaction should better push
through.
The two, John Paul Suguitan and Angelo
Gonzales, later on arrived at the gas station.
Lawrence took from them what appears to be a
package and handed the same to Pineda.
Manrique thereafter called Pineda asking
"positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied "yes."
The amount raised by the friends of Lawrence
was one hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php
180,000.00). They (Irma and Lawrence) were
later brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their
captors warned them not to report the matter
to the authorities otherwise they will face dire
consequences. The items taken from Irma like
the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were
placed by the men inside the console box of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. When they reached Star
Mall, the men talked to them for thirty minutes.
Again, they were warned about the
consequences of their reporting the incident to
the police. Irma was told that the men knew her
address, the members of her family and that
they have the picture of her child. She was
likewise warned not to report the matter to her
father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a
policeman, otherwise her daughter with
Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the
consequences ("anak ko ang mananagot").
They were released after thirty (30) minutes.
Lawrence had to plead for their gasoline from
the accused and he was given Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother about the
incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence
however made a report to the Makati police
station in the evening of 7 November 2002
where he was shown a "coordination sheet"
pertaining to the plate number of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda in the
meanwhile kept on calling them (Irma and
Lawrence) demanding for their "balance" of
one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). Irma’s
mother however soon learned of the incident
because of a newspaper item. Her father
likewise learned of the incident and lost no time
in contacting authorities from the CIDG. They
(Irma and Lawrence) were later investigated by
the CIDG people to whom they gave their
sworn statements on November 14, 2002. As
Buboy Pineda continued to call them for the
alleged balance, an entrapment operation was
planned on that date. Boodles of money were
dusted with ultra-violet powder. On the same
date, Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for
purposes of meeting him that night in order to
get the remaining money. The entrapment
operation which was conducted along the New
World Hotel, and participated in by PO2
Almonte, was successful as Buboy Pineda was
arrested. Recovered from the possession of
Pineda were a gold necklace without a
pendant; a Nokia cellphone model 7650; a
Toyota corolla car with plate number PNG 214
color red and one (1) ignition key. The
necessary acknowledgment receipt was duly
signed by the said accused. A pawnshop ticket
was likewise recovered from his possession.
Lawrence on the other hand narrated that
during that fateful day of 7 November 2002 at
around 1:30 o’clock in the morning, as he was
stepping out from the Where Else Disco, he was
suddenly "sandwhiched" [sic] by two (2)
persons, Manrique and Trestiza. Pineda whom
he likewise knew, held a gun and pointed the
same to him. He was later on "lifted" through
his belt and loaded to a yellow Mitsubishi
Adventure. He was made to occupy the
passenger seat at the back while Trestiza drove
the said vehicle. Manrique occupied the seat
5
beside Trestiza. He asked the accused who they
were and he was told that they were
policemen. At the time, Trestiza was wearing an
outfit which was "hip hop" while Manrique was
wearing a polo which was "button down." He
was cursed and told to shut up. He was asked
to bow down his head as they drove along. He
remembers that the accused dug into his
pockets and his valuables consisting of
cellphones, a 9210 and a 3310 models [sic]
respectively, including his wallet, cigarettes,
watch bracelet, ring, necklace and a pair of
earrings, were taken from him. He later on saw
his Honda ESI car. He noticed that the
Mitsubishi Adventure they riding was following
the said Honda ESI. Manrique later asked him
how much money did he have. When replied
that his money was inside his car, Manrique
allegedly retorted "imposible." They later on
stopped in Mandaluyong near an open canal.
He was asked again by Manrique about his
money. At that point, another man whose
name he later on learned was SPO2 Reynel
Jose, boarded also the Mitsubishi Adventure.
Jose asked him about his money. When he
replied that his money was inside his car, Jose
got mad and boxed him on his face. They later
on resumed driving around. When they
stopped again, Jose asked him whether he has
thought of the money. When he again replied
that the money was inside his car, he was boxed
repeatedly by Jose. Manrique and Trestiza were
seated in the front seats but did not do
anything.
They resumed driving again. Jose asked him
again about the money. When he gave the
same response, Jose put a plastic material over
his head which made him unable to breath [sic].
Jose strangled him, prompting him to shout
later "okay na, okay na. Sige na, sige na
magbibigay na ako" ("Okay, okay. I will give.").
Jose stopped strangling him and immediately
removed the plastic material over his head.
Jose remarked that had he cooperated earlier,
he would not have been hurt. Trestiza and
Manrique told him that he should not have kept
the matter long. Later on, the four (4) men had
a brief huddle. He was later on approached by
them saying "okay na ha, isang milyon na"
("Okey ha, it’s one million). He could not recall

however who in particular made the remark.
He was later on instructed by Manrique to call
certain persons with the information that he
figured in [an] accident. He was made to use his
9210 model phone as the same had a "speaker"
thus enabling the accused to listen to the
conversation. He tried to get in touch with his
siblings but failed. He was able to contact later
on his friends John Paul Suguitan and Angelo
Gonzales who were then in Libis. He told his
friends that he needed money very badly as he
had an accident. He instructed his friends to
proceed to the area given by Manrique which
was at the Caltex gas station along Ortigas
corner Wilson Street in Greenhills.
Later on, Irma and Lawrence were allowed to
be together inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. It
was at that point where they were told to
produce the amount of One Million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00) that night so they will be
released. These very words were uttered by
Jose and Manrique. Irma later on asked
permission to answer the call of nature and she
was accompanied by Pineda to the Shell gas
station in San Juan where she relieved herself.
Upon arriving at the said gas station, Lawrence
was directed to drive his Honda ESI car. He was
in the company of Pineda while Irma on the
other hand was with Manrique, Trestiza and
Jose inside the Mitsubishi Adventure. While
Irma was inside the Mitsubishi Adventure, she
was told that if the person contacted by
Lawrence will not show up, they will not be
released and if Lawrence will escape, she will be
finished off. Manrique thereafter told Irma to
better pray that the transaction will push
through. She was warned that if she reports the
incident, her family will be harmed. The said
accused had her child’s picture at the time. Jose
was cursing her. Trestiza on the other hand was
seated at the driver side of the Mitsubishi
Adventure van and remarked that Lawrence’s
transaction should push through so that they
will be released.
Not long after, Lawrence alighted from his car
and stood beside the vehicle. His friends’
vehicle later on arrived. Lawrence approached
the vehicle that has just arrived and took
something. Pineda remained seated in
Lawrence’s car while smoking. The door of the
said car was open at the time. Lawrence
thereafter walked back to where Pineda was
and handed to him a package. It was already
around 4: or 4:30 in the morning. Lawrence’s
friends thereafter went away, prompting
Pineda to call Manrique. Manrique allegedly
asked "positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied
"yes."
The amount raised by the friends of Lawrence
was one hundred eighty thousand pesos (Php
180,000.00). They (Irma and Lawrence) were
later brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their
captors warned them not to report the matter
to the authorities otherwise they will face dire
consequences. The items taken from Irma like
the cash money, jewelry and cellphone were
placed by the men inside the console box of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. When they reached Star
Mall, the men talked to them for thirty minutes.
Again, they were warned about the
consequences of their reporting the incident to
the police. Irma was told that the men knew her
address, the members of her family and that
they have the picture of her child. She was
likewise warned not to report the matter to her
father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a
policeman, otherwise her daughter with
Lawrence will be the one [to] bear the
consequences ("anak ko ang mananagot").
They were released along Edsa after thirty (30)
minutes. Lawrence had to plead for their
gasoline from the accused and he was given
Php 100.00.
Irma decided not to tell her mother about the
incident as she was very afraid. Lawrence
however made a report to the Makati police
station in the evening of 7 November 2002
where he was shown a "coordination sheet"
pertaining to the plate number of the
Mitsubishi Adventure. Buboy Pineda in the
meanwhile kept on calling them (Irma and
Lawrence) demanding for their "balance" of
one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00). Irma’s
mother however soon learned of the incident
because of a newspaper item. Her father
likewise learned of the incident and lost no time
in contacting authorities from the CIDG. They
(Irma and Lawrence) were later investigated by
the CIDG people to who they gave their sworn
statements on November 14, 2002. As Buboy
Pineda continued to call them for the alleged
balance, an entrapment operation was planned
on that date. Boodles of money were dusted
with ultra-violet powder. On the same date,
Buboy Pineda called Lawrence for purposes of
meeting him that night in order to get the
remaining money. The entrapment operation
which was conducted along the New World
Hotel, and participated in by PO2 Almonte, was
successful as Buboy Pineda was arrested.
Recovered from the possession of Pineda were
a gold necklace without pendant; a Nokia
cellphone model 7650; a Toyota corolla car
with plate number PNG 214 color red and one
(1) ignition key. The necessary
acknowledgment receipt was duly signed by
the said accused. A pawnshop ticket was
likewise recovered from his possession.
Early in the morning of the following day at the
CIDG, Lorieman Manrique went to the said
office looking for his co-accused Froilan
Trestiza. He (Manrique) was arrested thereat
when the private complainants who happened
to be there as they were giving additional
statements identified him (Manrique) through
a one-way mirror. Trestiza was likewise
arrested later as he was identified by his co-
accused Rodie Pineda. During the arrest,
Trestiza was found to be in possession of an
unlicensed firearm for which the corresponding
charge was filed. He (Trestiza) was likewise the
subject of the complaint sheet filed by Irma and
Lawrence and was likewise identified by his co-
accused Pineda as one of the cohorts in the
kidnapping of the former.
The Defense on the other hand presented the
following version:
Private complainants Irma Navarro and
Lawrence Yu were known to accused Rodie
‘Buboy’ Pineda, a freelance dance instructor
prior to his incarceration, and a godfather to
the child of Irma’s sister, since 1997. The two
(Irma and Lawrence) are known to Pineda as
suppliers of prohibited drugs, particularly
‘Ecstasy,’ ‘blue anchors,’ and ‘yeng-yen.’ The
two, Irma and Lawrence have been distributing
these drugs to various customers who [sic]
6
frequented bars and disco pubs. Pineda has
been transacting with the two, particularly
Lawrence, for a profit. Realizing later that his
involvement with the group of Lawrence has
become deeper and deeper, Pineda thought of
causing the arrest of the latter. He (Pineda)
soon decided to report the matter to the police
authorities and contacted forthwith his long-
time acquaintance, now his co-accused Froilan
Trestiza on November 6, 2002 at 10:30 in the
evening. At that time, Trestiza was a policeman
under the Special Action Unit, Group Director’s
Office of the National Capital Region. Pineda
and Trestiza, who have known each other for
the past ten years, used to be dancers at the
Equinox Disco along Pasay Road. Upon learning
the information from Pineda, Trestiza
contacted his classmate PO2 Rolando de
Guzman of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) who in turn referred Trestiza to
Captain Lorieman Manrique who was then the
Deputy Chief of the Special Enforcement Unit of
the PDEA, Metro Manila Regional Office.
Manrique was called later by Trestiza through
cellphone and they agreed to meet the same
night, at around midnight, at the parking lot of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Manrique
prepared a Pre-Operation sheet for a possible
narcotics operation. He likewise gave [the]
plate number of the vehicle he was then driving
which was a Mitsubishi Adventure van with
plate number HAU-298.
During their ensuing meeting, Manrique was
with PO2 Reynel Jose. Pineda and Manrique
talked to each other. Manrique later on briefed
Pineda and Jose. Trestiza was about three to
five meters away from the three (3). After the
briefing, Manrique asked Trestiza to drive the
Mitsubishi Adventure. Manrique told Trestiza
that the buy-bust operation has been pre-
coordinated with the Makati police. Manrique
later joined Trestiza inside the Mitsubishi
Adventure while Jose and Pineda were outside
as though waiting for someone. Irma and
Lawrence later on arrived and they talked to
Pineda and Jose. Pineda introduced Jose to
Irma and Lawrence as ‘the buyer.’ Jose was only
wearing a t-shirt at the time and it seemed
Lawrence and Irma doubted him. Jose told the
two that he has the money with him and he

would like to buy drugs. Irma however
whispered something to Lawrence prompting
the latter to vascillate [sic]. From where they
are seated inside the Mitsubishi Adventure,
Trestiza and Manrique could see what were
[sic] going on among Irma, Lawrence, Jose and
Pineda. Later on, Jose approached Trestiza and
Manrique and told them that the ‘pre-arranged
signal’ is when he (Jose) scratched his head.
According further to Jose, his scratching of his
head will mean a signal to Trestiza to drive
towards them the vehicle. As Jose later on
scratched his head, Trestiza drove the vehicle
towards the group as instructed. Manrique
thereafter alighted and effected the arrest of
Irma and Lawrence. Irma went hysterical and
was loaded into the Honda ESI while Lawrence
was made to board the Mitsubishi Adventure.
It was at that point when two (2) mobile cars
arrived with policemen on board. A commotion
immediately ensued between the police men
aboard the mobile cars and Manrique’s men.
Firearms were drawn and poked against each of
the men (‘nagkatutukan ng baril’). Jose,
however, later on showed what appeared to be
a document to the men aboard the mobile car.
One of the men later on made a call through his
radio and then left afterwards.
Manrique later on instructed Trestiza to drive
towards Edsa on their way to Camp Crame.
Along the way, Manrique conducted a tactical
interrogation against Lawrence and Irma about
their drug-related activities. Upon reaching SM
Megamall, however, Manrique told Trestiza to
pull over. Manrique talked to Lawrence, Irma,
Jose and Pineda. Trestiza remained inside the
van. Trestiza, however, overheard that
Lawrence was at that point was talking about
his supplier of ‘ecstasy.’ Thereafter, Manrique
briefed anew Pineda and Jose in the presence
of Irma and Lawrence. It was understood
among them that Lawrence will wait for his
alleged supplier whose name was allegedly
‘Jojo’ at the Caltex gas station along Wilson
Street in Greenhills. Lawrence told Manrique
that this Jojo was really a big-time supplier
of ecstasy and cocaine. Upon arriving at the gas
station, the group waited for Lawrence’s
supplier for an hour but nobody appeared.
Manrique became impatient and went to
where Lawrence was. Manrique later told his
men that Lawrence might have alerted his
supplier. He (Manrique) then decided to bring
the two (Irma and Lawrence) to Camp Crame.
Trestiza, however, pointed out to Manrique
that nothing was taken from the possession of
the two. Manrique conferred anew with Jose.
Jose remarked that the items could have been
thrown away. It was later on decided that Irma
and Lawrence will just be released. The two
were indeed released near the [Manuela]
Complex along Edsa.
Trestiza was later on arrested by the CIDG
operatives in the early morning of November
16, 2002 at the parking lot of the Club 5 Disco.
A gun was poked at him and he was shoved
inside a vehicle. He was boxed and placed on
handcuffs. He was not shown any warrant of
arrest. He told the arresting officers that he is
also a policeman. He was brought later to Camp
Crame. While at Camp Crame, he was shown to
his co-accused Pineda and the latter was asked
"di ba sya yung nag-drive noong may operation
laban kina Irma Navarro?" ("Is he not the one
who drove during the operation against Irma
Navarro?"). He (Trestiza) asked the authorities
what were the grounds for detaining him but
his queries were not answered. His watch,
wallet and cellphone were taken. Later on the
same day, Irma arrived in Camp Crame. The
authorities thereat talked to Irma, afterwhich,
a policeman told her "eto yung itinuturo ni
Buboy na nag-drive." ("This is the one pointed
to by Buboy as the one who drove"). Several
days later, all the accused were presented to
the press by the office of General Matillano.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer covered the story
and later on came out with an article entitled
"We Were Framed."
The defense likewise presented PO2 Rolando
de Guzman who corroborated the claim of
Trestiza that he was called by the latter
concerning the information given by Pineda. No
further evidence was presented.23
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Joint Decision24 dated 24 July 2007, the
trial court found Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom.
The trial court concentrated its ruling on the
credibility of the witnesses. It found the
testimonies of the prosecution credible, with
their versions of the incident dovetailing with
each other even on minor details. On the other
hand, the defense’s testimonies taxed the
credulity of the trial court. The trial court raised
numerous questions about the defense’s story
line:
x x x But this leads the court to wonder: if
indeed Pineda was so bothered by his
involvement with the group of Lawrence, why
did he spill the beans against Irma and
Lawrence only? Did he not state that it was a
"group" that he was transacting with? Who
were the other members of this group? What
were their activities that were so dark and
clandestine so as to make him suddenly
shudder and opt for a change of life? These
were not answered by Pineda’s testimony.
Also, while Manrique presented what appears
to be a Pre-Operation Coordination Report,
thus creating at first glance the impression that
theirs was a legitimate police operation, this
still does not detract from nor diminish the
credibility of the complainants’ claim that they
were subsequently abducted and money was
demanded in exchange for their release. For
even if the court is to indulge the claim of the
defense that the complainants were indeed
drug-pushers and undeserving of this court’s
sympathy, the nagging doubt about the
existence of a prepared police operation as
what Manrique and his co-accused refer to,
persists. For one, the said Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet appears to be
unreliable. Aside from the fact that the same
was not duly authenticated, the failure of the
defense, particularly accused Manrique, to
summon the signatories therein who may
attest to the existence and authenticity of such
document was not at all explained. Second, all
the accused narrated about their almost-fatal
encounter with another group of policemen
while they were allegedly in the act of
conducting the supposed buy-bust operation
against the complainants. This event, to the
7
view of this court, only invites the suspicion
that the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet was
dubious if not actually non-existent.
The accused likewise claimed that they
released the two later along Edsa as nothing
was found on them. The manner of the release,
however, raises several questions: why were
the complainants who were earlier suspected
of being drug-pushers not brought to the police
precinct? Did not Lawrence volunteer the name
of his alleged supplier earlier during the tactical
interrogation? Why were they unloaded just
like that along Edsa at that ungodly hour? Was
there an incident report on the matter
considering that Manrique was mindful enough
earlier to first secure a Pre-
Operation/Coordination sheet?25
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 02-3393
finding the accused PO1 FROILAN TRESTIZA Y
LACSON, P/INSP LORIEMAN L. MANRIQUE and
RODIE PINEDA Y JIMENEZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of KIDNAPPING for
RANSOM, and they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In
addition thereto, they are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the private complainants
the sums of PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages,
and PHP 300,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
the accused are ACQUITTED in Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-766 and 04-1311 both for Robbery
respectively.
Send the records of this case to the archives in
so far as accused PO2 Reynel Jose, who
continues to be at large, is concerned. Let,
however, a Warrant of Arrest be issued against
him.
SO ORDERED.26
On the same date as the promulgation of its
decision, the trial court issued an Order of
Commitment27 of Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections.

