G.R. No.

L-630 November 15, 1947 at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall
then proceed to decide that question.
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Alexander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot
acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
Constitution may acquire residential land. lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be
judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
the measure and the limit of the grant.
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this
case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of
question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with
different considerations now to be stated. reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it
means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber
and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed
Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members
majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the
of the legal profession.
Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of
the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of
residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the
obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to
and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from
be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions
decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39
General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it
is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as
constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to
be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a
consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new
field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal
circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question
in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not
may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress
orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be
contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or
remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the
urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
Constitution.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and
not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted,
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of

1
the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and
that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or
mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members
of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such
words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and
the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning.
(11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson
vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given
the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the
framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal
and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written
Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have
a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to
a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used
in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously
used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation
given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised
a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth
Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may
be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which
are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands"
has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the
Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized
in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of
alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The
fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of
Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute
and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after
the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such
kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And,
again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain
suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and
under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and
the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of
sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another
legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a
query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the
Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of
their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the
adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore,
acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the
leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural
public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral
lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or
not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick
and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for
agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or
not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may
be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it
as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the
Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was
firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive —
have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber,
and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
2
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly
buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host
of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's
Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was
leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the
under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands,
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the
said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real
same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under
estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land
preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of
under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is
natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall
nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?"
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated allowed to own a pieace of land.
above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act
of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain
No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which
shall have become private residential lands.
granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land"
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The
under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their
implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify
charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the
concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word
laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
"agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest
lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other
therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and
hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above
while the same are in force but not thereafter.
indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands
that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft
can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public
one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft. formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos,
or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by
royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be

3
 encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the
acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or
Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said
pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the
provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality
thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or
may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent
is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private
courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by
judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage.
years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands
(Public Land Act, No. 2874.) that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of
aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional
prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these
that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative
two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express
measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire
private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude
aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this
is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible
to acquire.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any
other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public G.R. No. L-60078 October 3, 1987
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIRCULO BANTAYANO FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the Petitioner seeks to review the decision of the Court. of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67236-R, 1 affirming the
provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said decision of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 2 its dispositive portion reading as follows:
lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise,
such property shall revert to the Government. WHEREFORE, finding the application for registration well grounded, the Court hereby
declare (s) the applicant, CIRCULO BANTAYANO FOUNDATION, INC., a corporation
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only composed of Filipino citizens duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken with principal place of business at Cebu City as the owner of the parcel (and) (sic) of land
out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the described on plan Psu-07-01000195 and its corresponding technical description (see
Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right exhibit "O" pages 21 to 23 of the record). Once this decision becomes final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the adjudicate.

4
 SO ORDERED. In affirming the trial court's decision the Court of Appeals found that the application by respondent-
corporation is not actually for the grant of land of the public domain but for the confirmation of an
imperfect title acquired through long years of possession through the predecessors-in-interest of applicant
In its application for registration before the trial court, respondent Circulo Bantayano Foundation, Inc.
corporation. The appellee court in ruling thus considered the fact that oppositor Republic of the Philippines
alleged that it is the owner in fee simple or thru a possessory information title of a parcel of land including
failed to present any evidence whatsoever during the trial showing that the property applied for is land of
the buildings and improvements thereon situated at Poblacion Bantayan, Cebu, described and bounded on
the public domain as against the undisputed evidence presented by applicant. The evidence consisted of
plan Psu-01000195, containing an area of 108,711 square meters thru purchase on December 5, 1974
the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses for applicant declaring that the property had been in the
from the heirs (represented by Anunciacion Escario) of the late Pedro Escario, Sr. who in turn inherited said
continuous and open possession of their predecessors-in-interest for more than 39 years immediately
land from his father Margarita; that the said land is assessed for taxation purposes of P17,850.00 for the
preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title in the concept of owners.
year 1978; that 'The same is occupied and possessed openly, continuously, notoriously and peacefully in
the concept of owners for more than 40 years by applicant and its predecessors-in-interest.