On 27 July 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda filed a Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition. Two witnesses, Camille Anne Ortiz y
Alfonso (Ortiz) and Paulo Antonio De Leon y
Espiritu (De Leon), allegedly intimate friends of
Navarro and Yu, will testify as to the
circumstances which took place in the early
morning of 7 November 2002. Their
testimonies, if admitted, will allegedly result in
the acquittal of Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda.
These witnesses are not known to the accused,
and they could not have been produced during
trial. Moreover, the accused are of the belief
that trial court judge Zenaida T. Galapate-
Laguilles acted with bias against them. She
allegedly made an off-the-record remark and
stated that the prosecution failed to establish
what they sought to prove, but then later on
questioned the existence of the defense’s Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet in her decision.
Judge Galapate-Laguilles also failed to resolve
the Petition for Bail, and failed to point out
discrepancies in the testimonies of the
defense’s witnesses, particularly those
regarding the arrests of Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda.
The prosecution opposed the Motion for New
Trial and Inhibition.28 De Leon shared a cell with
Manrique since July 2003, while the trial was
ongoing, and hence De Leon’s supposed
testimony should not be considered "newly
discovered" evidence. On the other hand,
Ortiz’s narration of events in her affidavit is full
of inconsistencies. The prosecution likewise
questioned the credibility of the witnesses who
allegedly heard Judge Galapate-Laguilles’ off-
the-record remark. One was Trestiza’s relative,
while the other was a security escort who was
supposed to stay outside the courtroom.
Finally, the motion itself was filed late. The
supplement to the motion, to which the
affidavits of the additional witnesses were
attached, was filed two days after the finality of
the trial court’s decision. Copies of the decision
were furnished to both prosecution and
defense on 24 July 2007, which was also the
date of promulgation. The Motion for New Trial
and Inhibition was dated 27 July 2007, while the
Supplement to the Motion which included the
witnesses’ affidavits was dated 10 August 2007.
The trial court held hearings on the twin
motions. On 3 October 2007, the trial court
issued an Order29 denying the Motion for New
Trial and for Inhibition. The evidence presented
was merely corroborative, and the prosecution
was able to prove its case despite the judge’s
alleged off-the-record equivocal remark.
On 19 October 2007, Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda filed a notice of appeal.30 The Order
denying the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition was received on 18 October 2007,
while the Motion for New Trial and for
Inhibition was filed on 27 July 2007 or three
days after the promulgation of the Decision on
24 July 2004. The trial court gave due course to
the notice of appeal.31 In their brief filed with
the appellate court, Trestiza, Manrique, and
Pineda assigned the following errors:
The trial court erred in convicting accused
Trestiza despite the fact that he was not part of
the alleged conspiracy in that it was not
stipulated during the pre-trial that he was just
the driver and was not part of the team.
Besides, he did not perform any act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of private complainants Lawrence
Yu and Irma Navarro as their demeanor in the
witness stand show hesitation indicative of
guilt of fabrication and their testimonies lack
spontaneity and were not straightforward.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses John Paul
Suguitan and Angelo Gonzales as they alleged
facts and circumstance that are contrary to
human nature and experience.
The trial court erred in convicting the accused
despite the fact that the complainants were
arrested in a legitimate operation as evidenced
by the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet
which was authenticated by accused-appellant
Manrique.32
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 June 2008, the appellate court dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
In its recitation of facts, the appellate court
quoted from the People’s Brief for the
prosecution and from the trial court for the
defense. The appellate court ruled that
Trestiza’s contention that he was just the driver
of the van and never communicated with the
witnesses deserves scant consideration. Yu
identified Trestiza as one of the two men who
sandwiched him as he left Where Else Disco,
and insisted that Yu cooperate with Jose when
Jose asked Yu for cash. Trestiza’s acts thus show
that he acted in concert with his co-accused in
the commission of the crime. The appellate
court relied on the trial court’s assessment of
the reliability of the prosecution’s witnesses,
and gave credence to their testimonies. The
appellate court declared that all the elements
of kidnapping for ransom are present and thus
affirmed the trial court’s decision:
In any event, it was established that all the
elements constituting the crime of kidnapping
for ransom in the case at bar are present. The
elements of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 7659 are as
follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to
deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual
deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c)
motive of the accused, which is extorting
ransom for the release of the victim (People vs.
Raul Cenahonon, 527 SCRA 542). Here, Navarro
and Yu testified how they were abducted at gun
point from the parking lot in Makati and
confined inside the car and van respectively;
that they were both handcuffed, hence,
deprived of their liberty and that appellants
made a demand for them to deliver a certain
amount in exchange for their release.
In fine, the Court rules and so holds that
appellants’ guilt for the offense of kidnapping
for ransom has been proven beyond moral
certainty of doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal is hereby
DISMISSED.
8
SO ORDERED.33
Trestiza alone filed a Motion for
Reconsideration34 of the appellate court’s
decision. In his Motion, Trestiza claimed that he
alone, through counsel, filed an appeal brief.
Trestiza further claimed that the stipulations
made during pre-trial established Trestiza’s
limited involvement, that is, he was merely a
driver of the vehicle when the alleged crime
took place, he never communicated with the
complainants, and none of the items allegedly
taken from the complainants were recovered
from Trestiza’s possession. The trial court did
not mention nor discuss these stipulations in its
decision. Even the trial court’s finding of facts
shows Trestiza’s participation was merely that
of an invited driver in a legitimate Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) drug bust
operation. Moreover, the testimonies of
witnesses of both prosecution and defense
establish that Trestiza was a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) when he
allegedly committed the crime. Under the
circumstances, Trestiza claimed he should be
held liable only for Arbitrary Detention. Finally,
Trestiza’s identification was not only improper
for being suggested, but his warrantless arrest
should also be held invalid.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
comment opposing Trestiza’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The stipulations do not
discount that Trestiza conspired with his co-
appellants Manrique and Pineda in committing
the crime charged. The apprehension and
detention of Navarro and Yu were clearly
effected for the purpose of ransom; hence, the
proper crime really is Kidnapping with Ransom.
Trestiza filed a Reply to the Comment35 on 20
October 2009.
The appellate court denied Trestiza’s Motion
for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 11
November 2009.36 An examination of the
appellants’ brief showed that the brief was filed
for Trestiza, Manrique and Pineda. The
appellate court found no compelling reason to
warrant consideration of its decision.
Trestiza still filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the
appellate court’s decision on 10 January 2010.

The appellate court initially denied38 Trestiza’s
Notice of Appeal due to late filing, but
eventually granted39 Trestiza’s Motion for
Reconsideration40 of the 16 February 2010
resolution denying his Notice of Appeal.
Trestiza filed the present supplemental
brief41 before this Court on 15 August 2011. In
his brief, Trestiza emphasized that Yu was
apprehended by agents of the PNP and PDEA
on 30 June 2011 during a raid of an illegal drugs
laboratory. Yu was charged with the crime of
manufacturing, possessing, and selling illegal
drugs under Sections 8, 11, and 12, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
The Issues
Trestiza raised the following arguments against
the appellate court’s decision:
I. The supervening event involving the
apprehension of Lawrence L. Yu as the head of
a big-time drug syndicate throws his credibility
as a witness beneath the abyss of morass and
decay that must be now totally discarded.
II. The facts and circumstances surrounding the
above-entitled case is consistent with the
innocence of [Trestiza] rendering the evidence
presented insufficient and without moral
certainty to support a conviction.
III. At the very least, the "equipoise rule" finds
application in the case at bar, taking into
consideration the supervening event that
demolished the credibility of the witnesses
presented by the prosecution.
IV. The Constitutional presumption of
innocence of [Trestiza] has not been
overwhelmed by the tainted testimony and
total lack of credibility of Lawrence L. Yu and, in
light of the supervening event, could not now
be overcome by questionable testimonies
presented by the prosecution.
V. The conviction of an innocent man is a great
injustice that affects the very foundations of
humanity.
VI. It was not sufficiently shown that all the
accused in the above-entitled case conspired in
committing the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom and the same was not proven by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
VII. [Trestiza] has no malicious or evil intent in
acquiescing to drive the vehicle used in the buy-
bust operation.
VIII. [Trestiza] is innocent of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom.42
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, we declare that the 30 June 2011
arrest of Yu has no bearing on the present case.
The two cases are independent of each other
and should be treated as such. Yu’s innocence
or guilt regarding his 30 June 2011 arrest does
not affirm or negate the commission of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom against him.
Warrantless Arrest
These are the circumstances surrounding
Trestiza’s arrest: Pineda had been contacting Yu
to follow up on the balance on the ransom.
Pineda was then arrested pursuant to an
entrapment operation conducted in the early
morning of 16 November 2002 at New World
Hotel. During the investigation at Camp Crame,
Pineda revealed that Trestiza could be found at
Club 5 in Makati. Pineda and Yu accompanied
the arresting team to Club 5. Yu pointed out
Trestiza to the arresting team while Trestiza
was on his way to his black Hummer.43
Trestiza questioned the legality of his
warrantless arrest in an Omnibus Motion44 filed
before his arraignment. In its Order dated 19
August 2004, the trial court stated that the
quashal of the informations on account of
Trestiza’s illegal arrest is not warranted. The
determination of the nature of the arrest goes
directly into the merits of the case, and needs a
deeper judicial determination. Matters of
defense are not grounds for a Motion to Quash.
The trial court, however, did not make any
ruling related to Trestiza’s warrantless arrest in
its 24 July 2007 Decision.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances
when warrantless arrests are lawful.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. ‒
A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
It is clear that Trestiza’s warrantless arrest does
not fall under any of the circumstances
mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113. However,
Trestiza failed to make a valid objection to his
warrantless arrest.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the
matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be opportunely raised before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.45Trestiza, being a policeman himself,
could have immediately objected to his
warrantless arrest. However, he merely asked
for the grounds for his arrest. He did not even
file charges against the arresting officers. There
was also a lengthy amount of time between
Trestiza’s arrest on 16 November 2002 and the
filing of the Omnibus Motion objecting to
Trestiza’s warrantless arrest on 11 May 2004.
Although it may be argued that the objection
was raised prior to the entry of Trestiza’s plea
of not guilty in the kidnapping for ransom
charge, it must be noted that the circumstances
9
of the present case make us rule otherwise.
Trestiza was charged with two crimes at the
time of his arrest: kidnapping with ransom
under Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and illegal
possession of firearms under Criminal Case No.
02-3394. Trestiza did not question the legality
of his warrantless arrest nor the acquisition of
jurisdiction of the trial court over his person,
and fully participated in the hearing of the
illegal possession of firearms case. Thus,
Trestiza is deemed to have waived any
objection to his warrantless arrest. Under the
circumstances, Trestiza’s Omnibus Motion in
the kidnapping for ransom case is a mere
afterthought and cannot be considered as a
timely objection.
Assuming arguendo that Trestiza indeed made
a timely objection to his warrantless arrest, our
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that Trestiza’s conviction is
proper despite being illegally arrested without
warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled:
[T]he illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to
their culpability.46
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error.47 The fatal flaw of
an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in
view of a credible eyewitness account.48
Kidnapping with Ransom
The trial court’s findings of facts, its calibration
of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its
assessment of the probative weight of the
evidence of the parties, as well as its
conclusions anchored on the said findings, are
accorded great weight, and even conclusive
effect, unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would alter the outcome of the
case. This is because of the unique advantage
of the trial court to observe, at close range, the
conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the
witnesses as they testify.49 We see no reason to

overrule the trial court’s finding that Trestiza is
guilty of kidnapping with ransom.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. ‒ Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be
a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Before the present case was tried by the trial
court, there was a significant amount of time
spent in determining whether kidnapping for
ransom was the proper crime charged against
the accused, especially since Trestiza and
Manrique were both police officers. Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code specifically stated
that the crime should be committed by a
private individual.50 The trial court settled the
matter by citing our ruling in People v.
Santiano,51thus:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an
organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a member of the PNP would not
exempt them from the criminal liability of
kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting
and taking away the victim, appellants did so
neither in furtherance of official functions nor
in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is
not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in
purely private capacity that they have acted in
concert with their co-appellant Santiano and
Chanco.
In the same order, the trial court asked for
further evidence which support the defense’s
claim of holding a legitimate police operation.
However, the trial court found as unreliable the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented
by the defense. The sheet was not
authenticated, and the signatories were not
presented to attest to its existence and
authenticity.
The second to the last paragraph of Article 267
prescribes the penalty of death when the
extortion of ransom was the purpose of the
kidnapping. Yu and Navarro were released only
after they were able to give various personal
effects as well as cash amounting to ₱300,000,
with the promise to give the balance of
₱1,000,000 at a later date.
Trestiza insists that his participation is limited
to being a driver of the Mitsubishi Adventure
van. Yu testified otherwise.
Direct Examination of Lawrence Lim Yu
Atty. Oledan:
Q: What happened [after you left Wherelse
Disco]?
Witness:
A: As soon as I stepped out of the Wherelse
Disco, somebody bumped me at my right side.
And then later on, I was "sandwiched" by two
(2) persons and when I looked up, I noted the
presence of one (1) man immediately in front
of me holding a gun.
Q: And these men who "sandwiched" you and
the third men [sic] who held the gun in front of
you, would you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Are they inside this Courtroom?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Will you please identify them?
A: The three of them, ma’am.
At this juncture, the witness is to pointing to the
three (3) men, who are the accused in this case,
inside the Courtroom.
COURT: (To the Accused) Again, for the record,
please stand up, gentlemen.
At this juncture, the three (3) accused stood up.
COURT: (To Witness) Are you sure these were
the three (3) men whom you are referring to?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, ma’am.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness
pointed to accused PO1 Froilan Trestiza, PSINP
Loriemar Manrique and Rodie Pineda.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Q: (To Witness) Specifically, who among these
three (3) "sandwiched" you?
WITNESS:
A: It was PO1 Trestiza and Capt. Manrique.
xxx
Q: What happened after you were brought
inside the Mitsubishi vehicle?
A: Later on, Officer Trestiza and Capt. Manrique
likewise boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure.
xxx
Q: Who was driving the vehicle?
A: It was Froilan Trestiza, ma’am.
xxx
10
Q: After [Reynel Jose] said [that had Yu
cooperated earlier, he would not have been
hurt] and the plastic removed from your head,
what did [sic] the two, Trestiza and Manrique,
doing?
A: They told me the same thing. They told me
that I should not have kept the matter long.
Q: What happened after that?
A: After that, Reynel Jose alighted again and we
drove towards an area, which I know now to be
within San Juan. Right in front of the
Tambunting Pawnshop.
Q: What happened at the Tambunting
Pawnshop? Did the vehicle stop there?
A: The two (2) vehicles parked there beside
each other.
Q: What happened when you were there at
Tambunting Pawnshop?
A: After parking in front of the Tambunting
Pawnshop, they boarded Irma and have her sat
[sic] beside me. Then after which, the door at
my left side was opened.
Q: What else happened?
A: They told me not to make any move, that I
just keep on sitting there. Afterwards, the men
huddled with each other ("nagkumpul-kumpol
po sila").
Q: Where did they huddle?
A: They huddled in an area close to me, almost
in front of me.
Q: Who among the accused huddled together?
A: The four (4) of them, ma’am.
Q: How long did they huddle?
A: For a while only, ma’am, around (10) ten
minutes.
Q: After ten (10) minutes, what happened?
A: After ten (10) minutes, Buboy approached
me.

Q: What did he say?
A: He told me that they thought my money
would be One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00).
xxx
Q: So, after that huddle, after you were told by
Buboy that "okay na ‘yong one million" and that
was confirmed by one of the three (3) men who
said "isang million na," what happened?
A: I was talking to Buboy at that time and I was
telling him, "Why do you have to do this to me?
You are the ‘kumpare’ of the elder sister of
Irma."
Q: What did Buboy say to that?
A: Buboy retorted, "Pare, pasensya na, pera
pera lang ‘yan."
Q: After Buboy said that, what happened?
A: I told him that he need not do that, because
if he needs money, I can always lend him.
Q: What did Buboy say?
A: After saying this to Buboy, he told me to just
shut up and then he later on handed over to me
a cell phone and told me to contact a person,
who can give me money.
Q: Who handed you your cell phone?
A: It was Froilan Trestiza, ma’am.
xxx
Q: After that, were you told to go home
already?
A: Not yet, ma’am. Before letting us go, they
threatened us. They reminded us that they
have our IDs, the pictures of our children and
the members of our family.
Q: What did you do after that?
A: We just kept on saying yes because we
wanted to go home already.
Q: What time was that?
11
A: It was almost daybreak ("mag-uumaga na"). Costs against Froilan L. Trestiza.
I have no watch already at that time, ma’am.
SO ORDERED.
Q: So, what did you do after that?
A: After that, Froilan Trestiza handed to me my
sim card telling me that they will be calling me
in my house concerning my alleged balance.52
We agree with the appellate court’s
assessment that Trestiza’s acts were far from
just being a mere driver. The series of events
that transpired before, during, and after the
kidnapping incident more than shows that
Trestiza acted in concert with his co-accused in
committing the crime. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.53
Trestiza’s civil liability is joint and several with
Manrique and Pineda. They are liable for the
₱120,000 taken from Navarro and the
₱180,000 raised by Yu. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,54 Trestiza is also liable for
₱75,000 as civil indemnity which is awarded if
the crime warrants the imposition of death
penalty; ₱75,000 as moral damages because
the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, without need of proof; and ₱30,000 as
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C.
No. 03119 promulgated on 30 June 2009, as
well as the Resolution promulgated on 11 June
2010, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Froilan L. Trestiza is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 02-
3393 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, as well as the accessory
penalties provided by law. In addition to the
restitution of ₱300,000 for the ransom, Trestiza
is ordered to pay Lawrence Yu and Irma
Navarro ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages.

BENITO ASTORGA, G.R. No. 154130
Petitioner,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in
this case affirming petitioners conviction by the
Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. Petitioner now seeks
reconsideration of our Decision.
The facts are briefly restated as follows:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises
de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of
the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG)
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1,
1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B.
Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the
Philippine National Police Regional Intelligence
Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team
found two boats measuring 18 meters in length
and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at
Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met
petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram,
who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A
heated altercation ensued between petitioner
and the DENR team. Petitioner called for
reinforcements and, moments later, a boat
bearing ten armed men, some wearing
fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team
was then brought to petitioners house in
Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The
team left at 2:00 a.m.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner
was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary
Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24986. On petition for review, we
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July
5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.
Costs de oficio.
a SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied with finality on January 12,
2004.[1] Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration[2] with attached Motion for
Reconsideration,[3] wherein he makes the
following submissions:
1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED
BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED
VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE
DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE
DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONER;
4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE
INSTANT CASE.[4]
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to
the Second Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The prosecution was required to comment on
petitioners second Motion for Reconsideration
and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second
Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.[6]
While a second motion for reconsideration is,
as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior
leave whenever substantive justice may be
better served thereby.
12
The rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They were conceived and promulgated q And you arrived at 5:00 oclock?
to effectively aid the court in the dispensation
a Yes sir.
of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In q And you left at 2:00 oclock in the morning of
rendering justice, courts have always been, as September 2?
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a a Yes sir.
backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of q And you ate dinner between 5:00 oclock to
the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than 2:00 oclock in the morning of September 2, is
promote justice, it is always within our power that correct?
to suspend the rules, or except a particular case
a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have
from its operation.[7]
dinner.
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary
q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house
Detention are:
where you had dinner?
1. That the offender is a public officer or
a Yes sir.
employee.
q And of course you also partook of wine?
2. That he detains a person.
a I know they had wine but with respect to us
3. That the detention is without legal
we had no wine sir.
grounds.[8]
xxx xxx xxx
The determinative factor in Arbitrary
Detention, in the absence of actual physical AJ NARIO:
restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the
evidence on record, we find no proof that q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to
petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the 8:00 oclock Mayor Astorga was with you having
private offended parties. dinner
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear a Yes Your Honor.
from the narration of SPO1 Rufo Capoquian,
the police officer who escorted the DENR Team q You did not hear the conversation between
during their mission. On the contrary, what the Mayor and the foresters, the complainants
appears is that petitioner, being then a here?
municipal mayor, merely extended his
a I could not hear anything important because
hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in
they were just laughing.
his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:
xxx xx xxx
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
AJ PALATTAO:
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in
Daram? q And then according to you there was laughter
what was the cause of this laughter?
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in
Daram but on our way we saw a boat being
constructed there so we proceeded to
Barangay Lucodlucod (sic). a Probably they were talking of something
humorous.[9]

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that
there was no actual restraint imposed on the
private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in
fact testified that they were free to leave the
house and roam around the
barangay. Furthermore, he admitted that it was
raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that
petitioner prevented the team from leaving the
island because it was unsafe for them to travel
by boat.
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q It was raining at that time, is that correct?
a Yes sir it was raining.
q And the weather was not good for motorized
travel at that particular time that you were in
Lucoblucob, Daram?
a I know it is raining but I could not say that you
could not travel.
q What was the condition of the sea at that
time when you were in Lucoblucob?
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet
and there were no waves at that time.
q But it was raining the whole day?
a It was not raining at the day but after we ate
in the evening it rained.
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up
to 1:00 oclock in the morning is that correct?
a A little bit hard I dont know when the rain
stopped, sir.
q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at
1:00 oclock in the morning of September 2?
a I dont remember sir.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ PALATTAO:
q Were you told not to go away from the place?
a No Your Honor.
q Up to what point did you reach when you
were allegedly prevented to go somewhere?
a They did not say anything sir.
q Where did you go after that?
a Just down until it rained.
q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave
that place, on your part, was there somebody
prevented you to go to another place?
a I dont know Your Honor.
q But on your part can you just leave that place
or somebody will prevent you to go somewhere
else?
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because
we were already told not to leave the barangay.
q In other words, you can go places in that
barangay but you are not supposed to leave
that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?
a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.
q On your part according to you you can go
places if you want although in your impression
you cannot leave the barangay. How about the
other companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and
Maniscan, can they leave the place?
a No Your Honor.
q Why are you very positive that in your case
you can leave but in the case of those I have
enumerated they cannot, why?
a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your
Honor.[10]
Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended
parties, took the witness stand on August 16,
2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-
chief due to lack of material time. His testimony
only covered preliminary matters and did not
touch on the circumstances of the alleged
detention.[11]
On August 23, 2000, all the private offended
parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon, Moises de la
Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and
Wenefredo Maniscan, executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent
part:
xxx xxx xxx;
6. That what transpired may have been caused
by human limitation aggravated by the
exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores
of the small islands of Samar for several
days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also
been confronted with the same predicament,
hence our confrontation resulted to a heated
argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
7. Considering that he is the local Chief
Executive of the Municipality of Daram, Samar
our respect for him prevailed when he ordered
us to take dinner with him and other local
residents thereat, so we capitulated whose
invitation was misinterpreted by us;
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous
conversation between the team and the group
of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we
were eventually allowed to leave Daram,
Samar;
9. That upon our return to our respective
official stations we reported the incident to our
supervisors who required us to submit our
affidavit;
10. That at present our differences had already
been reconciled and both parties had already
express apologies and are personally no longer
interested to pursue the case against the
Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
xxx xxx xxx.[12]
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not
appear anymore in court to testify. This
notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts
of the DENR Team.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians
testimony negate the element of
detention. More importantly, fear is a state of
mind and is necessarily
13
subjective.[13] Addressed to the mind of the
victim, its presence cannot be tested by any
hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed
in the light of the perception and judgment of
the victim at the time of the crime.[14] As such,
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being
victims, were not competent to testify on
whether or not fear existed in the minds of the
private offended parties herein. It was thus
error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on
their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1
Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to
whether petitioner detained the DENR Team
against their consent. The events that
transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the
proposition that the private offended parties
were taken to petitioners house and prevented
from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning,
it is equally plausible, if not more so, that
petitioner extended his hospitality and served
dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He
could have advised them to stay on the island
inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by
the heavy rains. He ate together with the
private offended parties and even laughed with
them while conversing over dinner. This
scenario is inconsistent with a hostile
confrontation between the parties. Moreover,
considering that the Mayor also served
alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his
guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following
morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.[15] He is entitled to an acquittal unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.[16]
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the
accused has not been proven with moral
certainty, the presumption of innocence of the
accused must be sustained and his exoneration
be granted as a matter of right. For the

prosecutions evidence must stand or fall on its
own merit and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[17] Furthermore, where the
evidence for the prosecution is concededly
weak, even if the evidence for defense is also
weak, the accused must be duly accorded the
benefit of the doubt in view of the
constitutional presumption of innocence that
an accused enjoys. When the circumstances
are capable of two or more inferences, as in this
case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of
innocence must prevail and the court must
acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to
convict an innocent man.[18]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision dated October 1, 2003
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986
is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,[1] as well as its
Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July
10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September,
1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with
unidentified persons, who are herein referred
to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who
were armed with firearms of different calibers,
with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain
Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias,
DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram,
by not allowing them to leave the place,
without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their
personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without
exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the
island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection
operations in line with the governments
campaign against illegal logging. The team was
composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz,
Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger
Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto
Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as
team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3
Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian.[3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram,
Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw
two yacht-like boats being constructed. After
consulting with the local barangay officials, the
team learned that the boats belonged to a
certain Michael Figueroa. However, since
Figueroa was not around at the time, the team
left Brgy. Bagacay.[4]
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar,
the team spotted two more boats being
constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m.,
prompting them to stop and investigate.Thus,
Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the
DENRs service pump boat and proceeded to the
site of the boat construction. There, they met
Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the
mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the
purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of
Mayor Astorga.[5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3
Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached
Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose
of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped
hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga,
who exclaimed, Puwede ko kamo
papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka
maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya
ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame
e charge ha misencounter. (I can make you
swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I
can box? I can box. Dont you know that I can
declare this a misencounter?)[6] Mayor Astorga
then ordered someone to fetch
reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes
later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m.,
a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of
them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men
were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
14
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at
the team members.[7] At this, Simon tried to
explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams
mission.[8] He then took out his handheld ICOM
radio, saying that he was going to contact his
people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform
them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly,
Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simons radio,
saying, Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri
somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri
kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if you have
no radio so that your office would not know
your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask
for help).[9] Mayor Astorga again slapped the
right shoulder of Simon, adding, Kong siga
kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar
kay diri kamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough
guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because
I will not tolerate it here.)[10] Simon then asked
Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home,
at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they
would not be allowed to go home and that they
would instead be brought to Daram.[11] Mayor
Astorga then addressed the team, saying, Kon
magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga
dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an
kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat
ipadakop an akon. (If you really want to
confiscate anything, you start with the big-
time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at
Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.)[12] Simon
then tried to reiterate his request for
permission to leave, which just succeeded in
irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, Diri
kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha
Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya. (You
cannot go home now because I will bring you to
Daram. We will have many things to discuss
there.)[13]
The team was brought to a house where they
were told that they would be served
dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor
Astorga and several others at a long table, and
the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.[14]After
dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1
Capoquian were allowed to go down from the
house, but not to leave the barangay.[15] On the
other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in
the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was
finally allowed to leave.[16]