The sole issue raised before Us by the petitioner is whether or not private respondent is qualified
under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitutions to acquire and subsequently register in its name the
Petitioner opposed the application alleging that private respondent did not have title in fee simple or
disputed lot.
imperfect title to the land and it was disqualified under the 1973 Constitution, being a corporation, to own
lands of the public domain. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner filed its opposition but never appeared at
the trial nor was any evidence presented in support of its opposition. On the other hand, applicant It is true that under both the 1973 and the 1987 Constitution, 3 a private corporation (even if a domestic
corporation presented in court Tax Declarations Nos. 02330, 11891, 016991, 018116 and 01268 in the one) cannot acquire (and therefore cannot register) lands of the public domain, but in the present case the
name of the previous owner Pedro Escario, Sr. land involved, at the time it was acquired by the corporation in 1974, was no longer part of the public
domain; long years of exclusive continuous, and adverse possession of the same by its predecessors-in-
interest had given ownership thereof ipso jure to said predecessors, enabling the latter to convey title to
The trial court found that the applicant's possession had always been peaceful, open, public, continuous,
said corporation. True, the Corporation's acquisition was in 1974, or after the 1973 was already in effect.
notorious and in the concept of absolute owner thereof and including their predecessors-in-interest's
But then as of that time, the land was no longer public land, It was private land.
possession extended for more than thirty (30) years; that the applicant herein had been paying regularly
the taxes due on the property having declared the land for taxation purposes in its name; that there are no
traversing roads (either national or provincial) nor any river or creek crossing the land applied for, and that As found by the Court of Appeals —
the produce of the land has been solely enjoyed by said applicant.
The testimony of the two witnesses for applicant-appellee clearly proves that. the
After due trial, the court rendered its decision declaring the applicant Circulo Bantayano Foundation, Inc. a property has been in the possession of their predecessor in interest 4 that for at least for
corporation composed of Filipino citizens duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with three generations or for more than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of
principal place of business at Cebu City as the owner of the parcel of land described on plan Psu-07-01- application for confirmations of title. (Decision, pp. 3-4, pp. 49-50 Rollo)
000195 and its corresponding technical description, and ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree
of registration in favor of applicant once the decision becomes final.
Thus, the prohibitions referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions can no longer apply (The Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 73002, December 29, 1986, reversing Meralco v. Castro-
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799, and Republic v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875).
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPLICANT- APPELLEE IS A decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
PRIVATE CORPORATION DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION TO
HOLD ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
SO ORDERED.

II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF LAND APPLIED
G.R. No. 127969 June 25, 1999
FOR IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NOT SUBJECT TO PRIVATE APPROPRIATION.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,

III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANT- APPELLEE AND ITS
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE M. ESTRADA and THE REGISTER OF
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN PEACEFUL, OPEN, PUBLIC, CONTINUOUS,
DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, respondents.
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER OF THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED FOR .MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 39816 which
has affirmed the judgment and orders of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") or Cavite (Branch 20) in LRC
IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING AND/OR DENYING THE APPLICANT'S
Case No. 1077-95, entitled. In Re: "Petition for Reconstitution of Los/Burned Original Copy of Transfer
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AND IN NOT DECLARING THE LAND IN QUESTION AS
Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No. 11204.
PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision, gave a brief factual and case settings of the controversy.

5
 On March 28, 1995, Jose M. Estrada, the private respondent in this case and petitioner in
LRC Case No. 1077-95 filed with the Regional Trial Court Branch 20, Imus, Cavite the
reconstitution of lost/burned original copies of certificate of titles nos. T-11203 and T-
11204 and for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of the same certificates.
These were allegedly lost or destroyed when the capitol building was burned.
On April 29, 1995, RTC Branch 20 of Imus Cavite set the hearing of the petition on June
19, 1995 at 9:00 A.M. requiring all interested parties to appear and show cause, if any,
why the petition be not granted. The order required its publication in the Official Gazette
for two successive issues with the further directive that copies be furnished the adjoining
owners, Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration authority, and the Register of
Deeds. It was likewise required that the petitioner post copies of the order at the Bulletin
Board of the Court, at the main entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building, Trece Martirez
City and at the Municipal Building of Dasmariñas, Cavite, as well as where the properties
is located.