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for
arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and
his men, which led to the filing of the above-
quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on
July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.[17] At the trial, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their
Joint Affidavit.[18] However, the presentation of
Simons testimony was not completed, and
none of his fellow team members came
forward to testify. Instead, the members of the
team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint
Affidavit of Desistance.[19]
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused BENITO
ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary
Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 11, 2001[21] which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated
September 28, 2001.[22] A Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001[23] was
also filed, and this was similarly denied in a
Resolution dated July 10, 2002.[24]
Hence, the present petition, wherein the
petitioner assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding
the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as
defined and penalized under Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code, based on mere
speculations, surmises and conjectures and,
worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining
witnesses wherein the latter categorically
declared petitioners innocence of the crime
charged.[25]
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed
to establish the required quantum of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused,[26] especially
in light of the fact that the private complainants
executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.[27] Petitioner asserts that nowhere
in the records of the case is there any
competent evidence that could sufficiently
establish the fact that restraint was employed
upon the persons of the team
members.[28]Furthermore, he claims that the
mere presence of armed men at the scene does
not qualify as competent evidence to prove
that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the
team members, to the extent that they would
feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.[29]
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public
officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person.[30] The elements of
the crime are:
1. That the offender is a
public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.[31]
That petitioner, at the time he committed the
acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram,
Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element
of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a
public officer or employee, is undeniably
present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on
the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred
by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he
admitted that his acts were motivated by his
instinct for self-preservation and the feeling
that he was being singled out.[32] The detention
was thus without legal grounds, thereby
satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether
or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,[33] which
involved the illegal detention of a child, we
found the accused-appellant therein guilty of
kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show
that any physical restraint was employed upon
the victim. However, because the victim was a
boy of tender age and he was warned not to
leave until his godmother, the accused-
appellant, had returned, he was practically a
captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such
instruction.[34]
In the case of People v. Cortez,[35] we held that,
in establishing the intent to deprive the victim
of his liberty, it is not necessary that the
offended party be kept within an enclosure to
restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time
of her rescue, the offended party in said case
was found outside talking to the owner of the
house where she had been taken. She
explained that she did not attempt to leave the
premises for fear that the kidnappers would
make good their threats to kill her should she
do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not
baseless as the kidnappers knew where she
resided and they had earlier announced that
their intention in looking for her cousin was to
kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear
has been known to render people immobile
and that appeals to the fears of an individual,
such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.[36]
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and
illegal detention is that the curtailment of the
victims liberty need not involve any physical
restraint upon the victims person. If the acts
and actuations of the accused can produce such
fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to
paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim
is compelled to limit his own actions and
movements in accordance with the wishes of
the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from
fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not
allowed by petitioner to go home.[37] This
refusal was quickly followed by the call for and
15
arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all
armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons
pointed at the complainants and the
witnesses.[38] Given such circumstances, we
give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement
that it was not safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas
orders.[39] It was not just the presence of the
armed men, but also the evident effect these
gunmen had on the actions of the team which
proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that
they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of
the complainants and witnesses against their
will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the private complainants, suffice it
to say that the principles governing the use of
such instruments in the adjudication of other
crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v.
Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the defenses of the accused, not the
sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the
testimony given by the witnesses at the trial
and accepted by the judge. Here, there are no
such circumstances.[40]Indeed, the belated
claims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance,
such as the allegations that the incident was the
result of a misunderstanding and that the team
acceded to Mayor Astorgas orders out of
respect, are belied by petitioners own
admissions to the contrary.[41] The Joint
Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainants is evidently not a clear
repudiation of the material points alleged in the
information and proven at the trial, but a mere
expression of the lack of interest of private
complainants to pursue the case. This
conclusion is supported by one of its latter
paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only
to prove our sincerity and improving DENR
relations with the local Chiefs Executive and
other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR

programs and project can be effectively
implemented through the support of the local
officials for the betterment of the residence
living conditions who are facing difficulties and
are much dependent on government
support.[42]
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the
trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of
SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason
that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants in the case.[43] He also makes
much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1
Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to,
and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired
between herein accused and the DENR team
leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged
confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-
Lucob in the early morning of 2 September
1997.[44]
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial
courts factual findings are conclusive and
binding upon appellate courts unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.[45] Nothing in the case at bar
prompts us to deviate from this
doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian
is not one of the private complainants is
completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor
the rules of evidence requires damning
testimony to be exclusively supplied by the
private complainants in cases of Arbitrary
Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorgas claim
that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to
what transpired between Simon and himself is
belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the
latter went to talk to petitioner.[46] He heard all
of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks.[47]He
was with Simon when they were encircled by
the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16
and M-14 rifles.[48] In sum, SPO1 Capoquian
witnessed all the circumstances which led to
the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the
hands of Mayor Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the
team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply
decided to while away the time and take
advantage of the purported hospitality of the
accused.[49] On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly
and categorically denied that they were simply
whiling away the time between their dinner
with Mayor Astorga and their departure early
the following morning.[50] SPO1 Capoquian gave
similar testimony, saying that they did not use
the time between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to enjoy the place and that, given a
choice, they would have gone home.[51]
Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge, because
the ponente of the assailed decision acted both
as magistrate and advocate when he
propounded very extensive clarificatory
questions on the witnesses. Surely, the
Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle
arbiter during a trial. It can propound
clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to
ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the
court cannot be assailed on the ground that
clarificatory questions were asked during the
trial.[52]
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary
Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that, where the detention has
not exceeded three days, the penalty shall
be arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period,
which has a range of four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term
to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which has a range of one (1)
month and one (1) day to four (4)
months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct
in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the
words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring
opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried
16
the impunity enjoyed by public officials in Costs de oficio.
committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and
called for the intensification of efforts towards SO ORDERED.
bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or
illegal detention committed by government
officers form part of our statute books even
before the advent of American sovereignty in
our country. Those provisions were already in
effect during the Spanish regime; they
remained in effect under American rule;
continued in effect under the Commonwealth.
Even under the Japanese regime they were not
repealed. The same provisions continue in the
statute books of the free and sovereign
Republic of the Philippines. This
notwithstanding, and the complaints often
heard of violations of said provisions, it is very
seldom that prosecutions under them have
been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same
government to which the prosecuting officers
belong. It is high time that every one must do
his duty, without fear or favor, and that
prosecuting officers should not answer with
cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints
of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the
provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce
to its minimum such wanton trampling of
personal freedom as depicted in this case. The
responsible officials should be prosecuted,
without prejudice to the detainees right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the
unjustified violation of their fundamental
rights.[53]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 123979 December 3, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA
PILLUETA and JOSE VICENTE (JOVY)
CHANCO, accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose
Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Vicente
(Jovy) Chance were indicted for the kidnapping
with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a
detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an
amended Information, docketed Criminal Case
No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not
guilty to the charge. The trial thereupon
ensued.
The evidence submitted by the prosecution,
disclosing its version of the case, is narrated by
the Solicitor General in the People's brief.
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon
John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in partner, Loida
Navidad were arrested by appellants Jose
Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and several
other NARCOM agents for alleged illegal
possession of marijuana (p. 32, TSN, April 20,
1994).
After the arrest, they were brought to the
NARCOM Office situated at the compound of
the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Headquarters, Naga City (p. 32, ibid.). Thereat,
they were at first warned by appellant Pillueta
not to contact a lawyer (p. 35, ibid.). Appellant
Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only
a matter of P10,000.00" (p. 35, ibid.).
When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived
accompanied by a lawyer, appellant Pillueta got
angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once, the victim and
Navidad were dragged to the Naga City Jail
situated at a distance of six (6) to seven (7)
meters from the NARCOM Office (pp. 10, 38-
39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained
at the Naga City Jail (ibid.).
Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio
Santiano was detained at the Naga City Jail (pp.
4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the same cell
occupied by the victim (p. 6, ibid.). When
appellant Santiano was mauled by the inmates
of Cell 3, the victim was one of those who
participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).
After the release of Santiano, he returned to
the City Jail in November 1993 accompanied by
one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Thereat, the
victim was pointed to by appellant Santiano as
the one who mastermind his mauling (ibid.).
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in
the evening, the victim asked permission from
a jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside
the jail (pp. 7-9, ibid.). When he left, the victim
was wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p.
9, ibid.).
As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he
was accosted by appellants Sandigan and
Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25, 1994). The two (2)
appellants held the victim between them and
thereafter hurriedly, proceeded towards the
NARCOM Office situated at a distance of about
twenty-five (25) meters away (pp. 7, 38-
41, ibid.). Upon reaching the door of the
NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside
(pp. 7-8, ibid.). Once the victim was already
inside the NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan
proceeded to and took his place at Plaza Barlin
facing the PNP Police Station (pp. 8-12, ibid.).
The victim was made to sit and thereafter
mauled by appellant Santiano (pp. 8-11, ibid.).
Santiano got hold of a handkerchief, rolled it
around his fists and continued to punch the
victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes (p.
16, ibid.). As the victim was being mauled,
appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the
NARCOM office, her both hands inside her
pockets while looking to her right and left,
acting as a lookout (ibid.).
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and
drove his trimobile, parked it in front of the
door of the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, TSN,
April 25, 1994). Thereafter, he proceeded
inside the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out
of the NARCOM Office and started the
trimobile (p. 21,ibid.). His co-appellant Santiano
and Pillueta followed him. Inside the trimobile,
appellant Pillueta occupied the back seat (p.
21, ibid.). Santiano occupied the reserved seat
in front of the passenger seat which was
occupied by the victim (ibid.).
As appellant Chanco was about to start his
trimobile, appellant Sandigan, who was at Plaza
Barlin, transferred to and stationed himself at
the Century Fox in front of the GSIS building
situated at the corner of General Luna and
Arana Streets (p. 23, ibid.).
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction
of San Francisco Church (p. 40, TSN, April 23,
1994). When it passed the Panganiban Drive,
Naga City, on its way towards the direction of
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was
still aboard the trimobile seated at the
passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN,
May 24, 1994).
When prosecution witness Rañola heard over
the radio that a person was found dead at the
canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no
time in informing a policeman Prila of the Pili
Police Department that the descriptions of the
dead person he heard over the radio fit not only
the person he saw being hauled to and
thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but
likewise the same person who was on board the
trimobile driven by appellant Chanco (p. 13,
TSN, May 6, 1994).
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead
in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as his brother
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.1
The defense presented its own account of the
facts hereunder expounded by it; viz:
Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an
organic member of the NARCOM, Naga City,
Command. Accused-Appellant Jose Sandigan is
a regular member of the PNP but, he was a
former organic member of the NARCOM. On
17
the other hand, Accused Alipio Santiano and
Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the
active Civilian Volunteer/Assists of the
NARCOM.
That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December
27, 1993, accused-appellant Sandigan was in
front of the Advent theater; that while thereat,
he saw accused-appellant Santiano and he
invited the latter for a snack at the Mang
Donald's, a burger house, situated just beside
the Advent theater; that after taking their
snacks, they decided to go to the NARCOM
office; that while on their way to the NARCOM
office, they saw accused-appellant Chanco
emerging from the Nehrus Department Store
where the latter bought something; that this
Nehrus Department Store is located in front of
the Naga City Police Head Quarters which is
also near the NARCOM office, that the three of
them (Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco)
proceeded to the NARCOM office; that when
they arrived, accused-appellant Pillueta, SPO3
Lorna "Onang" Fernandez, Tet Deniega and the
NARCOM, District Commander P/Insp. Del
Socorro were at the NARCOM office while
accused-appellant. Chanco's trimobile was
parked in front of the NARCOM office; that
while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant
Santiano and Chanco were joking with each
other, like kids, such that accused-appellants
Santiano would sling accused-appellant Chanco
with his handkerchief; that, as it was
intermittently raining, accused-appellants
Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco left the
NARCOM office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the
trimobile of accused-appellant Chanco, while
accused-appellant Pillueta together with SPO3
Lorna Fernandez and Tet Deniega left the
NARCOM office at or about 8:00 P.M. and
proceeded to the Sampaguita Music Lounge to
watch a lady band performing at the
Sampaguita Music Lounge, leaving behind
P/Insp. Nelson Del Socorro at the NARCOM
office.
That upon leaving the NARCOM office and
while on board the trimobile accused-
appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco
were deciding whether to see a movie or have
a round of drink and, after failing to decide

whether to see a movie or a round of drink,
accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco
conducted accused-appellant Santiano to the
jeepney terminal for Milaor, Camarines Sur and
thereupon, accused-appellant Chanco also
conducted accused-appellant Sandigan to the
Philtranco terminal where the latter boarded a
bus to Bato, Camarines Sur where he resides.
That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the
same date, accused-appellant Santiano was in
Milaor, Camarines Sur, a Municipality less than
four kilometers away from Naga City, and
fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife
(komadrana), from the latter's residence to
conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy (hilot)
upon his (Santiano) pregnant wife; that Ms. Paz
and accused-appellant Santiano proceeded to
and arrived at the latter's house in Naga City
about past 7:00 o'clock in the evening where
Ms. Paz conducted a pre-natal therapy upon
appellant Santiano's wife; that Ms. Paz finished
the pre-natal therapy at or about 9:00 o'clock
P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of accused-
appellant Santiano and was accompanied for
home by latter at or about 10:00 o'clock of the
same evening; that from past 7:00 o'clock when
Paz and Santiano arrived at the latter's house
until past 10:00 o'clock when they left
Santiano's house, accused-appellant Santiano
was all the time present at and never left his
house;
That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez,
Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, upon
leaving the NARCOM office, went directly to the
Sampaguita Music Lounge and watched the
lady band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a
common acquaintance of SPO3 Fernandez,
Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, even
saw and approached them (SPO3 Fernandez,
Deniega and Pillueta) at their table inside the
Sampaguita Music Lounge; that the three of
them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta)
left the Sampaguita Music Lounge at or about
2:00 A.M. of December 28, 1993, and
thereupon, they went to their respective
homes.
That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the
day, the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was
neither seen by the accused-appellants nor was
he in the NARCOM office more specifically and
particularly between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the
same date; that the late Ramon John Dy Kow,
Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and his (Dy
Kow, Jr.) height and body built is almost the
same or similarly the same as that of accused-
appellant Chanco; that she (SPO3 Fernandez)
also known William Rañola whom she usually
see drunk/under the influence of liquor;
That in the first week of January, 1994, during
the investigation of the case conducted by the
PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, SPO3 Fernandez was
asked by major Ernesto Idian, chief of PNP Pili,
Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's
whereabouts in the night of December 27,
1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez) told Major
Idian that accused-appellant Pillueta was with
her (SPO3 Fernandez) at the Sampaguita Music
Lounge; that Major Idian did not ask her (SPO3
Fernandez) to execute an affidavit of what she
told him instead, Major Idian requested her not
to tell accused-appellant Pillueta about what he
asked her.
That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants
Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco, reported and
submitted themselves to their superior officer,
Col. Norberto Manaog, Deputy Director of the
NARCOM at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
wherein they reported that they were
suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy Kow,
Jr. and requested that they be placed under his
custody; that Col. Manaog referred them to the
legal officer of the NARCOM, Major Acpal; that
after being informed by accused-appellants
Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco that they did not
have any idea of whether a warrant of arrest
was already issued against them, Col. Manaog,
in consultation with Major Acpal, told them
that there is no yet basis for them to be placed
under custody, so that, Col. Manaog instructed
them just get in touch with him so that if a
warrant of arrest comes out, the same could be
served upon them; that Col. Manaog directed
Major Acpal to proceed to Pili, Camarines Sur to
determine the status of the investigation and to
know whether a warrant of arrest was already
issued; that on January 24, 1994, Major Acpal
went to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that
a warrant of arrest against accused-appellants,
Sandigan, who was already arrested, Pillueta
and Santiano has been issued on January 21,
1994; that on January 25, 1994, Major Acpal,
being a lawyer and the Legal officer of the
NARCOM filed before the Municipal Trial Court,
Pili, Camarines Sur, a motion to quash the
warrant of arrest; that on January 23, 1994
accused-appellant Pillueta informed Col.
Manaog that she was hospitalized due to a car
accident and that she may be placed under his
custody should a warrant for her arrest be
issued; on January 26, 1994, she was placed
under the custody of her superior, Col. Manaog
of the NARCOM. On the other hand, accused-
appellants, Santiano and Chanco were, from
time to time, contacting Col. Manaog to
determine whether a warrant of arrest was
already issued but, since Col. Manaog was
always out of his office, they were able to
contact, via telephone facility, Col. Manaog
only on April 16, 1994; and accused-appellants
Chanco and Santiano went to the office of
NARCOM, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
voluntarily surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed
them under the custody of the NARCOM and
were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell, Camp
Crame, Quezon City. The records of this case
show that no warrant of arrest was issued
against accused-appellant Chanco (Order dated
Sept. 5, 1994), however, he voluntarily
surrendered and submitted to the custody of
the NARCOM and to the trial court.2
Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further
statement in his supplemental appeal brief;
thus:
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an
unknown person was discovered somewhere in
the vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality
of Pili, Province of Camarines, by Danilo Camba,
the Barangay Captain of said locality. The
corpse was later on identified by Robert Dy Kow
as that one of his brother, Ramon John Dy Kow,
Jr. 3
Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy
on the cadaver of the victim. His findings
revealed that Dy Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained
the following injuries:
18
Eye: Contusion, upper lid extending to the
outer canthus, right;
Ear: lacerated wound ripping off the lowest
pole of the lobule, right; serrated border
Sub-occipital region: lacerated wound, 0.9 cms.
in length, centrally located;
Neck: punctured wound, 3-4 mm deep, semi-
circular with serrated border, base of neck at
the sternomastoid border, right;
Chest: Gunshot wound
point of entrance: 2nd ICS, sternal border, right,
12 mm in diameter
Bullet route: from the point of entrance
extending backwards to the left, piercing the
heart and left lung and lodging on the anterior
aspect or surface of the sub scapular area, left
Point of exist: None
Bullet slug: Recovered
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE
SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4
Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court
found all four accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping, defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code; the court adjudged:
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this
Court FINDS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and finds all of the accused, Jose
Sandigan, Armenia, aka Armie Pillueta, Alipio
Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka Jovy,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
KIDNAPPING as defined and penalized under
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences each and all
of them to suffer imprisonment, RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the
penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon
John Dy Kow, Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos, and to pay the costs; they are credited in
full for the preventive imprisonment.5

Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
Assailing the decision of the court a quo,
appellants would insist that the amended
information under which they were arraigned,
tried and convicted, although so captioned as
an indictment for the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, was, in reality a mere
indictment for murder. According to
appellants, the use of the words "abducted"
and "kidnapping" in the amended information
was not in itself indicative of the crime of
kidnapping being charged but that, from the
averments of the information, it could be
apparent that Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., was
"abducted or kidnapped" not for the purpose of
detaining but of liquidating him. Hence, the
defense theorized, the conviction for
kidnapping had no legal ground to stand on.
Let it not be said that the contention lacks
remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal
proposition that can here hardly be accepted.
The amended information reads:
The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Camarines Sur accuses JOSE
SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO, ARMIE PILLUETA
and JOVY CHANCO of the crime of KIDNAPPING
WITH MURDER, defined and penalized under
Article 267 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December
1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in
the evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality
of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery,
superior strength and evident premeditation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct, kidnap, and bring into a
secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur,
one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while
thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting
him on the different parts of his body causing
his instantaneous death.
That as a consequence of the death of the
victim Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs
suffered damages. 6
The information is not so wanting as to render
it legally inadequate for the purpose it has been
intended by the prosecution. It should be
sufficient for an information to distinctly state
the statutory designation of the offense and
the acts or omissions complained of as being
constitutive of that offense.7 A reading of the
amended information readily reveals that the
charge is for "kidnapping with murder, defined
and penalized under Article 267 (Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention) and Article 248
(Murder) of the Revised Penal Code" Evidently,
appellants have been properly apprised of the
charges, the information did go on to state thus
— the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death;
That on or about the 27th day of December
1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in
the evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality
of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery,
superior strength and evident premeditation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct kidnap and bring into a
secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur
one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while
thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting
him on the different parts of his body causing
his instantaneous death. 8
The accused have gone through trial without
any objection thereover. Exceptions relative to
the statement or recital of fact constituting the
offense charged ought be presented before the
trial court; if none is taken and the defective or
even omitted averments are supplied by
competent proof, it would not be error for an
appellate court to reject those exceptions on
appeal.9
The issue is next posed: When a complex crime
has been charged in an information and the
evidence fails to support the charge on one of
the component offenses, can the defendant
still be separately convicted of the other
offense? The question has long been answered
in the affirmative. In United States vs.
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has
ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an
accused on one of the offenses included in a
complex crime charged, when properly
established, despite the failure of evidence to
hold the accused guilty of the other charge.
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its
amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act
7659, 11 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another; or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be
a minor, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
The elements of the offense, here adequately
shown, are (a) that the offender is a private
individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the
commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5
days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating
public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person
19
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer. 12
Prosecution witness William Rañola testified
that he had seen the victim being accosted,
held and thereafter dragged to the NARCOM
office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan.
Inside the NARCOM office the victim was
mauled by Santiano. For several minutes,
Santiano continued to batter him with punches
while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as
the "lockout." The appellants then took the
victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by
Chanco. Rañola positively identified the fatigue
jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his
abduction on 27 December 1993 and when his
lifeless body was found in the morning of 28
December 1993. Don Gumba corroborated
Rañola's testimony. Gumba was positive that
he had seen the victim at around eight o'clock
in the evening of 27 December 1993 with
appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board the
trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way
towards the direction of Palestina, Pili,
Camarines Sur, where, the following morning
the victim was found dead evidently after
succumbing to several gunshot wounds.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious
motive on the part of the witnesses that might
have influenced them to declare falsely against
appellants; the Court sees no justification to
thereby deny faith and credit to their
testimony. 13 The Court likewise shares the
view of the Solicitor General in pointing out
that —
1. There is no question that the victim, who was
on the date in question detained at the Naga
City Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee
in order to buy viand outside. It was while he
was emerging from the PNP store that he was
accosted by appellants Santiano and Sandigan.
2. From the moment that the victim was
accosted in Naga City, he was at first dragged to
the NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This
circumstance indicated the intention to deprive
him of his liberty for sometime, an essential
element of the crime of kidnapping.

3. The victim did not only sustain serious
physical injuries but likewise died as indicated
in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants'
claim that none of the circumstances in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he
declared that he saw the victim at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1993
with appellant Chanco on its way towards the
direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where
the victim was found dead. 14
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an
organic member of the NARCOM" and
appellant Sandigan a regular member of the
PNP would not exempt them from the criminal
liability for kidnapping. 15 It is quite clear that in
abducting and taking away the victim,
appellants did so neither in furtherance of
official function nor in the pursuit of authority
vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to
their office, but in purely private capacity that
they have acted in concert with their co-
appellants Santiano and Chanco.
The crime of kidnapping cannot be here
absorbed by the charge of murder since the
detention of the victim is not shown to have
been for the purpose of liquidating him.
Appellants themselves, in fact, all deny having
killed the victim. And while the evidence may
have thus been found to be wanting by the trial
court so as to equally hold appellants
responsible for the death of the victim, the
Court is conviced that the court a quo did not
err in making them account for kidnapping. The
circumstances heretofore recited indicate the
attendance of conspiracy among the appellants
thereby making them each liable for the
offense.
The claim of appellants that they cannot be
held liable for indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 because the prosecution did not
present evidence to prove damages is without
merit. The indemnity awarded by the trial court
clearly refers to the civil indemnity for the
offense 16 and not for actual damages
sustained.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993
FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL
MUNDO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by
Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Judge
Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite
with abuse of authority.
Acting on said complaint, the Office of the
Court Administrator directed Judge Enrique M.
Almario, Regional trial Court Branch XV, Naic,
Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to
submit his report and recommendation
thereon.
Based on the records as well as the report
submitted by the investigating Judge, it appears
that on or about October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m.,
while traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa,
Alulod, Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of
Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No. DWB 315,
overtook a Sto. Niño Liner with Body No. 5282
driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a
consequence thereof, the bus driven by
complainant almost collided head-on with an
oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate No.
PJT 752. It turned out later that the jeepney was
registered in the name of respondent Judge Del
Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was
one of the passengers therein along with his
sons Rommel and June and one Edward
Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was
behind the wheel.
At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before
complainant could properly park his bus, he
was picked up by policemen of the Philippine
National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the
Indang Public Plaza and was immediately
brought before the sala of respondent judge.
There, complainant was confronted by
respondent judge and accused by the latter of
nearly causing an accident that morning.
Without giving complainant any opportunity to
explain, respondent judge insisted that
complainant be punished for the incident.
Whereupon, complainant was compelled by
respondent judge to choose from three (3)
alternative punishments none of which is
pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple
attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his
driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three
(3) days. Of the three choices, complainant
chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3)
days, as a consequence of which he was forced
to sign a "waiver of detention" by respondent
judge. Thereafter, complainant was
immediately escorted by policemen to the
municipal jail. Though not actually incarcerated
complainant remained in the premises of the
municipal jail for three (3) days, from October
22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his
"sentence". On the third day, complainant was
released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody
of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's co-driver
and cousin.
The fact of detention of complainant in the
premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days
was confirmed and corroborated by the
testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite,
SP04 Adelaida Nova. The fact of complainant's
release therefrom after three (3) days
detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig
who prepared the corresponding document of
release. For his defense, respondent judge
merely made general denials.
The actuations of respondent judge herein
complained of, constitute abuse of authority.
To begin with, respondent's verbal order for
the arrest of complainant at the Indang Public
Plaza without the requisite complaint having
been filed and the corresponding warrant of
arrest having been issued in order that
complainant may be brought to his sala is
characteristic of personal vengeance and the
abusive attitude of respondent. Being a judge,
respondent above all, should be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for
others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA
14 [1989]). Instead, respondent judge opted to
avail of his judicial authority in excess of what is
20
allowed by law to gratify his vindictive
purposes.
If respondent honestly believes that
complainant committed violations of traffic
rules and regulations which nearly caused the
accident involving their respective vehicles,
respondent judge should have caused the filing
of the appropriate criminal charges against
complainant and left it at that. On the contrary,
respondent is not one to let the law run its own
course. This is a classic case where respondent
took it upon himself to be the accuser,
prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same
time to condemn complainant for his alleged
wrongdoing without the benefit of due process.
Without even an opportunity to air his side,
complainant was unceremoniously made to
choose his own penalty. Left with no other
choice but to face his predicament and
overpowered by the imposing authority of
respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil
of the three alternatives given to him.
Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing.
A perusal of the two (2) other choices
presented to him will illustrate why.
The first choice given to complainant was to
face a charge of multiple attempted homicide.
To threaten complainant with a criminal case
for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of
respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a
judge, he should know very well that such at
charge will not hold water in any court of law
considering that no accident per se ever
occurred and hence, no life threatening injury
was even sustained. To a mere bus driver who
is not at all familiar with the intricacies of the
law, such a threat spelled not only the
possibility of long-term imprisonment and all
the hardship it entails but also the onus and
shame that will forever attach to his name.
Surely, to his mind, a threat of prosecution
coming from a municipal trial court judge is
alarming enough.
The second alternative punishment offered to
complainant to choose from involves his very
means of livelihood — revocation of his driver's
license. This is tantamount to economic death
penalty and just as repulsive as the first
alternative.

Faced with these grim prospects complainant
voluntarily submitted himself to the jail warden
of the Indang Municipal Jail for detention after
executing his "waiver of detention,"
complainant felt that he had no other choice
but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and
arbitrarily imposed upon him by respondent.
While it is true that complainant was not put
behind bare as respondent had intended,
however, complainant was not allowed to leave
the premises of the jail house. The idea of
confinement is not synonymous only with
incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be
restrained, either morally or physically, of his
personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270
[1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent
judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention
when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest
and detention of complainant without legal
grounds (Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S.
vs. Battallones 23 Phil. 46 [1912]). In overtaking
another vehicle, complainant-driver was not
committing or had not actually committed a
crime in the presence of respondent judge
(Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being
the case, the warrantless arrest and
subsequent detention of complainant were
illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the
testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed
that complainant was indeed deprived of his
liberty for three (3) days:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain
Fernando Cayao on that premises? On the
ground of that premises?
WITNESS (jail warden):
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor,
but he was inside the police station.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did
you or did you not detain Fernando Cayao
based on the premises that you said under oath
before this Court?
A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone
freely of his own volition outside the police
station without your authority or permission?
A He can move freely.
COURT:
Q When you said that, you meant he could have
gone home, he could have gone eating in
restaurant, he could have gone to a theatre or
in any public place. Is that what you mean?
WITNESS:
A No, your Honor. Only inside the police
station.
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What
is your order? What did you tell him?
A Because he voluntarily went to the police
station to be detained.
Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would
have gone to other places, you will have no
objection? You will have no interpolation or
you would not feel that you have a right to have
him under your custody. Is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I will still prevent him.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
Of equal importance is the perception of
complainant himself as to whether his liberty,
was actually restricted or not:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you
were detained in the municipal jail of the
station of Indang, Cavite?
A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get
out from the police station from the time that I
was detained.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)
It would be well to emphasize at this point that
the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is
not alone centered on his order for the
detention of complainant. Rather, it is
ingrained in the fact that complainant was so
detained without affording him his
constitutional rights.
As previously mentioned, complainant was
condemned by his own accuser without the
benefit of due process. Complainant was not
even accorded any of the basic rights to which
an accused is entitled. When respondent
insisted on punishing hire without a chance to
air his side, complainant was deprived of the
presumption of innocence, the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him as well as the right to an
impartial and public trial. Moreover,
complainant was made to execute a waiver of
detention without the assistance of counsel.
Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even
subscribed by complainant before the very
same judge who was his accuser. Certainly,
such intentional and blatant violations of one's
constitutional rights committed by respondent
cannot be tolerated by this Court.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the
judiciary to serve as the visible representation
of the law, and more importantly, of justice.
From them, the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan,
64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If judges, who swore to
obey and uphold the constitution, would
conduct themselves in the way that respondent
did in wanton disregard and violation of the
rights of complainant, then the people,
especially those with whom they come in direct
contact, would lose all their respect and high
regard for the institution of the judiciary itself,
not to mention, cause the breakdown of the
moral fiber on which the judiciary is founded.
21
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent
judge represent the kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct on the part of those who are
charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice
that so quickly and severely corrodes the
respect for law and the courts without which
the government cannot continue and that tears
apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs.
Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct
exhibited by respondent judge in the case at
bar exposed his total disregard of, or
indifference to, or even ignorance of the
procedure prescribed by law. His act of
intentionally violating the law and disregarding
well-known legal procedures can be
characterized as gross misconduct, nay a
criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs.
Tan, 157 SCRA 277 [1988]). He used and abused
his position of authority in intimidating the
complainant as well as the members of the
Indang police force into submitting to his
excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the
mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
always conduct himself as to be beyond
reproach and suspicion not only in the
performance of his duties but also outside his
sala and as a private individual. (Castillo vs.
Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75 [1991]).
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that
respondent, through his oppressive and
vindictive actuations, has committed a
disservice to the cause of justice. He has
unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to
continue as a member of the judiciary and
should accordingly be removed from the
service.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A.
Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of
Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits with prejudice to
reinstatement or reappointment to any public
office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172604 August 17, 2010
(Formerly G.R. Nos. 155345-47)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal by way of automatic review is the
Decision1 dated January 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00666,
affirming the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) convicting appellant Venancio
Roxas y Arguelles (appellant) for the crimes of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with
Frustrated Murder, Violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
and Theft. The Informations alleged –
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated
Murder –
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of person and at gunpoint,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap,
carry away and detain AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a
female, thereby depriving her of her liberty,
and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited
place in Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose,
Batangas and then and there, with intent to kill
and with treachery, evident premeditation, and
abuse of superior strength, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot her in the face with a
hand gun, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of
MURDER as consequence, but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, the able and timely medical assistance
given to said Agnes Guirindola which prevented
her death, resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow,
sufferings and sleepless night, compensable in
actual, moral and exemplary damages in such
amounts as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 for
Carnapping –
That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence against
and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take and carry away one Nissan
Sentra Model 1993 with Plate No. TKR-837,
then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by
her mother Elvira G. Guirindola, to the damage
and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola and
Elvira G. Guirindola in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
and -
In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for
Robbery –
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence against
and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, while on board the motor vehicle
of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a 1993 Nissan Sentra
with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the course of its
trip, divested and robbed said Agnes Guirindola
of the following cash, check and personal
belongings, to wit:
Cash ₱1,000.00
Check 3,000.00
Pieces of jewelry valued at 34,000.00
and in the course of execution thereof, shoot
and fatally wounded Agnes Guirindola with a
handgun, which is clearly unnecessary in the
commission of the crime, to the damage and
prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola, in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The antecedent facts as culled from the records
are as follows:
On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes
Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along Panay
Avenue, Quezon City, on board a red 1993
model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate number
TKR-837, was suddenly flagged down by a man
wearing a PNP reflectorized vest. The man
signaled her to make a U-turn. Agnes complied
and made the U-turn. The man walked in front
of her car and proceeded to the right side of the
car.6 Agnes, later on, identified the man in open
court as appellant, Venancio Roxas (Roxas).
Agnes opened the right front window of the car
and asked Roxas, who had positioned himself at
the front passenger side, "Ano ang problema?"
Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito."
Agnes explained to the man that she usually
passed by the same street and it was only that
day that she had been caught. Roxas told her
that the street had been made a one-way street
because a girl figured in an accident in the same
street two days ago.7
Roxas then asked for Agnes' driver’s license.
After taking the driver’s license, Roxas handed
her a piece of paper which she was asked to
sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual
traffic citation ticket but, nevertheless, she
pretended to sign the same by making a check
thereon.8
When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas,
the latter asked her to open the door of the car
so that he could show her the one-way sign and
the other traffic aide at the corner of the street.
Agnes let Roxas enter the car. Roxas then
instructed Agnes to drive to the corner of the
street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas
pointed to her the one-way sign and looked for
22
the traffic aide he had told Agnes about. The
traffic aide was not there. Agnes asked Roxas
where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to
make a left turn from the corner of the street
and that he will alight somewhere in Mother
Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a left turn and
stopped the car. Thinking that Roxas was
waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet,
pulled a ₱50.00 bill and gave it to Roxas. After
receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes
her driver’s license.9
Upon returning the driver’s license to Agnes,
Roxas immediately switched off the engine of
the car and poked a gun at her saying "Miss,
kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified
and shocked by Roxas’ actions, cried and
pleaded with him to let her go and just take the
car. Roxas continued to poke a gun at her,
unmindful of what Agnes was telling him.10
After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside
the car. Roxas opened the rear door and then
someone boarded the car, occupying the back
seat. The second passenger immediately
reclined the driver’s seat and pulled Agnes
towards the back seat. Agnes identified this
man as Roberto Gungon (Gungon).
Subsequently, Roxas took the driver’s seat and
drove the car while Gungon held Agnes on the
shoulder with one hand, and her leg with the
other.11
Agnes then heard Gungon say: "Boss, dalhin
natin sya sa Philcoa." After crossing Mother
Ignacia Street, Gungon got his beeper and told
Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon
na natin siya i-s." Agnes became more
frightened as she understood "s" to mean
"salvage," a lingo for summary execution.12
Along the way, Roxas stopped the car and went
to a sari-sari store. Gungon was left behind,
holding Agnes, and would tighten his grip every
time she made a slight move and sometimes
would poke a gun at her. Upon returning to the
car, Roxas offered Agnes a bottle of soft drink
and Skyflakes biscuit. Agnes refused so Roxas
handed the softdrink to Gungon and told him:
"Mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo
siya." Gungon took the bottle of softdrink and
tried to force Agnes to drink the contents