There being no opposition to the petition, petitioner was allowed to adduce his evidence
in the presence of the public prosecutor who had been deputized by the Solicitor General
to represent him for the Republic of the Philippines.
Florinda Estrada, a 41-year old daughter of the petitioner who was duly authorized to
represent her sickly father, introduced oral and testimonial evidence. The lost/burned
certificate of titles were presented in court as well as the tax declarations in the name of
petitioner. The official receipts of tax payments were likewise introduced. A copy of the
Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1957 in favor of petitioner was submitted by him to the
court. After Florinda Estrada's testimonial evidence on the possession of her father of the
land and its not being mortgaged or encumbered, Francisco Cuenca, owner of all the
adjoining lots offered no objection to the petition. The public prosecutor Zenaida de
Castro cross-examined the petitioner's witnesses. 1
On 20 June 1995, the trial court granted the petition for reconstitution; thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to cause the reconstitution of the lost/burned original of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 11203 and 11204 in the name of Jose Estrada upon payment of
proper fees.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Register of Deeds, the Solicitor General, the Land
Registration Authority and to petitioner. 2
On 24 July 1995, private respondent filed a motion to cite the Registrar of Deeds of Cavite for contempt
alleging, among other things —
3. That in spite of the finality of the judgment, and over the pleas of petitioner's [private
respondent's] representative, the Register of Deeds of Cavite has refused and continues
to refuse to effect the reconstitution, thereby depriving the petitioner [private
respondent] of the use of his Transfer Certificate of Title.
4. That the Register of Deeds of Cavite insists on referring the matter first to the Land
Registration Authority, which is uncalled for, without factual and legal basis, an exercise
in futility, considering that the LRA was very much aware of the proceedings and did not
oppose the petition, and is aware of the judgment and did not appeal either.
5. That the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect the reconstitution is
punishable contempt under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
6. That under Section 7 of the same Rule, the Register of Deeds of Cavite may be
imprisoned until he effect the reconstitution. 3
Atty. Alejandro Villanueva, the then incumbent Registrar of Deeds of Cavite, proffered his explanation
asseverating —
That the Register of Deeds did not give due course to the registration of the above
decision for reconstitution in view of the doubt entertained by the Register of Deeds as to
the authenticity and genuiness of the alleged owner's duplicate copy of TCT Nos T-11203
and T-11204 which serve as basis for reconstitution of the original copy thereof when
presented and suggested that the same be subjected to government agencies like the
NBI to determine their genuiness.
That the tax declarations presented to the court to support the petition for reconstitution
and marked Exhibits K and K-1 were not genuine as per Certification dated July 27,1995
issued by the Assistant Provincial Assessor which is hereto attached as Annex "A";
That the alleged certification issued by the Register of Deeds that TCT Nos. T-11203 and
T-11204 were among those burned and marked as Exhibit J is also not genuine.
That Lot 5766 as allegedly covered by TCT Nos. T-11203 and T-11204, is already covered
by a certificate of title issued on November; 6 1967 namely TCT No. T-26877 in the name
of PILAR DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., Xerox copy hereto attached as Annex "B";
That as held by the Supreme Court in RP vs. C.T. of APP. et al 1-46626 Dec. 27, 1979,
(Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 1982 Ed. P-09) — THUS, where a certificate
of title covering a parcel of land was reconstituted judicially, and it was found later that
there existed earlier a certificate of title covering the same property in the name of
another person, it was held that the existence of such prior title ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in said proceeding as to the
alleged ownership under the reconstituted title cannot be given any credence. That kind
of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud FOISTED on the courts of justice.
That this explanation is being submitted for the appraisal of the Honorable Court with a
prayer that the Register of Deeds be not cited for contempt of Court.