thereof. Agnes refused because she saw tablets
floating inside the bottle. Roxas resumed
driving, while Gungon held Agnes.13
Agnes testified that she planned to escape, but
could not make a single move because every
time she made a slight move, Gungon would
poke the gun at her. The windows of the car
were tinted and remained closed.14
Around 5:00 p.m., Agnes noticed that they
were already at the South Superhighway. 15
Along the superhighway, Roxas stopped the car
in order to urinate. Gungon guarded Agnes by
holding her. When Roxas returned, Gungon
alighted to relieve himself too. While Gungon
was out of the car, Roxas sat at the driver’s seat
facing Agnes and poked his gun at her. Shortly
thereafter, Gungon came back to the car and
Roxas resumed driving. When Agnes took the
prayer leaflet from her wallet, Gungon looked
at her wallet and saw the picture of her sister.
When asked if she was the one in the picture,
Agnes told Gungon that it was her sister. Out of
the blue, Gungon also took his wallet and
showed Agnes three (3) pictures which,
according to him, were the pictures of his niece,
her girlfriend and that of Roxas and a lady with
a little child. After showing the same to Agnes,
Gungon returned the said pictures to his
wallet.16 Agnes planned to escape at that time
but the car was running at a speed of 80 to 100
kilometers per hour. Agnes just continued to
pray.17
At this point, Gungon again offered the
softdrink to Agnes. When she refused, Gungon
became mad and tightened his hold on Agnes,
forcing her to drink it. Sensing that Gungon was
already furious, Agnes took the softdrink. After
Agnes drank it, Roxas told Gungon, "Ipainom
mo pa itong dalawang tablets dahil malaki sya,
mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya." Gungon
took the tablets from Roxas and forced Agnes
to swallow the same. Out of fear, Agnes took
the tablets, but did not swallow them. She
placed the tablets under her tongue. When
Roxas and Gungon were not looking, she took
her handkerchief and spat out the tablets into
the handkerchief.18
Afterwards, Agnes told Roxas and Gungon that
she was hungry and wanted to eat a
McDonald’s sandwich. Gungon replied that
they were in the province and that there was
no McDonald’s there. Roxas told Agnes that
they will just drop by a restaurant to buy
something to eat. Roxas then stopped by a
bakery and alighted from the car, while Gungon
held Agnes. It was at this point that Agnes
noticed the signboard of the bakery which read
something like Sto. Tomas or San Jose,
Batangas. After a while, Roxas came back with
a "taisan" cake and offered it to Agnes which
she refused. At that instance, Agnes felt dizzy
and fell asleep.19
When Agnes woke up, she found herself lying
at the back seat with her legs on the lap of
Gungon. The car was at a standstill. She noticed
from the car’s clock on the dashboard that it
was about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. She also found
out that her jewelries consisting of bracelets,
pair of earrings, necklace and a watch worth
around ₱30,000.00 to ₱40,000.00, as well as
her pair of shoes, were already gone. When she
asked Gungon about them, the latter told her
that they were just keeping the same for her.
Agnes also lost her wallet containing a check in
the amount of ₱3,000.00 and cash in the
amount of ₱1,000.00.20
Agnes also noticed that there was already a
third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas
who was still driving. She then asked them if
she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas
if Agnes would be allowed to relieve herself to
which Roxas answered in the affirmative. Agnes
fixed her hair and then asked Gungon for her
shoes. Gungon put the shoes on her feet. Roxas
alighted from the car and opened the rear door.
Gungon alighted first from the car followed by
Agnes. Gungon then led Agnes to a nearby
grassy area and told her, "O, dyan ka na lang
umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she
was about to get up and return to the car, she
saw white sparks at her right side and then she
fell down. When she opened her eyes, she saw
Roxas walking back towards the car with a gun
in his hand. She did not see Gungon at that
particular time. Then she lost consciousness.21
When Agnes regained consciousness, she was
all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man, as
well as the car, were no longer there. It was
very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that
led her to a small house. Upon reaching the
house, she opened the door and saw two (2)
children and a teenager singing. She asked for
their help but upon seeing her, they ran away.
She then saw a lady standing at the stairs of the
house carrying a baby. Agnes asked for her help
but the lady went upstairs and locked herself
inside the room. Agnes followed her and
knocked at the door of the room asking for
help, but still the lady did not come out of the
room. She then went downstairs and lied down
on the sofa. Only then did she notice that blood
was profusely oozing from her face and there
were "holes" in the left side of her neck and her
right cheek.22
After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and
also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan sa
loob ng bahay, tulungan natin siya!" Agnes was
then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and
brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital,
where she was treated for her wounds and
given first aid.23 Agnes sustained the following
injuries:
Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX
Sudmandibular area (L); Fx, zygomatic arch &
condylar area, (R) Sec to GSW; Submandibular
Gland involvement with sinus tract. (Exhibit
"A," Medical Certificate dated February 1, 1994
signed by attending physician Dr. Lauro R. San
Jose, Captain MC, Neurosurgery 4-A, p. 177,
Volume III, Record)
The following day, about 3:00 a.m. of January
13, 1994, the parents of Agnes and the rest of
the family arrived at the hospital. Her parents
immediately arranged for her transfer to the V.
Luna General Hospital (now AFP Medical
Center) in Quezon City, where she was treated
further, operated on and confined for forty-
three (43) days.24 Agnes incurred actual
damages amounting to ₱36,161.83 for her
hospitalization, surgical operation and medical
treatment, and suffered moral damages the
amount of which she cannot readily quantify, as
a result of the ordeal she underwent on that
fateful day of January 12, 1994.25
23
Upon transfer of Agnes to the V. Luna General
Hospital, her parents immediately reported the
incident to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila, which promptly conducted an
investigation. On January 17, 1994, some NBI
agents visited her for the taking of the
cartographic sketches of Roxas and Gungon. On
January 19, 1994, another group of NBI agents
went to the hospital and showed her 3 to 4
pictures of Gungon who was subsequently
arrested in Davao City. On February 1, 1994,
Agnes positively identified Gungon at the NBI in
a police lineup consisting of 5 to 6 men.
Likewise, Agnes was able to identify certain
personal effects recovered from Gungon such
as her rosary beads,26 jewelry purse,27 key
chain with a key to the lock of her Nissan Sentra
car,28and the check taken from her, which were
all presented in evidence in the trial of Gungon
as well as in the trial of the instant case against
Roxas.29
In the meantime, the NBI conducted a manhunt
for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was
arrested by elements of the NBI inside the
municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he
was working under the Office of the Mayor
using the aliases "Joe Villamor" and "Marianito
Villamor."
Agnes further testified that the name of
appellant Venancio Roxas was supplied by the
NBI, but she was very sure that he was the
person who fatally shot her. She positively
identified Roxas on January 12, 1994 during a
police line-up at the NBI as the perpetrator
other than Gungon, of the crimes charged. She
told the NBI agents that the person in the
picture was the one who had flagged her down
and shot her on January 12, 1994.
For the defense, appellant denied committing
the crimes charged against him. He claimed
that it was impossible for him to be at the place
of incident on January 12, 1994. He narrated
that on that same day, at around 6:00 to 7:00
p.m., he and a certain Tranquilino Mangiliman
and two others were installing an antenna on
the roof of his house. He added that he never
left his house that evening. Both Mangiliman
and his wife, Hermogena Roxas, testified that
on January 12, 1004, Roxas was in his house at

Feria Compound, Commonwealth Town
Homes, Quezon City.
Subsequently, in a Decision30 dated September
5, 2002, the court a quo, found Roxas guilty of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with
frustrated murder, carnapping and theft, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
these cases finding accused Venancio Roxas y
Arguelles guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with frustrated
murder, and sentences him to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for
Carnapping, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
18 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as
maximum;
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for the crime
of Theft, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1
year for the additional ₱10,000.00 in excess of
₱20,000.00 value of the property taken or a
total of 9 years, 8 months and 1 day, as
maximum.
The accused shall be credited in full of his
preventive imprisonment.
Accused Roxas is also liable to pay the offended
party Agnes Guirindola, moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 and
₱500,000.00, respectively, actual damages in
the amount of ₱36,161.83, representing her
hospitalization and related expenses, and
₱38,000.00 representing the value of the
articles taken from her. Accused Roxas is
likewise ordered to pay Mrs. Elvira Guirindola
the amount of ₱250,257.90.00, representing
the cost of repair of the subject vehicle.
SO ORDERED.
August 29, 2002, Quezon City.31
Roxas moved for a reconsideration of the
September 5, 2002 decision of the court a quo.
Likewise, noting the well-attended
promulgation of the court a quo’s decision,
Roxas also moved for the inhibition of the
Honorable Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. He
argued that the presence of then Justice
Secretary Hernando Perez showed the court's
predisposition to convict him of the offenses
charged. Roxas contended that he was robbed
of his right to due process because the Judge
Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. had lost the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge required of him
in trying and resolving cases.
In an Order32 dated October 8, 2002, the RTC
denied appellant’s motions for inhibition and
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, appellant's co-accused Roberto
Gungon y Santiago was found guilty of the same
charges in a Decision33 dated March 19, 1998.
Roxas was at-large during the trial and was
arrested only after the RTC rendered the
judgment of conviction against Gungon. Thus,
the cases, as far as they concerned Roxas, was
archived until he was eventually arrested on
September 11, 1995.
The records of this case were originally
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Conformably with our ruling in People v.
Mateo,34 however, the case was referred to the
Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
In its Decision35 dated January 13, 2006, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of
the court a quo.
Thus, this appeal, raising the following
arguments:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN RENDERING IN THE ABOVE-TITLED CASE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE COURT A QUO HAS LOST THE COLD
NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO DUE PROCESS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE OFFENSES OF (1) KIDNAPPING AND
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH
FRUSTRATED MURDER, (2) CARNAPPING, AND
(3) THEFT.
Roxas challenged the RTC judge’s neutrality as
he invoked that he was deprived of his right to
due process because of the "unexplained
presence" of the former Secretary of the
Department of Justice, Hernando Perez, in
court. He contended that the RTC was already
predisposed to convict him even before trial.
We are unconvinced.
The Court finds no basis for appellant's
allegation that he was deprived of due process
of law and that the trial conducted was far from
impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and
partiality is not supported by the record. The
fact that the trial judge opted to believe the
prosecution's evidence rather than that of the
defense is not a sign of bias.36
Even if the RTC had allowed the presence of
then Secretary Hernando Perez and the media,
there is no sufficient basis to show that their
presence or pervasive publicity unduly
influenced the court's judgment. Before we
could conclude that appellant was prejudiced
by the presence of the media and Secretary
Perez, he must first show substantial proof, not
merely cast suspicions. There must be a
showing that adverse publicity indeed
influenced the court's decision.37 We found
none, in this case.
Appellant further argued that the RTC erred in
finding him guilty of the crimes charged against
him.
Time and again, we have ruled that the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to the highest
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would have
affected the result of the case. The trial court is
24
in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and
manner of testifying.38
We have painstakingly examined the records of
the case, particularly the testimonies for the
prosecution and the defense. However, after
much examination, we find no persuasive much
less compelling reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court.
Agnes not only positively identified her
abductors, she also graphically narrated what
happened on January 12, 1994. Actual restraint
of the victim's liberty was evident in the instant
case from the moment Agnes was taken from
Panay Avenue to a remote place in Batangas.
Agnes testified, thus:
Q - After Roberto Gungon pulled you towards
the back seat, what happened?
A - Venancio Roxas took the driver seat and
started the car, sir. I mean, he took the driver
seat and started the car.
Q – What was Roberto Gungon doing after
Venancio Roxas started the car?
A – He was holding me sir.
Q – How was he holding you?
A – One hand on my shoulder and the other one
is (sic) on my leg, sir.
xxxx
Q – What did Gungon do with the bottle?
A – He still forced me but when I refused he just
placed it down in the car, sir.
Q – After that what happened?
A – Roxas still drove and Gungon was still
holding me, then after that we went to this
gasoline station to gas up, sir.
xxxx
Q – Why were you not able to escape while you
were seated and crying?

A – Because Gungon was holding me and
everytime I just made a slight move, he poked
the gun at me, sir.39
xxxx
Q – While you were praying, do you know what
Gungon and Roxas were doing at that time?
xxxx
A – Yes, Roxas was driving and Gungon was still
holding me and he asked Roxas if he could
relieve himself, sir.
xxxx
Q – After your car stopped, what happened?
A – He told Gungon that he'll take a leak (sic)
first before Gungon so Roxas alighted from the
car and took a leak (sic), sir.
Q – How about Gungon, where was he?
A - He was seated beside me, he was still
holding me, sir.
Q - After Roxas finished leaking (sic), do you
know what did he do (sic), if any?
A- Yes, he went back to the car, he sat at the
driver's seat, he faced in front of me (sic), took
the gun and poked it at me and then Gungon
alighted from the car and he was the next one
who took a leak (sic), sir.
xxxx
Q - After Roxas alighted from the car, where
were you at that time?
A - I was still sitting at the car, with Gungon, sir.
Q- What was Gungon doing at that time?
A- Yes, we were waiting for Roxas and he was
holding my leg, sir.40
xxxx
Q – Previously, you testified that Gungon was
holding you and everytime you made a slight
movement he would grips (sic) you firmly and
poke a gun at you. My question is – for how
long had Gungon been doing this?
A - Ever since he pulled me from the driver seat
to the back seat up to the time when we were
cruising along South Superhighway, sir.
Q - Up to that while you were driving?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – When you reached Batangas, in the bakery,
what was Gungon's (sic) doing to you, if any?
A- He kept on holding me although from time
to time and only when I made a slight move,
sir.41
Thus, based on the foregoing testimony of
Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting
appellant of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the crime, thus:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have
been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be
a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As
amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659).42
The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the
commission of frustrated murder as qualified
by the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. The medical findings show that
had it not been due to the timely and proper
medical attention given to the victim, the
gunshot wound sustained by the victim would
have been fatal.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself,
arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. As narrated by Agnes, she
could not have been aware that she would be
attacked by appellant. In the darkness of the
night while she just finished relieving herself
and still trying to get up, she was shot by
appellant in the head with a gun. There was no
opportunity for her to defend herself, since
appellant, suddenly and without provocation,
shot her as she was about to get up. The
essence of treachery is the unexpected and
sudden attack on the victim which renders the
latter unable and unprepared to defend himself
by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack. This criterion applies whether the attack
is frontal or from behind.43
Moreover, the requisites of evident
premeditation was likewise duly established in
this case, to wit: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung
to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse
of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.44
The prosecution's evidence particularly the
testimony of Agnes demonstrated that Gungon
and Roxas had indeed planned to kill her from
the time they took the car. As testified to by
Agnes:
25
Q- You said that Roxas returned with a biscuit
and a bottle of softdrink, what was done with
the biscuit and bottle of softdrink, if you know?
A – I refused to accept it, he insisted but still I
refused so he just handed it to Gungon. He just
told Gungon "mamaya painom mo sa kanya at
pakainin mo siya," sir.
Q – Why did you refuse the softdrink?
A- Simply because when he handed it to me I
saw tablets floating inside the bottle, sir.45
xxxx
Q – At about 5:00 and 6:00 in the evening of
January 12, 1994 where were you at that time?
xxxx
A- Actually we were not really there, its (sic) we
were headed towards South Superhighway. I
mean I don’t know the exact place but I am
familiar that we were heading towards South
super highway, sir.
xxxx
Q – When you reached the South Superhighway
at that time what happened?
A – While we were in the car Gungon got his
beeper and then he told Roxas "Boss, negative
Philcoa," sir.
xxxx
Q – While you were driving along South super
highway at that time, do you know what
happened inside the car between the three of
you?
A – Yes, sir. That time Gungon was still holding
me and then he told Roxas "boss, dalhin na
natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s."
Q – After you heard that remark of Gungon,
what did you do?
A – Well, of course I was shocked and I asked
them if they were going to rape me or kill me or
just leave me somewhere, I do not know, sir.

Q – After you uttered those words, do you
know if Gungon answered?
A – Yes, sir, he told me that don’t give us ideas
(sic).46
xxxx
Q – What did you do when the bottle of
softdrink was being offered to you?
A - I refused to get it, sir.
Q – When you refused to drink it, do you know
what did Gungon do?
A – Yes, he got mad and furious, he held me so
tight and forced me to drink it, sir.
Q - Now, because he was furious and he was
angry at you, what did you do?
A - I took the softdrink, sir.
Q- After you drank that softdrink, what
happened?
xxxx
A – Yes, sir, after drinking it Roxas offered two
(2) more tablets to Gungon, he told to Gungon
"ipainom mo pa sa kanya itong dalawang
tabletas dahil malaki siya, mahina iyong dalawa
para sa kanya".47
xxxx
Q – Do you know what time was it when you
woke up?
A - I guess it was about 9:30 or 10:00 in the
evening, sir.
Q – How were you able to place the time?
A - There is a watch on the dashboard of the car,
sir.48
Thus, from the foregoing, it is evident that the
commission of the killing, albeit frustrated, was
formed from the moment the accused took the
victim in Quezon City until she was ultimately
"executed" in Batangas. The lapse of more than
eight hours, that is, approximately from 1:00
p.m. to 10:00 p.m., satisfies the last requisite
for the appreciation of evident premeditation
as there was sufficient time for meditation and
reflection before the commission of the crime
yet appellant proceeded with the same.
Likewise, we agree that Roxas is also guilty of
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law. R.A.
6539, otherwise known as An Act Preventing
and Penalizing Carnapping,
defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter’s consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things." More specifically,
the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
A careful examination of the evidence
presented would show that all the elements of
carnapping were proven in this case. It cannot
be denied that the 1993 Nissan Sentra with
plate number TKR-837 was unlawfully taken
from Agnes without her consent and by means
of force or intimidation, considering that he
and his co-accused alternately poked a gun at
Agnes. After shooting her, appellant also flee
with the subject vehicle which shows his intent
to gain. Agnes also positively identified
appellant and Gungon as the ones who took the
subject vehicle from her.
Finally, we likewise agree that Roxas is only
guilty of theft and not robbery as initially
charged.
From the records, it appears that the jewelries
and cash were taken from Agnes without the
attendance of violence or intimidation upon
her person. Agnes herself testified that when
she regained consciousness, she already found
her necklace, pair of earrings, watch and cash,
to be missing.49 While it was proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant took Agnes'
personal things, there was no evidence,
however, that the taking was employed with
the use of force, violation and intimidation.
PENALTIES
As to the imposable penalty, we sustain the
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate
court, with modification as to the penalty for
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with frustrated murder and the
awarding of damages.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention has been correctly complexed by the
RTC with frustrated murder. A complex crime is
committed when a single act constitutes two or
more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing
the other.
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since the
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the
more serious crime, the proper penalty under
Article 26750 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in its
maximum period; thus, the penalty should be
death. However, in light of R.A. 9346, or
the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty, the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of death is, thus, proper and
ineligible for parole.
Likewise, in accordance with current
jurisprudence, we modify the award of
damages, and apply People of the Philippines v.
Richard O. Sarcia51 where we said:
The principal consideration for the award of
damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome and People v. Quiachonis the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heineousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender.
xxxx
26
It should be noted that while the new law
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for
the victim is still Php75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also rationcinates as
follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the
appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts: ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is
awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages
because the victim is assumed to have suffered
moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award
of moral damages even without proof thereof,
x x x.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be
imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following
the rationcination in People v. Victor, the said
award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact
that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared
that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not only
a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity."1avvphi1
The litmus test therefore, in the determination
of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
of the crime committed, which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.52
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January
13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00666, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, insofar as to
sentence appellant Venancio Roxas y Arguelles
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for

the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention with Frustrated Murder, and to
declare him ineligible for parole. Appellant is,
likewise, ordered to pay Agnes Guirindola
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158797 July 29, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, JR. and EMILIANO
ENRIQUEZ, Appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were
convicted of kidnapping by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16, and each
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as
maximum.1 They appealed to the Court of
Appeals which not only affirmed their
convictions but imposed upon each of the
appellants the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.2 The Court of Appeals refrained from
entering judgment and certified the case to us
pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.3
On July 8, 1985, Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and
Emiliano Enriquez were charged with
kidnapping in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
City, Branch 16. The Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January 1985,
in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with the use of
firearm (nickel plated revolver), motor vehicle
(tricycle) and by simulating public authority, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, forcibly kidnapped Alexander
Pureza y Mendoza by the point of [a] gun
(revolver) and forcibly loaded said Alexander
M. Pureza to (sic) a yellow colored tricycle
(Hazel) with Plate No. MTC H8242 and brought
somewhere else and detained in an
undisclosed place for more than five (5) days
since the kidnapping took place and up to the
present time could not be located, with the
aggravating circumstances of the use of a
firearm, force, motor vehicle and simulation of
public authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge during
arraignment. Trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence shows that at about
6:50 p.m. of January 24, 1985, Rogelio Andico,
Edwin Pugay, Esmi Saquilayan, and twenty-one-
year old Alexander Pureza were conversing in
front of the Barangay Hall of Silangan, Rosario,
Cavite. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., alias
"Bonggo," who was dressed in military fatigue
pants, camouflage jacket, brown hat, and
wearing dark glasses, arrived on board a tricycle
driven by appellant Emiliano Enriquez, alias
"Emil Tate." After Bonggo alighted, Emil parked
the tricycle about ten (10) meters away from
the group. Bonggo then pulled out a .38 caliber
revolver from his jacket and warned the group,
"Huwag kayong tatakbo, awtoridad ako." He
singled out Alexander Pureza, poked his gun at
him and ordered him, "Sama ka sa ‘kin." He
dragged Alexander to the tricycle, and forced
him to board the same. The tricycle sped off.
Alexander Pureza was never seen again or
heard from since then.
Rogelio Andico, who was left behind after his
companions scampered away, hurried to
Alexander’s house and informed his parents
about the incident. At about midnight of the
same day, Rogelio gave his statement5 to the
police upon the advice of his uncle, Atty.
Ernesto Andico, the Vice-Mayor of Rosario,
Cavite. Rogelio executed two other statements
on January 25 and 29, 1985. 6
Feliciano Castro, a resident of Rosario, Cavite,
corroborated Rogelio’s testimony. He testified
that at about 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. of January 24,
1985, he was waiting for a ride when he saw
Alexander Pureza being pushed by appellant
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. into a waiting tricycle
driven by appellant Emiliano
Enriquez.7 Alexander was struggling to free
himself. Feliciano did not do anything to help or
tell anyone what he witnessed. He feared for
his life because Bonggo was the grandson of
then Mayor Calixto Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite.
At that time, many people just disappear or get
killed in Rosario. It was only in July 1987 when
Mayor Calixto Enriquez was no longer mayor
that he revealed the above information to P/Lt.
Col. Rogelio Pureza, the victim’s father.
The two appellants had a different story to tell.
They denied any involvement in the kidnapping
and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. testified that he was in
Bulan, Sorsogon from January 21 to 24, 1985
with his live-in partner visiting her sick father.
He left Sorsogon in the morning of January 24
and arrived at Rosario, Cavite at about 11:00
p.m. to midnight of the same day. He went to
sleep immediately upon arrival, and was
awakened at 1:00 a.m. when the police picked
him up for investigation.
Appellant Emiliano Enriquez claimed that he
did not leave his house during the night in
question as he was taking care of his child. He
also alleged that his tricycle had a broken shock
absorber.
In addition, appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr.
ascribed improper motive on the part of
prosecution witnesses Andico and Castro. He
alleged that Rogelio Andico testified against
him because he caused the arrest of Rogelio’s
uncle, Antonio Andico, known as the "king
pusher" of Rosario, Cavite. He also charged that
Feliciano Castro testified against him because
Castro is a trusted employee and bodyguard of
Jose Abutan, the uncle of Col. Pureza. He
further alleged that Col. Pureza filed the case at
bar against him in retaliation for having been
implicated in the case involving the killing of his
(Elpidio’s) father.
27
After trial, appellants were found guilty as
charged and meted indeterminate prison
terms, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. alias
Bonggo and Emiliano Enriquez alias Tate
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping as defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
consisting of seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim ₱50,000.00. (underlining supplied)8
Appellants elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. As aforestated, the
appellate court did not apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law but imposed
upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated May 28, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16
finding herein accused-appellants Elpidio
Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in that We hereby sentence them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let this case be certified and the
entire records hereof elevated to the Supreme
Court for review pursuant to Sec. 13 (2), Rule
124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.9 (emphasis supplied)
Appellants state a lone assignment of error in
their Appellant’s Brief, viz: that the lower court
gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
despite the insufficiency of the evidence. More
specifically, appellants assail the credibility of
prosecution witness Rogelio Andico because he
did not give his eyewitness account of the
alleged kidnapping in one sworn statement