In an Order, dated 03 August 1995, Atty. Villanueva was ordered as incarcerated until such times he would
have complied with the judgment of the RTC. A warrant for his arrest was issued, and a bond of
P100,000.00 for his provisional liberty was fixed which he posted.
Shortly after the complete records of LRC No. 1077-95, in connection with the contempt charge against
him, were elevated to the appellate court for review, Atty. Villanueva assailants was slain by unidentified
assailants in his residence in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
6
On 27 December 1995, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Cavite caused the reconstitution of the Originals of
TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 Pursuant to the 22nd December 1995 order of the RTC.
On 20 February 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. The petition for
annulment was anchored on the following grounds; to wit:
(a) That the two (2) reconstituted titles are patent nullity as they were
reconstituted pursuant to a void decision and secured thru fraud and
misrepresentation;
(b) that the amended order dated 29 April 1995 was not published;
(c) that the Solicitor General was not notified about the hearing on the
case; and
(d) that the Land Registration Authority was not furnished a copy of the
decision,
The appellate court, in its now assailed decision of 27 January 1997, dismissed the petition for annulment
and affirmed the judgment and orders of the trial court. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the Republic of the
Philippines filed the instant petition for review, contending that —
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE RECONSTITUTION CASE.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VOID DECISION. 5
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines would here insist that the RTC erroneously proceeded to take
cognizance of petition notwithstanding the existence of several jurisdictional defects, among which included
the following shortcomings, namely, that —
1. The amended order advancing the initial hearing of the case from 24 July 1995 to 19
June 1995 was not published.
2. No notice to actual occupants and other interested persons were sent.
3. The owner's duplicate of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 presented by private
respondent to the RTC were fake and of doubtful origin because —
a. The said owner's duplicates are not in the official form.
b. Lot No. 5766 is declared for taxation purposes in the name of Luis
Pujalte from 1940 to 1994.
c. The signature of the Registrar of Deeds Escorastico Cuevas on both
titles are fake.
d. The technical descriptions on subject titles when plotted did not
coincide/conform, with the technical description of Lot 5766.
e. The Alleged registered owner and his Attorney-in-fact are not the
occupants of the parcels of land.
f. The tax declarations in the name of Jose Estrada are fake and
spurious.
4. The existence Of other titles the same property barred the reconstitution proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court.
5. The void judgment reconstitution case was not served on the petitioner.
This Court, in its resolution of 16 April 1997, required respondents to comment on the petition and
forthwith issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining private respondent Jose Estrada from conveying,
encumbering or otherwise dealing with the property, as well as public respondent Registrar of Deeds of
Cavite Province from registering any transaction involving Transfer Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No.
11204, subject matter of the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. 1077-95. In accordance with the
resolution, private respondent Jose Estrada submitted his comment. Following the reply filed by petitioner,
the Court gave due course to the petition. 6
The Court sees merit in the petition.
Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act No. 26, denotes the restoration in the
original form and condition 7 of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the
title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. Among the
conditions explicitly required by the law is publication of the petition twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and its posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. 8 This directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be jurisdictional. In
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court has said:
Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the
trial court two things, namely that: (1) its order giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. 10
So also did the Court hold in Allama vs. Republic, 11
where the Court, again, has stated:
The non-compliance with these requirements provided for under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 26 as regards the notice of hearing is fatal and the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition. 12
7
Private respondent admits that the amended Order has not been published but seeks to justify this failure
by stating that the amended order is simply a verbatim reproduction of the first Order, published in the
Official Gazette on 29 May 1995 and 09 June 1995, and that, therefore, the omission is just a minor lapse.
The Court sees it differently. The flaw is fatal. The legally mandated publication must be complied with in
the manner the law has ordained. The date of the actual hearing is obviously a matter of accurately be
stated in the notice. It is not here substance that must accurately be stated in the notice. It is not here
denied that the volume of the Official Gazette, where the Order of Initial Hearing (for the 24 July 1995
setting) can be found, has officially been released by the National Printing Office only on 14 June 1995 or
merely actual five days from the date of the actual hearing on 19 June 1995. The clear directive of the law
is for the notice to be made "at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing." The Court of Appeals indeed
must have failed to take note that the Exhibits "B," "C," "D" and "D-1" of the alleged jurisdictional
requirements presented before the trial court all pertain to the original order setting the initial hearing on
24 July 1995 and not to the amended order advancing the hearing to 19 June 1995. Concededly, the
amended order has not been published at all.
One other compelling reason that militates against respondent is the evident failure of due compliance with
the requirement of notice to actual occupants, the (although one of the adjoining owners, Mr. Francisco
Cuenca, would appear to have been duly notified of the hearing of 19 June 1995) and all other persons
who may have an interest in the property. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26, provide:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First
Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the
property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that
the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-
owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, a any had been issued,
the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the
property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which
do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of
such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all
persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be
any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case
the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or
3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, [now Commission of Land Registration] or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section,
to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person
named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
Certificate of Title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the
property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and
file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit
proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
The existence of several other titles, including —
1. TCTs No. T-96019 (Lot 5766-B) and T-96011 (Lot 5766-A) both in name of Susan D.
Degollacion.
2. TCT No. T-148177 (Lot No. 5766-B) in the names of spouses Jose del Rosario and
Juliet dela Cruz.
3. TCT No. T-26877 (Lot No. 7524, a portion of Lot 5766) in the name of Pilar
Development Company, Inc. 13
mentioned in the records apparently have not been properly disclosed in the petition for
reconstitution nor in the corresponding notice caused to be given by the court, which notice the
law requires to be sent to all interested parties at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
The registered owners named in these incompatible titles, as so aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, are interested persons within the meaning of the law entitled to notice of the date of
initial hearing on 19 June 1995, the absence of which notice constitutes a jurisdictional defect.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the requirement of actual notice to the occupants and the
owners of the adjoining property under sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 is itself
mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for reconstitution of title and to take the
case on its merits. The non-observance of the requirement invalidates the whole reconstitution
proceedings in the trial court. 14
The Court, given the foregoing circumstances, is constrained to accordingly hold that the decision, dated
20 June 1995, in LRC Case No. 1077-95 decreeing the reconstitution of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 is
null and void. In contemplation of law, the decision is non-existent; in MWSS vs. Sison, 15 the Court had
said:
. . . (A) void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to valid judgment, but may
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought
to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It
has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect,
impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection
to those who seek to enforce. All Proceedings founded on the void judgment are
themselves regarded as invalid. In other words a void judgment is regarded as a nullity,
and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly,
leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. 16
For want of jurisdiction, the trial court must be held to have been without authority to take
cognizance of the litigation and all its aspects. 17
Finally, it may not be amiss for the Court to reiterate its admonition in Ortigas and Company Ltd.
Partnership vs. Velasco 18 that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining petitions for
reconstitution of destroyed or lost certificates of title in order to help avoid litigations and controversies, as
well as discordant supervening events, that may be spawned by a hasty grant of reconstitution.
8
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 27 January
1997, is set aside. The Temporary restraining order issued by this Court in 16 April 1997 is made
permanent and the decision and the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in the reconstitution case
(LRC Case No. 1077-95) are declared null and void for want of jurisdiction. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99331 April 21, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO DE LARA, THE SISTERS OF ST. JOHN DE BAPTIST,
INC., respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to
review and set aside the 21 February 1991 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, 2 affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-1012, and the 7 May 1991 Resolution,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the said Decision and Resolution are
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
On April 25, 1988, the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed an Amended Complaint 3
with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, alleging inter alia, that:
xxx xxx xxx
5. On July 6, 1979, Conrado de Lara filed with the then District Land Office in Noveleta,
Cavite, Free Patent Application No. (V-2) 11319 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 4184, (Ap-04-0016) Cad-355, containing an area of 17,266 square meters, located
at Iruhin, Tagaytay City.
6. On May 27, 1981, the then District Land Officer in Noveleta, Cavite approved Conrado
de Lara's Free Patent Application and issued in his favor Free Patent No. 016937.