only but executed two supplemental
statements as well. They allege that the
execution of three statements to the police
shows that Andico was a coached witness. They
argue that Andico’s excuse for the piecemeal
testimony, i.e., he was nervous and confused at
the time he gave his first statement to the
police, is not worthy of belief considering that
he gave his statement to Col. Pureza’s men.
Appellants likewise contend that prosecution
witness Feliciano Castro does not deserve
credence because it took him two (2) years to
report the incident which is counter to the
natural tendency of a person who witnessed a
crime to report the same at the earliest possible
opportunity.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We hold that the execution of not one but three
statements to the police does not necessarily
render prosecution witness Andico incredible.
Andico testified in court and was cross-
examined by counsel for appellants. Andico
testified in a clear and straightforward manner
detailing how Alexander Pureza was taken at
gunpoint and spirited away by appellants on
the night of January 24, 1985, never to be seen
or heard from again. His testimony was given
credence both by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals. We find no reason to disturb their
calibration of the credibility of Andico’s
testimony.
To be sure, the first statement, by itself,
executed by Andico at midnight of January 24,
1985 sufficiently proved the elements of the
crime of kidnapping charged against the
appellants. In this statement,10 Andico
categorically narrated how his friend Alexander
Pureza, a private citizen, was taken at gunpoint
by appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., who did not
have authority to do so, with the connivance
and participation of a tricycle driver. The victim
was never seen or heard from again. In his
second statement executed on January 25,
1985,11 Andico merely added that appellant
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., aside from being dressed
in military-like clothes, likewise introduced
himself to them as someone in authority. This
addition is a superfluity for the purpose of
proving the crime of kidnapping against the
appellant. It is undisputed that at the time the
Information was filed on July 8, 1985,12 the
victim had been missing for more than five (5)
months, more than the five (5) days’
deprivation of liberty required under the
former Art. 26713of the Revised Penal Code.
Alexander Pureza has not been seen again or
heard from since his abduction on January 24,
1985. The former Art. 267 mentioned four
circumstances for the crime of kidnapping to be
committed,14but they need not be present
simultaneously as the presence of just one
circumstance is enough to establish the
crime.15 Hence, the added circumstance of
simulation of public authority alleged in
Andico’s second sworn statement was
unnecessary. Examining the third supplemental
sworn statement,16 Andico merely supplied the
name of the tricycle driver whom he saw but
did not immediately recognize. This is not fatal
as there is the testimony of Feliciano Castro
who identified appellant Emiliano Enriquez as
the tricycle driver to corroborate Andico’s
account. Although Castro reported the incident
only two (2) years after the incident, his reason
for not reporting the same immediately, i.e.,
fear for his life, is reasonable considering that
one of the appellants is the grandson of the
incumbent mayor. His initial reluctance is not
unusual and is a matter of judicial notice.17
Appellants’ attempt to discredit Andico by
imputing improper motive upon him for
testifying in the case, i.e., that Andico testified
to avenge his "Uncle" Antonio Andico who was
apprehended by Narcom agents at the
instigation of appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr.,
cannot succeed. For one, the exact relationship
between Rogelio and Antonio Andico was not
proved. The uncle-nephew relationship was
merely speculated from the fact that Rogelio
called Erning Andico, the brother of Antonio, as
"mama" or uncle.18 Appellant Elpidio Enriquez,
Jr., admitted that he does not know the exact
relationship between Rogelio and Antonio
Andico.19 But even if Antonio was Rogelio’s
uncle, their relationship is not enough reason
for Rogelio to avenge Antonio’s apprehension.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe
that the natural interest of Rogelio, who is a
friend of the victim, in securing the conviction
of the guilty would deter him from implicating
a person other than the true culprit.20 Col.
Pureza’s alleged motive for filing this case
against appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., i.e., Col.
Pureza filed this case in retaliation for having
been implicated in the case involving the killing
of Elpidio’s father, is equally tenuous. The facts
show that Col. Pureza had been cleared of any
involvement in the killing of Elpidio’s father by
the Investigating Panel of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office.21 A contrario, it is Elpidio who
may have the reason to retaliate at Col. Pureza
who walked away from the charge.
We join the lower courts in rejecting appellants’
alibi. In the case of Elpidio, we find it incredible
that he did not inform the police about his alibi
when he was brought in for questioning just
hours after he came back from Bulan,
Sorsogon. Neither did his mother, who
followed him to the police station, nor his live-
in partner, who was allegedly his companion in
Sorsogon, say anything to the police to defend
him. Their silence was deafening. It was almost
a month later or only on February 20, 1985 that
Elpidio foisted the defense of alibi in his
counter-affidavit22 submitted during the
preliminary investigation of the case. We have
repeatedly ruled that alibi is an inherently weak
defense because it is easy to fabricate and is
highly unreliable,23 more so when corroborated
only by relatives and friends.24It cannot stand
against the positive identification of appellant
by a credible witness to the crime.25 On the
other hand, appellant Emiliano alleged that he
was in his house taking care of his child when
the kidnapping took place, and that his tricycle,
which was allegedly used in the crime, had a
broken shock absorber. However, he admitted
that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes
away from the place of the incident.26 He also
conceded that a vehicle can run even without a
broken shock absorber, although he qualified
that his tricycle’s shock absorber was seriously
broken.27 We reiterate the age old rule that for
alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.28 In the case at
28
bar, appellant Emiliano failed to show that it
was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission considering that his house was a
mere ten (10) minutes’ drive away from
the barangay hall where the victim was
abducted.
In sum, we find that the guilt of appellants has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. All the elements of the crime of
kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private
individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission
of the offense, any of the four circumstances
mentioned in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal
Code are present,29 have been proven through
the eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico,
corroborated by Feliciano Castro, who have not
been shown to have any improver motive in
testifying in this case.
Finally, we come to the correctness of the
penalty. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
Congress provides for it.30 Republic Act No.
765931 which classified kidnapping as a heinous
crime punishable by death took effect on
December 31, 1993. The crime at bar was
committed in 1985. We have ruled that R.A. No.
7659 cannot be applied to a crime that
transpired prior to its effectivity under the
principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws
which are unfavorable to the
accused.32Consequently, reclusion perpetua is
the only penalty that can be imposed against
the appellants. As correctly argued by the
Solicitor General, Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
cannot be applied in the case of appellants
considering the proscription in Sec. 2
thereof, viz:
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment x x x x
Indeed, in People v. Asturias,33 Serrano v.
Court of Appeals,34 People v.

Lampaza35 and People v. Tan,36 to name a few
cases, we in effect equated the penalty
of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life-
imprisonment for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that
the latter law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with the said
penalty. Consequently, we affirm the Court of
Appeals in not applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants
the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23589
convicting Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano
Enriquez of the crime of kidnapping.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121519 October 30, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY, accused-
appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with
the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor in an information filed by 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J.
Silverio, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of April 1989, in
Kalookan. City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the owners,
proprietors, managers and administrators of Sir
John Clinic and as such said accused had the
custody of Arabella Sombong, a minor,
conspiring together and mutually helping one
another and with deliberate intent to deprive
the parents of the child of her custody, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail to restore the custody of said Arabella
Sombong to her parents by giving said custody
of subject minor to another person without the
knowledge and consent of her parents.
Contrary to Law.1
Both accused were arrested, and then
arraigned on October 27, 1992 when they
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 123, the decretal portion
of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused
Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping a minor and failure to return the
same as defined and penalized by Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered to
pay the private complainant the sum of
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages caused
by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained
coupled by the fact that up to this date she
could not determine the whereabouts of her
child Arabella Sombong.
SO ORDERED.2
The accused now interpose this appeal alleging
the ensuing assignment of errors, viz:
I she decided to leave her child to the care of the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANTS "DELIBERATELY FAILED TO
RESTORE THE CHILD TO HER MOTHER," AND
CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND SENTENCING THEM
TO "RECLUSION PERPETUA";
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 277 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN "PEOPLE vs.
GUTIERREZ," 197 SCRA 569; and
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
"COMPLAINANT THE SUM OF P100,000.00 BY
WAY OF MORAL, DAMAGES."3
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case
are as follows:
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna
Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella,
then only seven (7) months old, for treatment
to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic
located at No. 121 First Avenue, Grace Park,
Kalookan City which was owned and operated
by the accused-appellants. Arabella was
diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and
diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to
confine the child at the clinic for speedy
recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella
was well and was ready to be discharged but
complainant was not around to take her home.
A week later, complainant came back but did
not have enough money to pay the hospital bill
in the amount of P300.00. Complainant
likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the
child at home as she was working. She then
inquired about the rate of the nursery and upon
being told that the same was P50.00 per day,
clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was
transferred from the ward to the nursery. 4
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and
accumulate. It was at this time that accused-
appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant
that she hire a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the
daily nursery fee of P50.00. Complainant
agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was
then again transferred from the nursery to the
extension of the clinic which served as
residence for the hospital staff.5
From then on, nothing was heard of the
complainant. She neither visited her child nor
called to inquire about her whereabouts. Her
estranged husband came to the clinic once but
did not get the child. Efforts to get in touch with
29
the complainant were unsuccessful as she left
no address or telephone number where she can
be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty
to notify the barangay captain of the child's
abandonment.6 Eventually, the hospital staff
took turns in taking care of Arabella.7
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella
was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe
Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested
during a hospital staff conference that Arabella
be entrusted to a guardian who could give the
child the love and affection, personal attention
and caring she badly needed as she was thin
and sickly. The suggestion was favorably
considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child
to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.8
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the
daughter she abandoned some five (5) years
back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered,
she filed a petition for habeas corpus against
accused-appellants with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Said petition was
however denied due course and was summarily
dismissed without prejudice on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention
having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed
against accused-appellants.
Complainant likewise filed an administrative
case for dishonorable conduct against accused-
appellant Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of
Medicine of the Professional Regulation
Commission. This case was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, this time against the
alleged guardians of her daughter, namely,
Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On
January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision granting the petition and ordering the
guardians to immediately deliver the person of
Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the
court having found Cristina to be the
complainant's child. On appeal to the Court of

Appeals, however, said decision was reversed
on the ground that the guardians were not
unlawfully withholding from the complainant
the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that
Cristina and complainant's daughter are not
one and the same person. On January 31, 1996,
this Court in Sombong v. Court of
Appeals9 affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision.
In this appeal, accused-appellants would want
us to take a second look and resolve the issue
of whether or not they are guilty of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor. Accused-
appellants of course contend that they are not
guilty and the Solicitor General agrees. In its
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee's
Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
recommends their acquittal.
We agree.
As we have mentioned above, this Court
in Sombong v. Court of
Appeals10 affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing the trial court's ruling that
complainant has rightful custody over the child,
Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being
identical with complainant's daughter,
Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:
Petitioner does not have the right of custody
over the minor Cristina because, by the
evidence disclosed before, the court a quo,
Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner's
daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced
before the trial court does not warrant the
conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
Cristina.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the testimonial and
circumstantial proof establishes the individual
and separate existence of petitioner's child,
Arabella, from that of private respondents'
foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is
petitioner's own witness, testified in court that,
together with Arabella, there were several
babies left in the clinic and so she could not be
certain whether it was Arabella or some other
baby that was given to private respondents.
Petitioner's own evidence shows that, after the
confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987,
she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when
she visited the clinic. This corroborates the
testimony of petitioner's own witness, Dra. Ty,
that Arabella was physically confined in the
clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This
testimony tallies with her assertion in her
counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was
in the custody of the hospital until April, 1989.
All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering
declaration of private respondents that they
obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and
had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church
on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that
Cristina is not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros,
herself a mother and the ponente of the herein
assailed decision, set the case for hearing on
August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of
observing petitioner's demeanor towards the
minor Cristina. She made the following
personal but relevant manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself
of four children, wanted to see how petitioner
as an alleged mother of a missing child
supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would
react on seeing again her long lost child. The
petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of
this case late, and she walked inside the
courtroom looking for a seat without even
stopping at her alleged daughter's seat;
without even casting a glance on said child, and
without even that tearful embrace which
characterizes the reunion of a loving mother
with her missing dear child. Throughout the
proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed
no signs of endearment and affection expected
of a mother who had been deprived of the
embrace of her little child for many years. The
conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that
petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by
aforestated observation. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since we hold that petitioner has not been
established by evidence to be entitled to the
custody of the minor Cristina on account of
mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private
respondents are unlawfully withholding from
petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At
this juncture, we need not inquire into the
validity of the mode by which private
respondents acquired custodial rights over the
minor, Cristina.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well
as the evidence adduced in this case accused-
appellants must perforce be acquitted of the
crime charged, there being no reason to hold
them liable for failing to return one Cristina
Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and
established to be complainant's daughter,
Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we
were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and
Arabella Sombong as one and the same person,
still, the instant criminal case against the
accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure
to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements
must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been
entrusted with the custody of the minor, and
(b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said
minor to his parents or guardians. The essential
element herein is that the offender is entrusted
with the custody of the minor but what is
actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the
minor, as the title of the article seems to
indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore
the latter to his parents or guardians.11 Said
failure or refusal, however, must not only be
deliberate but must also be persistent as to
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child
to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain
custody.12 The key word therefore of this
element is deliberate and Black's Law
Dictionary defines deliberate as:
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully
considered; not sudden or rash; circumspect;
30
slow in determining. Willful rather than merely
intentional. Formed, arrived at, or determined
upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of considerations, as a deliberate
judgment or plan. Carried on coolly and
steadily, especially according to a preconceived
design; given to weighing facts and arguments
with a view to a choice or decision; careful in
considering the consequences of a step; slow in
action; unhurried; characterized by reflection;
dispassionate; not rash. People v. Thomas, 25
Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.
By the use of this word, in describing a crime,
the idea is conveyed that the perpetrator
weighs the motives for the act and its
consequences, the nature of the crime, or other
things connected with his intentions, with a
view to a decision thereon; that he carefully
considers all these, and that the act is not
suddenly committed. It implies that the
perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of
such mental powers as are called into use by
deliberation and the consideration and
weighing of motives and consequences.13
Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in
Corpus Juris Secundum as:
DELIBERATE.
As a Verb
The word is derived from two Latin words
which mean literally "concerning" and "to
weigh;" it implies the possession of a mind
capable of conceiving a purpose to act, and the
exercise of such mental powers as are called
into use by the consideration and weighing of
the motives and the consequences of the act;
and has been defined as meaning to consider,
reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments
for and against a proposed course of action; to
consider and examine the reasons for and
against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect
upon, or weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a
view to make a choice; to weigh the motives for
an act and its consequences, with a view to a
decision thereon.
As an Adjective

The word, used adjectively, implies action after
thought and reflection, and relates to the end
proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind
capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based
upon an intention accompanied by such
circumstances as evidence a mind fully
conscious of its own purpose and design. It has
been defined as meaning carefully considered;
circumspect; entered upon after deliberation
and with fixed purpose, formed after careful
consideration, and fully or carefully considering
the nature or consequences of an act or
measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or
rash, carefully considering the probable
consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in
determining; weighing facts and arguments
with a view to a choice of decision; well-
advised.
Under some circumstances, it has been held
synonymous with, or equivalent to,
"intentional," "premeditated," and "willful."
Under other circumstances, however, it has
been compared with, or distinguished from,
"premeditated," "sudden," and "willful."14
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the
article must imply something more than mere
negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally
and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was
no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of
the accused-appellants to restore the custody
of the complainant's child to her. When the
accused-appellants learned that complainant
wanted her daughter back after five (5) long
years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried
their best to help herein complainant find the
child as the latter was no longer under the
clinic's care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not
have the address of Arabella's guardians but as
soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga
who was already working abroad, she
personally went to the guardians' residence
and informed them that herein complainant
wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as
follows:
Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when
you placed the child under the (sic)
guardianship, you are (sic) aware that the
natural mother will get back the child, why did
you not return the minor to the natural
mother?
A: During that time mam, the resident physician
who will (sic) discharged the baby was not
present because she was abroad.
Q: But then madam witness, are you aware
where the child was and to whom it was given?
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam,
before the resident physician left for abroad so,
I asked the PAO to give me one month to have
(sic) a long distance call to this doctor and asked
her for the whereabout(s) of the child.
Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period
by the Officer of the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day
period?
A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain
and she told me the exact address of the
guardian, mam.
Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact
address of the guardian, did you informed (sic)
the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
ATTY. WARD:
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?
A: I was the one who went to the address to be
sure that the child was really there, mam.
Q: And did you see the child?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did you do with the child?
A: I just tell (sic) the child, "Ay ang laki mo na
pala," I just told the child like that and I've (sic)
talked also to the guardian during that time,
mam.
Q: And what did you tell the guardian?
A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother
was claiming for the child and that we should
talked (sic) with each other at the PAO for the
decision, mam.
Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO's
Office (sic)?
A: No mam, she did not appear.
Q: Why?
A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to
contact a lawyer but for (sic) several days, she
did not respond anymore, mam. 15
When the guardians refused to return the child,
accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which conducted a conference among the
parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the
custody of the minor remained with the
guardians. This fact is evident from the
following testimony, thus:
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you
located the whereabouts of the child sometime
later, what steps did you take up (sic) after you
found the child?
A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal
agreement between the supposed to be
guardianship was only a plain guardianship and
not as an adoption, sir.
Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found
the child, why did you go to the NBI?
A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to
surrender the child to the PAO's Office (sic),
that is why I asked their help, sir. 16
...
Q: Now, when you informed the present
custodian that the natural mother is now
claiming the child, why were you not able to get
the minor?
A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the
help of the NBI to have the child surrender (sic),
mam.
31
ATTY. WARD:
Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the
assistance of the NBI?
A: They were the ones who asked the guardian
to surrender the child, mam.
Q: You stated a while ago that there was no
written agreement between you or your
hospital and the guardian of the minor, is that
correct?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the
guardian did (sic) not follow you or obey you
when you want (sic) to get back the child?
A: I don't know of any reason, mam. 17
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to
help the complainant in finding the child clearly
negate the finding that there was a deliberate
refusal or failure on their part to restore the
child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting
in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants'
conduct from the moment the child was left in
the clinic's care up to the time the child was
given up for guardianship was motivated by
nothing more than an earnest desire to help the
child and a high regard for her welfare and well-
being.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellants
VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged and are
ordered to be released immediately unless they
are being detained for other lawful causes.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.