7. Said Patent No. 016937 was thereafter transmitted to the Register of Deeds in
Tagaytay City, who registered the same and issued the corresponding Original Certificate
of Tile No. Op-578 in the name of Conrado F. de Lara on June 2, 1981.
8. On June 11, 1986, defendant Conrado de Lara conveyed the said property, by way of
a deed of sale with mortgage, in favor of defendant sisters of St. John the Baptist, Inc.
By virtue of the said deed of sale with mortgage, Original Certificate of Title No. Op-578
in the name of defendant Conrado de Lara was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Tagaytay City, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Tile No. P-265 was issued in
favor of defendant Sisters of St. John the Baptist, Inc.
9. On September 8, 1982, Florosa A. Bautista filed an affidavit — complaint (protest)
against the patent and title of Conrado F. de Lara alleging, among others, that she is the
owner-possessor of a partel of land located at Iruhin, Tagaytay City and is identified as
Lot No. 4184, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre; that she had declared the same for taxation
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon since 1937 up to the present; that
Conrado F. de Lara, through stealth, deceit, fraud and unlawful manipulations and in
connivance with some employees of the Bureau of Lands at the District Land Office in
Cavite, was able to secure the issuance of a free patent title covering the said lot; and
that the documents presented by the said Conrado F. de Lara in support of his free
patent application were all fraudulent and a complete misrepresentation of facts.
10. Upon investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it has been ascertained that
Free Patent No. 016937, and its corresponding original certificate of title, were
erroneously and fraudulently issued to Conrado F. de Lara through misrepresentation of
facts by stating in his application that the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by
any other person but is a public land when in truth and in fact said parcel is claimed by
and covered by survey plan Psu-104879 in the name of Roberto Bautista. Furthermore, it
appears that Conrado de Lara made a request to amend the survey claimant of Lot No.
4184 from Conrado Laurel to Conrado de Lara, it does not appear that the, said request
was granted or that the claim of Roberto Bautista was formally dismissed by the Bureau
of Lands.
11. On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Division, in
his memorandum dated October 9, 1986 to the Deputy Minister and Officer-in-Charge,
Bureau of Lands, recommended that proper court action be instituted for the cancellation
of Free Patent No. 016937 and Original Certificate of Title No. Op-578 in the name of
Conrado de Lara. The Deputy Minister and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands
approved the aforesaid recommendation. [Emphasis, supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
On June 21, 1988, Conrado de Lara sent in his Answer. 4
On July 4, 1988, the Sisters of St. John the Baptist, Inc. (Sisters, for brevity) interposed a Motion to
Dismiss 5 on the grounds, among others, that the amended complaint does not state a cause of action, and
"herein defendant-movant is innocent purchaser for value and in good faith and as such it has acquired a
title over the property in question which is perfectly valid and legally unassailable and indefeasible . . . . 6
On July 22, 1988, for failure of the Sisters to pursue the said Motion to Dismiss, Presiding Judge Julieto P.
Tabiolo "dismissed" the same. 7
On August 8, 1988, the Sisters presented a Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which the trial court granted in its
Order 9 dated August 24, 1988, ratiocinating thus:
Jurisprudence is replete with Supreme Court decisions to the effect that actions to cancel
or nullify or to declare void, Certificates of Title which have acquired indefeasibility, (for
the reason that the same were attained or procured through fraud) like the Certificate of
Title of defendant Conrado T. (sic) de Lara, as alleged by the Solicitor General in his
complaint, can only be maintained when the subject property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. Yet, this is the case of defendant Sisters of St. John the
Baptist, Inc. The Court feels that in the hands of the latter, its title over the property in
question is indeafisible (sic), and can no longer be annulled. Hence, an action of this kind
will no longer lie against the said defendant. As against the latter, this case is, therefore,
ordered DISMISSED.
9
On September 2, 1988, petitioner resorted to a Motion for Reconsideration, 10
but the same was denied by
the lower court in its Order 11 dated August 16, 1989, to wit:
In view of the fact that the Certificate of title appears to be clear of any encumbrance or
infirmities as of June 11, 1986 when the Sisters of St. John the Baptist, Inc. purchased
the same in good faith and for value, a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-265 issued
to it is valid and should be given full faith and recognition by the Court and the
government pursuant to Sec. 39 of Act 49.
On the second pending issue which is the Motion to Amend
Complaint 12 dated November 17, 1988 and filed on November 23, 1988 . . ., the same is
hereby DENIED as defendant Sisters of St. John the Baptist, Inc., are fully protected in its
ownership and possession of the property covered by TCT No. T-265, for being a
purchaser in good faith and for value and for the reason likewise, that the amendment
sought by the plaintiff as incorporated in its motion, is similar to the previous amendment
contained in the first amended complaint dated April 12, 1988 . . . .
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's motions are hereby DENIED.
On February 26, 1991, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal appealed from, 13
disposing as
follows:
The setting of the case at bar presents a situation where the original patentee is alleged
to have procured his title through fraud, but said property was subsequently sold to an
apparently innocent purchaser for value as there was no blemish whatsoever on the
certificate of title of the patentee upon which the purchaser has a right to rely upon. We
thus agree with the trial court, that upon 'such circumstances the alleged flawed title —
. . . may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands
of the buyer in good faith and for value . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, plaintiff has not shown any evidence that on June
11, 1986 or prior thereto, it has given sufficient warning to the public
that OCT No. OP-578 in the name of Conrado F. de Lara is highly
questionable by having annotated therein an adverse claim showing
that said title was fraudulently obtained and, therefore, null and
void. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We find that the private respondents are transferees in good faith and
for value of the subject property and that the original acquisition
thereof, although fraudulent, did not affect their own titles. These are
valid against the whole world, including the government. . . .
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing the case against the Sisters of St. John the Baptist,
Inc. is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, 14
the petitioner found its way to this Court via the
present Petition, posing as issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT A FREE PATENT TITLE PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD, AND HENCE,
VOID AB INITIO, MAY BE CANCELLED EVEN IN THE HANDS OF A BUYER WHO CLAIMS TO
BE A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, DATED NOVEMBER 11 (SIC), 1988, WHILE THE CASE
WAS STILL PENDING BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
The Sisters theorize that they are buyers in good faith and for value, stressing that Free Patent No. 016937
and OCT No. OP-578 of Conrado F. de Lara were free from any infirmity, and "since there was nothing in
the title which would indicate the presence of any defect in the issuance thereof and neither was there any
adverse claim over said property registered with the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City or annotated at the
back of the title, nor was there any adverse information whatsoever regarding the authenticity and/or
genuiness (sic) of the vendor's title, the herein defendant-movant acquired the said property in utmost
goodfaith (sic) and for the toovaluable (sic) consideration of two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos, Philippine
Currency. 15
An innocent purchaser for value is "one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time
of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. 16
After a careful study and examination of the pleadings and supporting documents on hand, the court is of
the opinion, and so holds, that the Sisters truly acted in good faith because when they (Sisters) purchased
the land involved, its OCT No. OP-578 was clean and free from any encumbrance. There was no blemish
whatsoever on the said certificate of title of the patentee and vendor, Conrado de Lara, upon which title
the Sisters, as purchasers, had every right to rely.
Petitioner's contention that the vendor, Conrado F. de Lara, acquired his free patent through
misrepresentation and fraudulent means, is untenable, as against the Sisters, for the simple reason that
the petitioner did not cause the annotation on the back of OCT No. OP-578, of the supposed infirmity
thereof. As aptly found by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, plaintiff has not shown any evidence that on June 11, 1986 or prior
thereto, it has given sufficient warning to the public that OCT No. OP-578 in the name of
Conrado F. de Lara is highly questionable by having annotated therein an adverse claim
showing that said title was fraudulently obtained and, therefore, null and void. . . . 17
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the procurement of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title of the vendor, Conrado F. de Lara, was tainted with fraud and misrepresentation, a defective title may
be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. In Gloria
R. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 492 [1997], the Court held:
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would
be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
10
 registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials on the lot in question, which was
title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of completed in 1957.
the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind
On December 16, 1957, Rosa's heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his two (2) children, Fructoso and Paciencia,
the certificate to determine the condition of the property. . . .
executed another deed of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent Santiago Fontanilla.

The Sisters of St. John the Baptists, Inc. being innocent purchasers for value of the registered land litigated
In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter Mila Fontanilla Borillo. They stayed
upon, and as the Amended Complaint at bar states no cause of action against them, the court a quo erred
there until 1981.
not in granting their motion to dismiss. Verily, the averments of subject Amended Complaint do not
warrant further proceedings against the Sisters.
On December 20, 1978, talking advantage of respondents' absence from the country, petitioners Enriquito
and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan for registration 4 of the said parcel
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the Petition is DENIED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
of land in their name.
CV No. 24666 AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124605 June 18, 1999
ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and RAFAELA RASING, respondents.
The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 which
affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan, 2 declaring respondents as the absolute
and lawful owners of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed Fontanilla.
Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto
Rasca and they had a daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna). Jose had a son,
respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land, containing an area of twelve
thousand five hundred eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap, Alaminos,
Pangasinan. 3
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same year, Turner Land
Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that the cost of survey
would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands
approved the survey plan.
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and pursuant to Decree N-176768, the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to petitioners. On January 10,
1980, the title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, an
action for reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T. No. 139. 5
In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla originally owned the land in dispute.
However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property for three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) from
Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn, traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca.
Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey costs in 1921, Turner Land Surveying
Company took the property in question as payment for services. Her father, Alberto Rasca, redeemed the
property from Turner evidenced by a deed of sale, which, however, Amparo could not produce in court.
When her father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the deed covering the transfer of the
property, which Santiago did not return. She said that the property was first declared in Alberto's name for
taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was ceded to her.
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court and in the land
registration case, on June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein
respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and legal owners of the land in question
particularly described and bounded and stated in paragraph two (2) of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and Recover [sic] Original Certificate of Title No.
139 to the plaintiffs;

In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the land to
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
his daughter, Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate property tax thereon.

(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary
On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven hundred pesos (P1,700.00), Rosa sold the
damages;
land to her nephew, respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of absolute sale,
signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered.
(e) And to pay the costs, without pronouncement as to moral damages.

11
 Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of August, 1992
(t/s) Vivencio A. Bantugan
Judge 6
From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents questioned
the court a quo's failure to grant their claim for moral damages. On the other hand, petitioners claimed
that the trial court committed serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law and
jurisprudence.
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the trial court.
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996, 7
the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the appealed decision is supported
by evidence; (2) whether or not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on appeal. 9 However, petitioners make an issue of the
fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided over the proceedings.
"We have ruled in People vs. Rayray, 10 that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself
the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to jettison
his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial
judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not
violate substantive and procedural due process." 11
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and we will
not normally disturb such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to this Court, only
questions of law may be raised. 12 And "for a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them." 13 "To reiterate the
distinction between the two types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 14
Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by Turner Land Surveying Co.
in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or falsity of this claim is
a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession
of the property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their predecessors in interest,
Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and
paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first time in 1939, 15 while respondents began
paying taxes in 1967. 16 They had their residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In
1980, Santiago executed a tenancy agreement 17 with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the taxes
together with his tenant Sixto.1âwphi1.nêt
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the declarant, 18 tax declarations
and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period
sufficient for prescription. 19
Going to the second issue that the appellate court's decision is not supported by law and jurisprudence, we
find this to be vague and without merit as well.
At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later,
Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified laws relative to
registration of property. "Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree." 20 After the
lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law 21 as a valid and legal basis for reopening
and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional omission of a
fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the
facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in
the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. 22
"An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that petitioners
should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged
fraudulent registration of the property." 23 Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from
the issuance of the certificate of title "because registration of real property is considered a "constructive
notice to all persons" and it shall be counted "from the time of such registering, filing or entering." 24
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land sometime after its
registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic fraud
attended the application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the country
and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name.
Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years from the
issuance of the torrens title over the property. 25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
12